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DOMESTIC TERRORISM: IS AMERICA PREPARED?

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Abstract Within the United States National Security Strategy, December 1999, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their possible use by terrorists are listed as a vital interest to our nations security. Excluded from this vital interest are terrorist acts that involve the use of conventional bombs and weaponry. The United States is focused on a Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) terrorist attack; but it should be equally prepared for the more likely domestic terrorist attack using conventional bombs.		
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Domestic Terrorism: Is America Prepared?

Author: Major Michel M. Russell, Sr., United States Army

Thesis: Within the United States' National Security Strategy, December 1999, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their possible use by terrorists are listed as a vital interest to our nation's security. Excluded from this vital interest are terrorist acts that involve the use of conventional bombs and weaponry. The United States is focused on a Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) terrorist attack; but it should be equally prepared for the more likely domestic terrorist attack using conventional bombs.

Discussion: A main focus of United States counter terrorism policy is the terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Environmental Protection Agency's definition of WMD is: "Weapons or devices that are intended, or have the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people, through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; or radiation or radioactivity." Governmental focus on deterrence, prevention, and managing the consequences of WMD is a vital national interest, but not at the expense of remaining equally dutiful in the war against terrorist conventional bombings that are not mentioned in the EPA's definition of WMD. In light of the global fear of WMD, terrorist use of conventional bombs may not receive the consideration it requires thus increasing America's vulnerability.

Conclusion: The United States' government must strike a balance between combating the domestic terrorist use of WMD and conventional bombs. An equally vigilant posture against homeland bombings is America's greatest protection against domestic terrorism in the 21st century.

PREFACE

While assigned to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in 1999, I became interested in the United States' policies and methodologies for combating terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In the United States' 1999 National Security Strategy, the use of WMD by state or terrorist actors against the United States is a vital national interest. I agree that this is a valid national interest, but I also believe the United States may overlook the use of a weapon still widely used by terrorists--the conventional bomb.

My research examines whether or not the United States is as equally prepared for a domestic terrorist bombing as it is for terrorist use of a WMD. Inside the borders of the U.S., if America is not adequately prepared and vigilant against domestic terrorist attacks that employ the use of conventional bombs, America's vulnerability for attack will elevate to an undesirable level.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Harmon and LtCol Mark "Pin" Bolin for their assistance and mentoring during my research effort, and Ms. Lynne Gernet for her tireless editing duties and helpful suggestions. A special thank you to my family (Sieglinde, Michel Jr., and Nicholas) for their unselfish support during the entire academic year.

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Section One

Terrorism Defined

Academics, politicians, and governments alike have attempted to define terrorism and its destructive use of violence. The Webster's II dictionary defines terrorism as: "Systematic use of violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve an end;"¹ it further defines the act of terrorism as: "To coerce by intimidation or fear."² There are various definitions of terrorism that originates from "political" and or "moral" foundations. Benjamin Netanyahu, former prime minister of Israel, writes that: "...terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends."³ He further argues, "...nothing justifies terrorism...it is evil *per se*." "Terrorism attacks the very foundations of civilization and threatens to erase it altogether by killing man's sense of sin.... The unequivocal and unrelenting moral condemnation of terrorism must therefore constitute the first line of defense against its most insidious effect."⁴

For the purposes of this paper I will use the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) definition of terrorism that states: "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."⁵ The FBI categorizes terrorism as either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and

¹ New Riverside University, *Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary* (The Riverside Publishing Company, 1994), p. 1195.

² Ibid.

³ Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society* (The MIT Press, 1998), p. 4.

⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Counterterrorism*, URL: http://www.fbi.gov/search?NS-search-page=document&NS-rel-doc-name=/contact/fo/jackson/cntrterr.htm&NS-query=weapons+of+mass+destruction&NS-search-type=NS-boolean-query&NS-collection=FBI_Web_Site&NS-docs-found=72&NS-doc-number=7. Accessed 16 December 2000.

objectives of the terrorist organization.

“Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or population. International terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”⁶

The FBI divides terrorist-related activity into two categories:

- A terrorist incident is a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
- A suspected terrorist incident is a potential act of terrorism in which responsibility for the act cannot be attributed at the time to a known or suspected terrorist group or individual.⁷

Goals of Terrorism

Terrorism aspires to achieve four goals within a democratic society.⁸

The first goal is to change how citizens view their government’s ability, through policy and enforcement, to provide adequate protection against terrorist acts. There is an

⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Counterterrorism*, URL: http://www.fbi.gov/search?NS-search-page=document&NS-rel-doc-name=/contact/fo/jackson/cntrterr.htm&NS-query=weapons+of+mass+destruction&NS-search-type=NS-boolean-query&NS-collection=FBI_Web_Site&NS-docs-found=72&NS-doc-number=7. Accessed 16 December 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Phillip B. Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 10-12.

assumption by a populace that their government will provide this protection at home and abroad. The differences in these two locations are their circumstances. The populace will more readily accept a terrorist attack abroad if not due to governmental negligence in military force or citizen protection.

The second goal is using violence to cause citizens to urge the government to pursue a policy of accommodation with the insurgent group and or to change political policy commensurate with terrorists' aims. There has been a measure of success using violence as a negotiator, as seen in: Northern Ireland, Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization, etc.... The United States' policy of "zero tolerance" provides its citizens with a level of protection because terrorist actors already know there will be no accommodation to their demands as a matter of national policy. Additionally, this policy is made even stronger because the citizens it is designed to protect support it.

The third goal is through the use of assassinations of political elites to intimidate due prosecution of terrorism in America. Cowardly acts of terrorism such as the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, President Abraham Lincoln, and Dr. (Rev) Martin Luther King, Jr. were attempts to push America from a path it has chosen. Painfully, the United States has stood firm in the face of terrorism and not waived even though the sacrifices of lives and property are high. Terrorism is a violent and revolting proposition that America has met with fortitude, as in the 1993 U.S. attack against Baghdad in retaliation for an attempt to murder former President George Bush in Kuwait.

Finally, the fourth goal is reaching the desired audience. There are three audiences a terrorist tries to reach: potential supporters of an insurgency, society at

large, and members within the group.⁹ Acts of terrorism against large countries, especially the United States, can show potential sponsors that the attacked government is not as powerful as it seems to be. Terrorism against society at large has two dimensions: violence against the average citizen to create fear and or against the political elite. This is done in an attempt to shape public opinion/will and or cause governmental policy changes/concessions. The third audience is the terrorist group itself. As the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps advertise to attract new recruits, so do terrorist groups. The difference is that terrorism advertises through their accomplishments, although violence constitutes success for some groups, and anti-western rhetoric to gain its recruits.¹⁰

Who Commits Terrorism?

If you walk through any neighborhood in America, you could pass by a terrorist. These terrorists are usually “extremists” that vehemently believe in their movement, ideology, and purpose as being “just” and legitimate in its execution. “Home grown” terrorist groups have been known to be operating within the U.S., some are: the Order, the Klu Klux Klan (KKK), Los Macheteros, Earth Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front, some Christian Identity Sects, Special Forces Background, Posse Comitatus, White Aryan Resistance, White Patriot Party, Minnesota Patriots Council (convicted of conspiring to kill federal employees with ricin), and the Oklahoma Constitutional Militia (some where seized after planning to bomb the Montana office of the Anti-Defamation League). This list names just a few extremist militia groups among hundreds that are

⁹ Phillip B. Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 10-12.

¹⁰ Ibid.

preparing for whatever they feel is their duty to accomplish (see Table 1).¹¹ It is not this passive preparation that threatens American democracy, but when these groups decide to act upon their beliefs, hatred, and bigotry using violence is what makes them a domestic terrorist.

TABLE 1: Sample Characteristics of Persons and Groups Indicted for Terrorism/Terrorist-Related Activities: 1980-1989

	<i>Name Of Group</i>	<i>Number of Persons Indicted</i>
Domestic Terrorism		
<i>Right Wing</i>		
1	Aryan Nations	3
2	Arizona Patriots	10
3	Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord	17
4	Ku Klux Klan	1
5	The Order	28
6	The Order II	5
7	Sheriff's Posse Comitatus	4
8	White Patriot Party	7
<i>Left-Wing</i>		
9	El Rukns	7
10	Macheteros	19
11	Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)	5
12	May 19th Communist Organization	7
13	United Freedom Front	8
14	New African Freedom Front	9
15	Provisional Party of Communists	1
<i>Single Issue</i>		
16	Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC)	5
	Subtotal	136

SOURCE: Reprinted from *Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams* by Brent L. Smith, State University Press, 1994.

¹¹ John Train, "Who Will Attack America?" Strategic Review, Fall 2000, p. 11

Americans are used to watching the news and seeing conventional bomb attacks in foreign countries, upon people they do not identify with. This act is regrettable but tolerable because tomorrow it is forgotten by those unaffected. With domestic terrorism, Americans cannot just wish away the act because it is in their own backyard.

International terrorists and domestic terrorists utilize the same tactics to achieve similar goals, the difference is one targets a global audience while the other stays home.

America is still at risk from international terrorist acts such as the November 2000, bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen killing 17 American sailors and wounding others.

With great power comes awesome responsibility, as does being the world's superpower. This status makes the U.S. a target by all those that feel we are contrary to any belief or position they may hold. This also pertains to U.S. homegrown terrorists; they primarily focus their efforts on federal government agencies and representatives. This was demonstrated by the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma city killing or wounding just fewer than 700 people (including children).¹² There is no stereotypical domestic terrorist because they all start off in life looking like you or me, thus making their identification an enormous task.

Mao Tse Tung's (Chinese military theorist and leader) writings on guerilla warfare evidence the complexity of identifying domestic terrorists. His essays and methods suggest to us today that our home grown terrorists may draw their power from others who have similar feelings of disenfranchisement by the Federal government and or oppression by a particular race or nationality. These people come together with a belief that their ideas are justified and their cause is legitimate as do revolutionaries acting against their government. These same people train themselves, arm themselves,

and form a command structure that eventually leads to missions that result in acts of terrorism on U.S. soil. This tactic of attacking without notice to inflict chaos and then withdrawing to a safe haven or even blending into the general population is the same tactic that Mao outlines for guerilla warfare. Domestic terrorists may never attack military targets, but in a limited way they resemble guerillas in that they are often not strong enough to move head on but instead employ a variety of asymmetric attacks designed to frustrate, damage, and discredit the enemy (U.S. government) to the populace.

Having made this correlation between domestic terrorism and guerilla warfare, the next logical step is to examine how the legitimate government of the U.S. contends with domestic terrorism within its open society based upon democracy and all the personal freedoms it provides.

Terrorism and Democracy

The U.S. Department of State lists these foreign states that sponsor terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria have a common thread which makes them a threat to the U.S. and its interests abroad. They also share an affinity for blaming the West and the U.S. for the ills of their society and political/religious situation.¹³ These foreign terrorist organizations often target the U.S. in ways below the military level; they use physical violence against our citizens. Internationally, we are

¹²Encyclopedia.com, *The World Trade Center*, URL: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/14004.html>. Accessed 10 January 2000.

¹³ United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999* (Washington, DC, GPO, 2000), Department of State Publication 10687.

very vulnerable, but domestically, we are better situated to prevent such attacks if we are prepared.¹⁴

As an open society based upon democracy and all its freedoms (speech, assembly, and privacy) has made the U.S. a lucrative target for domestic terrorists groups. The United States has been and will be targeted by terrorists as long as we are perceived as the bastion of capitalism and our foreign policy goals continue to expand our influence across two oceans. Our forward deployed military forces, embassies, and citizens traveling abroad have always felt the brunt of terrorism directed at the United States. Through policy, prosecution, and retaliation we actively try to minimize these dangers, but terrorist determination and being on foreign soil allows for unfortunate terrorists' successes.

Our government is extremely stable, with racial and ethnic divisions held in check by a strong constitutional base supported by federal, state, and local laws. Additionally, there is a cultural thread between Americans that dictates injustices and violence committed upon another will not to be tolerated. These common threads insulate us from overt attacks of terrorism but do not prevent a determined person, group, or state actor from attempting the execution of terrorist acts against America from within America.

So who is most likely to act against America without the constraints of borders, domestic terrorists? These domestic terrorists groups take the form of left or right wing groups that normally fit a certain profile of American; below are the standard domestic terrorist demographics (see Table 2).

¹⁴ Ibid.

TABLE 2: Characteristics of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the United States

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>Type of Group</i>	
	<i>Left-Wing</i>	<i>Right-Wing</i>
Ideology	Political focus; primarily Marxism	Religious focus; ties to Christian Identity movement
Economic Views	Procommunist/socialist; belief in Marxist maxim "receive according to one's need"	Strongly anticommunist; belief in Protestant work ethic, distributive justice
Base of Operations	Urban areas	Rural areas
Tactical Approach	Cellular structure; use of safe houses	National networking; camps and compounds
Targets	For funding: prefer armored truck robbery Terrorist (symbolic) targets: seats of capitalism or government buildings	For funding: prefer armored truck robbery Terrorist (symbolic) targets: federal law enforcement agencies or opposing racial or religious groups

SOURCE: Reprinted from *Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams* by Brent L. Smith, State University Press, 1994.

The U.S. has no internal borders or check points that track the flow and passage of our citizens, nor are there restrictions on what we do and how we do it as long as we stay within legal limits. These very freedoms, unfortunately, provide an excellent cover under which homegrown terrorists can operate. This is not to describe the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights as enablers to terrorists; but as guarantors to certain levels of freedom, they do allow domestic terrorists an environment they can operate in more easily. In an open society misfortunes occur. It could even be argued that a democratic society is more at risk to terrorism than a closed one. The point is that it allows its citizens as well as those who live or visit an open society can act and express themselves

freely, and some abuse this freedom through the most reprehensible expression of dissatisfaction--acts of terror.

This terror creates “fear”. A goal of terrorism is to remove the “feeling of safety” and detract from daily life with the worry of unpredicted, violent, and or instantaneous death. This feeling of safety is enjoyed immensely, it may even be said it is taken for granted, in the United States, where, as an open democratic society, enjoy freedom of movement and safety from violent aggression (terrorist acts). However, there are countries, such as Northern Ireland, Israel, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Egypt, Greece that live with fear and the reality of terrorist acts everyday. Americans often watch the news about attacks in these countries with great disgust. Were they to happen in this country, there would not only be the same disgust but also a profound feeling of fear would create an upheaval in our society. This upheaval is the very thing domestic terrorists are looking to accomplish, an upheaval in our present society resulting in their beliefs and ideology replacing it. Examples of domestic terrorists groups and some of their beliefs are:

a. The Patriot and Christian Identity whose ideas include, among others, that federal taxes and federal power are excessive and racial integration should be stopped.

b. The Order’s oath: “I, as a free Aryan man, hereby swear...that I have a sacred duty to do whatever is necessary to deliver our people from the Jews and bring total victory to the Aryan race.”¹⁵

c. During the radio talk show, “American Dissident Voices,” the host stated: “I suspect Americans will begin engaging in terrorism on a scale the world has never known...there is nothing the government can do to stop it.”¹⁶

¹⁵ John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, p. 12.

d. The Texas Emergency Reserve, a Klu Klux Klan offshoot, states: “When they get in the kill zone and you initiate fire...they mustn’t have a chance to do anything but die.”¹⁷

This is only some of the rhetoric espoused by these right wing militia organizations that are either ready or have already begun to advance through the levels of terrorism:

1. Group organization under a belief and or ideology; financial support from internal and/or external sources
2. Arming and training begins with founding members
3. Recruitment of new members
4. Propaganda in support of the “cause”
5. Conduct of passive missions to gain confidence, experience, and a reputation; if successful, the group redefines itself and reevaluates its potential for missions of greater significance
6. Conduct overt violent missions or remain passive -- this will depend largely upon the temperament of the command structure that sets the group’s operational tempo.

It is this construct that domestic terrorist groups as a general model tend to follow as they progress towards a violent alternative to express their views.

As for leadership of the groups, the current doctrine among the radicalized militias is “leaderless resistance,” which are small independent units taking their cue not from a vertical command structure but from the many informal networks now operating.

¹⁶John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, p. 12.

¹⁷ Ibid.

These networks include over a hundred internet and web sites, many dozens of newsletters, and radio links.”¹⁸ A manual entitled “Leaderless Resistance” outlines this new school of thought. The outcome sought by these radicalized militias using this new strategy of leaderless resistance is “...that their *bombings* and assassinations will trigger a conflict leading to a different America, with the federal government and its laws and its taxes rolled back, the New World Order bugaboos suppressed, and white Christians back in the saddle...”¹⁹

Section Two

Characteristics of Domestic Terrorism

Understanding that there is a very real domestic threat in the U.S., along with the realization that it is not going away and could materialize with devastating effects, we must examine their capabilities to prosecute their beliefs and ideologies. First, in order to put these groups into perspective, Table 3 (below) describes the general make-up of left and right wing domestic terrorists groups.

¹⁸ John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 13.

TABLE 3: Characteristics of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the United States

Demographic Characteristic	Type of Group ^a	
	Left-Wing	Right-Wing
Age	Average age at indictment: 35—18% over age of 40	Average age at indictment: 39—36% over age of 40
Sex	73% Male 27% Female	93% Male 7% Female
Race	29% White 71% Minority	97% White 3% American Indian
Education	54% college degrees 12% GED equivalent or less	12% College degrees 33% GED equivalent or less
Occupation	Mixed, but many professional workers: physicians, attorneys, teachers, social workers, etc.	Mixed, but a large number of unemployed or impoverished self-employed workers
Place of Residence	Urban	Rural

SOURCE: Reprinted from *Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams* by Brent L. Smith, State University Press, 1994.

“So where will the next bombing come from? More likely a homegrown source than a foreign one, but the most likely case is not the major strategic blow that the U.S. government seeks to parry. Instead, we may suffer a less catastrophic but still extremely unpleasant shock intended to attract attention. Provoking anxiety to bring change is the ultimate objective”²⁰

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center that tracks militia and hate groups there are over 500 racist and neo-Nazi groups and over 400 active militia groups espousing extreme antigovernment views as of 1999. These hate groups are categorized as: Klan, neo-Nazi, Skinhead, Christian Identity, Black Separatist and Other, while the Patriot movement is the largest and most active faction of the militia groups.²¹ “In the

²⁰ John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, p. 15.

²¹ Southern Poverty Law Center. *Active Hate Groups in the U.S. in 1999*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org>. Accessed 16 December 2000.

three years since the Oklahoma City bombing, a leaner, harder "Patriot" movement has emerged, producing terrorist conspiracies and crimes on a level not seen in decades. Driving much of the crime have been far-right-wing zealots hardened in the forge of the Christian Identity religion, a virulently anti-Semitic and racist theology."²²

This militia has grown in strength and influence by appealing to individuals and groups the message that the Zionist government (referencing Jewish influence in government and the media industry) is evil and a war is inevitable. Militia groups have further maintained their vitality through several evolutions of growth and beliefs:

- a. Thirty years of radical right organizing has produced a hardened cadre of leaders
- b. Some saw the year 2000 as the date of a long-expected race war
- c. Use of the internet and other technologies has strengthened the movement
- d. The goals of hard-liners of all ideological stripes are converging
- e. Many in aboveground groups have gone underground

The single most dangerous element in the current militia movement is the expanding network of Identity followers. For them, this is a holy war; one they intend to fight to the finish.²³

Identity members subscribe to the so-called "Israel Message." They believe that white people are the true Israelites and that Jews and people of color are subhuman "children of Satan" who, along with the government, are to be destroyed in an apocalyptic battle. Their hatred of the federal government is unmatched."²⁴

²² Ibid.

²³ Southern Poverty Law Center. *The Rise of the National Alliance*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html>. Accessed 18 December 2000.

²⁴ Southern Poverty Law Center, *Racist Identity Sect Fuels Nationwide Movement*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html>. Accessed 18 December 2000.

The more violent hate groups committed to terrorism are: The Covenant, The Sword, Arm of The Lord (CSA), the White Patriot Party, the Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations, and the Order. These groups have been responsible for the racist right's most violent episodes over the past 15 years. These groups have increasingly gained influence within some of the more heavily armed militia groups throughout the U.S. These Patriot groups (militias), largely driven by Identity theology, terrorist conspiracies, and crimes have skyrocketed since the Oklahoma City bombing. Plots have included plans to bomb at least three IRS buildings, two federal buildings, banks, a natural gas refinery, abortion clinics and other targets. Teams of terrorists have laid plans to assassinate politicians, judges, other officials and civil rights figures. Attacks on Army bases, raids on National Guard armories and a wave of bank robberies have been planned or carried out.²⁵

These groups are located throughout U.S., shown in Figure 1, giving them access to all localities that provide them the ability to reach out and commit violent crimes from anywhere they choose to.

²⁵Southern Poverty Law Center, *Active Hate Groups in the U.S. in 1999*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org>. Accessed 16 December 2000.

property of organizations or people associated with the exploitation of animals. The AOG is a hyper violent anti-abortion group that is well financed and uses bombers and shooters to enforce their beliefs.

Finally, the Underground Network, according to the FBI, is a sophisticated network that conceals children and/or mothers from an abusive environment. The FBI considers mothers that conceal their children within this network to be fugitives. This network is so well organized that these “fugitives” can travel globally without detection.²⁶

Even though these groups are not the main stream variety of domestic terrorists, their methods of violence and acts of concealment falls within the FBI definition of terrorism in the U.S.

Domestic Threat Capabilities

The arsenals that domestic terrorist groups have access to and have stockpiled in caches around their areas of operation are formidable. Extremists have amassed explosives, machine guns, missiles and other weapons (see figure 2). These groups are also trained by experienced war veterans, police officers, “guns for hire,” ex-special forces members, demolitions experts, and other highly skilled survivalist that train them in the art and science of war.

Figure 2



Police display weapons seized from Michigan militia members in 1995

These groups also infiltrate elected offices throughout the country by running for and in some cases winning political positions. They prefer county offices but are using every public position they can.

The Internet has also become a popular medium for domestic terrorist groups (DTG). There are hundreds of websites, radio broadcasts (“American Dissident Voices”), magazines (“National Vanguard”), and newsletters (“Free Speech”) that allows for national and global communications amongst members, global recruitment, and an inexpensive medium to publicize their message--immediately.²⁷

Financing of these operations spans a very wide spectrum of actions from membership dues to bank robbery. The militia groups who denounce the Federal government often will not pay taxes. A new trend amongst hate groups especially is the sale of “hate” music. The leader of the neo-Nazi group, the National Alliance, last year purchased Resistance Records, the nation’s largest white power music label. There is a growing market for this music by German, Scandinavian, and some U.S. bands, and a subculture exists of angry young racists who are willing to pay for it.²⁸

Globalism is not just a military or fortune 500 business term as these terrorist groups have gone global as well. David Duke, former National Director of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, is presently President of the National Organization for European American Rights (NOFEAR), an organization dedicated to protecting the rights and heritage of people of European descent in America and around the world. He travels around the world preaching about “world Zionism” in countries like Russia and all over

²⁶ Gregory A. Walker, “Managing the Domestic Terrorism Threat,” *The Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 2000): p. 9.

²⁷ John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, p. 12.

²⁸ Mark Potok. *Music, Money and Murder*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html>. Accessed 20 December 2000.

Eastern Europe. Additionally, violent hate groups like the “Hammerskins” travel globally in an effort to meet with their compatriots to better network their cause.

In sum, domestic terrorism is alive and dwelling in the U.S., as individuals and groups continue to use violent action against persons and property to perpetuate their beliefs.²⁹

Section Three

Evolution of U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy

Domestic terrorism with a political agenda, post World War II, was gradually recognized by the U.S. as an issue that required a coordinated response. From the Klu Klux Klan’s creation during the Reconstruction period to the 1950 assassination attempt of President Harry S. Truman by Puerto Rican Nationalists, the U.S. had not developed policies and procedures to combat these terrorist acts. In the 1960s and 1970s, political terrorism intensified as a result of U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict. This era produced domestic terrorists groups such as The Weathermen, the Black Panthers, and Students for Democratic Society (SDS). However, the activities of these groups were seen as acts of urban violence instead of a direct danger to civil order and the U.S. still did not initiate a national policy to combat terrorism.³⁰

During the 1970s, there were also many terrorist skyjackings and airline attacks, including the Lod Airport attack by three Japanese Red Army terrorists killing 26 people and wounding 76. These events finally put terrorism in a new perspective for America and the world. President Richard M. Nixon established a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and therefore established the beginning for a U.S national policy on terrorism.

²⁹ Mark Potok, *Music, Money and Murder*, URL: <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html>. Accessed December 20, 2000.

In 1976, the Office for Combating Terrorism (now The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism) was established to attack the terrorism issue.

During the Carter administration with adjustments under the Reagan administration, the “Lead Agency Concept” took form. This concept put the coordination responsibility in the hands of the Department of State, the Department of Justice (FBI) in incidents internal to the U.S. (domestic terrorism), and the Federal Aviation Administration for aircraft incidents within the jurisdiction of the U.S.³¹

Today, the U.S. counterterrorism policy fully recognizes domestic terrorism as a threat to national civil and political order. This counterterrorism policy is based on four tenets that relates to both international and domestic terrorism:

- a. Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals
- b. Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes
- c. Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior
- d. Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance³²

In 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism." This directive clearly assigned the FBI as the lead federal agency to coordinate all aspects of the Federal response to a WMD incident. The FBI, as the single agency coordinator, is leading this initiative in conjunction with the Department of Justice (DoJ), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Department of

³⁰ Stephen Sloan, “US Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1993): pp. 107-112.

³¹ Stephen Sloan, US Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1993): pp. 107-112.

³² U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Counterterrorism Policy*, URL: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/index.html>. Accessed on 17 December 2000.

Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). An advisory committee composed of local law enforcement, fire/hazardous materials (hazmat) departments, emergency medical services, hospitals, public health organizations, and state and local emergency response planners are helping to establish training standards, information sharing, equipping, planning, and exercises for first responders.

As the lead investigative agency, the FBI derives its legal jurisdiction to deter, investigate, direct, organize and prepare for a terrorist incident from an assortment of federal statutes and executive branch directives. Any alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Statute and the Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act will be investigated by the FBI. The WMD Statute includes the threat or use of a WMD weapon, and defines the WMD weapon as any destructive device greater than four ounces³³ (i.e. explosive or incendiary), chemical or biological agent, or the release of life threatening levels of radioactive material. The Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act Statute specifically provides for the prosecution of individuals who utilize hoax devices. The Norfolk Division of the FBI is committed to aggressively pursuing prosecution of anyone who threatens a terrorist act, whether or not it is determined to be a hoax.³⁴

Some highlights of the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act are:

a. Strengthens penalties for crimes committed against federal employees while performing their official duties; makes such crimes a federal offense

³³ The Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Counterterrorism*, URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/search?NS-search-page=document&NS-rel-doc-name=/contact/fo/jackson/cntrterr.htm&NS->

- b. Authorizes a study on the potential for tagging explosive materials for detection and identification purposes
- c. Requires plastic explosives to carry such detection agents
- d. Increases penalties for conspiracies involving explosives
- e. Expands penalties for possession of nuclear materials
- f. Criminalizes the use of chemical weapons within the United States, or against Americans outside of the United States
- g. Directs the Attorney General to issue a public report on whether literature or other material on making bombs or weapons of mass destruction is protected by the First Amendment
- h. Authorizes the Secretary of State to designate groups as terrorist organizations and prohibit them from fundraising in the United States; also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the assets of such organizations; in addition, forbids U.S. citizens, nationals, residents, etc. from having financial transactions with known terrorist states
- i. Prohibits U.S. government financial assistance to nations sponsoring terrorism
- j. Allows the Attorney General to deny asylum to suspected terrorists
- k. Authorizes more than \$1 billion over five years for various federal, state, and local government programs to prevent, combat, or deal with terrorism in the United States and abroad; in particular, authorizes \$468 million for the FBI counterterrorism and

query=weapons+of+mass+destruction&NS-search-type=NS-boolean-query&NS-collection=FBI_Web_Site&NS-docs-found=72&NS-doc-number=7. Accessed 28 March 2001.

³⁴ Ibid.

counterintelligence efforts, and authorizes \$20 million for the INS to deport criminal aliens.³⁵

The PDD –39 also established FEMA as the lead federal agency for addressing the effects or potential effects of such an incident on public health, safety, and the environment.

In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gave FEMA the task to develop and deliver training to firefighters and emergency medical personnel. Also in 1996, Congress provided financing to the Department of Defense to provide WMD training and assistance to state and local authorities. This training effort, referred to as Nunn-Lugar-Dominici after its sponsoring senators, designated the 120 largest cities in the United States for specialized training and equipment assistance. Four of those 120 cities are in the Norfolk Division's territory: Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Newport News. State and local first responders recommended that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno name a single agency to coordinate the numerous preparedness efforts of first responders. In response, she selected the FBI, due to the FBI's unique geographic positioning across the United States and its jurisdictional responsibility for the prevention of, and response to, acts of terrorism. She also announced the establishment of a new National Domestic Preparedness Office in Washington, D.C.

Section Four

Weapons of Mass Destruction or Conventional Bombs

Terrorism in America has taken a heinous path within the last decade, specifically, the magnitude of death and destruction being caused. According to the FBI,

³⁵ Close Up Foundation, *Overview of Domestic Terrorism*, URL:

a WMD results in; “Mass casualties and extensive property damage are the trademarks of weapons of mass destruction, making their detection, prevention, and destruction a FBI priority. A weapon of mass destruction, though typically associated with nuclear/radiological, chemical, or biological agents, *may also take the form of explosives, such as in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in 1995.* A weapon crosses the WMD threshold when the consequences of its release overwhelm local responders.”³⁶ The main initiative of combating terrorism in the U.S. today is preventing the terrorist use of WMD in the U.S. against its persons and property.

According to the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA), conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorism. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and or biological weapons than conventional bombs because they are more difficult to acquire, weaponize and deliver. The results, after delivery, are unpredictable and dangerous not only to the target but the terrorist as well. Also, domestic terrorist use of nuclear weapons is low due to their very high cost, difficulty in getting them into the country, required expertise to weaponize them, and their delivery requirements. On the other hand, conventional bombs are easily purchased, made, and deployed which makes them the weapon of choice for domestic terrorism. Bomb making materials can be purchased at hardware stores, chemicals can be purchased or created with minimal lab or chemistry

<http://www.closeup.org/terror.htm#domestic>. Accessed on 28 December 2000.

³⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues*, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, (Washington, DC: GAO, 1998), p. 2.

background, bomb-making instructions can be found in libraries and on the internet, as well as through extremist organizations' literature.³⁷

Bombs can be used to create several effects with minimal effort. Terrorists can use a variety of explosives from a simple pipe bomb to the moderately sophisticated truck bomb used at the World Trade Center and at the Oklahoma City Federal building. The following bombing incidents demonstrate this point:

The World Trade Center Bombing

In February 1993, a bomb exploded in the World Trade Center in New York City. The Center is the second tallest building in the world, where more than 100,000 people work and visit every day. The bomb exploded in the parking structure underneath the building, damaging the infrastructure and subway tunnels. Smoke reached the top of the 110-story building in minutes, six people were killed and more than 1,000 were injured. The FBI joined the Joint Terrorist Task Force in the investigation, which eventually brought 22 Islamic fundamentalist conspirators to trial. The trial revealed extensive plans to use terrorism to wreak havoc in the United States, including targeting government facilities.³⁸

The Unabomber

In April 1996, federal agents arrested Theodore Kaczynski and charged him with the crimes committed by the so-called "Unabomber." He had targeted university scientists and airline employees among others, and evaded authorities for over 18 years. According to the FBI, the suspect had killed three people and injured 23 others with package bombs. In a 35,000-word manifesto, which was published by *The Washington*

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Close Up Foundation, *Overview of Domestic Terrorism*, URL: <http://www.closeup.org/terror.htm#domestic>. Accessed on 28 December 2000.

Post and *The New York Times* at his insistence, the Unabomber stated that he believed that technological advances have dehumanized society. That is why scientists and researchers, at the forefront of the technological revolution, were targets for his anger.³⁹

The Oklahoma City Bombing

The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 killed 168 people and injured more than 500 others. U.S. citizens Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (homegrown terrorists) were charged and convicted with murder and conspiracy. McVeigh and Nichols have been connected to the militia movement, which opposes the expanded powers of the federal government and believes that their constitutional right to bear arms is threatened. The Oklahoma City bombing occurred exactly two years after federal troops stormed the Branch Davidian compound outside of Waco, Texas. Federal prosecutors theorize that McVeigh and Nichols committed the crime to protest what the two men saw as the government's murder of 78 Branch Davidians in the Waco conflagration.⁴⁰

The Olympic Bombing

During the Summer Olympic Games, in July 1996, less than two weeks after the TWA Flight 800 disaster, a pipe bomb exploded at Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing two people and injuring more than 100 others. The FBI said that the pipe bomb looked "homemade" with "nails and screws attached." They suspected domestic terrorists, and members of local militia groups were questioned without any results. The Olympic flag flew at half-mast and Olympic athletes and spectators became tense and worried. Lines to attend Olympic events extended as spectators were submitted to more thorough scrutiny as they passed through metal detectors and had their bags inspected.

³⁹ Ibid.

During the Games, Atlanta had been under surveillance by more than 30,000 law enforcement officials, and the Olympic Committee and the city had spent over \$300 million on security efforts. Yet even these measures were not able to prevent the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park.

The FBI named a suspect, Richard Jewell, a security guard who had spotted the bomb. His name was leaked to the press as the primary suspect and the story appeared in newspapers around the world. Much to the embarrassment of the FBI, however, they were unable to come up with any proof or physical evidence linking Jewell to the bombing. The investigations of the FBI and local authorities have not produced any other suspects. Recently, a \$500,000 reward was offered for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible. While the response has been encouraging, there has been no breakthrough and this terrorist attack remains unsolved.⁴¹

Section Five

Conventional bombs or NBC WMD

All of these terrorist incidents involved bombs that were easily attainable or created and deployed. Terrorist arsenals are largely based on military weapons and equipment such as automatic pistols, AK-47 type assault rifles, machine-guns, grenades and grenade launchers, mortars, and explosive devices to include plastic explosives. These arsenals are also supplemented with commercial off-the-shelf weapons, explosives, and equipment as well.

Lancer Militaria published a book titled Terrorist Explosives Handbook by Jack McPherson. This book details the design of several types of explosives and offensive

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Close Up Foundation, *Overview of Domestic Terrorism*, URL: <http://www.closeup.org/terror.htm#domestic>. Accessed on 28 December 2000.

weaponry that are part of the U.S. domestic terrorists' arsenal. There are also websites, advisors, and other books that detail the design and making of these types of devices (see figure 3).

The five questions and answers cited below about bombs and juveniles (under age 19) demonstrate the simplicity of bomb making:

Questions

1. How many bombs made by juveniles are discovered -- either exploding on purpose or going off accidentally – every year?
2. Between 1992-1994, how many juveniles died in the process of making, moving or placing a bomb?
3. In the same two-year-period, 1992-94, how many juveniles were injured in the process of making, moving or placing a bomb?
4. Of the bombs made by juveniles, what percent work?
5. How many of the bombings that happen across the country are caused by juveniles?⁴²

Answers

1. On average, 1,000 bombs are created by juveniles each year.
2. 13 juveniles died between 1992 and 1994 as a result of making a bomb.
3. 91 juveniles were injured in the process of making, moving or placing a bomb between 1992-1994.
4. 87% of the bombs made by juveniles work; the reason is that the bombs juveniles tend to make are simple and easy to assemble.

⁴² NOVA Online, *Bombing of America*, URL: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/bombing/juvenile.html>. Accessed 25 December 2000.

5. 32% of all bombs reported across the country are made by children under the age of 19.⁴³

In February, 2001, an 18-year-old student attending Southside High school in Upstate New York made and brought to school:


- 14 pipe bombs, some had nails attached to the outside
- Three carbon dioxide cartridge bombs filled with explosive gunpowder and topped with a fuse
- One propane bomb

Fortunately, other students became

aware of the bombs and alerted the authorities before any damage could take place. If a juvenile can make bombs such as these, then it is of little effort for an equally determined domestic terrorist to do the same on a much larger scale.⁴⁴

On the other hand, with WMD, especially nuclear devices, a likely scenario for their employment is much more complicated to achieve by both domestic and or international terrorists. For example, a likely scenario for a nuclear device in the U.S. would be to secretly ship nuclear components in several crates or containers packed with similar looking hardware to a port destination in the U.S. When the ship arrives the

Figure 3



This book is available at the Barnes and Noble website and it describes, in detail, several designs for pipe bombs. Even though this book is intended for police agencies, it is easily accessible by terrorists groups as well.

⁴³ NOVA Online, *Bombing of America*, URL: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/bombing/juvenile.html>. Accessed 25 December 2000.

device is tracked and fired by radio signal. The likely scenario preceding a detonation would resemble the group notifying the Federal government of their demands and intent to detonate the device if they are not met. Based upon U.S. terrorism policy, the government will not negotiate with the terrorists. Having come to an impasse, it is not likely that the terrorist would elect to detonate the device because attacks of mass casualties often does not further their cause but rather generates sympathy for the government and its people attacked.

The advent of a threat without the resolve to see it through leaves any such near future operation flawed on three counts: control, complexity, and credibility. As feasible as the aforementioned plan may seem, the means may not justify the ends when a kidnapping, assassination, conventional bombing, grenade, or automatic weapon will serve to support the terrorist agenda as well as offer them simplicity and ease of execution.

Section Six

The Patriot Movement

The Patriot movement is a domestic terrorist group that uses conventional forms of violence to aid their cause. Most members of this movement can be categorized into one of three groups⁴⁵:

1. Ideologically Motivated

Beliefs

- Theological
- Political

⁴⁴ Star-Gazette News, "Student charged in bomb scare at Southside," URL: //www.star-gazette.com/. Accessed 15 February 2001.

- Hybrid

Citizenship

- Domestic
- Foreign

2. Psychologically Dangerous

Sociopath

- Desires sense of power; knowledgeable about consequences

Mentally unstable

- Irrational or delusional

3. Self-Serving or Revengeful

Benefit

- Offender gains financial, reputational, or other enhancement

Revenge

- Offender settles an actual or perceived grievance against an individual or institution

Even though these three groups act contrary to society's accepted methods of expression, for the purposes of this paper, these groups are presented to show that regardless of motivation, commitment to a cause, and psychological makeup, statistically, domestic terrorists tend to use conventional bombs and weaponry over other instruments of destruction. An analysis of 60 Patriot-related criminal activities reported in the press or obtained by monitoring organizations from January 1994 to December 1996 revealed the following patterns:⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Harvey W. Kushner, *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium* (U.S.A.: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1998), p.98.

⁴⁶ Kushner, *The Future of Terrorism*, p.122.


- 22% ***Explosive-Related Incidents*** (theft, possession, manufacture, or detonation, sometimes accompanied by plan for use in specified or unspecified future attacks)
- 15% Threats (generally against government officials)
- 12% Failure to Comply with Regulations (environmental, tax, or other regulations)
- 10% Weapons Offenses (possession of banned or altered weapons or illegal paramilitary training)
- 10% Larceny/Fraud (theft, embezzlement, counterfeiting, securities fraud)
- 9% Premeditated Assaults/Confrontations (violence generally directed against law enforcement or government officials)
- 5% Armed Robberies (includes banks and journalists)
- 5% Violent Spontaneous Confrontations (generally traffic stops or suspect's appearance at official proceeding)
- 5% Standoffs (barricade-type events involving law enforcement)
- 5% Toxins/Pathogens
- 2% Infrastructure Attacks⁴⁷

Within the last ten years, the Patriot Movement has tended towards two types of violence, high intensity and moderate intensity acts. The high intensity acts involve detailed plans that result in catastrophes like the Oklahoma City bombing and the standoff in Waco. These events will likely result in large bombs and or lethal military weaponry being used to effect mass casualties by one large explosion or firefights with authorities. The second type is acts of moderate intensity. These involve single actors or

lone events that result in a shooting or small bombing attack such as a pipe or letter bomb. This type of attack also includes assaults on infrastructure targets like power, transportation, and communication systems to include cyber-terrorism (see figure 4).⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 122.
⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 123.

Figure 4



SOURCE: *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium* by Harvey W. Kushner.

Section Seven

Assessments

The bombing of New York City's World Trade Center (WTC) marked the beginning of America realizing it is not immune or insulated from domestic terrorism at home. Until the WTC bombing, terrorism had been seen as a problem endemic to the already violent Middle East, Latin America, occasionally affecting cities like Paris, London, and Madrid. The WTC bombing shattered this perception and fed Americans a painful dose of reality in the violent world of political and religious protest. In addition to the WTC bombing, as if to say America cannot close its eyes to the obvious, several more terrorist plots were discovered. Planned by Islamic terrorists already living in the U.S., these included the destruction of two commuter tunnels and a bridge linking New Jersey and Manhattan, blowing up the United Nations Building, staging a forced entry attack on the downtown building housing the FBI's New York field office, and assassination of various public officials, including Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato.⁴⁹

These 1993 events created a ripple affect throughout all of the United States to not only take a look at their terrorism preparedness but to improve it to where adequate response to a variety of situations became "standard operating procedure." The Rand Corporation, supported by the National Institute of Justice, conducted an extensive survey of 39 states, 80% (31 of which responded), that evaluated the states' perceived terrorists threat (domestic and international).⁵⁰ Nearly 90% of the respondent states reported the presence of terrorist sympathizers and supporters within the state's borders.

⁴⁹ Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, MR-505-NIJ (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1995), p. 16.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 17.

The majority of the states indicated the presence of right-wing terrorist groups such as the Klu Klux Klan and the Aryan Nations (see Figure 1).⁵¹ Most state law enforcement organizations also noted the presence of issue specific terrorist organizations. A list of the most prominent issue-specific groups with terrorist potential includes the anti-abortion, environmental, and animal rights movements. Some of these groups are establishing themselves on the national level such as the anti-abortionists groups.

Nearly 40% of the reporting states said their jurisdictions contain ethnic terrorist organizations, and nearly 25% report left-wing terrorist groups (see Table 3). New York and Puerto Rico are the loci of ethnic and émigré tensions. Puerto Rico is the home to separatist and nationalist terrorist groups that also operate in New York City due to its large Hispanic population. Left-wing terrorist threats and acts have been less frequent than right wing and issue specific organizations throughout the country.⁵²

Emergency preparedness organizations reported similar findings, as did the state law authorities with 65% reporting they have identified terrorists' organizations in their state. Again, right wing and issue specific groups (ecoterrorist, anti-abortionist, etc.) rank 1st and 2nd while ethnic groups rank third in activity.⁵³

Of the municipal law enforcement agencies reporting, approximately 1/3rd are aware of terrorists groups while an additional 43% recognize sympathizers in their municipalities. A total of 83% of local-level respondents noted the potential for terrorist threats in their states and municipalities. Of the 148 respondents, 91 (61%) reported right-wing terrorist groups at the state level; 26% reported left-wing terrorist groups;

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 18.

⁵² Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, p. 19.

⁵³ Ibid.

15% reported international terrorist groups; 38% reported ethnic terrorist groups; and 57% reported issue-specific terrorist groups (see Table 5).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Table 4

**Municipal Reports of State-Level Terrorist Groups
(N=148)**

Group	No.	%
Right-wing	91	61
Left-wing	26	18
International	22	15
Ethnic	38	26
Issue-specific	84	57
Other	8	5

Source: Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, MR-505-NIJ (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1995).

According to FBI reports, actual incidents of terrorism have been occurring disproportionately in Puerto Rico, the Western, and Midwestern United States. Based upon responses from the surveyed municipalities, 85% of Midwestern jurisdictions and 79% of Western jurisdictions report the presence of terrorist threats, while only 46% Northeastern jurisdictions report the same. Additionally, 70% of the Southern jurisdictions report terrorist activity in their jurisdictions (see Table 5.1).⁵⁵ The daunting tasks that states and municipalities face is summed up in a statement made by a New York City Terrorism Task Force member who noted before the World Trade Center bombing that preparing for terrorism is difficult when “the whole city is a target.”⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, p. 20.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 23.

Table 5

Distribution of Terrorist Organizations, by Type, Among the Population-Based Sample

Group	Region and Number in Sample			
	Midwest (20)	Northeast (13)	South (22)	West (29)
Right-wing	17	4	13	22
Left-wing	6	0	3	9
International	6	0	4	7
Ethnic	5	1	8	11
Issue-specific	14	4	15	18
Other	1	4	1	2
Total (reporting at least one group)	17	6	15	23

Source: Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, MR-505-NIJ (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1995).

Present Preparedness

There are numerous factors in the preparation for a terrorist attack. The key elements are planning and resources, developing coordinated contingency plans, training of emergency response personnel, medical personnel, facilities readiness, information sharing, and execution readiness. These factors are all vital to the overall preparedness of a government to protect its citizenry. But ultimately preparation must begin with a strategic plan that spans all the boundaries of bureaucracy in order to link all aspects to terrorism preparedness from a local municipality all the way to the White House.

Surprisingly, only 38% of state law enforcement agencies polled have contingency plans for dealing with the threat of terrorism, compared to 52% of the local agencies and nearly 56% of the state emergency management organizations. About 63%

of the 46 municipalities with populations greater than 150,000 and counties have a contingency plan while only 46% of the 102 jurisdictions with fewer than 150,000 do. This observation is relative because most terrorism is targeted at urban areas that usually have populations in excess of 150,000. Additionally, the likelihood of having a terrorist contingency plan depends on likely targets that require protecting such as military installations, energy facilities, weapons facilities, federal buildings, and high concentrations of elite government officials. Again, police forces with less than 100 officers have contingency plans for only 39% of the sample population (27 of 69) while forces with over 750 officers or more have terrorism plans 85% of the time (17 of 20). Overall, police forces with weapons plants in their communities develop contingency plans 66% of the time (42 of 65); and forces with military facilities in their community have contingency plans 65% if the time; and forces with energy facilities in their community have contingency plans 64% (16 of 25) of the time.⁵⁷

Federal funding is also a critical enabler of municipal contingency plans. About 62% of the municipalities that receive federal funding have contingency plans, compared to a 39% contingency planning rate in communities that do not receive funds. These federal funds must obviously be distributed at a proportional rate throughout a state, most likely prioritized based upon critical infrastructure and or facilities that may be targeted.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Table 6**Contingency Planning Rate for Jurisdictions Housing Sensitive Facilities, by Population**

Sensitive Facility	Population Size						Total No. of Facilities
	<100,000		100,001–500,000		>500,000		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
	Total Sample						
Nuclear plants	10	53	0	0	4	80	26
Military installations	10	48	19	76	13	68	65
Weapons manufacturers	7	50	11	79	7	70	38
Energy plants	5	50	6	66	5	83	25
	Population-Based Sample						
Nuclear plants	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	2	100	2
Military installations	5	36	13	87	6	54	40
Weapons manufacturers	3	43	7	88	2	40	20
Energy plants	1	33	3	60	1	100	11

^aNo observations.

Source: Riley and Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*.

Of the 17 state law enforcement agencies with contingency plans, 11 reported that their contingency plans were reviewed by at least one other agency, and three reported their plans were reviewed by three or more agencies. The FBI is usually the reviewer, at least 70% of the time, of the state plans. Of the 20 state emergency organizations that reported having contingency plans, 19 reported the Federal Emergency Agency (FEMA) reviewed their plans. Additionally, the FBI, 25% by other federal agencies, 45% by local agencies, and 90% by other state organizations reviewed 40% of the emergency management organizations.⁵⁹

These state and local municipalities that have terrorist contingency plans all have a similar weakness, that is the plans coordination at the federal level. The majority of the municipalities do not have access to the FBI, FEMA, and other federal agencies. The

⁵⁹ Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, p. 28.

federal government reviewed 35% of the municipalities. Of this 35%, the FBI reviews 11%, and both the FBI and other federal agencies review 16%. This poor review process facilitates a poor coordinated national effort to properly resource, plan, and prepare for terrorist activity across the spectrum of all levels of government (see Table 6.1).⁶⁰

Table 6.1

Review of County and Municipal Contingency Terrorism Plans
(N=77; 35 targeted and 42 population-based)

Reviewing Agency	% of Total Plans Reviewed	% of Targeted Plans Reviewed	% of Population Based Plans Reviewed
FBI	26	26	19
Other federal agencies	25	25	14
State agencies	35	35	24
Other local	47	57	38

NOTE: Column totals sum to more than 100 percent because of multiple reviews.

Source: Riley and Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*.

Cooperation and liaison among agencies is a vital element to keeping all levels of terrorism responsible agencies at the forefront of all developments. Forty percent of the municipalities report never having contact with federal agencies over terrorism issues. Possible reasons for this low contact percentage are the smaller municipalities not making the effort to contact the federal agencies; the distance between the rural municipalities and federal agencies that are usually located in the cities; and the small

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 29.

budgets of these municipalities that makes technological advancements such as video-conferencing prohibitive.

Terrorism training procedures are not standardized by any means: municipalities obtain their training from various sources such as the FBI, the states, professional organizations and private sources, the Army, local police academies, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the Department of Energy, FEMA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and local law enforcement agencies. All these organizations perform valiantly in their efforts against terrorism, but a standardized strategic plan would yield greater benefits as it could be monitored by the Federal government and or pushed down to the individual state that could monitor their individual municipalities progress (see Table 6.2).⁶¹

⁶¹ Riley, Kevin J. and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*, p. 29.

Table 6.2

**Distribution of Contingency Plan Reviewing Agencies
(in percent)**

	% with Plans	% with Plans That Are Reviewed by:						
		FBI	Other Federal	State	Local	Local Only	All Four ^b	None
Municipal LEAs (N=148)	52	26	25	35	47	12	6	26
State LEAs (N=39)	36	43	21	36	21	14	7	42 ^a
Emergency Organizations (N=37)	54	35	90	80	35	0	10	0

^aIncludes one review listed as other.

^bFBI, other federal, state, local.

Source: Riley and Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism*.

Lead Agency-FBI

These studies show the disparity amongst state and local government anti-terrorist preparation from the bottom up, but what has the federal government done to bridge this gap, especially since the Federal government is ultimately responsible for the protection of its states from foreign and domestic attacks.

The FBI, with Department of Justice oversight, is the nation's lead agency in the fight against domestic terrorism. The FBI's counterterrorism budget, congressionally supported, has grown from \$78.5 million in 1993 to \$301.2 million in 1999. The number of agents funded for counterterrorism investigations has grown from 550 in 1993 to 1,383 in 1999.⁶²

In 1998, the FBI submitted a five-year interagency plan to congress outlining their strategic plan to improve counterterrorism planning. In all likelihood, State and

⁶² Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, *President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, as prepared for the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce,*

local law enforcement, emergency management, and public health agencies are going to be the first to respond to and contend with the aftermath of a terrorist's large-scale improvised explosive device or the release of chemical or biological agents. Congress has recognized the critical importance of state and local agencies in the national response to and management of such a crisis by providing assistance through several programs, such as the Department of Defense Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and training and equipment grants under the auspices of the Office of Justice Programs. The FBI strongly supports efforts to train and equip State and local first responders whose assistance and expertise will be critical to our investigation of such terrorist incidents.⁶³ Three prominent FBI-led initiatives supporting domestic readiness are: the proposed National Domestic Preparedness Office, the Hazardous Devices School, and the equipping of state and local bomb squads.⁶⁴

In October 1998, the Attorney General announced her proposal to establish a National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) that would serve as a single point of contact for State and local authorities. The mission of the National Domestic Preparedness Office is to assist State and local emergency response agencies (law enforcement, fire, hazardous materials, emergency medical services, emergency management, and public health) by serving as a single coordinating office and clearinghouse for federal efforts to prepare our Nation's communities for the threat posed by the terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction (to include conventional bomb). The Attorney General delegated responsibility for implementing and managing the Office to

Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Washington, D.C., URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/freehct2.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.

⁶³ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Second Annual Report (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp, 2000).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

the FBI. Agencies involved in the design of NDPO office were the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, various components within the Department of Justice, and State and local authorities. The Office is organized around six program areas that focus upon specific issues or areas, including: planning, training, exercises, equipment/research and development, information and intelligence sharing, and health and medical.⁶⁵

Another initiative being undertaken by the FBI to improve state and local readiness capabilities is the expansion of training and modernization of facilities at the Hazardous Devices School, located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. These the FBI trains and certifies federal, state, and local bomb technicians in accordance with standards developed through the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board. The Hazardous Devices School is the only law enforcement training facility offering certification for public safety bomb technicians. The 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan recommends increasing the availability of federal pre-blast and post-blast bomb technician training for first responders. With Congressional funding in 1998, the school trained 963 students, an increase of 48 percent over the previous year. In particular, 386 students were trained in a new Weapons of Mass Destruction Bomb Technician Emergency Actions Course. In 1999, the weapons of mass destruction course are being integrated into the basic bomb technician course so

⁶⁵ Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, *President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, as prepared for the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Washington, D.C.*, URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/freehct2.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.

that all new bomb technicians receive this training.⁶⁶

State and local bomb technicians may be among the first emergency responders to encounter a terrorist device, including devices that may combine the use of explosives and a chemical, biological, or radiological agent. Recognizing the importance for providing State and local bomb technicians with a capability for detecting the presences of such agents, the FBI developed a multi-year initiative to provide basic equipment and chemical/biological detection technology to the approximately 630 State and local bomb technician squads across the nation. Congress directed the Attorney General in the 1999 Justice Appropriations Act to provide \$25,000,000 from the Department's Working Capital Fund to begin this initiative. For 2000, the Department is requesting \$45,000,000 to continue this initiative that is being managed by the FBI.⁶⁷ This request directly supports the recommendation contained in the 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Plan to prepare bomb technicians to address incidents involving a combination of explosives and chemical, biological, or radiological agents.⁶⁸

In an effort to fortify national domestic and international terrorism preparedness, the federal government, led by the FBI, is on track to do this. Even with the initiatives outlined along with many more, the fight against terrorism will not end because those that use it are ever present and waiting for their next opportunity for attack.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ Ibid

Section Eight

Freedom or Security

The United States is a country that prides itself on a constitution and a Bill of Rights that guarantee each citizen certain inalienable rights and protections against certain government intrusions without due process. With the advent of domestic terrorism by homegrown groups/individuals as well as international terrorists acting from within the U.S. or projecting their terror from abroad, America faces a daunting paradox. This paradox asks whether U.S. citizens are willing to sacrifice some freedoms in order to obtain greater security against terrorism by the federal/state/local governments?

Even though domestic terrorists attacks have not occurred with great frequency, when they do, they may be as disastrous consequences may occur such as the Oklahoma City and New York City building bombings. These two events alone have single-handedly put domestic terrorism on the average U.S. citizen's front step. No longer can America look at terrorism on the television or in the newspapers and say "that's too bad" or "I am glad that didn't happen here;" because now it has and will inevitably again happen here.

If in fact another successful catastrophic terrorist attack were to occur, by bombing or in cyber-space, the results could prove overwhelming. If the U.S. is not prepared, the sheer public panic, government over-reaction, misuse of U.S. Armed Forces, confusion amongst federal/state/local agencies, or other factors may do long term damage to or change the unique nature of American society. This unique nature revolves around Americans ability to feel safe within the borders of the U.S. This feeling of

safety is by no means replaceable by any level of security or program. If the American populace lost its feeling of security to terrorist attacks in its own “backyard,” then the trust a government must have from its populace may to begin to erode. This erosion of trust is an occurrence that a democracy could not withstand. In the event of the erosion, America’s right-wing militias and hate groups would finally gain the leverage they needed to justify and legitimate their war against government and other races. Society could not bear a breakdown of the status quo as it pertains to social order and personal freedoms. Social discord and terrorist acts that serve to perpetuate public fear could result in marshal laws being implemented to control public unrest. Marshal law, in the United States, would prove to be the beginning of a perpetual quagmire of events that could lead to the “Armageddon” the right-wing militias believes so very much in.⁶⁹

Section Nine

New Effort & Emerging Issues

Since Nunn-Lugar-Dominici domestic preparedness program, the federal government along with the state/local/municipal governments has made strides to improve and better coordinate crisis response strategy, programs, and resources. Such improvement is evidenced in the Attorney General’s interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crimes. This document is the most close to a national strategy. However, the plan fails to establish concise guidance for desired outcomes for federal government actions.⁷⁰ To address this deficiency, in 1999, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget began a new interagency process for


⁶⁹ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Second Annual Report (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp, 2000), p. C-9.

evaluating federal agencies' programs for combating terrorism. The results of this evaluation provided a basis for new budget requests for combating terrorism in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2001. This evaluation also gives the president's administration and Congress a better picture of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response capabilities.⁷¹ These budget requests are substantial; the President's fiscal year 2001 combating terrorism budget proposal is about \$11.3 billion (\$9.3 billion, which includes \$1.6 billion directly related to WMD and \$2 billion for critical infrastructure protection).⁷²

Two recent interagency activities have been developed to help improve the operational coordination among federal response teams (see figure 5). First, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group (WMDISG), led by FEMA, is identifying the federal consequence management teams that could be called upon to respond to different terrorist scenarios.

⁷⁰ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination*, GAO-01-14, (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000), p. 5.

Figure 5



Source: GAO's analysis.

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, GAO-01-14, (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000).

The second activity response teams are participating in various combating terrorism interagency exercises that provide agencies with the opportunity to improve the operational coordination of their teams. In May 2000, the federal government sponsored a congressionally mandated national-level combating terrorism exercise, named TOPOFF 2000, which tested the response and coordination of federal/state/local government agencies. This exercise was vast improvement over previous ones because it coordinated crisis management as well as consequence management teams in a “no

⁷¹ Ibid.

notice” realistic field setting.⁷³ Until TOPOFF 2000, federal agencies had conducted 201 combatting terrorism exercises in the previous three years, however; only four were considered no notice exercises.⁷⁴

A source of confusion among state/local governments and their first responders is the question of who is in charge at the scene of a crisis management or consequence management site. In the event of a WMD incident, first on the scene will be the local police, emergency service technicians, and the fire department. Often these local agencies will introduce the first steps toward crisis management and or consequence management prior to any federal agencies arrives. The confusion occurs when the state/local first responders are joined by federal WMD response agencies. With all layers of government now at the scene, the state/local agencies/responders feel they are placed between outside agencies that want to conduct a criminal investigation/crisis management (FBI) and those that want to conduct consequence management (FEMA), and all those supporting agencies in between. State and local governments recommend that federal agencies develop future assistance programs with the coordinating input from state/local emergency management structures. With this accomplished, rescue and investigative efforts can be better coordinated to work simultaneously instead of in conflict.⁷⁵

As part of the domestic preparedness program (DPP), the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command designed a “train-the-trainer” program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of local first responders: fire, law enforcement, medical personnel, and hazardous materials technicians. Of the 120 cities chosen for this

⁷² Ibid, p. 8.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 5.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 23.

program, the Department of Defense's (DOD) goal was to have trained at least one-third of the cities. All training is to be complete in 2001. The DPP also allows for the Public Health Service to establish Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams to help improve cities' medical response to a WMD incident.⁷⁶

The DOD is considering using distance learning technology through satellite-to-television links to reduce travel cost of training teams and to reach more first responders. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases has already used distance-learning techniques through satellite-to-television links⁷⁷

Legislation (NPP) also authorizes DOD to lend rather than give or grant training equipment to each city (120 so far). The agreement between DOD and each city specifies that the loan is for five years and the cities are responsible for repair, maintaining, and replacement of the equipment. This equipment is valued at around \$350,000 per city. This program's intent is admirable, but it leaves some cities feeling they are committed to an unfunded federal mandate. Smaller cities' budgets are not large enough to absorb this cost of sustaining the equipment. Also, some city governments expressed their desire to retain the equipment after the five-year loan date arrives and that the federal government provides funds to sustain the program. The Department of Defense's position is that the program is designed to encourage cities to share the burden of preparing for WMD terrorism by funding additional equipment and training themselves.

There is also an effort afoot to link a definitive national counterterrorist strategy based upon a current threat and risk assessment. It has been recommended to the FBI by

⁷⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs*, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000), pp. 2-3.

GAO to conduct a national-level threat and risk assessment. The FBI has agreed in principle to this recommendation and has set out to accomplish it. The FBI and the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs are about to send out their threat and risk assessment information for local governments to use. The local jurisdictions will then send their assessments to their respective state governments to compile and analyze. The state governments will use the findings to develop a statewide domestic preparedness strategy while the FBI develops the national strategy.⁷⁸

Although the FBI and the intelligence community see growing interest in WMD by groups and individuals concerned, the intelligence community concluded that conventional weapons would continue to be the most likely form of terrorist attack over the next decade.⁷⁹

Recommendations

Further terrorism, especially further terrorism with conventional bombs, must be expected in America. There are three ways the U.S. could be better prepared to fight back and manage the consequences of terrorism.

First, the federal government led by the FBI must continue to better prepare federal/state/local governments and agencies for the event of a terrorist attack. This preparation must address very definitive needs for a national standard of deterrence and response throughout the U.S.

Beginning with the federal government, a national strategy against domestic terrorism must be designed, resourced, and executed throughout the U.S. The levels of

⁷⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program*, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, (Washington, DC: GAO, 1998), p. 2.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

preparedness throughout the U.S. at the three levels of government, federal/state/local, should be brought up to a certain “national standard of readiness.” This national standard of readiness will result in a cross fertilization of information, program and budget control, intelligence coordination and analysis, research and development of new and innovative detection and deterrence techniques and equipment, equipment resourcing, technical and tactical training for first responders, plans reviews at all levels of government, and review of health and medical programs to include hospital availability. These areas are vital elements within an overall national strategy against terrorism. The federal government has passed numerous terrorism policies, directives, presidential decision directives, and created/assigned agencies to the threat of terrorism, but unless these efforts are standardized for all, the level of vulnerability to terrorist attack for the less prepared or unprepared is an unacceptable proposition.⁸⁰

Second, the lead agency concept that has been applied at the federal level should be applied to all states. Of the 50 states, each should have an identified lead agency with the same responsibilities as the FBI does for the nation but at a proportionately reduced size. These lead agencies should then be linked into the FBI counterterrorism’s office, allowing for daily information flow between the federal government and the states. In turn, the states should reproduce this system regionally across their state and have local municipalities link into the regional lead agencies. These coordinated and linked networks of lead agencies will facilitate near instantaneous intelligence sharing, updates, and act as a repository for counterterrorism officials. Understanding funding is always an issue, especially for smaller municipalities, within law enforcement agencies there is

⁸⁰Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Second Annual Report (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp, 2000).

already established systems that link criminal prosecution agencies together. It may be possible to exploit this present technology to further support this new network. By using the already established police system, the need for smaller municipalities to purchase new equipment and provide training will be minimized due to the police often being the main crisis first responders anyway.⁸¹

Finally, the federal/state/local governments must do more to educate and prepare the American people for the occasion when all deterrence fails and a crisis occurs (conventional bombing and or Nuclear Biological Chemical attack).⁸² The national leadership as a collective should inform, educate, and culturally prepare the public for the reality of a terrorist attack and what forms it can be delivered. It is unfair to the public to have a massive bombing take place, without warning, and expect a community to react, accept, and assimilate what has happened to their neighbors and friends. The use of all forms of media should be used to prepare the public in a slow and methodical manner as to not create an unnecessary panic or an incorrectly perceived feeling of imminent attack. Combating terrorism should be addressed as if the nation is going into low-level war. During the Vietnam conflict, President Lyndon B. Johnson failed to keep the public and congress properly informed and mentally prepared for the horrors of war and national strategic goals hoped to be achieved by entering the conflict. President Johnson's secrecy and conscious act to not allow full disclosure in this respect cost him the presidency and left scares within the public consciousness for the last 30 years. This too can be the direction the American society could be headed for by the federal/state/local agencies not collectively coming on line to adequately prepare the public for the next domestic terrorist attack. Just imagine, what would have happened if

⁸¹ Ibid.

the New York Trade Center bombing had been completely successful and the bombed 110 story (1350 ft/411 m)⁸³ tower would have fallen right in the middle of downtown Manhattan. The public is not ready.

Domestic terrorism is like a beast that periodically rears its ugly head among a society not prepared to respond to its destructive proclivity. Our nation, as a whole, must recognize this and collectively act against it. All efforts have to be coordinated and shared with the agencies charged to protect us as well as putting the onus on the public to be aware of this potentially violent environment and to act accordingly. Domestic and international terrorism committed on U.S. soil will continue as long as America is seen as a threat to the many terrorist groups around the world and those homegrown. America has begun to prepare for the consequences of this, but more can be done. A **national strategy**, supported by **national unity of effort** and **vigilance** is our best counterterrorism defense.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Encyclopedia.com, *The World Trade Center*, URL: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/14004.html>. Accessed 10 January 2000.

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