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MOLDOVA:
ANALYZING US AND ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS

By

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4 February 2002

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

MOLDOVA: ANALYZING U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS

The republics of the Former Soviet Union are gaining the increased attention of both civilian policy makers and military planners. However, Moldova is probably the least known of the former republics. Except for the intense focus on Moldova in its brief struggle for independence, then again during the 1992 war for Transnistrian independence, little attention has been paid to this country. It is precisely because the potential problems in Moldova could pose a significant threat to regional security that Moldova should be studied in greater detail.

The United States, and CINCEUR in particular, should be concerned with the ethnic conflict between Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians, as well as other minority groups in Moldova, because of the inherent instability ethnic conflict injects into the dynamics of a region. The CINC should also be concerned with the potential terrorist problem of weapons trafficking through Moldova, the Transnistrian problem, human rights violations, particularly trafficking in women, and the KGB's suppression of basic freedoms. Mostly the CINC should use all available tools to prevent Moldova from becoming a failed state.

With this in mind then, the United States and its allies may have to conduct military operations in Moldova to maintain stability in the region or at least to resolve conflicts in Moldova before they threaten the security of neighboring states. The United States and NATO could accomplish this through peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is designed not just for civilian and military planners, but also for the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is focused at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war and provides an assessment of the possible military missions the United States and its allies might encounter in Southeast Europe in the next 20 years.¹ Specifically, this paper will address the Republic of Moldova in the context of Southeast Europe as it relates to the security and stability of Europe as well as neighboring states at the fringe of the former Soviet Union.² Since Moldova is neither a fossil fuel producer nor a nuclear power, it receives little attention in the world press. Western interest in general, and the interest of CINC USEUCOM (or CINCEUR as he is more commonly called) in particular, is low.³ However, the CINC should not overlook this small country.

Moldova, with its peculiarities, is probably the least known of the former Soviet Republics. Except for the intense focus on Moldova during its brief struggle for independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and then again during the 1992 war for Transnistrian independence from Moldova, U.S. military planners have paid little attention to this country.

Moldova is strategically located between East and West. It may soon border the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if Romania is invited to join the alliance. Additionally, because Moldova is almost a failed state, there are many pressing issues that the United States and its military should address in order to help ensure it does not become a failed state.⁴ It is precisely because of these potential problems that Moldova could pose a significant threat to regional security and why

Moldova could serve as a model for action in other countries that are at risk of becoming failed states.

CINCEUR should be concerned with the ethnic conflict among Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians, as well as other minority groups in Moldova, because of the inherent instability ethnic conflict injects into the dynamics of a region. The CINC should also be concerned with the potential terrorist problem of weapons trafficking through Moldova, the Transnistrian problem, human rights violations, particularly trafficking in women, and the Moldovan Federal Security Service's suppression of basic freedoms. Most important, the CINC should help prevent Moldova from becoming a failed state. With the potential for problems of this nature increasing, the U.S. government and the military must explore the requirements for military action in the region. Specifically, the CINC should employ peace operations, counterterrorism operations, humanitarian assistance and foreign internal defense, while continuing to plan for non-combatant emergency evacuation to prevent Moldova from becoming a failed state.

In order to prioritize potential missions and contingencies for U.S. forces in this area of the world, this paper will first examine failed states and why it is important that Moldova not fail. It will demonstrate how the ethnic conflict and potentially volatile separatist movement in Transnistria could contribute to instability in the region. It will then briefly summarize current U.S. and NATO programs in Moldova before discussing and analyzing the possible future military missions. Finally, this paper will summarize and prioritize the engagement tools for U.S. action in Moldova.

MOLDOVA: THE NEXT FAILED STATE

Failed States

A failed state is a one that can no longer provide services for its people. It is a state whose organs of government no longer function and can no longer fulfill the obligations of statehood. That is to say, it cannot keep the peace, govern, or protect the rights of its citizens or provide for them in a state of emergency. The leadership is not able “to compel internal order or to deter or repel external aggressions.”⁵ There are three broad categories of characteristics that show the potential for Moldova to become a failed state.

- *Weak state institutions that do not provide adequate services to the population, do not instill popular or ideological agreement in the society, and do not instill loyalty in the populace.*
- *Ethnic, social or economic class or ideological competition that the weak political and social institutions cannot improve.*
- *Combined effects of poverty, over-population, rural flight and rapid urbanization. Environmental degradation and a collapsed welfare system also exacerbate social conflict.*⁶

Moldova as a Failed State

In February 2001, the Communist Party won the majority of the seats in Moldova’s parliament and selected the party chair, Vladimir Voronin, as President. This government has not been strong enough to settle the separatist dispute in the Moldovan region of Transnistria. The separatists have had their own government since the early 1990s and are not loyal to the Moldovan government. The Transnistria separatist officials were even successful in preventing the people living in Transnistria from participating in the last round of national, parliamentary elections.⁷ Further, Moldova

has not been able to eliminate government corruption or redress inadequate legislation to protect human rights.⁸

Moldova also faces many challenges from ethnic competition and conflict. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the people of Moldova, like those of other republics, found themselves a people without a state and sought to forge a new nation or reestablish a lost one. This fact of history, combined with the loss of the communist ideology as a “glue,” created an atmosphere in which nationalistic aspirations were based on a shared ancestry. The effect of this combination of events was to create “nationalism [which] fills the void left by a system that attempted to impose uniformity in the name of an internationalist ideology.”⁹ The explosive result of this situation was the 1992 Transnistrian War for Independence.

In 1990, just before Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union, the pro-Russian Transnistria region broke away from Moldova because of fears that the ethnic Romanian majority would seek to reestablish ties or even unification with Romania. The war ended only after the Russian military intervened and mediated a settlement with the help of Ukraine and the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE).¹⁰ This separatist problem still exists, and the Moldovan government seems incapable of resolving it.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also ended the extensive, life-long welfare system of Soviet society. The Moldovan government remains unable to provide basic healthcare services for its people. Additionally, Moldova continues to battle both the effects of severe droughts and extensive damage from seasonal flooding. Furthermore, with a per capita Gross Domestic Product of \$353, 20% of the population lives below the

poverty line.¹¹ Environmental degradation also plagues this country because the government continues its extensive use of banned agricultural chemicals and pesticides that contaminate soil and groundwater.¹² Clearly, Moldova already exhibits many of the characteristics of a failed state.

Why it Matters if States Fail

Failed states decrease the stability of a region. They also tend to attract terrorists because terrorists and organized crime thrive in instability and chaos. Most stable governments, therefore, perceive it to be in their best interests to prevent neighboring states from failing. Governments want to eliminate the widespread human suffering that most often accompanies failed states. Also, failed states, that “cannot fulfill the obligations of society, undermine the world order.”¹³ Some, however, argue just the opposite. Ralph Peters contends that the United States has chosen to defend the current world order in its quest for world stability. “In one of the greatest acts of self-betrayal in history, the nation that long was the catalyst of global change and which remains the beneficiary of international upheaval has made stability its diplomatic god.”¹⁴ According to Peters, the last two centuries were the age of devolution, where old forms of government were cast aside and territories were reorganized according to the popular will. He further argues that the United States is “trying to freeze history in place. And it cannot be done. In our ill-considered pursuit of stability (a contradiction in terms), we have raised up devils, from terrorists to dictators, who will not be easily put down.”¹⁵ Those who support Peters would argue that not only should the CINC do nothing further to prevent Moldova from becoming a failed state, but that the CINC should stop those

programs currently in place. However, this is not the position of the U.S. government. The United States is concerned with promoting stability and preventing large-scale human suffering in an effort to prevent more children from starving in places like Somalia, as well as preventing genocide in places like Rwanda and the Balkans.

CURRENT U.S. AND NATO PROGRAMS IN MOLDOVA

Recognizing that continued instability, ethnic conflict and potentially open warfare in Moldova (and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe) would adversely affect European security, CINCEUR seeks to promote stability and democracy, as well as foster military professionalism as part of his Theater Engagement Plan. USEUCOM conducts Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in Moldova and other neighboring countries. It also invites officers and government officials from Moldova to study at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. The Marshall Center trains middle and senior level military and government officials from the Former Soviet Union nations while fostering closer relationships with the U.S. Army Eurasian Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) who also study there.

NATO is also actively involved with Moldova and is concerned with the potential volatility of ethnic conflict, seeking to avoid future conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo. Through PfP exercises, Moldova will gain familiarity with NATO procedures. Similarly, these exercises will facilitate NATO's development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for use during future operations that NATO might conduct in Moldova or with Moldovan forces outside of Moldova. The following exercises were recently conducted: COOPERATIVE BEST EFFORT 2000, an exercise whose aim was to expand and improve political and military cooperation, helped each participating nation learn to conduct peace support

operations through cooperation and familiarization with NATO procedures, while learning about each other's capabilities.¹⁶

EXERCISE CORNERSTONE 00-1, an exercise in which Army National Guard engineers from North Carolina and U.S. Navy SEABEES from South Carolina deployed to Moldova as part of the State Partnership Program. During this two-month exercise, engineers from North Carolina and Moldova shared construction techniques while conducting small unit training and constructing a medical clinic, which will provide basic medical care for more than 600 children.¹⁷ Such Cornerstone projects enhance regional stability, provide needed facilities in Moldova and give U.S. and Moldovan participants the opportunity to learn more about each other.

PEACESHIELD 01, an exercise in which more than 200 U.S. Soldiers, Airmen and Marines deployed to Ukraine to participate with Moldovan forces in the Southern European Task Force (Airborne) sponsored, computer-driven, command post exercise which helped train battalion commanders and staffs. It also helped them develop TTPs for peace support operations.¹⁸

In the spirit of greater NATO-Moldovan cooperation, the Moldovan Prime Minister, Vasile Tarlev, visited NATO Headquarters in May 2001 and announced his country's intention to "broaden and extend cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, namely in the field of peacekeeping operations."¹⁹ Additionally, in 2001 Moldova formed a peacekeeping battalion whose commander is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. This battalion will be the first to participate in future NATO peacekeeping missions in which Moldovan forces play a role.²⁰ From this cooperation, both sides are starting to build better relations and are fostering interoperability while advancing regional stability. However, these programs are only the beginning.

THE MOST IMPORTANT AND MOST LIKELY MISSIONS IN THE REGION

If the United States is committed to increasing the security of the region, it cannot wait to see if Moldova will fail as a state. The CINC should act now. He should initiate

the following military missions. They are prioritized on a scale of most important and most likely, to least troublesome for the CINC.

Peace Operations

There are two areas of Moldova that are plagued with ethnic conflict. The first area is Gagauzia, where ethnic Gagauz declared a separatist republic in August 1995. This area is located in the southern portion of Moldova and the ethnic Gagauz there represent 64% of the total population.²¹ Overall, the Gagauz represent less than four percent of the country's total population.²² To date, the Gagauz have not committed any hostile acts and appear content to have vocalized their desires for autonomy. Therefore, the likelihood of ethnic unrest reaching the level of armed conflict in Gagauzia is unlikely. However, this may not be true for the second Moldovan area of ethnic conflict.

The second area of Moldova beset by ethnic conflict is Transnistria. This region, east of the Nistru River and bordering Ukraine, is very important to Moldova because it contains the vast majority of the nation's significant industrial potential. For example, The Ribnitsa Steel Mill, located in Transnistria, is one of the finest such plants in the world.²³

The ethnic Russians in Transnistria have formed their own government. In December 2001, Igor Smirnov was overwhelmingly elected for a third five-year term as President of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic.²⁴ While the nation's overall ethnic breakout is 65% Moldovan and only 13% Russian, the population of Transnistria is 23% Russian, 40% Moldovan and 28% Ukrainian.²⁵ Even though the vast majority of the citizens are non-Russians ethnically, the ethnic Russian separatists are in control. The

only solution Transnistrian leaders will accept is the creation of a loose confederation of independent states in Moldova that would give Transnistria total autonomy and independence from the rest of Moldova.²⁶

Just before Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union, ethnic Russian separatists in Transnistria declared independence from the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They did this in part because they feared the ethnic Moldovans would seek reunification with their ethnic kin in Romania. The situation quickly worsened, and hundreds of people were killed in the armed conflict that ensued, before the Russian Army forces still stationed in the area enforced a cease fire.²⁷

As of January 2002, there are more than 2,500 Russian troops still deployed in Transnistria, despite continued protests by the Moldovan government. These forces are equipped with a large arsenal of Soviet-era weapons and ammunition. Further, these forces remain in Transnistria against Moldova's will even though Moscow, in an OSCE agreement signed in 1999, pledged to withdraw these forces.²⁸ Moscow continues to claim its right under international law to protect its citizen abroad and thus feels the right to act as arbiter of peace in the region.²⁹

The seriousness of the situation is routinely evidenced. One example is the 13 May 2001 incident when border guards at a checkpoint along the Moldovan-Transnistria boundary refused to allow Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin passage. The border guards claimed that they were so ordered by a "higher authority" in Tiraspol, the capital of the breakaway republic.³⁰ It is difficult to say how long Moldovan President Voronin will tolerate this situation. However, it is clear that any action he takes militarily will pit Moldovan forces against not just Transnistrian forces, but also potentially against Russian

forces. This is exactly the type of situation likely to disrupt the stability and security of the region—precisely the type of situation the United States would seek to prevent.

Clearly, Moscow is interested in Moldova. Russian leaders may see their role in Moldova as a part of a greater scheme to regain some regional influence, to play a greater role in NATO, or even for increased U.S.-Russian military operations. Russia may want to ensure it can influence and protect its citizens abroad. Some analysts would even argue that Moldova is a potential staging point for Russian operations in Central Europe.³¹ Another possible explanation is that Moscow has not abandoned its imperial claims and seeks a political and military foothold from which to expand its influence on Europe.³²

The worst case scenario is one where the situation again devolves into open hostilities and Moldovan forces clash with the separatists alone or against the separatists assisted by Russian forces. It is in this case that CINCEUR would have to consider the feasibility of combat operations to restore stability to the region. If he could not find a peaceful resolution, he might call for the introduction of the Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) troops to act as peacekeepers.³³ U.S. forces would intervene only to prevent wholesale human rights violations or war crimes that the SEEBRIG troops could not stop.³⁴

Recommendation: The CINC should design future exercises with SEEBRIG troops that focus on peacekeeping missions. U.S., NATO and SEEBRIG forces should develop common operating procedures to facilitate working together in future peace operations. The Marshall Center should provide U.S. Army FAOs to act as liaison officers to the

Moldovan Ministry of Defense and to assist in all future training. The Marshall Center should also ensure that a Moldovan representative is enrolled in its program of study each year.

Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Another tool the CINC has at his disposal to shape the environment and promote stability is Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations. These operations often have an immediate impact. They help feed and care for a population while working to reestablish normalcy and promote stability. They are also extremely visible and demonstrate the United States' willingness to help. Additionally, Moldova is in dire need of HA Operations and would almost certainly appreciate such assistance.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, health care in Moldova was severely affected. Today, not only is the state no longer paying the subsidy for universal health care, but private health care is severely limited and beyond affordability for the majority of Moldovan citizens. As a result, the general health of the population has deteriorated while incidences of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases are reaching epidemic proportions. Additionally, natural disasters such as earthquakes, severe storms, flash floods and mudslides punish the citizenry each year. Experts estimate that more than 150,000 people live in the basins of the Dniester and Byk Rivers. These zones are under a constant threat of flood.³⁵ Poverty is so widespread that it could more accurately be described as destitution. With this type of poverty, many people, especially children, suffer from malnutrition.

Presently, international organizations are sponsoring many humanitarian programs. They include Visiting Nurses Services which provides medical supplies, wheelchairs, crutches, informational pamphlets and even bicycles to help medical professionals visit the sick. Another agency, Pharmacutists Without Borders, participates in the international medical care effort in Moldova. The Red Cross provides Mobile Technical Teams to teach local professionals and has established food distribution centers and a hot meal program.³⁶ While these international organizations are making a difference in Moldova, their programs are not sufficient to care for the people and prevent them from losing confidence in their government's ability to provide for them--a fundamental characteristic of failed states. To ensure this does not occur, the CINC should add his resources to the HA effort.

The U.S. Army does not lack experience in conducting HA Operations. USEUCOM has gained a wealth of experience from performing similar operations throughout Europe. Since numerous PfP exercises have had a HA focus, the CINC and his staff should have minimal difficulties executing future shaping operations of a similar design.

Recommendation: The CINC should increase mobile technical team visits that have medical, dental or emergency preparedness focuses. He should also plan civil engineering unit exchanges during which U.S., NATO and Moldovan forces would build medical facilities and emergency action centers or other needed infrastructure. The CINC should plan to establish a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center to serve as

his crisis action center and work with future Disaster Assistance Response Teams that may be established by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Counterterrorism Operations

As a country on the political and possibly cultural border between East and West, Moldova is in a geographically advantageous position to serve as a criminal transit point. This geographic position, coupled with the country's extreme poverty, creates even more favorable conditions for Moldova to engage in and profit from all varieties of international crime. A recent World Bank report includes Moldova as a country in which one-fifth of the population lives below the poverty line. The report also stated that the economic situation is so bad that Moldova has become a major supplier of illicit human organs.³⁷ The potential income from international crime becomes even more attractive under these conditions. These same conditions also make Moldova attractive as a potential safe haven for terrorists. Countries typically become safe havens for terrorists either because the government is unable to control its territory or because the government is complicit. While there is no evidence that Moldova is willing to harbor terrorist groups, there is ample evidence to show that the Moldovan government is not in control of its territory or its borders.

The CINC must also consider the problem of Moldova's porous borders in light of efforts to combat terrorism in this region. The United States is not alone in its concern with porous borders. The European Union directs that all ex-communist candidate countries secure their borders and tighten controls to prevent illegal immigration before it will allow these nations access to the Union. The CINC should be most concerned about

arms smuggling and illegal immigration. However, drug trafficking, car theft, and trafficking in women are also significant international problems.³⁸

Especially after the events of September 11, 2001, the CINC should focus attention on anti-terror activities in Moldova. Moldova is not currently a high threat terrorist country, but as U.S. forces eliminate terrorist operating bases in other countries, the likelihood that Moldova will become a new hiding place will increase. The Romanian Interior Ministry reports that the Romania-Moldova border has become a popular point for smuggling illegal immigrants into Western Europe. “Almost daily, Romanian border police are confronted with...people who attempt illegally to cross the Moldovan border into Romania, helped by professional guides. [They include] people from Afghanistan, Iran, even from some African countries.”³⁹ Last year alone, Romanian police turned back almost 10,000 illegal immigrants.

Recommendation: The CINC should not wait until Moldova is a safe haven for terrorists. He should make a positive and immediate impact in the fight against terrorists by helping to decrease or even stop this cross-border, East-to-West trafficking. As Moldova and Romania come to terms with passport control, the CINC should use technical training teams to teach border guards the latest TTPs through the International Military Education and Training program. Additionally, the CINC should provide qualified U.S. and NATO Military Liaison Teams. These teams would train and work with the Moldovans at border checkpoints, initially as part of PfP exercises, to make illegal transit into Moldova more difficult for terrorists. Further, the United States should supply new equipment for detection and communications as part of the Foreign Military

Sales Program. Once they have learned the latest techniques and have upgraded their equipment, Moldovan forces will provide this security for themselves. These options provide the CINC with the shaping tools to increase the security and stability of Moldova.

Nation Assistance/Foreign Internal Defense

In its effort to promote democracy, freedom and open international trade, the United States is committed to diplomatic, material, and instructional means of assistance to friendly nations that face threats to their internal security. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) involves all aspects of national power and can be focused at various levels.

Training, material, technical and organizational assistance, as well as advice, infrastructure development and tactical operations, are all a part of FID.⁴⁰ However, three conditions must be met before the U. S. government considers FID operations:

1) Existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States supports U.S. national strategic goals; 2) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance; and 3) The threatened nation requests U.S. assistance.⁴¹ Assuming that the United States has a strategic interest in the stability of Europe and that unrest in Moldova could potentially destabilize Europe, the likelihood of FID operations in Moldova are moderately high. Moreover, the Moldovan government might seek assistance from the United States to ensure that it does not have to rely on Moscow for assistance.

Renewed ethnic violence would make Moldova unstable. Open warfare in Transnistria between the separatists and the Moldovan military could quite possibly lead

to the introduction of Russian forces into the conflict. If the Russian forces now stationed in Transnistria entered into hostilities, Moscow would be compelled to send additional forces to intervene. This would increase Moscow's influence, not just in Moldova but in the region as well. Also, one cannot discount Ukrainian or Romanian interests in a stable Moldova. Surely these two countries would consider it in their best interests to assist in keeping the peace. However, the likelihood of renewed hostilities is low. The Transnistrian peace settlement, although ideal for neither side, has been working with few difficulties for almost a decade.

The question remains: would Moldova ask for U.S. assistance? Even if Moldova did ask for such help, it might not be politically feasible for the United States to intervene. Any military force, therefore, should consist of international peacekeepers and not solely American units. It is unlikely, then, that the CINC will conduct combat operations in Moldova with U.S. forces. However, he should continue those FID operations that deal with security assistance and exchange programs.

Recommendation: The CINC should establish military exchanges and create training programs for local forces and leaders that focus on civil-military cooperation. He should provide intelligence, communications and logistical support to local operations. He should task the Security Assistance Officer in Moldova to tailor PFP exercises to increase interoperability among U.S., NATO and Moldovan forces. These exercises should include counter drug operations, checkpoint control and security and emergency response planning. In this manner, the CINC would use all the tools at his disposal to promote stability in Moldova.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) are always a possibility. The likelihood of a NEO in Moldova increases whenever the internal stability of the nation degrades or an existing hot spot flares up anew. While there is always such a possibility, it is not very likely that such a situation will arise in Moldova's immediate future. Nevertheless, the CINC must have a NEO plan.

If the Ambassador orders an evacuation, then the CINC will need to ensure the safe departure of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. civilians working in the country. Additionally, there may be other third country foreign nationals who would seek assistance from the United States. This type of extraction is routinely planned by country teams as part of their emergency action plans and poses very little difficulty for the CINC provided that U.S. firms with U.S. citizens working in Moldova develop their own emergency action plans in conjunction with the country team.

Recommendation: The CINC should work closely with the embassy's country team to revise the NEO plan and ensure that it includes the evacuation of U.S. civilians working in Moldova.

CONCLUSION

The recommendations in this paper present CINCEUR with the essential information needed to focus the operational plan of engagement in Moldova. This paper presents a definition of a failed state and shows that Moldova is already exhibiting many of the classic characteristics of a failed state. It shows the CINC the complexity of the growing ethnic conflict and separatist movement in Transnistria and the potential terrorist threat that might adversely affect the stability of the region. It further shows why U.S. and NATO interests in regional security will continue to increase in response to these threats. Therefore, it follows that U.S. involvement in Moldova should also continue to grow. More important, this paper has assessed the likelihood of the possible military missions in Moldova, and has provided the CINC with a rough plan of action. The CINC should therefore revise his engagement plan for Moldova with an added emphasis on preventing it from failing as a state. He should do this while preparing to conduct the entire spectrum of military operations in the region.

NOTES

¹ While this paper, by necessity, will include some theater-strategic focus, it will mainly address the operational level of war and analyze the missions and contingency plans the CINC may have to rely on to insure stability in his area of responsibility.

² The Republic of Moldova occupies land that was, until 1991, part of the Soviet Union. See Appendix A for a more detailed history of the Moldovan people and the land they possess.

³ This CINC wears two hats. CINC EUCOM is also the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for NATO forces (SACEUR).

⁴ Brendon McAloon, McAloonBB@state.gov "Research Topics" [E-mail to Steven Sabia sabias@nwc.navy.mil] 5 October 2001. LTC Brendon McAloon is the Defense Attache in Moldova.

⁵ Douglas Dearth, "Failed States: An International Conundrum," McLean: Joint Military Intelligence College, 121.

⁶ Ibid, 121-122. Dearth provides this model to show the patterns failed states exhibit.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Background Note: Moldova, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm.htm/> [8 January 2002].

⁸ U.S. Department of State, Country Narratives, Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2001. <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/tiprpt/2001/index.cfm/> [27 November 2001]

⁹ Vaclav Havel, "Dilemmas of Post Communist Development," The National Idea in Eastern Europe. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company 1996, 128.

¹⁰ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), "Moldova: Smirnov Reelected Leader of Breakaway Transdniester," 2.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Background Note: Moldova, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm.htm/> [8 January 2002]. Note: the GDP fell from \$527 in 1997 to \$353 in 2000.

¹² CIA, World Factbook-Moldova, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html/> [9 January 2002].

¹³ Dearth, 122.

¹⁴ Ralph Peters, "Stability, America's Enemy," Parameters, Vol, XXXI, No. 4, (Winter, 2001-2002), 5.

¹⁵ Ibid, 9.

¹⁶ The Maple Leaf/ Feuille D'Erable, "Partnership for Peace: A Learning Experience," <http://www.ins-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/isn/ConverDocCGI.htm/> [7 January 2002].

¹⁷ Defense Link/Pentagon News Release, "Engineers Deploy to Moldova for Cornerstone Exercise," http://defenseink.mil/news/Jun2000/b06292000_bt371-00.html/ [27 November 2001].

¹⁸ United States European Command (USEUCOM), "Peaceshield 01," <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Exercises/Peaceshield.htm/> [7 January 2002].

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Update, "Moldova to Develop Relations with NATO," 15 May 2001, <http://isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/isn/ConvertDocCGI.htm/> [7 January 2002].

²⁰ Brendon McAloon, McAloonBB@state.gov "Research Topics" [email to Steven Sabia sabias@nwc.navy.mil] 05 January, 2002.

²¹ Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 218.

²² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Background Note: Moldova, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm.htm/> [8 January 2002].

²³ Brendon McAloon, McAloonBB@state.gov "Research Topics" [E-mail to Steven Sabia sabias@nwc.navy.mil] 14 December 2001.

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- ²⁴ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Moldova: Smirnov Re-Elected Leader of Breakaway Transdnier,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/12/10122001080221.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ²⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Background Note: Moldova, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm.htm/> [8 January 2002].
- ²⁶ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Moldova: Moscow and Chisinau Initial Bilateral Agreement,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/11/06112001083532.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ²⁷ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Moldova: Moscow and Chisinau Initial Bilateral Agreement,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/11/06112001083532.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ²⁸ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Moldova: Transdnier Denies President Access to Monastery,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/15052001121817.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ²⁹ Pavel Baev, “Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Union,” <http://isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/isn/ConvertDocCGI.htm/> [7 January 2002].
- ³⁰ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Moldova: Transdnier Denies President Access to Monastery,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/15052001121817.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ³¹ Federation of American Scientists/Military Analysis Network, “Moldova,” <http://fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/moldova.htm> [7 January 2002].
- ³² Wilbur E. Gray, “The Chivalrous Republic: Intrarepublic Conflict and the Case Study of Moldova,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 10.
- ³³ SEEBRIG is the military arm of the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerials which consists of Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Greece, and Italy with Croatia having observer status.
- ³⁴ Brendon McAloon, McAloonBB@state.gov “Research Topics” [E-mail to Steven Sabia sabias@nwc.navy.mil] 23 January 2002.
- ³⁵ Humanitarian Assistance Situation Report, 21 August 2001, <http://isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/isn/ConvertDocCGI.htm/> [7 January 2002].
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “USSR Breakup: Historian Explains Phenomenon of Soviet Nostalgia,” <http://rferl.org/nca/features/2001/12/14122001100541.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ³⁸ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Romania: Officials Introduce Passport Controls for Moldovans,” <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/04/25042001120216.asp/> [9 January 2002].
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, (Joint Pub 3-07.1), (Washington, D. C.: 26 June 1996), vii.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, viii.

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APPENDIX A

Timeline of Important Events

Eighteenth Century

- 1792 Ottoman Empire cedes all of its holding in Transnistria to the Russian Empire.

Nineteenth Century

- 1812 Bessarabia is incorporated into the Russian Empire under the Treaty of Bucharest after the Russo-Turkish War (1806-12)
- 1858 Moldovan territory west of the Prut River is united with Walachia. Alexandru Ioan Cuza is elected prince of the two regions the following year.

Twentieth Century

- 1917 February Revolution and Bolshevik Revolution bring down the Russian Empire. Bessarabia's newly created National Council declares Bessarabia the independent Democratic Moldovan Republic, federated with Russia.
- 1918 Bessarabia declares its complete independence from Russia and votes to unite with Romania.
- 1924 Soviet government creates the Moldovan Autonomous Oblast on the east bank of the Nistru River. Seven months later, the oblast is upgraded to the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldovan ASSR).
- 1940 Bessarabia is occupied by Soviet forces as a result of the secret protocol attached to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.
- The Soviet government creates Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR) from most of Bessarabia and a portion of Moldavian ASSR.
- 1941 Germany and Romania attack Moldavian SSR and Ukrainian SSR; Germany gives Bessarabia and Transnistria to Romania.
- 1944 Soviet forces reoccupy Bessarabia and Transnistria.
- 1947 Bessarabia and Transnistria are formally returned to the Soviet Union by a treaty.

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- 1989 Transnistrian Popular Front is formed.
- 1990 Gagauz declare an independent “Gagauz Republic.
Slavs in Transnistria proclaim independent “Dniester Moldavian Republic” and elect a president.
- 1991 August Coup d’etat takes place in Moscow
- 1992 Government of Moldova declares state of emergency following unsanctioned elections in Transnistria. Armed resistance by separatists escalates to full-scale civil war in Transnistria.
- 1994 Moldova and Russia sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria, but only Moldova governemtn approves it.
- 2001 Moldovan citizens overwhelmingly vote in a communist government.

SOURCE: Library of Congress. Country Study-Moldova,
<<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mdtoc.html#md0005>>

APPENDIX B

Maps

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|-------|---|
| Map 1 | Moldova in relation to Southeast Europe |
| Map 2 | Moldova in relation to its neighbors |

SOURCE: University of Texas, Online Map Collection – Moldova, <<http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/moldova.jpg>> [8 January 2002]. The library's web link shows the Central Intelligence Agency as the original source of the maps.