Combat Search and Rescue: An American Way of War
Abstract
This paper examines the period that has had the greatest impact on present CSAR force structure, namely, the years of the conflict in Southeast Asia during the period 1961 to 1975. If one believes that military operations throughout the entire spectrum of conflict can only be successfully executed if the people support the decisions of the government and the actions of the forces in the field, then the armed forces must be capable of effecting the recovery of isolated personnel during these operations. In future conflicts, operations, or wars a commander who shapes the battlespace by using air power may encounter an American public that will probably expect a minimum of casualties and the timely recovery of any downed aircrew not immediately captured. Consequently, as we enter the 21st century, our leaders must understand that CSAR is not a 'nice to have' capability. It is a requirement for a nation that relies on decisive air power, precision engagement, and dominant maneuver. These discussions should help to confront the corollary questions, to what length should the U.S. armed forces conduct CSAR and can our current CSAR capability meet the requirements of our nation and military commanders at both the strategic and operational levels of war?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA401171
Entities
People
- Christopher C. Dunphy
Organizations
- Marine Corps University