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ABSTRACT

FUTURE NATO FORCE STRUCTURES – INCREASED DEGREE OF MULTINATIONALITY GERMAN EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES

by Lieutenant Colonel Ruediger Gottzein, German Army, 58 pages (including appendices).

In the Cold War era, massive armed forces were required, especially in Central Europe, to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, the security situation has changed dramatically. The nations were able to reduce their armed forces considerably, thus reaping the "peace dividend."

However, the massive threat has been replaced by other risks which require the nations to provide flexible and mobile forces suited for a broad spectrum of operations. The employment of armed forces in the 21st century will nearly always require multinational efforts to keep or restore the peace in crisis areas.

In 1990/91, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded to this requirement by setting up several multinational corps in Central Europe comprising reaction forces, main defense forces and backup reaction forces. The corresponding decisions were influenced both by political and by military aspects. Although the composition of these multinational units has been changed several times, the principle of multinationality has become firmly established as a basis for operations of modern armed forces.

Germany has supported and pushed the idea of multinational structures from the very beginning. In some cases, multinational units were activated for political rather than for military reasons with a view to visibly demonstrating the nations' will to cooperate. The military effectiveness of these units had yet to be demonstrated. The experiences until now allow to evaluate the political and military value of multinational forces and to draw conclusions for the future.

This paper deals with the question of to what extent the principle of multinationality should drive the degree of integration of future force structures. The various integration models, i.e. the "lead-nation model," the "framework model" and the "integration model," are examined for their advantages and disadvantages, considering both political and military arguments.

The paper concludes that the deeper the degree of integration is in peacetime, the more successful a unit will be on operations. The paper recognizes the difficulties in overcoming legal problems as well as the difficulties in mutual understanding due to different cultures, training principles and doctrine, and, of course, due to language problems. However, based on the examples of the Franco-German Brigade and the German-Dutch Corps, the paper illustrates that these problems can be solved.

With its multinational force structures, the military can contribute considerably to the creation of a European security and defense identity, and to the unification of Europe.

Future NATO Force Structures
– Increased Degree of Multinationality?
German Experiences and Perspectives

A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Ruediger Gottzein
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
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
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I INTRODUCTION

On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty¹ was signed by twelve European and North American nations. The solidarity and reliability of the Alliance have created a zone of security and stability in Europe. The end of the East-West confrontation has caused worldwide changes. From the early 1990s, NATO has witnessed a sweeping reform process and it has adapted to the new security environment. The decisions made in this connection also had a strong impact on the structure of the armed forces in Europe². As a result there is no alternative to multinational armed forces in Europe.

Force structures are not an end in themselves, but have to be designed in a way to enable the armed forces to achieve the security objectives in an optimum way. Thus, if the security environment and the objectives change, the structure of the armed forces may have to be adjusted too. It is no wonder then, that the radical changes in the security environment from 1990 - 2000 have had a major impact on the military structures. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany and due to the call for a peace dividend, the majority of the Western states have considerably reduced the number of their armed forces.

But the end of the East-West conflict has not only changed the force structures in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality. Massive armed forces capable of countering a large-scale attack after a short warning time were no longer required. That is why in 1990, the NATO nations agreed to reduce the number of their armed forces and to rely increasingly on reserves in the future.³ This general declaration of intent was

subsequently defined in more detail at a meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in May 1991.⁴

The Ministers of Defense decided to divide the armed forces into Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and Augmentation Forces, and to create several multinational corps in the central region. This decision was driven by both political and also by military considerations.

“The task of providing security through deterrence and collective defence remains unchanged. However, the quite different security situation of the 1990s has allowed Alliance forces to take on new roles in addition to fulfilling this primary function.”⁵

The broad spectrum of missions to include peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid required the ability to react immediately. Taking into considerations that the forces would be reduced, different categories of forces were the best solution. It is in the interest of the NATO nations to respond to a crisis in the future with many nations involved in order to increase the international political pressure. Consequently the principle of multinationality has been introduced to NATO's force structure on corps level and below. The *NATO Handbook* describes the importance of multinationality for the Alliance as follows:

“Increased ‘multinationality’ has also been an important factor in the development of the new defence posture. It has provided enhanced opportunities for multinational task sharing among Allies, allowing military capabilities available to NATO to be maintained or enhanced and ensuring that the most effective use can be made of resources allocated for defence purposes. The principle of ‘multinationality’ is of key importance for NATO's solidarity and cohesion, for the conduct of Alliance missions, and as a disincentive for the renationalisation of defence policy.”⁶

Since multinationality has been discussed within NATO, Germany has been a strong supporter of this idea and has contributed forces to all multinational formations for many years. Based on the lessons learned during the last ten years and after the first

employments of multinational forces in the former Yugoslavia, the different types of multinational structures can be evaluated and conclusions for future force planning can be drawn. In order to limit the scope of this paper, NATO headquarters and multinational coalitions will not be considered. This study focuses on the following permanent multinational forces in Europe:

- Franco-German Brigade
- II (GE/US) Corps and V (US/GE) Corps
- ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
- EURO Corps
- GE/NL Corps and
- Multinational Corps Northeast

The Multinational Division (C) will be covered in the chapter on the ARRC.

The objective of this study is to identify the capabilities and limitations of multinational force structures, to evaluate the models reflecting different degrees of integration and, as a result, to answer the question whether in the future NATO should seek a deeper integration of its forces in multinational structures in Europe. Although this paper is based on experience, primarily from the German perspective, it will also briefly address the attitudes of Germany's most important allies, the United States, France and Great Britain.

II THE CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In contrast to the political and strategic situation of the Cold War characterized by a one-dimensional threat situation, the challenges have become multidimensional. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the transatlantic cooperation within the Alliance has created a zone of stability in Central Europe which so far has been unparalleled in European

history. For the first time, Germany is surrounded by friendly nations only. It is this stability, that has to extend all across Europe. But even this security environment is not free from risks. Instead of one major threat the Western world is now confronted with a multitude of minor risks. These risks are both of a military and a non-military nature. In general, the current threat can best be described by instability. There are many causes for instability. Non-military risks include mass migration as a result of underdevelopment, overpopulation and hunger, cross-border crime and the fight for natural resources and water. The development of sophisticated communications media brings with it the risk of the employment of weapons of mass disruption.⁷ In the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, ethnic, religious and nationalistic differences are deeply rooted which may even erupt into violent conflicts from time to time. Fundamentalism and terrorism in conjunction with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the major risks for the Western community. By the end of the 20th century, there were forty-two conflict areas and/or trouble spots.⁸ The risks are numerous and complex. The coordinated common security and defense policy of the Alliance must be able to counter these multi-faceted and diverse risks. This requires both political and military capabilities and structures allowing a rapid and efficient crisis management.

III General Requirements of New Force Structures

The structure of armed forces should be in line with the political aims and strategic objectives of the respective nation, on one hand to provide the means to implement those objectives and on the other hand to prevent incorrect perceptions by other nations. False perceptions of a government's political intentions can cause unwelcomed reactions and

can undermine the stability. Therefore, the structure of armed forces must not be determined exclusively by operational considerations.

In Europe, NATO's Eastern expansion, the Western European Union (WEU) initiatives and the European unification process have influenced the organization of the armed forces in many ways. The transfer of sovereign rights to common transnational institutions and the development of a common European defense and security policy will for the first time create the conditions for a coordinated division of responsibilities between the armed forces of different nations. In the long-term perspective, this might even lead to a common European army.

Of course, this development is also driven by the tight budgets of all European states after the end of the Cold War. Due to their financial situation, the different nations are no longer able to provide a sufficient number of military resources for all potential missions.⁹ To guarantee the best and most efficient use of financial resources, the streamlining of internal processes, to include the structures, will be inevitable. Flexibility in every respect is the wave of the future. This includes not only a closer cooperation with trade and industry, but also the requirement to delegate economic responsibility to lower levels of command. The changed security environment in Europe also had an impact on the deployment of the forces. Deployment was a crucial factor as part of the "forward defense" strategy which implied that the units had to be located as closely as possible to their operational areas. This requirement does not exist anymore. In the case of national defense, which is rather unlikely, the forces will be called upon to use space in the most flexible way. Due to a long warning time, the deployment of the forces will therefore be of minor importance. Consequently, the current deployment and structure of the armed

forces is determined more by different domestic political considerations rather than by operational considerations.

Last but not least, military structures must be accepted, both by the parliaments which have to give their consent, and by the population and the members of the armed forces. The societies as a whole - both civilian and military - must be convinced that the military organization is appropriate and suitable for meeting the objectives. This is not only necessary and important for socio-political reasons but also for the attractiveness of the armed forces and their ability to recruit young people.

Force structures must be able to meet different, sometimes even conflicting operational requirements. First, they must be tailored to the potential types of missions, particularly to those which are most likely. The forces must be designed to optimize their potential in combined arms combat. The military requirements for national and Alliance defense,¹⁰ and for operations in support of crisis prevention and conflict management are of a totally different nature.

Military operations cover a wide range and sometimes rapidly changing types of missions and objectives. That is why the structure of the armed forces requires a high degree of flexibility. While the peacetime organization should resemble the military structure on operations, since joint training in peacetime will make operational cooperation easier, the current forces must usually be mission-tailored on a case-by-case basis.

Frictions which may occur on every operation and unexpected events increase the pressure on the command and control organization. If this is aggravated by a lack of mutual understanding and difficulties in the exchange of information, chaos and failure

will be inevitable. The best way to overcome these difficulties is to create a smoothly functioning military organization in peacetime for which cooperation is routine from the very beginning of an operation.

IV Current and Future Requirements of Multinational Forces

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The military alliance with a multinational command structure existing in peacetime is a post-World War II achievement. Before World War II, the nation states used to defend their interests with their own resources and alliances and coalitions were only formed on a case-by-case basis. In war, the coalition forces usually conducted their operations separate from each other in terms of space, often only loosely coordinated at the highest command level. In history there are only a few examples for a closer operational cooperation.¹¹ In addition, the joint conduct of war was made more difficult by the limited means of communication.

In 1950, a decisive step towards a multinational peacetime command structure was made with the decision to establish integrated military headquarters.

"The Council agreed upon the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and ensure the defence of Western Europe."¹²

The Alliance's objective to defend against potential Soviet aggression with highly mobile forces required a command structure capable of assuming command and control of the assigned forces at short notice. The operational concept of forward defense was implemented in such a way that national corps were deployed abreast¹³ along the border with the Warsaw Pact.¹⁴ It was only above corps level, that is at Army group level, that

integrated NATO commands were established. During the Cold War, the cooperation at this level was very good due to the fact that the corps could already make a detailed defense plan (General Defense Plan) in peacetime. In addition, this plan could be reviewed regularly during exercises and harmonized with adjacent units. In some cases, brigades or divisions were exchanged between the corps. The deployment of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), a unit at the strength of a reinforced brigade composed of smaller elements of different nations, was meant to be an unmistakable signal to the Warsaw Pact that an attack against one member of the alliance would be considered an attack against NATO as a whole. Due to the changed security environment and the resultant force reductions the high degree of combat readiness could only be maintained for certain parts of the NATO forces. In order to provide a sufficient number and appropriate composition of forces at the beginning of a conflict it was necessary to create multinational units below army group level.¹⁵ The heads of state and government issued the following declaration at their summit held in July 1990 in London:

As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:
NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units. NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, ... NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.¹⁶

This general statement was defined in greater detail by the NATO Defense Planning Committee in the spring of 1991:

We have agreed the basis of a new force structure consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types: land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various national contributions to the multinational corps of Main Defence Forces for which detailed

planning will now proceed. With regard to Reaction Forces, we have agreed that these should consist of immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions from most NATO nations and including national as well as multinational formations.¹⁷

At this meeting¹⁸ the decision was made to create a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps under British command as well as an airmobile multinational division for the Central Region.¹⁹ The establishment of the EURO Corps must not be seen in this strategic-operational context, but was initially rather driven by political considerations. Germany wanted to tie France more closely to the military organization of NATO. At that time, there were indeed signs that France might return into the military integration of NATO. The French intention in establishing the EURO Corps was to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to intensify its cooperation with Germany. However, this brought the United States and England to the scene who criticized the EURO Corps as an attempt to weaken the United States' influence in Europe.

All doubts now have been dispelled. In view of America's worldwide commitment to protect US interests, the United States has recognized that it is in its best interest if Europe establishes the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)²⁰, and develops its own military capabilities in order to be able to resolve a conflict without US participation. This will not affect the importance of the transatlantic Alliance, however. What is important now is to establish a new equilibrium between the USA and Europe which is in their mutual interest.

2 CURRENT REQUIREMENTS OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES

According the Strategic Concept of NATO and the role of allied military forces,²¹ multinational force structures must be able to operate across the entire scope of potential missions, from humanitarian operations through UN peacekeeping missions to peace-

enforcing military operations as well as national and alliance defense under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The military structures and the capabilities of multinational forces must derive from their future missions.

Multinational forces must permanently maintain a high degree of operational readiness. The governments of the Alliance will only consider and decide on military operations after all other political, diplomatic and economic (e.g. embargoes) possibilities have been exhausted.²² Once the decision for a military reaction has been reached, the military chain of command will only have little time to prepare and launch the operation. Therefore, all conditions must be created to ensure a high responsiveness of the forces.

Another key aspect is the command and control capability. With its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)²³ concept, NATO has created the organizational basis for an efficient command and control structure on operations. Apart from that, it must also be ensured that the multinational corps-level headquarters are capable of deploying rapidly to potential operational areas.

The strategic mobility of the forces is of crucial importance for the employment of armed forces. In this area, the European states still have considerable deficiencies. The United States is the only nation in NATO which has the required capabilities. In the near future, the USA will enhance its capabilities, particularly in terms of quality, the WEU nations decided to get the capabilities for the strategic transport in the near future.²⁴

Future operations will be characterized by the fact that their duration will be difficult to predict. The forces employed in the former Yugoslavia will have to secure the peace on the ground for an indefinite time. That is why prior to a military operation the possible

rotation of forces should already be considered. Multinational structures therefore need a certain degree of sustainability.

However, the successful cooperation of the forces of different nations within a multinational structure requires interoperability. This refers above all to the area of command, control, communications and computers (C4) with emphasis on the communications capability of the command and control systems. The nations participating in multinational structures have different equipment, most of them cannot even afford the same technological level. Consequently the technologically advanced nations must provide the required interfaces to ensure interoperability and cooperation. Not only the technology, but also doctrine, training and logistics have to be harmonized. The following paragraphs will address the issue of interoperability and standardization in more detail.

V CURRENT PARTICIPATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL ARMED FORCES

1 TRADITIONAL FORMS OF MULTINATIONALITY WITHIN NATO

Since its accession to NATO in 1955, Germany has participated in the integrated command structure of NATO. Except for several elements of the military base organization and home defense units, all Army elements are assigned to NATO. Even in the forward defense era, there existed close links between the adjacent corps. For example, the 7th (GE) Armored Division, as reserve of the Northern Army Group, had preplanned operational options in all sectors of the corps. This division is assigned now to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).²⁵ This division has not conducted any exercise in which no elements of at least one other nation participated. In

other cases, German divisions were subordinated to corps of other nations, for example the 12th (GE) Armored Division to the V (US) Corps.

Until 1990, there was only one exception to the rule that corps were under national command: The binational Danish-German Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT). It was based on the 1961 Treaty of Oslo and became operational in 1962.²⁶ The 6th (GE) Mechanized Infantry Division and corps troops were subordinated to LANDJUT as the German contribution.

In addition, Germany contributed forces to the Allied Mobile Force (Land)²⁷ as well as to the corresponding NATO Air Force and Navy rapid reaction forces. Until 1990, despite these diverse multinational links, a structural multinationality only existed from army group level up. Until the late eighties, the German corps were also purely national. Only the European unification process and the dramatic political changes resulting from the reunification of Germany led to considerations in Germany about restructuring the Army for the future in line with parallel NATO plans.

2 NEW CHALLENGES

The reunification of Germany required radical measures regarding the reorganization of the armed forces. German politicians and the military leadership had to consider how to overcome the concern both of the NATO partners and of Russia and the East European nations that a reunified Germany might become too powerful. The integration of the armed forces into multinational formations seemed to be a suitable means to dispel the reservations of the other nations. Moreover, multinational structures justified the continued basing of allied forces in Germany. While this was politically desirable, it was called into question by the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the former German

Democratic Republic (GDR). The German considerations were also taken into account in the NATO discussions of 1990 and 1991.²⁸

The different political and military environments in the nations and the harmonization of national interests, traditions, doctrines and structures with the partners required the nations to develop a wide range of possible multinational structures. This applied especially to the different degrees of integration. These differences are reflected in the currently existing various forms of multinational units; almost every multinational corps in the Central Region is organized differently.

3 THE INTEGRATION MODELS

Basically, the multinational formations can be reduced to three basic models:

- The "Lead-Nation Model"
- The "Frame-work Model" und
- The "Integration Model".²⁹

Under the "lead-nation model," a nation commands and controls a multinational unit and, with a few exceptions, provides all staff personnel. The contribution of the participating nations is confined to the provision of units for the multinational formation. An example of this is the II (GE/US) Corps.

The "framework model" is characterized in that a nation is responsible for the command and control, administration and logistic support of the headquarters and provides most of the headquarters personnel. The other participating nations provide mutually agreed numbers of personnel, including key personnel, and assign units to the multinational formation, which will be subordinated to this formation exclusively on

operations. An example of this is the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Under the "integration model," also referred to as "deeper integration model", the number of staff personnel provided by the individual nations depends on the number of forces contributed by the respective nations, with key personnel being provided by the participating nations on a rotational basis. The national units are permanently assigned to the multinational formation and, if appropriate, completely or partly subordinated to a multinational commander even in peacetime. The administrative control of these units remains a national responsibility.³⁰ Examples of this are the Franco-German Brigade and the I (GE/NL) Corps.

4 THE FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE

The first step towards realizing a multinational force structure was initiated as early as 1987 with the establishment of the Franco-German Brigade.³¹ However, this decision primarily had a political background: Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French President François Mitterrand agreed on establishing a joint security council and a joint brigade-size unit³² with the intention of demonstrating the special unity and common interests of Germany and France in all security matters and giving new impetus to the Franco-German cooperation. In Germany and France, this initiative met with great approval, and abroad, it was received with understanding and interest, but also with skepticism, which was reflected in quite a few cynical comments.³³

Of course, a joint military unit has a high symbolic value. The creation of the Franco-German Brigade and the establishment of a joint council for defense issues was politically plausible, because the coordination of common interests required a formal

institution. France had sizeable forces based in Germany and had nuclear weapons affecting the interests of Germany, but it was not militarily integrated into NATO and thus not subject to the decision-making processes of NATO.³⁴ Therefore a bi-national forum seemed reasonable.

Initially, the German Army Staff viewed the creation of the joint brigade with skepticism because it involved major practical problems. Different laws, traditions and military cultures had to be taken into consideration. Due to the underlying political motivation, this project was nevertheless pushed so forcefully that the Franco-German Brigade could report its operational readiness on 17 October 1990.

The Brigade has a binational headquarters, with most of its personnel being provided by the nations on a rotational basis,³⁵ as well as a binationally mixed logistic support battalion. The Brigade comprises two French and German battalions each. These units are based at three locations in Germany near the French border. French and German are equally used as working languages. For the first time in military history, a brigade was set up which not only cooperates on operations but is permanently established in peacetime. Despite many problems, which have all been solved by now, the Brigade is fully operational. It demonstrated its efficiency during the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 II (GE/US) CORPS AND V (US/GE) CORPS

The II (GE/US) Corps and the V (US/GE) Corps, which were both designed to be part of the Main Defense Forces, became multinational units in 1993. Five officers and one noncommissioned officer of the one nation are assigned to the headquarters of the respective other nation. In case of an operation under Article V of the NATO Treaty, after

transfer of authority, the 1st (US) Armored Division will be assigned to the II (GE/US) Corps and the 5th (GE) Armored Division to the V (US/GE) Corps.

In addition to the formal command relationships, there are numerous links between the corps and the units assigned to them. These include, among others, exchange of information, joint exercises and the participation in training programs. The goal is to enhance mutual understanding and operational cooperation at all command levels.³⁶

This type of command over national units is not new. Even in the past, the 12th (GE) Armored Division was assigned to the V (US) Corps for operations. With the NATO concept for multinational force structures of 1991,³⁷ this relationship has been formalized to a greater extent and put on a new basis in the overall context of the NATO plans. Although this model works, the differences between the assigned divisions are nevertheless obvious and complicate cooperation. This applies especially to the 5th (GE) Armored Division which is combined with Military District Command IV in peacetime and can establish full operational readiness only through mobilization measures.³⁸ In contrast to this, the V (US) Corps, as the only U.S. corps based in Europe, is highly mobile and has to accomplish a broad spectrum of national missions. Consequently, there is no operational, military need for the cross-attachment of the two divisions. The mutual education effect, the feeling of being part of a multinational environment and the improvement of mutual understanding between the major allies at this military level may serve as adequate justification for this organization.

6 ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS (ARRC)

In the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, a higher degree of multinationality has been realized with the framework model.³⁹ The ARRC is the largest element of the NATO

Reaction Forces. Approximately sixty percent of the headquarters officers are provided by the United Kingdom; the other posts are divided among the sixteen participating nations. On operations, additional personnel will be assigned to the staff by the nations which are the major contributors of divisions. The UK supports the ARRC headquarters with its forces in the areas of command and control, communications, intelligence, and administration. Apart from a division, the UK additionally provides the major part of the corps troops.⁴⁰

The sixteen nations which participate in the ARRC have earmarked ten divisions and corps troops for subordination to the corps. Two divisions, i.e. the Multinational Division Central and the Multinational Division South, are assigned to the ARRC even in peacetime. Germany has assigned its 7th Armored Division to the ARRC for operations, and with Airborne Brigade 31, it provides an element of the Multinational Division Central. On operations, up to four of the ten earmarked divisions can be assigned to the ARRC. The ARRC has meanwhile been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in accordance with the Dayton Agreement of November 1995⁴¹ and has accomplished its mission. An essential advantage of the "framework model" is that the "framework nation" can take the lead in the development of the operational concepts in line with NATO procedures and that the staff members, including personnel from all other nations, are accustomed to working together smoothly even in peacetime. Since potential operational options can be jointly developed early on and approved in principle by the participating nations, an operation can be launched rapidly. A disadvantage to the lead nation, in this case the UK, is that, as compared to

other nations, considerable military and financial resources are tied down and its national freedom of action is thus reduced.

7 EURO CORPS

Initially, the EURO Corps was set up as a binational Franco-German corps based on the decisions made at the La Rochelle summit of 1992.⁴² This was basically a political decision, because at that time there was no military need for an additional corps command in Southern Germany/Eastern France. As a consequence of the arrangements between Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Russian President Michael Gorbachev after the reunification of Germany, the German armed forces had to be reduced from 460,000 troops in the old West German states and 110,000 troops of the former East German Army of the GDR to a total of 370,000 troops.⁴³ Among other things, this involved the deactivation of five divisions in the old West German states and the activation of two divisions and a corps headquarters in the newly-formed German states.⁴⁴ The II (GE/US) Corps in Southern Germany was then to command three German divisions,⁴⁵ which is a reasonable number from an operational point of view. Due to the activation of the binational Franco-German Corps, these plans were changed.

Political reasons were the decisive factors for the ultimate activation of the Franco-German Corps. After the fundamental changes in the security environment, it was widely agreed in Europe that the special role of France within NATO was no longer appropriate. German political and military leaders saw an opportunity to completely reintegrate France into NATO. However, such a development would have its price. France had an interest in increasing Europe's weight vis-à-vis the U.S.A. by strengthening the political

role of the WEU and developing European military capabilities. At the same time, the reunified Germany was to be tied more closely to France.

In Germany, there was some resistance to this policy, as it was feared that the European-Atlantic alliance might suffer. The U.S.A. would have to remain Germany's strong partner within NATO. On the other hand, such a development was fully consistent with the efforts towards the unification of Europe and the creation of a European security and defense identity.⁴⁶ Despite the objections, Federal Chancellor Kohl decided to take the risk.

The second political reason for activating the Franco-German Corps was to keep French forces in Germany even after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1994. The French President Mitterand ruled this out in the prevailing circumstances.⁴⁷ However, a joint corps might justify the continued basing of French forces in Germany.⁴⁸ Consequently, the supreme command of the French forces in Germany was deactivated in August 1993, and at the same time, the II (FR) Corps was withdrawn from Germany. Several months later, the EURO Corps was created.⁴⁹ In the meantime, Belgium had joined the Franco-German initiative; Spain followed in 1994 and Luxembourg in 1996.

Except for Luxembourg, which provides a reconnaissance company, each nation contributes an armored division. In addition, the Franco-German Brigade and a French signal regiment are subordinated to the Corps. The German and the French languages are used on a co-equal basis within the headquarters. Flemish is the third and Spanish the fourth official language, which means that all documents are translated into these languages. The staff posts are assigned to the nations according to a fixed ratio, with the six most important posts being filled by all participating nations on a rotational basis.⁵⁰

Although the corps was activated within a short period of time without any major problems,⁵¹ the criticism concerning its role within NATO did not subside.⁵² Reservations of the United States and the United Kingdom were dispelled by an agreement which provides that the EURO Corps is earmarked for WEU and NATO operations.

8 GERMAN-DUTCH CORPS

Unlike the EURO Corps, the German-Dutch Corps was created primarily for military reasons. In 1991, in the course of the considerations on force reductions after the changes in the security environment, the Dutch military leadership came to the conviction that it was no longer possible to maintain a national Army corps. From the perspective of that time, this command level could only be maintained at a binational or multinational level. Germany seemed to be the most suitable partner, because a Dutch brigade had been based in Northern Germany for decades and there had always been close cooperation between the German and the Dutch forces. After two years of negotiations and another two years of organizational preparations the I. (GE/NL) Corps became operational in 1995.⁵³

A condition for the creation of this unit was an absolutely equal participation of both nations in a joint corps. From the very beginning, the deeper integration model was therefore pursued as the only alternative. Contrary to other multinational corps, the German-Dutch Corps would directly exercise command and control over the Dutch land forces and the German Army units in Northern Germany even in peacetime. Initially, the German Army Staff had considerable reservations not about the basic idea of jointly commanding German and Dutch forces but about the expected practical problems. However, the principle of multinationality as part of NATO's strategic concepts, which

was particularly supported by Germany, was deemed so important that all practical problems, especially with regard to the different laws, should be overcome.⁵⁴

Temporarily, the two nations considered including Denmark, which, however, had insurmountable doubts about whether the subordination of its forces even in peacetime would be accepted by the Danish people. Nevertheless, the participation of Denmark in a multinational corps was realized later as part of the Multinational Corps Northeast. In March 1993, the two Ministers of Defense signed a joint declaration, thus laying the formal foundation for the new German-Dutch Corps.⁵⁵ The new corps profited from the fact that the I (GE) Corps in Münster could be used as a nucleus for the joint corps staff. Both nations provided equal numbers of staff personnel, with the Commanding General and his deputy being provided by the nations on a rotational basis. On 30 August 1995, the new corps was activated by Federal Chancellor Kohl and the Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok. The first Commanding General was the Dutch General Ruurd Reitsma.⁵⁶

A brigade-level joint Command Support Group, the I (NL) Division and the I (GE) Armored Division were subordinated to the Corps. For organizational reasons, the 11th (NL) Airborne Brigade and an Army aviation regiment on the Dutch side, as well as the 7th (GE) Armored Division, a noncommissioned officer school and an infrastructure staff on the German side were additionally assigned to the Corps. The 7th (GE) Armored Division is assigned to the Corps only in peacetime; for operations, it is assigned to the ARRC. It is obvious that this somewhat complex construct with many remaining national tasks complicates the functioning of the corps staff.

In spite of the intended high degree of integration,⁵⁷ organizational matters and the command authority over national elements largely remain national responsibilities. The

Commanding General and the Deputy Commanding General will perform the respective national tasks. However, the two nations agreed to put national reservations and legal restrictions aside and to realize a deeper integration step by step. This process will be monitored and pushed forward through regular meetings of a joint commission.⁵⁸

However, within the scope of the agreed detailed regulations, the Commanding General is entitled to exercise his command authority in the areas of exercises and training and, to a certain extent, in the area of logistics. As compared to all other commanders of the NATO corps, who will exercise operational command and control only after transfer of authority and approval of the respective nations, the Commanding General thus has greater authority.

9 MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST

The activation of the Multinational Corps Northeast was jointly agreed by Germany, Denmark and Poland at the political level in August 1997.⁵⁹ The setting up of the corps headquarters started in Rendsburg with the deactivation of the German-Danish LANDJUT headquarters on 31 March 1999. The Corps was activated in Stettin in September 1999. Operational readiness was reported by the end of 2000.⁶⁰ The Corps is organized according to the "integration model". The trinational staff consists of equal numbers of personnel from the three participating nations. Leadership positions are filled alternately by the participating nations on a rotational basis.

The units assigned to the corps staff are purely national. While the corps staff is assigned to NATO, it is not part of the new NATO command structure. In individual cases, and if decided by the nations, it can be made available to other security bodies.⁶¹ The Corps is designed for operations as part of collective alliance defense. In addition,

the corps staff will be available for operations as part of multinational crisis management, including peace support operations. Furthermore, it will be available for the planning, preparation and - if necessary - conduct of humanitarian aid and rescue operations, to include disaster relief.

Germany contributes the 14th Mechanized Infantry Division. Denmark provides its DAN Division and Poland the 12th Mechanized Division. To ensure command and control, every participating nation assigns one national signal battalion to the corps staff. If required, the nations can decide, on a case-by-case basis, to assign additional corps troops to the Corps.

VI EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS MODELS OF MULTINATIONALITY

1 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY

The most common argument against multinational force structures is that the participating nations would have to give up part of their sovereignty. From a purely legal point of view, it is doubtful whether the nations actually give up part of their sovereignty in each case. NATO's integrated command structure, for example, does not at all affect the nations' freedom to decide on the deployment of their units, for NATO is an alliance of free nations and not a supranational institution. The nations can decide on a case-by-case basis whether and to what extent they want to participate in an operation. Even after transfer of authority, every member nation remains fully responsible for its forces. Every nation is entitled to define certain restrictions for the employment of its forces. On the other hand, the nations' personnel is, of course, tied down in integrated staffs and thus not

freely available to the nations. If forces are provided for a NATO mission, they are not available for other national purposes. However, this will not limit national sovereignty. This applies both to the "lead-nation model" and to the "framework model."

The "lead-nation model" has the least impact on the national availability of the assigned forces. This was the essential reason for the U.S.A. to choose this model for the V (US/GE) Corps and agreeing to participate in the II (GE/US) Corps.

Sovereignty will be affected to a greater extent if the forces are an integral part of the peacetime structure. The "deep integration" model is characterized by a greater dependence on joint headquarters and forces of other nations. The forces are no longer easily available for purely national purposes.⁶²

2 POSSIBLE LEVELS OF MULTINATIONALITY

Experts have still controversial discussions on the issue what is the lowest command level suitable for multinationality from the military point of view.⁶³ Political and military criteria are to be taken into consideration. For UN missions, it will be important to involve as many nations as possible, in order to increase the international political pressure on the parties to a conflict. Frequently, smaller nations can only provide battalions or even companies. These will have to be integrated into contingents of larger nations. The advantages resulting from the participation of many nations are deemed more important than the military disadvantages involved, such as difficult integration, different doctrines, logistic support problems and, by extension, lower military effectiveness. On combat operations, multinationality below brigade level is not appropriate, as the required coordination effort would be too great, misunderstandings would be very likely and thus operational success would be jeopardized.

Since this monograph deals with multinational structures already existing in peacetime, the military criteria are of substantial importance. The Franco-German Brigade is the only existing multinational unit which is structured binationally below brigade level. With this brigade, the Army succeeded in setting up a combat-capable major unit suited for any operation in spite of different tactical and mission planning concepts, some differences in the military key terminology and different training and command practices. Considerable efforts and willingness to compromise on both sides to overcome these problems. Only after approximately one year, the Brigade had established full operational readiness. The experiences gained with the Franco-German Brigade have shown that deep integration will only be possible from this level.

3 THE "LEAD-NATION MODEL"

The "lead-nation model" has the least impact on the national availability of the participating forces. This is an essential reason for the fact that the U.S.A. agreed to introduce this model for the V (US/GE) Corps based in Germany and to participate correspondingly in the II (GE/US) Corps.⁶⁴ On the other hand, this form of multinationality has relatively few implications for the endeavors to expand multinationality. It is to be considered a political fig leaf rather than a militarily useful construct. The political benefit of this model resulting from the strengthening of the German-American relationships after the German reunification nevertheless compensates for the military disadvantages, that is the low degree of integration and the mutual exchange of a division which is of little military use.

4 THE "FRAME-WORK MODEL"

While the "framework model" for multinational headquarters does not affect the authority of the nations providing forces and staff personnel, it is at the same time characterized by a much higher degree of multinationality. This model is so flexible that, for certain operations, additional officers can be integrated into the staffs, if required. The ARRC, as an example of this model, demonstrated its full operational readiness and military effectiveness on operations as part of the SFOR (Stabilization Forces) mission in the former Yugoslavia. Due to the fact that the "framework nation" provides most of the staff personnel and lays down the rules of staff work, the conceivable frictions of cooperation in an international environment are minimized.

On the other hand, this form of multinationality always has the disadvantage that the other nations may feel underrepresented and fear that the framework nation might have too much influence on the employment of their forces. Every nation has an interest in implementing its concepts as far as possible. Concerning the IFOR (Implementation Force) operation in the former Yugoslavia, Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge said:

"We thought it very important that British soldiers were commanded by primarily British Headquarters."⁶⁵

This statement is certainly correct and, of course, equally applies to other nations. That is why Germany had recommended to organize the ARRC in line with the "integration model". From the German perspective, it should not act as a NATO headquarters but as a headquarters which can act on behalf of NATO and in which all 13 nations are represented according to their force contingents. In 1991, after intense, controversial discussion at the conferences of the NATO Military Committee, it was decided to design the ARRC as a framework headquarters.⁶⁶ However, experience has shown that the most

likely and frequent operations in which NATO forces were involved required a high degree of multinationality primarily for military and less for political reasons. With a view to further developing the ARRC, the nations should therefore reconsider the idea of introducing the "integration model" after all.

5 THE "INTEGRATION MODEL"

The "integration model", which has been realized for example in the EURO Corps, allows a fair distribution of all important staff positions among the participating nations. The nations identify themselves with the command. The EURO Corps has already participated several times in the traditional military parade on the French national holiday.⁶⁷ Even when it was under the command of a German Commanding General, the French people regarded it as a part of their military identity without reservation. This proves that one aim of multinational structures, namely to overcome national reservations, can really be achieved. We should not underestimate the psychological factor, that is the fact that the military can contribute to influencing people to give up national mindedness in favor of a more multinational way of thinking. The military can thus contribute significantly to the unification of Europe.

These effects will be even stronger if a unit is organized according to the deeper integration model, as it is the case with the German-Dutch Corps. This means that not only the headquarters is staffed with multinational personnel in peacetime and the assigned divisions are subordinated to the Corps only on operations, but are permanently tied to it even in the peacetime structure. The experiences gained with the Franco-German Brigade have shown that the soldiers of both nations can develop a better

understanding for each other.⁶⁸ By now, the Brigade has become a symbol of the fact that two neighboring countries which were bitter enemies in the past can cooperate so closely.

It cannot be denied that considerable efforts are required to establish and maintain the operational readiness of such a unit. Problems concerning primarily the legal status of the soldiers and the superior-subordinate relations must frequently be solved at the ministerial or even parliamentary level. But the Brigade is too small to act as a driving force for legal and tactical-operational adjustments for the whole Army. Time after time, the two nations therefore make appropriate special arrangements.

The Brigade demonstrated its operational capabilities on the SFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia, when a brigade command formed from the Franco-German Brigade was deployed to Sarajevo under the Multinational Division Southeast and commanded German, French, Ukrainian and Albanian units.⁶⁹ The success of this unit has shown that a binational or multinational formation organically established in peacetime is better suited to conduct a multinational operation than an ad hoc command. Due to language problems, it would not have been possible to set up a mixed Franco-German brigade on an ad hoc basis or to assign a German brigade to a French-controlled and French-speaking division.

The experiences gained with the Franco-German Brigade facilitated the activation of the German-Dutch Corps in 1995 which is also organized according to the deeper integration principle. The most difficult problems resulted from the different legal provisions governing the status of the soldiers in the two nations, and from the question as to what rights and competences the Commanding General should have. While the members of parliament basically supported the activation of the Corps, there was concern

that the soldiers' rights might be limited through the requirement to create equal conditions for all soldiers in a multinational formation. Moreover, the right of the parliaments to control the armed forces should not be limited in any way. Apart from these reservations, it was not so easy to create equal standards for France and the Netherlands which are required for the deeper integration model.⁷⁰ The more nations are involved, the more difficult it is to reach an agreement especially on legal provisions. This may be easier in the future, when European legislation will be introduced to an increasing extent.

As to the "framework model", the Commanding General of the ARRC, for example, has no opportunity to exercise his influence on the training of the divisions to be subordinated to him for operations. He can only inform the providing nations of the capabilities the divisions should have. However, it is up to the nations to meet these requirements or not. Because of national reservations and to keep national control of the assigned divisions the Commanding General is not entitled to inspect, but only to visit the divisions.

The Commanding General of a unit organized on the deeper integration principle has many more rights. It is true that the forces assigned to the Corps even in peacetime are, in principle, commanded by the respective highest-ranking national General in the Corps, i.e. if the Commanding General is a Dutchman, he will directly command the Dutch forces and the German Deputy Commanding General will command the German forces, but the Commanding General, irrespective of his nationality, will report to the commanders of both Armies, that is to the German "Inspekteur des Heeres" and to the Dutch "Bevelhebber van de Landstijdkrachten".⁷¹ Conversely, in accordance with the

"Progress Report 1996", all directives, even those which concern only the national components, are submitted via the Commanding General. The "Progress Report" recommends

" ... to provide the Commander with the full responsibility for the implementation of all directives issued by both nations".⁷²

The Commanding General thus has considerable freedom of action within the agreed limits. This includes, for example, the right to issue training guidelines and to inspect the assigned forces of both nations. If he considers it necessary to make decisions which do not lie within his authority, he has to submit his proposals to both nations for approval. Experience has shown that Germany and the Netherlands are prepared to make extensive concessions in order to give the Commanding General maximum possible freedom of action. The "Progress Report" says:

The Commanding General has a certain degree of flexibility in deviating from national regulations. Deviations from existing national regulations will be judged against the impact on national structures.⁷³

The Report further says that all legal problems have been solved that might limit deeper integration in the areas of training, exercises and logistics.⁷⁴ All in all, the principle of deeper integration has been implemented successfully since the Corps was activated. Meanwhile, the Commanding General was alternated twice between the nations, and most of the staff officer positions have been refilled three times. The initial uncertainty in dealing with each other has given way to mutual understanding, and cooperation has become routine.

However, it must be admitted that full integration has not yet been realized in several fields of cooperation. This includes different personnel structures,⁷⁵ which affect the training requirements, different administration and budgeting procedures, partly

insufficient languages skills among the lower ranks⁷⁶ and, not least, different military cultures.⁷⁷ However, the decision-makers are very confident that they will overcome even these problems, because the staff structure makes no allowance for a large-scale application of national procedures.

There is no doubt that the deeper integration model will enable the nations more than any other model to develop a joint defense identity and to harmonize doctrine, training, equipment and logistics. With patience and the joint will to succeed, it is possible to realize deeper integration, which is demonstrated by the I (GE/NL) Corps. The new Multinational Corps Northeast also pursues the same objectives.

6 THE "HUMAN" FACTOR

In developing new structures, not only political, military or organizational arguments have to be considered. The considerations should focus on the people concerned, that is on the soldiers. The efficiency of an organization depends primarily on the efficiency of the people in this organization. The way people deal with each other in multinational structures requires special attention. This applies to the preparation of soldiers for a multinational assignment but also the education and training during this assignment. Klaus Wittmann very aptly described this as "human interoperability."⁷⁸

Based on the example of the German-Dutch Corps, the challenges and solutions should be identified briefly. It is true that the combined headquarters had known each other for a long time due to a close partnership, but now the soldiers from two countries with different biographies and cultures had to develop a common identity. Since all those in positions of authority were fully aware that the "human factor" would play a key role, the activation process as well as the creation of a favorable materiel and infrastructural

environment were characterized by great human commitment. The two nations established rules for international cooperation in line with the following principle:

"As much binational integration as possible, as little national independence as necessary."⁷⁹

This principle also describes the mutual relationship of those in positions of authority. Especially at the beginning, a lot of "human" problems had to be overcome; it was required to give up well-loved structures and patterns of behavior and to develop new ways of living together and cooperating.

The bi-national staff divisions organized seminars which provided information on the country, the people, the history, the culture and the special features of both nations, as well as on new official working procedures. The private relationships and the mutual person-to-person understanding were deepened at joint meetings, sports events and social events which were also attended by the soldiers' families. After some time, the members of the Corps no longer referred to "the Dutch" or "the Germans" but said "we". The more successful the human integration efforts were, the more obvious it became that the fundamental aspects of leadership could be harmonized.

7 U.S., FRENCH AND UK POSITION

There is no official position of Germany's major allies, that is the U.S.A., the UK and France, except that European multinationality within NATO is supported by all. Nevertheless, our allies have quite different interests, from which we can derive views showing different tendencies.

The U.S.A. is Germany's major and largest NATO partner. It takes the view that, due to its role in the world, the American forces must not be tied down through integration into permanent multinational peacetime structures. At the same time, it realizes that it

might not be able to pursue all its interests with its own resources. The 1999 Strategic Assessment says:

One of the key dilemmas facing the United States will be that of balancing its enlarging interests and growing involvements with its need to avoid overcommitments and entangling involvements in unresolvable situations."⁸⁰ Another passage reads: "Allied and partner forces might be configured for rapid deployment and employment alongside U.S. forces in a crisis region. Without this emphasis, U.S. forces will carry unfair and unmanageable burdens."⁸¹

Successful military operations in the Persian Gulf War showed that the cooperation with other nations is necessary not only for political reasons. The question is whether other nations can keep pace with the development of the U.S. armed forces which are outlined in the Joint Vision 2020. This will hardly be the case. However, it has to be ensured that the nations' compatibility, that is their ability to cooperate, will be maintained. Close cooperation within multinational structures can contribute to this as well.

The British approach is very pragmatic. The British continue to base British forces on the continent of Europe, in order to demonstrate their will to ensure collective security. At the same time, a considerable British contribution to the multinational units will ensure the British influence in Europe both at the diplomatic and military levels. This is the only way of filling senior NATO command positions and influencing future NATO and WEU structures from within. From the British perspective, this field must not be reserved for the Germans and the French.⁸²

Through its massive support of the further development of multinational force structures in Europe, particularly as part of the WEU, France has an opportunity to increase its influence in Europe. In view of the fact that the French armed forces are no longer integrated in the NATO structure, the only way of preventing France from getting isolated is to make a military contribution to multinational armed forces. The close

Franco-German relationship sought by France is a counterbalance to the English influence in Europe.

This paper is not suited to elaborate on the national positions of Germany's major allies. However, it is obvious that different national interests are behind the push for multinationality and a high degree of integration of the armed forces which will continue to provide the basis for maintaining multinational armed forces in Europe even in the future.

VII IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURES IN EUROPE

Multinationality in the command structure above corps level has been a fundamental NATO principle since its foundation. Multinationality as a key principle of force structures was generally introduced in 1991. The employment of NATO forces for peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid operations and, to an even greater extent, for combat missions against the former Yugoslavia has shown that, in the future, military operations will be initiated through multinational political initiatives and conducted in a multinational environment with multinational forces. It is obvious that peacetime cooperation within multinational formations will facilitate the conduct of operations, even if non-organic elements are additionally assigned.

The convincing ARRC operation in Bosnia proves that NATO's decision to rely on multinationality at these levels was correct. The German contribution to IFOR and SFOR has profited from multinationality in many respects. For example, it was possible to fill

key positions with officers and noncommissioned officers who had gained experience in multinational headquarters and had appropriate language skills.⁸³

Following the NATO decision of 1991, five corps and divisions were set up in the Central Region as multinational units. Due to the different political conditions and concepts of the participating nations, they are organized on different principles. The lowest degree of integration is realized in the "lead-nation model". Corps of this type hardly differ from purely national corps. While they may have a certain political and psychological effect, they have little influence on military education, doctrine, training and equipment. Nevertheless, this is the only practical way of integrating American armed forces into permanent multinational structures at this level, because the U.S.A. as a superpower will never give up its freedom to decide on the deployment of its forces independently of any other nation. However, within NATO, this model should be confined to the existing corps. In all other cases, including the integration of new member nations, a model with a higher degree of integration should be selected.

The "framework model" implies a much higher degree of multinationality. The framework nation, which provides most of the staff personnel, forms the backbone that guarantees military effectiveness and cohesion. A command organized according to the "framework" principle will do the required work even under difficult conditions on operations. But the reliability and the tight command and control of such an organization have their price: The fact that the other participating nations are not appropriately represented in the command may induce them to impose too many restrictions on the employment of their assigned units. National unofficial command and control structures

superimposed on the official command structure are a drawback and will considerably restrict the operational freedom of the Commanding General.

All multinational operations require the general political agreement of the participating nations. The troop-contributing nations always have an interest in being represented appropriately and visibly even in the command structure. This is best achieved by the "integration model." The potential objection of insufficient military effectiveness cannot be accepted, as NATO has practiced these principles for years in all integrated headquarters not only at army group level and above, but also at corps level (LANDJUT) and even below with the Allied Mobile Force (AMF).

In the current political situation, there is enough time to train such a command and to make it fully operational. This has been demonstrated by the EURO Corps and most recently by the Multinational Corps Northeast. Admittedly, the lower the command level, the more practical integration problems will arise. The activities of the corps focus on the planning and conduct of operations. At the lower levels, practical details of logistics and administration gain in importance and national differences affect the daily routine work to a greater extent. Thus, the corps are the most important level for realizing multinationality in peacetime structures. With regard to a further force draw down in Europe - Germany will reduce its armed forces from 2001 and simultaneously increase the reaction force portion - it would be conceivable to set up further multinational divisions in addition to the two existing ones. Despite the success of the ARRC, it might be expedient to introduce the "integration model" for this organization as well. In any case, NATO and the participating nations are well advised to introduce this model for new organizations, as is the case with the Multinational Corps Northeast. Especially with

regard to the accession of new NATO member nations, there is no better way of political and military integration.

For future force structures a dilemma has to be resolved: the multiple assignment. In times of force reductions and simultaneous efforts to provide rapidly available reaction forces for many different purposes both in support of NATO and of the WEU, the phenomenon of multiple assignment occurs again and again. Especially as part of the creation of a European security and defense identity, the same divisions are earmarked for different purposes and assignments.⁸⁴ However, they can only conduct one operation at a time, either under the control of the WEU or of NATO, either as part of the ARRC or under national command. The diverse multinational force structures may thus give a wrong impression of the total strength and the available options. This distortion is to be avoided for future structures.

Regarding the top-level positions in the multinational corps, there is no reasonable alternative to the rotation principle, because this is the only way of ensuring that smaller nations will also be represented at the top at appropriate intervals and will thus be motivated to cooperate. This is very much in line with the NATO principle of being a multinational Alliance of equal sovereign nations. However, the rotation principle should be confined to the commanders, their deputies and the chiefs of staff. To maintain continuity, all other posts are to be assigned to the nations according to a fair key largely based on the proportion of forces provided.

Practical experience has shown that there is the risk of making the staffs too top-heavy and large merely to meet all demands of the participating nations. To some extent, redundancies are certainly useful, to be able to compensate for individual officers who

have been appointed by the nations but who are less qualified in terms of expertise or language skills⁸⁵ However, top-heaviness and overstaffing of the commands should be avoided, as far as possible.⁸⁶ As a matter of principle, multinational headquarters should not have considerably more personnel resources than national headquarters of the same level.

Despite all these obvious advantages of multinational formations, the language problem must not be concealed.⁸⁷ Although France has left the integrated military structure of NATO, French is still an official NATO language, but English is undoubtedly accepted as the only language used in practice at all levels within the Alliance. The EURO Corps and the Franco-German Brigade are exceptions. Despite great efforts, it is still difficult for Germany to provide a sufficient number of qualified officers who have an appropriate knowledge of English and French. While the French may find it hard to accept English as the only common language, it is worthwhile making every effort to convince them. In recent years, the French seem to have realized this, as they are going to great lengths to improve their officers' knowledge of English.⁸⁸

The degree of integration is to be weighed very carefully. Frequently, the militarily desired degree of integration cannot be realized due to different legal requirements of the participating nations. The example of the German-Dutch Corps proves that very much is possible with mutual good will and willingness to compromise. Beyond the military area, this will contribute considerably to the unification of Europe and to the development of a common European identity. With the creation of a European security and defense identity, the military can become the trail-blazer for other areas of society. The time has come for further bold steps.

Irrespective of whether the European unification process will retain its current momentum and whether the European Union will preserve the status of the nation states or develop into a federal system, multinational force structures will gain in importance. The expansion of NATO provides a good perspective for this. Although this paper concentrates on the situation in Central Europe, the implications identified above may also apply to other parts of Europe or even to other regions. In any case, the positive experiences gained with the existing multinational organizations should provide the basis for creating future structures. The advantages of multinational formations clearly outweigh the difficulties.

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- ¹ NATO, *North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949.
- ² The most important milestones in the reform process of NATO were:
- London and Paris Declarations of 6 July and 19 November 1990
 - Rome Declaration and the New Strategic Concept of 20 December 1991
 - Foundation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 20 December 1991
 - The decisions reached on 4 June and 2 September 1992 in Oslo and Brussels to offer OSCE and UN the support of the Alliance for peacekeeping operations.
 - Declaration issued by the heads of state and government that NATO is open to new members and to introduce the "Partnership for Peace" program.
 - Decision made by the foreign ministers of NATO on 3 June 1996 in Berlin to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
 - Founding act defining the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation.
 - Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance on 12 March 1999.
 - Adoption of the New Strategic Concept at the NATO Summit held in April 1999 in Washington.
- ³ NATO, *London Declaration*, NATO Ministerial Communiqué London, 5-6 July 1990, paragraph 14.
- ⁴ NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, paragraph 9.
- ⁵ NATO, *The NATO Handbook*, 50th Anniversary Edition, Brussels, 1998, page 69.
- ⁶ NATO, *The NATO Handbook*, page 246.
- ⁷ *Bericht der Kommission 'Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr'* [Report by the Commission on Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr]. Berlin, 23 May 2000.
- ⁸ Benno Ertmann, „Soldat und Tugenden“, in Peter Blaschke, ed., *De Officio*. (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000, page 172).
- ⁹ *Bericht der Kommission 'Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr'*, pages 38 – 40. The report recommends for financial reasons more military cooperation of the European nations in order to avoid unnecessary duplications.
- ¹⁰ Deployment of forces in accordance with Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- ¹¹ A famous example of this close co-operation is the battle of Blenheim (in German historiography: Höchstädt) of 1704.
- ¹² NATO Ministerial Communiqué, New York, 26 September 1950
- ¹³ Also known as "layer cake".
- ¹⁴ The only exception in this connection was the LANDJUT Corps composed of German and Danish units.
- ¹⁵ This issue was first discussed at ministerial level in May 1990 at the meeting of the Defense Planning Committee. See paragraph 9 of the communiqué issued at this meeting. "Looking towards the longer term we attach particular importance to a study . . . into the possibilities for greater use of multinational forces."
- ¹⁶ *London Declaration*, NATO Ministerial Communiqué, paragraph 14.
- ¹⁷ NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, paragraph 9.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid*, paragraph 1.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*, paragraph 9.
- ²⁰ Compare H.H. Sammet, *The Development of the European Security and Defence Identity towards a Common Defence Policy and a Common Defence*. RCDC, 1995.
- ²¹ Compare *NATO Handbook*, pages 65 - 70
- ²² *Ibid*, pages 147 – 155.
- ²³ *Ibid*, page 247.
- ²⁴ *Erklärung von Bremen* [Bremen Declaration], WEU Ministerial Council, 10 May 1999. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Nr. 30, Bonn, 26 May 1999, paragraph 4.
- ²⁵ See Homepage ARRC, www.arcmedia.com/Body.htm, of 18 April 2001.
- ²⁶ See Gerber, Manfred, "Korps LANDJUT". Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, pages 18-21; Lieutenant General Gerber was Commanding General, LANDJUT from 1995 to 1998.
- ²⁷ NATO, *The NATO Handbook*, page 256.

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- ²⁸ NATO, *London Declaration*, NATO Ministerial Communiqué London, 5-6 July 1990 and NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 May 1991
- ²⁹ See Federal Ministry of Defense, *"Multinationalität"*, Bonn: December 1999.
- ³⁰ Ibid, page 9.
- ³¹ Ibid, page 12.
- ³² On 25 September 1987, during the Franco-German corps exercise "Kecker Spatz", the establishment of both institutions was agreed, and on 22 January 1998, it was formally confirmed by the parliaments. The first meeting of the Franco-German Defense and Security Council took place in Paris on 20 April 1989.
- ³³ The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher commented: "utter tokenism, an initiative for the gallery"; quotation from Haglund, David, "Who's afraid of Franco-German Military Cooperation?", *European Security*, Volume 2, Number 4, Winter 1993
- ³⁴ France was represented in the NATO Military Committee only by a liaison officer in the rank of general. He represented the interests of his nation but was not involved in the decision-making processes. At the military headquarters SHAPE in Mons, France was also represented by a French military mission; no French officers were integrated in the staff itself.
- ³⁵ The brigade commander is a brigadier general, the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff are officers in the rank of colonel.
- ³⁶ See Trost, Edgar, *"Multinationalität II. (GE/US) Korps"*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 28; Lieutenant General Edgar Trost, now retired Vice Chief of Staff, Army, was Commanding General of the II (GE/US) Corps until 30 September 1996.
- ³⁷ Ibid, page 28.
- ³⁸ In peacetime, under the current structure of the German Army, territorial tasks and traditional operational tasks are performed by a joint command. On operations, the elements of the division command and of the Military District Command will be separated; the division will report to the corresponding NATO command, and the Military District Command to the German Army Forces Command.
- ³⁹ The term "framework model" for the ARRC is not used consistently in all publications. For example, Sir Peter Inge defines England's role in the ARRC as "lead nation". See Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, GCB, *"The Roles and Challenges of the British Armed Forces"*. Defence and International Security, RUSI Journal, February 1996, page 5. In this paper, the term "lead nation" is used for the organization form for example of the II (GE/US) Corps.
- ⁴⁰ See Walker, Michael, *"Multinationalität auf dem Prüfstand"*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996; General Michael Walker was Commanding General of the ARRC from December 1994 to 1997.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, page 13.
- ⁴² The annual Franco-German summit took place in La Rochelle (France) on 22 May 1992.
- ⁴³ The essential conditions for the reunification of Germany were jointly defined by Germany and the Soviet Union at a meeting of Federal Chancellor Kohl, President Gorbachev and the two Foreign Ministers held in Shelesnovodsk on 17 July 1990. In response to the Russian concession to withdraw the Russian forces from Germany by 1994, Helmut Kohl agreed to a reduction of the German armed forces to a total of 370,000 troops after the reunification. On 21 November 1990, this intention was laid down in the Treaty of Paris as an agreement that is binding under international law.
- ⁴⁴ According to the Two-plus-Four Treaty between the two German nations and the occupying powers, it was not allowed to integrate this corps into NATO as long as Soviet forces were based in Germany. In addition, this treaty prohibited the basing of foreign forces in the newly-formed German states.
- ⁴⁵ 1st Mountain Division, 10th Armored Division and 5th Armored Division, which will be assigned to the V (US/GE) Corps on operations.
- ⁴⁶ See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991.
- ⁴⁷ Compare Rühl, Lothar, *"Sicherheit in Europa - Zur Stabilität ohne Instabilität"* in Wellershoff, Dieter (Editor), *"Frieden ohne Macht? - Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte im Wandel"*. Bonn, Bouvier Publishers 1991, page 201.
- ⁴⁸ On the other hand, Germany did not want to remain the only country in which foreign troops are based and therefore wished to have German forces based in France - and be it only as a symbolic gesture. This was one of the main reasons for the decision to establish the Corps headquarters in Strasbourg and to set up joint training facilities on French territory. Meanwhile, the two nations have decided to establish a

- joint Army aviation school in Le Luc, which will provide training on the joint TIGER attack helicopter.
- ⁴⁹ The ceremony was held in Strasbourg on 5 November 1993 in the presence of the Ministers of Defense of Germany, France and Belgium. The first Commanding General was Helmut Willmann, the present Chief of Staff of the German Army.
- ⁵⁰ The positions of the Commanding General, the first deputy, the Chief of Staff and the three chiefs of division on the headquarters are filled on a rotational basis. At the same time each nation provides a Deputy Commanding General. Germany accepted this arrangement only after some hesitation, since it makes the headquarters very top-heavy.
- ⁵¹ Operational readiness was declared in November 1995.
- ⁵² The Financial Post commented: "The news from La Rochelle sounded like a diplomatic version of 'Yankees go home'", quotation from Haglund, David, *"Who's afraid of Franco-German Military Cooperation?"*, European Security, Volume 2, Number 4, Winter 1993.
- ⁵³ Federal Ministry of Defense, *"Multinationalität"*, Bonn: December 1999, page 12.
- ⁵⁴ See Kopp, W./Karl-Ernst Graf Strachwitz. "Gewisse Einbußen an Effizienz" [Certain losses of Efficiency] *Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung*, 7 - 8/1998.
- ⁵⁵ Joint Resolution of the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany of 30 March 1993.
- ⁵⁶ Reitsma, Ruurd, *"The I (GE/NL) Corps - nichts Besseres, aber etwas Besonderes"*, Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 22.
- ⁵⁷ Agreed in the Williamsburg Declaration of 5 October 1995.
- ⁵⁸ The first "Progress Report on Deeper Integration within the I (GE/NL) Corps" was submitted to the Ministers of Defense on 1 July 1996.
- ⁵⁹ Agreed by the Ministers of Defense of the three participating nations on 17 August 1995.
- ⁶⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense, *"Multinationalität"*, Bonn: December 1999, page 10.
- ⁶¹ Convention between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and Government of the Republic of Poland on the Multinational Corps Northeast, dated 5 September 1998, Article 3.
- ⁶² Compare Steinaecker, Günther Freiherr von, *"The German Army As A Partner In Multinational Major Formations"*, Military Technology, Vol. XXI, October 1997, page 90.
- ⁶³ Compare Klein, Paul, *"Künftig der Regelfall? - Multinationalität als verteidigungspolitisches Element"*, Information für die Truppe, 4/00, Bonn, April 2000, page 9.
- ⁶⁴ Steinaecker, Günther Freiherr von, *"The German Army As A Partner in Multinational Major Formations"*, Military Technology, Vol. XXI, October 1997, page 92.
- ⁶⁵ Inge, Sir Peter, GCB, *"The Role and Challenges of the British Armed Forces"*, Defence and International Security, RUSI Journal, February 1996, page 5.
- ⁶⁶ See Homepage ARRC, www.arcmedia.com/Body.htm, of 13 December 2000.
- ⁶⁷ For the first time on 14 July 1994.
- ⁶⁸ Compare Klein, Paul, *"Ende der Nationalarmee? Die Bundeswehr auf dem Weg zur Multinationalität"*, Information für die Truppe (GE), October/November 1995, page 96.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., page 96.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., page 96.
- ⁷¹ This matter became somewhat more difficult, when the German Army Forces Command was set up as an additional level between the Corps and the Ministry of Defense, to which the German elements of the I (GE/NL) Corps were subordinated. It took some time to convince the Netherlands of the fact that the Army Forces Command must form part of the German reporting channel, to enable it to perform its command and control task. Merely decisions on issues of fundamental importance were to be referred to the Ministry of Defense.
- ⁷² "Progress Report on Deeper Integration within the I (GE/NL) Corps" of 1 July 1996.
- ⁷³ "Progress Report on Deeper Integration within the I (GE/NL) Corps" of 1 July 1997, Chapter I, 1. (5).
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., Chapter VI.
- ⁷⁵ The Netherlands has a volunteer army, whereas Germany still supports the conscription system.
- ⁷⁶ See Reitsma, Ruurd, *"The I (GE/NL) Corps - nichts Besseres, aber etwas Besonderes"*, Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 27.

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- ⁷⁷ Wittmann, Klaus Dr., *"Die NATO hat viele Gesichter"*, De Officio. (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000)
- ⁷⁸ See Jannssen, Charles J., *"Ein bisschen 'bi' schadet nie: - Some research findings on post-merger situation, relevant to I (GE/NL) Corps"*, Fact Sheet I (GE/NL) Corps - Press and Information 1996.
- ⁷⁹ Compare Steinaecker, Günther Freiherr von, *"Zeit zum Zuhören - Zum Umgang mit Menschen in den Streitkräften"*, in: De Officio, Leipzig, 2000, page 200-202.
- ⁸⁰ Strategic Assessment 1999, National Defense University, Washington 1999, page XV.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., page 276.
- ⁸² Compare Palin, Roger H., *"Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects"*, Adelphi Paper No. 294, Oxford University Press, 1995, page 12.
- ⁸³ The integrated posts at NATO headquarters are not sufficient to provide a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers for multinational operations. They have to be augmented through suitable personnel from the participating nations. The Chief of Staff, HQ SFOR, for example, previously was the Commander of the 7th (GE) Division, which is assigned to the ARRC.
- ⁸⁴ For example, the German 7th Armored Division is assigned to the I (GE/NL) Corps in peacetime but also earmarked for ARRC operations.
- ⁸⁵ At NATO headquarters, an unofficial "bypass system" has been developed for such cases, which guarantees the effectiveness of the organization if individual staff members are not available or skilled enough for the respective position.
- ⁸⁶ The author has gained experiences as member of the staff activating the Allied Command Europe Reaction Forces Planning Staff. The target number of about 45 officer posts was finally exceeded by five posts, since this was the only way of reaching an agreement between the nations on the filling of the individual posts. The additional posts were established to ensure proper representation of the nations. Strictly interpreting the military necessities, these posts would not have been required.
- ⁸⁷ Compare Palin, Roger H., *"Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects"*, Adelphi Papers No. 294, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, April 1995, page 40-42.
- ⁸⁸ The author attended several meetings with French officers who stated that the French offer additional language courses and force their officers to improve their English.


APPENDICES

MULTINATIONALITY OF THE GERMAN ARMY


For completeness the illustrations include the long existing ACE Mobile Force and the NATO Composite Force which are not addressed in the monograph.

- A Overview
- B Integration on corps level
- C Principles
- D ACE Mobile Force (AMF)
- E NATO Composite Force
- F ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
- G Multinational Division (C)
- H Eurocorps
- I I GE/NL Corps
- J Multinational Corps Northeast


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
EUROCORPS




**I. (GE/NL)
Corps**



**II. (GE/US)
Corps**




NATO Composite Force




MNC NE




ARRC




AMF (L)



GE/FR Brigade




MIND (C)



**V. (US/GE)
Corps**

B INTEGRATION ON CORPS LEVEL





C PRINCIPLES

"LEAD NATION"



"FRAMEWORK-NATION"

"INTEGRATION"


D ACE Mobile Force



E NATO COMPOSITE FORCE




F ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS




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Mönchengladbach

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



Up to 4 Div





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

G MULTINATIONAL DIVISION (C)




H EUROCORPS



I I GE/NL CORPS



J MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST






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STETTIN




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Jutland



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