Operational Art, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, and the Operational Employment of the U.S. Army's Objective Force
Abstract
This monograph is about theory and the use of theory to develop doctrine. In light of the dramatic capabilities envisioned for the 'Objective Force', the organized U.S. military mechanism of physical coercion, and the dynamic operational environment that characterizes the world of 2002, land and naval theory is examined, investigated and analyzed. A common perception is that maritime strategy and land strategy exist in discrete and separate spheres of knowledge. However, closer analysis demonstrates that they do not exist as independent areas of study, rather, they are merely divisions in the overall art of war. To develop and illustrate this concept, a general overview of the future threat/operational environment and the proposed characteristics and capabilities of the U.S. Army's Objective Force are presented. Manifest from this description of the Objective Force and the future threat, an apparent analogy between the Objective Force and a naval force becomes evident, even while it is increasingly apparent that technological advances are blurring the traditional distinctions between the divisions in the art of war between land, sea and air warfare. The functional divisions are becoming less distinct, increasingly interrelated and integrated.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA403852
Entities
People
- Kennth A. Szmed Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College