

The Objective Force and the Requirement for Assigned Tactical Missions to Specified Units

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR ASSIGNED TACTICAL MISSIONS TO SPECIFIED UNITS by Major Scott J. Bertinetti, U.S. Army, 81 pages.

This monograph assesses the feasibility of providing tactical units of the U.S. Army's objective force with specific missions other than conventional combat roles. 2002 information pertaining to the objective force only address conventional offensive operations in detail. The purpose of this monograph was to identify deficiencies faced by the objective force conducting stability operations. After identifying those deficiencies, this monograph presents possible solutions to enhance the objective force's ability to accomplish all missions across the spectrum of conflict. The research conducted on this topic looked at two case studies in which conventional army units were given specific missions in support of two different stability operations.

The first case study, the U.S. Constabulary, was established in Germany following WW II with the purpose of enforcing law and order within the U.S. Zone of Occupation. The U.S. Constabulary was an organization composed of conventional specialty soldiers assigned to the unit for performing a law enforcement role. The second case study, the British Army in Northern Ireland, examines how British Army units rotate through a tour of duty in Northern Ireland as they provide support to law enforcement services in Northern Ireland. Both case studies analyze the intricacies of the missions they performed in relation to conventional warfare preparedness. The case studies emphasized the importance of using conventional soldiers to execute the mission. This monograph does not advocate the implementation of a military police organization to meet the demands of stability operations

Objective force concept planners appear to have inadequately considered the threat assessments of the CIA, leading authors, and academics. If the planners do not understand the future threat, they cannot accurately predict objective force capabilities and limitations. The U.S. is not expected to be challenged by a peer competitor whom it must fight a major theater war. Future assessments portray conflicts as being regional in nature with a large requirement for the armed forces of the United States to be involved with stability operations such as peace and humanitarian assistance missions.

It would be beneficial to objective force planners to assign specific units tactical tasks that focus on stability operations. Information about the objective force indicates that the full spectrum of conflict will likely occur simultaneously due to the increased tempo of operations and the ability to converge on objectives from different directions. When the two case studies are combined with the future threat assessment and the operational and organizational concept of the objective force, it supports the requirement for tactical units to be assigned specific tasks other than conventional warfare. The objective force will likely face numerous challenges in having adequate time to prepare or transition from conventional to stability operations. The case studies highlight when specific units are identified and assigned stability operation missions, it enhanced the individual army's overall capabilities. The objective force would benefit if some units were assigned tactical missions other than conventional war to ensure mission success across the spectrum of conflict.

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Introduction

The “objective force” is the term the U.S. Army is using to describe how it will train, equip, and fight in the future. “The objective force is the ultimate transformation goal. It is the future force that achieves all the characteristics (strategic responsiveness, agility and versatility, lethality, and survivability) described in the Army Vision.”¹ The objective force concept is attempting to change how the U.S. Army will deploy and fight in contentious areas around the globe. Its unique concept is influencing the overall development of this organization and stands to change the method in which the U.S. Army operates in the future. This organization is designed around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, and networked maneuver units.² Although the units would be dispersed, through the use of technology, these small units would be able to join to strike the enemy repeatedly if necessary. Attacking from many directions, the objective force will have the capability to maneuver in a non-linear fashion, in widely dispersed small elements across the full spectrum of operations.³

Through the examination of two separate constabulary organizations, this monograph evaluates the objective force’s ability to conduct military operations other than conventional combat.⁴ It identifies deficiencies with the concept, which may allow force designers to take into account those problems before the objective force is fielded. Both the U.S. Constabulary

¹ U.S. Department of the Army. *Weapons Systems: United States Army 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 2.

² John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Swarming & The Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), vii. Arquilla and Ronfeldt work for the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit institution that helps to improve policy and decision making through research. They believe that future conflicts will involve adversaries who pursue innovations as a result of the information revolution.

³ The full spectrum of operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. These can range from war to military operations other than war such as humanitarian assistance and peace keeping operations. They may occur as single operations or in any combination with another. U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-15.

⁴ Constabulary forces are defined as a “force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.” Erwin A. Schmidl, “Police Functions in Peace Operations: A Historical Overview,” in *Policy the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988) Internet, <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/policing/chapter1.html>. accessed 17 August 2001.

following WW II and the British Army's augmentation to the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland provide advantages and disadvantages of assigning tactical army units with specific missions other than combat roles.⁵ The final objective of the monograph is to determine whether the U.S. Army should dedicate tactical objective force units to specific missions other than conventional combat roles for the fighting units of the objective force.

The U.S. Constabulary was created in 1946, to maintain law and order in the U.S. Zone of occupation in Germany. Occupation soldiers from mechanized cavalry units along with soldiers from the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions formed the nucleus of this newly created organization.⁶ This unit was composed of soldiers with conventional specialties such as infantrymen and tank crewmen, had trained for war, but were now responsible for providing a law enforcement and security in the U.S. occupied zone.

The British Army was called into Northern Ireland in 1969 to restore order after the local police force lost the ability to stop violence between Catholic and Protestant groups. Although the British Army had a long tradition of using its army to police its colonial empire, it was not equipped or prepared to act as an internal security force in Great Britain.⁷ Once it was called in, violence continued which resulted in the British Army maintaining an active presence to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in providing law enforcement service to Northern Ireland. The requirement for the British Army to remain in Northern Ireland resulted in assigning army units to Northern Ireland with the purpose of maintaining law and order. Their presence continues in 2002.

⁵ These case studies highlight two tactical army units whose primary purpose was not to fight a conventional war. The author chose these two case studies due to their contemporary nature and that these separate organizations existed in two democratic nation's armies as opposed to nation's who use their military to maintain law and order over those they govern. Although the two case studies focus on law enforcement operations, the author does not imply that the objective force requires a robust law enforcement capability.

⁶ Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany: 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army Europe, 1953), 66.

⁷ David Barzilay, *The British Army in Ulster Vol.1*, (Belfast: Century Books, 1973), 2.

This monograph contains seven sections. Following this *Introduction*, the section *U.S. Constabulary*, discusses the U.S. Army's occupation forces in post-WW II Germany. *Northern Ireland*, follows with an analysis of how the British Army augments the police force in Northern Ireland. The fourth section, *Objective Force*, addresses the present concept of the objective force and how it is expected to operate in simultaneous full-spectrum military operations. Section five, *Future Conflict Assessment*, highlights the future types of military operations that will likely involve the U.S. Army. The sixth section, *Conclusions*, provides an analysis of the two case studies and if there are applicable considerations force designers can implement into the objective force. Recommendations are presented in the final section.

U.S. Constabulary

In the decade following the end of the cold war the U.S. Army has been faced with contending with smaller scale contingencies in which it has been deployed not to fight a Soviet model army, but to provide humanitarian assistance and to peace keeping operations. Many forget that following WW II, the U.S. Army was in a similar situation in that it was trained for war, but had to go about figuring out the correct force to maintain law and order in occupied Germany. The U.S. Constabulary was a factor in keeping West Germany friendly toward the western side during the cold war. World War II ended with the defeat of Germany due to the overwhelming weight of the United States entering the war. "But the war was won when the occupation force brought about a change in government, demilitarization and the people's acceptance of American domination."⁸ The U.S. Constabulary of post WW II is a valid case study when discussing the objective force and how it will contend with simultaneous operations and stability operations

⁸ Frederick J. Kroesen, "Designed for Europe?" *Army*, Vol. 51 No. 6 (June 2001): 7.

along with specialized units.⁹ “Members of the U.S. Constabulary made civil arrests and solved crimes, but they also helped resettle displaced persons and stood guard against possible trouble from the Soviet occupying forces to the east.”¹⁰ This organization provided the Army with a trained and respected force to effectively control the U.S. Zone of Occupation until the German people were prepared to enforce their own laws under democratic principles.

Post War Germany

Upon conclusion of hostilities in Europe, Germany’s cities lay in rubble. Most of the German industrial centers had been destroyed and many of these areas that were relatively intact had been dismantled and moved to the Soviet Union. Germany’s infrastructure was destroyed. “The courts did not function, the police were not at work, and stores were closed.”¹¹ There was a lack of potable water, malnutrition, and the destroyed sewage system in many cities resulted in disease. Even if Germany’s industrial centers were intact it lacked the ability to move raw materials to industrial centers due to the lack of fuel and transportation issues. Transportation challenges existed from the lack of trucks to destroyed bridges and rail lines, combined with a lack of fuel sources such as coal to support the remaining population or to operate transit systems. Freedom of movement issues that are challenges in most contemporary stability operations existed within Germany where it was difficult for allied soldiers to effectively control civilians moving from point to point.¹² Amid the destruction remained many different groups of people: Allied occupation forces, German citizens, displaced persons, and war criminals. Sorting out

⁹ Stability operations can be further defined as using the military for any purpose other than war. Currently, the Army delineates ten types of stability operations. These include, “peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force.” *FM 3-0 Operations*, 9-6.

¹⁰ Robert F. Dorr, “Constabulary Troops were ‘Combat Cops’ in Germany,” *Army Times*. September 3, 2001.

¹¹ Brian Arthur Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952” (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 1977), 2.

¹² Frederiksen, 9.

former Nazi's took time. It would take time to find individuals qualified to fill positions of responsibility.

The lack of basic items resulted in the implementation of a 'black market' where goods became available at high rates or for barter in exchange for items of equal value such as illegal gasoline, tires, cigarettes, sugar, coffee, and butter.¹³ Compounding the black market issue would be further crimes committed such as theft and assaults in the attainment of desired items. The state of Germany upon conclusion of hostilities resembled the Balkans of the 1990's.

U.S. Army Europe

Following the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, the focus of the divisions in Europe became either on re-deploying to the Pacific Theater or back to the United States for demobilization. The allies were cognizant of the fact that they did not want a repeat of the results following the signing of the armistice ending World War I. The allies wanted the occupation to demonstrate to the German people that they were defeated and their country occupied.¹⁴ Additionally, Germany lacked a central government, which the allies would have to implement until the Germans were prepared to govern themselves. Rather than occupy one portion of Germany such as the Ruhr following the first war, the allies agreed that all of Germany would have to be occupied by the four allied countries: The United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

The initial occupation forces primarily were concerned with tactical tasks such as manning check points, enforcing curfews, guarding Army installations, displaced person camps, factories and banks, and manning border crossings. These tasks would often conflict with the tasks the military government was attempting to accomplish. "An office of Military Government supervised German civil affairs within the American Zone, working increasingly through German local, state, and zonal agencies which military government officials staffed with men who were

¹³ Franklin M. Davis, *Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945-1949* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 149.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 136.

politically reliable.”¹⁵ The military government based on the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, wanted to assist the German people in political rehabilitation that would allow them to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world by encouraging democratic political parties, local self-government, and trade unions.¹⁶ The U.S. Government wanted the Germans to take on responsibility for governing themselves as soon as possible. One of the largest shortcomings with the occupation force was that it was not permanent. The majority of the soldiers understood that they would be going home or to the Pacific. They did not know when, since the Army was still working out the requirements for soldiers to be discharged.

The American command needed to find an acceptable force structure and unit to enforce the terms of surrender since the task was quickly becoming more than the U.S. forces could handle due to the inexperienced new soldiers arriving and the experienced combat veterans being sent home. General George C. Marshall asked General Dwight D. Eisenhower to consider a police-type organization similar to one being devised for Japan, in which a native Japanese police force under American supervision and backed by U.S. tactical units would take over responsibility for security and order in the country.¹⁷ Marshall further posed the feasibility of using foreign manpower in the police force and in tactical units in order to ease the requirements on U.S. forces and continuing to incur the cost of the occupation.

Eisenhower required a disciplined force that enforced the laws of the military government and applied fair treatment to all the groups they encountered in order to gain credibility with the German people and to reinforce the benefits of self-government under democratic principles. He ultimately accepted the idea of a police-type occupation, but rejected the idea of using Germans due to public reaction in Europe and the United States. The War Department dropped the idea of

¹⁵ “Peace Becomes Cold War, 1945-1950,” Internet. <http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/cold-war.html#occupation>. accessed 18 August 2001.

¹⁶ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 346.

¹⁷ Davis, 163.

using friendly nations as a police force largely due the fear of creating a movement for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces.¹⁸

U.S. Constabulary Organization

As the Army faced the challenge of drawing down its wartime forces it had to figure out how to provide an occupational force to enforce military government in Germany. Most of the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions became Constabulary units, along with elements of the seven mechanized cavalry groups and various other armored, tank destroyer and self propelled anti-aircraft units in Europe.¹⁹ The original divisional units were broken down and reformed into three constabulary brigades—each commanded by a brigadier general, which contained nine constabulary regiments and twenty-seven constabulary squadrons. The remainder of the constabulary organization were filled by cavalry reconnaissance squadrons and tank destroyer battalions. “The district constabularies would be mechanized cavalry groups taken from tactical units, given special instruction in military government laws and ordinances, trained in conducting raids and searches, and employed as quick, mobile security reserves.”²⁰ This idea led to the creation of a concept called the United States Constabulary, a self-sufficient security force for the entire zone of occupation. The size of the force was based on one constable per 450 Germans.²¹ General Eisenhower estimated that 38,000 men would be adequate to establish police-type control by July 1946, on the premise that the displaced person and prisoner of war requirements would be greatly reduced.

The headquarters of the U.S. Constabulary resembled a modern heavy division in its organization and was similar in size to a U.S. Army Corps sized unit. Initially, the U.S.

¹⁸ Libby, 10.

¹⁹ “Peace Becomes Cold War, 1945-1950,”

²⁰ Ziemke, 341.

²¹ Ibid., 341.

Constabulary force had 34,526 officers and soldiers.²² It was headed by a major general, had a chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff and its general staff consisted of a G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, a provost marshal, and a public safety officer. Additionally, within the headquarters there was a signal squadron, band, school squadron, an intelligence detachment, a counter-intelligence corps unit, and an element from the criminal investigation division. The fact that the Constabulary had a general staff allowed it to effectively plan operations, control its units, and to coordinate their actions with adjacent units.

The U.S. Constabulary consisted of three brigades, nine regimental headquarters, and twenty-seven squadrons. Individual squadrons contained three mechanized and two motorized troops. “The primary unit of the Constabulary was the troop, organized on the pattern of the mechanized cavalry troop used during WW II.”²³ The troops operated using M5 armored cars containing 37mm cannons, quarter and half-ton trucks, .30 caliber machine guns, Thompson submachine guns, rifles, pistols, and code and voice radios.²⁴ Additionally, within each regiment there was a horse platoon, motorcycle platoon, and a light tank troop.

This combination gave the Constabulary the ability to cover or patrol great distances quickly and in depth throughout the U.S. Zone of Occupation with brigade headquarters in Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, and Munich.²⁵ The Constabulary was organized along geographic lines, which mirrored as close as possible the German civil administration. This allowed for clearer lines of operation between the United States Office of Military Government and the evolving German government and police.

²² A.F. Irzyk, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary,” *Military Review*, (March 1947): Internet, http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/MilRev_Mar1947.html#military%20review. accessed 17 August 2001.

²³ “History of the U. S. Constabulary 10 January 1946 — 31 December 1946,” (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.1 CA 371947) Internet, <http://www.strandlab.com/germocc/uscindex.html>. accessed 17 August 2001.

²⁴ Ziemke, 341.

²⁵ Irzyk, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary.”

U.S. Constabulary Mission

The official dates the U.S. Constabulary operated in Germany was from 1946 to 1953. It was unique because it was an organization created and given a specific mission based on the nature of Europe and the U.S. Army, which differed from the U.S. Army's combat role in WW II. Its task was daunting due to the fact that the U.S. Army had prepared for war and was now conducting stability operations. Upon acceptance of Germany's surrender, its task was to stabilize the divided nation and assist in rebuilding it. The U.S. Constabulary would be the organization tasked with supporting the U.S. goal of a 'new' Germany. Its mission was to:

maintain general military and civil security; assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States Government in the occupied U.S. Zone of Germany (exclusive of the Berlin District and Bremen Enclave), by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellions, and acts prejudicial to the security of the U.S. occupational policies, and forces; and maintain effective military control of the borders encompassing the U.S. Zone.²⁶

In addition to its difficult task and the poor physical state Germany was in, the U.S. Constabulary with an approximate strength of 35,000 soldiers was responsible for 40,000 square miles that included nearly 1,400 miles of the international and inter-zonal boundaries.²⁷ The space itself varied from flat lands, hills, mountains, forests, and included many cities. Within this space resided 16 million Germans and over 300,000 displaced persons of varying nationalities.²⁸ These were the conditions in which the U.S. Constabulary was to maintain law and order among the civilian population, and to be the zone military police for the U.S. forces."²⁹ Finally, they were to assist in developing a German police force as soon as it became practicable.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ D. Steinmier, "The Constabulary Moves Fast," *Army Information Digest*, Vol. 2 No. 11 (November 1947): 7.

²⁸ James M. Snyder, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945-30 June 1947* (Heidelberg, Germany: Historical Sub-section G-3, United States Constabulary, 1947), 247.

²⁹ Bud Groner, "Forming the U.S. Zone Constabulary." Internet, <http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/uszone.htm#Zone%20top>. accessed 17 August 2001.

Training the U.S. Constabulary

It took time before the U.S. Constabulary would become functional. By February 1946, the U.S. Constabulary consisted of a commander, a staff, a headquarters, and a plan. Most of the soldiers were in the age group of eighteen to twenty-two years and were not veterans of the war. The U.S. Constabulary became a reality when a constabulary school was opened to train soldiers on constabulary operations at Sonthofen, Germany. The requirement for a school came from Army leadership's identification that the Constabulary required soldiers who retained more authority and that they would be operating in dispersed groups not always under the direct supervision of officers or senior non-commissioned officers. "The Constabulary trooper must not only know the customary duties of a soldier, but also the police methods, how to make arrests, and how to deal with a foreign population."³⁰ The school's initial cadre of instructors were to consist of soldiers from an unnamed cavalry reconnaissance squadron.³¹ They were responsible for training the soldiers who were to fill the ranks of the U.S. Constabulary.

The school taught courses to officers and enlisted men that built on their previous military training and education. The Constabulary school reinforced military subjects such as equipment operation and maintenance, weapons proficiency, leadership, and map reading. Motorized infantry and mechanized cavalry tactics were to be employed by the Constabulary. Since the Constabulary consisted of cavalry soldiers, mounted movement and maneuver was not new to them. The constabulary tasks were new to the soldiers. Instruction was given on mob and crowd control, passes and permits, techniques and mechanics of making an arrest, evidence collection, laws of the occupation, and judo for self-protection in preparation for their constabulary role. General subject instruction consisted of the History of Germany, the Military Government,

³⁰ "History of the U. S. Constabulary 10 January 1946 — 31 December 1946."

³¹ Ziemke, 341.

International Relations, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), German Courts, and displaced persons.³²

U.S. Constabulary Operations

The U.S. needed to convince the Germans and the displaced persons that the Constabulary was acting with their best interests in mind. The Constabulary emphasized throughout its operations the minimum amount of force if required in the conduct of their duties. The Constabulary was out among the population providing law enforcement to the German population within the American sector. The Constabulary discovered that a constant vigilance was one of the best methods to uncover subversive and other detrimental activities and to suppress them in their initial stages.³³ Patrols contacted the mayors of all towns, military government detachments, and headquarters of U.S. troop units within its area of responsibility.³⁴ This enabled the flow of information in monitoring trouble spots and to maintain a presence. Additionally, it added to the building of trust in the new way of life from the German people.

The U.S. Constabulary's primary responsibilities included conducting area patrolling in conjunction with manning border control posts separating the U.S. Zone from the French, Russian, and British zones. The constabulary force was not used as a guard force on the prisoner of war camps, the displaced person camps, or on vital installations. These tasks were managed by the few infantry units that remained in Germany.³⁵ Most trouble spots were not in rural areas, but in towns and cities where large populations congregated seeking food and shelter among the ruins. The Constabulary demonstrated its credibility as a law enforcement force by actively patrolling cities and arresting violators. Check point locations varied and revolved in order to avoid establishing patterns. They conducted search and seizure operations in which a constabulary unit converged on a suspected area where illegal activities were suspected or known.

³² Irzyk, "Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary."

³³ "History of the U. S. Constabulary 10 January 1946 — 31 December 1946."

³⁴ Irzyk, "Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary."

Constabulary leaders understood that established checkpoints along roads could be bypassed.³⁶ They instituted patrols in depth several miles inside the border to counter these actions. Patrols covered difficult terrain with the use of horses in conjunction with their armored cars and jeeps. Horses and constabulary soldiers could move more quietly to inspect terrain in which it was difficult for motorized transportation to get to regardless of detection.

The flexibility of the Constabulary organization was evident in that the platoon could be broken down into sections or smaller elements depending on the mission and terrain involved. The horse asset proved to be invaluable while patrolling the area along the Rhine River, which separated the American and French Zones where smuggling, illegal crossings, largely conducted by means of boats.³⁷ Railroad checkpoints were often established in which the trains and passengers were searched for black market goods and proper documentation as they were entering or departing the American zone. Constant intelligence collection and assessment along with the study of criminal activity allowed the constabulary to focus its efforts at specific locations rather than trying to be everywhere all the time, which was an impossibility. “Constabulary patrols would operate in small groups of two or three troopers far from their headquarters, and were empowered with the authority to make arrests, conduct searches and seizures if required.”³⁸

The Constabulary did not arbitrarily conduct large-scale check and search operations against displaced persons, refugee camps or the German population. These were usually conducted in relation to suspected black market activities and coordinated with local U.S. authorities.³⁹ Prior to conducting such an operation, a request might have to be made through UNRRA, the military government, or the local commanders before a raid would occur. These types of operations

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ray E. Williams, “U.S. Constabulary Horse Cavalry,” *Armored Cavalry Journal*, (May-June 1948); Internet, <http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/ArmCavJou1948.htm#armored%20cal%201948>. accessed 17 August 2001.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “History of the U. S. Constabulary 10 January 1946 — 31 December 1946.”

required cooperation and close coordination between the various organizations operating in the U.S. Zone. Its active presence facilitated coordination activities through training and intimate knowledge of the actors and organizations within its area of responsibility.

In addition to its policing duties, the Constabulary performed functions similar to civil affairs units of the U.S. Army. It assisted the military government in the reorganization and development of the German police force.⁴⁰ These actions assisted in rebuilding the German's trust in civilian control of government and further demonstrated that the police do not make laws but enforce them.

Antagonists

The initial assumption by the U.S. Government was that the German people would oppose occupation through insurrection. This assumption proved to be inaccurate. Much of the unrest the Constabulary actually faced in Germany came from the displaced persons and U.S. service members. In addition to maintaining order among the Germans, displaced persons, and U.S. soldiers, the Constabulary had to deal with many unforeseen problems created by organizations sent in to assist and the very people the Americans were attempting to help. Red Cross workers and UNRRA personnel proved to be key suppliers to the black market since they had access to U.S. goods.⁴¹

Throughout the Constabulary's existence there were few reported instances of crime by German civilians. "Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, reported U.S. troops as the chief source of disturbances in the zone."⁴² Following V-J Day, the Army in Europe changed from a well-disciplined organization to an undisciplined mob. Discipline was eroding quickly within the U.S. Army as soldiers were anxious to return home. There were many instances of robberies, assaults,

³⁹ Frederiksen, 69.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 69.

⁴¹ Ziemke, 354.

⁴² Ibid., 424.

and vandalism on Germans by U.S. soldiers. Reckless driving, poor uniform discipline, and low standards of military and civilian courtesy were rampant among the soldiers in Germany. Based on the conduct of some soldiers many Germans perceived the Americans as drunks, with no respect for their uniforms, prone to hooliganism, with little regard for human rights who benefited themselves through the black market.⁴³ This was not the impression the U.S. wanted to have on the German people. General Eisenhower, referring to the U.S. soldier's unruly behavior noted that, "a bad reputation that will take our country a long time to overcome."⁴⁴ As the U.S. Constabulary set out to enforce the laws of the U.S. Zone of Occupation, an unforeseen law enforcement challenge rose from the displaced persons left in Germany at the conclusion of the war in Europe.

Under the Nazi Regime, a number of people were imprisoned due to their ethnic background or religious orientation. These people constituted a large portion of the Nazi labor force. Following the fall of the regime, they found themselves homeless and stateless in Germany. Displaced persons not only consisted of Germans, but those initially brought to Germany as war laborers such as Poles, non-German Jews, eastern Europeans, Czechoslovakians and Russians who were generally non-repatriable due to their fears of political or religious persecution upon return to where they had come. The Germans attributed most violent crimes to the displaced persons. This could have been because of their fear of retribution by the displaced persons and for their desire for the Constabulary to maintain a presence in their localities.⁴⁵ It was not unheard of for displaced persons to maraud and loot as they came and went from the camps. In Munich for example, "displaced persons accounted for 4 percent of the population but were responsible for 75 percent of the crimes."⁴⁶ The displaced person camps proved to be a large burden on the U.S. forces. Robbery, murder, looting, burglary, and theft were not uncommon in

⁴³ Ibid., 421.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 420.

⁴⁵ Frederiksen, 73-74.

⁴⁶ Ziemke, 358.

population centers. “Uncertainty about the future, free rations, and lodging without having to work, privileged status under the occupation, and virtual immunity from the German police bred indolence, irresponsibility, and organized criminality.”⁴⁷ The displaced person camps provided a location to store black market goods and bases for gangs. The military issue clothing provided to the displaced persons, became an aid in camouflaging criminal activity and a means to intimidate Germans.

Although the enforcement of law and order around the displaced persons camps was a challenge for the U.S. Constabulary, “the expected acts of revenge on a large scale (by displaced persons) against the Germans did not materialize.”⁴⁸ Most displaced persons were not involved in crime and wanted to bring their lives back to normalcy. There are several reasons why the displaced persons attracted the attention of the Constabulary and German civilians. The Constabulary was interested in identifying war criminals and wanted persons who may have been posing as displaced persons in the various camps.⁴⁹ The displaced persons tended to distrust everyone including other ethnic groups from their experiences in the Nazi camps of competing for basic needs in order to survive. German civilians feared losing their houses in order to quarter the displaced persons since “displaced persons, refugees, Jewish and other persecutees were assured priority over the German population.”⁵⁰ This included higher ration allowances, better priority for housing, and priority for employment. If there was a perception that one group was benefiting over the other or if favoritism was detected the possibility of unrest increased.

Initially, the U.S. appeared to have a grasp on both the number and care of displaced persons within its zone. The predictions were that the numbers would steadily decrease. The U.S. did expect some additional displaced persons due to the reputation of humanitarianism within the U.S. Zone. However, the U.S. was unprepared for the increase in displaced persons due to the

⁴⁷ Ibid, 356.

⁴⁸ Frederiksen, 74.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 74.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 74.

fear of persecution based on race, religion, or politics. The U.S. Zone continued to attract more displaced persons, specifically non-repatriables, not from groups who were persecuted by the Nazis, but from the results of post war politics in Eastern Europe.⁵¹ Public sympathy for the displaced persons almost gave them a free hand to do whatever they pleased until the U.S. Army reinstituted its policy of guarding the camps with soldiers.⁵²

By 1947, the U.S. Constabulary was succeeding in its mission. The displaced persons were slowly leaving the camps. The Constabulary was maintaining an active presence throughout the U.S. Zone. “No civil disorders materialized and the German population demonstrated no animosity toward the U.S. Occupation Forces.”⁵³ Simultaneously, Germans were beginning to assume responsibility for policing and by the fall of 1947, the German border police assumed responsibility for the borders. A consequence of the Constabulary’s success led to the unit to change its focus from policing to a purely military function.⁵⁴

U.S. Constabulary Success and Redesignation

As the nature of the U.S. Zone changed, the U.S. Constabulary changed with it. The training focus shifted from individual constabulary tasks to those that supported an armored cavalry organization.⁵⁵ Initially, the Constabulary reinforcement units began to transition to a conventional war focus at the platoon level. By 1948, the USSR posed a threat to Europe. The Constabulary changed with the developing threat and began to reorganize as a tactical force.

The training focus for the Constabulary shifted from internal security to combat readiness.⁵⁶ The Constabulary began to reorganize as tactical units equipped with M8 scout cars and became

⁵¹ Ibid., 75-77.

⁵² Ziemke, 422.

⁵³ H.P. Rand, “A Progress Report on the United States Constabulary,” *Military Review*. Vol. XXIX No. 7 (October 1949): 32.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 32.

⁵⁶ “U.S. Constabulary School, Sonthofen,” Internet, <http://home.tampabay.rr.com/usfa/Sont1.htm> accessed 18 August 2001.

armored cavalry regiments. “By the end of 1948, the constabulary completed its initial reorganization and three Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) were assigned to the Constabulary and provided the majority of its combat power.”⁵⁷ The ACRs had the responsibility for guarding the border and providing a mobile reserve while the remainder of the constabulary squadrons continued with the mission of internal security. In addition to the USSR, a threat of communist uprisings in France and Italy also necessitated the requirement for a force capable of defending against aggression.

In 1949, the Constabulary consisted of three ACRs, a field artillery group, two brigade headquarters, and four constabulary squadrons. By 1950, the U.S. Constabulary deactivated and its personnel shifted to Headquarters, U.S. Seventh Army who maintained control of the last two constabulary squadrons until they deactivated in 1952.⁵⁸ The Constabulary ceased to exist as the Army transitioned its units from occupational duties to a defensive army protecting its sector of West Germany.

U.S. Constabulary Conclusions

The U.S. Constabulary existed from 1946-1952. Its role, organization, and the mission it executed demonstrates that tactical units with specific missions other than their conventional roles can and did enhance the U.S. Army’s overall capabilities. Objective force designers can heed several lessons from the U.S. Constabulary regarding organization, training, and simultaneous operations. Many of the challenges faced by the U.S. Army in Germany following WW II, may be similar to the challenges that will be posed to the objective force in the future.

Command and control issues present in any military operation were mitigated due to the assistance of the general staff. The general staff of the Constabulary coordinated activities, planned operations, and resourced the Constabulary. This highlights the importance of having

⁵⁷ “Peace Becomes Cold War, 1945-1950.”

⁵⁸ “The United States Constabulary Squadrons: 1946-1952,” Internet, <http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/squadrons.html#sq.top>. accessed 19 August 2001.

specified tasks for individual units and a higher headquarters equally trained to plan operations and to interface with adjacent organizations. The Constabulary dealt with problems not only from Germany's physical state, but with the human aspects of post-conflict operations including: Displaced persons, the press, and government agencies attempting to assist civilians and locating war criminals. It investigated crimes, controlled the movement of personnel through the U.S. Zone of Occupation, and conducted searches for black market goods. Additionally, it provided the U.S. Army with the flexibility to occupy Germany while simultaneously de-mobilizing its forces. Many of these challenges the U.S Army contends with regarding stability operations. These challenges are expected to continue, as will stability operations. The U.S. Constabulary conducted its mission following hostilities in a permissive environment. It is likely the objective force, due to its ability to speed up the tempo of operations, may have to conduct stability operations simultaneously rather than sequentially, as in the case of the U.S. Constabulary. This may require objective force commanders to assign combat elements away from their conventional roles in order to protect supply assets or to conduct stability operations rather than using all available combat forces for the fight. Preparing for operations other than war does not come without a cost in regards to the overall force.

There are two drawbacks to the establishment of an organization with a training focus at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The U.S. Constabulary succeeded in its mission due to the availability of manpower and funding for the U.S. Army following WW II. This allowed for the creation of a headquarters to coordinate the Constabulary's efforts and to coordinate its activities with other agencies within the Zone of Occupation. A similar organization would likely be required for the objective force. It would have to be able to coordinate and execute operations in a joint and combined environment while not subtracting from the overall force structure of the U.S. Army in its ability to conduct conventional warfare.

The second drawback to establishing an other than warfighting organization is the perception that could be interpreted by potential adversaries if anything less than a fully combat capable

organization was assigned to a stability operation. Adversaries could interpret this force as a limiting factor of U.S. interests and commitment. This could result in the U.S. Army losing its ability to maintain the initiative across the spectrum of conflict. It is debatable to how effective the U.S. Constabulary would have been in Germany if the occupation evolved into a counterinsurgency operation.⁵⁹ While the case study of the U.S. Constabulary highlights an operation occurring in a permissive environment the case study of the British Army in Northern Ireland portrays an army operating in a non-permissive environment. The British Army has been employed as a policing force throughout its history. Although it maintains a wartime focus, it has routinely been called to establish law and order throughout Great Britain's colonies.

Northern Ireland

The purpose of examining Northern Ireland is not to assess a conventional army's ability to conduct stability operations, but to highlight that a contemporary army's tactical units assigned a mission with a specific purpose are an important capability that the U.S. should consider as a part of the objective force. The struggle in Northern Ireland is an important case study in evaluating the conduct of a conventional army's participation in a contemporary stability operation.⁶⁰

Although the British have always stationed soldiers in Northern Ireland, 1969 marked the year that the British Army was ordered to assist in restoring law and order within the province.⁶¹

⁵⁹ "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency or an armed movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict." U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1-40, 1-83.

⁶⁰ See footnote #9 for the definition of stability operations. The case study of the British Army in Northern Ireland highlights a conventional army conducting peace operations. Two types of operations; peacekeeping and peace enforcement can further define peace operations. "Peacekeeping operations are conducted under the consent of all parties involved in a conflict or prepared to act against one another." These types of operations generally include the implementation of military forces to "monitor and facilitate implementation of cease fires, truces, or other such agreements, and to support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements. Peace enforcement operations may or may not involve the consent of all the actors. Peace enforcement operations involve the application or the threat of employing force to separate belligerents in order to restore peace in support of diplomatic efforts." *FM 3-0 Operations*, 9-6.

⁶¹ "Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives," (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982), 11.

In a discussion of British Army involvement in Northern Ireland it would not be prudent to assess all of the tactics and procedures the British have used since 1969. Nor is it critical that this study assess the organizational changes the British have instituted in their army for the mission in Northern Ireland since few changes have occurred in the conduct of the operation. What is important is that since that date, the British Army has been assigning its armed forces to support the local police by providing them protection allowing the police to do their job and to establish peace in Northern Ireland. This section focuses on how the British Army currently conducts rotations in Northern Ireland, the primary antagonists, the mission the British Army is conducting, and the effect of its commitment to Northern Ireland on its ability to conduct conventional wartime operations.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is not a new conflict. It is composed of strong nationalist and religious fervor that contributes to the heart of the problem. This monograph investigates the conflict with the introduction of the British Army into Northern Ireland as a peace enforcer.⁶² Northern Ireland became a world issue in 1969, due to political, social, and cultural divisions in the region.⁶³ The small province of Great Britain has continued since that time to observe acts of terrorism from extremists from both antagonists.

History

The British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 in order to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in restoring law and order. Initially, the Catholic community welcomed the British Army as it deployed to the streets of Northern Ireland with the hope that it would be able to establish peace. “The fundamental cause of the conflict – the dispute over which jurisdiction Northern Ireland should belong to – remains unresolved and will continue to be so until there is a

⁶² See note #60 for the definition of peace enforcement.

⁶³ “Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives,” 11.

shift in the hitherto unmovable positions of each side.”⁶⁴ “British attempts to grant home rule to Ireland met with Protestant resistance.”⁶⁵ The Protestants in Northern Ireland believed that they would lose their social, economic, and political privileges while the Catholics wanted an end to discrimination in regards to housing and employment. Examining all of the social, religious, and political difficulties of Northern Ireland is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is important to identify the primary antagonists in order to understand who the British Army is opposing in their operations in Northern Ireland.

Antagonists

Since 1969, the British have continued to face a dangerous environment in Northern Ireland. It is considered one of the most dangerous areas to deploy to from the viewpoint of the British Army.⁶⁶ The primary antagonists are routinely categorized as Protestant and Catholic. The difficulty with Northern Ireland is that it is simply not a Catholic versus Protestant issue. Nor is it Nationalist versus Unionist, since every Catholic is not a Nationalist or every Protestant a Unionist. “The primary disputants are Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland.”⁶⁷

The British Army confronts an enemy who is not always distinguishable from the general population. The population has been included into collecting intelligence on the British Army and the RUC for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In Republican areas sympathetic housewives, small businesses, taxi drivers, and bricklayers keep their eyes open in

⁶⁴ M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 218.

⁶⁵ Montgomery Cybele Carlough, “Pax Britannica: British Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1969-1982,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1995), 118.

⁶⁶ Major Acton Kilby, Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Liaison Officer to the British Army, interview by author, 14 January 2002, Email. The author corresponded via email with Major Kilby during the course of research for this monograph. Major Kilby has been assigned to the Royal Infantry Headquarters since summer 1999. Major Kilby provided the author insights from the British point of view on operations in Northern Ireland. He was able to provide the training challenges incurred by the British Army in preparation for an assignment in Northern Ireland.

⁶⁷ “Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives,” 14.

order to pass information on to the PIRA.⁶⁸ The conflict in Northern Ireland will continue to take generations to overcome the perception of distrust among the antagonist before peace can be achieved. “Northern Ireland is simultaneously a low-intensity conflict, and a total war.”⁶⁹ It is considered a total war because within Northern Ireland and Belfast specifically, there is not a safe place for the British to let their guard down. All British soldiers, regardless of rank, must be prepared for a sudden attack at any time.

Loyalists and the PIRA use violence against individuals who they perceive as not supporting their causes or assisting the security forces in Northern Ireland. The PIRA and Loyalists are known to have automatic weapons, .50 caliber machine guns, 81mm mortars, commercial explosives, and rocket propelled grenade launched weapons. Death, mutilation, harassment are just some of the threats civilians and British soldiers must address on a daily basis. “The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and various other Catholic and Protestant paramilitary groups have been responsible for more than 3,000 deaths in the last three decades.”⁷⁰ Both organizations require extensive funding in order to continue their fight against each other and in the case of the PIRA against the British. The PIRA and Loyalists continue to raise money by traditional criminal methods with armed robbery being one of the most traditional crimes committed to support their efforts. “Extortion, counterfeit money and goods, loan sharking, smuggling, overseas contributions and fraud continue to fund their movements.”⁷¹ Both sides have established businesses in order to launder money and recently have delved into the drug scene.

In the most simplistic of terms, IRA operates via two primary organizations Sinn Fein is its political voice and the PIRA, the armed faction. They are relatively well organized, have support of the Catholic community and support of Irish-Americans. “The IRA has no more than about

⁶⁸ Ibid., 330.

⁶⁹ Carlough, 232.

⁷⁰ “Hope Emerges with Disarmament in Northern Ireland,” *The Kansas City Star*, 28 October 2001.

⁷¹ “Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland,” Internet, http://www.nics.gov.uk/nio_old/press/secintro.htm. accessed 14 January 2002.

500 armed men at its disposal.”⁷² They have been able to maintain their position and continue to keep themselves in the world press using both organizations. The PIRA is probably the most notorious and effective of the various terrorist groups in Northern Ireland. “It has experience, resources, political sophistication, and propaganda skills.”⁷³ The PIRA advocates the use of force to drive the British out of Northern Ireland.

“The pattern of Irish republican military activity has been very diverse. Over the decades the movement has embraced an assortment of low intensity war techniques ranging from guerrilla warfare, terrorist bombings, rural insurgent war, urban guerrilla campaigns, and the present dual military/electoral strategy.”⁷⁴ The IRAs ultimate objective was to outlast the British in Northern Ireland. They hoped for a long-term campaign, characterized with a steady level of military operations combined with political maneuvering would eventually defeat British resolve to hold Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.⁷⁵ The PIRA understood they could not defeat the British Army force on force and resorted to guerrilla tactics. Since they were familiar with the area and the people, they believed they could effectively wage war in this method. The PIRA strategy included maintaining a steady stream of violence. They wanted to continue to keep their cause in the headlines without causing the escalation of the conflict.

The Loyalists are not as organized and do not have as large a base of support from throughout the Protestant community “Loyalist terrorist activities since 1969, have usually taken the form of indiscriminate sectarian attacks against the Roman Catholic community. There was a significant increase in their activity in the early 1990s prior to the ceasefire declaration in 1994 when more people were murdered or maimed by Loyalist paramilitaries than by their Republican

⁷² Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Police Powers.” *The Atlantic Monthly*. December 2001, Internet, <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/12/obrien.htm> accessed 12 January 2002.

⁷³ “Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland.”

⁷⁴ Smith, 219.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

counterparts.”⁷⁶ The two primary paramilitaries associated with the Loyalist movement include the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defense Association. These groups target those who are perceived as being sympathetic to the IRA cause.⁷⁷

Policing

The RUC is the primary organization responsible for maintaining law and order in Northern Ireland.⁷⁸ Due to the threat, the RUC is one of the most heavily armed police forces in the world. The Royal Ulster Constabulary maintains 8,489 active policemen and an additional 13,000 reservists with a budget of over 600 million pounds.⁷⁹

Until 1994, most RUC patrols were escorted by the military as they performed their duties. Since that time, the RUC has been able to conduct some of its patrols without an armed escort.⁸⁰ Its goals are to support everyone in Northern Ireland, regardless of political or religious affiliation. Its members are often targeted since they work for an organization that supports the Unionist ideals of preserving the existing order and the supporting the British Government. The British Army supports the RUC by protecting its patrols as the RUC is charged with the prevention and investigation of all crime.⁸¹ Ideally, the British Army prefers that the RUC make the arrests. However, if the armed forces do make an arrest, they must turn the suspect over to the police within four hours.⁸² Soldiers have the right to use armed force within the constraints of the law. The use of force is used as a last resort and adheres to the British Army policy of using

⁷⁶ British Army, “The Rule of Law,” Internet, http://www.army.mod.uk/hqni/unitsandorg/n_rule.htm accessed 25 January 2002.

⁷⁷ “Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland.”

⁷⁸ As of November 4, 2001, the RUC changed its name to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). For the purpose of this paper, the Northern Ireland police will continue to be referred to as the RUC.

“Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland.”

⁷⁹ “Background Information on Northern Ireland Society – Security,” Internet, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm> accessed 4 August 2001.

⁸⁰ “Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland.”

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² British Army, “The Armed Forces in Northern Ireland,” Internet, http://www.army.mod.uk/hqni/1%20units%20and%20org/n_milops.htm accessed 4 August 2001.

minimum force when necessary. Due to the high threat incurred by the RUC, the British Army was required to provide protection in order for the RUC to perform its duties.

“For every two members of the RUC in Northern Ireland, there are three members of the armed forces.”⁸³ British soldiers while they are supporting the RUC are given certain legal power to assist them in their duties. British soldiers in Northern Ireland:

Have the power to stop and question any person about his identity, his movements or his knowledge of any recent terrorist incident. Stop and search any person to ascertain whether he is in unlawful possession of munitions, a transmitter or scanning receiver. Arrest without warrant and detain for up to four hours anyone reasonably suspected of committing any offense. The suspect must be released within four hours of the original arrest, unless re-arrested by the RUC. Soldiers may enter premises to search for and seize unlawfully held munitions, transmitters, or scanners. The specific authority of a commissioned officer is required to enter a dwelling house for this purpose and there must be a reasonable suspicion that such items are there. Finally, soldiers may stop vehicles, vessels etc. and search for and seize unlawfully held munitions, transmitters, or scanning receivers.⁸⁴

Northern Ireland is divided into three brigade areas, which correspond to the three police regions. A brigade is a collection of different regiments and supporting units that maintains a standing peacetime organization. A conventional brigade usually contains infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments combined with supporting units. Brigades operating in Northern Ireland always maintain three battalions within the unit. The composition of each brigade is different based on its responsibility, but could contain 5,000 to 8,000 soldiers.⁸⁵

The British Army’s Headquarters in Northern Ireland (HQNI) is located at Lisburn, which is outside of Belfast. It is responsible for the three brigade headquarters located in Northern

⁸³ Roger MacGinty, “Policing and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Internet, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/rucpp.htm> accessed 4 August 2001.

⁸⁴ British Army, “The Rule of Law.”

⁸⁵ British Army, “Units and Organizations,” Internet, <http://www.army.mod.uk/unitsandorgs/subsections/divandbrig.htm> accessed 5 August 2001.

Ireland.⁸⁶ The British Army's three brigade headquarters are located in Portadown, Londonderry, and Belfast. The area it is responsible for includes well over 200 miles of border with the Republic of Ireland, numerous border crossing points, and rail links. The terrain varies from open rural areas to heavily populated cities. Included as part of the British Army's responsibility are the coasts, airports, and seaports. Preventing terrorists from infiltrating and escaping via the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is one of the primary tasks the British Army has been assigned throughout its role in Northern Ireland. "The border has no natural contours, penetrates fields and farms, and is often overgrown."⁸⁷ The border with the Republic of Ireland has offered PIRA members safe haven because the British Army are forbidden from pursuing them into the Republic.

Mission

The official mission of the British armed forces in Northern Ireland is "to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the defeat of terrorism and assist the Government's objective of restoring normality to the Province."⁸⁸ The British Army executes its mission by providing the HQNI security augmentation to the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The British Army although deployed to support the Ulster Constabulary rarely involve themselves with policing. They patrol and demonstrate a constant presence. They provide assistance and protection to the police and leave the job of policing to the RUC.

⁸⁶ Major Nicholas P.F. Berchem, British Army Officer attending SAMS, interview by author, 10 January 2002, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Notes. Major Berchem, a member of the King's Royal Hussars, deployed to Northern Ireland from July 1994 to February 1995. He provided the author with insight from personal experience of the training, the mission, and preparation requirements for his unit's readiness to conduct operations in Northern Ireland. He elaborated on the challenges of learning dismounted patrolling which was not inherent in an armor unit and of the nuances of preparing this type of unit for its conventional mission upon completion of their tour in Northern Ireland.

⁸⁷ Carlough, 235.

⁸⁸ British Army, "The Armed Forces in Northern Ireland."

British Army

Since 1969, the British Army has been the only military organization employed against the various terrorist factions. The British maintain that it is an internal issue to the United Kingdom and does not warrant outside assistance.⁸⁹ Additionally, since it is considered an internal issue, using the army to maintain peace and order is within its responsibilities to Great Britain. Finally, all British Army units with the exception of the Gurkhas may deploy to Northern Ireland. However, before they deploy it is necessary for each unit to conduct a period of training that focuses strictly on the tasks they are expected to execute while in Northern Ireland.

The British Army for much of its history has acted more in a police manner than it did as a conventional land army. "Historically the Royal Navy has played the crucial role in Britain's survival, while the Army has been assigned the role of defending the outposts of the Empire and suppressing rioting and civil unrest in Britain."⁹⁰ Unlike the U.S. Army following the fall of the Soviet Union, in which it struggled to identify and prepare itself for conventional and stability operations. The deployment of the British Army to Northern Ireland is not been viewed as a task that would be better performed by an organization other than the army.⁹¹ The British Army based on their colonial experiences in dealing with civil unrest in their colonies are comfortable in performing stability operations. Their previous experiences focused on the controlling of and monitoring of suspect populations rather than on dealing with specific incidents.⁹² They used the same techniques in Northern Ireland. However, their focus on the Catholic area resulted in alienating and ultimately uniting the Catholic extremists and moderates. Combined with the fact that there was not a political resolution or proposed resolution for the unrest in Northern Ireland caused the army to maintain a high profile in Northern Ireland ultimately causing it to become involved in the conflict.

⁸⁹ "Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives," 14.

⁹⁰ Carlough, 77.

⁹¹ Kilby, interview.

The deployment of the British Army was viewed by both antagonists as temporary. The support of the army eroded due to the Catholic perception that the British Army favored the Protestants. This perception developed as the army escorted the Protestants marching near or through Catholic areas and the fact that the army maintained an active presence in the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.⁹³ As time moved on and the Army remained in Northern Ireland both antagonists became frustrated by the army's efforts. The Catholics thought they were being singled out as the sole instigators and that they were not being consulted with how order was going to be restored. The Protestants on the other hand felt that the Army was not being firm enough in stopping the Catholic protests.

Deployment

The British Army does not have units assigned as pure constabulary organizations. Historically, a unit will require three months to return to warfighting duties. This equates to a year out of the conventional British Army. A unit scheduled for a rotation to Northern Ireland trains three months for the rotation. The rotation in Northern Ireland lasts six months and the remaining three months are required to recover from the rotation and to prepare for their conventional duties. This includes leave, re-training requirements for their individual specialties, preparing their equipment, and a final preparedness exercise that validates the unit's training.⁹⁴

British Army battalions deploy to Northern Ireland via three methods. The first method is that a unit may be stationed in Northern Ireland for two years and is directly assigned to a Royal Ulster Constabulary Division.⁹⁵ These battalions are accompanied with their family members and their organizational equipment that a conventional battalion would normally have at its home

⁹² Niall O' Dochartaigh, "The British Army," Internet, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/troops/chap4.htm>, accessed 25 August 2001.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Kilby, interview.

⁹⁵ Berchem, interview.

station. However, most of these units are light infantry battalions and do not have much heavy equipment.

In 1972, the British Army established the second method of deploying soldiers to Northern Ireland called roulement.⁹⁶ This is a similar method that the U.S. currently uses for its forces rotating in and out of Bosnia and Kosovo. This system currently continues in which British Army battalions rotate with other British Army units as they conduct a tour in Northern Ireland. Typically, the roulement lasts six months in which battalions leave their families and organizational equipment at their home stations while they deploy to Northern Ireland.

The third and final method of deploying to Northern Ireland is through forward basing. This is in response to the current political situation in which it is desirable to minimize the British military presence.⁹⁷ As a result, battalions that would normally be in Northern Ireland on a roulement tour remain in mainland Britain prepared to deploy to Northern Ireland for short emergency tours. These units are usually sent to reinforce border areas. These type of tours typically last in terms of weeks, but are always dependent on the situation.

Units

Every British Army unit is available to conduct a rotation into Northern Ireland. The aim of the British Ministry of Defense is to base units within the United Kingdom or home base, at an interval of no less than five years.⁹⁸ There is no formal policy since requirements change week to week. The rotation or roulement to Northern Ireland is usually for six months. In simple terms, the British Army in Northern Ireland operates on a continual rotation policy supported throughout the remainder of the army on a six month calendar cycle. Theoretically, one-third of the British Army is either preparing for a rotation, executing a mission, or has completed a rotation and are in the process of conducting training for their conventional wartime tasks. It should be noted that

⁹⁶ Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), 181.

⁹⁷ Berchem, interview.

⁹⁸ Kilby, interview.

these missions include SFOR, KFOR, Cyprus U.N. and the Northern Ireland roulement tours.⁹⁹

This means that at any given time there are at least six British battalions, not permanently assigned or stationed in Northern Ireland supporting the RUC.

Within Northern Ireland there are six resident Infantry Battalions along with six Home Service Battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment. These are supported by up to six infantry battalions on six-month rotational tours. Unlike any other Regiment in the British Army, the Home Service Battalions of The Royal Irish Regiment are territorial army battalions on permanent operational duty every day of the year. These battalions with the exception of one, remain in Northern Ireland and are not deployable outside of the Province. They have a clearly stated operational objective - the defeat of terrorism, the return of peace, and a chance for all the people of Northern Ireland to lead normal lives.¹⁰⁰ They are analogous to the National Guard units in the U.S. who may be mobilized under Federal authority.

Objectives

The British Army's mandate demands that it assist in the preservation of law, order and duly appointed authority. Northern Ireland is a Domestic Operation for which the Army must be prepared, it is considered a primary operation.¹⁰¹ Overall, the British consider their involvement in Northern Ireland as a success. However, they do acknowledge that dedicating approximately twenty percent of their army to a domestic theater does limit its ability to react to other contingencies.¹⁰²

Training

Before a unit rotates to Northern Ireland it must conduct a specific set of tasks tailored to the unit prior to becoming considered prepared for the mission. The initial training varies from six

⁹⁹ Berchem, interview.

¹⁰⁰ "Security, crime, and policing in Northern Ireland."

¹⁰¹ Kilby, interview.

weeks to three months in length.¹⁰³ The Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team (NITAT) advises the units as they plan their training. The team is composed of soldiers with experience in Northern Ireland and it helps design training to replicate the types of operations they will be expected to perform combined with the conditions that exist in Northern Ireland. An In Barracks Training Team (IBTT) composed of up to twenty to thirty soldiers who have just completed a tour in Northern Ireland supports this initial training. This training program is based on over thirty years of operations in Northern Ireland. This training is conducted by all units prior to rotating to the province regardless of their level of expertise in a Northern Ireland or similar operation. Similarly, if the United Kingdom were to commit troops to a Bosnia or Kosovo type operation, the units that were deploying would follow a similar three-month train-up prior to the deployment.¹⁰⁴ In certain circumstances the train-up period may be advanced if the unit was returning from a deployment in Northern Ireland.

The initial training conducted by the British Army is similar to the method in which the U.S. uses various combat training centers (CTCs) to conduct major readiness exercises (MREs) before deploying to a small-scale contingency areas such as Bosnia or Kosovo. Prior to deploying to Northern Ireland, all British Army units conduct similar readiness training before they are deemed certified by the Ministry of Defense as being prepared for the challenges of Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁵ The NITAT is similar in that it is a dedicated organization which advises units in their deployment training at the battalion's location. Upon completion of the in barracks training, units complete their training at one of two training sites that were designed and built for the purpose of training units prior to rotating to Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁶ A rotation to Northern Ireland is considered an excellent venue for junior leader development. British soldiers operating in Northern Ireland

¹⁰² Dewar, 178.

¹⁰³ Berchem, interview.

¹⁰⁴ Kilby, interview.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Berchem, interview.

become experts in house-clearing, street patrolling, search techniques, and anti-terrorist operations.¹⁰⁷

Effects

The British believe that they have prevailed in Northern Ireland due to their will of not giving into terrorist demands. They attribute the success on the ability of their army to adapt to the situation by changing their tactics, effectively engaging the antagonists by maintaining a presence, and assisting the RUC. Although Northern Ireland is currently observing a period of eased tensions, it is still considered dangerous for the British. In some areas it is relatively free of terrorist activity while in other areas it is impossible to travel without an armored vehicle. Due to the nature of dispersed operations, responsibility for making decisions rests with the NCOs and junior officers. “Young non-commissioned officers, usually twenty-one or twenty-two years old, lead the section patrols on the streets and in the country. They are alone except for radio contact and have to make instant decisions under difficult circumstances.”¹⁰⁸

The British Army operates in Northern Ireland under specific rules of engagement, which advocate the minimum use of force necessary to accomplish their duties. “Soldiers are restricted from firing unless he observes someone using a firearm or carrying a firearm which he is about to use.”¹⁰⁹ This is a challenge to any soldier operating in a stability operation in which he is doing exactly opposite of what he has trained for during conventional warfare training. While maintaining a presence through patrolling and establishing checkpoints, soldiers actively collect information about their area responsibility. While soldiers are in Northern Ireland, they must be familiar with suspected members of the PIRA. British soldiers are also all familiar with the residents, their automobiles, and business activities of the area they are responsible for. This allows them to detect crime or suspect terrorist activity if something is out of place such as an

¹⁰⁷ British Army, “The Royal Irish Regiment,” Internet, <http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/royirish/main.htm#history>. accessed 25 January 2002.

¹⁰⁸ Dewar, 111.

unidentified car parked within their patrol area.¹¹⁰ Simultaneously, they often present themselves as targets for snipers and improvised explosives while they perform their duties.

Unlike the U.S. Army, the British do not view the Northern Ireland augmentation mission as a drain on the overall preparedness for the force. It is considered a mission that must be accomplished, which has beneficial side effects. Considering there are about 20,000 British soldiers in Northern Ireland at any given time, it is a drain on the total force structure of the British Army.¹¹¹ Arguably, without the Northern Ireland commitment there may be 20,000 less soldiers in the British Army. The mission does require a significant number of soldiers in which the total pool to draw from is limited. This makes other contingencies limited in which the United Kingdom can commit. In the event of another contingency, it is usually not policy for a unit in Northern Ireland to be pulled out in order to conduct the second contingency.

There is a significance to the number of units that deploy to Northern Ireland. Although viewed as part of their overall mission, their warfighting tasks do suffer. While in Northern Ireland, the focus is on the execution of the mission itself, not attempting to maintain proficiency in conventional wartime tasks. However, upon the unit's return to Great Britain or Germany, units transition to the follow-on mission that they have been assigned. This includes the rotation of personnel, leave, and a period of training for the follow-on mission. It is a cycle that the British Army accepts as normal.¹¹² The cycle allows for units to prepare and to know when they are deploying. It does provide a focus for training based on a calendar.

Upon completion of a rotation and a train-up for Northern Ireland, platoon and below level leadership for junior officers and NCOs develops since small units are the key organizations in Northern Ireland. Patrols are conducted by four-man teams and these small unit leaders are responsible for making split-second decisions based on their training. However, the focus in

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 112.

¹¹⁰ Berchem, interview.

¹¹¹ Kilby, interview.

¹¹² Berchem, interview.

Northern Ireland is different than the warfighting tasks they are expected to perform in a conventional war. In a sense, the leadership and experience these junior leaders gain in Northern Ireland make the British Army stronger regarding leadership and cohesion, but hinders them in specific task skills for their primary role.¹¹³

British Army in Northern Ireland Conclusions

The British Army has played an active role in Northern Ireland for over thirty years by providing security for the RUC to provide law enforcement to the Province. This case study demonstrates that stability operations are lengthy affairs and manpower intensive. It also demonstrates that soldiers require time to prepare for both conventional and stability operations upon completion or in preparation of the other.

Although the British Army works closely with the RUC, it does not consider itself or the units conducting operations in Northern Ireland as a constabulary force. Its mission is to support the police by providing them protection so that the RUC can conduct its law enforcement job. Objective force designers can benefit by considering several of the methods the British Army employs from its experience in Northern Ireland. Units selected to conduct a tour in Northern Ireland are given a specific mission other than their conventional combat role, for a specific period. “Virtually every unit within the British Army is capable of conducting an operation in Northern Ireland.”¹¹⁴ The British Army rotates their battalion-sized units through specific training, the rotation in Northern Ireland, and a post-deployment training period in order to restore their units to conventional readiness training levels. The small unit leadership developed in Northern Ireland by the British Army may be beneficial for similar contingencies and strengthening the overall leadership abilities of its soldiers, but conventional warfare preparedness suffers because of the small unit focus in Northern Ireland.¹¹⁵ In the case of the

¹¹³ Kilby, interview.

¹¹⁴ Berchem, interview.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

British, units returning from a roulement tour in Northern Ireland are not available for conventional operations until a year after they initially began their training for operations in the Province. This is understood and accepted by the British Ministry of Defense, the army, and the units conducting the operation, which allows for a training focus and a better understanding of the missions units are responsible for conducting. In the future, the United States may not have the luxury of being able to plan unit rotations to support stability operations. As the objective force nears fruition, force planners should take into consideration the types of operations the U.S. Army will likely engage and how the objective force will manage stability operations as a single mission or simultaneously with conventional combat operations.

Objective Force and Force Planning

One of the reasons the objective force is being developed is so that the U.S. Army can effectively handle operations across the spectrum of conflict. “The means of combat have expanded dramatically over the last several decades. Armies must now account for a full spectrum of operations, with diverse employment roles. An army with global responsibilities such as the U.S. Army, must envision operations in a vast array of environments.”¹¹⁶ The U.S. Army will likely continue to address conventional operations as well as stability operations.

In 2002, the objective force remains as a concept. There is not a specific doctrine that addresses the objective force nor is there an established organizational design that includes the number of personnel or the types and numbers of vehicles developed for this organization.¹¹⁷ The objective force is seeking new methods in which to fight by exploiting the nonlinear battlefield.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ David A. Fastabend, “That Elusive Operational Concept,” *Army*, June 2001, 44.

¹¹⁷ “Secretary: Adapting to surprise critical” *AUSA News*, Vol. 25, No. 3, January 2002, 3.

¹¹⁸ “In nonlinear operations, maneuver units may operate in noncontiguous areas throughout the area of operations. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points. Simultaneity overwhelms opposing command and control systems and retains the initiative. Nonlinear operations proceed along multiple lines of operations—geographic, logical, or both. Lines of communication often diverge from lines of operation, sustaining operations may depend on combat service support (logistics) moving with maneuver units or delivered by air.” *FM 3-0 Operations*, 5-11.

Before addressing the initial concept and organization of the objective force, it is necessary to briefly address U.S. strategy and how strategy and force planning influence force structure concepts.

Strategy and Force Planning Considerations

The U.S. currently approaches its security strategy as pluralistic.¹¹⁹ “The purpose of military strategy is to secure national interests and to attain the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”¹²⁰ The U.S. executes this strategy through active involvement throughout the world in its shaping of international security environment. A primacy strategy poses significant challenges at home and abroad. For example, two significant challenges are financial and how the strategy relates to other nations in the world. The first is that the public may not be willing to support large defense budgets without a clearly defined threat. The second problem with primacy is that it tends to alienate friends and allies, making it more difficult to ensure diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation is met when the U.S. is attempting to accomplish a goal within the international environment.¹²¹

Military strategy continually functions during war and peace. It provides an objective in which to orient military forces during times of war. In peacetime, military strategy guides the military as to its composition, weapons, and how to employ the military in peace in order to deter war and execute other missions. “Strategy answers the question: what plan will best achieve the

¹¹⁹ This means that it maintains a variety of armed forces to meet a variety of potential adversaries. It also maintains a “primacy” strategy in that the U.S. desires to continue to hold its current position in the world in order to prevent the emergence of another peer competitor.

¹²⁰ Mackubin Thomas Owens is a Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the U.S. Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island and a senior adjunct fellow of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va. Dr. Owens earned his Ph.D. from the University of Dallas, his M.A. in economics from Oklahoma University and his B.A. from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Mackubin T. Owens, “Primacy and Global Leadership: A Grand Strategy for Republican Empire, 21 April 2001, Speech, 21 April 2001. Internet, <http://www.townhall.com/Phillysoc/Mack%20Owens%20Speech.htm>. accessed 17 August 2001.

¹²¹ Ibid.

ends of national security, given scarce resources for defense? The answer to this question serves as a guide to employing current forces and planning future forces.”¹²²

The objective force is the organization that is being touted to meet the requirements of the U.S. strategy.

A strategy of primacy through global leadership is militarily demanding. It must enable us to lead coalitions to deter aggression and win if deterrence fails, restore order to unstable regions, support international law, and enforce peace in regions of vital interest to the United States. Primacy through global leadership requires a flexible military strategy and a force structure able to respond to contingencies across the entire spectrum of conflict. These forces must be able to execute four basic missions: deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, constabulary operations, the projection of power to areas of importance to the U.S., and homeland defense.¹²³

General Purpose Forces vice Full Spectrum Forces

The objective force is considered a general purpose force—a force that is not designed for one type of conflict, but rather the entire spectrum of conflict. Some of the confusion about the objective force and its ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict may be due to the lack of a doctrine for the objective force and in the clarity of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) publications concerning the objective force. Specifically, *TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-3-91, Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept*, Draft, 29 August 2001, addresses the objective force’s capabilities as being a “full spectrum force with general purpose qualities.”¹²⁴ This continues to reinforce the notion of a force that is capable of executing a number of tasks but none well without a significant train-up period. The unknown threat, combined with a proposed doctrine may cause anxiety on the part of force structure planners in proposing specific missions for units. In order to compensate for an unknown threat, the U.S. Army habitually hedges its force structure. This leads to maintaining a force between a capabilities and a threat structure. It appears the objective force is attempting to incorporate a

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-91: Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept*, Draft, 29 August 2001 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 7.

capabilities based organization without adequately addressing the full-spectrum of conflict and how this force will be employed in various operations.

This furthers the argument that the objective force is being developed without a doctrine. The establishment of a doctrine will assist force planning in the development of capabilities and organization of the objective force. Official information pertaining to the objective force continues to be in draft form, which means that it is not permanent.¹²⁵ However, a comprehensive doctrine would assist planners with the overall organization as it pertains to the full spectrum of conflict. Currently, the focus of the objective force concept is on offensive operations. An initial full-spectrum doctrine would assist in identifying organizational shortcomings that may not work in stability operations.

Objective force planners are continuing to hedge based on the variety of threats. The draft publications on the objective force continue to indicate that the focus for objective force designers is on traditional conventional land threats without adequately addressing stability and simultaneous operations. Correctly identifying the roles and missions for tactical units may assist in the overall development of the objective force and its doctrine.¹²⁶ However, the problem with giving units specific missions for every possible threat is that there is the potential for a group of specialized units to be an inappropriate force once a threat arises. The time may be correct to state that it is permissible to have a general-purpose army, while having specific tactical formations. Since the objective force is a future force, the actual force structure is capable of changing based on the threat. A sound doctrine for the objective force will compensate for such changes and focus the roles of tactical units. Finally, the cost of maintaining forces for specific missions that may or may not occur is not easily justifiable within a democracy.

¹²⁵ The official U.S. Government sources on the objective force that the author had access to were draft publications. At the time of this writing there is not a designated doctrine or organization for the objective force concept.

¹²⁶ Arquilla, 4.

Cost

Inevitably, the bottom line to force structure is cost. A large standing military in a democratic society without clearly defined enemies is difficult to support economically and politically.¹²⁷ The military in general and the U.S. Army specifically, have resorted to using one force to meet the challenges of full-spectrum military operations. A proposed doctrine may help in justifying some of the organizational changes required for the objective force to meet the challenges of full spectrum threats. It may have more, the same number of forces it contains in 2002, or less. The actual structure of the objective force is not clear. One view from the Association of the U.S. Army is that “the objective force concept reduces numbers while multiplying effectiveness.”¹²⁸ This indicates that the force may be smaller. It is unclear if the objective force would be funded to establish units for specific missions. Expecting units to be prepared to equally conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict is probably not realistic. This would result in an organization that is similar to the U.S. Army of 2002, in which units require significant training periods prior to conducting stability operations such as peacekeeping. For these reasons, it may be appropriate to designate units of the objective force with specific missions.

Objective Force Organization and Structure

Discarding 2002 U.S. Army organizational designs may assist in defining the objective force in relation to its roles in the full spectrum of conflict. However, the current U.S. Army organization of corps, divisions, and brigades are still addressed within the concept of the objective force.¹²⁹ This may inhibit force planners from effectively proposing the organization of the objective force. Understandably, draft information pertaining to the objective force serves not

¹²⁷ Henry C. Bartlett, Holman, G. Paul, and Sommes, Timothy E., “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), 21.

¹²⁸ Dennis Steele, “The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Digitization,” *Army*, September 2001, 22.

¹²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Draft 1 November 2001), 39-41.

only to provide direction for force planners but to maintain its role within the Department of Defense. However, the continual reliance on current force organization may inhibit the thought process required to actually transform the U.S. Army into a viable full-spectrum force.

Draft document, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0 The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, organizes the objective force into two units. “They are labeled as ‘units of purpose’- the unit of action and the unit of employment.”¹³⁰ Units of action are the base units of larger organizations to accomplish discrete sets of functions in accordance with mission essential tasks. These units must have the capability to fight small single engagements and then be able to transition to another enemy threat or set of circumstances. These units will likely be dispersed from similar size elements. They are envisioned having the capability to understand when and where to fight and with whom.

The units of employment are highly adaptable higher echelons that integrate and synchronize U.S. Army forces and link joint forces to the campaign. This force is envisioned having the capability to arrive at multiple points of entry and quickly transition to the offensive, secure and integrate the information infrastructure and can change faster than the enemy can respond on the battlefield. Units of employment establish and maintain a tactical info sphere to enable precision operations at operational and tactical levels. “They should have the ability to see first at all operational levels, disseminate information at real time to smaller units of action and shape the battle space with concentrated precision fire with one shot/one kill or multiple target capability.”¹³¹

¹³⁰ “TRADOC scenario anticipated conflict,” *AUSA News*, Vol. 25, No. 3, January 2002, 2.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

Objective Force Innovations

There is little doubt that small, organized units, operating in a dispersed manner can create difficulties for a large military organization. The study of the British Army in Northern Ireland in the third section of this monograph highlighted the PIRA engaging the British Army with limited success in order to ultimately defeat the will of the British government to remain in Northern Ireland.¹³² Although the example of the PIRA demonstrates the lethality of small units on a larger organization, it does not illustrate the ability to win decisively. Ultimately this is the difference between military operations in 2002, and how the objective force is expected to fight. Specifically, its ability to conduct a decisive operation from the deployment through execution of small units of action.

The strengths of the objective force come from its ability to operate in a non-contiguous manner. This future organization envisions being able to accomplish these tasks based on the United States maintaining its technological lead in the world. These “new” concepts are based on the development of new technologies and through the leveraging of information in order to defeat a near peer competitor in a conventional method of conflict. Its capabilities should provide the U.S. Army with the option to fight only at the time and location of a U.S. commander’s choosing and to avoid fighting when and where an enemy desires.¹³³ The objective force concept envisions having the ability to detect adversaries before they can engage U.S. forces while at the same time conducting operations simultaneously and continuously throughout the battlefield.

The key to the objective force is having the knowledge of where the enemy is and the ability to strike him from numerous directions simultaneously. “The success of the objective force depends on the operation of a vast, integrated sensory system that can distribute not only specific targeting information but also overall top sight about conditions in and around the battle

¹³² J. Bowyer Bell, *IRA: Tactics and Targets* (Dublin, Ireland: Poolbeg Press Ltd., 1990), 103.

space.”¹³⁴ This would enable the objective force to conduct operations against a dispersed enemy simultaneously. In addition to its conventional combat role, the objective force by its ability to quickly establish a presence should also be able to manage small-scale contingencies.¹³⁵ For instance, during a peace enforcement operation, the objective force will have the capability to suddenly appear at a riot or small engagement. The ability to move rapidly, could mitigate time and space constraints, combined with its ability to act decisively if required, is a clear benefit to the implementation of the objective force. Capitalizing on these innovations could further enable deterrence and crisis stability in the future.¹³⁶ Technological advances in information and the ability to react may also have an impact on the objective force’s logistic requirements.

The logistics requirements for the objective force could be reduced if the organization was indeed smaller than the 2001 tactical U.S. Army structure. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt believe that it is likely that the objective force employing dispersal and converging techniques will be far smaller than a traditional expeditionary force, thus requiring less sustainment.¹³⁷ However, they imply that there may be additional requirements for supply distribution vehicles to deliver supplies over greater distances and to dispersed locations since the objective force’s units of action would not be operating in large formations. This has an impact on the security of those vehicles and the number of support forces to conduct resupply. Due to the smaller nature of the objective force units and its technologically advanced weapons systems it would be logical to assume that fuel and ammunition supply requirements may be less than sustainment needs of the early twenty-first century U.S. Army. This does not lower the burden of ensuring soldiers have adequate food and water, which would likely continue to be a requirement for objective force soldiers.

¹³³ Steele, 27.

¹³⁴ Arquilla, 45.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 79.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 77.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 46.

Smaller, lighter, more lethal and faster forces may have an impact on a conventional conflict. However, it is debatable on to how effective these smaller numbers will have on stability operations or an operation involving both stability and combat operations simultaneously. If the objective force is conducting conventional operations, according to the objective force concept, it does not need to actively control the space behind the area of action all the time. This notion is dangerous. It is reminiscent of some of the U.S. Army's experiences in South Vietnam where the enemy was able to move in and out of areas without being detected. "The enemy's ability to return to villages that had supposedly been cleaned out. The U.S. troops could never liberate territory, but found themselves going back again and again to fight the same battles."¹³⁸ These conditions combined with unclear strategic directives contributed to the U.S. eventually withdrawing from the conflict.

Objective Force Disadvantages

It is difficult to criticize a concept that is in its infancy and official material is still in draft form. The initial concept probably will not look like anything that is being discussed or reported at the time of this writing. Understandably, the initial information about the objective force focuses on conventional combat and how this new organization will operate in the most difficult of military operations.

Information pertaining to the objective force discusses full-spectrum of military operations. Full-spectrum military operations consist of everything from conventional decisive military operations to support operations. Futurists predict that potential adversaries will more than likely avoid head-to-head confrontation and seek asymmetric means to engage U.S. forces and seek ways to engage the U.S. homeland.¹³⁹ However, much of the information pertaining to the objective force does not adequately address in any detail the majority of operations below full-

¹³⁸ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 469.

scale offensive operations. For example, defensive operations have yet to be addressed and stability operations are not covered in depth.

Arguably, future engagements and operations will consist of adversaries who engage in criminal activity, operations with social structure challenges, political implications, rioting, and economic issues. Stability operations are expected to dominate U.S. Army operations in to the future. The U.S. Army will be the organization called upon to manage these types of operations. Although the objective force enhances its conventional war capabilities through technology, it may not take into account the human dimension of conflict, especially the humanistic nature of stability operations.

The objective force concept does not adequately address these types of operations nor does it adequately address who will control the “white space,” the area that is not under direct control of forces.¹⁴⁰ It will likely lie between the “rear” areas and the multiple engagement areas. Even to the highly potent objective force, this is the area where this new force is most vulnerable during conventional conflict. TRADOC’s Draft *Pamphlet 525-3-0* states, “combat support unit and sustainment facilities, including those associated with the reception of follow-on forces into theater must be furnished enough local assets to protect against air, missile, and unconventional threats, and in some cases, conventional attack.”¹⁴¹ This pertains to the support areas. Implied with protecting the support assets, is the question of protecting the supply convoys as they move to support the forces fighting.

¹³⁹ Fastabend, “That Elusive Operational Concept,” 41.

¹⁴⁰ White space is the area located between the objective force units. The objective force concept does not label a “rear” or a “front” within an area of operations since the battlefield will likely be noncontiguous. This area is not under the direct control of objective force units. The objective force concept does not require units to physically control terrain. The theory is to control the area through the use of sensors to identify what is in this area prior to entering. The objective force concept does not advocate always controlling every part of the area of operations, except when a unit must pass through or occupy it for limited periods of time.

¹⁴¹ TRADOC *Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, 32.

The objective force concept has not thoroughly delineated the amount of assets required to provide convoy security and protect support areas. TRADOC Draft *Pamphlet 525-3-0* addresses the need for “planned and coordinated cycling of available forces,” this statement sounds attractive on paper however, it may allow an adversary a penetrable seam in which he can exploit an obvious weakness.¹⁴² Forces are likely to either be engaged, preparing for combat, or coming out of combat. This leaves few assets to control the “white space.”

Shortcomings

The continuing belief of relying on one force to operate across the full spectrum of military operations may become more difficult with the objective force. The objective force is reliant on technology and dispersal. Arguably, it will require more time to train and to maintain the proficiency in conventional warfare tasks. Units tasked to support stability operations could suffer in their combat readiness evaluations. The military will probably continue to be the only organization that can effectively support humanitarian and civil operations.¹⁴³ However, if the operation is going to be handled effectively, it requires a force that is trained and equipped for these other than combat operations. Using the highly technologically advanced objective force combat units for humanitarian and civil support could be considered misuse of an asset.

It is unknown how the objective force would effectively address an enemy who blends in with and is supported by the local population. Arquilla and Ronfeldt believe that an organization such as the objective force would have difficulty against an adversary employing guerrilla tactics and enjoying the support of a populace that could sustain, hide, and nurture them.¹⁴⁴ Futurists predict that there is a strong likelihood that such an adversary will use these techniques to maintain

¹⁴² Ibid., 31.

¹⁴³ Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 105-106.

¹⁴⁴ Arquilla, 5.

dispersal and avoid direct confrontation with U.S. forces. This could hinder the objective force from effectively targeting an adversary if he does not mass or fight in a conventional manner.

The ability to move undetected is another capability the objective force is counting on in order to be successful. Conducting operations in a non-permissive environment would likely cause the objective force to experience some difficulty moving undetected.¹⁴⁵ This highlights the objective forces need to identify when and where to simultaneously move. As in current operations, the commander will have to determine based on the immediate situation regarding terrain and the mood of the populous when to employ the objective force simultaneously to stop an uprising or disturbance. The objective force will be able to quickly responding to any signs of trouble. This works in an environment where U.S. forces are accepted. It is debatable on the effectiveness of moving undetected in a hostile or unfriendly environment.

Implications of the Objective Force

Objective force designers may want to consider reassessing the organization's ability to conduct stability operations simultaneously while conducting offensive operations or as a single mission. Solutions to these questions may be found in organization design rather than searching for solutions from technology. "Technology matters, but so does the form of organization that is adopted or developed to embrace it."¹⁴⁶ The ability to use a smaller force, capitalizing on information about the enemy to defeat larger forces is a unique and innovative step in conventional warfare. It may be necessary for the objective force designers to reassess this organization's ability to conduct full spectrum operations and to go beyond offensive combat operations.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 22.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

Once the Army creates the doctrine and has the technology to employ the objective force, it will likely have to reorganize. In doing so it may be imperative for objective force designers to consider assigning specific missions to the units of action in order to meet the requirements of a force capable of handling the full spectrum of military operations. Assigning specific missions that focus on stability operations would enhance the overall warfighting capabilities of the objective force and provide a viable organization to handle stability operations.

Due to the anticipated future threat tactics, the likely type of operations the Army will deploy on, and the overall uncertainty of the world it may be prudent for the objective force to contain a organizations within the units of action whose training focus is on stability operation-type tasks. The future organization would not be made up entirely of military policemen but would be a sizeable force of traditional combat military occupational skills such as infantrymen, armor, artillery, etc., so that it would be capable of limited combat operations for self-defense.¹⁴⁷ This force would be responsible for the various stability operations that the U.S. Army would be called on to assist in such as humanitarian relief operations or peacekeeping operations simultaneously while objective force units are conducting combat operations possibly during the same operation.

Another point objective force designers may consider is the ability of the objective force to protect the supply areas. Granted, the logistic areas may be out of range of the adversary, however, due to the unknown nature of how supplies will be delivered, this could mean a vulnerability to the objective force.¹⁴⁸ An agile adversary will more than likely recognize that he cannot take on the U.S. directly and will likely resort to the indirect approach hoping to inflict casualties and disrupt “rear” operations. There are numerous methods an adversary can employ, but this is beyond the scope of this study. It is unclear as to who will be providing security for the

¹⁴⁷ *FM 3-0 Operations*, 9-15.

logisticians and other out of combat forces.

The final issue with the smaller force is its ability to conduct stability operations, specifically peacekeeping operations. Although the consent of all major parties are required prior to entering one of these operations, soldiers will likely have to conduct preparatory training and become familiar with the rules of engagement (ROE) of the particular operation. This will likely require time for training. Additionally, it may take time for soldiers to adjust to the change of mission. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0 The United States Army Objective Force* acknowledges that “the human dimension of warfare will always remain preeminent.”¹⁴⁹ However, the remainder of the manual addresses changing from conventional warfare to stability operations as if it was easy as turning a switch. Conventional warfare and stability operations are expected to continue to be different where the ability to kill quickly is not the objective but rather to maintain a presence in order to maintain the stated goals of the operation.

Understanding the changing world and identifying possible threats and tactics potential adversaries could employ is one of the critical factors in determining future organizational structure. “How the U.S. Army adapts to these changes will determine their readiness to confront future operational challenges and threats.”¹⁵⁰ The development of a doctrine that encompasses the full-spectrum of conflict based on the future threat assessment may allow for the creation of a flexible force structure to change and adapt with emerging threats. Identifying future threats is not an easy task. Equally difficult is the development of a force structure to counter threats that have not yet appeared.

¹⁴⁸ *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, 36.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

Future Conflict Assessment

In order to choose a force structure that supports an overall strategy it is important to ensure that the desired force is predicated on what the possible threat is expected to be. Moreover, it should be flexible enough to adapt in structure and doctrine should unforeseen adversaries emerge. Force planners should assess future strategic challenges in relation to proposed force structure to meet possible security challenges. Addressing possible threats allows for the establishment of national strategies and helps to determine the nature of the U.S. force structure.¹⁵¹ Planning to fight a war in one method and to discover that the enemy is not who you expected or is employing different methods of combat could be detrimental to the overall success of a military operation. The difficulty in identifying possible threats to prepare a future force structure is further complicated in a democracy if there is not a clearly defined enemy with competing government agencies vying for tight resources. Before addressing what the experts believe the future threat will look like, it is necessary to understand why futuristic outlooks are critical to force planners.

Futurists

There are many people and organizations who consider future threats. They vary from journalists to academics and professionals with experience in economics, diplomacy, politics, and operational military billets.¹⁵² These assessments in turn, assist in developing a national strategy, which drives the force structure to accomplish the objectives of the strategy. Futuristic thinkers, intelligence agencies, and academia influence the way decision and policy makers think about the future.¹⁵³ These organizations and individuals raise awareness of possible threats or areas that may require U.S. assistance, which may cause decision makers to reassess strategies and means to

¹⁵¹ Bartlett, 27.

¹⁵² Ibid., 19.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 23.

meet national goals. They come from a variety of academic disciplines and professional backgrounds. Through the study of history, international relations, and economics, it becomes easier to recognize patterns and to identify possible outlooks. “The challenge to decision makers is to formulate the varying perspectives into a strategy that matches capabilities to support the nation’s security goals.”¹⁵⁴

The Outlook

Of the many sources from where the U.S. gains its strategic outlook there is probably none with a larger following than journalist Robert D. Kaplan. Kaplan gained notoriety for his book *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*, in which he predicted the Bosnian crisis in the mid 1990s. In his book *The Coming Anarchy*, Kaplan asserts, “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states, and international borders, and international drug cartels,” are some of the issues that will confront the world in the future.¹⁵⁵ He is not alone in these conclusions. *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, addresses the effects of globalization on nations who resist technological change and eludes to the possibility of conflict between groups who resist change due to their culture or values that do not support the embracement of technology.¹⁵⁶ Similarly, Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington’s book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, discusses the differences between civilizations and the likelihood of conflict between competing cultures rather than states.

Overwhelmingly, many futurists, scholars and organizations believe intrastate rather than interstate conflicts will continue to pose the most frequent threat to stability around the world. These will undoubtedly be the same reasons the U.S. could be called to act in various regions of

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 19.

¹⁵⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 7.

¹⁵⁶ Friedman defines globalization as the world integration of finance markets, nation states, and technologies within a free-market capitalism on a scale never before experienced.

the world. This is a concern due to the possibilities of “spillover,” in which the conflict could spread to other areas of a region.

As technology spreads throughout the world, it offers competing groups the ability to purchase communication systems to coordinate their operations and speed up their ability to communicate with one another. Authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, believe that new generations of terrorists and criminals will be able to coordinate their efforts while remaining dispersed.¹⁵⁷ In a mid-intensity conflict, where these measures could be applied may induce military affairs to encompass police matters as well. Arquilla and Ronfeldt further advocate the future use of information operations through advancing technology to bring nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as sympathetic advocates for various nationalistic causes who may be at odds against U.S. interests.¹⁵⁸

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has come to similar conclusions. It does not believe the U.S. will face a peer or near peer competitor in the near future. However, the CIA believes that the U.S. and the international community will have to deal with the military, political, and economic dimensions resulting from the rise of China and India and the continued decline of Russia.¹⁵⁹ The CIA furthers the notion that potential adversaries will seek to avoid a direct military confrontation with the U.S. Potential adversaries both state and non-state, will use strategies, tactics, and weapons improved with some technological advances to minimize U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. Conventional threats will remain a part of the future. “These threats are envisioned as being regional, in which a few countries maintain large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold War concepts and technologies.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Arquilla, 2.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹⁵⁹ “Future Conflict,” *Global Trends 2015: A Dialog about the Future with Nongovernment Experts* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), Internet, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html#link3>. accessed 8 Nov 01.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

The CIA's outlook for the future of war among developed countries is estimated to be low. However, it believes that the international community will continue to face conflicts around the world, ranging from frequent small-scale conflicts to less frequent regional interstate conflicts. The most likely areas of conflict will come from rivalries in Asia, such as India and Pakistan or China and Taiwan. Furthermore, the rivalries in the Middle East will continue to pose challenges that the U.S. may be forced to address. The CIA believes that all of these states potential lethality will grow, driven by the availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), longer-range missile delivery systems, and other technologies.¹⁶¹

Internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes will remain at current levels or even increase in number. The United Nations and regional organizations will be called upon to manage such conflicts because major states—stressed by domestic concerns, perceived risk of failure, lack of political will, or tight resources—will minimize their direct involvement.

Impacts on the Objective Force and to Stability Operations

From the futurist's outlook there are several key points that the Army has recognized as important to consider in its transformation toward being a viable force in the future. The U.S. Army desires to acquire the capability to rapidly deploy and to be a formidable force once on the ground. The Army is already taking steps to make itself more deployable in order to respond rapidly to contingencies around the globe. This force is called the interim force.¹⁶² It is the bridge between the 2002 force and the objective force.

The U.S. Army is seeking a force structure allowing it to be capable of performing both conventional combat operations and stability operations. TRADOC continues to believe that if

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² *Weapons Systems: United States Army 2001*, 2.

the objective force can accomplish conventional warfare tasks it can easily transition to stability operation-type tasks.¹⁶³ The British Army case study demonstrates the considerable amount of time for conventional army units to train for conventional wartime tasks upon completion of a stability operation mission. It is highly likely that this will remain a challenge in the future. The transition from combat to stability operations could be further complicated if objective force units were operating in a non-permissive environment. Based on what many believe the future to hold it may be time to reconsider organizational roles and responsibilities within the future U.S. Army's force structure.

Possible Future Operational Challenges

The U.S. Army acting as part of a joint force may participate in a military action unilaterally. Traditional allies may not support U.S. actions.¹⁶⁴ Others may be slow to deploy. Conducting military action as part of a coalition and with allies is a key part of U.S. strategy. Without coalition support the U.S. may not have the ability to conduct an operation unilaterally in regards to world opinion. This prediction further strengthens the requirement of the objective force retaining a stability-type organization to handle stability operations in the areas between where the objective force will be conducting conventional operations on a nonlinear battlefield. Another scenario may entail the U.S. having to commit forces to a stability operation while at the same time remain prepared to deploy to an area with a conventional requirement.

It is likely that the UN will continue to coordinate peacekeeping and observation forces following conflicts. However, the UN still requires time to establish the force and to coordinate the efforts of the force that acts under the auspices of the UN.¹⁶⁵ An internal stability asset of the U.S. Army would be able to immediately conduct stability operation tasks while a conflict is

¹⁶³ *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, 33.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

underway and would be an ideal force to transition control of an operation over to a UN controlled force. Many of the futurists predict that regional conflicts will be the norm. On a final note, a UN force may not be the correct organization to command a peacekeeping or observation mission. Due to regional politics and cultures, it may require a regional coalition that is not tied to the UN.¹⁶⁶

Potential adversaries are likely to harness technology as well. Potential adversaries could use available technology to coordinate their efforts against the U.S. Army's objective force vulnerabilities.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, they may develop countermeasures to the high tech capabilities of the objective force. The technology of the objective force may not be able to differentiate between civilians and combatants who attempt to blend in with the indigenous population. Again, a constabulary type force would not be directly involved in the conduct of a combat operation. However, it would be providing "rear" security to the objective force and conducting a stability operation mission that would be able to react quicker and may have knowledge before an incident occurs through the nature of dealing with the people on the street and the various non-government organizations (NGOs) involved in a stability operation mission.

The U.S. Army is expected to operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment that poses complex challenges and a wider range of threats. "These include regional instabilities, fragmented states, terrorism, religious and ethnic strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian crises."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 122.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁶⁷ *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, 6.

¹⁶⁸ *Weapons Systems: United States Army*, 1.

The U.S. does not expect to meet a near peer competitor in the future. This does not mean that it should not be prepared for major theater war.¹⁶⁹ The focus of the objective force is on conventional conflict and its capabilities. Doctrine and technology for the objective force has not been formulated. The future outlook indicates that the U.S. will require a dedicated ability to address stability operations. The initial information on the objective force indicates conflict occurring simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict, but fails to address the future organization of the U.S. Army in accomplishing the tasks it will have to achieve in such an environment. Specifically, identifying forces to conduct stability operations while protecting or conducting shaping or sustaining operations in the areas away from the decisive operation of the objective force while it conducts conventional combat.

Conclusions

Historically and doctrinally, at the tactical level of war when commanders were unsure of the enemy's size or location they would initially lead with a small force in order to make contact with the enemy while maintaining the majority of the forces out of contact.¹⁷⁰ They did this in order to develop the situation while retaining a large reserve in order to counter the worse case scenario. It appears that the objective force planners are attempting to do the same with the U.S. Army since potential adversaries are unknown and the types of operations the U.S. Army is expected to participate in vary. Rather than acknowledge that it would be beneficial at this time in U.S. history to have dedicated units prepared to execute stability operations, it is continuing to hedge its force addressing it as a 'full-spectrum force' capable of handling all missions, equally well across the spectrum of conflict.

¹⁶⁹ *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, 7.

¹⁷⁰ *FM 3-0 Operations*, 7-8.

Arguably, it appears that the objective force will be smaller in size than the current U.S. Army. It is debatable that if the objective force is to accomplish all of the missions associated with the full-spectrum of combat it will have to become larger than the current force structure, assign specific missions other than conventional warfare to some of its units, or both if it is to be successful. Based on the initial concept it appears that the objective force may be smaller than the current U.S. Army. Although smaller and more deployable, the objective force expects to exploit technology as the means to maintain an advantage over potential adversaries.

The implementation of the objective force is expected to speed up the tempo of conventional operations. This has an impact on the overall conduct on an operation since tempo is increased. It is likely that this will cause a convergence of the many types of operations along the spectrum of conflict. Based on the harnessing of technology the logistics requirements for the objective force are also expected to change. For instance, vehicles may not require as much fuel and can move longer distances without having to refuel. However, as long as soldiers are fighting there will continue to be a sustainment requirement to ensure that soldiers have adequate water and food while in combat. The implication for the objective force is that it must not only be able to fight and win conventional battles but also be able to accomplish missions at the lower end of the spectrum such as stability operations or conduct both simultaneously.

It appears that the objective force is continuing to be driven and designed as if the Cold War was still occurring. However, based on the assessments of many futurists the likelihood of engaging a near peer competitor is unlikely, while there is a greater chance of engaging in smaller scale contingencies and stability operations. Based on the predictions of these many organizations and people the U.S. Army should change to address the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The concept of a lighter and faster force is what the Army will need for the future. Some aspects of the objective force such as its lighter more deployable structure is an aspect that is a change from the heavy structure of the U.S. Army in 2002. The vagueness of *TRADOC PAM 525-3-0*, Draft, may infer that since the objective force is a full-spectrum force, it

may require commanders to designate a stability-type of force within units of action. This may be a designation that rotates through a brigade or battalion or it may be a permanent organization within the organization. Since it is not clear, it would make sense that this assumption would have to be true if the force is truly prepared to conduct full-spectrum operations.

What is unclear is if the problems identified with the objective force are organizational or doctrinal in nature. Developing or refining Army doctrine will allow for some of the ambiguities about the objective force to be cleared up. Undoubtedly, some support operations such as peace keeping would be applicable missions for the conventional units of the objective force rather than a stability-type unit. Once the situation was stabilized, the conventional units could hand the mission over to a stability-type unit rather than wait for a UN force or coalition forces who may not be prepared to execute once hostilities ceased. Force planners should address the possibility that operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict will continue to occur. They should not assume that these conflicts will occur sequentially, but rather simultaneously combined with a conventional operation, which would probably require the employment of the objective force.

The objective force is likely to have a smaller structure than the units in existence today. Arguably, the units of action will require as much training if not more for their conventional war time roles. This is based on their dispersed nature and the technological reliant systems they will employ. It is expected that the objective force will continue to be faced with support operations in the unknown future. It is unclear as to what the total size of the force will be. This statement raises more questions than it answers. For instance, a smaller force may have to support more manpower intensive humanitarian operations while having to maintain its conventional readiness. A smaller force with a commitment to the same number or more stability operations that exist in 2002 may hamper its ability to transition from stability operations to conventional combat operations. Thus requiring longer training periods before units are considered ready for combat. The future is further blurred if these various types of operations occur simultaneously or if the U.S. is acting unilaterally.

Although the number of soldiers required to effectively engage a conventional fighting enemy will be less, the nature of stability operations will continue to require significant numbers of soldiers on the ground providing support to accomplish the task required. By their nature, stability operations such as humanitarian assistance do not require the exact same technologically advanced equipment to accomplish the tasks at hand. The same may be true in the rear areas of a conventional operation. Using the example of the German Army in Russia and Yugoslavia during WW II, the Germans initially fought well against these two countries' forces while the fight was conventional. However, the German's tactical prowess and relatively modern equipment experienced difficulties once they were faced with an adversary who employed asymmetric means against German occupation forces. They used guerrilla operations conducted by individuals who did not wear uniforms, did not attempt to engage the Germans in open combat, and blended in with the local population. "The Germans learned, that the only forces that mattered were those that were lightly armed—police, light infantry, mountaineers, special forces, signals units, and above all, intelligence personnel of every kind."¹⁷¹

Advantages to assimilating U.S. Constabulary roles into the Objective Force

The U.S. Constabulary demonstrated the importance of a dedicated trained force to conduct post conflict operations. Although the Constabulary was not constituted directly upon conclusion of hostilities in Europe, it reinforces the notion that the U.S. requires units to immediately conduct stability operations upon conclusion of hostilities if overall strategic objectives are to be met. With the establishment of a dedicated force to handle post-conflict duties it would assist in signaling U.S. commitment to an area. This is critical within the world community who often view the U.S. as non-committal if the region is not critical to U.S. strategy. "The U.S. is

¹⁷¹ Martin Van Creveld, "Through a Glass, Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War," *Naval College Review*, Autumn 2000, 34.

notorious for initially underestimating the investment required and then losing patience with military involvement in non-critical regions.”¹⁷² This will be especially true in the future if the U.S. must act unilaterally or if U.S. friends and allies cannot agree on what an endstate should look like. The U.S. Constabulary example supports a separate force with an assigned mission working with conventional units. The separate unit concept allowed conventional units to focus on their missions while the U.S. Constabulary maintained order in Germany.

Due to the continuous changing nature of world politics, the U.S. Constabulary reinforced the policy of using soldiers with conventional specialties in order to maintain flexibility within the U.S. Army. The U.S. Constabulary was not strictly composed of military policemen. It was a force composed of infantrymen, tankers, cavalrymen, and signal soldiers, along with almost every other military specialty that was contained in an American division. Although the occupation mission required more police work, the soldiers all possessed individual basic military skills which enhanced their duties as members of a tactical unit with a specific mission other than fighting as opposed to the remainder of the U.S. Army. Additionally, the fact that the Constabulary was composed of ordinary soldiers, organized similarly to U.S. Army conventional units allowed it to quickly transition to a conventional role in which it was equipped to fight a delaying action against a hostile force.

U.S. Army leadership at the time, recognized that the task of maintaining order in Germany required a different set of skills for its soldiers to obtain if they were to be successful in attaining the goals set forth for post-war Germany. They recognized that conventional units were not the correct choice to maintain law and order, which might undermine the objectives the U.S. was attempting to achieve. It was difficult for American soldiers to transition from using maximum force to minimal force in performing their duties. The U.S. Constabulary verified that U.S. Army units with a stability operation focus were the ideal organization to conduct post-hostility

¹⁷² Steven Metz, “The American Army in the Balkans: Strategic Alternatives and Implications,” Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2001/balkans/balkans.htm> accessed 9 August 2001.

operations. The Constabulary understood the political and economic dynamics occurring within the U.S. Zone of Occupation. This understanding allowed for closer cooperation and eventual attainment of the U.S. goals.

During and immediately following WW II, the U.S. Army had within its ranks enough manpower to support the U.S. Constabulary. It is unlikely that the U.S. Army in the future will enjoy this luxury. However, the requirement to conduct stability operations will continue. Stability operations by their nature are manpower intensive. Objective force designers will have to thoroughly evaluate how this smaller force will conduct these operations without hindering its ability to respond to conventional threats. Similarly, objective force designers must be cognizant of the time required to train objective force soldiers for conventional operations upon conclusion of a stability operation. The establishment of a separate constabulary-like unit in the objective force will allow conventional units to focus their training efforts on conventional operations. Additionally, the objective force may not have the convenience of conducting separate sequential operations. It is likely that many operations could occur simultaneously limiting the objective forces ability to meet all requirements.

The flexibility in organizational design combined with the general military specialties of the soldiers, provided the U.S. not only an effective unit to maintain law and order in Germany, but as a deterrent to possible adversaries. Ultimately, this allowed the U.S. Army reconfigure its Constabulary units to conventional units almost seamlessly once the Soviet threat became credible.

Disadvantages of identifying U.S. Constabulary with the Objective Force

As previously noted the U.S. Army was able to constitute the Constabulary due to the overwhelming number of soldiers in its ranks at the conclusion of the war. Similarly, the Constabulary operated in a permissive environment where the people of Germany accepted the unit and did not actively seek methods for their removal. The case of the U.S. Constabulary

further highlights that this unit was organized and conducted one stability operation in one geographic area. It does not demonstrate how the U.S. Army would have responded to multiple stability operation requirements or if the Constabulary would have been integrated with conventional units conducting conventional operations.

Although the U.S. Constabulary's use of conventional soldiers to fill its ranks can be identified as being one of the contributing factors that led to the organization's benefit, objective force designers can also view the Constabulary's method of using conventional specialties within its ranks negatively due to the factor of time involved in re-training soldiers and organizations. If the Constabulary had to transition to a conventional role, it would have still required time, a factor the objective force may not have the ability to control. The issue of maintaining military proficiency in both conventional and stability individual tasks did not exist within the Constabulary. Although the organization was organized and conducted patrols using armor and mechanized movement techniques, it would have likely required a significant transition period to train for a conventional role. However, the Constabulary's primary task was its stability operation and not conventional warfare.

The U.S. Constabulary maintained a separate uniform and were distinct in their appearance from their conventional unit contemporaries. The defined uniqueness of the organization may have been applicable then since it was enforcing laws over U.S. servicemembers as well as civilians. The composition of their uniform is not important, what is important to objective force planners is that a separate organization enhancing the capabilities of the objective force by definition of its mission could be perceived by adversaries in any environment as an organization less capable than conventional objective force units. A constabulary type unit within the objective force would have to have the similar characteristics of objective force units with the exception of the mission they were executing. This would prevent the perception that the unit was not anything less than the U.S. Army.

Advantages to Assimilating British Army Techniques into the Objective Force

The British method of tasking a unit with a mission in Northern Ireland allows for a training focus at the unit level and highlights to the British Ministry of Defense that that same unit will not be available for conventional wartime tasks. This system works well with operations that are established. However, the system becomes dysfunctional once additional stability operations are introduced and units are committed. If stability operations consume an army, it raises the question of the army's ability to conduct conventional wartime tasks if required.

The British Army can attribute much of its success to its ability to train conventional soldiers for the specific operation in Northern Ireland and to capitalize on lessons that have been captured from first hand experience. One of the most applicable lessons the British have used in Northern Ireland and that is applicable to the objective force is that mobility at the tactical level must be as good as their adversaries if not better. The British Army has capitalized on its ability to communicate and to employ numerous squads on patrol. Although terrorists usually maintain surprise and dictate when they will strike, the British Army maintains the capability to quickly cordon suspected areas before their adversaries can escape. The objective force's ability to converge at one or many different points from dispersed origins would be required in order to establish a presence or reinforce existing forces is a clear benefit the objective force's capabilities could exploit.

The use of the Royal Irish Regiment in Northern Ireland has more policy implications to the overall defense of the U.S. The British use this regiment as a permanent organization in Northern Ireland with a focus of supporting the RUC and the roulement battalions. It is similar to the U.S. Army National Guard with the exception that the majority of the soldiers in this unit are full time. The objective force could benefit from the addition of a larger active guard force within the Army. An active Guard could be more responsive to homeland defense requirements, while other

part-time Guard units could augment the objective force by focusing their training efforts on stability operations versus the current practice of many units training for a conventional role. By focusing the Guard on stability operations, it would provide a trained force in stability operations that has practical applications in assisting their individual states during time of need. Additionally, if these units were federalized they would be able to augment the objective force by providing the capability of executing a stability operation while the objective force focused its efforts on the conventional fight.

The British policy of maintaining an active presence in Northern Ireland to deter terrorist acts demonstrates that stability operations are manpower intensive. It also highlights that technology may not be the ‘save all’ in stability operations. These types of operations require people to assist in tasks varying from separating belligerents to rebuilding infrastructure to issuing supplies. Additionally, these operations tend to demonstrate that technology may not be able to assist in identifying antagonists from civilians and require soldiers on the street to counter this threat. Arguably, the same is applicable to stability operations. An interesting corollary can be formed; “as the technological sophistication of an enemy declines, the more reliant we are on intelligence derived from human sources.”¹⁷³ In most stability operations the U.S. Army will be used to help shape people’s minds. Hearts, minds, and hunger do not respond well to the use of force.

Disadvantages of British Army Techniques with the Objective Force

One of the largest arguments against comparing the British in Northern Ireland with possible capabilities for the objective force is that this operation is considered an internal issue. The British Army is fully within its confines to execute this operation in order to bring stability to the Province. The U.S. has maintained anxiety over using federal soldiers to maintain order within its borders since it was established. However, since September 11th, 2001, the British example may bring to the forefront the future role of the U.S. Army in homeland defense issues.

Since Northern Ireland is considered an internal issue, the British do not require outside assistance with the mission. The U.S. is expected to continue to use and rely on allies and coalitions in support of military operations in which it is involved. This highlights some of the anxiety felt by U.S. allies on the effects of interoperability with the objective force. The advances in technology that the U.S. armed forces are striving for will undoubtedly outpace those of our allies and potential coalition partners. Understandably, many of the U.S. allies' economies do not support large military budgets, which will be required to maintain pace with the objective force. This may be acceptable if the U.S. must act unilaterally. However, the objective force design may produce unintended consequences in which the U.S. must act unilaterally in conventional operations or relegate allies and partners to roles other than fighting.

A final compelling argument against comparing the British in Northern Ireland with the objective force is that Great Britain does not have the capability or the desire to maintain large conventional army units. The U.S. is the only nation in 2002 that has the capability to deploy its conventional forces around the globe in order to influence world events. It is likely the U.S. will continue to pursue this capability in the future in which it can defend its interests around the globe. Objective force innovations are based on technology. Before objective force planners rely on technology to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, it may be beneficial to assess how the U.S. Constabulary and British Army organized themselves for stability operations.

Discussion and Relevance to the Objective Force

The case studies of the U.S. Constabulary following WW II and the British Army in Northern Ireland are valid case studies that can assist the U.S. Army's objective force in demonstrating a need for clear doctrine and an effective organization to support that doctrine. Both organizations were effective. However, both organizations operated under different circumstances and in different periods of history. Additionally, the two case studies highlight that the objective force

¹⁷³ Carlough, 217.

does not require a constabulary type unit, but a unit dedicated to training for and being the primary unit to conduct stability operations.

Both case studies demonstrate that the stability operations performed by army units provided flexibility to the overall state of the respective armies. However, they also demonstrate that it takes time to train soldiers for the mission involving stability operations and it requires time to re-train soldiers for their conventional warfighting tasks. The cases also demonstrate that stability operations are manpower intensive. This is a consideration objective force planners should address, considering the overall design for a force that is reliant on technology. The assumption can be made that it is likely that the objective force will require more training to perform its conventional war fighting tasks due to the nature of dispersed units and its reliance on technology.

The case studies focused on one operation. However, the British Army did demonstrate that its units were capable of performing similar missions upon completion of training or a deployment to Northern Ireland. This allowed for shorter training periods in which units were being deployed to Balkans or to other stability operations. Both examples reinforce the argument that war fighting requires different skills and reactions from stability operations. It can be inferred that participating in support operations requires a different temperament on the part of soldiers and leaders conducting the support operation. Additionally, it requires time and training before soldiers are prepared to conduct a stability operation upon completing a war time training period or war. Similarly, the same if not more training is required of the inverse.

One large organization of soldiers with a single focus of preparing for stability operations is probably not the correct organization to enhance the capabilities of the objective force. Unlike the U.S. Constabulary and the British Army in Northern Ireland, the objective force is likely to face numerous stability operations around the world. A single organization would probably not be able to effectively control the numerous operations due to geography and the amount of soldiers required to conduct such an operation. Arguably, it is difficult to envision such an

organization handling more than one since the duration of many stability operations are lengthy and could be considered a limiting factor for such an organization. Additionally, it would be difficult for one organization to be proficient in all of the types of missions that encompass stability operations. Ultimately, by limiting the U.S. Army to one stability operation organization would eventually cause the conventional units to pick up the missions, thus defeating one of the purposes for having a stability operation type force. More importantly, by having several organizations trained in stability operations would provide the objective force with trained command and control elements to better plan and control stability operations.

However, the establishment of organizations trained and prepared for stability operations within the objective force is valuable. This force would be able to provide a seamless transition from combat to support operations upon completion of hostilities. It would enable a state to begin to re-establish its viable infrastructure more quickly than waiting for allies or politicians to figure out what the follow-on force structure would be composed.

Using conventional units to conduct stability operations works in the short-term to initially establish security. However, beyond that their efficiency is questionable. Conventional skills erode while the nature of stability operations do not allow for clearly identifiable results or timetables for states to disengage. Conventional forces work well if the units are working with a set of operations that equate to following a schedule. However, the effectiveness begins to degrade once the schedule is disrupted and conventional capabilities are required for other contingencies.

Noticeably, both case studies occurred under different circumstances and at different times in history. The U.S. Constabulary following WW II and the British Army's active peace enforcement role in Northern Ireland after police could not stop internal disorder in 1969. The British roulement policy in Northern Ireland is similar to what the U.S. Army does with the rotation of units in and out of Bosnia and Kosovo. Since 1969, the British have been deploying units to Northern Ireland and will likely continue into the future. The British do not have the

desire nor the ability to project its forces around the globe unlike the U.S. who is looked upon to be the leader and the only nation in the world with the ability to deploy its army in support of its policies.

The U.S. Army of 2002 is a full-spectrum force. Units across the Army are conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict. Combat units are conducting stability operations. Upon completion of a mission to conduct a stability operation, they require further training prior to being committed to a conventional role. The U.S. Constabulary following WW II provided stability in Germany, allowed combat units to focus on wartime tasks, or to go home with the demobilization effort. The U.S. Constabulary provided flexibility to the U.S. Army. Since it was manned by combat arms soldiers, they had basic warfighting skills which proved valuable when they were converted back to conventional units once a conventional threat appeared. The British Army maintains the same capability by rotating conventional soldiers through the stability operation in Northern Ireland.

A stability operation type organization enhancing the capabilities of the objective force could provide a similar flexibility. Since the unit would be composed of conventional specialties, they would not only be the correct unit to employ at the lower end of the conflict spectrum due to their inherent mission, they could additionally be a deterrent to further escalation. Similar to the U.S. Constabulary, an objective force stability operations unit would enhance the capabilities of the objective force. A stability operation force organized along similar lines of a unit of action, capitalizing on the same technology of the objective force would ultimately contribute to the overall success of the objective force at both ends of the spectrum of conflict. In the event a bipolar world reemerges, stability operation forces could transition to form additional units if required.

Both cases demonstrate the small unit leadership developed by junior NCOs and officers benefited the organizations. The British experience in Northern Ireland including preparing for the deployment and the execution of the mission in Northern Ireland supports small-unit

leadership. This may be an important advantage to advocating the continued use of conventional units of the objective force since it is envisioned as operating decentralized, without the physical overwatch of large organizations at point of impact.

If specific missions for objective force units are not adopted, it may require the Army National Guard and Reserve to change their heavy units to stability operations units. This would be a shortfall in which the active forces would require assistance. A stability operation focus for selected Guard units would have more applicability to state mission of disaster assistance and would benefit individual states and the active U.S. Army collectively.

The Cost issue

A single force capable of accomplishing all of the missions equally well, across the spectrum of conflict will come at a high price. Unfortunately, the price is usually too high and the military will have to conduct operations with less than it desires. Cost combined with the precarious position the U.S. Army is in with having to be prepared to fight a conventional war to executing stability operations, lends itself to re-structuring in order to successfully meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. “The Army must continue to refine the way it is organized for peace support, seeking to optimize effectiveness and efficiency without eroding warfighting capabilities.”¹⁷⁴ Cost is misleading.

U.S. military forces essentially provide an international “public good” by underwriting the security upon which global stability, interdependence, and ultimately prosperity depend. If the U.S. forces that provide this public good are stretched thin because they are under-funded, the result may be a decline in world stability and prosperity. Given the contribution of U.S. military power to a global prosperity which benefits the US disproportionately, cost should be kept relative to the ends the U.S. is attempting to accomplish.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Steven Metz, “The American Army in the Balkans: Strategic Alternatives and Implications,” Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2001/balkans/balkans.htm> accessed 9 August 2001.

¹⁷⁵ Mackubin T. Owens, “Primacy and Global Leadership: A Grand Strategy for Republican Empire.” .

This point should be articulated and reinforced by the U.S. Army leadership when it is justifying its force requirements and the cost involved in carrying out the strategy of the United States.

The authors of TRADOC's draft *Pamphlet 525-3-0*, continue to emphasize that "objective forces must be decisive at every point on the spectrum of military operations."¹⁷⁶ They further state that objective forces "must be capable of simultaneously conducting warfighting and stability operations and transitioning smoothly from one category of mission to the other and back again without any loss of momentum or operational focus."¹⁷⁷ This statement implies that the U.S. Army will continue to use general purpose forces without adequately addressing the possible erosion of combat skills as units conduct stability operations. There is little doubt that the objective force could conduct warfighting and stability operations simultaneously. The question arises to how much of the force would be required and how large of an adversary would the U.S. face?

The British have learned and acknowledged that units conducting stability operations are different from the units required to conduct conventional operations. The amount of skills an objective force soldier will have to become proficient at in order to be prepared for combat may require more training and time. Stability operations will likely continue to be manpower intensive in which soldiers continue to gain valuable leadership experience while larger unit combat readiness will erode. .

Finally, expecting soldiers to operate as if they were machines is not realistic. Training a combat unit for stability operations will continue to require time that the U.S. may not have. Expecting a soldier to automatically change his mindset and use minimal force at a moment's notice is asking for more than any reasonable leader can expect out of his soldiers. This can be attributable to the likely continued difficulty in identifying combatants from innocents, the likelihood of operating in an urban environment, and the possibility of the rules of engagement

not changing fast enough to address the situation. It may lead to ambiguities which could result in the loss of life to soldiers or cause a relatively minor operation to backfire and cause the U.S. to lose its legitimacy in the operation.

The establishment of a stability operation type force would enable the U.S. Army to have a relatively small, but well-trained force prepared to execute stability operations, such as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The specified mission would also allow staffs to be more familiar and proficient in planning and leading these types of operations. It is anticipated that much of the technology developed for the objective force will have beneficial implications for stability operations in addition to the obvious benefit of conventional warfare. Although it is likely that units will be tasked to conduct operations other than war, it is doubtful how prepared they will be upon notification. Assigning tactical tasks to units, as in the cases of the U.S. Constabulary and the British Army in Northern Ireland would ultimately allow the objective force to focus its unit's training and to improve its overall ability to effectively prepare for missions across the spectrum of conflict without degrading readiness.

Recommendations

The Army must maintain its warfighting focus. However, to maintain its effectiveness the objective force concept must dedicate conventional units to stability operations while conventional warfare missions occur simultaneously. If the U.S. Army cannot dedicate units then it should provide units with a mission to conduct stability operations as part of its doctrine. If the mission rotated to organizations within the unit of action for a certain period of time, the stability-

¹⁷⁶ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept, 7.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 7.

type operation unit would likely be allocated training time to train for the tasks required. This would ultimately result in the entire force benefiting from the rotation procedure.

Any unit either created or assigned a stability operation mission should have some conventional capabilities. The units created to support stability operations may be either active or, if the active structure is too limited in its ability to accept the mission, transferred to some of the National Guard. This would benefit individual states and the U.S. Army in its ability to conduct stability operations.

The Army is reviewing force structure and its ability to adequately address the challenges of the twenty-first century. The result of the force structure review is called the objective force and is generally a good concept. It is harnessing technology to combine the effects of intelligence, information, mobility, and lethality into a force that can strike at many different locations from varying directions. Once technology catches up to the concept, it will drastically change the way the U.S. Army conducts conventional warfare. However, there are parts of the objective force concept that need to be readdressed. Specifically, the control and management of the “white space,” or areas out of contact. Similarly tied to the “white space” are the stability operation missions the U.S. will most likely confront, according to the futurists, well into the twenty-first century.

The objective force is a concept in which the U.S. Army of 2002 is attempting to shape itself for future combat operations. Although only a concept, the U.S. Army is spending much intellectual and fiscal resources in pursuit of the future. Before the Army adopts this concept, the objective force designers must review organizational and doctrinal challenges that have not been adequately addressed to meet the expectations of a full-spectrum operations force.

Based on the findings of this monograph, it is clear that a dedicated stability-type force would enhance the overall capabilities of the objective force. The establishment or identifying a separate unit within the objective force to focus its training efforts on stability operations tasks will enhance the objective force’s overall ability to conduct full-spectrum operations. The case

studies of the U.S. Constabulary and the British Army in Northern Ireland advocate the establishment and assigning specific roles to units within the respective armies. The objective force designers should do the same.

Arguably, the U.S. is expected to enjoy the latitude of not having a peer competitor that threatens its interests or way of life. Although the U.S. does not have a clearly defined adversary, futurists have predicted types of operations the U.S. is likely to become involved with in the twenty-first century. To meet the predicted operational requirements, it is necessary for force planners to abandon their Cold War thought processes and take note of the developing threat environment and capabilities. The U.S. should capitalize on this unique period in history in order to correctly develop the objective force with its technological advanced systems and build within the organization a flexible doctrine combined with a flexible organization to address potential operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The organization should not be so rigid that it cannot adapt to the changing global environment. Developing a doctrine to address diverse threats will assist objective force planners to an adequate organization structure and roles for the units within the objective force. Current information pertaining to the objective force alludes to the need for units to conduct specified missions other than combat in order for the objective force to succeed. This does not mean that the objective force should not be prepared to conduct conventional combat operations. It means that the objective force must assess its organizational structures and roles in order to conduct full-spectrum operations.

The size of the stability-type operation organization should exist as a part of a unit of action such as today's ACRs, brigades, or battalions with a primary task of training for stability operations. This would allow conventional elements time to prepare and focus their training efforts on conventional warfare. It would ultimately enhance the overall capabilities of the objective force. A stability-type operation organization would require a staff with the ability to

manage the training and contingency planning required of a division. It would probably need to have the same command relationships as today's ACR's, with one assigned per corps.

Such an organization would be considered a supporting unit to the conventional units during conventional conflict. It would be able to provide security for logistic assets and when required control the space between combat organizations and the support units. It would likely conduct stability operations simultaneously while objective force conventional units executed combat operations. Objective force conventional units could focus on the battle while the stability operation force could provide units to logistic area or perform stability operations within the area of operations. During stability operations, stability-type units would be the supported unit with the expertise to lead the operation supported or augmented by conventional objective force units.

A stability-type unit should be organized and equipped along similar lines of objective force units of action capitalizing on the technological advances. "There are dangers to relying on technology. Dangers to investing in the technological approach often leads to a smaller force with much more expensive platforms. "The emphasis on technology may undervalue the unique skills and other attributes that humans contribute to success or failure in war."¹⁷⁸ A stability-type operation unit should be robust and flexible enough to defend itself, while maintaining maneuverability. In the event a peer competitor emerges or that the global situation changed so that it was not prudent to maintain such a force, it could transition more easily to a conventional unit of action role within its parent organization.

A dedicated stability-type operation organization should be a fixed organization implemented with the objective force as with the case of the U.S. Constabulary. This would provide a focus for training and an organization proficient in stability operations. Additionally, by assigning a specific mission to an organization would allow for the establishment of a standard Table of

¹⁷⁸ Bartlett, 30.

Organization and Equipment (TO&E) allowing it to train and maintain specific equipment unique to the organization. Conventional soldiers should be assigned to the organization as part of the U.S. Army's personnel distribution system. Upon completion of their assignment, they would rotate back to a conventional unit. A stability-type operation organization composed of combat arms soldiers would further provide a deterrent to potential adversaries in stability operations. This force would not be just military policemen, but a force capable of effectively defending itself while conducting a stability operation.

It is imperative to have a unit capable of conducting stability operations immediately upon entry to a theater or upon conclusion of operations. Subsequent occupation or follow-on missions upon cessation of hostilities are as much a part of war as the actual fighting. Typically, strategic objectives will be established prior to actual combat operations and will likely require the U.S. Army maintaining a presence and assisting a nation to meet those objectives. The inability to influence and provide assets immediately upon completion of hostilities could have strategic implications unsupportive of strategic goals. A dedicated force with a stability role would be more responsive to conduct post-conflict operations immediately without having to wait on political agreements or allies to arrive in theater.

Finally, a stability-type operation force should not be viewed as a separate organization, but rather a specialized unit that would ultimately be a force multiplier during conventional combat operations. In the conduct of stability operations, it would enhance the U.S. Army's objective force in its ability to shape the security environment. A stability-type force would likely provide trained staffs familiar with stability operations along with adequate command and control capabilities to accomplish the tasks such as coordinating with NGOs and humanitarian assistance missions that are not necessarily inherent considerations in conventional war planning and execution.

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