The Combined Bomber Offensive: A Retrospective
Abstract
This paper analyzes the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) as it relates to: (1) the application of air power, (2) how the use of current doctrine led to the misapplication of air power (3) how limited technology affected the design of the campaign, and (4) how the misunderstanding of the effects of bombardment led to a successful campaign. The intent of the CBO was to devastate Germany through the application of bombardment upon a center of gravity. Because the CBO did not identify decisive target sets this led to an operational level failure of the strategy. The CBO was a success at the strategic level. Analysis of the CBO shows that to be successful, an air campaign needs to be phased such that it is first focused on air supremacy. This could have been achieved through attack on air fields and command and control facilities. Planners were challenged by undemonstrated technology. Had they utilized more stringent battle damage metrics, it is likely that the CBO would have been more effective over an evolving set of priorities based on actual effects. The CBO over-relied upon pre-war expectations of the consequences of the damage they were inflicting.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 09, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA401851
Entities
People
- James E. Eisenhart
Organizations
- United States Army War College