Linebacker II: Achieving Strategic Surprise

Abstract

This paper examines the Linebacker II campaign conducted at the end of the Vietnam War. During an eleven-day period between 18 and 29 December, 1972, strategic airpower was used to coerce the North Vietnamese Government back to negotiations aimed at ending the war. Tailored rules of engagement and a clear objective equated to mission success and a clearly defined end state. President Nixon stated his political objective and military power provided the means to achieve his goal. The air campaign stands as a successful example of the proper use of military means to obtain a political end. The campaign is also a classic study of achieving strategic level surprise as defined by the principles of war. Clausewitz contends that surprise is more readily attainable at the tactical level of war. Linebacker II is noteworthy for achieving surprise at the highest echelon of war despite clear indications to the enemy that attack was imminent. It was a demonstration of President Nixon's resolve triumphing in a clash of wills.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 04, 2002
Accession Number
ADA401178

Entities

People

  • Gregory S. Clark

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Agreements
  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Aircrafts
  • Bombing
  • Defense Systems
  • Governments
  • Military Operations
  • National Security
  • North Vietnam
  • Security
  • United States
  • Vietnam War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies