

**STRATEGY
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**INTEGRATING VERSES MERGING OF THE
GUARD AND RESERVE: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN DUPLICATE FEDERAL AND
STATE MILITARY RESERVE FORCES**

BY

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**Integrating Verses Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to
Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Reserve Forces**

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Integrating Verses Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Reserve Forces?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 25 February 2002 PAGES: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has always sought to secure for the American people a set of basic objectives: the protection of their lives and personal safety, both at home and abroad, the maintenance of the nation's sovereignty, political freedoms, and independence, with its values, institutions, and territory intact; their material well-being and prosperity.

Never in the history of the United States has the Guard and Reserve played a more vital role in our National Defense. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has increased its reliance on the Guard and Reserve. The increased reliance calls for an extraordinary assessment of the role and the politics of our National Security. There is a call for change in the Guard and Reserve business practices. This paper will mainly focus on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. It will compare and contrast the Guard and Reserve by looking at the roles, missions, life cycle management, and significant contributions to Homeland Security; to include Weapons of Mass Destruction and the roles in Crisis Management and Consequence Management. This paper will address how the Guard and Reserve can best contribute to Homeland Security. It will address how the Guard and Reserve should partner together along with other agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to carry out the mission of Homeland Security. Finally, it will provide the analytical basis and rationale for maintaining two separate federal military reserve forces, along with the Guard's state mission.

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INTEGRATING VERSUS MERGING OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN DUPLICATE FEDERAL AND STATE MILITARY RESERVE FORCES?

BACKGROUND

The United States Army has two sets of essentially duplicative military reserve components, each with its own administrative and logistical system.¹ These reserve component assets, combined with the Active Army reflects three systems. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve comprise a greater percentage of the total Army force and are essential partners in military operations. These operations cover the full spectrum of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy missions from domestic emergency through full scale war. In 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced a major restructuring of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. As a result of the restructuring, combat support along with combat service support was concentrated in the Army Reserve and combat functions were concentrated in the Army National Guard.²

The Guard and Reserve have made increasingly large and more significant contributions to the execution of the National Military Strategy both domestic and abroad and they have become essential enablers in carrying out the business of the National Security Strategy. As the nation's military strategy has evolved, so has the role of the Guard and Reserve. Evolution of the Guard and Reserve and their missions over the past decade has fully integrated both Reserve Component elements into the Total Army concept. Yet there is vigorous debate about how to structure our armed forces which continues to be of importance to our democracy, but threatens the essence of an Army of One.

ROLES/MISSIONS

The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states by the Constitution of the United States under Article 1, Section 8.³ The National Guard has a state and federal role. Although the Guard's primary mission is to serve as a Federal Reserve force, the National Guard has an equally important role in support of the states.⁴ The National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916) expanded the role of the Guard in national defense. Though the Guard remains a state force, a direct result of NDA-1916 was to increase Federal oversight and assistance. NDA-1916 required National Guard units to be organized similar to active army units. It established Federal standards for commissioning officers in the Guard and gave the President authority to mobilize the National Guard in case of war or national emergency.⁵

Typically, the Guard is under the command of the Governor of each state or jurisdiction. In the case of the District of Columbia, a general commands the Guard. The National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C., formulates and administers the programs for training and development.⁶ During peacetime, required training is completed and emergency state duty is performed. However, when the Guard is mobilized in support of a federal mission, it is no longer under state control. The Constitution gives control of the National Guard to the states; therefore, National Guard soldiers are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) when performing state-ordered missions. Each state has its own laws similar to the UCMJ, but the Active Army has no position in enforcing them unless National Guard soldiers are placed in a federal status.

Whereas the National Guard evolved from the tradition of the decentralized colonial or state controlled militia system, the Army Reserve evolved from the reality that a significant portion of the nation's military reserve must be centrally controlled in times of peace and war, similar to the active army, which is controlled by the Federal Government.⁷

The Army Reserve is a three-tiered command consisting of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), and the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). The Chief, Army Reserve, is on the Department of Army staff and also commands the USARC. With exception of the Army Reserve special operations units, most Army Reserve units fall under command and control of a Regional Support Command (RSC) or an Army Reserve Command (ARCOM). The Army Reserve special operations units are under command and control of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.⁸

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARMY

The Army National Guard is a local force that lives and works in the communities in which it would be called upon to support domestic emergencies and plays a more significant role in the National Military Strategy. The Guard provides a trained, capable and cost effective military force, which is able to provide rapid augmentation, reinforcement, and expansion in time of call-up or mobilization. Units of the Guard embrace a force structure of combat, combat support and combat service support. These units play a significant role in the nations defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and counter-drug efforts. They are part of the Department of Defense's overall effort to support local, state and federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of biological, chemical, and/or radiological weapons.

ARNG Contributions to the Total Army




FIGURE 1⁹

ARMY RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARMY

The Army Reserve provides trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in times of war, national emergency or whatever the call may be in support of the National Military Strategy. Like the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve is a local force that comprises 17 percent of the Army's organized units. The Army Reserve provides 26 percent of the total Army's combat support assets and 45 percent of its combat service support assets. The core competencies that the Army Reserve provides allows the Army to focus its resources on preparation for combat operations. Ninety four percent of the Army Reserve units are directly linked to Army war plans. The remaining six percent are primarily command and control elements or part of the Army Reserve's training base.¹⁰




FIGURE 2¹¹

MOBILIZATION

Until the early 1990s, access to the Reserve Components was governed strictly by laws and policies set in place during the Cold War. Accessibility has become increasingly important in recent years because the Services have placed greater reliance on their Reserve Components for both wartime and peacetime needs. Cold War-era laws and policies related to accessibility have been adjusted to ensure that they are sufficiently flexible to meet the national security needs of the post-Cold War world.¹²

Because of high operating and personnel tempo demands on the Active Army, Guard and Reserve personnel are called upon more often and for longer periods of time. Significant to any reserve call-up or mobilization, is how the soldiers can be employed.

When circumstances exceed National Guard capabilities, active and/or reserve forces may be called upon through presidential authorization. National Guard forces may be activated through presidential authorization, thus becoming a federal asset. When the President federalizes a National Guard unit, it is placed under the command and control of a Federal military response headquarters (referred to as Title 10 U.S.C. authority). When this occurs, state and territorial governors lose their authority over their respective Guard forces.

National Guard units operate under the command and control of the Governor and Adjutant General of their respective states (referred to as Title 32 U.S.C. authority). There are several differences in mobilization of soldiers under Title 10 versus Title 32. Each state has laws and regulations regarding deployment of soldiers in a state active duty status. The law drives most of the differences. The advantages of whether to be federalized or remain a State force lie in the intent of the mission.

National Guard soldiers on state duty fall under state laws, are paid according to their respective state rules, and are perceived to have more latitude in completing the mission. For example, in Texas, the state pays according to the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) pay scale, but has a minimum pay amount of \$95 per day plus \$25 per diem. In essence, soldiers called to state duty are considered to be employees of the state. Whereas National Guard soldiers receive higher pay at the lower rank while under state active duty, many could possibly lose this pay advantage long-term because state duty has no federal benefit toward retirement year credit.

One of the missions of the National Guard is to preserve the laws of the state during times of emergency when regular law enforcement assets prove inadequate. It is only when federalized pursuant to an exercise of Presidential authority that the National Guard becomes subject to the limitation of the Posse Comitatus Act. It has been an argument that federalization of the Guard and the use of federal forces (Active Army and Reserve) for a state level emergency would put the force under Posse Comitatus limitations and hampers the mission.

POSSE COMITATUS

"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. 1385

Posse Comitatus has been viewed as a detriment to the use of United States military forces in planning for Homeland Defense. Yet Posse Comitatus today is more of a procedural formality than an actual impediment of the use of military forces in homeland defense. The

Posse Comitatus Act was passed to remove the Army from civilian law enforcement and to return it to its role of defending the borders of the United States. The National Guard, when it is operating in its state status pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S. Code, is not subject to the prohibitions on civilian law enforcement.¹³

Often it has been misconstrued as to what limitations the reserve would be governed by under Posse Comitatus. The federal courts defined what activities were permissible under the Posse Comitatus Act for military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement. The test applied by the courts has been to determine whether the role of military personnel in the law enforcement operation was "passive" or "active". Active participation in civilian law enforcement, such as making arrests is deemed to be a violation of the Act, while taking a passive supporting role is not. Passive support has often taken the form of logistical support to civilian police agencies.¹⁴

In an interview with CNN shortly after the September 11th attack on America, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the way we do business and go about our daily lives is going to change. He indicated that the way we do business would require greater emphasis on homeland defense--and not just military forces, but all the national power that is at our disposal. Secretary Powell emphasized that political, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, financial and military efforts must all come together to be successful in this campaign.

With the advent of technology that permits weapons of mass destruction to be transported by a single person, the line between police functions and national security concerns has blurred. Recognizing that the military possesses unique equipment and uniquely trained personnel, the courts have held that providing supplies, equipment, training, facilities, and certain types of intelligence information does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. Military personnel may also be involved in the planning of law enforcement operations, as long as the actual arrest of suspects and seizure of evidence is carried out by civilian law enforcement personnel.¹⁵

Congress has approved the use of the military in civilian law enforcement matters through the Civil Disturbance Statutes (10 USC, Section 331-334). These provisions permit the President to use military personnel to enforce civilian laws where the State has requested assistance or is unable to protect civil rights and property. Federal military personnel may be used in times of natural disaster upon request from a state Governor pursuant to the Stafford Act (42 USC, Section 5121). While the Stafford Act authority is subject to the active versus passive analysis, it still represents a significant exception to the Posse Comitatus Act's underlying principle that the military is not a domestic police force auxiliary.¹⁶

ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

As we approach the 21st century, our foes have extended the field of battle – from physical space to cyber space; from the world's vast bodies of water to the complex workings of our own bodies. Rather than invading our beaches or launching bombers, these adversaries may attempt cyber-attacks against our critical military systems and our economic base. Or they may deploy compact and relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction – not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological, to use disease as a weapon of war.

—Former President Clinton

The highest priority of the United States military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.¹⁷ President George W. Bush emphasizes a strategy to begin building a military capable of combating the threats of a new century.¹⁸ This new strategy calls for greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve to be seamlessly integrated with the active Army.¹⁹ To meet the challenges encompassing Homeland Security, the correct mix of capabilities between and within the Guard and Reserve must be in place and continually compared with an emergent requirement.

The historical ties that created the Guard and the Reserve are just that, "historical." Too often a division of labor unconsciously motivates the separation of Guard and Reserve. The Guard would specialize in combat units, while the Reserve would specialize in combat support and combat service support. Yet a closer analysis of the two forces would find this not to be totally true. Both the Guard and Reserve carry an infrastructure that they don't need and grossly under-invest in an infrastructure that is needed.

Both the Guard and Reserve have the capabilities to support state governments in all types of disaster response. But the analytic process to determine the force needed for homeland security requirements has not been identified. The Guard continues to maintain 6 Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB) planned for 2 major theaters of war (2MTW). In addition, the Guard maintains another nine enhanced brigades with 35,000 combat troops. The Guard also maintains 110,000 combat forces, organized into 8 divisions that have no direct combat role to play in a likely conflict.²⁰

By virtue of its domestic requirement, the National Guard has a commanding advantage in being the military's first response for homeland security and domestic incidents. But the requirement for first responders in the role of homeland security must be trained and ready to fill the gap between the civil agencies with support forces, not combat. The domestic mission operation tempo in response to local emergencies requires the National Guard to routinely provide assistance to communities in non-combatant roles. Not only does the National Guard support local communities in non-combatant roles, but also the various CINCs.²¹

The Active Army's plan for shaping the force to meet the challenges in the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) is identified by the Total Army Analysis process. This process reviews capabilities against a set of missions identified in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and sizes an appropriate force to relieve a perceived shortage of support troops by converting some combat units in the Reserve Component to units that perform support. This reorganization would take about 10 years to complete and cost almost \$3 billion.²² The National Guard's plan for shaping calls for converting up to 12 of its combat brigades to combat support and combat service support organizations.²³ Whereas some small savings in operation and maintenance cost may result from converting combat units to support units, converting some combat units that have no direct role-play in WMD and homeland security would eliminate some redundant combat forces and funding could be focused toward needed support infrastructure. Additionally, National Guard personnel who are trained to render emergency service in domestic crises might perform better than those who were trained primarily for combat.²⁴

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Ensuring the safety of America's citizen at home can only be achieved through effective cooperation among the many federal departments and agencies and state and local government that have homeland security responsibilities...Department of Defense (DOD) will place new emphasis upon counter terrorism training across federal, state, and local first responders, drawing on the capabilities of the Reserves and National Guard...DOD will continue to examine the roles and responsibilities of the Active and Reserves forces to ensure they are properly organized, trained, equipped, and postured to provide for the effective defense of the United States.²⁵

The exact roles and missions that the Guard and Reserve are expected to fulfill in response to WMD incidents have not been determined. The critical element to determining the roles and missions of the Guard and Reserve during a WMD response lies in the assets and capabilities of both forces. Many units in the Guard and Reserve possess the skills and capabilities that can be applied to WMD response requirements, yet few have focused on the precise tasks or are equipped with the appropriate assets to immediately respond to such an event.

Seventy-nine potential federal roles have been identified for Reserve Component tasks in support of homeland defense involving WMD. Figure 3 identifies some of the gaps and/or shortfalls within the National Guard and Army Reserve toward meeting the potential federal roles for a WMD response. The National Guard has identified 46 percent of the potential roles to be

accomplished using National Guard assets and the Army Reserve has identified 59 percent of the potential roles to be accomplished with Army Reserve assets. Thirty-five percent of the tasks identify a redundancy in capability between the National Guard and Army Reserve. Sixty-five percent can either be independently accomplished or have no identified force capability within the National Guard or Army Reserve.

Potential Federal Reserve Roles²⁶

Role Name	ARNG	USAR
1. WMD Defense Resource Facilitator		
2. Interagency Coordinator		
3. Dual-Use Watchdog		
4. TSWG Representative	X	X
5. Requirements Aggregation		
6. Interoperability Coordinator	X	
7. Federal Funding Conduit		
8. Equipment Certification		
9. Modeling and Simulation Certification		X
10. Modeling and Simulation Interoperability Coordinator	X	X
11. Standard Buy List and/or Procurement Services		
12. Acquisition Management Oversight for Emergency Responders		
13. Information Clearinghouse		
14. Evaluation Metrics Coordinator		X
15. Exercise Automation Support	X	X
16. Augment C4I Infrastructure	X	X
17. Implement National Disaster Information Infrastructure		
18. NDII M&S Facilitator		
19. Emergency Responder Community Outreach	X	X
20. Strategic Threat Information Clearinghouse		
21. Establish Local Terrorism Threat Working Groups		
22. Threat Information Conduit	X	
23. Augment Incident Command Personnel	X	X
24. Augment Hazard Prediction Modeling and Simulation	X	X
25. Assist Assessing Threat Information	X	
26. Inform Emergency Responders of Guard Capability		X
27. Assist Public Information Distribution	X	X
28. Assist Management of Media Requests	X	X
29. WMD/Terrorism Subject Matter Expert (SME) Database		X
30. Stockpile CB Medical Supplies and Equipment		
31. Provide Field Hospitals/Mobile Medical Assets	X	X
32. Mobile Emergency Care Clinics	X	X
33. Responder and Victim Critical Incident Stress Management	X	X
34. Track Exposed Individuals		X
35. Assist Mass Casualty Response		X
36. Augment Physical Security		
37. Pre-Staged Response Teams	X	X
38. Rapid Assessment	X	X
39. Detailed (Follow-up) Assessment		

Role Name	ARNG	USAR
40. Refugee Management		X
41. Augment Mortuary/Graves Registration Services	X	X
42. Vulnerability Assessment Assistance	X	
43. Assist State and Local Emergency Planners	X	X
44. Support Urban Search and Rescue	X	
45. Augment WMD Detection, Reconnaissance, Assessment and Monitoring	X	X
46. Augment Firefighters		X
47. Assist Mass Evacuation Operations	X	X
48. Support Geographically Remote/Isolated Areas	X	X
49. Employ Specialized Equipment		
50. Military Support Detachment (CST) Sustainment	X	
51. Distribute Consumable Resources	X	X
52. Contractor Reserve Equipment		
53. Personnel and Equipment Decontamination	X	X
54. Emergency Medical Air Transport		
55. Bulk and Heavy Load Ground Transport		X
56. Civil Engineering Support	X	X
57. Decontaminate Hot Zone and Affected Areas		X
58. Maintain WMD-Related Equipment Readiness		
59. Maintain WMD Response Non-medical Stockpiles		
60. Provide Food Service		X
61. Provide Water Purification		X
62. Provide Emergency Power and Lighting		
63. Provide Air Transport For Supplies & Personnel	X	
64. Augment Law Enforcement Support	X	
65. Provide Heavy Equipment and Operators		X
66. Manage Distribution of Mass Care Supplies		X
67. Provide Bed-down Facilities for Emergency Responders	X	X
68. Provide Ground Transportation for Supplies and Personnel		X
69. Provide Specialized Training for Equipment Use	X	X
70. Joint Exercise Coordinator	X	
71. Coordinate Exercise/Training Grants		
72. Develop and Manage Training Scenario Templates		X
73. Establish and Maintain WMD Training Centers	X	X
74. Train NG Personnel in HAZMAT and ICS		X
75. Establish WMD Response Training Center	X	X
76. Conduct WMD Defense Training	X	X
77. Train Selected Personnel for Response Exercises	X	X
78. Assist Establishment of WMD Response Accreditation		X
79. Provide Community Preparedness Training with FEMA		X

FIGURE 3

The 1993 Department of Defense restructuring of the Guard and Reserve placed most of the army's chemical and medical units in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve has the bulk of chemical equipment, trained troops, and overall technical expertise in Nuclear Biological and

Chemical operations as is known today. The Army Reserve has sixty-three percent of the chemical units within the Army, including 100 chemical reconnaissance/decontamination elements stationed across the United States that can perform basic detection and identification of chemical agents as well as decontamination operations. The Army Reserve is training 100 decontamination platoons and eight chemical reconnaissance platoons to act in the civil support role. Two chemical companies that are specifically designed for nuclear, chemical, and biological reconnaissance also are in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve contains the only biological detection company in the Army that is ready for deployment. In terms of chemical assets, the Army Reserve has biological detection systems, which can alert to the presence of biological weapons. The Army Reserve has many soldiers with command and control expertise along with chemical specialties that can be deployed as individual experts to a WMD situation.²⁷

Chemical forces in the Army National Guard include one chemical brigade with four subordinate battalions, five chemical companies, 15 chemical platoons and one smoke/decontamination company. Additional chemical assets will be added to the Army National Guard in fiscal years 03-07 with the purchase of 47 chemical units. Whether these units will be added to the already existing infrastructure or part of a restructuring cost saving to increase support elements in the National Guard remains to be seen.

Medical Forces in the Army National Guard include fifty medical companies capable of providing immediate lifesaving measures and evacuation to medical treatment facilities. It also includes five Area Support Medical Battalions and two Medical Evacuation Battalions with eight Air Ambulance Medical Companies.²⁸

The Army Reserve holds 59 percent of the medical assets in the Army and has 35 hospitals of various types and 22 Forward Surgical Teams.²⁹ This places the Army Reserve in the role as the primary provider for medical and chemical response between the two forces. Nationwide there is limited understanding of the magnitude of casualties that could result from a WMD incident particularly one involving biological agents³⁰ and the aforementioned forces may not be enough to streamline WMD preparedness and fill the gap between the Guard, Reserve and civil elements in defense of our homeland.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 required the DOD to develop and maintain a domestic terrorism rapid response team capable of aiding federal, state and local officials in responding to incidents involving WMD, containing chemical and biological or related materials. The Act mandated the enhancement of domestic preparedness and

response capability for attacks involving nuclear, radiological, and chemical weapons. The Act authorized the National Guard and other Reserve Components to assist the Secretary of Defense in training civilian personnel of federal, state and local agencies regarding WMD responses.

The National Guard is responsible for developing a domestic chemical/biological counter terrorism mission plan that is fully coordinated with all related plans and programs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the active forces, and all other Reserve Components so as to leverage existing capabilities to the maximum extent possible. Activities include conducting joint, interagency training for federal, state, and local responders with respect to counter terrorism operations and the defense against WMD and for testing and evaluating equipment related to the support of the chemical/biological defense mission.³¹

In November 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed DOD to develop a plan to integrate the National Guard and Reserve into the Department of Defense response to WMD attacks. The result was the Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued January 1998. This plan outlined the capabilities the United States military might be called upon to provide in support of civil authorities during a WMD attack, the capabilities that existed in the military, and the gaps in DOD's capabilities to respond. The plan led to the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) formerly known as Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams.³² WMD-CST became operational in January 2000 and is a small portion of the WMD response capabilities; still, a tremendous amount of focus has been given to the element.

At an initial cost of \$143 million, each WMD-CST consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard personnel and is currently based in 27 states. Each team is an asset of the states in which it is located and can be deployed as a regional asset to other states. The DOD plan suggested that there should eventually be a WMD-CST in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia, for a total of 54 teams. Until this occurs, the Army Guard is establishing WMD-CST (Light) teams in the other locations to provide limited chemical/biological response capabilities.³³

The mission of the WMD-CST is to deploy to an area of operation to assess a suspected biological, chemical, or radiological event in support of the local incident commander and advise civilian responders regarding appropriate action. The WMD-CST will facilitate requests for assistance, help save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate property damage.³⁴

Response time for WMD-CST takes hours, not minutes. Although they may miss the first rush of rescue and response, hours later they can provide backup to exhausted incident commanders.³⁵

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999 mandated that, "A reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency...unless...the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements." This places an increased demand on ensuring that the civil support teams (CST) have the right mix and capabilities, to include integrating Army Reserve personnel within the teams, and are properly resourced.

It takes 18 months and costs up to \$200,000 to fully train a civil support team (CST) member. The standard tour of duty is three years. Many soldiers would sign up for a second tour, but promotion opportunities are limited within the CST which causes fully trained soldiers to leave for advancement in other units. Not unlike many of the armed forces highly skilled soldiers, competition from the private sector lures CST soldiers with jobs averaging twice the Army salary.³⁶

The teams are a must and will require the Guard and Reserve partnering together to remove limitations such as the three-year assignment tenure and develop an infrastructure that will retain highly skilled soldiers and allow for advancement. Whereas this may not reduce the cost of training, operating and sustaining the CST, it will have tremendous long term savings on retention, personnel advancement and possibly even loss of life.

The Army Reserve's role in relation to WMD-CST is to support the domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management and training. The value of training to the same standard, using common terminology and rehearsals involving civilian agencies could be the difference as to whether the Guard and Reserve are prepared for a WMD response. The Army Reserve has a network of seven institutional training and five divisions that provide training for both active and reserve component soldiers. Forces Command (FORSCOM) has designated the Army Reserve as the lead for the Train-the-Trainer Program for both decontamination and reconnaissance units. This designation is consistent with the Army Reserve's role as the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated proponent for combat support and combat service support institutional training, which is under the Training Support Division (TSD) concept.

The Army Reserve Command at Fort McPherson Georgia, has command and control of three Regional Training Sites – Medical (RTS-MED) located at Fort Gordon, Georgia, Camp

Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, California and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. At an approximate cost of \$14 million, RTS-MED provide training and training support to active and reserve component, military medical personnel, and civilians throughout the United States. RTS-MEDs' primary mission is to enhance the readiness of the Army Reserve and other Department of Defense personnel/units by providing integrated combat health support training and medical logistics support.³⁷ RTS-MEDs are critical in providing medical support to local communities for any incident. In one year, RTS-MED, Fort Gordon, trained more than 3000 Active, Reserve and civilian students and integrated the WMD training program of instruction with the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command's training program of instruction at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

MISSION DURING CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement response. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; state and local government provide assistance as required for crisis management.³⁸

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for coordinating consequence management of the Federal government for terrorist incidents. Crisis management encompasses all of the operations to prevent an incident after a threat has occurred, seeking out and/or arresting perpetrators before lives are lost, and rescue and response operations during the first minutes and hours after an incident to mitigate its consequences. Consequence management differs from crisis management in that it involves preparedness and response for dealing with the consequences of a terrorist incident, including alleviating damage caused by the incident.³⁹

The Department of Justice directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead agency for crisis management in response to a domestic terrorist threat or incident. The FBI is responsible for pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting the terrorist. State governments have primary responsibilities for managing the consequence of domestic disasters, including major terrorist incidents; however, the federal government can support state and local authorities if they lack the capabilities to respond adequately.⁴⁰

To augment the capabilities found at the state and local level, FEMA coordinates federal measures to aid the on-scene officials through the Federal Response Plan. FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management and retains responsibility for consequence management throughout the federal response and acts in support of the FBI as appropriate.

When a state deploys National Guard soldiers for an emergency, it does so in a state active status. If the emergency gets a federal declaration, then FEMA reimburses the state for what the state spent on the event. This reimbursement is usually a 75/25 split with the federal government paying the 75 percent.⁴¹ Army Reserve soldiers can be employed to respond to a domestic crisis when a state requests a presidential declaration of a state of emergency. Once a federal state of emergency is declared, military forces are under the direction of FEMA.⁴²

On March 17, 1998, former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced the establishment of a Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) to integrate the capabilities of the Guard and Reserve domestic preparations to respond to terrorist or other incidents involving WMD. The primary function of CoMPIO is to bring Reserve Component integration in synch with current interagency WMD preparedness programs and to establish the WMD-CST elements.

The National Guard has historically been used in domestic emergencies to bring immediate relief, humanitarian aid, and medical and logistical support to the victims of domestic emergencies and natural disasters.⁴³ Whereas it may appear that the Guard has a monopoly on emergency response, this is not the case. The Guard has inherent qualities and characteristics that can easily be integrated into the civil agencies for domestic emergencies, natural disasters, and homeland defense throughout the nation; however, the Guard will require major structural adjustments to ensure it possesses the necessary organization, assets, and capability.

Under the authority of Army Regulation 500-60, a Reserve commander can respond to an emergency in the local area when there is imminent danger of loss of life or critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the local authorities could request assistance from the local Reserve commander in any emergency, including WMD, without an official deployment of the military.⁴⁴

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITY

State governments have the primary responsibility for domestic order and response to disasters, natural or man-made. The National Guard has a constitutionally mandated state mission to provide military support to civil authority.⁴⁵ However, both the Guard and Reserve represent a unique pool of manpower and expertise that, with the proper training and equipment, can support local, state and federal authorities in WMD consequence management. Both Guard and Reserve soldiers live and work in various communities and they have

established links to the fire, police and emergency medical personnel who are always the first to arrive at the scene of any incident.⁴⁶

As with any operation involving military assistance to civilian authorities, the Guard and Reserve will play a support role. Local authorities will retain their overall jurisdiction and FEMA will retain its role as the lead federal agency for consequence management.⁴⁷

DOD Directive 3025.1 designated the National Guard as the primary DOD agency for disaster relief. The National Guard is the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquility and is the cornerstone of military support to civil authorities. Both National Guard and Army Reserve units possess expertise, trained manpower, and equipment that can support response to chemical and biological attacks in civilian communities.

The two largest capabilities the Army Reserve brings to the table in term of Civil Support are its chemical and medical assets. The chemical and medical forces represent the largest piece of all of the assets the Army Reserve has to offer for WMD consequence management. In addition, the Army Reserve has 97 percent of the Army's civil affairs assets and several other core capabilities such as engineering, public administration, public works, water works personnel, and transportation.⁴⁸ Whereas the Army Reserve prides itself on having this capability, the potential impact on OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO that could be placed on these units as they implement their roles in the NMS could be in danger for significant future loss in readiness without a major force adjustment of organizations, assets, and capabilities.

LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

The requirement for maintaining the quality of life and well being for soldiers is the same for Guard and Reserve. Life cycle management includes institutional training, self-development, leader development and supporting programs such as the evaluation, promotion and command selection systems. It begins with initial entry training and continues throughout a soldier's entire period of service. Commanders at all levels need timely, accurate and relevant personnel information that will enhance their ability to accomplish the mission and improve soldier quality of life.⁴⁹

Throughout the years the Guard and Reserve have maintained their own dynamic view of life cycle management through their activities, processes, personnel functions, and systems. These separate views came with its vocabulary and its own concept of reality as to what was important. What typically coincided with these views was mostly chaos within the business rules. The business rules in the Guard and Reserve have differed for years and their personnel legacy systems were not designed to communicate between the forces. For example, the

National Guard and Army Reserve have separate retirement points accounting systems (RPAS) that perform the same function but have their own automation language and infrastructure. But if a National Guard or Army Reserve soldier changes between the two services before his/her retirement year ending (RYE), chaos erupts with attempts to merge the retirement points data. More chaos erupts when National Guard soldiers become eligible for retirement at age 60 because all soldiers must be entered into the Army Reserve RPAS for retirement eligibility verification.

To improve the accuracy and functionality of personnel data throughout the different facets of life cycle management, the Guard and Reserve are integrating with the Active Army to create a centralized human resource system that provides total visibility of personnel across both components.

As the centerpiece of the Army's personnel transformation, Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPDB), functions as the Army's human resource data provider, and provides a single source of data for the Active, National Guard and Army Reserve components and civilian personnel. This integrated database will accommodate warehousing web enabled applications and allow increased user access to all human resource databases. ITAPDB will be the single source of personnel information needed to manage the Personnel Life Cycle of the Active and Reserve Component and will function as the catalyst to enforce data standardization, eliminate data redundancy, and improve interoperability across components in managing the life cycle function of the soldier.⁵⁰ The integration of the forces with ITAPDB will not only be cost effective for providing timely, accurate, and improved quality of data, it has the potential for being a key factor in manpower reduction for both forces.

The ITAPDB Personnel Transformation Plan identifies several multi-component Unfinanced Requirements (UFRs) needed in order to implement. The plan calls for \$1.26 billion to be spent over the POM on Army legacy systems (Figure 4).⁵¹ Previous articles have been presented that reflect a cost savings of \$2.6 billion per year from consolidation of the Army components.⁵² Whereas there is no argument that a cost saving could be obtained, these arguments focused more on size reduction of the force. What is needed in the Reserve Component is not a force reduction but a force restructuring of the Guard combat units into support units. The Army could spend \$1.4 billion less by having four fewer Guard divisions each year after 2010.⁵³ The cost savings from restructuring the Guard combat forces to support units could be used to fund the Personnel Transformation costs.

Personnel Transformation Plan/Costs

RESOURCE STRATEGY:

- Tax Existing Accounts
- Develop UFR
- Use DIMHRS \$
- Reinvest from Legacy Systems
- Army Modernization Program

PROJECTED TO SPEND
\$1.26B OVER THE POM
ON MAINTAINING
ARMY LEGACY SYSTEMS

INITIAL (FY00)	INTERIM (FY01-02)	INTERIM (FY03-07)	OBJECTIVE (FY08-16)
• ITAPDB PROOF OF CONCEPT (50K) • PERSTEMPO 6.7M (3.5M UFR) • MULTI-COMPO PERS VISIBILITY 4.7M • BDE CASUALTY OPS (ACIPS-LT) (FIELD) • PERS ACCT OPS (TPS V1.0) (FIELD) • STR FORECASTING MODELS (4M UFR)	- ITAPDB(-) 30.6M (16.5M UFR) - APPLICATIONS(-) 3-9M • NCOER SUBMISSION • OMPF/ERB/SRP • SGT/SSG PROMOTIONS • REASSIGNMENTS • SOLDIER ACTIONS • ENL BOARD PROCESS • COMMON ACCESS CARD (CAC) • FORECAST MODELS • S-GATE	- ITAPDB 19.4M (13.8M UFR) - APPLICATIONS \$30M - \$216M (ALL UFR) • STRUCTURE • ACQUIRE • DISTRIBUTE • DEVELOP • SUSTAIN • COMPENSATE • DEPLOY • TRANSITION	MILITARY to MILITARY SOLUTION
\$15.4M (\$7.5M UFR)	\$33.6M-39.6M (\$25.5M UFR)	\$49.4-235.4M (\$43.8-229.8M UFR)	\$ TBD 1

FIGURE 4⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

Today, our National Military Strategy is founded on a three-pronged approach: it calls on us to shape the international environment, prepare our forces for the future, and respond to crises when and where our interest require. As we embrace this new strategy for a new century, America's National Guard and Reserve are moving to the forefront of our efforts to secure peace, engender democracy, and nurture market economies on a global scale. Reservists are an integral and vital part of America's Total Force, and we will continue to rely on them well into the new millennium.⁵⁵

There is little to be gained by merging the Guard and Reserve and there is room for both Reserve Components in meeting the National Security needs. As America's armed forces look at future efforts and opportunities to reshape, the growing importance of homeland security will task the Guard and Reserve with new responsibilities, roles and missions.

By virtue of its domestic requirement, the National Guard has a commanding advantage in being the military's first response for homeland security and domestic incidents. But in this era of change and uncertainty, it is far from clear as to whether this advantage can be sustained without additional support forces. The Army Reserve is the active Army's federal force with core

competencies and personnel that are capable of offsetting the active Army's man days and allow the Army to focus its resources on preparation for combat operations.⁵⁶

The Army National Guard has enough forces to provide state and territorial governors with capabilities to support their domestic needs. Questions have been raised about whether the National Guard's combat units, specifically its divisions have a clear mission in a post-Cold War world. The National Guard argues that eliminating its division would harm its ability to provide assistance in domestic crises, such as natural disasters and civil disturbances. However, the National Guard has never been asked to provide a large number of personnel for state missions, though large percentages of individual states' Guard personnel have been called up during domestic crises such as Hurricane Andrew and the Los Angeles riot in 1992.⁵⁷ Whenever a disaster or emergency overwhelms the assets of a state or territory, the governors can call the federal government for assistance. This action could present future arguments to have a small state or territorial militia focused on the domestic needs including homeland security with the rest of the force in a federal status. Whereas the cost of building and maintaining a force of this nature maybe cheaper, arguments cannot be supported without further study. Still, it is imperative to consider that cost savings from the elimination of National Guard combat divisions could be channeled into funding needed to support forces for homeland security.

The new threat to the United States requires a reassessment of traditional military roles and missions along with an examination of the relevance and benefit of the Posse Comitatus Act. This Act is a statutory creation, not a constitutional prohibition.⁵⁸ Therefore any statements that National Guard forces should not be federalized or Army Reserve forces are limited in their ability to provide support because of the Posse Comitatus Act are unwarranted.

Within their own separate, but mutually supporting roles and capabilities, the Guard and Reserve remain an integral part of the total Army force. In support of the total Army force, the National Guard provides primary combat assets and the Army Reserve provides combat support and combat service support assets. Both forces play an important role through their interface with the civilian community in support of domestic missions such as disaster relief, civil disturbances, WMD and the war on drugs.

Congress must re-look all the authority listed in Title 10 and Title 32 and determine what makes sense. Governors and State Adjutant Generals must be able to use federal forces in their respective state as part of their force protection plan with minimal limitations. Removing limitations would also enhance the CINC's efforts in managing and controlling assets as well.

Designing the Guard and Reserve roles requires an assessment of organizations and capabilities and that assessment must address institutional and operational obstacles to effect policy. Until this occurs, the focus must be on integration between the two forces.

This is going to change the way we do business. It is going to change the way we go about our daily life. It will require greater emphasis on homeland security. And it will require not just military force, but all the national power that is at our disposal.

Homeland security capabilities span across numerous agencies including the Department of Justice and Department of State. The FBI has a hazardous material squad, focused on evidence collection. The Marines have their own response force for WMD. The Army can send a chemical team anywhere in the country within four hours, with advance detection, disposal and decontamination capabilities.⁵⁹ Within the Department of Defense, the Guard is the most capable to initially respond to a homeland security threat, but other forces will be required.

The Homeland Security Acts calls for the Secretary of National Homeland Security to plan, coordinate, and integrate the United States Government activities relating to homeland security.⁶⁰ Key to this task is the synchronization of capabilities with continued integration as the primary driver.

Focusing on integration verses merging of the Guard and Reserve will eliminate barriers that have historically existed in the way military operations are conducted. Integration requires more than the removal of barriers. It means changing the way we think and handle our business processes. Achieving a seamless integration of the Guard and Reserve will require senior leaders, both military and civilian; to create an environment that will eliminate all biases existing in operational, institutional and cultural processes.

The Guard is no longer limited by a state boundary to provide assistance and/or support. Under legal agreements between the States called interstate compacts or memoranda of agreement, and under Federal guidelines, States may provide mutual assistance to other States during times of disaster.⁶¹

The Army Reserve, although not limited by state boundaries, has no such agreement. Whether this is a critical factor is of little consequences. What is critical, is the capability of the Army Reserve to provide essential equipment and skill shortfalls within a geographical area when required.

Consequence management is skill and resource intensive and requires units possessing particular capabilities. Because of the magnitude of the consequences associated with WMD, preparing a proper homeland defense requires sound planning and the establishment of a viable organization to provide those capabilities.

As we rapidly move toward the threats and required capabilities of 2020, we need to embrace the seamless integration of the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces. Paramount to integration is a common personnel and pay system. Having the Army embedded into the National and DOD infrastructure with a common life cycle management support system allows us to reinvest our efforts and planning to accomplish the work of our nation. As we emerge from the capabilities required to meet the National and DOD requirements, we must seize the opportunity to rapidly transform to the Force of 2020. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) will drive the Total Army Analysis process to match our force structure and force modernization inefficiencies. This will be critical to ensuring our relevance and providing the national confidence that we will continue to be the force-of-choice to defend our national interests both at home and abroad.

Word Count = 8651

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³ U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8: "To provide for calling forth the militia...; To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia...reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

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⁸ U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 32.

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¹⁰ Ibid., 32.

¹¹ Ibid., 33.

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¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department Of Defense, 30 September 2001), 18.

¹⁸ George W. Bush, A Blueprint for New Beginnings, Revitalize National Defense, Highlights of 2002 Funding," chapter 6; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud06.html>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2002.

¹⁹ Deborah R. Lee, "Reserve Components in the 21st Century: An Evolving Resource," The Officer, 74 (January-February 1998): 36.

²⁰ Francis M. Lussier and Douglas J. Taylor, Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, National Security Division, December 1997), xiii. ERBs are combat brigades that the Administration plans to maintain at a higher level of readiness than other combat forces in the Guard.

²¹ The CINC of US Southern Command relied upon the Guard for Operation NEW HORIZON and Hurricane Disaster Relief in late 1998 and through 1999. Over 12,600 Army National Guard soldiers from 41 states participated. President Clinton call the resulting missions, "the largest military humanitarian assistance mission since the Berlin Airlift".

²² Francis M. Lussier and Douglas J. Taylor, xv.

²³ U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 27.

²⁴ U.S. Congress Budget Office, "Reducing The Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options," March 1997; available from http://www.fas.org/man/congress/1997/cbo_deficit/def18.htm; Internet; accessed 19 January 2002.

²⁵ Donald H. Rumsfeld, 18-19.

²⁶ National Guard Bureau, Enhancing the National Guard's Readiness to Support Emergency Responders in Domestic Chemical and Biological Terrorism Defense, Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., 20 July 1999), 19-27.

²⁷ General Accounting Office, 14.

²⁸ National Guard Bureau, 79.

²⁹ U.S. Army Reserve, "Army Reserve Gear up for Civil Support Mission," 22 March 2000; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Mar2000/a20000322usarcivil.html>; Internet; accessed 8 December 2001.

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³¹ Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Special Weapons Monitor, Domestic Preparedness; available from <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/domestic.htm>; Internet; assessed 18 December 2001.

³² General Accounting Office, 5.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ National Guard Bureau, 68. The WMD-CST elements are National Guard units, comprised of Army National Guard or a combination of Army National Guard and Air Guard personnel. The WMD-CST elements are organized under the peacetime control of state Adjutant General.

³⁵ Stephanie Simon, "All The Readiness Money Can Buy," The Los Angeles Times, (26 December 2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2001/e20011227all.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2001.

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⁶⁰ Department of National Homeland Security Act of 2001, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 2001.

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