



**STRATEGY
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**TRANSFORMATION:
HOW DOES THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DO IT?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Army National Guard traces its roots to the Colonial Militia. At that time its purpose was to organize a defense of the local citizenry using the manpower available from the general populace. In the subsequent 350 years, the requirement for local defense has been intermittent. During the same 350 years the State Militias/National Guard Forces have participated in concert with the Regular Army Forces in numerous National Defense Activities.

Now in 2001, the Army is undergoing transformation with the objective of becoming a more deployable full-spectrum force. The Army National Guard is fully included in the Department of the Army's transformation plan. However, some issues require further exploration for the Army Guard's utility to be fully developed. These issues include the continued need to respond to State missions as well as the need for specialized units.

The attacks on September 11th have shown that the 350-year-old requirement of defending local populations still exists. The attack aftermath has shown the continued significance of a National Guard prepared to respond to State missions. The Federal mission of the Army National Guard calls for the Guard to be an adjunct to the Active Army. Under previous strategies the Army National Guard's ability to be deployed and specialized capabilities have been taken into account (strategic hedge, counterattack force, etc.)

This project will discuss the implications of transforming the Army National Guard. Discussion will include ideas toward developing a framework in which the Army Guard transforms to a force that is vital to the Total Army, can take advantage of its specialized capabilities, and retains the ability to perform State missions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF TABLES	vii
TRANSFORMATION: HOW DOES THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DO IT?	1
THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE DILEMMA.....	1
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN 2002.....	2
ARMY TRANSFORMATION	4
WHAT THE ARMY NEEDS IN A TRANSFORMED ARMY GUARD.....	5
WHAT THE STATES AND TERRITORIES NEED.....	10
CONCLUSIONS	14
A LIGHT INFANTRY-CENTRIC ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.....	15
THE OBJECTIVE FORCE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD	16
A MISSION-FOCUSED TRANSFORMATION.....	16
MISSIONING, STRUCTURING, AND EQUIPING THE ARNG FORCE	16
IMPROVING READINESS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.....	17
RECOMMENDATIONS	18
ENDNOTES	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	25

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 - POST-ADRS UNITS (PHASE I & II)6
TABLE 2 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DISASTER RESPONSE ASSETS 14

TRANSFORMATION: HOW DOES THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DO IT?

THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE DILEMMA

The Army is beginning a transformation to the type of force that can serve the future needs of our Nation. This thirty-year process is likely to be filled with gut-wrenching experiences for many members of the Army. The Army National Guard (ARNG), with a long history of struggling to keep pace with Army innovations, is likely to experience its share of discomfort throughout this course. Transformation, however, does offer many positives for the Army National Guard. For one thing, Army Transformation from the outset, though at a slower pace, fully includes transforming the Army Guard.¹ For an organization used to being an afterthought this should come as a refreshing change.

The other positive, in so far as the Army National Guard is concerned, is the effect that Transformation will have on the make-up of the Army. Instead of having heavy forces that are too heavy and light forces that are too light, we will only have medium weight forces that can respond to a wide spectrum of crises. Many members of the National Guard believe that for the sake of relevancy, Army National Guard forces should mirror or at least resemble the Active Army forces. They should be greatly relieved, since now under Transformation, all forces, Active and Reserve will look nearly alike.

This leads to the subject of this project. The question of whether an organization such as the Army Guard with unique characteristics as a wartime organization and more than a few responsibilities as a State organization should in fact transform in precisely the manner that has been proposed. One of the dilemmas is that since the Cold War, the Army National Guard's warfighting roles have been poorly defined. Like the Active Army, there is the dichotomy of incomplete role definition at a time of ever increasing role expansion. The State role is another issue of import. The National Guard began as militias organized to defend and serve the local populace. This role has long been understood, but perhaps been given slight consideration when issues such as stationing, force structure, or transformation are weighed. Since the attacks on 11 September 2001, there is considerable evidence that a new approach that takes into account the State missions of the Army Guard is warranted.²

This project will begin by describing the Army National Guard, its warfighting role and its State roles. This will be followed by a discussion of Army National Guard Transformation and what the Army and the States will need from a transformed Army Guard. This will lead to an analysis that compares capabilities and requirements. This analysis will yield recommendations toward adjusting the transformation process in such a way that the Army National Guard will

emerge as an organization that is fully capable of accomplishing both its State and Federal missions.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN 2002

A logical jumping-off point for this project is a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the Army Guard, as they exist today. The Guard's federal warfighting job and its domestic security and support job are complementary and yet distinguishable one from another. Accordingly, a discussion of each is appropriate. Regarding its federal mission, FM 1 states, "Army National Guard units must maintain trained and ready forces, available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or other missions."³ This discussion will focus on mobilizing for war and the question becomes who does the Army Guard fight, when do they fight and where? This is not easy to answer. When the Soviet Union was a threat, the Guard was to fight in Western Europe with the rest of the Army. In the absence of that, some have suggested that in a two Major Theater War (MTW) scenario the Army National Guard would supply the counterattack force in the second MTW.⁴ Recently the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld called the 2- MTW strategy a Cold War construct and questioned its appropriateness.⁵ This leaves the National Guard without a defined warfighting role. In 1997, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army GEN (R) Ronald Griffith suggested that if for no other reason, Army Guard forces were important "as a hedge against miscalculations in our strategy."⁶ Currently, the Army is redefining the roles of the Army Guard will play in efforts to defend the U. S. Homeland, defeat terrorism, and win MTW's.

As an entity wholly separate from the Active Army, the Army Guard may not yet have a clear-cut warfighting role. However, elements of the Army National Guard play parts in The Army's war planning. At the end of the Cold War, the Army shifted large percentages of its Corps level Artillery and Air Defense Artillery to the National Guard. Currently, there are seventeen Artillery Brigades in the Army Guard including fourteen Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Battalions.^{7 8} There are also three Corps level Air Defense Avenger Brigades in the National Guard.⁹ The allocation of these Corps level assets to the National Guard represents the traditional use of the Army National Guard as a reserve force. These units have limited utility in peacetime and their availability is essential in an MTW.

There is also Corps level and higher combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) in the Army Guard including a Military Intelligence Brigade, three Military Police Brigades, three Signal Brigades and a Transportation Brigade. There will be more CS and CSS units in the Guard. In 1996, operating under the two MTW planning requirement, the Secretary of the

Army directed that, to address shortages, twelve Army Guard brigades convert from Combat units to CS/CSS units.¹⁰ These conversions will be complete by 2009.¹¹

The other half of the Army National Guard's dual role is its State mission. This mission can be broken down into three categories: Local Defense, Disaster Response, and Support of Civil Authorities. When not performing Federal service, Guardsmen are commanded by the Governor of their State with each State's Adjutant General performing the role of Chief of Staff.

Local defense was the original reason that the militias (from which the Guard evolved) were organized. In frontier communities, organized companies were formed to defend against Indian attack. Subsequently, State militias have been used to quell riots, put down insurrections, and to defend borders. Prior to 11 September 2001, the last large use of National Guardsmen for local defense was from 1953 to 1974 when up to 104 Antiaircraft Batteries in fourteen States and the District of Columbia defended the populace against a Cold War air attack.¹²

Disaster response has become the mission for which the National Guard is best known. The specialized capabilities of the military equipment, the organizational hierarchy, and the ability to rapidly assemble personnel allows the National Guard in each state to respond to natural disasters. Some examples of the disaster assistance provided during 2001 include: 1200 Massachusetts Guardsmen activated to evacuate residents from coastal regions during a March blizzard, 225 Iowa Guardsmen called up to prevent flooding along the upper Mississippi River in April, and 2000 West Virginian National Guardsmen on State active duty to respond to flooding and mudslides after heavy rain in July.^{13 14 15}

The Governors expect the National Guard to be responsive to the needs of the States in peacetime. They represent a reserve force at a Governor's disposal that can be activated for special missions and to augment other State agencies when needed. Examples of non-disaster, State active duty call-up include crowd management for the Boston Marathon, additional security at the 2000 Republican and Democratic National Conventions, and replacing striking prison guards.¹⁶

Another arena that the Guard plays a prominent role in is supporting local authorities in counter drug operations. 32 States, predominately coastal states or those bordering Mexico or Canada, maintain Counter Drug detachments that augment State and local law enforcement officials working to prevent the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs. Army Guardsmen possess special equipment, such as night vision equipment, and special skills, such as reconnaissance and surveillance, that enhances the counter drug effort. Additionally, National

Guardsmen in State active duty status are not prohibited from participating in law enforcement activities by the Posse Comitatus act of 1878.¹⁷

ARMY TRANSFORMATION

The transformation of the US Army was the primary initiative offered by General Shinseki when he was appointed to be the Army Chief of Staff. At the center of Shinseki's transformation plan was the determination that, "Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile."¹⁸ This led to the idealization of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), an infantry-centric, 5000-man organization equipped with lightweight armored vehicles. These BCT's will be rapidly deployable and have a degree of self-sustainability.¹⁹ The Army's Transformation includes all components of the Army; active and reserve. This project will not delve into how Transformation will affect the Army Reserve, for that requires research of an entirely different set of issues.

GEN Shinseki's plan to transform the Army emerged at a time when the Army National Guard was in the midst of its own transformation. In 1996, the Secretary of the Army approved the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ARDS) plan. This four-phase plan aims to satisfy the Army's need for more CS/CSS by converting twelve combat brigades to CS/CSS and reorganizing the overall structure of many Army Guard organizations. For the first phase of ARDS, three brigades (one each from the 35th, 38th, and 40th Divisions) are currently in the process of being converted.²⁰ Since the last Brigades are not scheduled for conversion until 2009, the ARDS plan will run concurrently with the early years of the Army's transformation.

Much of the technology that is required to equip the BCT's of the future is in the early stages of development. However, the immediate need for a medium weight force has been demonstrated repeatedly in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. It is likely that for this reason, the Army's transformation plan calls for the fielding of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at a rate of one per year from 2001 to 2006. These IBCT's will be equipped with off-the-shelf systems such as the LAV III Infantry Combat Vehicle. These IBCT's will provide the Army an opportunity to develop doctrine and organizations that transformation will require.²¹ One National Guard brigade, the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, is scheduled to be among the six that will transition to an IBCT design.²²

The ultimate aim of Army Transformation is to reach what has been termed the Objective Force. No one knows exactly what it is to look like. The IBCT is the starting point and

developing technologies and capturing existing technologies is required to create an Objective Force that is “responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.”²³

The timetable for Army National Guard transformation is extended. There has been a brief flurry of activity that began when GEN Shinseki announced his plan that will last until the 56th Brigade is converted to an IBCT sometime around 2004. According to the Army’s timeline the first National Guard brigade is not scheduled to transform to the Objective force until 2012. Thereafter one Guard brigade will transform each year. At this rate, ten National Guard Brigades will become Objective Force units by 2021. Ostensibly, after nearly all of the active component brigades have transformed, the National Guard rate could accelerate to three brigades a year and the last brigade to transform will do so in 2031.²⁴ In some ways it may be advantageous that the Army National Guard is not extensively included in the early stages of Army transformation. The ADRS plan will not be complete until 2011; the Guard can focus its attention on that. Additionally, the Army Guard can work on transforming or at least better understanding and defining its wartime missions as well as its State missions.

WHAT THE ARMY NEEDS IN A TRANSFORMED ARMY GUARD

The world, the Army, and the Army National Guard have all changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. It has been suggested by some that there is no longer a need for the Army National Guard to play a role as a Strategic Reserve.²⁵ There have been many debates centered on the use of Army Guard forces. This project will assume that the Army National Guard’s roles will remain within the boundaries that history has defined, allow for adjustments based on present day requirements and suggest refinements to the Transformation strategy that the analysis reveals.

The Army National Guard’s role as the Army’s Strategic Reserve has diminished. The clearest evidence of this is that transformation and the ADRS will reduce the number of infantry and armor brigades in the Army Guard from forty-two to thirty. However, there are indications that the importance of the strategic reserve role for the brigades that are not to be converted is actually increasing. Until recently only fifteen brigades (the enhanced brigades) were apportioned forces on the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This means that National Guard Divisional forces were not even included in the CINC’s war plans. In 2000, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that Six National Guard Divisions be apportioned to a combat command.²⁶

One likely mission that a Strategic Reserve has is to provide forces to backfill Active Army forces engaged in a Small Scale Contingency (SSC), thereby freeing those active forces for a

MTW. This is exactly what happened after the 11 September attacks. On 8 October 2001, the 2nd Battalion, 153rd Infantry of the Arkansas National Guard was mobilized for deployment to the Sinai. Originally, a 10th Mountain Division Battalion was scheduled for this particular rotation.²⁷ While there are still some post Cold War adjustments being made, the latest trends indicate that the Army National Guard's mission of being the Army's Strategic Reserve will continue.

The large numbers of Artillery and Air Defense units in the Army Guard has been discussed. Corps level assets placed in the National Guard makes good sense for a several reasons. Economically, the Army saves because of the reduced cost of an Army Guard unit compared to an active unit. Of particular benefit for the Guard is the fact that these units are not competing with Active Army units for missions. This, in turn, guarantees the Army's reliance on

NUMBER	TYPE ORGANIZATION
1	Chemical Brigade Headquarters
7	Chemical Battalions
3	Construction Support Companies
2	Port Opening Companies
1	Dump Truck Company
1	Multirole Bridge Company
24	Fire Fighting Teams
3	Well Drilling Teams
2	Quarry Teams
1	Ordnance Battalion
1	Missile Support Company
1	HHD, Medical Evacuation Battalion
8	Medical Companies (Area Support)
7	Medical Detachments (Area)
4	POL Support Battalions
1	Water Supply Team
3	Supply and Service Battalions
1	Military Police Command
3	Military Police Battalions
1	Maintenance Battalion
1	Signal Company
2	Motor Transportation Battalions
3	Terminal Transportation Battalions
6	Mobile Liaison Teams
3	Press Camp Headquarters

the National Guard's ability to maintain the readiness of these units. All this notwithstanding, there are shortfalls largely based on equipment that prevent many Army National Guard Corps level Artillery and Air Defense units from being deployable. In 1998, the Army designated eleven National Guard artillery battalions to be converted from howitzer battalions to MLRS battalions. However, these conversions have not been given a high priority as only three of those battalions have received funding for conversion training and support equipment.²⁸ While the idea of having a large percentage of the Army's artillery reserve in the National Guard has been embraced by the Active Army and the National Guard, there appears to be little impetus or priority to resource the plan.

TABLE 1 - POST-ADRS UNITS (PHASE I & II)²⁹

The Army relies on the availability of Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) in the Army National Guard. This was evident in the Gulf War when the Guard deployed five Military Police Battalions, Four Maintenance Battalions, Four Medical Battalions, Three Transportation Battalions and Four Quartermaster Battalions to Southwest Asia.³⁰ This reliance has continued subsequent to the Gulf War as Guard CS/CSS units have deployed regularly to support operations in Southern Command, European Command, Central Command and Pacific Command.

There is somewhat of a paradox that exists between Army transformation and the changes that the Army National Guard will undergo with the ADRS plan. One of the major aims of the Army's transformation plan is to "reduce the Battle Space CS/CSS footprint."³¹ The ADRS plan, on the other hand, will convert up to twelve infantry and armor combat formations to additional CS/CSS units. For example, one Michigan infantry battalion will deactivate and will be replaced by a Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters, a Combat Heavy Equipment Transport Company, a Water Purification Detachment, and a Fire Fighting Team.³² The number and type of units that will be activated in the first two phases of the plan have been determined and are shown in Table 1. The yet unidentified types of units are to be determined at a later date.

There are several specialized missions for which the Army Guard is suited. The role that is best supported by the last several years' evidence is as Peacekeepers in mature SSC's. The Army Guard's involvement in SSC's has been evolving since the mid 1990's. In 1995, 4-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was organized to perform the Sinai Peacekeeping mission. This battalion was an integrated force. Seventy-two percent of the soldiers were volunteers from the Army National Guard. This force underwent lengthy training under the oversight of the 82nd Airborne Division. Although the mission was a success, there were numerous logistical and administrative hurdles due to the ad hoc nature of the force. Also, building unit cohesion had to be an initial priority, and having coalesced in the Sinai, the unit was scattered throughout the Army at mission completion.³³

Army National Guard soldiers have been deploying to the Balkans since 1996.³⁴ Initially, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units were mobilized for this duty. One notable exception has been the frequent deployment of Guard Divisional Target Acquisition Batteries. These counter-fire radar units have rotated regularly to support U. S. operations in the region.³⁵ In 1997, C Company 3-116th IN became the first Army National Guard infantry unit to serve in Bosnia. This company was given a narrowly defined mission that required only specific capabilities (provide security for the Sava River Bridge). C Company was mobilized on 3 September 1997 and deployed on 1 December 1997.

In 2000, 49th AD deployed to Bosnia, and served as headquarters for the Multinational Division (North). This was the first deployment of a National Guard Division Headquarters since the Korean War. The Active Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment provided maneuver forces and was integrated with the division staff. 29th ID deployed for SFOR-10 in 2001. The combat maneuver units for this deployment were drawn from the active Army (10th Mountain Division), an ARNG enhanced brigade (155th Separate Armor Brigade) and the 29th's Divisional forces.

National Guard Divisions will command Bosnia rotations between 2002 and 2005 with the fifteen enhanced Brigades providing infantry and armor soldiers to the mission on a rotating basis.³⁶ These developments and the deployment of 2nd Battalion, 153rd Infantry to the Sinai reflect the Army leadership's confidence in ARNG organizations ability to perform peacekeeping operations.

Another area of specialization that is suited for Army Guard organizations is the mission of providing defense forces in rear areas. This is a traditional role of the National Guard. In the Second World War, the 29th Division was sent to England prior to the North African campaign. After the 1st Division went to North Africa, the 29th was the largest combat formation in England and its soldiers guarded the beaches, warehouses, airfields and railroads along the Southern coast.³⁷ The asymmetrical threats that exist today absolutely require the allocation of forces to rear area defense. This is a mission that is much akin to Homeland Security that will be discussed later, in that the soldier skills and the level of training required for successful completion of the two missions are similar. National Guard soldiers have the required skills for this mission and it is another way to free up Active Army units for other uses.

The threat of asymmetrical attack and the rise of terrorism have resulted in much discussion about the role of the National Guard and Homeland Defense. In 1997, the National Defense Panel recommended that in the event of an attack by a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) that the National Guard and Army Reserve should be prepared to:

- Train local Authorities in chemical and biological weapons detection, defense, and decontamination;
- Assist in casualty treatment and evacuation;
- Quarantine, if necessary, affected areas and people; and
- Assist in restoration of infrastructure and services.³⁸

In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that further steps should be taken; this commission recommended that Homeland Security should be a primary mission of the National Guard and that the Guard be organized to perform this mission.³⁹ The

leadership of the Army National Guard has reacted to these recommendations in a cautious manner. Although, acknowledging that Homeland Defense is a mission that is consistent with the traditional role of the National Guard, leaders like MG Ronald O. Harrison, Adjutant General of Florida and President of the National Guard Association of the United States resist wholesale changes to the Army Guard's organizational structure saying the Guard can do Homeland defense "while we contribute our combat assets."⁴⁰ This reticence on the part of the Guard reflects a fear that any change in mission may adversely affect the ARNG's relevance and this could later undermine support in any future fight over resources.

Currently, the Army Guard is making changes in one area that will allow it to respond to attacks of WMD. Thirty-one States have formed or are forming Civil Support Teams (CST's). These 22-man teams are specially trained and possess high-technology equipment capable of detecting and classifying a nuclear, biological, or chemical contaminant. These teams are expected to support the local first-responders and are not trained to become the lead agency in the event of a WMD attack.

This program is not without its detractors. A 2001 Rand study regarding the U.S. Army and Homeland Security states that the National Guard's CST's are costly and possess only enough decontamination capability to support its own team members. Further, the study points out that the Army Reserve Chemical Companies identified to perform decontamination on a wider scale have a competing warfighting mission that calls their availability for Homeland Defense into question.⁴¹

The utilization of the Army National Guard subsequent to the 11 September attacks is certainly germane to a discussion of Homeland Defense. The CST's that have been certified have responded to suspicious threats of anthrax and other agents as public consciousness of these kinds of threats has suddenly risen.⁴² However, it is the use of Guardsmen performing Homeland Defense missions on both Federal and State active duty status that is most telling. Following the attack, President Bush enacted a Partial Mobilization of reserve military forces. Under this provision, the Department of Defense can activate up to one million reservists for up to two years. By 12 December 2001, 8293 Army National Guardsmen were mobilized.⁴³ Primarily, these soldiers are being used to increase security at military and other federal Installations throughout the country.

Concurrent with the mobilization, the President ensured that the States received federal money to bring Guardsmen to State active duty status (Title 32). Over 7,000, Guardsmen in State active duty status have been used to guard airports, power plants, reservoirs and bridges⁴⁴. Since National Guard soldiers in Title 32 status are not prohibited from conducting

law enforcement activities they possess an additional deterrence capability when performing these missions. Facilitating the use of Guardsmen in both Federal and State active duty status, in each case in a suitable status, shows that President Bush and/or his advisors understand the unique capability that National Guardsmen possess for performing Homeland Defense.

During the 2000 Presidential election campaign the topic of National Missile Defense was much debated after candidate George W. Bush announced his intention to energize the plan to develop a shield against ballistic missiles over the United States. Although the amount of attention that has been paid to this plan has diminished subsequent to the September 11 attacks, the necessity for a shield against such missile attacks has been justified. National Missile Defense is easily classified as a Homeland Defense mission and both the National Guard and the Active Army recognize that the Guard should play a role in this mission. The 207th Infantry Group (Alaskan Scouts) has a major role in staffing and securing the facilities of the first site located in Alaska.⁴⁵ The North Dakota Army Guard is preparing to play a similar role for the second site located in their State and any subsequent locations will likely be staffed with Guardsmen as well.

WHAT THE STATES AND TERRITORIES NEED

The transformed Army National Guard will have to be able to perform two major missions for their States and Territories: defend the local population from attack and assist with disaster recovery. It is intriguing that the State militias' original purpose (local defense) has once again become so prominent in any current discussion of National Guard missions. In 2002, the biggest threat that the ARNG must defend against is an attack by a weapon of mass destruction. Certainly, the Army Guard is not standing alone in providing this defense. Preventing a WMD attack will require a concerted effort from many Federal and State agencies. For example, if an attack is likely, the Guard can activate, deploy in and around a State's cities and towns and attempt to stop such an attack. However, the National Guard's ability to predict the likelihood of such attacks is limited and must rely on the intelligence service of the Defense Department, CIA, FBI or local law enforcement.

Once alerted to the threat of an attack or when activated after an initial attack, the ARNG should be able to provide certain elements for an effective response. The first element is organization. The ARNG's military structure and planning and execution practices are unique among local responders. The second element is capability. The training and equipment that ARNG receives in preparation for its wartime missions allow the Guard to respond with the appropriate number of units with the required variety of capabilities unified under a headquarters

experienced in providing command and control to its assigned forces. The Rand study offers an illustrative vignette of how the U.S. would react to truck bombing of a nuclear reactor in a major metropolitan area. Describing the Army National Guards contribution to the response the study says:

Five National Guard NBC companies help monitor the edge of the hot zone. These units are augmented with six *Fuchs* reconnaissance vehicles airlifted to the scene from two different Army posts. The *Fuchs* vehicles' on-board sensors measure and report ground contamination. The National Guard orders a brigade equivalent into the area to provide security, help maintain public order, and assist in evacuating contaminated neighborhoods. A battalion of infantry augments local police and highway patrol at maintaining a perimeter just outside the hot zone. A transportation battalion supplements local school district and commercial buses to provide transportation for evacuees. Three forward support battalions from DISCOM work with the local Red Cross and emergency services to provide food, shelter, bath support, and clothing to the displaced.⁴⁶

Despite that fact that very few States have five chemical companies and a DISCOM assigned to them, this illustration provides insight on how the Army National Guard would organize and respond to a WMD attack.

The Army National Guard has established a reputation as an organization that arrives on the scene after a natural or manmade disaster, relieves suffering, mitigates damage, and restores services to the local populace. An early instance of this kind of service was the California National Guard's response to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.⁴⁷ More recently, the New York National Guard responded after a blizzard dumped seven feet of snow in five days on Buffalo.⁴⁸ As an organization, a State's National Guard has the essential elements to perform the disaster response mission. These include an organizational hierarchy and manpower. Through its wartime construct, a State's National Guard is organized into companies, battalions, brigades, etc. Although, each State possesses a State Area Command (STARC) headquarters to provide command and control over domestic operations, these headquarters act primarily as a linkage between the Civil authorities and the Guard units. The responsibility for the planning, controlling and executing the disaster response missions falls mainly on the "wartime" headquarters. This only makes sense as units will regularly train together on their federal mission and will establish many policies and procedures as organizations that are applicable to all situations.

Intuitively it seems that the amount of manpower that a State's National Guard possesses should relate to the size of the population that the Guard will have to help recover from disaster (or with respect to the previous section, providing Homeland Defense). Table 2 compares State Populations with available National Guard assets and shows each State's largest wartime

headquarters as well as the authorized strength of the Army Guard in that State. Many factors contribute to determining the size of the force that can be recruited to join the Army National Guard including economic, demographic and regional social attitudes toward military service. Certainly the size of the available population from which Guard members can be recruited is a factor. So, in general, Table 2 shows that the size of a State's National Guard correlates to population size.

Due to their special contributions to disaster recovery, there are four types of organizations that every Adjutant General wants to have in his force. These are Engineers, Aviation, Military Police, and Medical. Engineers have heavy equipment that can remove snow, dig out mudslides, remove fallen trees, and perform a myriad of other tasks. Helicopters are essential for conducting search and rescue operations, dropping water on forest fires, performing evacuations, and transporting supplies and leaders to a disaster scene. The training that Military Policemen receive for dealing with refugees in a theater, give them the appropriate skills for dealing with citizens in a disaster area. Also, the law enforcement training they receive allows them to effectively augment State and local police forces. Additionally, many Guardsmen will work for police agencies in their civilian jobs. This goes a long measure toward fostering cooperation between the Guard units and the civilian agencies with which they work. Last on this short list are Medical units. Nearly all disaster recoveries will require treatment for the injured and while civil, public, and private medical personnel and facilities will participate in this effort, Army Guard medical companies have some unique capabilities to offer to the effort. First of all, they are mobile, they can move their treatment assets and personnel to remote locations, set up close to the scene, and treat multiple casualties. Secondly, they have the ability to evacuate casualties over rough terrain.

During the Post-Cold War draw-down, the Army National Guard worked hard to make sure that the loss of force structure did not debilitate any State's ability to perform its disaster recovery mission. A significant amount of "push around" of units took place to ensure that each State had the right number of the necessary units. This is why the Army National Guard's Aviation Brigades are spread across the various states. In many cases, the Guard Aviation Battalions have their subordinate companies assigned to two or three different States so that as many States as possible will have helicopters available to them when necessary.

Table 2 shows the equivalent number of Military Police, Aviation, Engineer and Medical units that are assigned to each State and Territory. The Table shows that these assets are fairly well distributed across the Country. At the least, the States with the largest populations have sufficient assets. The table does not show the units that an Adjutant General has

available in the Air National Guard, which can perform disaster recovery missions. New Jersey, a State with no Army Guard Engineers, has the 177th Civil Engineering Squadron as part of its Air Guard.⁴⁹ Additionally, many States have signed compacts to share National Guard assets if necessary.

State	Population	Army Guard Strength	Organizational Headquarters	Military Police	Aviation	Engineer	Medical
CA	33,871,648	18,768	40th ID	1 BN	Brigade	Brigade	5 Co.'s
TX	20,851,820	18,588	49th AD	1 Co.	Brigade	Brigade	4 Co.'s
NY	18,976,457	12,935	42nd ID	3 Co.'s	2 BN's	2 BN's	2 Co.'s
FL	15,982,378	9,718	SIB		1 BN	2 Co.'s	2 Co.'s
IL	12,419,293	9,433	IN BDE	1 BN	1 BN	1 Co.	3 Co.'s
PA	12,281,054	18,037	28th ID	1 Co.	Brigade	2 BN's	3 Co.'s
OH	11,353,140	10,160	AR BDE	4 Co.'s	1 BN	Brigade	2 Co.'s
MI	9,938,444	8,773	IN BDE	Brigade	2 BN's	Brigade	1 Co.
NJ	8,414,350	7,434	IN BDE	1 Co.	1 BN		2 Co.'s
GA	8,186,453	9,708	SIB	2 Co.'s	1 BN	2 BN's	2 Co.'s
NC	8,049,313	10,087	SIB, FA BDE	3 Co.'s	1 BN	Brigade	1 Co.
VA	7,078,515	8,902	29th ID	1 Co.	1 BN	Brigade	1 Co.
MA	6,349,097	9,112	IN BDE	1 BN	1 BN	2 BN's	1 Co.
IN	6,080,485	13,239	38th ID	1 Co.	1 BN	1 BN	4 Co.'s
WA	5,894,121	5,732	SIB		2 BN's	1 Co.	1 Co.
TN	5,689,283	11,986	ACR, FA BDE	1 BN	3 Co.'s	1 BN	1 Co.
MO	5,595,211	8,157	FA BDE	3 Co.'s	2 BN	Brigade	1 Co.
WI	5,363,675	7,528	IN BDE, FA	1 Co.	1 BN	1 BN	2 Co.'s
MD	5,296,486	6,675	IN BDE	1 BN	1 BN	1 BN	2 Co.'s
AZ	5,130,632	4,117	FA BDE	1 Co.	1 BN	2 Co.'s	1 Co.
MN	4,919,479	9,785	34th ID	1 Co.	2 BN's	1 BN	1 Co.
LA	4,468,976	10,068	SIB	1 Co.	1 BN	4 BN's	1 Co.
AL	4,447,100	14,002	SAB	1 BN	1 BN	4 BN's	1 BN
CO	4,301,261	3,165	FA BDE	1 Co.	1 BN	2 Co.'s	1 Co.
KY	4,041,769	6,697	AR BDE,	1 BN	1 BN	2 BN's	2 Co.'s
SC	4,012,012	10,971	SIB, FA BDE, ADA BDE	2 Co.'s	1 BN	2 BN's	1 Co.
OK	3,450,654	7,003	SIB, FA BDE		1 BN	1 BN	2 Co.'s
OR	3,421,399	6,601	SIB		2 Co.'s	1 BN	1 Co.
CT	3,405,565	4,507	IN BN	1 Co.	1 BN	2 BN's	1 BN
IA	2,926,324	7,605	IN BDE	1 Co.	1 BN	1 BN	2 Co.'s
MS	2,844,658	10,722	SAB, FA BDE	1 BN	2 BN	2 BN's	1 Co.
KS	2,688,418	7,123	35th ID	1 Co.	1 BN	1 BN	
AR	2,673,400	8,530	SIB	1 Co.	1 BN	1 BN	3 Co.'s
UT	2,233,169	4,987	1 Corps ARTY		1 BN	Brigade	
NV	1,998,257	2,090	CAV SQND	1 Co.	2 Co.'s		
NM	1,819,046	3,993	ADA BDE				1 Co.
WV	1,808,344	3,614	AR BN	1 Co.	3 Co.'s	1 BN	
NE	1,711,263	4,838	IN BDE *		2 Co.		1 BN

State	Population	Army Guard Strength	Organizational Headquarters	Military Police	Aviation	Engineer	Medical
ID	1,293,953	3,565	CAV BDE		1 BN	1 BN	1 Co.
ME	1,274,923	2,604	FA BN, EN BN		2 Co.	1 BN	1 Co.
NH	1,235,786	2,041	FA BDE		1 Co		1 Co **
HI	1,211,537	3,428	SIB		3 Co.'s	1 Co.	1 Co.
RI	1,048,319	2,783	FA BDE,	1 BN	2 Co.'s	1 Co.	
MT	902,195	2,912	IN BN, FA BN		1 BN		
DE	783,600	1,888	Signal BDE	1 Co.	2 Co.'s	1 Co.	
SD	754,844	3,601	FA BDE	1 Co.		1 BN	1 Co.
ND	642,200	3,711	EN BDE		2 Co.'s	2 BN's	
AK	626,932	2,045	Scout Group		1 BN		
VT	608,827	4,041	AR BDE		1 Co.	1 Co.	1 Co.
WY	493,782	1,574	FA BDE		1 Co	2 Co.'s	1 Co. **
PR	3,808,610	7,371	SIB	1 BN	2 Co.'s	1 BN	1 Co.
DC	572,059	1,867	MP BDE	1 BN	1 Co.		1 Co. **
Gua	154,805	825	IN BN				
VI	108,612	913	MP Co.	1 Co.			

*This Brigade is converting to CS/CSS under ADRS.
**State or Territory's lone aviation company is an air ambulance unit.

TABLE 2 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DISASTER RESPONSE ASSETS ^{50 51 52}

There is a crisis in the making regarding aviation assets in the ARNG. It has always been true that the National Guard operates with outdated equipment, often long after it has been dropped from the inventories of the Active Army. The Army Guard is currently in the process of replacing its UH-1 Hueys with UH-60 Blackhawks and its AH-1 Cobras with OH-58D's, an armed reconnaissance helicopter.⁵³ This transition is many years from completion and as part of the Army's Transformation the retirement of Cobras and Hueys has been accelerated so that all UH-1's and AH-1's will be out of the Guard by 2004.⁵⁴ Reducing the number of types of helicopters will reduce the aviation operating costs for the Army, but it will also create an aircraft availability shortfall that concerns National Guardsmen. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), an effective lobbying group that works to build support of Guard issues has formed an Army Aviation Task Force that works to find solutions to this shortfall. Currently, they are trying to convince civilian and Army leaders to both extend the life of the UH-1's and to accelerate the fielding of Blackhawks in Army Guard units.⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The necessity of Army Transformation is clear. The end of the Cold War, the rise of nationalism and the ascending lethality of terrorism have dictated that the Army must change. A medium weight force makes a lot of sense for the missions that the 21st Century Army are likely

to be given. The question that has been raised here, based on the unique State and Federal missions that belong to the Guard, is whether the Army National Guard should transform in the manner that has been proscribed. Prior to Transformation the Army Guard has managed to maintain a balance of types of forces that could fulfill all of their required roles. Perhaps, a degree of mismatch between force structure and missions has existed for quite some time but the abundance of resources has masked potential problems.

A LIGHT INFANTRY-CENTRIC ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Several thinkers on the role of the Army National Guard have suggested that Light Infantry organizations would make the most sense for the Army Guard.^{56 57} This proposal deserves consideration at many levels. A Light Infantry based force could reinforce earlier committed forces or secure rear areas in a MTW. Light Infantry is valuable for urban or other complex terrain operations. Light Infantry forces combined with heavy augmentation have been the mainstays in the Balkans and in the Sinai and are likely to play similar roles in Afghanistan. Homeland Defense is another mission that Light Infantry, augmented with specialized equipment or units, could perform very adequately. After September 11, thirty-five Guard Infantry companies were mobilized to perform security missions throughout the U.S.⁵⁸ No Armor units were activated and no mechanized infantry companies were deployed with their tracked vehicles. In the previous chapter, it was discussed that for Disaster Recovery the National Guard supplies two elements: specialized capability and organizational hierarchy. As long as an appropriate measure of capability (again these are engineer, military police, aviation, and medical units) was assigned in conjunction, there is no reason that Light Infantry Divisions or Brigades could not perform the Domestic missions of the National Guard.

General Shinseki has stated that the entire Army will transform to the Objective Force.⁵⁹ Some leaders have not necessarily interpreted this as the death knell of all Light Infantry forces. The former Chief of Infantry, MG LeMonde has stated that Light Infantry Divisions will remain in the Active Army saying, "The capability of rapidly deploying an airborne, air assault or light infantry task force is of great strategic value." Further MG LeMonde says, "A balance between strategic and tactical mobility, lethality, survivability and sustainability is the goal of this transformation."⁶⁰ Between today and 2031 as the icy cold water of reality flows across the hot concept that is Army transformation, we may find that General LeMonde is correct and not all Light Infantry will disappear from the Active Army. If so, then a Light Infantry-centric Army National Guard is a logical possibility.

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

In the past, when it was suggested that the ARNG should convert all or most of its units to Light Infantry, the Adjutants General have rejected the proposal outright.⁶¹ They believe strongly that the Army National Guard should be structured as much like the Active Army as possible. There are several arguments that could be made to support this belief. The Army Guard relies on the Active Army "schoolhouse" for all its primary MOS and branch producing training. If the "skill-sets" between the Light Infantry National Guardsmen and the heavier Active Army soldiers grew to be disparate, the ARNG could not rely on Training and Doctrine Command's willingness or even ability to provide the training it needs. In a similar vein, the National Guard recruits many former Active Army soldiers into its ranks. More often than not, these soldiers join units that they can continue to use the skills (MOS's) that they acquired on active duty, and contribute a significant amount of expertise to their unit.

The strongest argument in support of the Army Guard looking like the Active Army is utility, which translates into relevance. The National Guard worked hard to get six National Guard Divisions apportioned on the JSCP. This inclusion is a cornerstone to the continued survival of the Guard Divisions. If the Army Guard only had Light Infantry formations to offer to a CINC, he may be less likely to include combat Guard units in his planning. If Transformation causes all Active Army units to become medium weight organizations and the Army National Guard fails to keep pace with that transition then it is doubtful that Army Guard Combat units would be called to fight in a MTW ever again.

A MISSION-FOCUSED TRANSFORMATION

Another possibility is that the Army Guard could become, if not totally Light, at least lighter. In 1997, General Griffith proposed that all the Guard's combat Brigade's except those in the 49th Division and the eight heavy enhanced brigades convert to Light Infantry. After ADRS and Transformation, this would translate to an Army Guard Objective Force with nineteen Light Infantry Brigades and eleven medium weight brigades. It could be said that an Army Guard with this force structure would have two-thirds of its combat force ideally suited for Small Scale Contingencies and Homeland Defense and the remaining one-third structured to fight in a MTW.

MISSIONING, STRUCTURING, AND EQUIPPING THE ARNG FORCE

The Army National Guard Objective Force will need several items to insure its success. These requirements will remain whether Transformation causes the Army Guard to get heavier, lighter or if it remains as is. The items that the Army Guard requires to succeed are missioning, the proper force structure, resources and leaders. The performance of Guard units in Bosnia

shows that they can be ready for a deployment when they are given a defined mission and adequate training time. The Army National Guard calls itself a full spectrum force, but it is unreasonable to expect Guard units to be prepared to conduct all types of missions on the high end of that spectrum. If for example, Divisions and Brigades were told to train to defend in Southwest Asia, or to train to counterattack in Korea, then organizations could devote their training time to those specific tasks. In this manner, proficiency would increase across a narrower field, however if the likely missions were spread among the thirty surviving combat brigades and a plan of execution was developed then the ARNG could in fact cover the spectrum.

ADRS and Transformation will do a great deal to affect the force structure of the Army Guard. Currently, over fifty percent of the Army Guard's force structure is in combat forces. After 2009, less than forty percent will be combat units. There is a delicate balance between the types of forces needed for warfighting, Homeland Defense, and State missions. Table 1 shows that ADRS actually produces more of the type of units that are most valuable in domestic emergencies. The cost of producing these units is organizational hierarchy as Brigades and Battalions are reorganized as dissimilar Companies. It will be up to the leadership in the National Guard to insure this cost does not degrade the ARNG's ability as a whole or any individual State's ability to perform its missions.

This project has identified three resource shortfalls that affect the Guard. One of them, MLRS's, degrade the Army Guard's readiness to perform a wartime mission. One, Chemical Decontamination Companies, affects the ARNG's readiness to conduct Homeland Defense and is being addressed through ADRS. The last shortfall, utility helicopters, has great impact on the Guard's ability to perform disaster recovery and wartime missions. The facts show that, of the three, the helicopter shortage is the greatest danger and should be given the highest priority in the transformation strategy.

IMPROVING READINESS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Transforming the Army National Guard will be a failure even after all the expense is paid to change units from one type to another and supplying new equipment to everyone if something is not done to improve readiness in Guard organizations. Several strategies have been applied to improve readiness including: re-allocating resources to priority units, the formation of Training Support Brigades to assist Guard units, and teaming Guard and Active organizations. Each of these measures will contribute to the readiness solution. However, they each have the same failing; they show Guard leaders how to lead rather than teach them about

leadership. The Army Guard will need a more professional officer corps and noncommissioned officer corps in order to accomplish the missions of a transformed force. The answer to this may lie in the schoolhouse, depend on mentorship, require that more Guard officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's) perform tours with the active Army, or require some combination of all three.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army National Guard will have to wait to see how the Transformation is going to affect the Active Army. If MG LeMoyne's prediction is correct and Light Infantry does not completely disappear then the Army Guard will have more options regarding its own transformation. Light Infantry is so capable of performing the Guard's missions that if available the ARNG should use that option to its advantage. Nevertheless, some portion of the Army Guard's forces must become Objective Force units. The National Guard cannot afford to be left behind as doctrine and capabilities advance. While the Army Guard's most important missions may be its Homeland Security and State missions, its relevance with regard to perceived importance will always be tied to an ability to go to war. For these reasons, it is the recommendation of this project that the Army Guard conduct a mission-focused transformation with the aim of deriving an organization of combat elements that is two-thirds Light Infantry and one-third Objective Force units.

Beginning now, the Guard should work toward becoming a lighter organization. As many as possible of the twelve combat brigades that convert to CS/CSS should be Armor or Mechanized Infantry Brigades (of the three currently being converted: one is armor, one is mechanized and one is an infantry mix). For the same reason, if the ARNG is able to nominate more brigades to become IBCT's, it should do just as it did with the 56th BDE of the 28th Division and nominate a heavy brigade.

The Army National Guard's ability to defend the U. S. Homeland is currently being tested. It very possibly will be a defining time for the Guard. After September 11th, every State wants to have a CST as part of their force structure. The ARNG should determine if this configuration and these capabilities are the ones that allow it to be ready to defend against a WMD attack. Part of this examination should include, as the Rand Study suggested, an evaluation of the adequacy of the decontamination capability throughout the Army available for Homeland Defense. There may be a need for other or new capabilities as well. If these are identified and the Army Guard declares that it needs them to conduct Homeland Defense, the present concerns of today will be a powerful catalyst that will ensure they are delivered.

The last recommendation regards the five requirements for success described earlier: missioning, structuring, equipping, improving readiness and developing leaders. All Army National Guard leaders recognize this list of requirements. These are things that Guardsmen have been working for long before GEN Shinseki announced the plan to transform the Army. Leaders of the Army National Guard should recognize that these requirements were needed prior to Transformation, are needed now in the midst of Transformation, and, in all probability, will still be needed long after the Army National Guard Transformation is complete. Then they should get to work.

WORD COUNT = 8193

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