

**STRATEGY  
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**UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL ACTORS:  
A CASE STUDY**

BY

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**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES D. HARDEN  
United States Air Force**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

Lt Col James D. Harden  
USAF

Mr. Neil Silver  
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James D. Harden, Lt Col, USAF

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Since WWII the US has been involved in many regional conflicts in which US leaders have failed to anticipate the actions of regional actors. These failures resulted in some measure from an inability to appreciate the target states' values, priorities, and thought processes. It is possible the estimative process could improve if greater attention was given to the interests, challenges, and opportunities of the regional actors involved, rather than concentrating on US interests. This research project applies the US Army War College Strategic Appraisal process, examining the 1973 Arab-Israeli War from the Egyptian perspective. Using this method would yield a better understanding of factors affecting regional actors, and hence produces superior insight into their actions. To use this method most effectively, the US intelligence community should gather teams of regional experts tasked to analyze the world environment from the perspective of key regional actors. The understanding gleaned by this approach could improve the ability of the government to predict and respond to diplomatic and military events affecting US national interests.

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## UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL ACTORS: A CASE STUDY

Since WWII the US has been involved in many regional conflicts during which US leaders failed to anticipate or understand the implications of the enemy's and/or other key states' actions. These failures resulted in some measure from an inability to appreciate the target states' values, priorities, and thought processes. During the Korean War, US political and military leadership failed correctly to interpret Chinese government rhetoric and the capture of so-called Chinese volunteers fighting in Korea as indications of Chinese resolve not to allow UN forces to approach its border unchallenged. Pre-occupation with the Cold War led to the failure of US leadership to understand the nature of the conflict in Vietnam, hampering US political and military efforts to define the correct objectives and strategic approach. The failure to understand diplomatic signals and political activities of both Egypt and Iraq produced inattention to the economic situation of both of the countries. Egyptian and Iraqi economic distress led to military attacks by each on its neighbors, Israel and Kuwait respectively. In the last two cases the subsequent military strategies of Egypt and Iraq, that is, failing to advance militarily following dramatic initial gains, are still not well understood by most civilian and military officers.

Learning from case studies often can be problematic. More often than not regional actors do not leave behind open source records describing their values, motivations, and rationales. Fortunately, this is not the case for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt's leaders produced a significant body of literature following the conflict which can be used to understand their thought processes. From those writings we can discern the Egyptian leadership's national objectives and how it used economic, diplomatic, informational, and military power in the pursuit of those objectives.

One potential way to comprehend important factors in a regional conflict is the use of the Strategic Appraisal process advocated at the Army War College. However, unlike the US centered approach used by the War College, the process should be applied from the perspective of key regional actors. In theory this should lead to a better understanding of these actors' interests, challenges, and opportunities. This research project examines events before and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War from the perspective of Egyptian leaders, applying the Strategic Appraisal process. It then examines the actual event to determine the utility of the model in performing regional assessments.

Several assumptions underlie this analysis. The most direct evidence of the thoughts of the Egyptian leadership is in the works written by key leaders after 1973. However, there are problems with using participant recollections. Often the individual and collective interests of

those involved are not well served by full and accurate disclosure. For instance, at the time Anwar Sadat wrote In Search of Identity he was constrained by the continuing political situation. This produced a recollection of events perceived through the lens of Sadat's then current political agenda. To admit the 1973 war ended in an Egyptian defeat would have harmed Sadat's domestic and Arab world credibility and, potentially, also his negotiating position. Despite the debatable nature of the military situation in Egypt following the cease-fire, Sadat recalled the war as a great military victory.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, disclosing the reasons why some actions were or were not taken during the course of the war might have had dire consequences for Egypt politically and for Sadat personally, because these actions were not in accord with stated Egyptian policies or were opposed to the interests of key Arab allies. For example, Sadat never discusses the potential use of nuclear weapons by Israel. Officially, Egypt denied that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. It was Egypt's stated policy that the possession of nuclear weapons by any state in the region would be incompatible with Egyptian national security and would require action to remove that threat. Not being in a position to counter an Israeli nuclear capability, Egypt had no choice but to deny the capability existed. That said, in various places Sadat refers to an Egyptian retaliation weapon, the ability to strike at the heart of Israel, and his possession of and resolve to use SCUD missiles if it became necessary.<sup>2</sup> Linked with the actions of the Egyptian military during the course of the war, these statements are plausible evidence that Sadat considered the potential use of nuclear weapons by Israel.

Because of the lack of more definitive data, and despite difficulties and potential pitfalls, the intentions and motivation of individuals relevant to this case may be deduced by their statements, if analyzed judiciously in the context of the events and the environment.

## **STRATEGIC APPRAISAL**

This strategic appraisal will follow the format of the Department of National Security and Strategy Directive for Academic Year 2002, applied from the perspective of Egypt.

## **EGYPTIAN NATIONAL INTEREST**

Egypt had vital or important national interests in all of the following four categories: defense of the homeland, economic well-being, international security, and ideology. While the Israeli occupation of the Sinai was the root cause of most of the threats to Egyptian national interests, it was the economic interests which were most vital to the nation. Survival of the regime, included here in the ideology category, was of vital personal interest to Egypt's leadership.

### **Defense of the Homeland**

Egypt's vital defense interest was unfettered control of the country's territory. Since the defeat of the combined Arab forces in 1967, Israel had occupied virtually the entire Sinai Peninsula from the Suez Canal east. This occupation had a disastrous impact on Egypt's economy. Prior to his death in 1970, Egypt's president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, attempted to dislodge Israeli forces from the east bank of the Suez Canal through a war of attrition. Israel's response forced the evacuation of cities along the Canal, creating a burdensome refugee problem for Egypt.

### **Economic Well-being**

The cost of supporting refugees, military expenses related to countering the Israeli occupation, and loss of revenue from the cessation of Suez Canal operations and Sinai oil field production all severely strained the Egyptian economy. The economic situation became increasingly desperate until the survival of the regime, if not the state itself, was threatened.<sup>3</sup> The economic interests of Egypt included: a vital interest in unfettered access to the Suez Canal and the adjacent cities and oil fields, and an important interest in peace-time levels of military spending. Anwar Sadat stated in broad terms that the objective he sought was a restored Egypt at peace with Israel.<sup>4</sup>

### **International Security**

The international security interests of Egypt were important, but certainly not as vital as its homeland defense and economic interests. The bipolar Cold War world ensured a level of international stability, thus allowing Egypt some flexibility with respect to the superpowers and regional actors. If it was necessary for Egypt to continue the conflict with Israel, then support from the USSR and key Arab countries was required to balance Israel's military superiority.<sup>5</sup> If the conflict with Israel could be resolved, something which Sadat believed would require the intervention of the US, then support from the Arab world would be useful but not necessary.<sup>6</sup> Egypt's important international interest was to neutralize the threat from Israel, either through peace or an alliance with Arab states and support of one of the superpowers.

### **Ideology**

The category of interest described as promotion of values or ideology in the Course Directive is problematic in this case. Egypt was not attempting to export, or even support, a particular ideology. The values it supported were purely nationalistic in nature and specific to Egyptian interests. Which of the superpowers supported Egypt and whether Egypt formed an

alliance with the Arab states or made peace with Israel was not of particular importance. From the standpoint of ideology, the vital interest of the government was survival of the regime. While not the overriding interest of the state as a whole, this interest was vital to the individuals who led the regime. To some extent the importance of the other interests was modulated by their impact on the necessity of the regime to insure its own survival.<sup>7</sup>

The difficulty of Egypt's position in this case, as with many regional conflicts, was the interlocking nature and universally high intensity of its interests. Each interest was influenced by or had influence on another. Failure to meet any of the interests held the potential for disaster for Egypt or its government. This lesson should not be lost on those attempting to predict the behavior of regional actors. Smaller states, lacking natural resources and well developed economic and political systems, may not have the luxury of peripheral interests.

Category	Interest	Intensity
Defense of Homeland	Control of Territory	Vital
Economic Well-being	1. Unfettered Access to Suez Canal, Cities and Oil Fields	Vital
	2. Peace-Time Levels of Military Spending	Important
International Security	1. Support of at Least One Superpower	Vital
	2. Peace with Israel or Alliance with Arab States	Important
Ideology	Survival of Regime	Vital

TABLE 1. EGYTIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

## CHALLENGES

Challenges include both threats to the state and opportunities presented by the environment or circumstances. Egypt faced threats in three areas: potential economic collapse and the end of the regime, a militarily superior adversary with nuclear weapons, and a sponsoring superpower opposed to a military solution to Egypt's dire situation. These threats were counter-balanced by opportunities including: the economic and readiness impact of Israel's dependence on rapid mobilization of reserve forces, Egypt's ability to enact a deception plan, Syrian involvement in the attack, and the possibility of leveraging superpower concerns to the benefit of Egypt.

## **Threats**

The foremost threat to the state of Egypt was the potential for economic collapse precipitated by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent war of attrition. As described previously, the loss of revenue resulting from Israeli occupation of the Sinai created a continual drag on the Egyptian economy.<sup>8</sup> However, the more pressing threat for the Egyptian government was the erosion of domestic support resulting from its inability to resolve the economic and military situations. The Egyptian people expected positive action on the part of the government to regain the lost territory and spark an economic recovery. They were, however, not willing to see Egypt make concessions in addition to the losses and injuries already visited upon the nation. Further concessions would be considered a sign of weakness, unacceptable conduct for the government.<sup>9</sup> The challenge then was to rectify the economic situation before erosion of domestic support resulted in the overthrow of the regime.

## **MILITARY**

The military challenge for Egypt involved ending the Israeli military occupation of the Sinai. There were several problems associated with an Egyptian use of military force to rectify the situation. In addition to some interesting tactical problems, such as how to cross the Suez Canal and defeat the Israeli fixed defenses in the immediate vicinity of the Canal, there were several overarching military concerns. These included: Israel's military advantages, the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons capability, and the question of the stance of the superpowers.

Israel held several advantages with respect to the Egyptian military. Egypt lacked an effective air force; therefore, the Egyptian Army had no means to compete with Israel's combined arms in maneuver warfare in the open desert. In addition to the difference in air power, Israeli ground forces enjoyed better overall mobility. While Egypt could rely on surface to air missiles, SAMs, to defend against Israeli air threats, the Egyptian army could not hope to successfully operate beyond the range of its largely immobile air defenses. Egypt possessed numerical superiority in personnel, but the requirement to place in-depth defenses over the entire country and coastline to counter Israeli special operations raids reduced the forces available for offensive operations. In the Sinai, Egyptian military leaders expected to achieve parity with the available Israeli forces.<sup>10</sup>

## **WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

In the weapons of mass destruction arena, Israel also held the edge. By 1973 there was widespread belief that Israel had or could easily obtain nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup> Even if the Egyptians had outfitted their SCUD missiles with chemical weapons, the weapons' effects could not come close to matching those of potential Israeli nuclear warheads.<sup>12</sup> Apart from the threat of superpower involvement, Egypt had no effective answer to Israel's nuclear capability. For this and other reasons, military support of the superpowers to their client states was an issue.

## **SOVIET SUPPORT**

Egypt had an on-going relationship with the USSR. Following the Six Days War in 1967, Egypt was re-supplied with military equipment by the Soviet Union, which allowed Egypt to more than recover from the material losses inflicted by Israel. However, in the early 1970s the US and USSR embarked on a policy of détente, relegating Middle Eastern issues to a low priority in order to concentrate on more pressing bilateral concerns.<sup>13</sup> The USSR, whose advisors manned much of Egypt's advanced equipment, would not support an Egyptian attack on Israel. If the USSR refused to re-supply Egyptian losses during a conflict, Israel, with US support, would have an overwhelming advantage.<sup>14</sup> The reverse was also true, if the USSR re-supplied Egypt and the US failed to re-supply Israel, Egypt would have the advantage. If the advantage became overwhelming and Egypt became a threat to the survival of the Israeli state, Egypt might find itself the target of nuclear retaliation.

## **Opportunities**

Egypt, though at a military disadvantage in some areas, had some opportunities, including: the disproportionate economic impact of warfare on Israel, the ability to enact a deception plan, involvement of Syria in the attack, and the possibility of leveraging superpower concerns to the benefit of Egypt.

## **ISRAELI MOBILIZATION**

The Israeli Army depended on rapid mobilization of a large reserve contingent during times of war, thereby removing a significant portion of its male population from the workforce for the duration of the conflict. When combined with the costs inherent in mobilizing an army, the economic impact of calling up the Israeli reserves was staggering.<sup>15</sup> A long term conflict requiring the wide-spread call-up of Israeli reserves might force Israel to the negotiating table. Egypt's leadership recognized another opportunity resulting from Israel's dependence on rapid mobilization. Repeatedly creating the need for Israel to mobilize its armed forces would force

the Israeli government into a dilemma, either avoid and/or delay mobilization when it might be necessary, or bear the associated economic costs. The result of the Egyptian Army repeatedly raising warning indicators would be an economic drain on the Israeli economy, complacency, or both. Delaying Israel's mobilization would be particularly useful in a military crossing of the Suez Canal because construction of Israeli fortifications on the east bank required external support for long term survivability.<sup>16</sup> Any delay in the arrival of Israeli support for the Bar Lev line would give more time for Egypt to consolidate its vulnerable crossing sites. Egypt's opportunity to open a second front from Syria would be even more beneficial to Egypt.

#### **ARAB STATES**

Israel was surrounded by Arab states opposed to its very existence. The involvement of another adjacent Arab state would force Israel into a two front war. The most likely ally in this endeavor was Syria, a state then more closely aligned with Egypt than other Arab countries. It was well prepared militarily, and it also stood to regain territory lost in the 1967 war. If Syria could be recruited, more forces could be brought to bear and Israel would have to divide its effort. Syria was also an ally of the USSR, increasing the probability of support from that superpower.<sup>17</sup>

#### **SUPERPOWER INTEREST**

Superpower intervention was itself one of Egypt's best opportunities. Although both the US and the USSR would oppose another war in the Middle East, once Egypt began a war the superpowers' interests would likely change. Although by no means guaranteed, support from the USSR to Egypt was likely as the Soviets would be motivated to avoid another defeat of their military equipment and tactics at the hands of a US client state.<sup>18</sup> Most likely, both superpowers would try to contain the conflict to prevent it from damaging their détente, thereby restraining Israeli escalation to weapons of mass destruction and speeding resolution of the war. Since Egypt was already the disadvantaged party, being occupied since 1967, it was probable that a superpower brokered peace would place it in a situation no worse than that it then faced. Egypt's situation would likely improve if it ended the war with any military advantage.<sup>19</sup>

#### **EGYPTIAN POLICY**

Egypt's national policies subsequent to the 1967 war are important to note. These policies, fashioned by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, the president of Egypt prior to Anwar Sadat, produced economic difficulties and diplomatic constraints which affected the flexibility of future actions on the part of the Egyptian government. At the 1967 Khartoum Conference, Nasser

utterly rejected a negotiated settlement with, as well as recognition of, Israel. He demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai before talks would even be considered. Of course, Israel would not agree to these conditions. With Egyptian prestige tied to this policy, even after Nasser's death, Sadat could not abruptly recognize Israel or seek a separate peace without jeopardizing Egypt's position in the Arab world. The war of attrition with Israel, which exacerbated the economic decline of Egypt, began under Nasser's leadership.<sup>20</sup> To further complicate the environment, Nasser found it difficult to manage his personal relationships with Arab leaders, creating rifts with Egypt's erstwhile allies.<sup>21</sup> In summary, Egyptian policy was in dire need of an overhaul, but the political environment made this difficult.

## **OTHER ACTORS**

The other actors with interests in Egypt's situation included: Israel; the Arab countries, particularly Syria; the US; and the USSR. Arguably, all of these actors had both convergent and divergent interests with respect to Egypt.

### **Israel**

Israeli interests would apparently be strictly divergent to Egypt's, given Israel's occupation of Egyptian territory and their history of military conflict. However, beyond these obvious divergent interests lay more subtle convergent ones. Israel occupied the Sinai to gain a buffer between itself and Egypt. Egypt similarly benefited when it occupied the Sinai. Therefore, a military buffer zone between the countries was a shared interest. When occupation of the Sinai was viewed as a zero sum game, the interest appeared divergent, but as history would show, this was not an accurate characterization. A second convergent interest existed. The war of attrition and the occupation of the Sinai were costly for both states, leading to a shared economic interest in an end to the conflict.<sup>22</sup> In broad terms, Egypt and Israel shared interests in security and peace.

### **Syria**

In the reverse of the situation with Israel, the apparent convergent interests of Egypt and the Arab states concealed more subtle divergent ones. The Arab states, Syria and Jordan in particular, shared an interest in regaining territory lost in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. They also shared an ideological opposition to the Israeli state from its founding.<sup>23</sup> As discussed previously, Egypt and Syria shared military interests in conducting a joint attack to force Israel to divide its military forces and to increase the probability of Soviet support. Less obviously, the interests of Egypt and Syria were divergent. The nation which represented the most direct

threat the Israel, almost assuredly Syria, would become the main object of Israel's attention.<sup>24</sup> Because of the greater distances involved between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai as compared to Syria and Israel, Sadat could modulate the intensity of the conflict for Egypt by controlling the speed of the Egyptian Army's advance. By posing less of a threat to Israel's survival than Syria, Egypt could shift the bulk of Israel's military effort onto the Golan Heights. It was in Egypt's interest for its army to advance slowly, while it was in Syria's interest for the Egyptian Army to move swiftly.

### **Superpowers**

The USSR and the US both had the same interest, divergent from that of Egypt; neither superpower desired a conflict in the Middle East. Détente profited from the maintenance of the status quo between the superpowers' client nations. The USSR had several convergent interests with Egypt. The defeat of the Arabs in 1967 reflected poorly on Soviet equipment and tactics. It was not in either countries' interest for Egypt to fail in another contest against Western technology and doctrine. An alliance with Egypt also gained the USSR access to North Africa and a valuable Mediterranean port.<sup>25</sup> The US shared convergent interests with Egypt much the same as those Egypt shared with Israel. Peace between Egypt and Israel would make future large-scale conflicts between the Arab states and Israel much less likely, decreasing the probability of superpower conflict in the region.

### **ENVIRONMENT**

Many of the environmental characteristics: historical, political, economic, social, religious, and military, have been discussed previously in terms of Egypt's constraints and opportunities. In summary: Egypt's defeat in 1967 and the subsequent policies of Egypt's government left it in a conundrum. Egypt was expected by the Israelis and Americans to offer concessions in order to better its situation with respect to occupation of the Sinai.<sup>26</sup> The cultural, social, or domestic situation simultaneously dictated that Egypt not concede more than it had already lost, yet take some action to resolve the economic and military situation.<sup>27</sup> Egypt was dependent on the USSR for military support yet constrained from a military solution by the Soviet Union. Support from the US, an ally to Israel and opposing the USSR, was necessary to conclude a lasting peace, but like Russia the US placed little priority on resolving Egypt's dilemma.<sup>28</sup> Egypt shared interests with the Arab states in opposing Israel for historical and religious reasons, but while alliances with these states could help confront the Israeli military, short of total victory such alliances could not produce a lasting resolution to the conflict.<sup>29</sup> Israel's possible nuclear option

made total victory improbable, or at least held the possibility of a pyrrhic victory. The environment demanded action yet conspired to prevent it.

## FEASIBLE OPTIONS

Although few options were available to Egypt to pursue its interests, none of which was particularly promising, *some resolution to the situation was required*. The status quo was a path to the erosion of the Egyptian regime and grave economic danger to the state. The political and military instruments of national power held some promise, although the political instrument was weak and the military instrument was fraught with complexities.

### **Economic and Informational**

The economic and informational instruments of power offered few options. Egypt had no real economic leverage. Already in a difficult economic situation, it could not afford to endure additional privation in an attempt to pressure Israel or the US. Egyptian military action held the potential to harm the Israeli economy, but the Egyptian economy as an instrument of power could not be the core of a successful strategy. Information as an instrument of power was not well recognized or easily used at the time. Like economic power, information could not be the primary instrument of a solution. However, information could contribute in two ways. International support could be gained by ensuring the injury being done to the Egyptian people was addressed widely and often in international diplomatic circles and the media. This would gain Egypt the moral high ground and help in diplomatic efforts. Secondly, an informational campaign to acclimate the Israelis to Egyptian rhetoric could help ensure military deception and surprise.

### **Diplomatic**

The only hope for a long-term resolution to Egypt's current problems was political. Arab attempts to use military power in the past had turned out poorly. A stand-alone political solution, in which Egypt induced the US or the UN to intervene on its behalf and remove Israel from the Sinai, would be the optimal strategy. However, success in this endeavor was unlikely for the reasons addressed previously. And, Egypt had tried this approach with no results. In this bleak context, military action to motivate the involvement of the superpowers might create the desired long-term political solution, so long as the military action produced some, even minimal, success. Sadat felt that the military need only end the conflict in possession of some of the Sinai, regardless of how small a part or how tenuous the hold, to fundamentally alter the situation on the diplomatic front.<sup>30</sup>

## **Military**

Even with a limited objective, the feasibility of the combined military and political strategy was questionable. The military aspects of such a strategy would involve (1) overcoming Soviet resistance to an Egyptian offensive while at the same time ensuring that the Soviets re-supplied Egypt with military equipment, (2) massing sufficient forces to challenge the Israeli military yet controlling the conflict to ensure the survival of Israel was not threatened sufficiently to produce an Israeli act of desperation with a nuclear weapon, and (3) ending the conflict in a manner which not only ensured US involvement in the peace process but placed Egypt in a situation that was both domestically and internationally favorable for a satisfactory negotiating position.

## **Ends, Ways, Means**

The ultimate political end was a negotiated peace with Israel with the successful recovery of Egyptian access to the Sinai and Suez Canal area. The ways were negotiations backed by the US. The means were diplomatic and/or military actions to convince Israel and the US of the need to find a resolution to the existing conflict and place Egypt on a more equal footing with Israel.

Militarily, the optimal, though unlikely end, was the re-capture of the entire Sinai. The minimum acceptable end was a territorial gain resulting in at least partial control of the Sinai at the termination of the conflict. The way was an attack across the Suez Canal to seize control of a foothold in the Sinai followed by defense and/or follow-on operations in a protracted campaign designed to inflict at least partial defeat of the Israeli armed forces and induce Israel to seek a negotiated solution. The military means included several possibilities, Egyptian armed forces alone, with or without Soviet re-supply, and Egyptian and Syrian armed forces with or without Soviet re-supply. The means could not be fully determined until the operation was underway.

## **HISTORICAL ANALYSIS**

This analysis assumes that the Egyptian government broadly and President Anwar Sadat specifically were the architects of events before and during the 1973 war, and were not merely reacting to events as they occurred. Based on the outcome of the war, Sadat was either a careful planner, very resourceful, extremely lucky, or a combination of the three. His own accounts of the 1973 war indicate that his carefully laid plans were responsible for Egypt's victory.<sup>31</sup> Analysis indicates that Sadat's plans generally included several contingency options, each with a reasonable expectation of an acceptable outcome if the main plan failed. Howard Sachar, a Middle Eastern historian, wrote of Sadat, "The man's ability to play both sides was impressive."<sup>32</sup> We can infer from Sadat's emphasis on acceptable contingency outcomes that

he was concerned with reducing the risk posed by the war to Egypt. The analysis will provide support for the assumption that Sadat's decisions and Egyptian actions prior to the war, during the progress of the conflict, and in post-war negotiations were all the result of careful planning, including numerous branches and sequels.

#### PRE-WAR POLITICAL STRATEGY

Egypt made several efforts through diplomatic channels to resolve peacefully the situation before resorting to war. When these failed, diplomacy turned to setting the stage for successful military action and subsequent negotiations. Egypt could not win the war without Soviet support by the supply of arms and ammunition. However, Sadat also felt that he could not begin the war *with* Soviet military advisors or forces in Egypt due to the excessive control they exercised over Soviet supplied equipment. The situation was complicated further by the fact that the Soviet Union could not pressure the Israelis to engage in the peace process, only the US government could. Sadat needed the USSR to prosecute the war and he needed the US to prosecute the peace.<sup>33</sup> These conflicting needs required that Sadat play the superpowers against each other without alienating either one to the point that it would not cooperate when it was needed.

In the spring of 1971 Sadat extended the cease-fire across the Suez Canal and initiated contacts with the US to determine the commitment of the US government to a diplomatic solution to Middle East peace.<sup>34</sup> He then appealed to the UN in an attempt to gain full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, a rather vague document calling for restoration of pre-1967 borders.<sup>35</sup> Sadat found the US unresponsive. Not only were bilateral contacts rebuffed, but the US also blocked attempts to gain implementation of the UN resolution. To make matters worse, Soviet support for Egypt was waning. By 1972, in the interest of détente, the USSR had all but ceased arms shipments to Egypt.<sup>36</sup>

Faced with a lack of interest on the part of both of the superpowers, Sadat launched a bold plan to gain political flexibility, remove the impediment of Soviet control of his military, and test Soviet resolve. In July of 1972 Sadat ejected the approximately 15,000 Soviet military forces and advisors from Egypt. With Egyptian-Soviet relations cooling, Sadat made several more overtures to the US to gain support for a negotiated settlement. February 1973 saw the culmination of these efforts with a visit to Washington by the Egyptian National Security Advisor. Through these diplomatic contacts Sadat was able to: determine US attitudes toward Middle East peace, establish the foundation for future improved US-Egyptian diplomatic relations, and send a message to the USSR that more effort was required on its part if the USSR desired to maintain Egypt as a client state. Once again the US response was not promising. As it became

increasingly apparent that the US would not intervene on his behalf, Sadat gradually repaired Egypt's relationship with the USSR.<sup>37</sup> The earlier invited departure had embarrassed the Soviets and threatened their position in the Middle East.

Sadat's bold plan was a success; the Soviets got the message and became more willing allies, increasing arms shipments dramatically, while the US was prompted to believe it could interact with Egypt, albeit in a limited manner, in the pursuit of peace. However, questions remained with respect to Soviet military support. Although the USSR had supplied Sadat with enough military equipment to start the war, he would need to be resupplied during the war if the US supported Israel, which was likely. Détente brought both Soviet support of Egypt and US support of Israel into question and Sadat could not be sure re-supply would be forthcoming.<sup>38</sup>

## MILITARY STRATEGY

Sadat's strategy for the war was anything but simple. There were considerable risks involved in pursuing a military option, as well as potential difficulties in assuring acceptable contingency outcomes. Sadat used several techniques to offset Israel's military advantage: Egypt's attack was preceded by an extensive deception campaign, force ratios were increased and risk reduced by soliciting the cooperation of the Syrians, and a phased campaign plan was implemented.

### Deception

Israel historically depended heavily on advance mobilization and preemptive strikes to gain a decisive advantage in its conflicts. A successful cross canal attack required time to consolidate bridgeheads before Israeli counter-attacks materialized. Surprise was therefore required. The achievement of that surprise is well known and need not be recounted in detail. However, it is important to note that Egypt deliberately orchestrated an extensive deception campaign. The groundwork began very early, with repeated annual military exercises starting in 1968.<sup>39</sup> Throughout 1971 Sadat referred to that year as "the year of decision." While intended for domestic political purposes, this unfulfilled rhetoric contributed to Israel attitudes that Egypt was incapable of acting.<sup>40</sup> After two years of acclimation to Egyptian bluster, and overly confident in its intelligence and military superiority, Israel slipped into complacency. Extremely tight operational security enabled Egypt to avoid giving Israel detailed knowledge of its plans. Until one month prior to the attack less than two dozen senior Egyptian officers knew the timeline of the plan. In the last month, less than 20% of officers in attacking units were aware of it, with the majority of the officers in the dark until just one week before the attack was

launched.<sup>41</sup> To prevent foreign leaks, the cooperation of Syria was not solicited until April 1973, leaving only six months for military coordination.<sup>42</sup>

### **Syrian Alliance**

While Syrian participation was not as necessary to the tactical success of the canal crossing as achieving surprise, from a strategic standpoint it had several distinct advantages. Concurrent attacks increased the size of the attacking Arab force while opening a second front, thus requiring the Israelis to divide their forces. While this was beneficial to Syria as well, Egypt enjoyed a disproportional gain. Because the Syrians would represent the most direct threat to Israel, they would likely bear the brunt of Israel's military might, at least initially. If the Arab attack succeeded, then Sadat could claim the lion's share of the victory, since the plan was ostensibly Egyptian, and an Egyptian general was in command of the combined operation.<sup>43</sup>

While it can be deduced that Sadat was disproportionately shifting the military burden and risk to Syria, the potential exists for an even more sinister Egyptian motivation. By 1973 there was widespread belief that Israel had or could easily obtain nuclear weapons.<sup>44</sup> Arab knowledge and fear of the potential Israeli nuclear capability can be inferred from the Arabs' actions. Before the 1973 war the Egyptians provided chemical weapons to the Syrians.<sup>45</sup> Since these weapons were not used tactically during the war, they must have been intended for some other purpose. Both Syria and Egypt received Soviet SCUD missiles prior to 1973 as well. These missiles are largely inaccurate, and have little utility unless they carry a weapon which does not require a highly precise delivery, such as nuclear or chemical warheads.<sup>46</sup> Sadat made some rather cryptic remarks concerning "the retaliation weapon" and his ability to strike at the heart of Israel.<sup>47</sup> The lack of clarity was probably intentional, but it would appear that deterrence was a consideration during the war. In fact, just prior to the failed 22 October cease-fire, with Israeli forces threatening Cairo, Egypt launched two SCUD missiles into positions occupied by the Israeli Army. The damage done was minor, causing only a few casualties. Sadat wrote that the missiles were launched as a demonstration of the fact that he possessed and would use "such a weapon."<sup>48</sup> Thus the involvement of the Syrians takes on an additional dimension. Since they were the most direct threat to Israel's national survival, if the war had continued to favor the Arabs, then Syria would probably have been the first on the target list of an Israeli nuclear strike. Militarily, Sadat stacked the deck in Egypt's favor by involving the Syrians. He reduced the forces Egypt would face and increased the size of the Arab forces substantially. He transferred much of the risk to Syria, whether the war went well for the Arabs or poorly. Finally, he gave the Egyptian Army the opportunity to assume a wait-and-see

posture, predicating its actions on the progress of the war. It is interesting to note that when the Syrians began to demand more aggressive Egyptian action in the Sinai to relieve Israeli pressure in the Golan Heights, Sadat ordered an attack at great cost to the Egyptian forces. The Egyptians were mauled during the attack, failing to gain their objectives, but Sadat was able to maintain his political position in good standing in the Arab world as a hedge against the continued failure of the peace process.<sup>49</sup>

### **Phased Campaign**

Like the surprise achieved by Egypt on 6 October 1973, the progress of the military campaign is well documented. The reasons for the Egyptians' phased campaign are less well understood and still widely debated. A lengthy description of the events is not necessary; however, a brief summary is appropriate.

#### **BACKGROUND**

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated assault on Israeli positions east of the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. Israel was caught by surprise and Egypt and Syria were successful in their initial attacks. Egypt gained a foothold on the east side of the Suez Canal and captured the Israeli Bar-Lev line. On 8 October the Egyptians repulsed an uncoordinated Israeli counter-attack. Initially the Syrians captured most of the Golan, but by 9 October they were being thrown back by Israeli counterattacks. On 9 October the Sinai front stabilized with both the Israeli and Egyptian armies in defensive positions. The Israeli's diverted reserve units assigned to the Sinai to the Golan to reinforce the heavily engaged units there. By 10 October the Arabs on the Syrian front had been pushed back to the lines occupied at the end of the 1967 war, while the only actions in the Sinai were probing attacks from defensive positions. Between 10 and 13 October fighting raged in Syria, where the Arabs had limited success attempting to contain the Israeli Army's advance toward Damascus. During this same period the situation in the Sinai was relatively quiet. The Egyptians consolidated their position until 14 October, when, under heavy political pressure from the Syrians, Egypt finally launched a large-scale attack.

There are several competing explanations, both at the operational and strategic level, concerning Egypt's selection of a strategy of phased advance. The operational explanations include: Egyptian's desire to consolidate the canal crossing sites, and the army's assessment regarding its ability to operate beyond its air defenses. The strategic explanations include: the attempt to destroy the Israeli's will to fight by inflicting heavy losses from established defensive positions, prolonging the war to maximize the economic costs to Israel, the desire to avoid

posing a direct threat to Israel's survival, and Egypt's need to know how the superpowers would react to the war. Regardless of which reason or combination of reasons provides the best explanation, it was clearly not in Egypt's best interest to pursue aggressively an advance toward Israel.

#### **BRIDGEHEAD CONSOLIDATION**

In the consolidation of the bridgeheads explanation, the Egyptians were primarily concerned with the potential for a rapid Israeli counterattack. The delay between the initial assault and the follow-on attack resulted from the time taken by Egypt to insure its lines and defenses on the east bank of the Suez Canal were prepared. Of particular Egyptian concern were the link-up of the various crossing elements, the continuity of their long lines, and the security of their flanks, which were anchored to shoreline of the Suez Canal on both ends.<sup>50</sup>

#### **LIMITED OBJECTIVE**

An extrapolation of the consolidation of the bridgehead explanation is the idea that this limited objective was the full extent of the Egyptian military's plan. According to Lt. General Saad el Shazly, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces before and during the 1973 war, the crossing and consolidation phase of the attack was all that was realistically considered or planned in detail by the Egyptian military. The supposed plans to attack further into the Sinai were merely formulated as a deception aimed at gaining the cooperation of the Syrians. Sadat's own emphasis on the necessity to capture and hold only a token amount of the Sinai to change the political situation supports this limited objective, lending credibility to General el Shazly's assertion.<sup>51</sup> Further evidence that a continued advance might not have been seriously considered in the original planning is the length of time it took the Egyptians to advance after receiving the orders. If the attack was originally in the flow of the plan, one might assume it could be carried out in shorter order. In actuality, it took the better part of two days to get the attack underway following the orders.<sup>52</sup> While this delay supports the theory that further advance was not in the plan, there is some evidence which indicates that the delay was not due to a lack of planning.

By his own admission, before the start of the war General el Shazly was openly opposed to any attempt to advance Egyptian forces beyond the bridgehead. It is possible General el Shazly was told the plan was a deception to dupe the Syrians when in fact it was Sadat's purpose to use the plan if required. The intent was not to deceive the Syrians, but to gain the unwitting cooperation of General el Shazly. Following the receipt of Sadat's order to continue the advance, General el Shazly describes delays by the ground commanders in an attempt to

gain time so that Sadat would reconsider the attack. By this account, it was the trepidation of intermediate commanders, not the lack of planning, which forced the delay.

The strongest evidence of Sadat's limited objective, Egypt's control of the east bank of the Suez Canal at the termination of the war, can be seen in his behavior in the closing days of the conflict. Even when the Israeli army had breached the canal and was threatening the interior of Egypt, Sadat refused to allow sufficient forces to be withdrawn from the east bank to mount a defense. Once he had received superpower commitment to guarantee a cease-fire, Sadat willingly allowed the Egyptian Third Army to be surrounded and cut-off, rather than withdraw it from the east bank. Regardless of whether or not the deep attack into the Sinai was seriously considered for execution or not, time was allotted to consolidate Egyptian positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The delay allowed time to prepare either for a further advance or for defense of occupied positions. Sadat's emphasis on holding the east bank of Suez as the primary objective would not have required further advance. However, he may have determined that the advance was a political necessity because of Syrian pressure for Egypt to take a more active role in the war.<sup>53</sup>

#### **AIR DEFENSE**

The second explanation for a phased campaign was cited by General el Shazly, whose main concern was the inability of the Egyptian Air Force to effectively provide air cover against the Israeli Air Force, the IAF. This limited the probability that attacks beyond the coverage of the Egyptian's surface to air missile, SAM, batteries would succeed. In the General's judgment, the SAMs were the only effective Egyptian countermeasure to the IAF. The majority of the Soviet SAMs were at fixed sites on the west banks of the Suez Canal. Insufficient mobile SAMs were available to support a general advance of the Egyptian Army beyond the range of the fixed SAM sites. Thus any attack beyond the vicinity of the Suez Canal would have to be executed without air cover and therefore would be extremely vulnerable to attack by the IAF. The Egyptians had learned in 1967 the disastrous results of attempting to fight a ground war with an enemy holding uncontested air superiority. The Egyptian military leadership did not desire to repeat the experience. This was apparently the cause of the ground commanders' concern with Sadat's orders for the follow-on attack.<sup>54</sup> Inability to provide counter-air coverage for their forces was not a reason to delay further advance into the Sinai, but reason not to go at all.

#### **PROTRACTED WAR**

One strategic explanation for the phased campaign was Egypt's desire to involve Israel in a protracted war. The Egyptian military understood the economic cost of mobilizing the Israeli

army and keeping it in the field during long conflicts. They further judged that due to the small Israeli population, the large ratio of military to civilians, and their limited resources, the Israelis would be unable to endure high rates of casualties and equipment loss over the long term. The Egyptians planned to exploit this weakness by inflicting heavy losses on Israeli forces and drawing Israel into a protracted war, that is one lasting longer than six days. In contrast, Egyptian plans "would exploit the best qualities of Egyptian troops, their stolid courage when executing modest, thoroughly rehearsed assignments and when fighting from established positions." After capturing the Suez Canal, the Egyptian army paused to consolidate under the relative protection of its SAM umbrella with the intent of inflicting heavy losses as the Israeli's counter-attacked the Egyptian's prepared defensive positions. Fighting from defensive positions took advantage of the strengths of the Egyptian soldier while exploiting Israeli weaknesses, greater susceptibility to casualties and loss of equipment. After a sufficient period, the Israeli's would suffer sufficient losses to either allow the success of an Egyptian offensive or sue for peace.<sup>55</sup>

#### **RISK MANAGEMENT**

The last two strategic explanations for the phased campaign are more complicated and largely impossible to prove. The operational pause benefited Egypt in two ways; it reduced Egypt's risk, both in terms of military losses and the threat of Israeli massive retaliation, and it allowed Sadat to gauge the reactions of the superpowers so he could more accurately determine his own options. Sadat's priorities were to capture and hold the east bank of the Suez at minimum risk, while hedging his bets and protecting his political options. A phased campaign allowed Sadat to gauge and adjust the level of risk to Egypt by observing Israel's reactions and the progress of the war on the Syrian front. It signaled to the Israelis that Egypt was not bent on their destruction, hence it was not an appropriate target for nuclear weapons. By allowing Syria to be perceived as the primary threat to Israel, Egypt could avoid the damage associated with being the main focus of the Israeli armed forces. Sadat might deny that his intention was to sacrifice Syria to save Egypt. However, regardless of Sadat's intent, the operational pause allowed the Israelis to shift significant portions of their assets to the Syrian front. Simply put, because of the relative lack of activity in the Sinai, Egypt did not represent the major threat during the critical days of the war.<sup>56</sup>

Interestingly, it was during Egypt's operational pause that Israel reached the point of its greatest desperation. On 12 October Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir sent an urgent note to President Nixon. The note was an appeal for the US to re-supply Israel with arms and ammunition. It included a warning that Israel might be forced "to use 'every means' at its

disposal" to insure its survival. On the same day, Israel's ambassador to the US, Ambassador Dinitz, warned the US State Department of the potential for dire consequences if the re-supply effort failed to materialize.<sup>57</sup> The veiled threat was that Israel might be forced to resort to nuclear weapons if the US did not intervene to materially change the situation. Egypt's renewed advance into the Sinai did not begin until 14 October, after the American re-supply effort was visibly underway and Israel's concerns were somewhat relieved.<sup>58</sup> Sadat may not have known about the re-supply effort at the time, but he was undoubtedly aware that the Syrians had been pushed well back by 14 October and the threat to Israel's survival was dissipating. Egypt's operational pause not only let its army sit out the fiercest part of the conventional combat, but also left Egypt in a relatively unthreatening posture during the period of Israel's greatest desperation.

### **SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT**

The third strategic explanation for the phased campaign was to allow Sadat to gauge the reactions of the superpowers in order to determine Egypt's options. The attitudes of the US and the USSR affected Sadat's options and capabilities in both the military and the diplomatic arenas. As has already been mentioned, Sadat needed the arms re-supply from the USSR to sustain Egypt in the war. If the USSR had failed to re-supply Egypt, Sadat would have probably been fortunate to merely hold the defensive positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Soviet re-supply of Egypt had begun by 10 October and grew rapidly.<sup>59</sup> With indications that he would be fully supported, Sadat was able to take the risk of mounting further attacks into the Sinai. This allowed Sadat to maintain the appearance of supporting Syria, thus preserving the option for Egypt to remain in the Arab fold if that proved to be the most advantageous policy at the end of the war. Sadat's dependence on the superpowers can be clearly seen in his actions during the Israeli counter-offensive push into Egypt. Sadat understood that once the USSR committed itself to supporting Egypt there were limits to the degree of victory the Soviets would be willing to allow Israel. The clear defeat of Soviet weapons and technology in two consecutive wars in the Middle East likely would not be acceptable to the USSR.<sup>60</sup> The Soviet level of commitment was demonstrated by the docking of a Soviet ship in Egypt's port of Alexandria, a ship US intelligence suspected was transporting nuclear weapons. The suspicions were never confirmed, nor apparently denied. Following the conflict the ship returned to a port in the USSR without being unloaded. Whether this was an actual deployment or a ruse, it demonstrated the level of resolve of the USSR, given the considerable risk associated with even the appearance of introducing nuclear weapons into the region.

Sadat was able to make good use of Soviet resolve to end the war in a manner favorable to Egypt. He left the Third Army isolated on the east bank of the Suez Canal without fear of its destruction because the USSR guaranteed the enforcement of the 22 October cease-fire. When the cease-fire failed, the USSR was able to bring immense pressure to bear on Israel, through the US, by threatening unilateral intervention. This threat produced a superpower confrontation which significantly raised the stakes and finally led to conclusion of the war. The support of Israel by the US was also important to Egypt, because it affected the attitude of Israel toward the potential outcome of the war. If the US had failed to support Israel with the necessary equipment, the threat to Israel's survival would have been substantial.<sup>61</sup> This would have increased the likelihood of Israeli desperation and use of nuclear weapons. US delivery of military equipment to Israel not only prevented the potential collapse of Israel, with all the implications that would have entailed, but also assured US involvement in the peace process which would follow the war. Thus, Sadat's knowledge of US actions was vital to his understanding of his options. The operational pause allowed Sadat time to gauge the superpowers' reactions to the conflict, enabled him to make decisions predicated on those reactions, and fundamentally shaped both the progress of the war and the diplomatic sequel at the war's end.

The phased campaign adopted by the Egyptian army following its successful crossing of the Suez Canal resulted in many useful outcomes for Egypt. The explanations for the timing of the phases are not mutually exclusive and serve both operational and strategic ends. Sadat's political objectives for the war and his technique for risk management shaped the actions of the Egyptian military. Because some of the results gained by the Egyptian army's phasing were at odds with the vital interests of other countries, truthful discussions of the Egyptian leader's intentions cannot be expected in open sources and these motives must be extrapolated from actions and ideas which were expressed in contexts other than the 1973 war.

Sadat's main objective for the war was precipitation of a crisis which would gain renewed attention by the US and USSR. For Sadat victory consisted of capturing and holding a small amount of territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian army accomplished this early in the war. Operationally, the subsequent pause kept the Egyptians under their SAM umbrella and allowed them to consolidate their position. Strategically, the pause gave them time to inflict casualties on the Israelis from defensive positions, reduced the risk and cost of the war to Egypt, and allowed Sadat to adjust Egypt's actions based upon the intervention of the superpowers. A phased campaign was in Egypt's best interest with only one major drawback, the potential alienation of the Arab world. It led to the desired political objective, a crisis which

involved the superpowers and changed the military situation, thereby allowing for progress toward a diplomatic solution and peace in Egypt's greater interest.

## CONCLUSION

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war is a useful case study to determine the utility of the Strategic Appraisal model both because of the degree of documentation and the complexity of the situation. Application of the Strategic Appraisal process solely from the perspective of US interests fails sufficiently to examine factors affecting the interests of key regional actors. It further makes determination of the feasibility of options available to those actors inaccurate. When strategic appraisal is conducted from the regional actors' perspective, the convergence of interests and their intensity becomes more evident.

With few resources, poorly developed economies, and smaller land masses, the interests of many regional states become vital much more rapidly than those of the US. The failure to adequately analyze the motivations and likely actions of regional actors can also be viewed as an American ethnocentric bias. Implicitly, this failure reflects an assumption that leaders of smaller nations are usually unable to find a solution to complex problems in complicated environments.

It is interesting to note the change in US government leaders' opinion of Sadat before and after the 1973 war. Sadat was regarded as a "clown" before, a great statesman after.<sup>62</sup> Complex problems in complicated situations are not necessarily intractable, they may just require complex solutions. Furthermore, in situations where vital interests are already at risk, even desperate plans may be enacted. Any chance of avoiding disaster, no matter how small, may appear better than no chance at all. The use of the Strategic Appraisal process is more likely to find the subtleties of interest and options available to regional actors when applied from their perspective. Admittedly, this is extremely difficult when limited information is available and given cultural differences.

Regional expertise and a thorough understanding of the culture of the target state are required for accurate analysis. This level of training and knowledge is normally beyond the reach of military and political leaders. To prevent anticipatory failures in the future, the intelligence community should create standing teams of regional experts. These *red teams* should be tasked specifically to perform in-depth strategic appraisals from the perspective of selected states in order to better prepare US leaders to deal with diplomatic and military circumstances that might crucially affect US national interests.

WORD COUNT = 8967.



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1977), 268.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., 225, 265, 293.
- <sup>3</sup> Howard M. Sachar, Egypt and Israel (New York: Richard Marek, 1981), 168-186.
- <sup>4</sup> el-Sadat, 276.
- <sup>5</sup> Sachar, 195.
- <sup>6</sup> el-Sadat, 293.
- <sup>7</sup> Sachar, 168-186.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>9</sup> Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 89.
- <sup>10</sup> Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Middle East Research, 1980), 16-22.
- <sup>11</sup> Shai Friedman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 13.
- <sup>12</sup> Wynfred Joshua, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy," Strategic Review (Spring 1974): 66.
- <sup>13</sup> Sachar, 168-187.
- <sup>14</sup> el-Sadat, 230 & 293.
- <sup>15</sup> Sachar, 193.
- <sup>16</sup> Elizabeth Monroe and MG A.H. Farrar-Hockley, Adelphi Papers No. 111 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), 2-7.
- <sup>17</sup> Sachar, 194-197.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 187-210.
- <sup>19</sup> el-Sadat, 224, 244, & 292.
- <sup>20</sup> Sachar, 168-186.

- <sup>21</sup> el-Sadat, 238-239.
- <sup>22</sup> el Shazly, 4.
- <sup>23</sup> Monroe and Farrar-Hockley, 1 & 17.
- <sup>24</sup> Sachar, 194-197.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 187-210.
- <sup>26</sup> el-Sadat, 238.
- <sup>27</sup> T. Friedman, 89.
- <sup>28</sup> el-Sadat, 230-238 & 298.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 293.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 244.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 270.
- <sup>32</sup> Sachar, 166-185.
- <sup>33</sup> el-Sadat, 230 & 293.
- <sup>34</sup> Sachar, 195.
- <sup>35</sup> David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (Binghamton, New York: Vail Ballou Press, 1981), 108.
- <sup>36</sup> Sachar, 187-210.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> el Shazly, 16.
- <sup>40</sup> Sachar, 185.
- <sup>41</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and th Art of Operations (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987), 44-47.

<sup>42</sup> Monroe and Farrar-Hockley, 7.

<sup>43</sup> Sachar, 194-197.

<sup>44</sup> Shai Friedman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 13.

<sup>45</sup> Louis R. Beres, "Israeli Security in a Changing World," Strategic Review (Fall 1990): 12.

<sup>46</sup> Wynfred Joshua, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy," Strategic Review (Spring 1974): 66.

<sup>47</sup> el-Sadat, 225 & 293.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>49</sup> el Shazly, 246-250.

<sup>50</sup> Sachar, 204.

<sup>51</sup> el-Sadat, 244.

<sup>52</sup> Sachar, 213.

<sup>53</sup> el Shazly, 27-35, 247, 225, 246, & 268.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Sachar, 193-194.

<sup>56</sup> Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980), 172.

<sup>57</sup> Alan Dowty, Middle East Crisis: US Decision-Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), 245.

<sup>58</sup> John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), 187.

<sup>59</sup> Dowty, 182.

<sup>60</sup> Joshua, 66.

<sup>61</sup> Dowty, 189, 245 & 258.

<sup>62</sup> Hirst and Beeson, 152 & 175.

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