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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

BALANCE OF POWER vs. BALANCE OF THREAT: THE CASE OF CHINA AND PAKISTAN

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Abstract The balance of threat suggests that States form Alliances to prevent stronger powers from dominating them and to protect themselves from States or Coalitions whose superior resources pose a threat to National Independence. Geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions affect the threat level. During the Cold War, the SINO-PAK balance of threat was forged to counter the perception of Soviet and Indian Hegemony in the region. China's problems with India were exacerbated by a precarious relationship with the Soviet Union. China embarked on an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan. Cooperation with Pakistan did effectively balance the Indian Threat and prevented India from focusing on China. China used the elements of it's own national power - political, economic, military power and nuclear cooperation to influence Pakistan. This case study supports the balance of threat theory. It illustrates that the issue that drives China and Pakistan together is not India's Preponderance of power, but that by India possessing this power, coupled with it's geographic proximity, Offensive Power and Aggressive Intentions, it poses a real threat.		
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13. ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) THE BALANCE OF THREAT SUGGESTS THAT STATES FORM ALLIANCES TO PREVENT STRONGER POWERS FROM DOMINATING THEM AND TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM STATES OR COALITIONS WHOSE SUPERIOR RESOURCES POSE A THREAT TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, OFFENSIVE POWER, AND AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AFFECT THE THREAT LEVEL. DURING THE COLD WAR, THE SINO-PAK BALANCE OF THREAT WAS FORGED TO COUNTER THE PERCEPTION OF SOVIET AND INDIAN HEGEMONY IN THE REGION. CHINA'S PROBLEMS WITH INDIA WERE EXACERBATED BY A PRECARIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. CHINA EMBARKED ON AN ENDURING STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN. COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN DID EFFECTIVELY BALANCE THE INDIAN THREAT AND PREVENTED INDIA FROM FOCUSING ON CHINA. CHINA USED THE ELEMENTS OF ITS OWN NATIONAL POWER - POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY POWER AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION TO INFLUENCE PAKISTAN. THIS CASE STUDY SUPPORTS THE BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY. IT ILLUSTRATES THAT THE ISSUE THAT DRIVES CHINA AND PAKISTAN TOGETHER IS NOT INDIA'S PREPONDERANCE OF POWER, BUT THAT BY INDIA POSSESSING THIS POWER, COUPLED WITH ITS GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, OFFENSIVE POWER AND AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS, IT POSES A REAL THREAT.			
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat: The Case of China and Pakistan

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Thesis: In light of their significant differences over the past 40 years, and despite the vastly differing ideologies and political systems between China and Pakistan, does the balance of power or the balance of threat best explain China and Pakistan's prolonged mutual international relationship?

Discussion: The balance of power theory states that a combination of similar capabilities between two nation states tends to reduce the probability of violent interaction by another outside nation state. States ally to balance against threats rather than against a nation's power alone. The level of threat one poses is affected by geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. The balance of power theory suggests that states form alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them and to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat to national independence.

Putting aside obvious differences in principles, China and Pakistan were drawn to each other because there was geographic proximity between the two nation states, and India had a military posture and geography that made it capable of attacking both China and Pakistan. Further, India was viewed by both China and Pakistan as aggressive. Change any of these factors, and the outcome may have been different. Were India not bordered by both China and Pakistan, its ability to project its power would decline with distance. Had China and Pakistan not perceived India to be of an imperialist mentality following its Independence, China might not have felt threatened enough to seek an alliance. Had India not provoked Pakistan in 1965 in an attempt to restore national pride, Pakistan may not have seen such a clear demonstration of China's loyalty, which solidified their alliance.

Since the 1963 boundary agreement between China and Pakistan, the relationship has grown and endured through difficult international periods. During the Cold War, the Sino-Pak balance of power was forged to counter the perception of Soviet and Indian hegemony in the region. China's budding problems with India were exacerbated by a precarious relationship with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. China acted rationally and embarked on an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan. Cooperation with Pakistan did effectively balance the Indian threat and prevented India from focusing exclusively on China. China used the elements of its own national power - political, economic, military power and nuclear cooperation to influence Pakistan.

Conclusion: This case study supports the balance of threat theory. It illustrates that for China and Pakistan, the issue that drives the two together is not India's preponderance of power (foreign influence and political power as a result of population, industrial/military capability and technological prowess), but that by India possessing this power, coupled with its geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions, it poses a real threat.

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Introduction

Since its founding in 1949 and throughout the cold war, China's regional policy was heavily intertwined with the policies of the global superpowers. Both Chinese intervention in Vietnam in 1979 and Beijing's Middle East policy could be best understood as a reaction to global events driven by the superpowers rather than motivated by strictly regional issues. Though several bilateral issues involved Taiwan, Japan and Korea, the major factors steering Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War concerned the United States and/or the Soviet Union. As a result, China has had enormous difficulty pursuing a consistent foreign policy. China was threatened even when it had alliances. During the Cold War, China vacillated through a series of roles: self-sacrificing junior partner in the Soviet-led world; alienated hermit divorced from and fighting both superpowers; self-styled champion of the Third World; and finally, lone socialist power in the post communist world.¹

Pakistan, established only two years earlier than China, had been quick to recognize the Communist regime in China as the legitimate government and the Pakistani press had been critical of the United States' lack of recognition. Further in 1971, Pakistan spearheaded the successful campaign that enabled China to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.² This effectively ended China's international isolation that had existed since 1949.

In 1963, Pakistan and China signed a landmark agreement that defined a mutually acceptable border. The agreement was a hallmark event for military cooperation and the start of an

¹ Samuel Kim, "China as a Regional Power," *Current History China* 1992, (September 1992), 247.

² Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia*. (New York: Western Publishing Company 1970), 112.

enduring strategic relationship that has prospered now for almost four decades. This relationship is remarkable considering the significant differences separating these two nations. Since the border agreement, China has advocated revolution as a means to favorable change, while Pakistan has supported religious ideology and traditional values as the path to peace. China has opposed western military alliances while Pakistan has been an active participant. Yet, despite differences China and Pakistan have thrived under this permanent relationship. What began with the assumption that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” has developed into a truly amicable bond. The enemy that brought both the Communist Chinese and Pakistani Muslims together was India. Since the 1963 boundary agreement, the relationship between China and Pakistan has grown and endured through numerous difficult international periods. In light of their significant differences over the past 40 years, and despite their vastly differing ideologies and political systems, one needs to ask if the balance of power theory or the balance of threat theory best explains China and Pakistan’s prolonged mutual international relationship?

India and Pakistan

Throughout history, animosity between Hindus and Muslims has persisted. Based on centuries of hatred between these two cultures, partition of the Asian sub-continent was inevitable. When the division occurred, Pakistan emerged as the Muslim nation state. In Karachi, Pakistan on 14 August 1947, the flag of Pakistan flew for the first time.³

Fifty years ago, India and Pakistan were one country under Great Britain. When Great Britain granted India independence in August 1947, the Indian Empire was partitioned along

religious lines into Hindu-dominated India and Muslim-dominated Pakistan. But with that division came massive rioting and population flows as Muslims and Hindus found themselves on the wrong sides of the border. Muslims were fleeing India; Hindus and Sikhs were fleeing Pakistan. Pakistan's governor-general Jinnah's plea to regard religion as a personal and not a state matter was ignored. No one was prepared for the communal rioting and the mass population movements that followed London's announcement of imminent independence and partition. The most conservative tallies of the resulting casualties estimated 250,000 dead and the evacuation of 12 million to 24 million refugees. The actual boundaries of the two new states were not even known until August 17, when announced by a British commission. The boundaries-- unacceptable to both India and Pakistan-- have remained to this day.⁴ Based on their differences in religion, which existed long before the partition of the Indian Empire, India and Pakistan have been antagonists.

The partition established by the British not only brought confusion but also brought severe economic challenges to the two newly created countries. Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel, and equipment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a second choice--Lahore was rejected because it was too close to the Indian border.⁵ Pakistan's economy, which had at one time seemed enviable, lost the major market for its commodities after severing ties with India. West Pakistan, for example, traditionally produced more wheat than it consumed and had supplied the

³ "History and Culture 1776-1947 A.D." <http://www.rpi.edu/dept/union/paksa/www/html/pakistan/hist3.html>

⁴ Country Studies On-Line, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Pakistan [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+pk0024\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pk0024)) The Country Studies Series presents a description and analysis of the historical setting and the social, economic, political, and national security systems and institutions of countries throughout the world and examines the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors.

⁵ Ibid.

deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan was used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities. Commodities such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan--they had traditionally come from areas now part of India. Furthermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its commercial transportation because its four major ports were located in British India; it was awarded only Karachi.⁶ In spite of all this, the problem that proved most insurmountable was defining relations between the two wings of Pakistan, which had had little economic exchange before partition.

The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at independence, separated by approximately 1,000 kilometers of Indian territory. East Pakistan was smaller, comprising one seventh of the total area, while its 45 million people representing 55 percent of the population. The only thing that the two wings really had in common was religion. Linguistically, culturally and economically, there were great differences between East and West Pakistan. The East was the home of Bengali people, the West was made up of a tapestry of peoples and cultures of the four provinces Sindh, Punjab, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, as well as the semi-autonomous kingdoms of the north.⁷

The most problematic region between India and Pakistan was Kashmir, a small region located high in the Himalayas. At Independence, Kashmir, comprised of an 80 percent Muslim majority, still had not chosen whether to join India or Pakistan. At the time of Independence, Hari Singh was the ruler of Kashmir. Pakistani leaders felt that unless they made the move for Kashmir,

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Embassy of Pakistan, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, "History of Pakistan 1947 to Present Day", <http://pakembassy.8m.com/history.html>

they would lose it. Pathan tribesmen led a holy war to save their Muslim brothers and invaded the state on 22nd October 1947. Seeing the invaders, Hari Singh panicked and signed the accord by which Kashmir joined India. Indian Prime Minister Nehru sent in 100,000 troops to crush what he claimed was an invasion of Indian territory. India and Pakistan went to war. The United Nations later determined a line of control, by which Azad Kashmir was given to Pakistan and the territories of Baltistan and Ladakh were divided.⁸

In 1949, India and Pakistan signed a cease-fire. The western third of Kashmir fell to Pakistan, while the rest stayed under Indian control, and the two sides agreed to hold an UN-supervised election to determine the state's future. In 1964, India refused free vote for the Kashmiris, which resulted in a war in August 1965. The war lasted for a mere 17 days. While the war itself came to an inconclusive end, the overwhelming Muslim majority in Kashmir remained subjects of India and the region of Kashmir remains a battlefield today. The latest skirmish in Kashmir was in July 1999 when India and Pakistan came to the brink of another war in the disputed region. India fought an 11 week undeclared campaign because it insisted that Pakistani army troops were infiltrating the region across the snow bound Himalayan mountains. Almost on a daily basis, artillery shells are exchanged across the cease-fire line that divides Kashmir.⁹

Another dispute between India and Pakistan occurred in 1971. In an attempt to establish parliamentary democracy in 1969, Pakistan set elections for the following year. In the elections, there were two main parties: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had gained popular support

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ CNN Interactive, India and Pakistan Fifty Years of Independence, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9708/India97/shared/sibling.rivalry/>

in the western part of the country toward the end of 1960s, and the Awami League, which had emerged as the strongest party in Bengal. Not surprisingly, the election resulted in PPP winning the majority of seats in the West and the Awami League winning by a big margin in the East. Bengal had the majority of the population and the League claimed it was in a position to dominate the new National Assembly. The two parties were on a collision course. The dispute led to strikes and the Awami League declared East Bengal a separate state in March 1971. The government of Pakistan was determined to keep the country intact but the Awami League broke away. The internal dispute was overcome by events when India declared war on Pakistan on 12th December 1971. Pakistan sustained a major loss and by directly intervening in the conflict, India had supported the creation of the new independent country of Bangladesh.¹⁰

Relations between Pakistan and India have deteriorated further since the late 1970s, as a result of the growing arms race between the two countries. India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 persuaded Pakistan to initiate its own nuclear program. The issue has subsequently influenced the direction of Pakistan's relations with the United States and China. United States-Pakistan relations over the nuclear issue are particularly contentious. Pakistan's relations with China on this issue, however, have been influenced by both countries' suspicions of India. In 1991 China called on India to accept Pakistan's proposal of a nuclear-free weapons zone in South Asia. In the same year, Pakistan and China signed a nuclear cooperation treaty reportedly intended for peaceful purposes. This agreement included a provision by China for a nuclear power plant in Pakistan.

¹⁰ Embassy of Pakistan, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

An added source of tension in Indo-Pakistani relations involved the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. India refused to condemn the Soviet action, while Pakistan provided sanctuary for Afghan refugees and was a conduit for supplying arms from the United States and others to the Afghan *mujahidin*. During the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan, therefore, Pakistan felt an increased threat on both its eastern and northwestern borders.¹¹ The rise of militant Hinduism in India, and the accompanying violence against Muslims there, continues to fuel the uneasiness between the two countries.

In October 1999, Pakistani's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the return flight of then Pakistani's Chief of the Army General Pervez Musharraf to be diverted from Karachi during mid-flight without enough fuel to reach the ordered destination. When the army heard of this plot, they countermanded the orders and when Musharraf landed in Karachi, he was made ruler of the country. Mr. Sharif, on the other hand, found himself without his job and without his freedom. For the first time in 22 years, Pakistan is under the direct control of its armed forces.¹² This coup marks the first time in history that a military regime has taken over in a country that is an avowed nuclear power.

Balance of Power

¹¹ Country Studies On-Line, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Pakistan.

¹² "Pakistan's Old New Rulers," *The Economist*. 16 October 1999, <http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/1991016/as6676.html>

The concept of the balance of power, a consistent theme in international relations, has been controversial and indiscriminately applied. At times, the terminology has been freely applied and definitions have been distorted in order for the theory to support specific theses. On other occasions, the theory has been applied to describe the actions of specific nation states. Kenneth Waltz, in his *Theory of International Relations* says that the

Balance of power is seen by some as being akin to a law of nature; by others, as simply an outrage. Some view it as a guide for statesmen; others as a cloak that disguises their imperialist policies. Some believe that a balance of power is the best guarantee of the security of states and the peace of the world; others, that it has ruined states by causing most of the wars they have fought.¹³

By Michael Sheehan's definition in his *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, the balance of power "involves a particular distribution of power among states of that system such that no single state and no existing alliance have an 'overwhelming' or 'preponderant' amount of power."¹⁴ The balance of power theory states that a combination of similar capabilities between two nation states tends to reduce the probability of violent interaction by another outside nation state. Variations of balance of power by Hans Morganthau (*Politics Among Nations*), Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Relations*) and Stephen Walt (*Origins of Alliances*) will be used as points of reference throughout this discussion.

Case Study: China and Pakistan

¹³Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. (Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 117.

¹⁴ Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. (London: Routledge, 1996), 4.

Unlike Stephen Walt in his *Origins of Alliances*, who used thirty-six separate alliances established over a twenty-four year period to illustrate his many hypotheses, this short case study will focus on China and Pakistan and will contrast the balance of power with balance of threat theories to examine why these two fundamentally different nations have sustained a cordial relationship over a forty-year period. Citing examples of how China used the elements of national power - political, economic, military and nuclear - in cooperation with Pakistan, the paper will explain how the two countries created a balance in the region during three distinct time frames to counter perceived international threats. The first phase covers the Boundary agreement in 1963 through the end of Chinese isolationism in 1973. The second phase covers the period from 1973 Soviet Expansionism/succession of Bangladesh through the end of the Cold War. Finally, the third phase covers the period from the end of the Cold War/aftermath of Tianamen to the present day. The third phase includes other elements, such as nuclear weapons, which have an impact on both the balance of power and the balance of threat.

Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat

The next step toward understanding the relationship between China and Pakistan is to distinguish between the balance of threat and the balance of power. States ally to balance against threats rather than against a nation's superior power alone. While it is true that the greater a state's total resources (population, industrial/military capabilities, technological prowess) the greater a *potential* it has to threaten others, the level of threat that a state imposes is not just based solely on distribution of that power (i.e. foreign influence and political penetration). Geographic proximity,

offensive power, and aggressive intentions affect the level of threat one poses. The balance of power theory, as described by the experts cited above, suggests that states form alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them and to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.

One historical example that illustrates both the balance of threat and balance of power theories is the establishment and subsequent change of charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1949 following World War II, NATO was founded to counter the perceived expanding communist threat from the Soviet Union and her satellite countries. NATO was formed initially between 12 independent countries who had committed themselves to defending one another against communism. Though these 12 countries were all politically and ideologically different, the commonality between them was the anticipated aggression and expansion of the more powerful Soviet Union. Four additional European nations later acceded to the Treaty between 1952 and 1982. In 1989, as evidence that the threat was gone following the demise of the Soviet Union, former Warsaw Pact members Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, were welcomed into NATO.

Today, with the threat from the Soviet Union extinct, the mission of NATO has changed. There is no longer a common enemy but the alliance continues to act as a means to balance power and its prospers because of each nations desire to contribute more effectively as a group to the development of cooperative security structures for the whole of Europe. Additionally, NATO has changed its political and military structures in order to adapt them to peacekeeping and crisis management tasks undertaken in cooperation with countries which are not members of the Alliance and with other international organizations.

But the formation of alliances, especially when it involves such ideologically different nations as China and Pakistan is more complicated than that. More power (superior resources and influence) without geographic proximity, offensive capability and lack of aggressive intentions is not always seen as a significant threat. Even when and where it is, a state's aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions may provide a motive for forming a "balance" type of an alliance (where a state allies with another against the prevailing threat) or, in rare cases, a "bandwagon" type of alliance (where a state allies with the source of power when it is not geographically close to potential allies.)¹⁵ Though rare, one example of "bandwagoning" in recent history is the 1939 German-Soviet Treaty of Non Aggression. This agreement signed between Hitler and Stalin prior to the outbreak of World War II was designed to keep the Soviet Union at peace with Germany and to gain time to build up the Soviet military establishment, which had been badly weakened by the purge of the Red Army officer corps in 1937.

Putting aside obvious differences in principles, China and Pakistan were drawn to each other because there was geographic proximity between the two nation states, and India had a military posture and geography that made it capable of attacking both China and Pakistan. Further, India was viewed as aggressive. Change any of these factors, and the China/Pakistan relationship might not have prospered. Were India not bordered by both China and Pakistan, its ability to project its power would decline with distance. Had India not been perceived to be of an imperialist mentality following its Independence, China might not have felt threatened enough to seek an

¹⁵ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 22-26

alliance. Had India not provoked Pakistan in 1965 in an attempt to restore national pride, Pakistan may not have seen such a clear demonstration of China's loyalty, which solidified their alliance.

Phase I (1963-1972)

During the mid-1950's, in response to increasing nuclear threats from the United States, the Chinese launched its own nuclear weapons program. In the weeks following China's intervention in the Korean War, the U.S. government considered the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese columns marching toward the 38th parallel. Later, during the Eisenhower administration's efforts to force a cease-fire in Korea, the United States again threatened to use nuclear weapons unless the war was brought to a quick end. Faced with America's 'atomic diplomacy', Chinese Communist Party leaders decided it was time China acquired its own nuclear weapons as expeditiously as possible.¹⁶

Following India's independence in 1947, Sino-Indian relations were mostly friendly until 1959. The Tibetan revolt in March 1959, the granting of political asylum to the Dalai Lama by India and a chain of border incidents (highlighted by a clash between Sino-Indian troops in October 1959), brought about drastic changes in attitudes in both India and China. These incidents pushed the boundary dispute between India and China to the immediate forefront. India argued that since the Indian nation had existed long before the arrival of the British, India's traditional eastern boundaries that stretched into China were validated by history. China's counter argument was that Mao Zedong's perspective of a Communist China, even in the 1930's, had included Mongolia,

¹⁶ John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publishers, 1993), 260.

Sinkiang, Tibet and Formosa; he was remarkably free of imperialist guilt while asserting China's right to the vast domains west beyond the Great Wall.¹⁷ India believed it had the jurisdiction to keep intact all the territories, special relationships and extraterritorial rights it had inherited from the British. The Chinese had disputed the boundaries drawn by the British at a time when central authority in China was weak. This territorial conflict, which led to the Sino-Indian war of 1962, is a fundamental problem even today that has never been fully reconciled. The 1962 war, coupled with the fundamental differences between China and India concerning China's budding relationship with Pakistan, persists as the cornerstone of a longstanding dispute.

China's developing problems with India were intensified by an unstable relationship with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. While the Soviet Union did not pose an imminent threat to China, China embarked on an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan in an effort to balance power in the region and keep the Soviet Union "in check." As Walt points out, "because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away." The more the aggressive or expansionist a neighboring state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition.¹⁸ China saw its relationship with a cooperative Pakistan as effectively diffusing the Indian/Soviet threat and prevent India from focusing completely on China.

The first phase in China's strategy to balance power in the region began in 1963 with the signing of the landmark Sino-Pakistan border agreement, shortly after China had engaged in a military conflict with India, Pakistan's long standing adversary. China had poor relations with the

¹⁷ Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia*. (New York: Western Publishing Company 1970), 31.

¹⁸ Walt, 23.

United States while Pakistan, as a “bandwagoner” with a geographically distant superior power, tied itself militarily tied to the United States through alliances such as the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. China’s relationship with the Soviet Union was deteriorating. China was faced with virtual isolation from the two superpowers at the height of the Cold War. The decision to form an alliance with Pakistan as its window to the world regardless of ideological differences was both necessary and prudent. The fortification of Pakistan as a strategic stronghold would balance the threat by diverting India’s attention on the western front and providing China with an ally in South Asia.

An example of how the balance of threat theory affects international relations can also be applied to Pakistan during this time period. Pakistan, though tied formally to the United States, sought support from China because of growing fear U.S. allegiances would be with India in any dispute involving India and Pakistan. In essence, Pakistan was willing to align with China in exchange for Chinese political and military support against a Western backed India. Although the distribution of power is one factor in alliance formation, the level of threat is also important.¹⁹ The Sino-Pak 1963 alliance was grounded on the fact that neither desired to meet their security requirements alone in the face of India’s threat.

In 1964, The Peoples Republic of China entered the nuclear era when it detonated a nuclear device. This event sent shock waves throughout Asia. Once China was nuclear capable, India perceived China as a greater threat because of the shared border and repeated Sino-Indian clashes, the recent Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and China’s close ties with Pakistan. A nuclear

¹⁹ Ibid, 5.

arms race between India and Pakistan was, at least in part, spawned by the success of China's nuclear program.

The new relationship between China and Pakistan received its first test during the Indian-Pakistan conflict of 1965. India, faced with internal economic problems, factional riots, and the death of the Nehru, sought international unity through a military conflict with Pakistan. India believed Pakistan's growing relationship with China had estranged Islamabad's relations with the United States. This, coupled with India's need to restore national pride, provided an opportunity to provoke Pakistan. Utilizing numerous unresolved border disputes, India clashed with Pakistan in what was then Kashmir (western Pakistan), and finally near Lahore in eastern Pakistan. After six months of fighting, the Pakistani army outnumbered three to one, was able to deliver a knockout blow to the Indian Army. Politically, virtually nothing was solved between the two countries. However, the west realized that India was dependent on it for diplomatic, military and economic support and could not stand alone against Pakistan, and much less China.

The 1965 Pakistan-Indian conflict was also significant for the previously untested Sino-Pakistan balance of threat. Whether taking an Indian or Pakistani viewpoint regarding the outcome of the war, China demonstrated unwavering support to Pakistan. China went as far as issuing an ultimatum to the Indian Embassy on 16 September 1965 threatening "dire consequences" should India persist with "aggressive designs" in Kashmir.²⁰ China's statement effectively tied down Indian forces in the eastern sector of the Himalayas and was proof of China's association with and support

²⁰ Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan-China Defense Co-Operation." *International Defense Review*, February 1993, 108.

for Pakistan. China's ultimatum sought to balance the Indian threat by demonstrating offensive capability, pledging military support and utilizing geographic proximity.

The period after the 1965 Pakistan-India military conflict marked the beginning of prolific economic and military aid from China to Pakistan that continues today. Regarding the development of alliances, Stephen Walt states:

The provision of economic or military assistance can create effective allies, because it communicates favorable intentions, because it evokes a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient becomes dependent on the donor. Stated simply, the hypothesis is: the more aid, the tighter the resulting alliance. Regardless of the context, the argument is the same: the provision of military or economic assistance is believed to give suppliers significant leverage over recipients.²¹

An economic and technical cooperation agreement was drafted in February of 1966 that provided Pakistan with a \$60 million dollar economic credit line, a supply of electronic equipment, and the establishment of a paper plant in East Pakistan. In addition, China sent numerous cultural and medical missions to Pakistan aimed at assisting the Pakistani people. Even more monumental developments were underway in defense collaboration. Beijing assisted Pakistan in establishing an ordnance factory for the production of Chinese rifles, which supplied weapons for three new infantry divisions. The Chinese also began to equip the Pakistani armed forces with tanks and jets made in China and provided a production line for the manufacture of ammunition at the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF).²² The newly formed relationship, which had been tested and proven successful in the 1965 war, was reinforced by economic assistance and defense aid.

²¹ Walt, 41.

²² Hussain, 108.

Following the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes in 1969, the China-Pakistani alliance was strengthened due to the Soviet Union's attempt to influence Pakistan with arms negotiations. Chinese and Pakistani bilateral defense cooperation was initiated at a time when the United States had stopped all military aid to Pakistan and the Chinese provided a viable alternative for military supplies. The Chinese provided cheaper weapons than the west and accepted credit for payment. Concurrently, Pakistan had also initiated relations with the Soviet Union, which provided a modest supply of arms by 1968. The Soviets sought the support of Pakistan in its proposal for an "Asian collective security system." The Soviets sought to link their military sales to Pakistan with their hegemonic strategic policy in South Asia. This policy by the Soviets effectively served to isolate and contain China from the rest of the world. With the balance of power between Pakistan and China now less than ten years old, Pakistan rejected the proposal and, in doing so, reinforced its commitment to China. Pakistan's decision was made on the basis that China provided a proven and, recalling the emphasis on geography, more reliable partner for security than the USSR.

The most significant test of the Sino-Pakistan alliance occurred in 1970 when China sought to improve relations with India. Mao, at the famous May Day celebration in Peking in 1970, commented on the need for friendly relations between the two countries. Mao's speech was followed by informal contacts between Indian and Chinese diplomats in several world capitals where China offered an olive branch and made several gestures of friendship. The move toward Chinese-Indian rapprochement came to an abrupt end when events escalated in Eastern Pakistan.

Pakistan's failure to accept the results of the 1970 elections in Eastern Pakistan culminated in Pakistan's ill-fated decision to implement an armed crackdown. Armed clashes took place between Pakistani armed forces and supporters of the free Bangla Movement in Eastern Pakistan.

As during the 1947 division of the Indian Empire by the British, millions of refugees swarmed into India as the Bangla Movement declared East Pakistan the new sovereign independent Republic of Bangladesh. Afterwards, the Sino-Pak alliance was reinforced by Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai. In a letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan dated 13 April 1971, he wrote:

China and Pakistan are friendly neighbors. We believe that through the wise consultations and efforts of Your Excellency and leaders of various quarters in Pakistan, the situation in Pakistan will certainly be restored to normal. At the same time, we have noted that of late the Indian Government has been carrying out gross interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by exploiting the internal problems of your country. And the Soviet Union and United States are doing the same one after another. The Chinese Government holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely the internal affair of Pakistan, which only can be settled by the Pakistan people themselves and which brokes no foreign interference whatsoever. Your Excellency may rest assured that should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and its people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard State sovereignty and national independence.²³

The growing threat from the combined Sino-Pak power and the perceived aggressive intentions of the alliance, caused India to seek its own alliance that led to the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971. This action, similar to China's entente with Pakistan in 1963, again exhibited the tendency of nation states to form strategic alliances based on expediency and geography rather than principles when the potential threat from adversaries increases to the level where a victory for them seems viable. India preached a policy of non-alignment and was democratic in a western sense, but based on a dire necessity for a strategic balance of the Sino-Pak threat, India aligned itself with the Soviet Union to protect its national interest. As Steven Walt says states will act rationally in times of

²³ Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 173.

need by “bandwagoning” or aligning themselves with power to offset threats.²⁴ Pakistan and India eventually went to war over Bangladesh; this resulted in the surrender of Pakistani forces and India’s recognition of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

The succession of Bangladesh further strengthened the Sino-Pakistan alliance and marked the start of a new era of geopolitics in South Asia involving the United States. The Indo-Soviet military axis further sparked Chinese insecurities regarding Moscow’s expansionist intentions, and served as the catalyst for open discussions on Sino-U.S. cooperation out of which another bandwagon type relationship was formed. The Sino-Pak relationship was instrumental in the dramatic change in the previously cold Sino-U.S. relationship. Pakistan was instrumental in serving as a bridge between Beijing and Washington during Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s historic mission to China in July 1971. As the Soviet Union emerged under the “Brezhnev doctrine” and the threat of Soviet expansionism heightened, the United States under President Nixon sought to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s ever growing power. Kissinger flew to Islamabad and then to Beijing, thereby utilizing the United States relations with Pakistan to ease the difficulty of this historic mission. This mission led to the historic Sino-U.S. Communiqué of 1972, in which the United States recognized one government of China.

Pakistan, through much of this period, experienced “international relations acrobatics” as it tried to balance its contradicting loyalties to both China and the United States. With the United States’ intention to make the “China Card” a major factor in world politics to the detriment of the Soviet Union, Pakistan proved to be a worthy liaison between China and the United States.

²⁴ Walt, 19.

The China-Pakistan alliance at the end of the first period (1963-1972) was the epitome of “realpolitik” where countries essentially have no permanent enemies or friends, only interests. China and Pakistan, in keeping within the parameters of the balance of threat theory, despite conflicting ideologies, had come together to counterbalance the local or geographical threats of India and the Soviet Union. Though the United States had a greater economic infrastructure and military capability than Russia and India, the threat posed by these two nations to China and Pakistan was incomparable because of Russia and India’s geographic proximity, Russia’s superior military capability and expressed expansionist intentions. After nine years, cooperation between the two contributed to each country’s national interests. China’s significant economic and military aid followed by its loyalty and support to Pakistan in the 1965 Indian-Pakistan War, set in stone Pakistan’s longstanding allegiance to China in the event that a major conflict erupted with India. China also used Pakistan’s relationship with the United States to trigger the end of its international isolation. Conversely during this period, Pakistan became a benefactor of both China and the United States, juggling military aid from both countries and using it to enhance its own defense posture.

Phase II (1972-1989)

Whereas the first phase of the China-Pakistan relationship was dominated by the immediate threat of India, the second period focused on defense collaboration and the expansion of ties to enhance economic development. Though the underlying premise of offsetting the Indian threat remained, the relationship broadened most notably in world politics.

The second phase began much as the first had, with a changing global geopolitical environment. The China-Pakistan relationship entered the world stage as a supporter of the United States to combat Soviet expansionism. Just as China and Pakistan had come together to counterbalance the threat of India, the United States collaborated with China to offset the Soviet Threat.

Historically, relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States were 'forged' to counterbalance the perceived Soviet threat. In 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine and increase in Sino-Soviet border clashes convinced China's leaders that the Soviet threat was serious and served as a catalyst for more intense collaboration. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978, on top of Soviet involvement in Indochina, also fueled China's concerns. China (whose military power was no match for the Soviets) faced modern T-72 tanks, SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, and an assortment of *Badger* and *Backfire* bombers. During the Nixon Administration, when talks were first initiated, Henry Kissinger said, "China needed us precisely because it did not have the strength to balance the Soviet Union by itself."²⁵ In 1979, China and the United States normalized relations and formed a "united front" against the threat of what they perceived to be Soviet hegemony.

China and Pakistan continued to show no inclination towards normalization of relations with India. In a joint communiqué between President Bhutto and Chou En-lai in February 1972, China reiterated its call for Indian forces to withdrawal from occupied Pakistani territory. China also

²⁵ Bih-jaw Lin, "The Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle: An Analysis," *Mainland China, Politics, Economics, and Reform* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 629.

sought to stir up the Kashmir issue in the joint Nixon-Chou Communiqué in March 1972.²⁶ Though some marginal progress was made concerning Sino-Pakistan-Indian relations, including Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, China and Pakistan continued to fortify their relationship through defense cooperation, political ties and military collaboration.

Defense cooperation between 1971-1978 encompassed numerous Chinese funded Pakistan defense initiatives. Pakistan developed aircraft refitting factories with Chinese assistance for the overhaul and refurbishment of the F-6, F-7 and A-5.²⁷ The Chinese also provided the assistance for the continued development of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) originally developed in 1947 by the British. With substantial Chinese assistance, the number of factories grew to 14, with over 40,000 employees, and the ability to produce automatic weapons, small arms, rockets, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, tungsten alloys and propellants.²⁸ The Chinese also assisted in the development of Pakistan's military links with North Korea, particularly by enabling Pakistan's purchase of infantry and artillery hardware. Chinese military assistance strengthened a weaker Pakistan whose goals complimented those of China. As Walt states, "aid does not necessarily assure alignment; client states may serve their patron's interest, but only when such

²⁶ CNN Interactive, <http://europe.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/15/documents/us.china/>. In the joint U.S.-China communiqué issued at Shanghai at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to China, the Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. China firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir and China firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

²⁷ Eric Arnett, *Military Capacity and the Risk of War China, India, Pakistan, and Iran*.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 159.

programs serve their interest as well.”²⁹ China’s willingness to support Pakistan’s defense development was mutually beneficial in countering the threat of India.

China and Pakistan cooperated on the building of the Karakoram highway, which provided a physical outlet for China through Pakistan and an avenue for re-supply in the event of war. The highway also greatly enhanced the Chinese ability to access parts of the northwestern region of South Asia. The massive project was a combined effort between the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pakistani Army.³⁰ The effort was a significant representation of Chinese and Pakistan cooperation and commitment towards one another.³¹

Politically Pakistan was used as a bridge between China and the Middle East. Close relations with Pakistan, a Muslim country in good standing with the Islamic world, allowed Beijing to facilitate ties between Islamabad and other anti-Communist Islamic countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Chinese Communist leader Hua Guofeng was one of the last foreign leaders to visit the Shah of Iran prior to the Iranian revolution in 1978 which paved the way for China to become a major supplier of military equipment to Iran. In 1985, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan met Chinese emissaries in Islamabad. It was this secret meeting that led to the March 1988 agreement that resulted in the supply of Chinese CSS-2 surface to surface missiles to

²⁸ James Clad. “Off the Shelf Arsenal.” *Far Eastern Economic*, 15 November 1990, 72.

²⁹ Walt, 241.

³⁰ Hussain, 109.

³¹ Not only has China provided military assistance to Pakistan, but as part of its broad global strategy. China is also responsible for spawning many military power imbalances worldwide. China has been a major exporter of both military hardware and technology (some of it nuclear) to lesser-developed countries since the 1970’s. Some Third World countries that are denied western assistance because of export controls have turned to China as a willing and capable supplier of such sensitive technology. This, in turn, has provided China with markets in both the Middle East and Asia.

Saudi Arabia. Besides earning foreign exchange, this weapons sale also benefited China diplomatically. This arms deal was the first involving China and a Gulf State. China exported the CSS-2 (designated CSS by U.S. intelligence for 'Chinese Surface-to-Surface') *Dong Feng* or "East Wind," a single stage, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war. The *Dong Feng*'s range enables Saudi Arabia to strike targets in Iraq, Iran or Israel and the missile is capable of deploying either conventional, nuclear, or chemical/biological warheads. Saudi Arabia purchased 36 of these missiles for an estimated cost of 3-3.5 billion dollars.³² Ultimately, China profited diplomatically when King Fahd broke relations with Taiwan and recognized the People's Republic of China in 1990.

Pakistan was also instrumental in establishing the first official contact between China and Saudi Arabia in 1985. The Saudi ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan met Chinese emissaries in Islamabad. It was this secret meeting that led to the March 1988 agreement that resulted in the supply of Chinese CSS-2 surface to surface missiles to Saudi Arabia. Besides earning foreign exchange, this weapons sale also benefited China diplomatically. This arms deal was the first involving China and a Gulf State. China exported the CSS-2 (designated CSS by U.S. intelligence for 'Chinese Surface-to-Surface') *Dong Feng* or "East Wind," a single stage, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war. The *Dong Feng*'s range enables Saudi Arabia to strike targets in Iraq, Iran or Israel and the missile is capable of deploying either conventional, nuclear, or chemical/biological warheads. Saudi Arabia purchased

³² Hussain, 109.

36 of these missiles for an estimated cost of 3-3.5 billion dollars.³³ Ultimately, China profited diplomatically when King Fahd broke relations with Taiwan and recognized the People's Republic of China in 1990.

Pakistan also helped China's Islamic population by facilitating the journey of Chinese hajji to Mecca and providing scholarships for Chinese Muslims to study at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. China's decision to use Pakistan as a liaison to the Middle East minimized threats both foreign and domestic. A link to the Middle East both appeased fundamental Islamics and assisted domestic defense production. In the foreign policy arena it allowed China a beginning for power and influence in other parts of the world.

The centerpiece of the Pakistan-China balance of threat during this period involved collaboration after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, the United States entered the scene with China and Pakistan and forged a relationship to monitor and offset Soviet gains. All three nations put aside individual differences and sought to balance the greatest threat; Soviet expansionism. Embarking on an unprecedented level of cooperation, the United States Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan's Inter-Services intelligence and the Chinese Intelligence Services developed a close, cordial relationship aimed at exchanging information and monitoring Soviet activity.³⁴ This relationship also led China to agree to a U.S. listening post to monitor Soviet Central Asia in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. China-U.S.-Pakistan cooperation exhibited nations' tendencies to balance threats when facing aggressive intentions. The Soviet

³³ Ibid, 109.

³⁴ Ibid, 109.

Union's intimidation in Afghanistan and parts of Eastern Europe facilitated the unlikely cooperation between the United States and China.

In return for Pakistan's diplomatic assistance, China provided arms support totaling \$1.5 billion (U.S. Dollars) between 1963 and 1980.³⁵ With Chinese assistance, Pakistan's growing defense industry gained an enhanced ability to compete economically in the international market. China did everything short of providing direct military support for Pakistan in order to present India with a standing two-front threat.

Phase III (1989 -)

The period of time covered in Phase III was relatively quiet, with no actual fighting between China, India or Pakistan. Unlike either the first or second phase of the China-Pakistan relationship, which was forged to counterbalance the Indian threat, their relationship during this third phase was sustained based on the previous international experiences the two countries shared. Throughout a phase lacking fighting indicating a declining threat, one might assume that the Chinese-Pakistan alliance would weaken. Surprisingly, this phase was characterized by increased military and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan that continues to this day. Walt says of the balance of threat:

A superpower is sought as an ally against the more imminent threats that arise from other states within the region. Because the superpower is both more powerful and less threatening to most states in the region, it is an ideal ally for a regional power that faces a direct military threat from one of its neighbors.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid, 110.

³⁶ Walt, 171. Applying Walt's explanation to this case study, China would serve as the superpower, with Pakistan as the other state in the region that seeks an alliance with the superpower and which faces a direct military threat from its neighbor India.

The most notable development during this period was the implosion of the Soviet Union. From Tiananmen Square to the breaking of the Berlin wall, both China and Pakistan were on the international stage exploiting diplomatic relations abroad, all the while publicly supporting one another. Military and civilian contracts are predominant during this period and the exchange of services continues.

The third phase was one of geopolitical change and internal shifts both in China and the former Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the withdrawal of Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan and China's economic "opening up" dominated the international environment. This period of the relations between Pakistan and China began after the end of the Cold War in 1989, when China also normalized relations with Russia. Although this may have provided optimism for Indian-Sino relations, continued unresolved territorial conflicts and China's suspicion of Indian hegemony in South Asia, soured Indian-Sino relations and reinforced China-Pakistan bilateral relations. Pakistan's continued loyalty and political support through the Chinese turmoil was rewarded with continued defense cooperation in the area of nuclear development.

Again, following the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, China was ostracized politically for its actions. Islamabad stood by Beijing and within three weeks sent its Foreign Secretary for annual consultations and to convey solidarity. The support continued during China's fortieth National Day celebration on 1 October 1989, which most Western countries

boycotted. Pakistan was represented by a parliamentary delegation led by the speaker of the National Assembly.³⁷

China reciprocated with an increased supply of conventional weapons and also offered assistance for the development of “peaceful” uses of nuclear power. Recently, a Pakistani newspaper, *Islamabad The Nation in English*, reported that under a Sino-Pak venture, a new K-8E jet trainer developed by China had successfully made its maiden flight. This Sino-Pak project is reported to be the largest deal in China’s aviation industry’s history in terms of the number of jet aircraft built. The K-8E is scheduled to be exported to Egypt in a 347 million-dollar deal. Further, under another deal signed during since deposed Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit last year, China and Pakistan are also planning to manufacture the Super-7 fighter aircraft.³⁸

In March 1992, China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to adhere to the guidelines and parameters of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). MTCR guidelines established a 500 kilogram (1,100 pound) warhead and 300 kilometer (186 miles) range cap on missile exports.³⁹ Public support by all countries in the international arena for the MTCR seemed to indicate a belief in China’s commitment to adhere to global agreements concerning international weapons sales. However, in November 1992, just eight months after agreeing to abide by the MTCR, China reportedly exported M-11 missiles or related equipment to

³⁷ Hussain, 111.

³⁸ “Jointly Build K8E Aircraft” (text), in Pakistan *Islamabad The Nation in English* (08 June 2000), 1, 17 (Description of source: Independent Daily, member of the Nawa-I-Waqt group.) *FBIS Daily Report – China, Pakistan, Russia*. Document ID SAP 20000608000044.

³⁹ Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Pushes Arms Control in Effort to Open China Ties,” *Defense News*, October 10-16, 1994, 8.

Pakistan. Although China has never openly admitted to it, in August 1993, the Clinton Administration announced it had 'unambiguous evidence' that China had delivered technology for its surface-to-surface M-11 to Pakistan.⁴⁰ The missile (an M-series) is a single stage, solid propellant, short-range ballistic missile. The export of this missile, because of inherent capabilities, violates the MTCR because the M-11 exceeds the maximum allowable payload and range limits. Launched by mobile launchers (i.e. trucks), the missile can be armed with either a conventional 800-kg warhead (1,764 pounds) or a nuclear device. Propositioned Pakistani M-11 missiles could easily strike targets in India.⁴¹

In January 1998, in a hearing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency said:

Conventional arms sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to Weapons of Mass Destruction technology related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has contributed to Weapons of Mass Destruction advances in these countries. On the positive side, there have been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the long term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching.⁴²

⁴⁰ "China and Arms: Worry Lingers," *Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition)*, 06 October 1994, 10.

⁴¹ "China," Paper by the *International Technology and Trade Associates, Inc.*, Washington D.C. Tab 4.

⁴² Director of Central Intelligence, "Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," 28 January 1998. Provided by the *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, "China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Pakistan – Statements and Developments" *Resources on India and Pakistan*, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/mpakchr.htm>.

Not only has China exported missiles and related technology, but also it has also regularly supplied conventional military equipment, regardless of the buyers' intended use or the affect on regional stability. On occasion, Chinese policy on weapons exports has damaged its diplomacy. One Chinese conventional arms deal in 1988 resulted in a regional dispute between two countries. In spite of India's opposition, China sold military equipment to Nepal. India believed China's conduct violated the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace Friendship which stated that Nepal would only purchase arms from India or a third world country approved by India. Consequently, India imposed an economic blockade against Nepal.

On the diplomatically volatile issue of Taiwan, Pakistan has also publicly supported China. This past May, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman Iftikhar Murshid stated that

Pakistan believes there is only one China. Taiwan is an integral and alienable part of the People Republic of China, which is the sole legal government representing the whole of China including Taiwan. Outside powers should not meddle in China's internal affairs. The government of Pakistan is confident that like Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan would soon return to the motherland.⁴³

For the past 45 years, through diplomatic efforts and deterrence, nations with nuclear weapons have actually preserved international stability. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, but alone they hardly maintain any other power that can be defined as strategic.

Conclusion

This case study supports Walt's balance of threat theory. It illustrates that for China and Pakistan, the issue that drives the two together is not India having a preponderance of power

⁴³ "Pakistan Supports for 'One China' Policy" (text), in China *Xinhua* in English (31 May 2000). (Description of source: Beijing *Xinhua* in English – China's official news service for English-language audiences) *FBIS Daily Report – China, Pakistan*. Document ID CPP 20000531000139.

(foreign influence and political power as a result of population, industrial/military capability and technological prowess), the issue is that by India possessing this power, coupled with its geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions, it poses a real threat. The degree to which a state threatens others is not exclusively determined by its material capabilities (population, economic, industrial and military resources), as suggested by the balance of power approach.⁴⁴ Walt firmly argues that balancing is the dominant response to external threats,⁴⁵ and bandwagoning is almost always confined to weak and isolated states.⁴⁶ Bandwagoning is risky. It ‘says’ “you are powerful and since my options for alliances are prohibitive, I’ll join with you in hopes that I can benefit from your power.” Bandwagoning requires trust, it increases the resources available to the threatening power and inherent to it is the very real possibility that today’s ally can always turn to be tomorrow’s enemy. On the other hand, a different type of relationship emerges when a weaker nation state ‘says’ “you are the powerful adversary, close and aggressive, and I know of another nation state nearby that sees you the same, and we’re going to join in opposition to you.” Joining the weaker side (balancing) prevents the emergence of a hegemon that could threaten the independence of all.⁴⁷

There has only been one case where the alliance has been consistent and that is the case of China and Pakistan. Throughout the specific time periods studied, India and the Soviet Union provided an external threat, based on a series of conflicts between India-China and

⁴⁴ Walt, 22-26.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 148.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 28-30.

⁴⁷ Waltz, 126-7.

India-Pakistan which caused China and Pakistan to forge an enduring alliance. China's budding problems with India were exacerbated by a precarious relationship with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. China acted rationally and embarked on an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan. Cooperation with Pakistan did effectively balance the Indian threat and prevented India from focusing exclusively on China. During the Cold War, the Sino-Pak balance of power endured to counter the perceived notion of Soviet and Indian hegemony in the region. The examination of the different components of threat (power, proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions) as perceived by both countries during significant world events that occurred, has provided a compelling account of why China and Pakistan developed and maintained their international coalition.

During an inaugural ceremony for a Chinese built digital switch manufacturing plant in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf said that China is the "most dependable and trusted friend" of Pakistan. He further added that China has always assisted Pakistan, irrespective of the environment of political considerations."⁴⁸ As Walt points out, and as Chinese participation in the ceremony in Pakistan suggests, one benefit of alliances among neighboring states is that they are more able to be involved with each others economy and industry and are thus more likely to take active measures to influence regional events. A related benefit is that the synergy of cooperation between regional states may increase the importance of each as seen by the great powers.

⁴⁸ "Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf Praises Pakistan-China Ties" (text), in China *Xinhua* in English (07 April 2000). (Description of source: Beijing *Xinhua* in English – China's official news service for English-language audiences) *FBIS Daily Report – China, Pakistan*. Document ID CPP 20000407000130.

More than ever, Beijing is unsure of its place in a world no longer dominated by superpower rivalry. China's past domestic policies such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, have caused it to remain behind other nations in developing its technology and economy. In the early 1980's, Deng Xiaoping outlined three key initiatives for the future of China: anti-hegemony, reunification and modernization. China desperately needs western technology for industrial modernization and foreign exchange for a strong economy to assist its transition into the twenty-first century. China's foreign policy is driven by what is known as its 'independent foreign policy', that is, adjusting to whatever course can benefit China.

The end of the cold war removed the stabilizing presence of the superpowers on deep-seated regional problems and required China to develop a regional stability independent of its cold war status. In order to achieve modernization, China has been required to shed its steadfast determination to define its national identity in terms of status and security and respond positively to proposals for collective regional security. China is developing – politically, economically, socially and culturally. Pakistan intends to maintain the current alliance in order to benefit from China's rising status.

While India has recently made sincere efforts to mend strained relations with China, it is nevertheless a wasted effort. With Pakistan's army now in power, at least behind the scenes, there is little hope of renewed dialogue between Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf and India's re-elected Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee. Where Pakistan's economy is strapped, India's economy is flourishing, developing such high technical exports as computers and other software related items. With this new economic backing, India could be embarking on an arms race to bankrupt Pakistan in the same way that the United States caused the Soviet Union to go bankrupt.

What remains to be seen is whether the present Sino-Pak coalition will be able to face future regional and international developments. Today, the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad is sustained through the two countries' national security interests in the post cold war era. The threat from India is ever present even though the demise of the Soviet Union, India's historical ally and a past source for much of its technical and military hardware, has forced India to explore other paths to power and security. While India is currently making strides to develop a sound economic infrastructure, Pakistan is poised on becoming a possible failed nation state and continues to rely on China for economic support. Though stockpiled throughout the past 40 years, Pakistan is inferior to the advanced military of India and still relies on China for military support. China understands itself as the geographical superpower and with India and Pakistan on its borders, China has begun to act as the regional broker to settle the historical disputes between these two nations. But, China's favored status with Pakistan over the past 40 years affects its decisions in matters involving those two countries. In the present, China relies on Pakistan in order to extend its influence to South Asia and as a continued balance against India.

In Kenneth Waltz' Theory of International Politics, he states

We do not expect the strong to combine with the strong in order to increase the extent of their power over others, but rather to square off and look for allies who might help them. In anarchy, security is at the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is the means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Waltz, 118.

China has been accustomed to considering itself the only superpower in Asia. It has not been able to view the world's most powerful democratic nation (United States) recently coming closer to the world's largest democracy (India) as an ordinary development.⁵⁰ In view of recent discussions between China and India, China is unwilling to disrupt the stable relationship it has with Pakistan. Historically unresolved disputes between India and China remain unsettled. The border dispute regarding the Kashmir and Tibet remains unsolved. Status quo will persist in South Asia until a time when tensions between China and India escalate. Pakistan may serve as the spark that leads to a conflict involving these two nation states.

⁵⁰ "India's Changing Relationship With China Viewed" (text), in India *Chennai Dinamani in Tamil* (02 June 2000), 6. (Description of source: Independent Daily published by the Indian Express Group.) *FBIS Daily Report – China, India, United States*. Document ID SAP 20000605000077.

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