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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

ATTACKING ISLAMIC TERRORISM'S STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY

by

Bryan S. Kohn
LCDR, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Dr. John Ballard
Professor, JMO Department

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Abstract The strategic center of gravity for militant Islamic terrorist groups is the popular support of the Muslim world. Popular support provides the terrorists invaluable sources of funding, manpower, legitimacy, and the real potential to threaten entrenched governments in Muslim countries. Without this popular support, Ussama bin Laden and other violent global Islamists will not be able to achieve their desired end-state. In the strategic war against international Islamic terrorists, the United States and her coalition partners will have to carefully balance the application of national power to successfully reduce long-term Muslim support for radical Islam. Military power will be of limited utility in this greater strategic struggle. While the United States can choose many different courses of action to degrade popular support for radical Islam, it can best attack this center of gravity by strongly encouraging reform in Islamic states, with the goal of achieving more representative governments. America should focus on improving basic conditions necessary for democratic growth; promoting the development of political institutions required for representative government; and directing efforts on several of the more important Islamic countries. Success will require great patience and purposeful effort.		
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Abstract

The strategic center of gravity for militant Islamic terrorist groups is the popular support of the Muslim world. Popular support provides the terrorists invaluable sources of funding, manpower, legitimacy, and the real potential to threaten entrenched governments in Muslim countries. Without this popular support, Ussama bin Laden and other violent global Islamists will not be able to achieve their desired end-state. In the strategic war against international Islamic terrorists, the United States and her coalition partners will have to carefully balance the application of national power to successfully reduce long-term Muslim support for radical Islam. Military power will be of limited utility in this greater strategic struggle. While the United States can choose many different courses of action to degrade popular support for radical Islam, it can best attack this center of gravity by strongly encouraging reform in Islamic states, with the goal of achieving more representative governments. America should focus on improving basic conditions necessary for democratic growth; promoting the development of political institutions required for representative government; and directing efforts on several of the more important Islamic countries. Success will require great patience and purposeful effort.

The President and Secretary of Defense have told the U.S. public that the current war on terrorism will be long, possibly comparable to the Cold War in duration and persistence required to win. So far the U.S. military has been highlighted in the operational battle against Al Qaeda, with diplomatic and economic elements of national power as less visible supporting actors. But direct military attacks alone, while critical to the early operational war, will not achieve a strategic victory in the long-term war on Al Qaeda and similar or associated violent Islamic groups. For strategic success, America and her ever shifting coalition must focus national power on the real strategic center of gravity – that strength without which violent Islamists and their ilk will wither and fade. This center of gravity is the support of the Islamic *umma* (the community of all Muslims) which will only be “destroyed” for the violent Islamists when the people live under responsible, representative governments.

Assumptions. While no formal strategic objectives have been released to the public, President Bush outlined the nation’s objectives during his 20 September 2001 speech to Congress. He declared that the United States seeks the “destruction and defeat of the global terror network” known as Al Qaeda (AQ). He also declared that “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” And he announced, “Our war...will not end until every group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” For the purposes of this paper, I will focus the strategic objective on the threat from global Islamic terror groups (currently embodied by AQ), since those groups present the primary, sustained terrorist threat to the United States. Therefore, the grand strategic guidance for the “war on terror” should be: prevent further attacks by Islamic terror groups on the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons abroad, and U.S.

military forces. This translates to a single overriding strategic objective: defeat (destroy) the global Islamic terror network. The long term desired end state is: no significant threat by Islamic terrorist groups capable of conducting large-scale international attacks.

Description of the Enemy. The brand of violent Islamic terrorism culminating in the 9-11 attacks grew out of groups which first appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The United States was first directly attacked by this wave of terrorists in Beirut, Lebanon with Hizballah suicide attacks during the civil war of the early 1980s.¹ The nascent movement initially made up of disparate local groups was truly internationalized with the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan through the 1980s. This holy war saw the development of military/terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan for Muslim volunteers from Arab and other Islamic countries. It also “replace(d) the Palestinian cause in the Arab imagination, and symbolize(d) the movement from Arab nationalism to Islamism.”² The training and support network developed to support the Afghan war was maintained after the victory in 1989, with many of the former and newly trained *mujahideen* (largely Arabs) prepared for *jihad* in the Balkans, Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Sudan, and other Islamic conflicts worldwide. This loose network was further developed and focused on training *jihadis* in covert, terrorist tactics for use in asymmetric operations against “enemies” of Islam worldwide, including Yemen, Egypt, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and significantly, the United States.³

Ussama bin Laden’s (UBL) AQ developed into the headquarters of an umbrella organization more or less loosely linking many smaller national and international groups into its common support network, offering training, funding, operational direction or emphasis, and Islamic doctrinal guidance in the form of *fatwas* (theological decrees),

claiming the authority of the *Koran*. Bin Laden helped focus the various programs of violent Islamic groups by “espous(ing) an overarching and coherent philosophy that went beyond opposition to Israel and calls for a Palestinian state...an all-encompassing worldview with a much wider appeal than simple hatred of Israel.”⁴

This overarching philosophy becomes clear in UBL’s and Al Qaeda’s objectives, which have been spelled out with increasing clarity. They are:⁵

- Remove U.S. forces from the Arabian peninsula and eliminate U.S. presence in the Middle East.⁶

- Support Islamic groups worldwide fighting oppressive and un/non-Islamic systems.

- Free the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and ultimately bring about the return of Palestine to the Islamic *umma* (i.e. destroy the state of Israel).

- Save Arab countries from disintegration by the “Zionist-Crusader” conspiracy.

- Overthrow the oppressive rulers in Muslim societies and establish Islamic states based on *sharia* law.

- This would inevitably (according to UBL) lead to the ultimate goal, recently clarified, to reestablish the Islamic caliphate over all Muslim lands/Muslims.^{7 8}

Al Qaeda’s method for pursuing these objectives is continuous violent struggle against the enemies of Islam, initially focusing on the United States as enemy number one.⁹

While direct attacks on U.S. civilian and military targets receive the most airtime in the West, AQ provides a much support to militant Islamic groups in violent struggles worldwide. Of note, most of the smaller groups affiliated with AQ are focused on specific local objectives which in the grand scheme serve to support AQ’s strategic objectives.

These groups also focus on violent struggle to achieve their objectives, although several also have social action branches that conduct social programs for their populations.

The factor differentiating AQ from previous international terrorist organizations, and that makes it so difficult to attack directly, is the group's flat networked structure. Bin Laden's position at the top of the organization has been described as like a CEO of a multinational corporation¹⁰, or president of a university with geographically dispersed campuses.¹¹ In theory, each separate element, or cell of the organization receives support (guidance, training, funding) from the base, but is fully capable of conducting independent operations and even supporting itself for extended periods with no contact from the base. Individual cells are not aware of other cells until they are brought together to support specific operations planned with more or less direction from the base, resulting in a high level of operational security. Loss of one or more cells will not seriously damage the network, although it may disrupt or halt a specific operation. Al Qaeda fully exploits international business, banking, transportation and communication functions supporting today's globalization system, while also using traditional and much less formal Arabic/Islamic systems of business and finance. Theoretically, destruction of any part of the network, even the senior leadership and headquarters elements, will not destroy the network itself due to the self-sufficiency of all elements and cells.

The above holds true for the core AQ organization, but not for all violent Islamic groups. Bin Laden and AQ have certainly acted as a "unifying force" within the violent *sunni* Islamist world, but the organization is not a monolithic presence. In reality:

Bin Laden does have strings running through much of the network, but most of what goes on in the network is not the result of him (or any other influential figure) pulling them. There is much more practical, low-level back scratching than string pulling. The organizational picture is even more complicated due to the frequent splitting and merging of groups, the factionalism in many groups, the alliances, and the cross-memberships ... This network is something like the Internet: it is a

significant transnational phenomenon...that some determined people have used to their advantage, but nobody owns it or controls it.¹²

So while the much talked-of “global network” itself is a key element characteristic of AQ and an operational advantage, it is not the strategic center of gravity of violent Islamic terrorism. The *global* network is not absolutely essential to conducting coordinated terrorist operations.^{13 14} The 9-11 attacks were shocking due to the amount of damage done and because the terrorists had been living among us for an extended period of time.

Although the AQ network was an instrumental source of funding and motivation, these attacks could have been conducted without it. Survivability, security, and a structure enabling multiple coordinated operations are the key benefits of the AQ network.¹⁵

Ussama bin Laden and his AQ network, then, are the most significant element of the violent Islamic enemy currently facing the United States, but not the entire enemy. Destroying AQ by itself will not make the world safe from Islamic terrorism. There are too many angry, dedicated believers ready to step in and fight the violent *jihad*. As the most significant international organization currently operating, however, and with the significant support AQ provides to violent groups worldwide, it is the proper target of the first phase of America’s operational war. Its destruction would have a tremendous, albeit temporary, effect on violent Islamic terrorism.¹⁶

The Strategic Center of Gravity. Bin Laden, his top leaders, AQ, and the associated network of violent Islamic terrorist groups are all important elements of the Islamic terror system, but destruction of any of these elements will not stop terror attacks on America. State support of these terror groups is also not required, and in fact has been greatly reduced since the early 1990s. Most terrorist cells today are able to self-sustain in the countries they live in, using outside funding primarily for the extra costs incurred

preparing for and conducting an operation. While AQ has been instrumental in coordinating and internationalizing the financial support network for Islamist groups, most of its funding comes from private sources. Remaining state support (primarily Iran, and at least until very recently Pakistan) of some violent Islamic groups, especially in Palestine, Lebanon and Kashmir, is welcome by those groups, but may lead to significant problems for the donor country's government in the current environment. The former AQ structure in Afghanistan was both unique and ideal, where AQ existed in a symbiotic relationship with a relatively weak state government (Taliban) only partially in control of the country. This allowed the Islamists to operate openly with official cover, while the Taliban received financial and military support from AQ.¹⁷

The element most essential for the ultimate strategic success of violent Islamic groups is the popular support of the *umma*. For AQ and other international groups, as well as for those with a strictly local agenda, there is no way to reach desired end states without popular support. Short term, AQ and any other group can conduct terrorist attacks without popular support, and in fact can use successful attacks to increase support for its cause. But long term, the violent Islamists cannot accomplish any one of their primary objectives without this popular support.¹⁸

Popular support provides: (1) Plentiful funding from a wide range of sources including wealthy individuals, charities, businessmen and merchants; (2) A steady stream of volunteers, from hardcore suicidal *jihadis*, to larger numbers of sincere believers, to the unemployable just looking for a way to survive; (3) A distinct threat to Arab regimes, which react in various ways to stay in power (most trying to balance security crackdowns with quiet support or turning a blind eye – allowing extreme religious schools (*madrassas*),

allowing citizens to fight outside the country, etc.); (4) The potential to take power in Islamic countries, either forcefully or through reforms; and (5) Increased legitimacy in the Muslim world, leading to increased political power within countries.

Without popular support the regimes are free to destroy Islamic movements from within their country (Egypt is a prime example), and funding dries up, as does the volunteer pipeline. Then perceived legitimacy and therefore political power evaporates. Finally, state support becomes a deciding factor for group survival, increasing the group's vulnerability to direct military attack.

The level of popular support for AQ, its Islamist terror-driven associates, and their agendas is ever changing and has always been soft. This is why no violent Islamic group has successfully overthrown a government and only very rarely achieved any strategic objectives.¹⁹ With the increasing frustration in Islamic societies over the last decades of the 20th century, however, the general population has become increasingly receptive (at least in the abstract) to UBL/AQ's notion of struggle between Islam and the West; between 'God' and 'Satan.'²⁰ One of UBL's central means, then, is to promote this notion of continuous *jihad* requiring desperate measures and contributions from all Muslims. Recognizing the requirement for popular support to reach their strategic objectives, AQ's senior leadership (as in most terror groups) tailors all public pronouncements and all operations with an eye towards the *umma*'s perceptions.²¹ Successful operations against the United States (the "great Satan") effectively promote a heroic UBL, and are generally applauded on the Muslim street. For the great mass of Muslims, the concept of UBL scoring great tactical victories over the American infidel for the benefit of all Islam creates at least a moderately pleasurable intuitive reaction, if not outright approval.²²

Factors that directly or indirectly promote popular support for violent Islamic *jihad* are numerous, but can be grouped into several areas.²³ These areas are:

(1) Underlying fundamental causes (the roots) that increase the *umma*'s frustration, and thus susceptibility to the extremist message. The key examples include the failure of Islamic nations to compete in the modern world (poor economies, despotic governments, poor education systems, lack of opportunity); the historical decline from the golden age of Islam with the concurrent Western rise; the Israel/Palestine conflict; U.S. regional hegemony and the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia.

(2) The promotion of select Koran passages as justifying and requiring violence to defend Islam. This promotion is especially effective on the poorly educated looking for some hope to cling to, but also reads true to a number of serious, well-educated young men.

(3) A cultural lack of self-critical, introspective insight, leading to a willingness to blame outsiders for the *umma*'s problems. Bin Laden's pronouncements blame the U.S. and Israel for most of the Islamic world's problems, and often find a receptive audience. Inept, illegitimate Arab regimes are also a common target for blame (not without reason).

(4) As mentioned above, successful operations against the United States always produce a sharp spike of approval.

(5) Finally, AQ's public relations effort advertises all of these factors, using the deceptively charismatic UBL to motivate a strong reaction across the *umma*.

Critical Factors affecting the enemy CoG. The above broad categories of factors influencing popular opinion for or against UBL and the violent Islamists are complex but well documented. To make a discussion of these factors more useful for identifying a strategy designed to reduce popular support for militant Islam, the factors can be separated

into groups indicating whether they are strengths or a weaknesses for UBL et al: the message, the messenger, and underlying causes supporting violence. Historical factors that cannot be changed are left out:

Strengths (factors increasing popular support for violent Islamists):

- The message: UBL's "rational" propaganda distorting U.S. activities in the Middle East; selective use of *Koranic* quotations to support *fatwas*; promise of paradise for martyrs.

- The messenger: UBL's distinctive presence and charisma; UBL's reported background, providing legitimacy; UBL's successful attacks on the United States.

- Underlying causes creating fertile ground (currently existing): failures of states (economic, despotic regimes, poor education systems); lack of democracy; current relationship with the West/United States; "hostile" U.S. policy (supporting despotic regimes, supporting Israel vs. Palestinians, hurting Iraqi population, military presence in Saudi Arabia); Israel/Palestine quandary.

Weaknesses (factors decreasing popular support for violent Islamists):

- The message: UBL/AQ/extremists lack of a social program for improving life in the Muslim world; message of violence not supported by *Koran*.

- The messenger: UBL not qualified to proclaim *fatwas*; collapse of AQ/Taliban under U.S. attack weakens legitimacy.

- Underlying causes successfully addressed (potential): reformed regimes responsible to needs of the people; improved economic performance and opportunity; "benevolent" U.S. policy; peaceful solution in Palestine addressing moderate Muslim concerns.

These strengths and weaknesses give the United States and potentially any coalition many factors to choose from to attack the strategic CoG. By analyzing the above factors individually and assessing the feasibility and effectiveness of addressing them, it is possible to select the most promising course(s) of action.

Attacking the CoG. There are numerous approaches to attacking the Islamist network's strategic CoG (the popular support of the *umma*), using all aspects of national power. Popular support is obviously not a suitable target for direct military attack, although military operations can either strengthen or weaken this CoG for AQ and associated groups. At least near-term, the quick, effective, and relatively clean U.S./Afghan defeat of the Taliban/AQ base in Afghanistan has reduced overt public support for UBL dramatically across the Muslim world.²⁴ Muslims looking for a hero to solve all their problems cannot be impressed with the quick collapse of centralized AQ/Taliban resistance. The obvious joy displayed by many Afghans to liberation from that fundamentalist regime must also be disconcerting. Indeed, the quietly relentless elimination of AQ's operational elements by military and cooperative law enforcement means is critical to tack on another "F" to violent Islamic extremism's record of failure.²⁵ Many Muslims can see direct U.S. retaliation against AQ as justified. This perception is very sensitive, however, to any suggestion that U.S. military forces are going beyond their narrow mandate in Afghanistan to attack groups or governments in other Islamic countries, especially those not implicated in the 9-11 attacks. Further military action in such countries as Somalia or Iraq will be interpreted as the "war on Islam" constantly warned by UBL and others, confirming the *umma*'s fears of U.S. hostility to Islam.²⁶ A visible long term U.S. military presence in central Asia would further increase this popular perception.

So the short-term loss in visible public support for militant Islam is fragile indeed, and susceptible to rapid regeneration with profligate U.S. military operations in Islamic lands.

This does not mean that further U.S. military operations will do more harm than good in the immediate operational effort against AQ. Brief, highly effective attacks against important element of the AQ network in countries beyond Afghanistan will probably be necessary for the immediate goal of crushing that organization.²⁷ Even a seemingly inordinate amount of violence against a specific target will be accepted in the Muslim world if it is seen as the measure of last resort and does not cause inordinate collateral damage (a measurement tough to quantify). Such military operations should only be conducted, though, with a full assessment of the tradeoff between success against the operational target, and likely long-term damage to the desired end-state.

Many of the critical factors listed above would provide slight chance of success if “attacked” by elements of U.S. national power. The U.S. government will have no credibility trying to teach Muslims about Islam, although individual Muslim Americans can speak out about the more egregious distortions used by the militants. While addressing root causes, America cannot abandon Israel or abandon any part of our foreign policy simply because it is considered hostile or evil by another party. While the U.S. military could unilaterally pull out of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the region, this would be immensely destabilizing in the near- to medium-term, and would be a great propaganda victory for UBL and like-minded Islamists.²⁸

If the United States is to truly attack the militant Islamist’s strategic CoG, then the “larger real challenge is how to dissipate the anger that is so widely expressed by mainstream Muslims.”²⁹ In this light, repeated military attacks on terrorist targets without

addressing underlying causes of anger and discontent cannot reduce *long-term* popular support of the militants, but stands a very real chance of further increasing the already present rage.³⁰ U.S. military operations call for a very real balancing act, between near-term operational, and long-term strategic objectives. Immediate progress towards both will rarely coincide.

Muslims are willing to support programs and leaders that show real potential to successfully address the deep political, economic, and societal problems underlying their collective despair, indeed the very same problems providing such a fertile ground for the growth of violent, externally directed Islamic fundamentalism.³¹ As the initial 9-11 high is smothered by the reality of U.S. military might and AQ/Taliban ineptitude, the *umma* is back to the reemphasized banality of its current situation. The social, economic, demographic, and governmental trends in Islamic countries are generally poor, and point towards a continuance of the conditions that have left the region so susceptible to the message of violence. Hopes for improvement rest on the Muslim world reforming itself for successful integration into the modern global system.

The strategy: encouraging governmental reform in Islamic nations. It's easy to write a one-page op-ed piece idealistically proclaiming democracy and freedom the guarantors of a bright rosy future. The ideal is wonderful, but reality is unlikely to see such a clean end-state. Progress towards the goal of successful, responsible and representative Islamic regimes will be trying, demanding patient steadiness of purpose. The task is not impossible.

Promoting democratic reform in Islamic countries will require a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy outlook.³² American leaders should understand the new U.S.

national interest in the Muslim world is not simply the status quo, focused on allowing unfettered U.S. access to Middle Eastern resources.³³ America can no longer afford to give her full support to inept, despotic governments just because they provide apparent stability and a smooth flow of oil to the western world.³⁴ On the contrary, the national interest will be best served long-term by promoting healthy change in Islamic nations providing citizens a say in the direction of their lives and countries. Our policies must “ensure that significant numbers of Muslims...identify their own interests with those of the United States.”³⁵ Continuing to blindly support corrupt and totalitarian regimes that mismanage economies, crush any and all forms of dissent, and allow outlet for public participation in government will fertilize the breeding ground of discontent and violent Islamism. But what can America do to successfully promote reform?³⁶

America cannot forcefully change governments.³⁷ Change imposed or controlled from outside will not be accepted by the people and would only make the situation worse. Change will have to come from the people within each country. However, as the world’s most powerful and vibrant democracy, remaining fully engaged in the region, the United States can promote the process of positive change. Effective actions fall into three broad categories.

First and most basic, the United States should promote the improvement of conditions that will have to occur within and around Muslim countries before democracy can have a fair chance to succeed. Essential to this beginning is peaceful solutions to some of the international conflicts affecting the Islamic world. The most important of these are in Palestine and Kashmir, both of which suffice as excuses for leaders not to reform, as well as being a drain on resources for the countries and groups involved.³⁸ Unless the West

imposes democracy from outside (not feasible), most Islamic states will have to improve basic internal conditions to promote the growth of a more democratic and free society. Improvement in economic performance and job availability, quality public education systems open to all, and basic freedom of the press are essential to set the conditions necessary for a successful transition to representative government.³⁹ Education and the economy naturally go together. A more educated work force is better able to support a shift to higher technology base capable of attracting outside investment and industry. The United States should offer every possible economic advantage (i.e. markets free of tariffs and protective regulations) to countries that make a serious effort to reform. Jordan and Malaysia are two countries making the effort to set the conditions to attract investment and a broadening of their employment base. A free press is another critical element for any country hopeful of moving forward in the ranks of nations. Educated people earning a decent wage and informed by a vibrant free press will be ready to participate in the nation's decision making process.⁴⁰ Beyond measures directly affecting the people, the nation's government must reduce corruption and nepotism, and focus significant energy on the population's legitimate needs. This would be quite a sea change for most regimes in the Muslim world, but is an essential condition for progress towards greater representation. Regimes have to recognize and anticipate the potential benefits accruing from a change in status quo, although for most this will probably only occur through incremental improvements. America should notice and respond positively to each improvement, slight or great, always mindful of the process necessary for the desired end state.

Secondly, the United States should promote the development of political institutions required for representative government. Americans will have to accept that the form of

representative government developed in a Muslim country may not look a lot like western style democracies.⁴¹ Secular nationalism took a beating in the Middle East in the 20th century, and promising developments in some Muslim states point to the eventual development of a moderate form of Islamic representative government.⁴² “For the Middle East today, moderate Islam may be democracy’s last hope. For the West, it might represent one of the best long term solutions to ‘winning’ the war against Middle East terrorism.”⁴³ Moderate Islamist thinkers stress that Islam is flexible enough to coexist with modernity, using the concept of *shura* (consultation) to compel consideration of popular opinion and impose governmental accountability.⁴⁴ While the U.S. government lacks credibility to make recommendations for Islamic concepts, it certainly can remain open to this different form of representative government and encourage it as an alternative to Western style republican or parliamentary democracy. And American Muslims can publicly promote such types of reform for Islamic countries, especially if it seems likely to meet with success. Other areas of reform ripe for American support include the development and reform of constitutional documents and improvements in the rule of law, whether based on secular or Islamic forms. Iran has one of the more representative governments in the Islamic world, but should be encouraged to take the next step: reform the constitution to give the elected president and assembly the real power now held by the *ayatollahs*.⁴⁵ Any government reforms that help a state integrate and compete more effectively in today’s world can only help the people. For example, Jordan’s King Abdullah is energetically pursuing political, social, and economic reform, intent on turning his country into a Singapore-style dynamo.⁴⁶ He and Morocco’s King Mohammed VI successfully “co-

opt(ed) their political oppositions into government and parliament.”⁴⁷ The United States must offer all possible support.

High priority targets. Finally, successful reforms in several of the more important states in the Islamic world would offer the greatest potential towards the desired end-state. Contrarily, if these nations ultimately fail through lack of reform, the end-state’s outlook will be bleak. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Iran, due to various combinations of historical importance, strategic location, Islamic leadership, oil reserves, and population, should always be a focus of U.S. effort.⁴⁸ One state-in-waiting where the development of true representative government has the potential to pay huge dividends throughout the Islamic world is Palestine.⁴⁹ The United States has supported the Palestinian Authority (PA) for years on the theory that it was the best hope to stabilize the Israel/Palestine problem. But the PA is overflowing with graft and corruption, does not represent Palestinians’ best interests, and subsequently has very little popular. In short, the PA is a failure. Even the terrorist group HAMAS has gone further in providing basic services to Palestinians. America should throw her efforts behind Palestinians developing a functional representative government, and then focus all energy into enabling a Palestinian state.⁵⁰ A credible, legitimate government representing all Palestinians will surely have a much better chance of reaching an understanding with Israel as well as with Palestinian radicals. A well-run, free Palestine coexisting with Israel should also be an incredibly strong example for other Arab governments in the region, and may well alleviate much of the associated “root cause” effect. The United States cannot abandon Israel in favor of Palestine, but can logically insist on a serious dialog between the two nations if the Palestinians get their act together.⁵¹

Conclusion. The campaign against militant Islamic terrorism, the largest and most important part of America's "war on terrorism", will require all aspects of national power but must rely largely on "finesse and nuance, not just vigor and oomph".⁵² Military power has played a vital role in the opening salvos against Al Qaeda, but is of limited utility in the long-term effort to deny violent Islamists the popular support that is their essential strategic center of gravity. While Ussama bin Laden and his like will employ any and all means to secure that center of gravity, it will be denied them when the Islamic world's governments "embody the cherished goals and aspirations of the people"⁵³ by coming from the people. Representative government, whether in Islamic or secular form, must grow from within Muslim countries. It will probably require painfully halting progress in most states, and will depend on peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and basic improvements in economic performance, education systems, and freedoms of expression to support the fundamental changes in attitudes, institutions, and expectations required for successful reform. The United States can directly support this progression both by offering support every step of the way, and fundamentally reevaluating our basic foreign policy outlook to focus on the needs of Islamic countries instead of their raw materials. Other aspects of America's counter-terrorism campaign (and there will be many) must be evaluated for their effect on the enemy's strategic center of gravity, and if necessary adjusted, in a continuous balancing act. The United States will not win without it.

Notes

¹ “Hizballah”, *The Terrorism Research Center*. <<http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/Hizballah.shtml>> [11 Dec 2001]. While Hizballah is a *Shi'ite* group as opposed to the primarily *Sunni* groups associated with UBL, its objectives include establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon and removing the U.S. and Israel from the region. Thus Hizballah can be grouped with the violent Islamist groups concerned here.

² Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (University of California Press, 1993), p 14. As quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* (The Free Press, 2001), p 56.

³ Bergen, pp 72-75. Bergen details the establishment of the Islamist network originating in Afghanistan and spreading *jihad* around the world, focusing on UBL's role.

⁴ Ibid, p 37.

⁵ United States Naval War College and Naval Warfare Development Command - Newport Paper No. 10: “The Objectives of Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda”, Dec 2001. This list of UBL's objectives is taken directly from the Newport Paper No. 10, but the essentially same list can be found in many sources. It is derived from UBL's written *fatwas* as well as numerous press interviews.

⁶ Bergen, pp 97-8. Bergen points out that UBL's call to expel Americans from the Arabian peninsula does have some justification provided by Islamic tradition. “The Prophet's immediate successor, the Caliph Umar, issued a final and irreversible decree that Jews and Christians be evicted from the holy land of Hijaz.” Any continuing U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia will always run into this irrefutable logic.

⁷ Walter Pincus, “Zawahiri Urged Al Qaeda to Let Fighters Escape For Jihad's Sake”, *Washington Post*, 1 Jan 2002. Recently found book in Afghanistan by Ayman al Zawahiri, AQ's number two man, espoused the final goal of the Caliphate.

⁸ Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else's Civil War”, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2002, pp 22-42. Doran identifies UBL's shifting the focus of the global *jihad* to foreign targets (primarily the U.S.) from internal targets (corrupt leaders). Al Qaeda's objectives indicate this is a tactical move: it is necessary to remove U.S. power from the Middle East prior to overthrowing the corrupt governments there.

⁹ In its role as sole superpower and regional/global hegemon, the U.S. stands in the way of AQ achieving any of its objectives.

¹⁰ Jerrold M. Post, “Does Al Qaeda Need Bin Laden?”, *Los Angeles Times*, 9 Dec 2001.

¹¹ The basic elements (branches) of the Al Qaeda network are formally organized to include:
-The HQ element, made up of the senior leadership around UBL, which is indeed critical to the efficient, centralized planning aspect of AQ operations. The talent at the top are the individuals that brought the network together with their vision of globalized operations focused on specific, universal Islamist objectives. While Islamic terror attacks can and will still occur without AQ's (or a follow-on's) central leadership, the focus on universal objectives and the potential synergy derived from centrally planned and directed global operations will not. Therefore, the leaders in the key central positions (whether UBL, Zawahiri, or some future replacement) are the operational center of gravity of AQ (but not “Islamic terrorism”). A better way of expressing this may be to say the function of centralized planning, promotion and direction is the operational center of gravity of AQ. The severe disruption of this function in Afghanistan will impact the execution of future operations, but to what extent remains to be seen.
- Religious: Responsible for issuing religious doctrinal statements and *fatwas*. The writings must be credible enough to convince the most hardcore of followers to conduct terrorist attacks against civilian targets, not a small matter with the Koran's injunctions against such activity.

- Media/Public Relations: Responsible for presenting the group's message to the world, targeting both the enemy and the *umma*.
- Finance: Responsible for developing plentiful and reliable sources of income supporting the group. Includes donations from individuals and groups, as well as businesses run through front companies.
- Military: Responsible for the conduct of military and terrorist operations. This includes subgroups covering every aspect of military ops including training, planning, supply, surveillance, and execution. Individual terrorist cells are estimated to exist in over 60 countries worldwide, some directly under Al Qaeda, some as part of other groups that fall under the AQ support umbrella.
- The base of operations as it existed in Afghanistan is also a key operational element supporting AQ operations. The base provided a friendly and secure location for both the HQ element and the numerous training camps required to provide a steady stream of jihadis trained and capable of devoted performance in the holy war. The destruction of this base in Afghanistan has and will impact the HQ function as well as the training of new volunteers.

See Jessica Stern, "Preparing for a War on Terrorism", *Current History*, Nov 2001, pp 355-357. "U.S. Faces Islamic Radical Network," *STRATFOR*. 16 Sep 2001. <<http://www.stratfor.com>>.

¹² Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p 55. Other researchers report a similar structural fluidity, based more on personal relationships and reputations than a formal chain of command. See Carl Connetta, "Beyond bin Laden – The Temptations of a Wider War," 28 Sep 2001. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/pub/coc18.html>> who describes the network as based on "influence, contacts, and comrades".

¹³ Numerous commentaries have noted how the 9-11 attacks were conducted relatively cheaply (less than \$500,000) and how the perpetrators essentially supported themselves in American and European society. There has been no suggestion that numerous groups came together to conduct the attacks, or that a large number of support personnel beyond the 19 named terrorists participated in the U.S. See Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism", *International Security*, Winter 2001/2002, pp 39-55. Posen writes that "perhaps a dozen others" supported the 9-11 hijackers in the U.S., where money and patience obtained all that was needed to pull off the attack. Also, Pillar, pp 50-56. Pillar's discussion implies that destroying UBL and AQ alone will not end global Islamic terrorism or even *sunni* terrorism, which is a sum of many parts, not just one whole.

¹⁴ Pillar, pp 52-55. The author's very well documented work presents a well-balanced and concise description of UBL's and Al Qaeda's level of control over violent Islamic groups. Pillar writes of UBL, "He is at the center of concentric circles of Sunni radicalism that represent decreasing degrees of influence for him. In the innermost circle is his own organization, al-Qaida, over which he has direct operational control. The next circle out includes groups so closely allied with, or beholden to, bin Ladin (most notably the Egyptian Islamic Jihad) that their operations can be assumed to reflect his wishes or at least to closely parallel them. Farther out still are groups (such as the Kashmiri Harakat ul-Mujahidin) that are allied to bin Ladin in some way but are driven chiefly by their own local or regional imperatives. In the circle beyond them are groups or cells to which some link to bin Ladin can be drawn through the intricate extremist networks of the Middle East and South Asia, but without any real alliance. And in the farthest circle are individuals who admire bin Ladin and his rhetoric and may be stimulated by it to act violently, even though there may be no organizational links to him whatsoever. Possible examples of the last category were the four Saudis who confessed to bombing the U.S.-Saudi military program office in Riyadh in 1995 and in the confessions that were made public said they had been 'inspired by bin Ladin'. The labyrinthine network of Islamic extremists, particularly on the Sunni side, thwarts any attempt to draw clear and simple lines of responsibility for Islamic terrorism in general (as well as complicating efforts to assign responsibility for some specific acts or attempted acts of terrorism)."

¹⁵ "The Intercontinental Theater of Operations," *STRATFOR*, 27 Sep 01. <<http://www.stratfor.com>>.

¹⁶ Johanna McGeary, "Can Al Qaeda Find a New Nest?", *Time*, 24 Dec 2001. McGeary discusses the importance of a base of operations to the top leadership of Al Qaeda.

¹⁷ Bergen, p 162. Also Julie Sirrs, "Lifting the Veil on Afghanistan," *The National Interest*, Thanksgiving, 2001, pp 43-48.

¹⁸ Reuel Marc Gerecht, "The Gospel According to Osama Bin Laden", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Jan 2002, pp 46-48. Gerecht discusses the criticality of uniting the *umma* to UBL's agenda. Also, Doran. Doran writes, "Polarizing the Islamic world between the *umma* and the regimes allied with the United States would help achieve bin Laden's primary goal: furthering the cause of Islamic revolution within the Muslim world itself, in the Arab lands especially and in Saudi Arabia above all. He had no intention of defeating America. War with the United States was not a goal in and of itself but rather an *instrument designed to help his brand of extremist Islam survive and flourish among the believers* (emphasis added)." And, "Osama bin Laden's rhetoric, dividing the world into two camps – the *umma* versus the United States and puppet regimes – has a deep resonance because on some levels it conforms, if not to reality, then at least to its appearances. This is why, for the first time in modern history, the extremist *Salafis* have managed to mobilize mass popular opinion." Hashim.

¹⁹ Arguably (especially from the terrorist perspective), exceptions include Hizballah forcing the U.S. to leave Beirut after the truck bomb attacks in 1983, and forcing Israel to pull out of southern Lebanon in 1985, and out of the southern Lebanon security zone in 2000; UBL's forcing the U.S. to pull-out of Somalia in 1994.

²⁰ The growth of violent Islamic groups must be viewed in the context of physical struggles (nations and groups), personal difficulties (physical and psychological), group dynamics, and religious identification. The commonly accepted causal factors are:

- (a) Failure of Islamic nations to compete in the modern world leading to sense of despair.
 - Fragile, poorly performing economies; lack of opportunity for individuals
 - Unresponsive, despotic regimes / lack of freedom, and U.S. support of these regimes (especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt)
 - Poorly educated populations / incompetent education systems
 - Lack of self-critical, introspective insight, leading to projection of blame on outsiders and is a grounds for opposition to imported solutions
- (b) Historical context of western resurgence and Islamic decline.
 - The Christian Crusades
 - Muslim rollback from Spain
 - European colonialism
 - Demise of Arab nationalism
 - U.S. cold war power politics and resource exploitation
 - U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
 - U.S. regional hegemony (Iraq, the Gulf States)
 - U.S./Western cultural, materialistic world order
- (c) State of Israel and plight of Palestinians
 - The "Catastrophe"; the 1967 war and Israel's expansion beyond Mandate boundaries.
 - U.S. support for Israel
 - Israeli repression of Palestinians
- (d) Late 20th century context of Islamic victories
 - Iranian Islamic revolution overthrows U.S.-backed government
 - Defeat of Soviets in Afghanistan by jihadist groups
 - Defeat of U.S. and Israel in Lebanon; U.S. in Somalia
 - Assassination of Anwar Sadat
 - Further development of Jihadists in Afghan and Pakistani training camps
- (e) Development of a central leadership (UBL at the top) acting as a catalyst.
 - Development of the doctrine of Islam under siege
 - Development of the notion of global Islamic struggle
 - Organization of the Islamist network (Al Qaeda the number one)
- (f) The Koran/Islam as justification for violent action. The duty to defend Islam.
 - Scholars, sheiks issue fatwas and support Jihad (vacuum of authority)
 - Glorification of martyrdom

- Successful attacks on infidels (U.S.) proves justification, increases support

See Ely Karmon, "Who is the Enemy and What is the Coalition?" *International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism*. 15 Oct 2001. <<http://www.ict.org.il/>>; Reuven Paz, "Is There an Islamist Internationale?" *International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism*. 09 Jul 2000. <<http://www.ict.org.il/>>; Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islam and the Theology of Power", *Middle East Report*, Winter 2001, pp 28-33; Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror in the Name of God", *Current History*, Nov 2001, pp 357-361; Fareed Zakaria, "How to Save the Arab World", *Newsweek*, 24 Dec 2001; Bernard Lewis, "What Went Wrong", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Jan 2002, pp 43-45; Sami G. Hajjar, "Political Violence in Islam: Fundamentalism and Jihad", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Winter 1995, pp 328-351; Eliot A. Cohen, "A Strange War", *The National Interest*, Thanksgiving 2001, pp 11-22; Hilal Khashan, "The New World Order and the Tempo of Militant Islam", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, May 1997; Doran.

²¹ Juergensmeyer, pp 357-361. Also Dale F. Eickelman, "First, Know the Enemy, Then Act", *Los Angeles Times*, 9 Dec 2001; Ahmed S. Hashim, "The World According to Usama Bin Laden", *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001, pp 11-35.

²² Doran. Also, Fouad Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude", *Foreign Affairs*, Nov-Dec 2001, pp 2-16.

²³ See note 20.

²⁴ Fouad Ajami, "In Bin Laden's Mirror", *U.S. News and World Report*, 24 Dec 2001. Also, Zakaria, "How to Save the Arab World"; David Lamb, "For Muslims, Bin Laden's Star is Fading as Quickly as it Rose", *Los Angeles Times*, 31 Dec 2001; Charles Krauthammer, "Where Power Talks", *Washington Post*, 4 Jan 2001.

²⁵ Lamb. Author recounts the 20th century history of Muslim "saviors" including Islamists who failed utterly. The real problems of the region were never addressed.

²⁶ Posen.

²⁷ Ibid. Posen envisions a near-to-mid-term state where the U.S. and coalition has "reduce(d) the terrorists to desperate groups of exhausted stragglers, with few resources and little hope of success." And, "Constant pursuit makes it dangerous for them to rest. The threat of offensive action is critical to exhausting the terrorists, whether they are with units in the field in Afghanistan or hiding out in cities and empty quarters across the world." Judiciously apportioned military power will play a key role.

²⁸ Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude". Ajami poetically discusses the necessity for the U.S. to stay involved in the Middle East.

²⁹ Augustus R Norton, "America's Approach to the Middle East: Legacies, Questions, and Possibilities", *Current History*, January 2002. Similar approaches are suggested by Christopher D. Kondaki, "Suicide Terrorism, an Age-Old Weapon, Adds Technology", *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Sep 2001, pp 8-9; Zakaria, "How to Save the Arab World".

³⁰ Beyond merely increasing rage, failure to back up military attacks with a long term, serious effort to address the root causes risks making the much feared "war on Islam" a reality in the collective mind of the *umma*. If the attack on religion becomes real to the majority of Muslims, then in effect it is real. If the struggle against Islamic terrorism becomes the "war on Islam", then the strategic objective will be unreachable.

³¹ This theme is implicit in Sami Zubaida, "Islam and the Politics of Community and Citizenship", *Middle East Report*, Winter 2001, pp 20-27; Bahman Baktiari and Haleh Vaziri, "Iran's Liberal Revolution?", *Current History*, Jan 2002, pp 17-21; Gwenn Okruhlik, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia", *Current History*, Jan 2002, pp 22-28.

³² Many sources discuss reasons for changing U.S. foreign policy to deal with the threat from violent Islamist groups. See Steven E Miller, "The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002, pp 15-29; Fareed Mohamedi and Yahya Sadowski, "The Decline (But Not Fall) of US Hegemony in the Middle East", *Middle East Report*, Fall 2001, pp 12-22; Fareed Zakaria, "What's Next?- The New Rules of Engagement", *Newsweek*, 31 Dec 2001-7 Jan 2002.

³³ Numerous sources recommend against maintaining the status quo. See Ehsan Ahrari, "U.S. vs the Growing Turbulence in Muslim Countries," *Center for Defense Information, Terrorism Project*, 29 Nov 2001. <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/turbulence-pr.cfm>>; Ralph Peters, "Stability, America's Enemy", *Parameters*, Winter 2001-2002, pp 5-20; Zakaria, "How to Save the Arab World"; Cohen; Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar", *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-Feb 2002, pp 75-88; Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden", *International Security*, Winter 2001/2002, pp 56-78; Doran.

³⁴ Many individuals have noted that the U.S. (as well as the rest of the industrial world) is held hostage to maintaining stability in the Middle East by its economic dependence on oil. Any change in the status quo in the Persian Gulf oil producing states has the real potential to significantly disrupt the global oil market, at least during the initial period of change. Promoting governmental reform in these states, without pushing them into collapse, will be a real balancing act, one that the U.S. is not likely to be able to control. Part of America's strategy must be to seriously develop alternate energy sources that will significantly reduce the world's dependence on petroleum. The petroleum producing states should see this as even more incentive to develop their economies beyond raw material production. For a discussion on reducing U.S. oil dependence, see John Podesta, "Kick the Oil Habit", *The Washington Post*, 22 Jan 2002.

³⁵ Doran.

³⁶ While promoting greater representation in the Islamic world, the U.S. must accept the likelihood that at least some of these reforming governments will end up as Islamic governments, maybe even following *sharia* law. For example, since ending a military government and instituting some democratic reforms in 1999, Nigeria has seen many of its northern states (10 of 12) institute *sharia* law. The newly elected state governments voluntarily implemented *sharia*, although some were heavily pressured by militant Islamic groups. Harsh enforcement of the new laws has become common, and is quite popular in many quarters. Moderate Muslims feel that politicians are using *sharia* to "exploit public enthusiasm for law and order. The prospect of swift and harsh punishment appeals to many...where the police are seen as ineffective and corrupt." The situation seems to parallel that in Afghanistan under the Taliban. There, much of the population was happy to see the Taliban take over, for at least they would implement some order from the preceding chaos. The passage of time saw many people disillusioned by the strict implementation of the Taliban's version of *sharia*, though, and expressed great relief when that government was overthrown last year. I would hope for a similar development in Nigeria and any other state that swings so far into the past while searching for a cure for the present. At least in Nigeria, the people should be able to vote in more moderate officials as opinions change. See Richard Dowden, "Death by Stoning", *The New York Times*, 27 Jan 2002.

Nasser Momayezi, "Islamic Revivalism and the Quest for Political Power", *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Fall 1997, pp 115-129. Author shows cases where in countries where Islamists were allowed to openly engage in the political process they actually lost some of their previous political gains. "Government strategies of inclusion are likely to have a moderating effect on political movements, and strategies of exclusion leave opposition groups with little choice but to adopt a radical or revolutionary stance."

See also, Ray Takeyh, "Faith-Based Initiatives: Can Islam bring democracy to the Middle East?", *Foreign Policy*, Nov-Dec 2001; Zubaida.

³⁷ Doran. Author discusses the limits of U.S. power to change the region from outside.

³⁸ Indyk.

³⁹ Zakaria, "How to Save the Arab World". Zakaria discusses the need to set the conditions before democracy stands a chance.

⁴⁰ For this reason the U.S. cannot afford to complain too loudly about Al Jazeera, the Arabic language television news station broadcast throughout the Arabic world. Although Al Jazeera does report much news from the UBL perspective, it has also given time to U.S. and Western leaders. See Ehsan Ahrari, "Al Jazeera's Unwitting Role in the Unrestricted Afghan War," *Center for Defense Information*, 25 Oct 2001. <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aljazeera-pr.cfm>>. Eickelman.

⁴¹ Takeyh. "An Islamic democracy's attempt to balance its emphasis on reverence with the popular desire for self-expression will impose certain limits on individual choice. An Islamic polity will support fundamental tenets of democracy – namely, regular elections, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and institutional opposition – but it is unlikely to be a libertarian paradise." Gender rights is an area likely to be less emphasized in an Islamic democracy. On the other hand, "moderate Islamists are likely to be most liberal in the realm of economic policy."

⁴² Multiple sources point to the growing popularity and importance of a moderate Islamist movement in parts of the Muslim world. Bergen, pp 226-7, discusses moderate Islamist groups working within the existing political framework in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iran. He also discusses the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation with the people) that fits well in a democratic framework. Also, Zubaida; Khashan; Momayezi.

⁴³ Takeyh. Also Hajjar; Zubaida.

⁴⁴ Takeyh. The author quotes Tunisia's Ghannouchi on this concept and points out the connection with the historical Islamic concept of *shura*, as do many other authors. Also Hajjar; Zubaida.

⁴⁵ The Iranian people need as much help as possible. National and regional elections reveal a very strong public desire for more democratic reform (as well as for a robust, modern economy), and reports from inside Iran indicate a positive opinion of the U.S. and the West. Bahman Baktiari and Haleh Vaziri. Authors contend, "If Khatami does not seize the moment and conservatives continue to resist change, Iranian citizens will become increasingly impatient: their questions already are no longer 'Why reform?' or 'What kind of reform?' They now urgently ask 'How?' and 'When?'" Also Zubaida. "The recent evolution of competitive elections, to the advantage of the diverse reformist front, has strengthened civil society, the press and associational life, although all are heavily circumscribed by the institutional power of the conservative mullahs. This lively 'political' Islam, by all accounts, has elicited widespread popular participation."

Continued Iranian support for militant Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine comes from the *ayatollah* side of the government. It seems more likely that this would dry up under a truly democratic Islamic republic than the current *mullah*-led arrangement. Takeyh states, "Within a more open and democratic system, dictatorial regimes would enjoy less freedom to support terrorism or engage in military buildups without any regard for economic consequences." While the final change must come from the Iranian people, U.S. encouragement using all aspects of national power could only help. See John Newhouse and Thomas R. Pickering, "Getting Iran Right", *The Washington Post*, 28 Dec 2001; Amy Waldman, "In Louder Voices, Iranians Talk of Dialogue with U.S.", *The New York Times*, 10 Dec 2001; Barbara Slavin, "America No Longer a Dirty Word in Iran", *USA Today*, 3 Jan 2002.

Pillar, 226. Author recommends engaging state sponsors (Iran being the prime example) to encourage reduction in terrorist support. "The United States should try to make it easier, not harder, for regimes trying to clean up their acts to clean them up further. This requires clear communication of what is expected, ... It also means not expecting the more difficult reforms to be accomplished quickly. And it means incrementally improving the relationship as terrorist-related behavior incrementally improves."

⁴⁶ James M. Dorsey, "Jordan's King Says Islam Must Embrace the U.S.'s 'New Way of Doing Business'", *Wall Street Journal*, 2 Jan 2002.

⁴⁷ Indyk.

⁴⁸ The development of the Saudi situation will have the greatest effect on the future of the current wave of Islamic terrorism. It will also be the toughest problem for the U.S., requiring both near-term flexibility and long-term steadiness of purpose. The U.S. has turned a blind-eye to Saudi totalitarianism for decades in exchange for a stable supply of oil from the region. While the Al-Sauds are responsible for the mess they are in (militant Saudi terrorists attacking the U.S., the extreme *salafi/wahabbi* brand of Islam, a single-product economy totally dependent on foreign workers, extreme corruption rampant through the extended royal family), America's requirement for stability has only reinforced Saudi intransigence on reform issues. Reform here will be either a very long, slow process, or a swift, violent upheaval. See Indyk for a realistic discussion of a policy focused on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. See Okruhlik for a discussion of the range of possible choices for Saudi reform.

Obviously, America's diplomatic, economic, and informational functions of national power will play the major roles in executing this new foreign policy. The long-term goal for the U.S. military will be to have a greatly reduced footprint in the region, with the job of enforcing peace and stability gradually passed to the responsible regional powers that develop. In the near- to mid-term, Saddam Hussein will be a big problem, with no hope for Iraqi governmental reform as long as he remains in power. No matter how it's sliced or when it occurs, significant change in that country will be traumatic for the region. It may be impossible (and unwise) to keep Iraq together as a whole nation, but its breakup would cause immense concern to Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria. These regional nations should have an input to the eventual solution, but the people of Iraq must have the final say. The U.S. military may have a role in stabilizing the country, but should not unilaterally impose the solution. See Ofra Bengio, "Couldn't Be Worse? Iraq After Saddam", *The National Interest*, Winter 2001/2002, pp 52-58; Michael Eisenstadt, "Curtains for the Ba'ath", *The National Interest*, Winter 2001/2002, pp 59-68.

⁴⁹ As previously discussed, a resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict is a necessary condition to enable the beginning of regional reform. See Indyk.

⁵⁰ The U.S. must redouble efforts to bring Arab state pressure on the Palestinians for a negotiated agreement, while the U.S. delivers Israel. Indyk writes (of Saudi Arabia and Egypt), "They must partner U.S. efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem. It is unacceptable that at a time when Washington is insisting that the Palestinian Authority end its anti-Israel incitement campaign, Cairo and Riyadh should do nothing to counter the vitriolic anti-Semitism in their media and the shameful efforts to legitimize terrorist attacks against civilians because they happen to be Israelis. It is also unacceptable, given the genesis of this new U.S. initiative, that the Saudi and Egyptian governments should sit on the sidelines while the United States tries to broker an agreement. They will need to be public advocates of fair and reasonable compromises on the critical issues of Jerusalem and refugees. And, in the Saudi case, Washington should not heed Riyadh's insistence on Israeli and U.S. recognition of a Palestinian state unless the Saudis are willing to reciprocate by extending their own recognition to Israel." Also, Walt, who advocates a more firm approach towards Israel, recommending Israeli settlers withdraw from the occupied territories as part of a compromise solution.

⁵¹ Cohen. Cohen discusses a scenario similar to this, focusing on reforming Palestinian government.

⁵² Pillar, p 229. The author wrote prior to 9-11, and referred to increasing the quality of U.S. counter-terrorist policy, not just quantity. His recommendation that counter-terrorism should be at least considered in all aspects of America's foreign policy is an excellent way of approaching possible long-term solutions.

⁵³ Khashan. The author comments on the current Arab ruling elites' "failure to convince the populations that they embody their cherished goals and aspirations."

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