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ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND THE WILL TO WIN

by

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
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
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
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

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the *will to win* in asymmetric war. Asymmetric war, in which one side has an overwhelming advantage over its opponent, will likely be the war of the future for the United States in the post-Cold War uni-polar world. To win an asymmetric war, the individual and then the masses must be motivated to fight and, ultimately, the *will to win* must be cultivated and sustained for victory. Religion is a highly effective motivator for both the individual and the masses. This motivation, when properly directed, can provide the *will to win* in the face of overwhelming odds.

This thesis focuses on religion as the primary motivator in an asymmetric war. Religion is a strong motivator for the individual because of four factors: appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion's strength as an internally consistent logic. With a highly motivated individual, an organization gains specific advantages by focusing on the religious aspects of the conflict. These advantages are: commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. These are the measurable elements that create a strong *will to win*.

Three case studies - Iran and Iraq, Hezbollah and Israel, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Algeria - are explored as examples of contemporary asymmetric conflict. These case studies are used to examine the asymmetries between the countries in conflict and test the validity of our theory about the significance of the will to win.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE STRIP, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

Captain Jamie O'Conner rolled to his back and his thoughts were split on two very different things. First, he wondered how long he could continue lying at poolside in the Nevada sun without burning, and second, his mind drifted back to Afghanistan. The desert heat sure brought back memories of his time north of Herat. Jamie, now a reserve Special Forces officer, had done two tours in Afghanistan while on active duty.

His first 6-month tour was the best. Jamie worked with Master Sergeant Mark Phillips and Sergeant First Class Angel Vasquez as a liaison element attached to a 500-man Herati unit. All three were chosen because of their language skills. Jamie speaks Persian - and not too badly - after his first tour of on-the-job training. His element was very autonomous and had very little contact with other US forces. In fact, his only contact for a couple of months at a time was the twice-daily satellite communication with the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and the weekly aerial resupply. Their primary mode of travel was by horse or motorcycle (even though the team had a HMMWV). Everyday brought a new experience and while sometimes life was dangerous, it was always exciting. Missions just did not get any better than this.

That all changed during Jamie's second 6-month tour. After a short 90-day rotation back to the States, Jamie was sentenced to work as an Assistant Operations Officer in the FOB at the Shindand Airbase. This did not make any sense

to him. He was an action guy with ground experience, and now he could actually converse in the local dialect. The Army and its infinite wisdom no longer agreed with Jamie, the former action guy, and he decided to resign after returning to the US. The process took a bit longer than anticipated, but now Jamie is a civilian.

It is now over two years since the 2002 Winter Olympics in Utah. The Olympics were not particularly memorable except for the constant paranoia and several terrorist hoaxes that marred the event. It has been over one year since the last confirmed terrorist strike on American soil. The Microsoft CEO was lucky, but unfortunately, his driver was not. Ever since the Alcatraz ferry hijacking and the incident at the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, domestic terrorist targets have shifted to government leaders and then to business leaders. While still problematic for the country, the general populace has breathed a collective sigh of relief and accepted the current level of terrorism. Jamie smiled as he began to think that he could get too soft living this civilian life.

Jamie never contemplated for very long and rarely allowed disturbing thoughts. He compartmentalized most things in his life, especially those from the past. But, his mind was still on Afghanistan and the people of that godforsaken land. The Nevada desert certainly resembled parts of Afghanistan, but it was the people that made the difference to Jamie. In Afghanistan, the men were 'real men' and the women were surprisingly beautiful, actually exotic. But even after living in direct contact with the Heratis, Jamie never felt he could ever completely

understand the people or the culture. His intermittent interaction with the enemy Taliban normally occurred after they had left this world for paradise or their after-life. Jamie had seen his share of death, and really only three things bothered him from Afghanistan. The wounded or the lack thereof seemed strange. Of course, the reality was obvious, but it was easier not to think about the obvious. The children or the lack thereof was disturbing. Actually, there were plenty of young people; it was the innocence of youth that was missing. Lastly, the look of defiance in the eyes of a captured Taliban soldier always gave Jamie pause. The look was not necessarily as disturbing as it was puzzling.

The US military had entered Afghanistan in the latter part of 2001, after the horrific terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. And US soldiers are still there. Osama bin Laden is gone, presumed dead, and the Taliban government quickly dissolved into renegade bands. The UN missions are now peacekeeping and nation-building with an anticipated long-term occupation. Remnants of the Taliban still exist throughout the mountains south of Kandahar and in Pakistan. Jamie figured that these disorganized groups would not have made it through the first winter, but they did and are now enduring their second winter. What, he couldn't help but wonder, do they hope to gain through continued resistance?

Jamie can't imagine how the remnants of the Taliban continue their armed resistance. Yet, every other week or so, the major news networks report another attack of some type against the UN forces in Afghanistan. American

casualty statistics aren't outrageous; in fact, they are not really higher than during any high-risk training exercise. Of course, training exercises do not last for over two years. While Jamie had experienced more than one near death situation, he was never particularly concerned about his own safety. Even now, his only real concern is maximizing his time and enjoyment with his wife. They were married almost five years ago and are finally reconnecting on this Vegas getaway. The trip wasn't a planned second honeymoon, but after traveling a very rocky road since the first honeymoon, this trip was just what a counselor might have ordered.

Jamie began to again think about the defiance of the captured Taliban soldier. He must have had a family. Why would he continue to resist instead of caring for his family? Wouldn't it be easier to just accept the new government instead of fighting against it? Of course, the new government is hardly ideal. But, combined with international support, it is relatively powerful in the region, while the leaderless Taliban offer nothing to a man who needs to support his family. The weak decentralized bands of Taliban are armed with nothing more than rifles, mortars, and possibly some anti-tank rockets. The new government soldiers are experienced fighters who are well schooled in the art of war and are continually improving themselves through training and weapons stockpiling. What advantage could the Taliban possibly have over the Afghan government forces?

Jamie did the half-awake, half-asleep startled jerk that scares you and looks hilarious to anyone that is

watching. He realized that he needed to get out of the sun. He had thought enough about Afghanistan and who cares anyway? Jamie didn't care about Afghanistan anymore; it was half a world away. When he was there he had been motivated by the adventure and his desire to serve his country. It was now time to move on with life, and with that he rose from the poolside lounge. As he stood, he felt something. First, it was the slight pressure in his ears just like before they pop during elevation changes. Then it was a flash, not really blinding, but bright enough to make everyone look up. During this instant, Jamie thought of Nellis Air Force Base located just north of Las Vegas. He had never been to the base, but had seen it on his Nevada road map on the way into Vegas. The explosion was loud and the noise did not just come from the direction of the blast. The most terrifying sound was the imploding glass. Glass was suddenly everywhere on 'The Strip' and the sound of so much breaking glass mixed with screams is now the fourth thing that Jamie will never forget.

B. ASYMMETRIC WAR IN AMERICA

An attack on Nellis AFB, which results in large-scale destruction and loss of life in Las Vegas, is no longer inconceivable for the average American. Whether the attacker is the fugitive militant Osama bin Laden, the remnants of the Taliban, or a splinter group from Al Qaeda is not important for the victims and, for the moment, this discussion. The puzzling question for us is why one would start a fight that can't be won? This is not golf, where the pleasure and competition of playing is more important

than winning or losing. This 'game' instead defines winning in terms of life and losing in terms of death. It seems that the logical choice, should winning not be possible, is to not play. Yet, the games continue.

Why then *would* a weaker power choose to physically engage a stronger power? Two obvious answers come to mind. First, the weaker power does not realize it is weak. Or second, conventionally weak or not, people truly believe they can win. A third possibility borrows from both of these. Arguably, the most dangerous enemy is the one that knows it is weak (therefore it knows itself) and at the same time knows the enemy is strong (which means it knows its enemy), but still envisions victory.

This thesis explores the will to win in asymmetric war. Specifically, the masses must be motivated and, ultimately, the individual must have the will to win. Religion can motivate the individual and, subsequently, motivate the masses. This motivation, when properly directed, can fuel the will to win regardless of the overwhelming odds. Perhaps this is what the fictional character Jamie O'Conner saw in the eyes of the captured Taliban soldier. "The faith is crucial, not the techniques. Without the faith there would be no armed struggle" (Bell, 1999, p. 127).

This thesis focuses on religion as the motivator. Religion is a strong motivator for the individual because of these four factors – appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion's role as an internally consistent logic. Next, after an individual is motivated, an organization gains specific other advantages by using

religion. These advantages are the tangible elements that bolster a strong will to win. They are commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity.

The three case studies exemplify contemporary asymmetric conflict. Through case studies we examine the asymmetries between the forces involved in conflict and consider what might allow weaker powers to prevail over stronger powers. Religious motivation and a strong will to win are factors in each of these case studies. In the case of Hezbollah versus Israel we see Islam being used against non-Muslims from two different countries. In the case of Algeria, Muslims are fighting Muslims within the same country. Finally, with the Iran and Iraq war, we have two Muslim countries fighting against each other. After exploring the commonalities among these cases, we hope to offer some possible measures that can be used to counter others' spiritual motivation.

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II. OUR NEW WAR

A. WHY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE?

A weaker military force fighting and defeating a stronger military force characterizes asymmetric warfare. The Vietnam conflict represents a classic example of this type of war. Over the span of thirty years, both France and the United States were unsuccessful in defeating the Vietnamese forces.

Over the last half-century, the change that has taken place is momentous. From France to the United States, there has scarcely been one 'advanced' government in Europe and North America whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at the hands of under equipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate freedom fighters or guerrillas or terrorists; briefly, by men – and, often, women – who were short on everything except high courage and the determination to endure and persist in the face of police operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and whatever other types of operations that were dreamt up by their masters (van Creveld, 1999, p. 395).

American military power is presently unequalled. This fact virtually eliminates the likelihood of US involvement in a future symmetric war. But the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon indicate that there are still organizations willing to challenge the power of the US. As a result, it appears that asymmetric warfare will once again dominate US foreign and military policy. Just as the North Vietnamese victory in 1975 marked a turning point for US military strategy, the events of September 11, 2001 have brought asymmetric warfare back to the forefront

of military thinking. This change in focus justifies a re-examination of asymmetric warfare in an attempt to identify the circumstances that make victory possible for the weaker military force.

Typically, the primary difference between a stronger and weaker force lies in available resources. Resources include population, military equipment, manufacturing ability, and, of course, natural resources (food, oil, etc). "The asymmetric relationship is thus a function of the asymmetry in 'resource power'" (Mack, 1975, p. 186). However, resource power and global influence are not the only asymmetries worthy of attention. Analyst Thomas Mahnken (1993) writes:

Any conflict between the United States and a regional adversary would be highly asymmetric. Most fundamentally, the two antagonists would view such a confrontation in very different terms. In other words, what is for Americans a war for limited objectives may become for a regional power a contest for national survival (p. 175).

The conflict between the United States and Somalia in 1992-1993 exemplifies these asymmetric views. The US perceived its objectives to be humanitarian – to include nation-building and peace-enforcement. Mohamed Farrah Aidid and the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) viewed survival as their primary objective and declared war on the US on 12 July 1993. Although ultimately the US wanted to capture Aidid and remove him from power, the US never declared war against the SNA. These facts represented an asymmetry in views between the US and Somalia.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietminh strategist, studied the classic guerilla strategists, Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, and concluded that following a strategy of attacking the enemy's weaknesses while avoiding the enemy's strengths would result in victory. According to Bevin Alexander (1995) Giap successfully took advantage of enemy weaknesses. To do so he had to recognize the enemy's strengths *and* weaknesses. Alexander intimates that, in addition, Giap had a strong *desire to win*. As a factor, the *desire to win* depends on the motivations of the combatants and their asymmetric objectives. As Manhnken points out, "Because a third world state will be unable to destroy the physical ability of the United States to wage war, it may be forced instead to choose a strategy aimed at undermining the political will to do so" (Mahnken, 1975, p. 175). The desire to win can be an incomparable asset in assisting a weaker military power to defeat a stronger military power.

A weaker military force can coerce a stronger foe into a stalemate by being tactically more proficient and by strategically attacking the enemy's weaknesses while avoiding the enemy's strengths. At the height of the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger (1969) coined the following maxim: "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win" (p. 214). This statement, while true, does not tell the whole story, as a guerrilla war can still end with a stalemate, not a victory.

Nevertheless, possessing a stronger will to win can help even the playing field. So can attacking an

opponent's will to continue. "For centuries, even millennia, weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their enemy's technological or numerical superiority by fighting in ways or on battlefields that nullify it" (Goulding, 2000, p. 21). As Mahnken (1975) puts it: "In effect, an adversary would fight two wars: one to avoid defeat by U.S. armed forces on the battlefield, another to undermine U.S. will to remain in a war" (p. 179).

B. HOW TO WIN IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Research has not yielded a silver bullet that will guarantee success for either opponent in an asymmetric war. However, a close study of a number of asymmetric conflicts does reveal numerous principles that, when applied, can increase the probability of success. These principles for success are found in a variety of sources, from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, to U.S. Army doctrine found in Field Manual 100-20, to graduate work at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Interestingly, as varied as these sources are, all mention or allude to the desire and will to win.

For instance, Sun Tzu identifies five factors for success:

One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.

One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious.

One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.

One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared

will be victorious.

One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious.

These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory (Sun Tzu, 1994, pp. 178-179).

In western military terms, Sun Tzu proposes that knowledge of strategy, tactics, desire, preparation, and leadership is the key factor for victory. Successful application of these factors will lead to success on the battlefield.

Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement (Sun Tzu, 1994, p. 179).

Strategy, tactics, and leadership are self-explanatory, but desire and preparation require some interpretation and explanation. Preparation is very broad and can encompass full logistical readiness, advances in technology, or training readiness. Desire should be uniform throughout the military, as well as in society at large and among civilian leaders. This uniformity of desire will in turn lead to a unity of effort. Sun Tzu does not specifically mention the desire to win, but given that the ultimate objective of war is victory, the will to win must be present at all levels to satisfy his principle.

Although Sun Tzu developed his principles over four thousand years ago, his insights prove timeless. According to U.S. Army and Air Force doctrine for planning low

intensity conflict (LIC), "Success in LIC requires planning and conducting operations based on the following imperatives: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance" (FM 100-20, 1990, p. 1-5). The call for unity of effort and perseverance is in keeping with Sun Tzu's formula for victory. These imperatives themselves strongly allude to the will or desire to win. "Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them" (FM 100-20, 1990, p. 1-6). Perseverance, combined with a desire for the pursuit of victory, constitutes what we refer to in this thesis as the will to win.

Michael Lwin, in his thesis, proposed four factors which he considers "critical to the success or failure of a weak state's asymmetric strategy: skilled army, national will, external support, and counter strategy" (Lwin, 1997, p. 82). In his thesis Lwin demonstrates how, when these factors are combined, the weaker power can defeat a stronger power in an asymmetric conflict. Lwin (1997) goes on to note that, "National will is probably the one area considered by ourselves and our enemies to be our greatest weakness" (p. 84). Thus, as far as he is concerned, the U.S. should prepare for attacks on its national will and expect that any asymmetric adversary will do everything in its power to maintain its own strong will to win. We concur.

C. WHAT CONSTITUTES THE WILL TO WIN IN WAR?

The will to win has always mattered in war. Just consider: "Xenophon, himself an experienced soldier and troop commander, wrote almost 2500 years ago that 'I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in its soul'" (Gabriel, 1997, p. 46). It is this soul or drive that enables soldiers to endure the hardships and anticipated horrors associated with war. Psychologist Jules Masserman describes three key beliefs that he calls 'the Ur defenses of man': "The first of these beliefs [Ur defense] is that there is a connection between a man's actions and what happens to him" (Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). For example, the soldier who follows his orders, tries his hardest, and does the right thing will survive the battle. The second Ur defense is that, "Man is sustained by the belief (however unfounded at times) that he is not alone and that if he does all he can to survive and the danger still grows, someone - perhaps even God - will come to his aid and save him" (Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). This alludes to the importance of religious faith and the power of religion to motivate. The last Ur defense is that, "Even under the most trying of circumstances, men must continue to believe that they will somehow survive or else they collapse" (Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). Religion does not just reinforce and support each of these psychological defenses, it also fosters them. Religion can motivate the individual and subsequently motivate the masses. This motivation creates the will to win and provides the weaker force with an invaluable asset for engaging in asymmetric warfare.

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III. RELIGION: A MOTIVATOR FOR WAR

Modern warfare changed direction after the Allied victory in Operation DESERT STORM. Between 1945 and 1989, the USSR and US prepared to fight a conventional/nuclear war on the plains of Europe. Ultimately, the Allied victory over Iraq in 1991 ended the Cold War. That short desert war proved to the enemies of America who were not yet convinced, that it would be suicidal to square off against US conventional forces. With the chance of nuclear or conventional war unlikely in the future, it seems safe to assume that asymmetric warfare will remain the focus for military planners.

Asymmetric warfare, the seemingly lopsided conflict between strong and weak forces, takes on many forms. From guerrilla war to terrorist acts, asymmetric war also takes a special kind of soldier, a soldier who is motivated by a combination of personal, political, economic, and religious impulses. Although each of these motivators has their respective strengths, religion appears to be the strongest of the four.

As technology brings the world closer together, ancient feuds continue to grab the spotlight. The following headlines appeared in the New York Times newspaper during the past year:

- The Warship Explosion: The Overview; Blast Kills Sailors on U.S. Ship in Yemen (13 Oct 2000).
- Troops Kill 4 in Gaza; 2 Die in Car Bombing in Israel (23 Nov 2000).

- Attack on Mosque in Sudan By Fundamentalists Kills 20 (10 Dec 2000).
- Indonesian Leader Condemns Church Bombings That Killed 15 (26 Dec 2000).
- Algeria Is Found Guilty In Plot To Bomb Sites In The U.S. (7 Apr 2001).
- The Terror Verdict: The Overview; 4 Guilty In Terror Bombings Of 2 U.S. Embassies In Africa; Jury To Weigh 2 Executions (30 May 2001).
- U.S. Attacked; Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror (12 September 2001).

(source: New York Times archive search for 'Religious Terrorism or Terror'. Retrieved on October 18, 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://search.nytimes.com/search/>)

As these headlines suggest, various forms of religiously motivated asymmetric warfare can occur in a wide range of societies in disparate parts of the world. This chapter will examine the reasons why religion proves such an ideal motivator for violence. Also, the advantages that religious motivation lends groups waging asymmetric war will be discussed.

A. RELIGION AS A MOTIVATOR?

Trying to determine why religion is such a strong motivator for violence is as difficult as defining religion itself. Although there are a number of possible definitions for religion, the one that seems to accommodate all religions without offending anyone comes from the Religious Tolerance Organization (RTO). According to its website, RTO proposes that religion be defined as, "...any specific system of belief about deity, often involving

rituals, a code of ethics, and a philosophy of life" (Religious Tolerance Organization, 2001).

Religion motivates at both the individual and group level. For the individual, religion provides, among other things, a sense of hope for the future, giving the believer the inner strength and confidence to at least attempt to overcome seemingly impossible tasks. At a minimum, religious rituals offer the believer feelings of stability, commitment, and a sense of belonging to something greater than himself. When like-minded believers are unified by a single purpose, they represent a formidable group. When religion's individual benefits are combined with an organizational structure, the result is an attractive package that religious and secular groups can exploit to meet their respective goals.

In addition to these benefits, religion is also attractive because it is timeless. In general, religion has outlasted empires and nations. For this reason alone, even groups not intent on influencing the masses for either secular or religious reasons are likely to be interested in using religion. Even in the short term, a religiously based philosophy can be beneficial. For instance, an emerging group has little time to get its message out. Using religion as a vehicle to communicate with the masses not only allows for quick dissemination, but also adds some credibility to the message.

Another reason that religion can prove so attractive to a group is that it is more than likely already established in the area of concern. When it is already

present, religion offers a ready-made means of mobilization, as well as a formal social structure.

The use of religion as a motivator thus simultaneously benefits both individuals and the group. Furthermore, there is an ancient relationship between religion and violence that is used by some groups despite most peoples' presumptions about religion's usual promise of peace.

B. RELIGION AND VIOLENCE

History is filled with accounts of conquests by civilizations done in the name of God. From the Crusaders marching to the Holy Land to the modern version of Islamic jihad, religion has provided the motivation necessary for civilizations and their armies to destroy each other.

Author Mark Juergensmeyer identifies four reasons why religion will always be associated with violence. These have to do with loyalty and commitment, religion's violent nature and origins, the influence of religious doctrine in creating violence, and the connection between religious and political interests accompanied by the lure of religious power for secular interests (Juergensmeyer, 1992).

Not even political scientist and religious terrorism expert David Rapoport (1992) can explain this phenomenon, except to say that religion inspires the ultimate commitment. It is this commitment that enables a group to fight the asymmetric fight and lends individuals the motivation to be suicide bombers or to attack tanks with rocks. This commitment is seen at various levels in different organizations. It is probably best exemplified

by the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. As author Hala Jaber notes,

As far as Hezbollah is concerned, fighting Israel's occupation is not just a national duty. It is a religious obligation that falls within their concept of jihad and they are determined to continue the fight until Lebanese soil is liberated and every Israeli soldier has withdrawn from the country (Jaber, 1997, p. 60).

The benefits that commitment and loyalty provide to an organization, while fairly obvious, will be discussed later in the chapter.

Most people feel that religion should grant them tranquility and peace, not terror. Juergensmeyer (2000) points out that violence may be found at the deepest levels of religious imagination, in biblical wars, crusades, ritual acts of sacrifice, and acts of martyrdom. "Violence," he claims, "has lurked as a shadowy presence... and images of death have never been far from the heart of religion's power to stir the imagination" (p. 6). It is as if religion needs violence and violence needs religion to justify actions by divine mandate. As a result, historical precedents justify acts of religious violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

But religion cannot be blamed for all social ills. Juergensmeyer notes that although religion is not completely innocent, it does not always lead to violence. Violence only erupts when a particular set of circumstances – social, political, and ideological – join with violent expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and movements for political change (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

There are other theories about the relationship between religion and violence. René Girard proposes that religious ritual was created as a defensive response to outside threats. Religion provided a basic structure on which to build and maintain a defensive posture. In order to survive, man had to live in groups. The family unit became the basis for the group structure. Once familial obligations were met, the group's needs were addressed. After the familial and tribal responsibilities were met, loyalties could then be transferred to either a government or a religious structure. Like government, religion can bring together families and tribes under broader control. Under these circumstances, religion becomes a vehicle for organizing the masses. But in contrast to his relationship with government, the individual can usually choose whether or not to adhere to a religion. Even those forced to attend religious services do not have to participate in the spiritual sense; going through the motions usually satisfies even the concerned observer.

Religion, in its basic form, supplies the individual with structure and rules to live by. Success, in religious terms, comes from living the "good life," while reward lies in the promise of the next life. Christians, for example, believe a good life on earth will result in being able to enter the gates of heaven and live for eternity, while the Islamic martyr is promised unimaginable pleasures upon his death. One way religion organizes and then motivates the masses is by providing after-life incentives.

Religious doctrine can be interpreted in a number of different ways. The same doctrine, interpreted

differently, may lead to peaceful, positive actions or to violence. For example, one Islamic group may answer a call for jihad by ensuring that future generations will have adequate health care and education, thereby increasing the chances of the group's long-term survival. Another group may interpret these same words as a call to arms. It is these instances that terrorism expert David Rapoport is referring to when he cites the influence of religious doctrine in fomenting violence. Taken to the extreme, religion can inspire violence in believers who feel not only the violent act will bring about the desired outcome. Rapoport notes that throughout history there are many examples of violent acts undertaken by those who believed they were adhering to doctrine, ranging from religious war to suicide bombers (Rapoport, 1990).

Rapoport's point about the connection between religion and doctrine is based on two factors, timelessness and strength. Because we have already described religion's timelessness, this section will focus mainly on the spiritual strength religion offers to the individual and the organization. This strength marks the difference between religion and other motivators. What renders religion stronger than nationalism, communism, or capitalism as motivators is that they lack religion's spiritual dimension. Although self-preservation and familial protection are strong motivators, they are not mass motivators. Religion is not only a mass-motivator but it addresses humans' spiritual needs.

Four factors help generate religion's strength as a motivator. These factors can be characterized as

appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion's role as an internally consistent logic.

1. Appropriateness

Dr. Gordon McCormick of the US Naval Postgraduate School proposes a motivation theory, which he uses to categorize terrorist groups. McCormick's theory, which examines terrorist decision-making logic, can be carried over to other organizations. According to McCormick, pragmatists follow a logic of consequence because they base decisions on preferences and cost-benefit analysis. Purists, on the other hand, follow a logic of appropriateness because they base decisions on identity and an inclination to follow the rules. Pragmatists and the purists form two ends of a spectrum into which all terrorists can be fitted. A group, which espouses violence to further an ideology, more than likely uses the logic of appropriateness, while a group seeking power through terrorism employs the logic of consequence. Terrorists motivated by appropriateness are much more difficult to defeat. The tactics used against these groups include re-indoctrination and redefining appropriateness. To combat groups following the logic of consequence requires that attention be focused on the organization's cost-benefit analysis with the aim of increasing its costs. Changing others' beliefs and values is far more complicated than increasing their costs. Because religion follows the logic of appropriateness it turns out to be extremely powerful as a motivator and very difficult to attack.

2. Identity

Religion provides individuals with identity. Seeking identity and/or purpose in life strongly shapes individuals' decisions and actions. Religion can offer an identity both during and after this life. For instance, martyrdom represents an example of identity achieved with death.

Martyrdom, represents the voluntary acceptance of death in order to 'demonstrate the truth', is a central and perhaps critical element of the message giving religions (especially Christianity, Islam, and to a lesser extent, Judaism), for it dispels the doubts of believers and aids proselytizing efforts (Rapoport, 1990, p. 122).

The individual is able to achieve identity and purpose through martyrdom, while providing an organization with the material needed to recruit more martyrs. With an army of martyrs, an organization has a powerful weapon with which to wage asymmetric war against a superior enemy force.

Perhaps the most prominent martyrs in today's world are suicide bombers. Their strategy – which is to blow up themselves and their victims – first came to prominence in the 1980s as a means by which a weaker force could engage an asymmetrically superior force. Hezbollah and Hamas martyrs today continue to achieve the status and identity of national heroes.

3. Rationality

A religion's influence is based on the strength of belief demonstrated by its followers. By definition,

followers consider their religion and its doctrine to be rational and will defend both to the end. A rational person can be defined as someone who does not completely discount the future or as someone who calculates and plans to reach specific ends. An irrational person, then, can be defined as someone who is only concerned with the moment. Because most people appear to be unable to completely discount the future, they can be considered rational. Also, because religion is about following prescribed religious practices with the aim of living a good life and then going to one's just reward, religion cannot be considered irrational. Arguably, the organization motivated by religion is *super-rational*, providing stability and a long-term sense of purpose.

4. Internally Consistent Logic

The last and most powerful factor that makes religion such a strong motivator is its internally consistent logic. For those of faith, religion cannot be disproved. Even the atheist, who disbelieves the existence of God, becomes agnostic when asked to prove his belief. If there can be no proof of the existence of God, then there is no denying the possibility that God exists. This is the power of religion as an internally consistent logic.

The power of other motivators, such as nationalism or communism for example, can be quickly disproved. Nationalism has mutated into fascism and communism has collapsed. Religions continue to exist because they have remained flexible and have changed with the times. The combination of the irrefutability and the ambiguity of

religion makes this possible, and just adds to religion's power to motivate. An organization has much to gain and very little to lose by using religion as a motivator.

C. ADVANTAGES GAINED BY THE ORGANIZATION

The discussion to this point has focused on the relationship between religion and violence, and the strength of religion as a motivator. The question now is what benefits does religion provide an organization?

An organization benefits in four ways when using religion as a motivator: it gains commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. These benefits provide the organization with the ability to fight the asymmetric battle. Typically, in asymmetric warfare, the ultimate victory is not necessarily a decisive tactical engagement. Sustained strategic success is more important. These benefits encourage the organization to sustain itself despite facing overwhelming odds, and can ultimately lead to victory. The Vietnam War is an example of 'victory through survival'. As discussed in the previous chapter, the weaker force can defeat a stronger force by achieving a stalemate or better. Under the right circumstances, religion provides the motivation to sustain the fight.

1. Commitment

As examined earlier in this chapter, using religion as a motivator for violence results in a strong commitment from the believer to act in the name of God. The Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, used his fiery sermons to inspire his volunteer militias to participate in suicidal "human

wave" attacks. It was their belief that their deaths were for the greater good (while at the same time guaranteeing them a good seat in heaven) that ultimately led the men and boys to willingly sacrifice themselves. This commitment, used in the right way, provides an organization with a very powerful tool for furthering its cause.

2. Legitimacy

Religion offers legitimacy to an organization. Hamas gained legitimacy through invoking jihad and by promoting the spread of Islam. "Hamas perceives Islam in a defensive position, struggling against a local as well as an international environment that is openly hostile towards Muslims" (Nüsse, 1998, p. 83). This defensive stance finds favor among the masses who then see the link between Hamas and Islam. As an internally consistent logic, Islam, in turn, lends credibility to Hamas, and thereby secures its legitimacy. When an organization uses religion for legitimacy it becomes very difficult to discredit.

3. Membership

By design, religion offers an organization a large population from which to recruit members and fill its ranks. Recruiting from this population is possible for two reasons. First, religion is ubiquitous as most people espouse some form of religion. Second, religion can cross ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and even national boundaries. In many cases, such as those represented by Islam, religion regulates and mixes the powers of civil and political life (Norval, 1999). Hezbollah, for instance, has built an

entire social welfare system in Lebanon. "Hezbollah's social services, the group's social work has succeeded in transforming it into something 'larger than a party, yet smaller than a state'" (Jaber, 1997, p. 168). These actions are attractive to many, and at least tolerable or useful to the rest of the population.

4. Longevity

Lastly, religion provides the organization with longevity and the ability to survive the war, not just the battle. Longevity is critical to a weaker opponent in an asymmetric conflict. The ability to endure derives from individuals' commitment, the organization's legitimacy, and a bountiful membership. All four of these factors contribute to perseverance and the *will to win*. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its asymmetric fight against Israel exemplify this. In 1982, the PLO was virtually destroyed physically, but through perseverance and unity, the organization survived and has evolved into its own political entity (Lerman, 1982). This *will to win*, or to survive, would be impossible without commitment, legitimacy, membership, and organization.

D. SUMMARY

Religious motivation is prevalent in conflict around the globe today. Religion is used and will have continued use in the future because obtaining religious goals may be a primary objective, or because religion may double as motivational and structural means to rally the masses. Religion is a strong motivator because it follows the logic

of appropriateness, offers identity, is rational, and constitutes an internally consistent logic. Organizations can secure individual commitment, further their own legitimacy, gain a large membership and, most importantly, secure their own longevity when they employ religion as a motivator. Thus, it is particularly useful in asymmetric warfare, as the cases to be examined in this thesis will reveal.

IV. CASE STUDY #1: HEZBOLLAH AND ISRAEL

Nations and civilizations have gone to war for a number of reasons. Wars have been waged over political differences, alliances, natural resources, or access to those resources. Not surprisingly, religious differences have also been a source of conflict throughout history. From the holy wars recorded in the Old Testament of the Bible to the twenty-first century version of Jihad, history is filled with tales of "true believers" fighting wars in the name of God.

The current situation in the Middle East provides an excellent example of ancient feuds continuing into modern times. As the theological and geographic center of three of the world's major religions – Christianity, Judaism and Islam – the Middle East seems destined to be a battleground for religious-based conflict. These conflicts span the spectrum of intensity as religious groups fight one another for power and influence. From inter-religious turmoil to fighting off external threats, religiously motivated conflict seems to have an added dimension that is not present in secularly oriented wars. As author Mark Pinsky (1997) notes, "...faith, the essence of religious commitment, makes a formidable motivator" (p. 1).

Often, this extra edge that religious motivation provides is all that a group brings with it to battle against a larger, better equipped force. In Middle East history, there are many examples of this type of asymmetric war in which a weaker force fights and defeats a stronger force. From the Jewish defenders at Masada to T.E.

Lawrence and his guerrilla campaign on the Arabian Peninsula during World War I, the idea of asymmetric warfare is not new to the region.

The implications of this type of asymmetric conflict can be explored by examining the "war" between the state of Israel and Hezbollah during the closing years of the twentieth century. Although this undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah has many facets, it is ultimately a battle in which religious differences have been used as motivators.

If we use Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu's principles of warfare as a gauge, it appears that Israel was clearly the superior force. After comparing the strategic, tactical, preparation, and leadership aspects on both sides, western analysis would point to an easy Israeli victory. Yet, the conflict between the two has been raging for at least twenty years, with no end in sight. The question then is, what else is Hezbollah bringing to the fight? Does religious motivation gained from Islam provide the organization with what it needs to make up for deficiencies elsewhere? Is this religious motivation stronger than the feeling of national survival that motivates the Israelis?

A. BACKGROUND

At the heart of the current Middle East conflict is the existence of the state of Israel. Born in controversy over fifty years ago, Israel continues to be a painful reminder to the Arab world of battles lost and dreams unfulfilled. Officially created by the United Nations from the Palestinian mandate in 1948, Israel's short history can

be characterized as that of a state at continuous risk. From the beginning, the surrounding Arab states regarded Israel as simply the next in a long line of oppressive intruders out to wrest control over the area's limited land and resources. Whatever hopes Israel had for a peaceful beginning did not last long as the Arab states immediately declared war. While the Israelis had a slight numerical advantage in men, it was conceivable that the Arab forces could mass resources and men and crush the upstart nation. For a number of reasons, however, the Arab states were unable to fight a cohesive battle. Israel, on the other hand, fighting for its national survival, was able to mobilize and defeat the Arab forces. This scenario would be repeated three more times over the next twenty-five years, solidifying Israel's role as a regional power.

After independence, the leaders of the new Jewish state had a number of problems to solve. It was obvious that the land claimed by the new state would not be sufficient for its current population. Nor would it be able to support the expected influx of Jewish immigrants. Israel's Zionist leadership had been conducting an active campaign to encourage the Palestinians to move from their homes since before World War II. This intensified during the war of independence, which led to a massive outflow of Palestinians. Once Jewish settlers moved into these vacated areas, and with the Palestinians wanting to return to their homes, Israel found itself with an internal refugee problem with which it was unprepared to deal. Israel had three choices. First, it could allow the Palestinians to return and give them back their land. Second, it could negotiate some kind of settlement,

involving land resources Israel did not have. Finally, Israel could leave the situation unresolved, by claiming to still be under siege, thus relegating the Palestinians to remaining refugees. The Israelis chose this last option, leading Palestinians to seek a return to their homeland and return of land by the Israelis, which they continue to want today (Nasr, 1997).

The Palestinian refugee migration into southern Lebanon directly impacted the Lebanese Shiites living there. But the Shiites nonetheless remained sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian refugee problem taught the Shiites that fighting was the only way to keep their land. Both Israel and the Palestinians had indicated that the Shiite displacement would only be temporary. In the end, the temporary Palestinian ordeal in Israel had taught the Lebanese not to abandon their homes at any cost and that confrontation was the only way to survive intact (Jaber, 1997).

This Shiite confrontation would begin with the help of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Although the secular PLO had gained some political legitimacy from the United Nations in the early 1970s, their continued harassment of Israeli settlements eventually pushed the Israeli government to take decisive action. In 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon decided it was time to drive the PLO from Israel's northern border and launched Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE in an attempt to destroy the PLO once and for all. On October 16, 1982 an Israeli convoy rolled through a Shiite crowd of 50,000 in the city of Nabatiyeh, Lebanon. This gathering was being held to

celebrate Ashura, the most sacred religious festival in Shiite Islam. Instead of bypassing the town and avoiding a confrontation, the Israeli convoy commander chose to roll right through the celebration. The Muslims were furious at the disregard for their holy day, while the Israelis regarded the crowd reaction as a challenge to their authority. A riot ensued and two Shiites were killed. The Higher Shiite Council of Beirut issued a 'Fatwa,' or religious edict, calling for confrontation against Israeli forces. As a result of this call for jihad, the Hezbollah organization was born (Jaber, 1997).

B. HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah had begun as an informal resistance to Israeli occupation and eventually developed into a very complex psuedo-state at war with Israel. Although secrecy still shrouds much of the inner workings of Hezbollah, there has been enough information revealed over the years to analyze at least some of Islam's influence over the organization's purpose and goals.

In the early 1980's, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization was one of approximately twenty-five groups fighting the Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli governments for control of southern Lebanon. Islam's influence over every facet of the organization is what set Hezbollah apart from its rivals. Using the Islamic revolution in Iran as a blueprint, Hezbollah's leadership focused on the Lebanese Shiite Muslims as a foundation for their organization. The often forgotten Shiite population benefited little during Lebanon's prosperous years. Now, with the country in

chaos, the Shiite situation was hardly improving. Focusing on Shiite religious convictions yielded Hezbollah immediate results. First, religion was already a part of everyday life. Therefore, the edicts put forth by the clerics would be accepted as readily as any other religiously-oriented prescriptions. Islam also gave the group an instant infrastructure by which to build an organization. The clerical hierarchy already in existence was considered legitimate by worshipers, thus making the transition from a religious entity to a theocracy relatively easy. Finally, doing what was said to be religiously necessary provided the ultimate motivation. As was seen in Iran a few years earlier, the mood of the Lebanese masses was such that southern Lebanon was ripe for revolution. Hezbollah now had all of the elements in place to succeed in southern Lebanon (Jaber, 1997).

In his piece entitled "The Moral Logic of Hezbollah," author Martin Kramer writes that Hezbollah differs from other Lebanese militias in one fundamental regard. Hezbollah's leaders believe and espouse the idea of a revolutionary vision for an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hezbollah is not necessarily concerned about the future of other groups fighting for survival in Lebanon. Rather, the "Party of God" considers its version of Islam the only way to save the country from the evils of the west, and to provide the political and social stability that its adherents believe has been missing (Kramer, 1998). In contrast, terrorism expert David Rapoport notes that groups like the Palestinian Liberation Organization have attempted to do the same thing, but they have defined themselves from

a secular rather than religious point of view (Rapoport, 1998).

By using Islam as the foundation of the new organization, Hezbollah gained instant legitimacy from not only the Lebanese Shiites, but other displaced Lebanese minorities as well. Hezbollah's list of goals (which appear below) is general enough to benefit everyone, yet specific enough to leave no doubt about what are Hezbollah's intentions.

Hezbollah Goals

- *Liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation*
- *Inform the public of the continued Israeli aggression in Lebanon and of the Israeli army's systematic killing of civilians.*
- *Educate the public on the miserable living conditions of the Lebanese people living under Israeli occupation.*
- *Improve the living condition of the Lebanese people suffering under Israeli occupation.*
- *Provide assistance to families who lost their sources of income due to Israeli Army attacks and assassinations.*
- *Resist the criminal and terrorist actions of the Israeli-sponsored South Lebanese Army (SLA) terrorist organization.*
- *Provide housing to individuals whose homes were bombed by the Israeli army.*
- *Provide low cost medical care*
- *Provide educational assistance to families in need*

Source: www.mogwama.org

It is interesting to note that Islam is not specifically mentioned in this list. Whether the Islamic

influence is inferred or purposely left out, its presence is readily apparent. Of course, there are drawbacks to embracing a radical Islamic philosophy. As the Iranian and Afghan people found out after their revolutions, radical Islam completely changes the nature of a country. Although Hezbollah is essentially an undeclared "state within a state" it is still able to influence the population via strong-arm tactics. Using Islamic law as a basis for its legal system, Hezbollah tends to enforce its laws by direct action. Much to the dismay of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, Hezbollah supporters use terror tactics to enforce the strict Islamic standards on issues such as alcohol consumption and female dress codes (Jaber, 1997). Islamic law is known for its efficiency when desired and its hypocrisy when convenient, and its application in Lebanon proves no exception. For example, although suicide is not allowed according to the Koran, Hezbollah clerics have skirted the issue by comparing the Hezbollah's suicide bombers to soldiers at war, thereby authorizing the use of suicide tactics (Kramer, 1998). Yet, despite the perceived shortcomings of the Islamic legal system, its acceptance by Shiites is another proof of their recognition of Hezbollah's legitimacy. Also, although its version of Islamic law could be considered extreme at times, Hezbollah does provide a source of stability in an otherwise chaotic environment.

As mentioned in Chapter II, Western military analysts have long argued about the characteristics that a nation or its military force must possess in order to succeed in war. Without a decisive battle, or exchange of land or resources, analysts must look to other areas to determine

how the combatants fared during a conflict. For the purpose of our three case studies, western military tools of analysis will be used. These five keys to victory are based on the writings of Sun Tzu. They are, again: leadership, strategy, tactics, preparation (logistics and technology), and desire. History has shown that a force able to exploit its advantage in any of these areas may have the edge on the battlefield.

1. Leadership

Hezbollah used both historical precedence and Islam to set up its government infrastructure. Modeling itself after the Iranian revolutionary government, Hezbollah's organization can be separated into two parts. The first is made up of officials who hold positions in the hierarchy of the organization, and the second consists of the masses. As is the case in Iran, holy men who provide spiritual and political guidance lead Hezbollah. While these clerics have great influence over all issues, a council (or 'Sharia') and a Secretary-General make policy and legal decisions. Both the Sharia and Secretary-General are elected from within the established hierarchy (Jaber, 1997).

Initially, Hezbollah leadership relied heavily on the religious clerics to form the backbone of its organization. As the organization matured, however, Hezbollah gave its military arm, Islamic Resistance, more autonomy in dealing with day-to-day activities. This move toward centralized command and decentralized execution for operations led to a more effective fighting force in the early 1990's. As a

result, Islamic Resistance was able to carry out more operations with greater results and fewer casualties (Jaber, 1997).

While shrewd leadership has been critical to Hezbollah's success, its members come not only from Lebanon, but the rest of the Muslim world as well. The organization stresses the point that membership is not limited to Lebanese and Palestinians. Indeed, Hezbollah considers all Muslims members of the Party of God. This open membership philosophy allows the organization to cross national borders and expand its support base worldwide. It also lends the group longevity, as its basic assumption that any Muslim is a member guarantees followers as long as the religion exists (Jaber, 1997). Whether this form of leadership and government gives Hezbollah an advantage over the democratically elected Israeli government is debatable. However, the fact that Hezbollah is religiously based definitely lends it an edge in rallying followers to its cause.

2. Strategy

Although Judaism has played a significant role in Israel's development, Israeli national survival has been a continuous goal since the state declared independence in 1948. After its successful 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli government adopted two approaches as part of its long-term strategy against terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. By using air strikes and raids into southern Lebanon, the Israelis felt they could curb the resistance by eliminating Hezbollah's leadership. The Israelis also

believed that penalizing the population for any actions committed by Hezbollah would turn the masses against the freedom fighters. In both cases, their strategy did not work. Jaber (1997) notes that the leaders who had been targeted became martyrs and thus heroes to rally around, and each Israeli reprisal only strengthened the determination of the Lebanese Shiite to fight. Instead of destroying Hezbollah's will to win, the Israeli strategy only boosted it. On the battlefield, Hezbollah's long-term harassment strategy included car bombs, suicide bombers, rocket attacks, and small unit raids to provoke the Israelis to respond. Then, a continuous propaganda campaign exploited Israeli mistakes using all forms of media available. Hezbollah's goal was to not only make Israel look bad, but to also portray Hezbollah's own fighters as waging war for a good cause. Not only did this enhance Hezbollah's legitimacy within Lebanon, but furthered its cause with the outside world as well. The Shiite clerics took an active role in singing Hezbollah's praises. Wherever a crowd gathered – whether in mosques, at funerals, or for festivals – Hezbollah was able to get its message out while Israeli responses continued to prove the clerics' criticisms of Israel correct (Jaber, 1997).

3. Tactics

As in most cases of asymmetric warfare, the battlefield favors the defender. Not only does the defender know the terrain, but he can also choose when and where to fight. Because his aim is to throw the invader out he also has an advantage in terms of the will to win.

By definition, all of a defender's assets and resources are concentrated on defense. The attacker, on the other hand, not only has to take the fight to the defender, but also has to maintain support from home until victory has been achieved. Defeating defensive tactics is often easier said than done, as we saw in Vietnam and more recently in Somalia. Even in Israel, local knowledge and popular support in southern Lebanon have allowed Hezbollah guerrillas to remain elusive despite the best Israeli efforts to find and destroy them.

The most significant impact of a tactic in the Israel-Hezbollah war has come in the form of the suicide bomber. Although there are many historical examples of soldiers knowingly committing suicide for their cause (the Japanese kamikazes from World War II immediately come to mind), Israelis were taken by complete surprise when the first suicide attacks occurred in the early 1980s. The young men carrying out these attacks seemed to represent a new breed of freedom fighter. Born in poverty, with little hope for the future, the recognition and accolades heaped on these martyrs were too good for any young idealist to pass up. Like the kamikaze attacking US warships, suicide bombers were driven by the idea of defending their homeland and were committed to the act by their belief in Islam, which promises martyrs a pleasure-filled eternal life, at the right hand of Allah.

4. Preparation

When comparing the technological and logistical capabilities of Israel and Hezbollah, it certainly would

appear that Israel was better prepared for war. Backed by US military and financial aid, there was little doubt that when the conflict began in the early 1980s, Israel was one of the premier fighting forces in the world.

In spite of the overwhelming odds facing Hezbollah, however, the organization was able to build a respectable force in a short period of time. Starting with a small band of poorly equipped guerillas, and a combination of Iranian money and training, and an active recruiting campaign, Hezbollah developed into an efficient fighting force. Recruiting success can be attributed to both socio-economic and religious reasons. Having lived in chaos and poverty for their entire lives, there is little economic or educational opportunity for Lebanese youth, making the life led by Islamic Resistance fighters very attractive. In addition, answering the call to jihad by the religious leadership brings prestige not only to the individual, but to his family (Jaber, 1997).

Although membership in Hezbollah is universal and automatic, becoming a member of Islamic Resistance is a little more difficult, as new recruits have to pass through a probationary period before they are considered for full membership (Kramer, 1998). In 1986, militia membership was estimated at nearly 4,000 men. After years of combat, and considerable capital infusion from abroad, the Islamic Resistance has become an ever larger, well-trained, disciplined fighting force. In fact, Islamic Resistance has improved so much that it has even begun to take on a western military organizational style whereby specialized units like artillery, signals, and engineers have been

fielded. In addition, to tie all of these efforts together, a general staff now exists to carry out the tasks of running an army (Jaber, 1997).

Although, critics assert that Hezbollah could not exist without the support of the Iranian government, this is truer of Hezbollah in the past than today. Currently, Hezbollah maintains a very complex fiscal arrangement. Although it continues to accept 'alms' for support, Hezbollah has a number of business enterprises and investments to ensure that it can survive without any external support. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah is actively involved in large-scale business ventures such as supermarkets, factories, and farms. It also provides low cost housing to meet the needs of the displaced. Hezbollah has even ventured into the international investment market (Jaber, 1997).

Hezbollah has likewise matured over time, and evolved on the 'battlefield.' The Hezbollah-Israeli war has been characterized by small unit actions on each side. Western style force-on-force battles never materialized as each side attempted to capitalize on its strengths while attacking the enemy's weaknesses. For Hezbollah, what began with "set and forget" bombs, ambushes and kidnappings developed into complex, coordinated attacks against Israeli forces in direct and indirect actions. Being the pre-eminent military power in the Middle East, Israel's arsenal boasted modern western attack and surveillance aircraft. However, the lessons learned by the US in Vietnam were validated in Lebanon. The primary lesson learned had to do with the will or desire of Hezbollah. Despite the fact

that Israel could mass firepower with the best technology available, simple "shoot, move and hide" tactics made it nearly impossible for Israelis to locate and defeat their determined indigenous foe (Jaber, 1997).

The technological imbalance of military equipment between Israel and Hezbollah offers a classic example of the inequities to be found in an asymmetric war. With modern attack aircraft, like the US-made F-16 fighter-bomber and Apache helicopter gunship, it appeared that Israel would easily roll over any opposition. Technology had already proven itself decisive on the modern battlefield when US-led coalition forces soundly defeated the Iraqis in Operation DESERT STORM. The obvious difference between DESERT STORM and the Israelis' actions is that the coalition was fighting a conventional force under conventional conditions while the Israeli-Hezbollah war is an asymmetric fight. A better comparison might be US operations in Vietnam some twenty years earlier, or the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan.

Hezbollah's firepower is a mix of old and new. Despite fielding antique weaponry, Hezbollah has armed its fighters with excellent terror weapons, like the Russian-made Katyusha rocket, and has been able to maintain harassment fire into northern Israel throughout this campaign. Hezbollah military leader Sheikh Nabib Quarq claimed by the 1990s that his organization possessed its own state-of-the-art equipment that prevented Israel from locating and defusing roadside bombs. He also claimed that Hezbollah's communications had become sophisticated enough that they could not be jammed. Likewise, Hezbollah was

able to field electronically controlled bombs that it claimed could not be jammed or prematurely detonated (Jaber, 1997).

Despite its use of smart bombs, modern artillery, and other high tech equipment, Israel was unable to meet its expectations of hitting targets without causing civilian casualties. Hezbollah itself suffered 650 air raids and was the target of 24,000 artillery shells, yet was still firing salvos of Katyushas into northern Israel and at a higher rate than when the offensive started in 1982 (Jaber, 1997). Technologically speaking, Israel may have seemed to have the advantage, but as Arie O'Sullivan, defense analyst for the *Jerusalem Post*, pointed out,

Despite all its bravado and state-of-the-art weapons systems, the IDF's attempts to stop Hezbollah from firing Katyushas into northern Israel is like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito in his teeth (Jaber, 1997, p. 178).

Ironically, for an 'undeclared state' less than twenty-five years old, Hezbollah's achievements are impressive and reminiscent of Israel's in its early stages. Although it seems that Israel should have easily crushed Hezbollah, it has been unable to eradicate the organization, despite its best efforts. The question then is, what other factors could be playing a role in Hezbollah's survival? The answer seems to be that Hezbollah, like its predecessors in earlier asymmetric wars, possesses a stronger desire or will to win. This will to win should not be mistaken for a desire to survive. The will to win we refer to is proactive rather than reactive.

C. HEZBOLLAH'S WILL TO WIN

This will to win may be impossible to quantify, but it is very easy to locate. All we have to do is look at the actions of the believers. For example, Jaber opens her book *HEZBOLLAH* with the story of Hezbollah member Salah Ghandour, a young man in his early twenties who was married with three children. Ghandour had been active in the Islamic Resistance for years, but in 1995 felt he had to do more. In May of that year, he drove an explosives-laden car into an Israeli convoy, killing himself and twelve Israeli soldiers. His death came as no surprise to his wife who initially pleaded with him to not go on the mission. She eventually relented because she had always known that this was his destiny. Despite her and her children's loss, she was "proud and filled with joy," because her husband believed that his death was the best way he could defend and fight for his land and his countrymen (Jaber, 1997).

The type of dedication demonstrated by Ghandour could come from a number of things, but certainly testifies to his strong sense of faith in Islam and acceptance of self-sacrifice for the greater good. Khalil Jarradi, a local theology teacher in the Lebanese village of Marrakeh, sums up this motivation nicely,

It is faith. No one might believe us, but it emanates from our faith – that wondrous weapon, which no armaments in the world can destroy, united our town's residents, despite the fact that they belonged to different political parties and affiliations before the invasion (Jaber, 1997, p. 23).

Jarradi's own teaching continually challenged Israel's presence in southern Lebanon, while his leadership inspired many to the cause, and his success resulted in numerous Israeli raids attempting to capture him. Though these raids were unsuccessful, a bomb placed beneath his office eventually did kill him. Yet, as so often has happened in this conflict, though the Israelis may have killed the man his influence continues, and they actually assisted in turning him into a martyr for the resistance (Jaber, 1997).

While faith in Islam and commitment to the cause appear to be the most significant elements in this desire to win, Hezbollah's ability to call on its members for self-sacrifice is extraordinary. The idea of self-sacrifice is instilled at an early age even though Hezbollah admits that children cannot comprehend martyrdom. Through their study of religion, children learn that paradise is their reward for death in battle. To strengthen this point, the actions of martyrs dying for the cause are glorified in pictures, speeches, and poems. As one member of the *Hezbollah Women's Association* put it, "...self-sacrifice...is as normal as being taught in childhood that stealing is a sin" (Jaber, 1997, p. 90).

While it is difficult to provide tangible proof that the will to win exists, there is evidence that an organization gains when using religion as a motivator for war. Although there have been many stories and eyewitness accounts attesting to the faith and dedication of believers, there is still no proof, other than deliberate acts of self-sacrifice, that Islam itself is a motivator. But, throughout this case study, the effect that Islam has

had on the commitment, legitimacy, longevity, and membership of Hezbollah should be more than apparent.

In addition to these factors, Hezbollah has been able to succeed because it has been able to focus its energy on a common enemy, Israel. Hezbollah's hatred for the state of Israel is unyielding and, according to its manifesto, the organization will never have anything resembling normal relations with that country. This feeling stems largely from the fact that Israel exists on what is considered to be Muslim land. As a result, the 'war' between Hezbollah and Israel cannot end until Israel ceases to exist altogether (Jaber, 1997).

As with hatred, Hezbollah's most important resource – people – is virtually unlimited. This, combined with its ability to motivate its followers to action through the will to win, renders Hezbollah a difficult opponent. Israel's strategy for protecting its northern border, though admirable, only adds to the problem. Israel's aggressive action taken to eliminate terrorists only inspires more recruits and steels their resolve. As long as both sides pursue their current agendas, the battle will never be won and the conflict will continue. Over the long term, this stalemate could spell defeat for Israel, the stronger power.

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V. CASE STUDY #2: FIS AND ALGERIA

Nationalism is still today a powerful force in world politics and a critical cohesive element presently used by countries around the world. According to US historian John Lukas (1990), "All the isms are wasms – except one, the most powerful ism of this century, indeed, of the entire democratic age, which is nationalism" (p. 41). This means that nationalism endures, while colonialism, expansionism, and imperialism, for example, are no longer relevant in today's political arena. However, one 'ism' remerging in the 21st century is fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, of course, is not really new, while its appeal to the masses is not entirely different from that of nationalism (Peters, 1993).

E. J. Hobsbawm (1987) defines nationalism as "the readiness of people to identify themselves emotionally with 'their' nation" (p. 143). Nationalism can also be defined as a devotion to the interests or culture of a particular people. Fundamentalism, meanwhile, is an assertion or a re-assertion of traditional beliefs and practices associated with a particular religion. The connection between religious fundamentalism and nationalism is obvious if the traditional religious beliefs and practices represent a people's way of life or culture. This is true, for instance, in Algeria. "As during the preceding centuries, Islam was the strongest binding force in a highly heterogeneous country plagued by constant tribal and family feuding; under foreign, non-Muslim influence this became even more prevalent" (Stone, 1997, p. 146).

A. BACKGROUND

Fundamentalism, in a nearly religiously homogeneous society, can work to unite people and bridge fissures much the way nationalism did in Algeria in 1962. Ninety-nine percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. But, Algeria, not unlike other African countries, is diverse and full of overlapping fissures that divide or could potentially divide the country. Ethnically, Algeria is 80% Arab and 20% Berber. The common spoken languages are Arabic, Berber, and French. Geographically, 4/5 of the country is desert and most of the habitable terrain is along the Mediterranean coast. Therefore, most cities are along the coast. Over half of the population lives in cities and, subsequently, most of the population is located in the northern portion of the country. Generational cleavages are important because 70% of Algerians are under 30 years of age (Metz, 1994).

Events of the last 30 years have led to sharp distinctions between older Algerians who experienced liberation from France, middle-aged Algerians who grew up in the liberated state and currently run the country, and young Algerians who only know of the current government and its failures.

More immediately, fundamentalism flows from the belief that the nationalist leaders who led their countries to independence after World War II did not deliver to most people the better lives they promised; they and their foreign ideologies had failed. This perception of failure cut to a considerable extent along generation lines. As older people rested on the laurels of victories past, younger people were looking for victories

over present problems which their elders seemed unable or unwilling to produce. Their dissatisfaction was reinforced by the fact that slow economic growth limited their upward mobility. Those who had made and profited from the revolution could not now make room for their own children, or at least for the children of those who had not profited. Unemployment, underemployment, and inappropriate employment were greatest among the young, most of whom ironically now boasted better educations than their parents (Ruedy, 1992, p. 241).

Lastly, of course, economic fissures are also present in Algeria. The important point here is that all these fissures overlap and that most of these fissures were buried or ignored during the National Liberation Front's (FLN) long and heroic struggle for Algerian independence.

1. National Liberation Front (FLN)

Berbers are the indigenous people of Algeria. However, numerous invaders throughout history have affected them. The Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, and the French have influenced Algeria. The greatest pressure came during the Arab conquest of North Africa, which ushered in the spread of Islam. This is when Berbers converted to Islam and formed an Islamic government during the 8th century. Islam thus has a long history in the region, which is important for understanding just how deeply its roots extend into Algerian culture.

France invaded Algiers in 1830 and shortly thereafter annexed Algeria. The French controlled Algeria for more than 130 years. Although Algerians were French subjects, they were always considered lesser. Algerians could become

French citizens only if they renounced Islam and converted to Christianity. Obviously, this stipulation, combined with continuous French exploitation, instigated popular resistance. Initially, Algerians only wanted equal rights and status, but eventually they sought complete autonomy (Stone, 1997).

After World War II, the French tried to compromise with the Muslims in Algeria, but by then it was too late. Algerian nationalism, along with worldwide Arab nationalism, was growing and a fight for independence seemed inevitable. Ahmed Ben Bella, along with several other exiled Algerians, created the FLN in Egypt. On 1 November 1954, the FLN officially began what quickly developed into a ruthless guerilla war against the French. This eight-year campaign against France marks the epitome of Algerian unity. The Evian Accords, on 18 March 1962, ushered in a cease-fire and the end of over a century of French rule in Algeria (Stone, 1997).

The FLN was victorious in winning independence and in unifying a people divided by numerous fissures. These fissures have since resurfaced. The less the FLN has proved able to accomplish its original purpose, the less unified the country has become. "The avowed purpose of the FLN was 'the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social, Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles'" (Roberts, 1988, p. 558). Algeria won its independence on July 1, 1962 and operated as a socialist state from 1963 through 1989. The FLN used religion to assist in the unification of the people and to achieve its goals. "It mobilized the Islamic element of Algerian

culture in order to establish itself as a popular movement, but this mobilization was instrumental rather than expressive of the spirit of the movement" (Roberts, 1988, p. 588). Ironically, much as the FLN used but did not treat religion seriously, favoring nationalism instead, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) now wields fundamentalism in nationalism's place.

2. Islamic Salvation Front

The FIS emerged in February 1989 primarily because the FLN and the government had failed to understand the needs of the people. "Islamism had little difficulty in connecting with social distress, for it involved itself precisely where the vacuum and the attendant need were experienced most severely" (Malley, 1996, p. 242). This connection and understanding is critical to FIS's use of religion to motivate the Algerian people. At first glance, appearances might lead one to believe that the FIS was destined to be successful and that Algerians would peacefully unite. Unfortunately, for two reasons, this has not and is not likely to happen. First, the military (originally FLN-supported) assumed power and is reluctant to relinquish control. Second, although in step with Algerian society, the FIS does not have a plan for running the country and wants nothing less than an Islamic state. "The strength of their appeal came from their moral stance, not from the realism of their plans for the future" (Pierre & Quandt, 1996, p. 13). The FIS slogan of 'Islam is the solution' does not in itself solve the problems of Algeria.

a. Strategy and Tactics

The 12-year-old asymmetric conflict between the Algerian government and the FIS is currently stalemated.

A final scenario involves a prolongation of the present situation in which the junta is unable to reach out to other parties or even dominate the country militarily and suppress the Islamists, nor are the Islamists able to dislodge the military hold on the basic instruments of power (Fuller, 1996, p. 110).

The failure by both forces to consistently apply strategy, tactics, leadership, preparation, and desire – all of Sun Tzu's principles for victory – explains the stalemate. Although both the government and the FIS receive poor marks in strategy and tactics, the FIS's marks are worse. By engaging in killings, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and general terrorism, they have alienated parts of the population in their effort to undermine the government. "During the last three years, the Islamists have become so vicious, destructive, splintered and out of control that it is unlikely Algerians or the international community would allow them to govern" (St. John, 1996, p. 8). As Professor Peter St. John indicates, the FIS's current strategy and tactics are extremely unpopular. Although this makes it unlikely the FIS will govern in its present form, it could conceivably rule if it delegated and stuck to a clearly defined strategic plan.

b. Leadership and Preparation

The Algerian government has the advantage over the FIS in both leadership and preparation. The FLN

emerged from its war of independence with France having learned the benefits of capable leadership and thorough preparation. The current regime capitalized on this FLN experience. The FIS leadership, on the other hand, has struggled to stay out of jail and to remain alive. The resources, funds, and trading possibilities of the Algerian government far exceed the capabilities of the FIS, to include all available external support. FIS logistics, technology, and training cannot be compared to those of even a marginal nation-state. All told, the government has the advantage in four out of five of Sun Tzu's principles: strategy, tactics, leadership, and preparation.

Given the government's apparent superiority the question is, why is there a stalemate? The short answer is, the weaker force can win simply by not losing. Sun Tzu's last principle, desire – the hardest to measure – is clearly the equalizer in this case. Simply put, members of the FIS apparently have a greater will to win than do their government opponents. The Islamists are motivated to do whatever it takes, for as long as is necessary to achieve victory. This motivation represents the FIS's strength and highlights the current government's weakness. Unless the government can focus on overcoming this weakness, thereby undermining the FIS's strength, the best that the government can hope for remains a stalemate.

B. RELIGION MOTIVATES THE PEOPLE

"The question then is not so much whether the FIS will come to power, but how, and to what degree" (Fuller, 1996, p. xviii). Appropriateness, identity, rationality, and its

internally consistent logic lend religion the tremendous motivational force. The FIS uses Islam and these four factors to motivate its followers and supporters, and infuse them with the will to win. In time, this desire to win may eventually bring the FIS to power.

Historically, the typical Algerian has been described as more pragmatic than pure. The failure of socialism by the 1980s, combined with persistent nationwide economic difficulties, set the stage for the turbulent 1990s. "Islamism offered comforting social norms – dress codes, ritualized prayers – and a sense of collective purpose to young disaffected, and marginalized Algerians in desperate search of both" (Malley, 1996, p. 243). Preference-based decisions and cost-benefit analyses, which never seemed to lead to success, sent individuals searching for answers in other places. Rational individuals, who consciously sought to make plans and decisions for their future, were bound to be frustrated by the government's failings and its unconvincing explanations. By offering a philosophy based on the logic of appropriateness, as well as rules, and a social structure, Islam presented an appealing alternative to many Algerians.

At the same time, Islam offered Algerians an identity. This religious identity may actually be the most powerful component of Algerian culture.

Apart from tiny residual Christian and Jewish communities in Algiers and other northern cities, nearly all Algerians are Muslims. But this apparent homogeneity belies the enormous geographical, linguistic, ethnic, and other local divisions among Algerians; indeed, one of the central themes of successive Algerian regimes

since 1962 has been the goal of forging a 'national' identity as a means of overcoming the profound problems caused by these cleavages (Stone, 1997, p. 7).

Algeria has long struggled to find something that appeals to people beyond their family or tribe, and Islam would appear to be the one thing that people already share in common.

Algeria's linguistic difficulties epitomize the country's struggle for identity. The region's indigenous language is Berber, but was replaced by Arabic following the Arab conquest in the seventh and eighth centuries. During the one hundred years of French rule, French became the language of commerce and education. However, the country remained predominantly Islamic and the Koran continues to be written in Arabic. Arabic is necessary for reading and understanding the Koran, which automatically creates a sense of identity among believers. Following independence, the government's "goal was a country where the language (Arabic), religion (Islam), and national identity (Algerian) were free, as far as practical, of French language and influence" (Metz, 1994, p. 88). This Arabisation policy began in the 1970s and, inadvertently, helped fuel inter-generational tensions in Algeria. In many cases, the younger generation only spoke Arabic, while many of the scarce employment opportunities available to the Algerian youth still required knowledge of French.

The Arabisation of public administration and the state sector of the economy did not keep pace with that of secondary and higher education, with the result that by the mid- to late 1970s there were large numbers of young Algerians educated in

Arabic for whom employment opportunities were scarce (Roberts, 1988, p. 566).

These increasingly large numbers of disenfranchised male youth amounted to a ready-made membership for FIS. Unemployed and under-employed young men lent backbone and strength to the FIS. Islam not only helped refocus youth, but also offered them a collective purpose. Actually, disgruntled Algerians of all ages found themselves attracted to Islam. Although evidence does not suggest that the FIS consciously used Islam to motivate its followers, the fact that the FIS was Islamic did appeal to people.

C. THE WILL TO WIN AND THE FIS

Faith can be considered an enabling factor, if not the critical element, in the will to win, and can thus be considered instrumental in contributing to victory on the battlefield. The will to win cannot be described in tangible terms, as can the other four benefits gained by the FIS – commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. As previously discussed, commitment, legitimacy, and membership taken together are directly responsible for establishing longevity, and for securing an organization's long-term survival. Islam's perseverance in Algeria is beyond dispute – it has been there since the 900s – the FIS has endured for over a decade, and is still active.

While Islam has never truly been a pacifist creed, the FIS's original goal was not to engage in a military struggle with the Algerian government.

The FIS reversion to armed violence in January 1992 sprang directly from the army's coup, its annulment of the FIS national election victory of the previous month, its rejection of FIS activists who sought peaceful means to power, the subsequent arrest of hundreds of FIS leaders, including its top leadership, and the outright banning of the party (Fuller, 1996, p. 37).

Islam inspires ultimate commitment, but this commitment is not necessarily violent or peaceful. In Algeria, the FIS's Islamist bent, combined with its desire for radical political change, led to acts of extremism. However, in most cases, FIS's supporters were not committed to violence, but rather to their religion. All FIS really sought was support so that it could apply pressure on the government to change its ways.

The FIS continues to pursue the goal of an Islamic state. According to author Hugh Roberts (1988), "An Islamic state is a state governed in accordance with Islamic law, the Sharia" (p. 558). The Sharia is a set of laws derived from the Koran. The fact that Muslims believe that their ultimate spiritual guidance comes from the Koran, amounts to an internally consistent logic because the Koran is also said to be beyond question. Therefore, an Islamic state will be legitimate as long as it follows the Sharia. The pursuit of this has itself lent the FIS legitimacy. But the FIS has also gained legitimacy because it picked up where the FLN failed. The FLN promised, but did not produce, an Algerian state based on Islamic principles.

Meanwhile, the FIS is able to use its religious base to increase its membership. As nearly all Algerians are

Muslims, FIS's potential membership includes most Algerians. Nothing is as all-encompassing as religion is in Algeria when it comes to bridging fissures based on ethnic, linguistic, generational, economic, or regional differences. Altogether, the FIS appeals to a wide range of people, the most influential groups of whom include youth, militant Islamists, veterans from Afghanistan and the Gulf War, deserters from the Algerian army, the economically challenged, and anyone else who was adversely affected by colonialism or the failure of the Algerian government. As a result, the FIS can recruit from an enormous population base that excludes, arguably, only members of the ruling elite (Fuller, 1996). More to the point still, the FIS has an inexhaustible pool from which to recruit members. This alone guarantees it a future.

Presently, the FIS has not yet achieved a complete victory, and conflict in Algeria continues. However, by not having lost, the FIS has achieved a victory of sorts. The fact that it has not been defeated seems improbable because analysis indicates that the government holds most of the advantages. The only advantage held by the FIS is, presumably, its *will to win*. This otherwise invisible attribute manifests itself as commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. And it is ultimately these factors that may yet enable the FIS to achieve total victory over the government.

VI. CASE STUDY #3: IRAN AND IRAQ

In recent years the influence of the superpowers on political and military agendas has diminished, but many countries continue to be torn apart by internal violence. In some cases, religious differences have played a significant role. However, religious conflict cannot always be defined in the traditional terms of one religion fighting another. The conflict among people of the same religion is often just as generative of violence as is conflict between people of different religions. For example, the two major sects of Islam – Sunni and Shiite – have continually been at odds over which one represents true Islam. We see just how bloody an interfaith war can be in the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), where the Islamic religion played a role in motivating the forces on both sides.

This multi-faceted war was one of the few conventional conflicts fought during the Cold War era. It was a war fought over religious issues, border disputes, and political differences, and was fueled by ancient Shiite/Sunni and Persian/Arab cleavages as well as the personality clash between Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Husayn (Pike, 1999). As in the previous case studies, the Iran-Iraq War will be analyzed using five principles for victory derived from the writings of Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu. In terms of leadership, strategy, tactics, and preparation, the war was an asymmetric conflict that favored Iraq. Yet, in the final analysis, historians define the outcome of the war as a draw with heavy losses

on both sides. The question is, how were the Iranians able to fight to a draw when they were clearly outmatched? Was it simply that the Iranians were more committed to victory? The desire or *will to win* is the fifth principle for victory, and appears to have played the most significant role in this conflict. But was this desire to win religiously motivated, or was nationalism the fuel? – that is the question this chapter attempts to answer.

A. BACKGROUND

While some historians call the Iran-Iraq War the longest conventional war in the last one hundred years, other historians treat the war as the latest round of Persian-Arab hostilities. Although the reasons for the 1980 invasion by Iraq are complicated as well as numerous, some analysts believe that Husayn launched the Iraqi invasion for only two reasons. First, there was the open hostility between Husayn and his Iranian counterpart, Khomeini. With Khomeini's revolution less than two years old, the economic and political chaos that existed in Iran, exacerbated by a war, could lead to the downfall of the new Islamic regime and eliminate one of Husayn's regional enemies (Hiro, 1991). Husayn's second reason to invade Iran was based on his fear that the Shiite population in Iraq might be inspired by the success of the Iranian revolution to overthrow his government. Crushing the Iranian Shiite regime would then keep the Iraqi Shiite under control. While Middle East expert Daniel Pipes acknowledges that both of these explanations have merit, he proposes that Husayn invaded Iran for less complex reasons.

Pipes theorizes that the Iraqi invasion was inspired by border disputes that had been simmering for years. The boundary at the Shatt al-'Arab River, which separates the two countries, was at the center of the controversy (Pipes, 1983).

In 1975, the Shah of Iran and then – Iraqi Vice President Husayn signed the Algiers Accords. As a result of the Accords, both sides compromised and determined where the national boundaries would lie along the Shatt al-'Arab river. In the end, Iraq gained some territory while Iran was granted the access to the Shatt al-'Arab it desired. On the surface, both sides seemed satisfied with the deal, though it appeared that Iran had negotiated better terms (Hiro, 1991).

The four years following the Algiers Accords were filled with internal conflict in both Iran and Iraq. In Iraq, concerns over the Shiite Islamic revival and the threat it posed to the secular Baath party led to the election of the hardliner Husayn as president. While his predecessor, President Bakr, took a conciliatory approach to the Shiite problem, Husayn advocated tough tactics against Iraq's religious majority. Committed to the western notion of the separation of church and state, the Baath party and its leadership had a reasonable fear of a possible Shiite uprising (Hiro, 1991). Since Islamic fundamentalism had led to the Shah's overthrow, and with such a large Shiite population in southern Iraq, it was reasonable to believe that a religiously motivated uprising could also occur in Iraq.

Whereas the Iraqis' fear of religiously inspired revolution encouraged their invasion of Iran, the Iranians looked upon their religiously motivated revolution as a source of strength throughout the war. While a number of reasons for the Shah's demise have been identified, religion – in this case Shiite Islam – played a significant role. The Ayatollah Khomeini had been a critic of the Shah and his western-influenced government for some time. Khomeini had been jailed and deported a number of times for his outspoken protests against the monarchy. Ultimately, the popular Islamic fundamentalist movement led by Khomeini toppled the monarchy and redefined the entire country (Hiro, 1991). For Khomeini, the war could not have come at a better time. With the Islamic regime less than a few years old, it needed events to rally around to solidify its power. The American hostage crisis provided one such source at the beginning of the revolution, and the Iraqi invasion gave the Mullahs plenty of material for their fiery sermons that further energized the masses (Workman, 1994).

There were several factors, meanwhile, which encouraged Husayn to finally invade. First, Iran seemed to be an easy target. At the time, the new Revolutionary Regime was trying to deal with the problems of running a country. Iran's unemployment was high and its oil revenues were low, while the Kurds and other groups continued to rebel against the government. Also, the Iranian military had been decimated by purges while its equipment had fallen into disrepair. Second, the fall weather was favorable for infantry and armor operations in that part of the world. Finally, the most important factor was that the

superpowers' attentions were focused elsewhere. The Soviets had their own problems in Afghanistan and Poland, while the Americans were preoccupied with the upcoming presidential elections and a potential Cold War confrontation in Afghanistan. Also, judging from the recent US experience with Iran, Husayn must have assumed that the US would not be upset by the demise of the Iranian government (Pipes, 1983).

The success of the initial Iraqi ground assault, in September 1980, led analysts to believe that Husayn's prediction of a quick victory might come true. The combined arms assault against the disorganized Iranian government and military looked like a one-sided battle. Surprisingly though, the Iranians were able to quickly mount a defense and the Iraqi attack lost momentum. In 1982, the Iranian counterattack rapidly moved through Iraqi lines, prodding Husayn to propose the withdrawal of Iraqi forces in the hopes that Iran would agree to end the war. Iran, with momentum on its side, refused to accept the terms and continued the war into Iraq. By the beginning of 1984, Iraq had formally changed its war aims from conquest of Iranian territory to stopping Iranian forces from further gains. In April, Husayn proposed another diplomatic settlement, which was again rejected (Pike, 1999). By the end of 1984, human wave assaults and other wasteful tactics had taken their toll, and the casualty totals were horrendous. By 1985, both sides changed strategies as cities and industrial areas were targeted by air strikes, artillery barrages and missile attacks. Iraq's use of chemical weapons was officially noted during

this time, but their overall effects were insignificant (Hiro, 1991).

Oil, the lifeblood of both countries, had strategic implications throughout the war as its revenues helped finance the war effort. The new attacks on shipping brought the superpowers into the war when both the USSR and the US provided tankers to Kuwait to ensure the flow of oil. By 1988, the Persian Gulf was the center of naval operations for ten western and eight regional navies (Hiro, 1991). In 1988 UN Resolution 598 was passed, officially marking the end of the war. With the exception of huge losses in men and material, little of note had come out of the eight-year conflict.

B. THE WILL TO WIN IN AN ASYMMETRIC WAR

Determining the military significance of the war is difficult. Without a decisive battle or exchange of land or resources, analysts must look to other areas to determine how the combatants fared during the war. The principles for victory will again be used to determine which side had the advantage during the war.

1. Leadership

The effect of leadership on the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War can be evaluated on many levels. National leadership obviously played a significant role in the conduct of the war, but the military leadership also influenced the war's outcome. Much has been written about the leadership styles of Husayn and Khomeini. Throughout the war, Husayn's actions were in line with the secular

nature of the ruling Baath party, although he did not hesitate to use religious symbolism when it served his purposes. Khomeini, on the other hand, used religion as the basic motivator for the revolution *and* the war. With both leaders playing to their respective strengths, neither side had a leadership advantage at the national level. Author Dilip Hiro (1991) explains,

Both [Husayn and Khomeini] were strong willed, intransigent men, who could not be intimidated, they believed absolutely in themselves and their doctrines. But their experiences were poles apart, and they ran different types of regimes. Khomeini had every reason to be confident of his inspirational charisma... In contrast, Husayn was in charge of a well-oiled state and party machines, which were awash with money and confidence (p. 37).

The military leadership on both sides was marked by highs and lows. Despite having modern equipment, professional military training, and access to some of the Cold War's best advisors, neither side was able to make lasting military headway. For Iraq, much of the blame can be placed on Husayn. Although a self-proclaimed Field Marshal, Husayn had little military training and relied on his faithful lieutenants to carry out orders. Husayn's concerns about coup attempts ensured that capable combat commanders did not rise too high in rank. Even those Iraqi commanders who proved their worth during the first months of the war were unable to maintain momentum on the battlefield. The Iraqi war machine stalled because Husayn's centralized command policies made it difficult to exploit any advantages, and the logistical shortcomings of

the Iraqi army made sustained operations impossible (Hiro, 1999).

Iranian military problems also emanated from on high. The difference between the two countries was that in Iran's case its leadership was religious. The Revolutionary regime had purged its best officers during the revolution to ensure that a coup would not take place. Distrust of the professional military placed the new government in a difficult situation. The government needed experienced combat commanders and staff officers to make the armed forces run; yet, it did not trust officers' loyalties. As the war progressed, command eventually passed from the interim military leaders to the clergy. Under this new leadership scheme, positive results were immediately evident. In March 1982, the clerics launched Operation UNDENIABLE VICTORY to penetrate Iraqi lines and split Iraqi forces in the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. This was the turning point of the war as Iran took the offensive for the first time (Pike, 1999). As the war continued though, the lack of formal training became an advantage "... as the Iranian field commanders, unburdened by over-centralized control and unaffected by the traditional military staff college training, manifested themselves in innovation and ingenuity in the midst of battle" (Hiro, 1991, p. 51). It appears that neither side gained an advantage from its leadership. Fortunately, their mistakes only cost men, a resource that each side did not hesitate to use.

2. Strategy

Iraq's war strategy can be described as complex, ambitious, and inconsistent, all of which led to the high number of casualties and no significant gains. Hiro describes Iraq's war plans as being both offensive and defensive in nature. On the northern and central fronts, Iraq's planners developed a defensive posture to prevent Iran from moving through the oilfields of the Mesopotamian plain and on to Baghdad. In the south, Iraq's offensive strategy was designed to liberate Khuzestan. The strategy changed after the Iranian counter-attack. The Iraqis' goal changed from offensive warfare to defending against the Iranian attacks. Still later, their strategy changed again and evolved into pushing the Iranians back across the border (Hiro, 1991).

The Iranian strategy was simple through the first months of the war, as Iran had no choice but to fight a defensive campaign. Once its forces were healthy enough, Iran counter-attacked and began pushing Iraqi forces back across the border. Despite Iraqi overtures for a truce, Khomeini considered the Iranian counter-attack critical to attaining what was quickly becoming his ultimate goal, the downfall of the Iraqi government. There was little doubt that religion provided some of the motivation for the Iranian war plans. Destruction of the Iraqi government would not only free up access to Shiite holy sites in Iraq, but also rid Iraq of secular influences, allowing for a more appropriate Islamic-based government to take over. Strategically, Husayn was unrealistic in his expectations of eliminating the Iranian government. Iran's war plans,

on the other hand, not only appeared to be reactionary in nature, but also simple, given Khomeini's goal of toppling Iraq's government.

3. Tactics

Tactically speaking both sides adapted to the battlefield, using historical precedence and religious motivation when the circumstances dictated. Taking a lesson from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Iraqis attempted to destroy the Iranian Air Force on the ground with a surprise attack on the opening day of the war. Although the attack inflicted some damage, the Iranians were able to launch counter-attacks later that day. As the war dragged on, it became obvious that Iraqi forces were incapable of a sustained offensive because of the lack of tactical skill, motivation, and logistical support. Instead, the Iraqis fell back to a Soviet-style static defense to prevent further Iranian gains (Hiro, 1991).

The Iranians, although well equipped, lacked the spare parts to take advantage of the large military build-up initiated by the Shah. They based their most successful tactics instead on their greatest resource, people. These "human wave" assaults consisted of formations of about one thousand men, each armed with a shoulder fired rocket launcher. These formations, spread out at 200-500 yard intervals, strained the Iraqi defenses and eventually overwhelmed them. Without religion and the promise of martyrdom to motivate the troops, these human wave tactics could never have been used (Hiro, 1991).

Both sides learned their tactical lessons the hard way. Innovation and ingenuity eventually found their way on to the battlefield, but in the end Iraq maintained the overall tactical advantage.

4. Preparation

In terms of being prepared for battle, Iraq with its large, well-equipped war machine definitely had the advantage over Iran, which was still trying to deal with post-revolution chaos. One weakness that both sides shared was the inability to carry the fight to the enemy and sustain the attack. Although each side attacked into the other's territory, with air strikes, long-range artillery barrages, and surface-to-surface missile attacks, the ground war moved less than fifty miles on either side of the border. There may have been political reasons in each country for not expanding the front, but the bottom line was that neither country had the logistical capability to effectively move men, ammunition, and supplies forward. Hiro notes that on a number of occasions, Iran was unable to gain the tactical advantage due to "long supply lines... and inadequate logistical backing" (Hiro, 1991, p. 87). Iraq fared no better. Its forces performed well as long as they were near their own border, but lacked the motivation to operate deep inside Iraq as their communications and supply lines were overstretched (Hiro, 1991).

In terms of technology, the Iran-Iraq War was the latest conflict to be a testing ground for the superpowers. Analyst Anthony Cordesman notes that Iraq's technological superiority countered Iran's manpower superiority. But, in

the early 1970's, Iran had benefited from generous US weapons sales policies and from the presence of US advisors. Early in the war, US-trained airmen and F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers comprised the only counter-attack capability Iran had against the Iraqi onslaught. Later, critical items like HAWK air defense missile batteries and TOW anti-tank missiles made it through the arms embargo and improved Iran's offensive and defensive capabilities (Cordesman, 1987).

Iraq was able to continue to arm itself throughout the war, using its oil resources to fund its weapons purchases. Supplied by a number of countries including France and the Soviet Union, modern weapons such as T-62 tanks, Mirage and MiG fighter-bombers, and Exocet anti-ship missiles gave the edge to the Iraqis in the realm of technology. With the exception of the Exocet attacks on Gulf shipping, though, the Iraqis seemed to have difficulty in effectively employing these modern weapons. Husayn's dictatorial rule and military incompetence probably led to Iraq's failure in this area. The Exocet did add a new dimension to the war. For the first time since World War II, "neutral shipping" was attacked in order to expand the scope of the war. Also, the nature of long-range artillery duels changed when each side began using short-range ballistic missiles to attack population and industrial centers (Hiro, 1991). In the end, technology made the war more deadly for all of the participants, but because it had better access to equipment, Iraq retained a significant advantage. Yet, if Iraq's technological capabilities were so much better, why did it not win a decisive victory?

Having reviewed four of the five principles for victory, it appears that Iraq possessed the overall advantage. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, Iran was able to respond and turn the war into a stalemate that dragged on for seven more years. The difference between the two countries was that Iran seemed to have a stronger desire or will to win. This is not to say that Iraq completely rolled over for the Iranians. Once the battle was being fought on their native soil, the Iraqis stepped up and fought defensively with an enthusiasm not seen since the opening days of the war. The question then is, what could have inspired either side to fight a war whose only political or military significance was the tremendous loss of human life? The answer lies in the appetite each side had for fighting and for continuing to fight. In retrospect, it appears that age-old rivalries, animosities, religious differences, and nationalism combined to motivate each side to wage this war.

C. RELIGION MOTIVATES THE MASSES

Religion has been used throughout history as a motivator for war and violence. Typically, hostilities pit one religion against another. For example, western European crusaders marched on the Holy Land to free the area from the Muslims. But sometimes the fight occurs within the same religion, between two different sects.

Although Westerners often think of Islam as a single unified religion, this is, in fact, not the case. Islam's major dividing line splits the Shiite and Sunni sects, and though both groups espouse the same basic beliefs, there

are some fundamental differences that frequently lead to conflict. The main difference between the two sects revolves around the Imamate, or leadership aspects, of the religion (Metz, 1987). The Sunnis believe that religious and political leaders can be chosen or elected by the faithful. The Shiites believe that only God, can appoint the leadership. For the Shiites, any denial of a prophet would be denying a messenger of God and is therefore unacceptable (Ali Abbas, 2001). Sunnis and Shiites share five of Islam's Seven Pillars of Faith. The two pillars not shared by the Sunnis are jihad and the requirement for Muslims to do good work and avoid all evil. Shiites recognize Sunnis as fellow Muslims, but consider the Sunni sect to be incomplete when compared to their own (Metz, 1987).

At first glance, the Iran-Iraq War appears to be a war involving religious beliefs and is yet another chapter in the struggle between Shiite and Sunni Islam. Upon review of the post-war literature though, the war can be more accurately described as a conflict fueled by nationalist ideals as well as by religion.

Throughout its fifty-year reign, the Pahlavi monarchy pushed to westernize the Persian Empire. Although pursuing this modernizing strategy quickly brought Iran into the 20th century, embracing western ideals did not sit well with the country's Islamic leaders. Their resentment festered, and as the Shah's health failed alongside that of the Iranian economy, conditions were ripe for revolution. Led by the charismatic holy man Khomeini, the revolution's goal was not to simply overthrow the monarchy, but also to replace

it with a government based on Islamic values. Khomeini and his followers had remarkable success in quickly establishing a theocracy and de-secularizing a culture that had been at least two generations in the making.

D. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WILL TO WIN

As mentioned in earlier chapters, the benefits of an organization's strong will to win can be summed up in terms of legitimacy, commitment, membership, and longevity. Although both Iran and Iraq benefited from the will to win, Iran definitely had the advantage.

The adoption of Shiite fundamentalism in Iran lent the new government instant legitimacy with the masses. Already a part of everyday life, Islam provided stability during the last chaotic days of the Shah and also gave the masses the idea that they could least exert some self-determination in the new government. Shiite fundamentalists quickly spread throughout the public and private sectors, including the military, to ensure that anywhere Iranians gathered the correct revolutionary message was delivered (Metz, 1987). This indoctrination effort resulted in cohesion among the masses and support for the new government. Having helped whip up this new religious fervor, Khomeini was able to carry this enthusiasm into the war with Iraq. To fuel the fire, Khomeini characterized Husayn as a corrupt infidel whose actions resembled those of the Shah. By fighting Husayn, Khomeini said, the Iranians were fighting to protect Islam from the Iraqi leader who was trying to destroy it. According to Khomeini, the surprise invasion in 1980 was

proof enough of Husayn's intentions. With sermons like these to inspire the masses, Khomeini was able to elicit a strong commitment from his followers to defeat the Iraqis at all costs (Hiro, 1991).

In addition to the legitimacy Islam granted the new government, the large membership base, which essentially included all Shiite Muslims, provided Khomeini with an instant force of committed followers that ensured stability during the early, turbulent days of the revolution. Although Khomeini's natural ability to inspire his followers was extraordinary, it would take something more to energize the masses to respond to Iraq's surprise attack. Analysts believe that Iraqi forces would have rolled all the way to Tehran if it had not been for a fast and spirited Iranian response. To defend the nation, the regime recalled veterans from the old Imperial Army and recruited at least 100,000 volunteers for the People's Militia. Despite their lack of training and military leadership, these troops were committed to the religious cause as they marched into battle. Some members even went so far as to carry their own burial shrouds into battle in the expectation of martyrdom and a free trip to paradise should they be killed (Pike, 1999).

Although Islam provided Iranian forces with the motivation and commitment to fight the Iraqis, religion's predicted effect on the outcome of the battle was not always guaranteed. Khomeini expected to be able to influence the Iraqi Shiite population to rise up and overthrow Husayn, much as the Iranian fundamentalists had defeated the Shah. Instead, the Iraqi Shiites rallied

around their government, feeling that any Persian occupation of their homeland would be a national dishonor. (Hiro, 1991) This was one of many instances when the idea of nationalism appeared to be just as important a motivator as religion for both sides.

Religion played a lesser role for Iraq's secular government. Baath Party leader Michel Aflaq felt that Islam should be considered a civilization as well as a religion. For a secular government to succeed in a multicultural environment, the cultural and "civilizational" aspects of Islam would have to be emphasized. Such a government could not rely solely on legal and religious issues for its legitimacy. Much as Christianity influences the western democracies, he felt Islam should have a similar effect in Iraq, bridging the gap between Iraq's various groups. Not only did this liberal view of government fit in with the Sunni beliefs, but it also encouraged the leadership to use nationalist rhetoric as well as religion to energize the masses.

To appeal to Iraqi Muslims, Husayn liked to portray himself as a pious man, but usually only when Iran was on the offensive (Hiro, 1991). Husayn even attempted to use the ancient Persian-Arab feud to motivate Iraqi soldiers and the population. However, in spite of these efforts, there is little evidence that any of Husayn's schemes inspired any fervor in Iraqis. In fact, the performance of the Iraqi Shiite conscripts was very poor, especially when fighting fellow Shiites on Iranian soil. Only when the Iranian counter-attack reached Iraqi soil did it appear that a form of nationalism or self-preservation became a

factor. Although the invading Iranians shared more with them than did their Iraqi countrymen, the Iraqi Shiites remained loyal to Husayn when fighting in their homeland (Workman, 1994). A similar situation occurred across the border in Iran. Some of what lured Iraq to conquer Khuzestan was the fact that Iranian Arabs inhabited it. Husayn believed (much as Khomeini did vis-à-vis the Iraqi Shiites) that the Khuzestan Arabs would join him and rebel against the Khomeini regime. But such a rebellion never materialized. Nor did the Khuzestan Arabs inject any life into the Iraqi Army's waning momentum (Pike, 1999).

Because of the secular nature of the Iraqi government, stories of Iraqi nationalism on the battlefield are not a complete surprise. However, displays of Iranian nationalism on the battlefield, especially after the fundamentalist-inspired purges, might not be so expected. The loyalty of the professional Iranian military was still questionable, and as a result, a number of Iranian Air Force pilots were jailed. During the Battle of Dezful in Khuzestan, the Iranian field commander pleaded with the chain of command for air support from a nearby Iranian air base. Iranian President Bani Sadr took a chance and authorized the release of the jailed pilots. Surprisingly, the pilots manned their aircraft and helped slow the Iraqi advance. Whatever their motivation - whether commitment to the nation or to Islam - the actions of these American-trained pilots throughout the war were admirable and at times tactically brilliant (Pike, 1999).

Nor were such incidents isolated. In the early years, once regular army units were finally deployed, they proved

eager to fight and sought opportunities to regain prestige lost through having been associated with the Shah (Metz, 1987).

It is interesting to note that these acts occurred early in the war. It was during this period that military professionals left over from the Shah's reign were mixing with those loyal to the new regime. Even while the revolutionary forces were fighting the Iraqis, the Iranian mullahs were conducting an active campaign for the 'Islamization' of all Iranian institutions, including the armed forces. Once this was complete, religion rather than nationalism became the driving factor for Iranian success for the remainder of the war.

The influence of the will to win on longevity should be obvious. Already noted as the longest conventional war of the twentieth century, both sides appeared willing to fight indefinitely and only stopped when the superpowers and the United Nations intervened. What, other than the *will to win*, could have sustained both sides in the face of such punishing losses?

The purpose of this study has been to examine whether religion gave the Iraqi or Iranian soldier an extra weapon on the battlefield. We have assumed that if all other things are equal, religious motivation will give the soldier something extra. With this desire or will to win, a weaker force can overcome a stronger force and defeat it in battle. The Iran-Iraq War makes for an interesting case study because of the presumed influence that Islam had throughout the region. Also, the tremendous losses suffered by Iran and Iraq in men and materiel indicate that

there was something deep-felt and intangible motivating soldiers on both sides.

From a western perspective, it appeared that Iraq had a decisive advantage during the war. However, Iran was able to respond thanks to its desire to survive, which was transformed into a desire to win. Iran's leaders marshaled religion to tremendous effect. In contrast, religion played a minor role in Iraq. Iraq already had a well-established government and military structure in place and did not need the organizational benefits provided by religion. Husayn tried to use religion as a motivator, but only when Iranian forces were threatening. Husayn also attempted to use the idea of Islamic martyrdom to inspire his forces, but it appears that he motivated more soldiers with the barrel of a gun than with promise of eternal paradise.

In our analysis we have noted that Iraq was the more technologically superior of the two countries. Unfortunately, Husayn was unable to motivate his forces to fight effectively throughout the war even with superior equipment. If only the Iraqis had been able to marry the two elements it is likely they would have rolled all the way to Tehran and toppled Iran's new government.

Alternatively, Husayn could have made more effective use of Iraqi nationalism. As it is, this appears to have been a decisive factor in two areas. First, there is the example of the loyalty of the Iraqi Shiites. Surprisingly, what could be described as nationalist feelings overcame their religious loyalties and prevented a rebellion in southern Iraq. Second, is the example of how well the

Iraqi armed forces fought once they returned to Iraqi soil. It would seem that for the Iraqis, nationalism played just as important a role in the conduct of the war as Islam did for the Iranians.

Without its emphasis on religion, the Iranian government probably would have succumbed. Not only did Islam provide inspiration, but organization and leadership as well. Religion did prove to be a deciding factor on a number of occasions and may have been even more effective if only the Iranians had all the technological capabilities of their opponents.

In the final analysis, if Iraq had not possessed technological superiority, it would not have been able to hold off the Iranian advances. If Iran's motivated forces had not been hobbled by the arms embargo, the war would have ended up one-sided in Iran's favor. In the end, the will to win, fueled by religion and nationalism, did make a difference and inspired the Iranians to fight to a draw.

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VII. ANALYSIS AND RELEVANCE

A. AMERICA'S WILL TO WIN IN MODERN CONFLICT

As the twentieth century came to a close, the United States remained the only nation capable of exerting its political and economic influence worldwide. To implement its policies, the US maintains a military force capable of projecting its strength, anywhere in the world. Not only does the US act to protect its interests, but it also responds to its allies' requests for assistance. Not all of these requests are met with enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the US has deployed its military forces numerous times during the last fifty years to fight in some form of asymmetric conflict. From the campaign to stop the flow of illegal drugs to the current war against terrorism, the US has had many opportunities to fight different types of asymmetric war. Given the current state of affairs, this trend is likely to continue.

Despite the fact that the US is well versed in this type of warfare, we have done only a mediocre job at best when it comes to recognizing our enemy's strengths and weaknesses and then employing an effective strategy to defeat our foe. What policy-makers have failed to recognize is the influence that the *will to win* has on the outcome of a long-term struggle. This *will* was clearly in evidence during the Vietnam War, and again on the streets of Somalia some twenty years later. Unlike other characteristics of a fighting force – leadership, strategy, tactics, and preparation mentioned earlier in this thesis – the *will to win* is intangible, and impossible to measure or

quantify. This fact makes countering this *will* using conventional methods very difficult. As counter-insurgency expert J. Bowyer Bell (1999) states, "It is difficult to bring weapons to bear on a dream..." (p. 423). Without 'hard' targets to attack, US military planners must focus their efforts on other areas in order to defeat the opposition in an asymmetric war. In these cases, strength does not guarantee success. As Bell (1999) notes,

More does not assure triumph, for if there is not will at the center then all the things, the men in nifty uniforms, the money in the bank and the materials, the helicopters and hospitals and electronic gear, will not matter (p. 170).

This does not mean that strength is not important. On the contrary, strength does play an important part in achieving victory. Ultimately, a weak force with a strong desire to win must *gain* strength in order to survive. Conversely, the strong force must maintain a desire to win in order to effectively *use* its strength on the battlefield.

B. CAN THE U.S. COUNTER SPIRITUAL MOTIVATION?

In light of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, questions about the United States' ability to fight spiritually or religiously motivated groups have never been more relevant. The US can counter spiritual motivation in one of two ways: by attacking the enemy's motivation, or by boosting (or encouraging) Americans' will to fight. These methods are complimentary and are more effective when used in tandem. Also, altering the enemy's sources of motivation is a time-consuming process which has to take

place 'over there', while boosting America's *will to win* can be done here at home in much less time.

1. Attack the Strengths of Motivation

In the current asymmetric war against terrorism, the US counter-strategy appears to be very simple: re-assure the victims and punish the perpetrators, including those who aid terrorist efforts. This policy, although effective in appeasing the typical American citizen, does little to address the root of the problem. Analysts must go deeper and design national strategies that affect the faith of the believers in their cause. To do this, US responses should focus on attacking their motivation. Or, to be more specific, we need to attack the tangible characteristics that give the rallying cause – in this case religion – its strength to motivate. Through the case studies examined in this thesis, we have sought to illustrate just how useful religion can be. Religion's use in terms of the logic of appropriateness, as a means of identity, a source of rationality, and as an internally consistent logic were determined to be keys to a weaker force being able to defeat a stronger force over the long run. Therefore, these are the characteristics that a stronger force likewise needs to focus on in order to effectively counter the enemy.

a. Appropriateness

Appropriateness is difficult to undermine and often more difficult to verify. Changing the beliefs of

the *true believer* with some kind of certainty is nearly impossible. Yet, the purist can be shaken. Peter Partner (1997) writes, "Purity is an immensely important religious concept, and an immensely important religious weapon" (p. 309). However, purity as a weapon is a double-edged sword. The religious leader who interprets and spreads his faith also becomes a model for that faith. If it is possible to destroy the character and impugn the purity of the leader, the followers' faith in the cause will start to wane. This type of attack may focus on the actions or words of the leader and could possibly expose the leader as a fraud to his followers. For example, a well-known religious leader in the US fathered at least one child as the result of an affair with a co-worker. Despite hiding behind seemingly invincible armor, this church leader has become more of a punch line for jokes than a spiritual leader. As a result, a leader whose opinion had great power at one time has been rendered nearly ineffectual. The same tactic could be used to attack the leadership of terrorist organizations. There is a caveat to this strategy, though. True believers may overlook the faults of their leaders and remain loyal to the cause, in which case the group may become stronger even as attacks are launched against its leaders.

b. Identity

Identity is probably the most difficult characteristic to undermine. It is difficult because even the hint of altering an identity automatically puts people on the defensive. This 'Us vs. Them' mentality provides the enemy's leadership with a strong cause around which to

rally. While the contrast between East vs. West and rich vs. poor, for example, is fairly obvious, the dividing lines within an organization can be difficult to define. In the Muslim world, the difference between the Islamist, the Islamic fundamentalist, and the Islamic extremist are unclear. Partner (1997) notes that, "Almost all Islamists adopt a position of strong hostility to what they term cultural westernization" (p. 249). Yet clearly, this hostility manifests itself differently in each individual. Views can vary from rabid hatred to passive acceptance. Not only may any attempt to influence a group be difficult, but also it is best to remember to not place all of its members in one category. The effort must be general enough to influence a major portion of the membership, yet specific in its message to remain effective. A foreign policy based on too limited a view of religion can be as ineffective as carpet-bombing: it can all too quickly create hostility among the intended audience that can never be overcome.

c. Rationality

Rationality appears to be the easiest characteristic to undermine. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the rational individual plans for the future and, assuming he believes in life after death, will do everything he can to prepare for the afterlife. Life in the present, however, requires that immediate needs often take precedence over preparations for eternity. Religion provides solutions for both of these problems. A religious community can meet the needs of the present and immediate

future by offering education, training, medicine, food, and shelter. Religion also meets the needs of the afterlife by providing the structure and guidance to guarantee the believer an eternal life. To counter the strength of the rational aspects of religion, policy-makers should not attempt to restrict the religion in any way, but rather recognize the needs that a religion addresses and satisfy these more quickly and efficiently than the religion can. For example, a religious organization may provide a community with some rudimentary medical care. In an effort to lessen the religious organization's grip on the community, a military force could provide a medical team to do basic checkups and pass out medicine. In this way the focus group's needs are met, while the religious influence is undermined a bit. The religion will continue to provide spiritual guidance, but the believer begins to rely on other organizations to meet his more mundane needs. These actions are critical when fighting an internal asymmetric conflict, such as that illustrated by the Algeria case study.

d. Internally Consistent Logic

Undermining the strength provided by adhering to an internally consistent logic also appears to be a difficult task, but actually holds the greatest promise. The Koran, Islam's holy book, is a collection of revelations sent to earth through the prophet Muhammad, which offer guidance about all aspects of Muslim life. As is the case with most religious texts, the Koran's vagueness is significant because this allows the religion

to seem internally consistent. Vagueness encourages interpretation, which in turn means the message can be manipulated to meet the needs of the situation. For example, the use of 'jihad,' which is central to the survival of Islam, is not used consistently throughout the Islamic world. According to Islamic law, jihad, which is the striving or a struggle for the benefit of society, can only be initiated by a recognized group of religious leaders (Nüsse, 1998). But this is true only for the Sunni sect of Islam. In the Shiite sect, only the Messiah on his return to earth can call for jihad. Islamic splinter groups, meanwhile, follow neither law when calling for jihad and may simply initiate jihad in order to get a clip on the evening news. This example illustrates inconsistencies in the use of Islamic law. While this varied interpretation of religious doctrine is not unusual, it must be remembered that, in the case of Islam, its followers regard adherence to Islamic law as a cornerstone of their belief. To attack the internally consistent logic, policy makers must seek out and expose the inconsistencies and corruption prevalent in religious interpretations and actions.

The ability to interpret the Koran by any believer offers added benefits. Muslims can still worship according to the Holy Book and not necessarily be under the influence of religious leaders with questionable intentions. As was seen with the recent collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, once the oppressive leadership was run out of the country, life returned to some semblance of normalcy. Although the Afghanis shaved their beards and played music for the first time since the

Taliban takeover, they remained Muslim. The only thing that changed was who was interpreting and enforcing Islamic law, and how strictly they were doing so.

2. American Will

Critics have often claimed that the US lacks the strong will and perseverance to fight extended wars for worthwhile causes. On the contrary, Americans seem to be more than willing to fight the good fight as long as they believe the cause just. The problem lies in influencing the will of the individual to merge with the will of the group. The keys to uniting a group's will to win are found in the strength of the group's faith. Author Shireen Hunter (1998) understands the West's indifference to faith when she notes, "The difference lies in the fact that, in the western world, religion has lost the battle with secularism, whereas in the Muslim world and in Israel the contest continues" (p. 56). Hunter does not imply that religion is completely unifying, and in fact discusses at length the absence of unity and uniformity in the Muslim world. The difference instead lies in the fact that the secular west is unlikely to use religion or faith as a motivator.

Critics contend that in an asymmetric war, the United States would have a weaker *will to win* than its opponent because of the perceived lack of perseverance of the American people. Whether this belief is true or not, creating and maintaining an appropriate desire to win is a continuous challenge for the US national leadership. To achieve this resolve, secular governments must rely on the

same type of commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity that a religious organization gains from using religion as a motivator. Using religion as a motivator – to foster the will to win – amounts to an organic solution that is defensive in nature and, as a result, is probably more sustainable. In a secular society, the equivalent has to be found elsewhere.

The United States, for example, has relied on nationalism a number of times to steel citizen's resolve, and this has proved to be just as effective as religious fundamentalism has been in other parts of the world. The public's reaction to the September 11 attacks demonstrates the power of nationalism to rally support. Critics will no doubt point out the fact that because the attack occurred within the US's borders, this represents a unique case. But while this may be factually true, there are other recent events that prove that when presented to the American public in the right way, causes elsewhere can be equally compelling. For instance, public support for Operation DESERT STORM was quite high because the national leadership was able to effectively present a case for conducting that war.

Attacking the enemy's motivation centers can yield quicker and more visible effects than building consensus at home, but may also produce results of limited duration because the enemy continues to evolve. As Bell (1999) points out, "Enemies are necessary to the faith" (p. 172), and America, by virtue of its global influence, is a natural enemy for those who seek enemies to bolster their legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that in

asymmetric wars, the US's presence is a motivator in and of itself. For example, in Iran during the 1970s, and today with bin Ladin's forces, Islam provided the initial motivation, and will continue to provide the core motivation, but hatred for the United States stirred up by an aggressive propaganda campaign has added considerable fuel to the fire.

a. *Commitment*

It has often been said that US foreign policy contributes to rather than solves problems. Although the US has the resources to react to any situation, anywhere in the world, the nation often lacks the commitment to consistently set policy and see it through to completion. What happened in Somalia in 1993 is often cited as an example of mission failure. According to common belief, the US was deeply involved in Somalia, but the government feared public support would plummet after its forces suffered numerous casualties during a raid on an Aideed stronghold. As a result, the situation in Somalia after America's departure was no better than before the forces first landed in Mogadishu. This synopsis of events, although factually correct, only refers to a single incident. In contrast to using the Somali case and extrapolating from it, consider just how committed Americans have been in other places and at other times. Perseverance for a *just* cause is woven into the national fabric. US efforts during World War II and the Cold War are but two examples of the level of commitment of which Americans are capable. The main difference between Somalia

and World War II is that in 1941 the American people were given a reason to fight. Defeating the Axis powers was not only the right thing to do, but it was also understood to be a matter of national survival. The situation in Somalia was nebulous to begin with and got even more confusing as it developed. The American people were never convinced that deploying forces to Somalia was necessary and, as a result, they were never committed to the cause.

America's current war on terrorism, although still unclear in many areas, has the advantage that the precipitating events – the September 11 attacks – took place on home soil, and there is at least one person who can be identified as the enemy. Therefore, national commitment to the cause can be sustained fairly effectively, but for how long? That will depend, in part on the national leadership's ability to remind us why we should remain committed.

b. Legitimacy

Finding legitimacy in an offensive campaign, no matter what the cause, can be difficult for the American public. All confrontations consist of offense and defense and, at some point, each side must choose to defend or attack. American history suggests that we prefer to attack. The axiom, "The best defense is a good offense," is part of our national ethos. Whether, in fact, a good offense is the best defense does not matter when it comes to legitimacy because perception defines legitimacy. A defensive posture will always be considered more legitimate than an offensive posture. The fight for survival or self-

defense is understood by everyone to be a legitimate reason to act. The offensive stance, however, no matter what the claimed injustices, will never be accepted by everyone as a legitimate reason to attack. This is why terms such as *homeland defense* and *force protection* are constantly being used now to re-enforce the idea that the American public is engaged in a just war. Yet, to maintain this defensive posture while concealing an offensive attitude may require a proactive, rather than a reactive propaganda campaign aimed at the American public.

c. Membership

As citizens of a nation-state, members of the American public are automatically assumed to comprise the membership supporting the cause. America's sheer size and three hundred million people give it a large base of natural resources and people from which to draw. These characteristics, however, will not always guarantee victory. Without a common goal or national priority, any effort to solve a problem will fail. With continual failure, the public will lose faith in the cause and refuse to support it. In a struggle for national survival, the defensive nature of the conflict assures membership participation and support. To win a conflict, though, requires an offensive campaign at some point. This is where the government cannot afford for citizens to lose faith. Therefore, the national leadership must use all means available to succeed in the conflict (even if this means lots of small victories). The government can then

maintain the confidence of its citizenry and eventually prevail in its goals.

d. Longevity

A secular government must ensure its longevity in order to defeat its enemies. This ability to endure manifests itself from a combination of the other three factors; longevity depends on the public's commitment, the government's legitimacy, and the nation's membership. It also requires that the government be flexible enough to change as the security environment changes. Just as religion has adapted over the years to meet the needs of its followers, governments have to do the same in order to survive. This ability to adapt results in a system that accommodates its citizens' needs and addresses their concerns. This, in turn, guarantees commitment from its followers who see it as something worth propagating. With commitment and belief in the national cause, you get legitimacy and, with legitimacy, you get membership, all of which collectively contribute to the will to win. Securing longevity, then, is the key to fostering America's will to win.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

When research and discussion began on this thesis, there was no way to know that it would have such relevance in terms of current events. Experts theorized that the United States would eventually be involved in some type of asymmetric conflict. Although some of these experts may have thought that this battle would take place on US soil, no one could have guessed the impact of September 11, 2001. The audacity and precise execution of those attacks has made it clear to the United States, and the rest of the world, that terrorism has taken a huge leap from the car bombs and hijackings that have defined terrorism up until this point. What made these attacks different was that the terrorists changed the hijacking paradigm.

In the past, hijackers relied on pilots to meet their demands and fly them where they wanted to go. Everyone seemed to accept this as the standard scenario - until the first aircraft struck the first World Trade Center tower. Initially, no one could believe that a pilot would fly into a building on purpose. Even under duress, the experts hypothesized, the pilot could easily miss and crash into the bay. Then, we learned, the aircraft were all piloted by Islamic extremists who, after having learned to fly in the US, commandeered the aircraft and committed the ultimate sacrifice in their jihad against the United States.

Once the picture began to emerge about what happened, the next question was, why did it happen? The world

situation had changed little in the last ten years; there appeared to be no significant events to precipitate such an attack. Yet, not only had the conspiracy been planned, for quite some time, but the terrorists had also been living and training in the United States for months, if not longer. Besides their extraordinary good luck and near flawless execution, the other thing that stands out about the terrorists was their ability to stay motivated for their mission and to stay focused on their assigned tasks despite being given every opportunity to stray.

It appears that the terrorists' desire to succeed was stronger than any obstacle placed before them. The question then is, what was the source of this motivation and what can the US do to counter it in the future? The motivation seems to stem, at least in part, from religion. Although every major religion has had moments when the faith of its members was tested under extreme circumstances, it appears that Islam is the only religion able to consistently call on its believers to pay the ultimate price.

B. THE FUTURE

In this thesis, religion as a motivator and its effect on the will to win were explored using three similar, yet different case studies. Also, asymmetric warfare and the nature and role of religion were discussed. Religion gains its strength from at least four factors: appropriateness, identity, rationality and its use as an internally consistent logic. It is this strength that appears to provide the individual with the will to fight what seems to

be the un-winnable fight. As this thesis suggests, once an individual is religiously motivated, an organization can tap into this and gain specific advantages that also allow it to sustain and further its efforts. Through religious motivation, the group gains commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. As was pointed out, often a group only has to survive to win the war in spite of the fact that the group may have lost every battle.

What makes religion the near perfect motivator is that all of these components feed off of each other. As was seen in the case studies, given its proven longevity religion has legitimacy. This legitimacy secures the commitment of its followers. Together, longevity, legitimacy, and the commitment of others eventually encourage more people to join, thereby helping increase the membership and benefiting the organization in innumerable ways. With all of these elements feeding off of each other, any organization looking for a philosophy by which to legitimize its cause would do well to look toward religion or a similar motivator (like nationalism).

Although it may seem impossible to defeat a group that is religiously motivated, and though the war would likely be lengthy, the job can be done if US strategy focuses on undermining the elements that provide religion its strength. These elements are appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion's use as an internally consistent logic. In addition, the US can foster and sustain the same level of commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity among its population by focusing on nationalism rather than religion. With a well-balanced, long-term strategy that

supports our desire to win, the United States can ensure that no foe can best us in an asymmetric war.

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