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Operational Logistics: The need for a Joint Logistics Command, who is best for the job?

By

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USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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Signature_____

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CAPT Chet Helms & COL Marv Englert
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Introduction

As America ventures into the 21st century, the military faces increased responsibilities all over the globe. Military missions cross the entire spectrum of crisis intervention, from humanitarian assistance to peace operations to high-intensity conflict. This increased responsibility has been coupled with an extensive decrease in force structure. In just the last 15 years, the Armed Forces have suffered a 30 percent loss in manpower along with a 40 percent cut in defense budget and a 70 percent reduction of weapon systems acquisition.[1] In addition, the US has withdrawn two-thirds of its ground forces and three-fourths of its air forces from Europe, leaving a large void in the logistics infrastructure available for conducting overseas operations.

For the past twenty years, from Grenada to our current war against terrorism, the United States has fought as a joint force, with more emphasis on doing it effectively after the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. If these wars/conflicts are any indication of the future, then joint force commanders need a tool to handle the myriad of logistical problems that they will confront. Logistics management remains one of the most important areas contributing to the success of a joint force, yet there have been few advances in methods or thinking to improve its effectiveness and efficiency for a joint commander. Most of the attention has been given to forming joint headquarters for managing the fight while very little work has centered on the joint management of the logistics mission. This paper argues that the Department of Defense should focus on joint logistics command and control and a single joint logistics commander, with the automation and trained staff required to manage the entire process of sustaining a deployed force is the key for the formation of a joint logistics command. This will not relieve the individual Services from their responsibility of providing support for their deployed forces, but will enable the joint force commander to reduce redundancy, improve efficiency and keep him aware of his logistics capabilities or shortfalls in the operational area. The additionally important requirements for a joint logistics command are the ability to interface with the strategic level of support, an organic capability to execute several

logistics functions such as supply, maintenance, transportation and Reception, Staging Onward Integration (RSO&I).

To determine which organization is best suited for serving as a joint logistics command this paper will examine the requirements of a typical joint force, examine the logistic capabilities of the different services and make the determination based upon an organizations ability to plan, coordinate and distribute resources to a joint force, ability to interface with the strategic level of logistics, embedded organic capabilities, and the command and staff level of training and experience.

The goal of joint warfare is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. [2] The joint logistics command must be capable of deploying early to assess the situation, and be able to access data on all logistics assets in the theater of operations, have the authority to take immediate action concerning the movement of supplies, support equipment and personnel to respond to changes in mission. Additionally, this command would have the ability to support the majority of a joint force with units or organizations that are part of their normal organization. "Joint force commanders (JFCs) organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs' vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations".[3]

There are pre-identified units that could be called upon as potential Joint Task Force headquarters in all five geographic commands.[4] The vast majority of these commands have imbedded logistic units or subordinate commands that could possibly fulfill the requirements of a joint logistics command. Considering our recent history, of the past twenty years, it is logical to assume that any joint operation that we undertake in the future will involve some sort of ground force, whether it is Army or Marines. This paper will show that both of these organizations have the capability to serve as a joint logistic command and train to function as such, but that the Marines limited logistical capability and the Army's USC Title 10 responsibilities make the Army best suited to serve as joint logistics commands. The problems associated with assuming this role are numerous and include support responsibilities for remaining customers if they are not all within the Joint

Operations Area (JOA), service rivalries, command and control, asset visibility, transportation arrangements, and information sharing. With all of this taken into consideration, the Army's Corps Support Commands (COSCOMs) are the best suited to serve as joint logistic commands for future Joint Task Forces that are Corps size or below, and Theater Support Commands (TSCs) if the joint force is larger. The Army's COSCOMs and TSCs have robust and capable supply, maintenance and transportation units embedded in them, in addition to a command and control structure and staff that is routinely called upon to participate in joint exercises. Common to both of the organizations is the need for specific expertise from the other Services.

What are the typical logistic requirements of a Joint Force

Each joint force will have a varying degree of logistical requirements but they can be generalized into six broad functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services.[5] In addition to these broad areas, one of the most important requirements of a joint force is a command and control system with the automation and trained personnel needed to manage the entire process of sustaining a deployed force. The inefficient process used during the Persian Gulf War of sending large quantities of supplies and materiel to the JOA and hoping by virtue of the quantities sent, that each unit would end up with what it needed, is no longer acceptable in the days of the post draw-down military of the United States. This practice also does not fit the requirements of minimizing the logistics tail and maximizing the combat power that technology can provide, and the civilian sector have been using for the past several years.[6] Now let us examine the options that are available.

Air Force Logistics

The Air Force is increasingly called upon to deploy on short notice to unpredictable locations throughout the world. Continued political expectations for a high operating tempo and rapid-response capability have led the Air Force to develop Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF) to provide sustainable, quick- strike capabilities for global power projection. This new expeditionary operational concept in turn led to an agile combat support (ACS) system that can quickly provide

supplies, munitions, and transportation. ACS involves integrated information systems and improved transportation to streamline the infrastructure used to support combat operations and sustain operational systems. "Combat support provides the foundation for and is the enabler of the Air Force core competencies".[7] The operational unit that supports this concept is the Air Force Contingency Supply Squadron (AFCSS). The AFCSS provides global supply, fuels, accounting, and supply computer support to the geographical combatant commanders or major air force command, during wartime, contingency, natural disaster, or humanitarian relief operations. The level of support provided by the AFCSS is situational driven and depends on the support requested. The AFCSS provides limited support for deployments less than 30 days. For operations greater than 30 days, the AFCSS provides full supply support to include those already mentioned and the monitoring of all requisitions and base operating support.

Additionally, the Air Force is now using fast, high-reliability transportation and information systems to deliver the right parts to the right place at the right time. This approach increases the Air Force operational capability while reducing both its mobility footprint and cost, which in the end reduces the vulnerability of our forces. The efficiency and flexibility of the ACS concept substitutes responsiveness for massive deployed inventories.

Air Force logisticians also utilize the concept of time-definite resupply, a fundamental shift in the way that deployed forces have been supported. Resupply of deployed forces begins upon arrival, reducing the initial lift requirement. Time-definite delivery forms the basis for all resupply in the theater, thus reducing total lift requirements. When combat commanders require an item, the system will reach back to the continental United States and deliver it where and when it is needed. This reach-back approach will make it possible to deploy fewer functions and personnel forward for the deployment and sustainment processes. This, in turn, reduces the size and therefore the vulnerability of the forces forward.

To provide ACS, information technology is leveraged to improve command and control, which is key to accurate and timely decisions. As an example, the ability to know the location of

critical parts, no matter which Service or agency holds the parts, allows enormous gains in efficiency. The Air Force depot system, centered around three locations, Ogden, Oklahoma City and Warner Robins strive to reduce cycle times and streamline their infrastructures.

The Air Force has approached logistics and logistical support from a corporate perspective and deploys the minimum number of support personnel and supplies forward to sustain its own war fighters. The command and control systems used in their support organizations have the ability to use Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) and link into other automated information systems but the focus is strictly on Air Force specific items. The command and control within the support staffs do not incorporate a material management center or movement control center, which is of vital importance when dealing with support of several large units simultaneously. In the area of fuel management, the Air Force is aptly suited to support other forces, but only from a pull perspective. The Air Force is focused around fixed facilities and has a limited capability to distribute petroleum products to other areas in large quantities. In the other areas of supply, maintenance, transportation and RSO&I the Air Force is limited. Their ability to sustain a force larger than the AEF is limited by a lack of ground transportation and units to conduct RSO&I operations from a port. On the positive side, the commander and staff of a AFCSS is senior and experienced, manned with field grade officers that have Service level experience in command of smaller level units. "The Air Force tailors support requirements to fit the mission, taking only the structure needed to support it".[8]

In the end, all this comes down to a risk analysis. The Air Force balances the need to reduce costs with the need to ensure timely, effective, and dependable support services to its deployed forces. While the system works, it is small in scale and focused fully on support of airmen. The Air Force approach is geared more towards tactical logistics than operational when considering the employment of an AEF and its support structure.

Navy and Marine Corps Logistics

The Navy and Marine Corps are striving to revamp their logistics operations to correct current shortcomings and to meet future requirements. Their goal is to replace slow, cumbersome

logistics processes that are predicated on large volumes of materials that might be needed, with responsive, or, when possible, anticipatory processes that deliver only what is needed, when and where it is needed. The strategy is to use accurate, timely information and rapid transportation to create for the military the kind of efficient, effective logistics systems that leading commercial firms have developed.

Naval logistics is predicated on maintaining and supplying naval and ground forces through the use of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships and auxiliaries. The CLF provides underway replenishment to battle groups, amphibious ready groups, embarked units, and individual ships at sea. The CLF is highly mobile and carries a broad range of supplies, including food, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and other essential materiel to keep naval forces operating at sea for extended periods of time.[9] The ships that comprise a CLF range from fast combat support ships that carry ammunition, supplies and petroleum products, to specialized ships for just ammunition, fuel, repairs or rescue and salvage. In addition, the Navy also has large hospital ships that are capable of handling all levels of care and can deploy with a naval task force or on their own.

When any of the CLF ships need to replenish their stocks the Navy primarily relies upon forward staged U.S. bases or CONUS based sites. The shore-based system theater distribution of the Navy is based on an advanced logistics support site (ALSS) located near major transportation terminals and the forward logistics site (FLS).[10] The ALSS/FLS receive, consolidate, store, and transfer supplies and equipment to shore-based aviation units, fleet hospitals, and other Navy units operating on land as well as to Navy operating forces afloat. This does not mean that a CINC could not authorize the use of a host nation, ally or coalition port as a means of resupply though, and gives flexibility to an operational commander when deemed necessary. In the future, the Navy hopes to reduce its reliance on shore based facilities and is developing capabilities and striving to make greater use of containers to facilitate quicker and more efficient resupply possible of both sea based and land based forces.[11] Until this is achieved, the Navy is limited as to how far inland they can support a force.

Naval command and control of their logistic ships is not performed in a traditional sense when using the word command. "Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions".[12] While afloat logistic forces are controlled through a Fleet Logistics Coordinator (FLC), Task Force Logistics Coordinator (TFLC) or Task Group Logistics Coordinator (TGLC).[13] These individuals receive their guidance and direction from a Navy operational commander, and are not commanders themselves. The commanders of the ships that carry the supplies or services are therefore only commanding their individual ship and do not have control of the other logistical assets that may be with them at sea. From either an operational or tactical perspective, the Navy does not train or develop their logisticians to become joint logistical commanders. The system the Navy uses separates the operational forces from the tactical forces and this is a limitation that does not provide a training base for officers within their supply corps to become familiar or effective with the practices, procedures and qualities that would be necessary to perform as a joint logistics commander for a joint task force.

In the informational arena, the Navy is on par with the other services. They are accustomed to using the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II) and the Joint Force Requirement Generator II (JFRG II) in addition to Naval specific information systems that tie into their sustainment base in CONUS. From the informational requirement perspective, a joint force commander at least has the capability of accessing the information that may be required for an operational decision concerning moving supplies from the Navy to another service, though he will not be able to deal with a specific naval logistical commander, only a competent staff officer.

The Marine Corps logistics organization is comprised of units from the tactical to the strategic level. Within the operational level the Marine Corps has the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), which at times can also be referred to as a Marine Corps Logistic Command (MLC). The MLC is an employment option available to the Marine Corps component commander for executing operational logistics. The MLC is capable of creating and/or integrating existing and emerging

theater support systems. The MLC receives, stores, fixes, and moves logistics in general support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).[14] Each one of the three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) has a FSSG embedded within them. These FSSG are capable of providing tactical level combat service support for up to 60 days without resupply.

Inherently important, in addition to the logistical capabilities of an FSSG, is its abilility to interface with the strategic level of support in CONUS or overseas. The MLC or FSSG can conduct operations that both facilitate the force closure of a MEF (RSO&I), and build a foundation for an emerging theater support system. This system can be built incrementally by deploying the MLC by echelons organized to support the surge requirements of the MEF during force closure and initial tactical operations. After the theater support system is established, the MLC can pull sustainment from the strategic base to arrive synchronously with MEF requirements, and facilitates replenishment and redeployment operations. In creating the conditions for MAGTF success, the MLC integrates MAGTF requirements with both intertheater and intratheater logistics systems and fulfils them using organic unit capabilities.

The command and control of the MLC is structured around a senior commander at the Brigadier General or Colonel level, and a staff comprised of filed grade officers that have commanded Marine logistics units at a lower level. This is an important distinction from the command and control structure of the Navy.

Army Logistics

The Army has numerous operational logistic organizations above the tactical level that can provide theater-level logistic support to a joint task force. These organizations are responsible for in-theater management of seaports, common-user land transportation, airport operations, and the distribution of common items such as food, clothing, lubricants, and conventional munitions to all services when deployed under provisions of Title 10 USC.[15] The largest of these organizations is the theater support command (TSC). It is a multifunctional support headquarters that works at the operational-level with links to strategic and tactical-level support organizations and agencies. The

units comprising a TSC consist of area support groups (ASGs) that are capable of providing direct support (DS) supply (less ammunition, classified map supply, and medical supply and support), DS maintenance, and field services. ASGs can also provide general support (GS) supply and sustainment maintenance support within the area of operations of the JTF and TSC. If an operational-level ammunition group is not established, specialized battalions assigned to an ASG provide ammunition support. ASGs can also support intermediate staging bases and (RSO&I) operations. The bottom line is ASGs are composed of specialized and multifunctional units. The mission, functions, and organization of ASGs vary according to the type and extent of support required.

Two additional important assets contained within a TSC are a movement control agency (MCA) and a distribution management center (DMC). The MCA serves as the primary element for the planning and controlling of transportation operations at the operational level. The MCA synchronizes its operations with those of US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the DMC and lower echelon movement control centers through the use of various information systems such as TC-AIMS, JOPES, etc. The DMC is the integral piece of all operations for the TSC; it is responsible for materiel management and movement for all of the classes of supply that are maintained by units of the TSC. The DSC has information and communication systems that provide a link back to the strategic level as well as with other operational level commands and agencies.

The COSCOMs are one level below a TSC from an operational perspective. Depending on the definition that is used, some consider the COSCOM to be a tactical level organization but considering the ability to link with the strategic and also tactical level units for support this author believes it is an operational level logistical unit.[16] With that as a frame of reference, the size and composition of a COSCOM depends on the type of corps (e.g. airborne, armored), number of soldiers to be supported, type of organizations supported, number and types of weapon systems to repair, and tonnage of supplies to be issued and transported. The COSCOMs consist of a special troop battalion; a material management center, movement control center and a variable number of

Corps support Groups (CSGs), a medical brigade, and a transportation group. COSCOMs are designed to provide tactical-level DS and GS support to Corps units, but can perform significant operational-level support functions with the material management center and movement control center utilizing JOPES, TC-AIMS II, (JTAV) and GTN.

A final area that is important in both the TSC and COSCOM organizations is that the commander and staffs of both are well trained and senior individuals who have the rank, experience, and informational resources at their disposal. This is not to say that the other Services do not have well-trained and experienced people, rather that the Army's logistician career path that involves command at an early level and through senior level, is an intangible benefit that should not be overlooked. Logisticians in the Army are not only trained as specialist but also as commanders as they progress through their career.

On a COSCOM staff the primary staff officers are Colonels, with numerous other field grade officers as their assistants. This equates to a tremendous amount of experience within the organization. In addition, the COSCOM commander is a Brigadier General which means that the commander already has experience in joint matters due to the joint requirement before becoming a General officer.

Analysis of which organization can serve as a Joint logistics Command

Each one of the different Services has the capability to serve as a joint logistics command, just as they have the capability to serve as a commander of a joint task force. The differences lie in the type of operation that is being conducted as to who is best suited to serve as the joint logistics command. The Air Force has the capability to arrive quickly into the JOA and does posses the reach back capability with their current command, control and communications systems, but their heavy emphasis on establishing the AEF base of operations would detract from their ability to also perform as a joint logistics command. Additionally, the AEF does not necessarily have to be located within the JOA to perform its mission of delivering fires, thus presenting the possibility that its support base is also out of the JOA. The support element of an AEF is tailored to meet the needs and requirements

of that force. Their practice is to minimize their logistical footprint, which would then dictate a larger infusion of augmentees to all them to execute the added responsibility of a joint logistics command. Additionally, as indicated in joint doctrine, " the CINC may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user".[17] The Air Force element of the joint task force will not in most cases be the dominant user and if it was then another joint force could minimize the support structure of the AEF.

If the Air Force was given the mission to perform as a joint logistic command, the biggest problem to overcome is the lack of a materiel management center and movement control center. These are two critical staff areas to effectively sustain the deployed force and the Air Force does not posses either of them as part of their support to an AEF. If there were an augmentation slice to the staff, (out of the air force material command) the problem of staff integration and synergy would be a difficult hurdle to overcome and not one that should be undertaken during an actual joint operation. "The logistic support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. Whenever feasible, peacetime chains of command and staffs should be organized during peacetime just as they would be in wartime to avoid reorganization during war."[18]

The Navy's ability to serve as a joint logistic command is severely limited due to the factor of Space and the lack of a training base/program for its officer corps concerning the art of command. The Navy is split into distinct career fields, those that gain command experience during their careers and those who do not and remain technicians and specialist.[19]

The operational factor of Space is important when you consider where our joint task forces have operated in the past twenty years and where they can be expected to operate in the future, on land. If the joint task force remains within the operational reach of naval supply and support it is feasible the Navy could serve as the joint logistic command, but this is highly unlikely.[20]

The Marine Corps on the other hand, does have the capability and organizational structure to serve as a joint logistic command. The MLC has the staff and informational resources to bridge the

gap between tactical, operational and strategic logistics. The Marine Corps like the Army, does have a command tract for its logisticians and it also has a staff at the MLC level that is senior enough to handle the complexities that would come with serving as a joint logistics command. The downside with the Marine Corps serving as a joint logistics command is twofold: it may not have the predominance of forces involved in a joint operation and its logistic focus is for 60 days or less. If it is not the predominate Service then service rivalries will have to be overcome. If it is the predominate Service and the operation last longer than 60 days the Marine Corps may not want to tie down their limited logistic capabilities. The Marine Corps has traditionally been an early entry force and then turns the logistical piece of the operation over to the Army in accordance with the Army's Title 10 responsibilities. The bottom line is that the MLC is capable of establishing an inter/intra theater support system, coordinate and conduct RSO&I operations, provide a link between the tactical and operational level of logistical support and execute the flow of operational sustainment for a joint task force, but is only suited for short duration operations.

The Army has two organizations that are capable and suited to perform as a joint logistics command. Which organization that is selected to perform the duties would depend on the size and scope of the operation and force to be sustained. A TSC, the largest operational organization can easily conduct all logistical operations that are required by a joint force and trains daily in its performance of USC Title 10 responsibilities of supplying, equipping, servicing, administering, maintaining and civil engineering, in both Europe and Korea for example. There are problems that might be encountered if a TSC is deployed to support a joint operation though. Since the major units of a TSC are responsible for base support operations, if they are sent to a JOA and some of their customers remain out of the JOA, who will support them? This was not such a problem several years ago when we had many more units forward deployed overseas, but now after the post-draw down, the geographical separation of units within Europe would make sending a TSC more difficult if all of its normally supported units were not also sent.

On the positive side, the day-to-day operations of a TSC lend themselves to a great degree of staff training and competence in dealing with strategic-level logistics. This as stated earlier, is an important factor that is difficult to measure, but one that must be considered when selecting an organization to perform as a joint logistics command.

The COSCOMs are the last organizations that have the capabilities to serve as a joint logistics command. The COSCOM is organized to support an Army Corps consisting of several divisions and practices this on a day-to-day basis, just as a TSC does, but on a smaller scale. The scale of their support is important when considering the size of the joint operations that we have undertaken in the past 20 years and what can be expected for the future. The COSCOM organizational structure contains that commander, staff, functional centers and informational infrastructure to support just a force. As an example, the 1St COSCOM based out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is the COSCOM for the XVIII Airborne Corps and participates and serves as a joint logistics command during the exercise Purple Dragon which is conducted every 18-24 months and includes the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Additionally, the 1st COSCOM deployed and served as the joint logistics command for JTF-180 UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.[21]

The downside to using a COSCOM, as a joint logistics command is the same as that for a TSC, if all of the normally supported units are not involved who will support them? There is no definitive answer to this question, but an option is to have the director of Logistics of an installation assume the support role for any units that are not involved.

Conclusion

Operational logistical operations link tactical requirements to strategic capabilities in order to accomplish operational goals and objectives. They include the support required to sustain operations from peacekeeping operations through the spectrum of conflict all the way up to and including major theater operations, although operational logistics normally support campaigns and provide theater-wide logistic support, generally over periods of months. Operational logisticians coordinate the apportionment, allocation, and distribution of resources within a theater. They interface closely with

operators at the tactical level in order to identify theater shortfalls and communicate these shortfalls back to the appropriate theater or strategic source and/or ration supplies to support operational priorities. Operational logisticians coordinate the flow of strategic capabilities into a theater based on the joint commanders priorities. At the operational level, the concerns of the logistician and the operator are intricately interrelated. For these reasons there are only two organizations that are well suited and staffed to perform as a joint logistics command in our future conflicts or humanitarian operations; the Army's COSCOMs for operations on a smaller scale involving a Corps equivalent, and the Army's TSCs if it is more than a Army Corps equivalent. Both of the organizations have the ability to interface with strategic level organizations such as Defense Logistics Agency and their service level supply and support organizations. Both have appropriately trained and manned staff to assist the commander in performing his or her duties, subordinate units that can execute several logistics functions, and the commander himself is an individual that has the rank, experience and training to serve as a joint logistics commander.

The formation of a joint logistic command is vitally important and we must get serious about it, codify it in joint doctrine, and then task and train these specific type organizations to prepare for the joint logistic command mission.

NOTES

1. Defense Systems Management College, *Acquisition Logistics Guide*, 3rd ed., Ft Belvoir: Defense Systems Management College, 1997, 1-5.

2. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, (Washington, D.C.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), p. ix.

3. Ibid., p. II-10.

4. In Pacific Command the units are 7th Fleet, I Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force and III Marine Expeditionary Force, in European Command: 6th Fleet, Southern European Task Force (SETAF), V Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, 3 Air Force, 16th Air Force, and Supreme Commander Europe (SOCEUR), in Southern Command: XVIII Airborne Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and 2nd Fleet, in Joint Forces Command: XVIII Airborne Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and 2nd Fleet, and in Central Command there is NAVCENT, ARCENT, MARCENT, AFCENT, SOCCENT, and C/JTF-Kuwait. The authority for appointing these as Joint Task Force headquarters is vested with each geographic CINC for the units under his command or stationed within his area of responsibility.

5. *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 4-0, (Washington, D.C.; Joint Chief of Staff, 6 April 2000), p. I-2.

6. Personal experience during the Gulf War while serving as an Operations Officer for the 507th Corps Support Group at Log Base Charlie. Several thousands tons of supplies and equipment were moved to Log Base Charlie not based upon a unit requirement but in the hope that when an item was asked for it would be on hand.

7. *Combat Support*, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4, 22 November 1999, p.2.

8. Ibid., p. 26.

9. *Naval Logistics*, Naval Doctrine Publication 4, 20 February 2001, p. 62.

10. Ibid., p. 67.

11. "Naval Expeditionary Logistics," on-line at http://search.nap.edu/readingroom/books/naval/chap4.html, accessed 22 January 2002.

12. Joint Pub. 3-0, p.II-15.

13. Naval Logistics, p.48.

14. Ibid., p. 59.

15. General Military Law, U.S. Code, Title 10, (2001)

16. A COSCOM is comprised on tactical units but it also has a material management center and movement control center that routinely link with strategic logistic organizations. It has the capability to maintain visibility of supplies leaving the strategic level and entering the JOA, in addition to access to the GTN for the movement of personnel. For these reasons, a COSCOM can be considered both operational and tactical based upon the mission it is performing.

17. Joint Pub. 4-0, p. II-6.

18. Joint Pub. 4-0, p. I-7.

19. The Naval Supply Corps is trained and has a career track that does not provide for command while at sea. The commander of the ship is an operational or line officer. Supply Corps officers serve as staff members.

20. To win the overall war you must control the ground, this has been shown time and time again. Air power and Naval power alone cannot win; they are most effective when used in concert with a ground force. Our recent experiences have shown us that wars will encompass the entire country or countries that we are involved with. The ground forces move from their initial positions that have been near the sea in some cases and then move inland beyond the current reach of Naval Supply and Support. The capabilities of the V-22 and other initiatives that the Navy is pursuing could change this in the future, but for the time being the Navy does not have the capability to support a ground force once it moves inland.

21. Department of Defense, Operation Uphold Democracy, Operations in Haiti (Washington, DC: 1995), 14-3.

Defense Systems Management College. *Acquisition Logistics Guide, 3rd ed* (Defense Systems Management College: 1997).

Department of Defense. Operation Uphold Democracy, Operations in Haiti (Washington, DC: 1995).

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