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**POLAND AND NATO: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
ASPECTS OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP**

BY

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POLAND AND NATO: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

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NATO enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the debate and assimilation of the Alliance Strategic Concept, and the first two years of Poland's membership in NATO all raise questions of Poland's responsibilities deriving from its membership in the Alliance. NATO membership is more than the guarantees of the Article 5 of the Treaty. It is also a great responsibility related to the preservation of this organization's credibility, strength and effectiveness. Poland's historical accomplishments in democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe are not the ultimate factor for becoming a credible member of the Alliance. Also, it does not guarantee that Poland is a viable and capable NATO member politically, economically, and militarily. For Poland the first years of NATO membership will decide what role it will play within the Alliance. This will depend on Poland's external political efforts towards the West and the East as well as the development of its internal military and defense capabilities dedicated to NATO. An active, international politico - military role in promoting the Alliance security policy - especially towards non- NATO states - as well as its active participation in NATO military operations can help Poland to realize its role within the Alliance. This paper will focus primarily on identifying of what Poland's role should be in NATO, its regional security efforts and how its armed forces should best be configured to support that role.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vii
POLAND AND NATO: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP	1
POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO - THE BASIC CONTEXT.....	2
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN POLISH PERSPECTIVE.....	4
POLISH POLICY TOWARD NON - NATO NEIGHBORS	6
BALTIC STATES.....	6
RUSSIA	8
THE KALININGRAD DISTRICT.....	9
BYELORUSSIA.....	10
UKRAINE.....	11
SLOVAKIA.....	13
NATIONAL ASPECTS OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.....	13
POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCESS.....	17
STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE SYSTEM - A NEW ROLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES	18
THE FIRST YEARS IN NATO.....	20
A NEW PROGRAM OF MILITARY REFORMS.....	22
FUTURE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES.....	25
CONCLUSION	28
ENDNOTES	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	39

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 POLAND'S GEO - POLITICAL LOCATION.....	5
FIGURE 2 THE BALITC REGION.....	7.
FIGURE 3 KALININGRAD REGION'S BORDER CROSSING.....	10

POLAND AND NATO: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP

Becoming a member of NATO Poland became not only the member of the most powerful and reliable political - military pact in history. Our allies became the United States, Germany, France and many other democratic, stable, rich, and strong economically and militarily western countries. From the day of accession to NATO the principles of Polish security policy are defined through NATO security policy, and its goals are realized through the support and cooperation with the Alliance.

——Wladyslaw Bartoszewski

In the early years of the Third Republic of Poland, following its inception in 1989, the principal objective of Polish foreign policy was to change the nation's geopolitical situation. This meant, above all, incorporating Poland in the institutions of the Western world, and securing friendly relations with neighboring states. In 2002, Poland is a NATO member and is preparing itself for European Union membership.

The problem of security was a constant problem in the history of Poland in past centuries. However, within the last decade, the security situation around Poland has dramatically changed. Professor Bartoszewski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland described the situation in these words,

"We do not live any more in the shadow of global nuclear conflict, which characterized the Cold War period. We are witnessing the disappearance of classical wars between the nations. Few, two- three conflicts are taking place far from the immediate proximity of Poland and they are low intensity conflicts. In a new Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland we could write, "the integrity of Poland is not threatened and our homeland is not subject to any direct military aggression".¹

Indeed, from the perspective of the sufferings in the twenty- century, the current security situation in Europe, and especially for Poland, is like a miracle. The situation in which Poland finds itself security policy is the result of successful efforts leading to its accession to NATO.²

This new situation, with the transformation of Poland's immediate and more distant international environment, the emergence of new neighbors, and the intensification of the integration process with the European Union has caused the broadening of tasks related to security. These tasks involved two different endeavors. The first involves Poland's activities in fulfilling its responsibilities to NATO. The second involves Poland's active participation in the larger movement toward enduring security and stability throughout Europe.³

What then are the defense policy imperatives necessary for Poland to effectively fulfill its NATO obligations and further the cause of general peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe? This paper will address these issues and make recommendations for further policy development.

POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO - THE BASIC CONTEXT

Poland's membership in NATO poses a direct question about Poland's national security strategy and the ways to implement it. This strategy concerns first and foremost political and military preventive measures, provided for in national and allied plans, meant to prevent threats and to actively shape the security environment so that potential sources of instability are limited.⁴

Moreover, the strategy must answer questions about the scope of Poland's national responses, as well as its functioning within the framework of responses provided by NATO, to a real crisis or conflict taking place on the periphery of allied territory. Besides, possible involvement in an armed conflict brings questions as to the extent of Poland's preparations and the participation in NATO operations. Such a perspective should determine the thinking and acting of Poland as an ally and those practical measures Poland takes to build her position among members of the Alliance.⁵

The Washington Treaty builds NATO on the principle of cooperation among sovereign governments. Member states delegate to the Alliance's bodies none of the rights that would go beyond the prerogatives of their own capitals. Every decision taken by the Alliance, to be enforced requires unanimous approval of all member states.⁶ At the level of joint decisions and actions, there are no military, political and financial matters particular countries of the "nineteen" would see in any different way. Poland, by its membership status, has become an element of this mechanism of cooperation, with all the obligations as well as rights of the members of the allied structures. It means that Poland's decisions and security efforts in the international arena reflect its NATO membership and her obligation to enhance the interests of the "nineteen".

One of the fundamental obligations laid on members is to provide for the collective defense of the North Atlantic area against outside aggression. Moreover, NATO develops capabilities to effectively repel threats which can go beyond rigid political or military categories or allied territory as defined by the Treaty. This requires Poland to adjust its armed forces, doctrine, infrastructure and political abilities to be able to participate in the full range of allied activities.

Most important is that new member states, including Poland, enjoy full membership rights common for all "nineteen" nations. During the accession talks Poland obliged itself to act in accordance with the Alliance's principles.⁷ This included:

- The recognition of the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty, such as democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law.
- Peaceful settlement of international disputes.
- Refraining from threatening the use of force or from the use of force in any way inconsistent with the goals of the United Nations Charter.
- Supporting the development of peaceful international relations by way of consolidating democratic institutions and promoting stability and prosperity.
- Promoting the Alliance's effectiveness by taking on an assigned role and through the sharing of responsibility, costs and benefits of reaching common goals and from furthering common interests in the areas of security, the maintenance of peace and security, and, within the Alliance, for taking decisions on political and security issues of interest to NATO.
- Support for the principle of keeping the Alliance open to candidates for membership.
- The understanding of and the will to undertake the commitments resulting from the Washington Treaty, supporting NATO's Strategic Concept and participating in its implementation, including NATO's nuclear policy. Poland expressed its interests in the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and of NATO bodies subordinated to it.
- Support for PfP and readiness to develop co-operation in the area of security with those OSCE members which are not members of NATO.
- Support for partnership between NATO and Russia, NATO and Ukraine, and being ready to assist in developing co-operation between the Alliance and those states.
- The will to transfer the command of Polish operational armed forces to NATO.
- Readiness to join unreservedly the Alliance's military structures (delegation of personnel included) and to take part in defense planning.
- Being able to quickly ensure interoperability of Polish and NATO forces, and to attain NATO standards.
- Understanding and acting on the financial consequences of joining the Alliance.
- Understanding the importance and the role of the Alliance's activities financed collectively, and accepting the guiding principles, procedures and decision-making mechanisms.

- Readiness to contribute to NATO's budget and investment programs, according to the rules and procedures established by the Alliance.

The factors above also describe the Alliance's expectations of Poland. These translate into the tasks Poland will be assigned within the allied framework. It is generally believed within NATO that Poland will act as a vigorous promoter of democratic and free-market values in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.⁸ Adherence to these fundamentals by other countries in the region will be of vital importance to the success of their drive towards NATO membership, and in a wider context, to the strengthening of regional stability and security. Moreover, the Alliance expects Poland to become a source of valuable information, opinions and expert reports on regional matters which will better help NATO to promote co-operation with the countries of the region.

NATO expectations should correspond with Poland's expectations. From the beginning of the 1990s - together with Euro-Atlantic integration - Polish foreign policy has focused on regional policy and relations with its eastern neighbors. The former Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs Przemysław Grudziński argues,

"Thanks to us NATO will acquire a distinct central-eastern-European component, while Poland will take part in the shaping of Brussels' new way of thinking about relations not just with the East, but also about the Baltic Sea basin, about connecting the Baltic Sea region with that of the Black Sea, about Transcaucasia."⁹

In order to analyze and understand Poland's role in promoting the regional security policy in the context of Poland's membership in NATO, it is necessary to examine the current situation in Poland's neighboring states and Poland's role in it.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Central and Eastern Europe has at least three security processes underway. Three states- Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary- belong to NATO. Additional states including Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are making efforts for NATO accession in the near future.¹⁰ The states belonging to these two groups have chosen integration with European political and economical structures as their primary goals. On the other hand Ukraine and Byelorussia are in the process of integration with a Russian bloc. Ukraine, however, declaring its "out of bloc" status, is simultaneously developing its cooperation with the East and strengthening its cooperation with the West.

Two basic aspects define the character of politico-military cooperation of Poland with Ukraine, Byelorussia and first and foremost- Russia, still a state of key significance to security in

Europe. First, Polish national security interests are to strengthen external security arrangements both as a member of the Alliance and as a promoter of regional cooperation in the region. By strengthening security cooperation with the states to its eastern border, Poland contributes to the overall reduction of security threats in the region.

Second, politico-military cooperation benefits from other ways of cooperation: economical, cultural and social. For the developing and still changing Polish economy, desired changes in above- mentioned states create a positive implication for further economical development. The development of cultural and social cooperation is a positive factor, which decreases resentments and stereotypes and contributes to, for example, the solution of problems concerning Polish minorities.




FIGURE 1 POLAND'S GEO - POLITICAL LOCATION

Russia has recently reestablished its position in the international arena, regaining some of its position in the area of the former Soviet Union and recovering somewhat from economic stagnation. Russia perceives NATO enlargement as a process of reestablishing political divisions in Europe and as a threat to its security. On the other hand, Russia has a rich potential for cooperation, especially in the field of economics. Russian president Vladimir Putin has effectively strengthened Russia's international position. Russia has been reestablishing her influence in the area of the Commonwealth of the Independence States (CIS) by implementing a policy of economical dependency of the states and by taking advantage of internal crises, such as the conflict in Transcaucasia, as well as threats from Islamic fundamentalists. The states of

the Commonwealth are attracted by Russia's better economic situation. With respect to the states of Central Europe, Russia's international relations are limited in scope.

From a Polish security interests perspective, the stabilization of the political situation in Ukraine and the continuation of its new government reforms and policy towards Europe are significant. For this reason, Poland sees the program of co-operation with NATO agreed by Ukraine for the years 2001-2004 as an element of further intensification of co-operation with western institutions. Poland supports Ukraine in its endeavors to develop better co-operation with European institutions. Poland believes that because of the Ukrainian geostrategic position, the key significance for future democratic development of Ukraine is international support. By the same token, it is believed that its geopolitical location will dictate its efforts to maintain good relations with Russia. This is in the interests of both Poland and Europe.

The security and defense policy of another Polish neighbor - Byelorussia influences the security situation in the region. With its authoritarian political system, Russia's neighbor, Byelorussia, possesses little tradition of state self-definition. Byelorussia refrains from closer cooperation with European institutions and perceives Russia as its primary strategic partner. Byelorussia perceives NATO enlargement and initiatives offered to post-communist states by the Alliance negatively. In this context, a matter of concern is its broadening integration with Russia, the lack of political and economic reforms, the stagnation of the economy and authoritarian political rule. This is why anchoring Byelorussia with democratic European institutions is a matter of Polish security policy efforts since this directly influences the security situation in the region.

POLISH POLICY TOWARD NON – NATO NEIGHBORS

BALTIC STATES

The Baltic Sea region has essential meaning for the future European security architecture. Its distinctive feature is the diverse security status of the countries in it. There are North Atlantic Alliance members (Germany, Denmark, Poland, Norway), countries aspiring to join NATO (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and neutral ones (Sweden, Finland) are engaged actively in the process of strengthening regional and European security.¹¹



FIGURE 2 THE BALITC REGION

A substantial element influencing the security situation in the region is the place and role of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the future security architecture and their potential conditions for economic development. The security situation of these three countries determines both the geographic position in one of the most stable regions of the European continent and a decisive integration policy with Western political and economic structures in achieving this goal. The security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their need to make the choice of the right security policy option and their inclusiveness in a stable zone is essential for Polish national interests.¹²

Poland considers the aspiring countries' engagement in cooperation with NATO as influencing a very positive security development in the Baltic region and the whole continent, not only in its military aspects, but also politically and economically in the line of a broad security understanding. In this context, Poland considers the "open door" policy as having the function of promoting stability and security in the area of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, Poland perceives the Partnership Charter between The United States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia¹³ as an important element of the security in the Baltic Sea region. It is evidence of the realization of American policy.

Poland, as a member of the Alliance, is actively engaged in this field and supports the aspirations of the countries in the region for integration in NATO, both through multilateral activities and bilateral ones. The efforts of Polish policy aims at strengthening security of the Baltic region are concentrated on activities within the framework of the Euro - Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace.

Poland had actively participated in the Partnership for Peace Program when it was aspiring to membership in the Alliance. Now as a NATO member Poland is contributing to its improvement and adaptation of initiatives for actual needs.

Undertakings within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP) - courses, workshops and common exercises - are conducive to building mutual confidence and the exchange of practical experiences. Polish bilateral cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is developing dynamically and intensively.¹⁴ Additionally, from a Polish perspective, cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad District is very important. Lithuania submitted to the European Union some bilateral projects, which will be realised in the framework of Northern Dimension.¹⁵

Recognizing the security needs of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and their integration into Euro - Atlantic structures as an important element of its national interests, Poland supports the Alliance's "open door" policy. In this context, the process of NATO enlargement is perceived to be an important factor in shaping the Euro-Atlantic security space on the basis of multilateral co-operation of the countries in the continent.

RUSSIA

Shaping the development of multidimensional cooperation with Russia is a permanent feature present in Polish foreign policy. It derives from the principles of Poland's policy, which stresses a need for active involvement in international relations in order to strengthen regional and European security. In this context, the development of politico-military cooperation with Russia is paramount both because of Russia's proximity and its importance for security in Europe.¹⁶ Poland pays a lot of attention to the development of friendly relations in bilateral contacts and as a member of international organizations. Currently, Poland as a neighbor as well as a member of NATO sees both this roles equally important for maintaining the best possible relations with Russia.

Politico-military cooperation between Poland and Russia was initiated in 1997 at the Deputy Minister of Defense level. In 1998 Poland was able to initiate cooperation at the level of experts. Up to now, Poland has initiated bilateral politico-military relations whereas the Russians selectively participate in cooperative arrangements with the tendency to keep them on low level and minimal involvement. The basic obstacle to the development of Polish- Russian military cooperation is the lack of interest from Russia. Although, the Russians declare the desire for intensification of military cooperation with Poland the practical meaning of this declaration is minimal. Undoubtedly, in the foreseeable future the possibilities of democratic changes in

Russia will influence further Polish -Russian politico-military cooperation. This is why it is assumed that the development of military relations with Russia will be a long lasting process.¹⁷

Poland needs to be actively involved in the institutionalized NATO– Russia dialogue and to act effectively in strengthening this dialogue. In order to increase the dialogue with Russia, Poland needs to strive for involvement in the mechanisms of the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Permanent Joint Commission (PJC) NATO – Russia¹⁸ and the EU in the future. Moreover, Poland as a participant in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans can use the forum of PJC ad hoc group on peacekeeping (AHG/PKG) for the development of politico-military cooperation. Also, the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow can serve to intensify politico-military cooperation. By the inclusion of Polish officers in the Mission it can serve Polish authorities in the dialogue between NATO and Russia and simultaneously improve the bilateral dialogue with Russia.

The above aspects suggest that Poland needs to patiently build its partnership cooperation with Russia, especially - in the context of EU enlargement - with the Kaliningrad District. Poland needs to increase its involvement in institutionalized cooperation and to strive for inclusion of Russia in various regional security initiatives.

THE KALININGRAD DISTRICT

In the foreseeable future the process of EU enlargement will shape the security situation in this region. As a consequence one of the anticipated problems is the future status and geopolitical situation in the Russian Kaliningrad District. Seeing the significance of this area for Russia and Central Europe - especially for Poland and Lithuania - the EU already has proposed to Russia several solutions, which aim to minimize any negative effects of EU enlargement and to enable free economical development in this enclave. Consequently, the EU and Russia's dialogue on the Kaliningrad District should lead to its economical and political development and should prevent its future isolation.¹⁹

Since October 2000, after the signing by the EU and Russia joint declaration on cooperation and European security policy dialogue, Russia has intensified its relations with this organization. Recently, President Putin's declarations on the need for the economic development of Russia and closer economic relations with the EU seem to be to the advantage of Poland. Moreover, the EU policy regarding the Kaliningrad District has created additional possibilities for a dialogue with Russia.²⁰




FIGURE 3 KALININGRAD REGION'S BORDER CROSSING

Because of the fact that Poland is not an EU member yet, its ability to influence the cooperation between the EU and Russia are limited. Although with respect to Polish interests, such as the future status of the Kaliningrad District, Brussels discusses its position with Warsaw. This is why, from the Polish standpoint, it is so important to be actively involved in all forms of cooperation including -whenever possible the EU - Russian enterprise.²¹ Recent, high level contacts between Poland and Russia indicates that there is a significant improvement in bilateral relations including the Kaliningrad District issue.²²

BYELORUSSIA

Politico - military cooperation with Byelorussia is defined both by Byelorussia's approach towards European security as well as the internal situation in Byelorussia. The vision of European security presented by Byelorussia's authority is based on OSCE and EAPC as the main mechanisms of politico-military cooperation over NATO and the EU, and even the CIS.²³ Byelorussia acknowledges the right of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia for the free selection of military alliances but it is against "building up military alliances at its doors".²⁴ Byelorussian authorities express their interest in cooperating with NATO in the form of a bilateral agreement similar to PJC NATO - Russia. As a main factor for its security, Byelorussia sees its integration with Russia as a form of commonwealth of states.

By strengthening cooperation with Russia in conjunction with anti - western rhetoric, halting internal democratization reform and an authoritarian style of government, Byelorussia

has found itself isolated from the international community of states. In this situation, Poland's politico - military cooperation is focusing on the conduct of a good neighborly policy towards Byelorussia and through supporting its democratic tendencies and processes. With respect to military cooperation, Poland has declared its will for constructive bilateral cooperation, simultaneously limiting its political contacts with Byelorussia's political establishment.

The military contacts between the Ministries of Defense (MODs) started in 1994 on a regular basis. Since the election of Alexander Lukaszenka as a President of Byelorussia, these contacts were limited to meetings at level of Deputies Minister of Defense. Bilateral relations are mainly based on cross -border cooperation and military contacts between the commander of the Pomeranian Military District of Poland and the commander of the 28th Corps of Byelorussia's army. Politico-military relations have a character of a dialogue of experts.

Until recently, Byelorussia has signaled a need for the development of cooperation with Poland - a NATO member - according to EAPC standards. At this time, it is difficult to evaluate if this is the permanent line of Byelorussia's foreign policy.²⁵ However, bilateral military cooperation can have reciprocal benefits. Military exercises can positively affect the bilateral relations between soldiers and through them civilian societies. From the Polish perspective, its cooperation as a NATO member can be beneficial by eliminating many prejudices about the perception of western structures, which are deeply rooted in Byelorussia's society.

Still, the future of Byelorussia as an integral state with its national priorities- beneficial from Polish point of view - is not completely defined yet. Byelorussia's perception of security problems in Europe still reflects the Cold War period. Still, it is possible for Byelorussia to gain a more important role in the international arena through the democratization of political situation and the creation of basis for a free economy. This is why Poland's future politico - military cooperation with Byelorussia can bring positive effects, especially after changes in its political situation. Currently, endeavors are justified to enhance Byelorussia's involvement in European security arrangements and to invite its representatives to participate in regional activities organized by Poland, as well as maintaining a dialogue of experts and cross - border cooperation.

UKRAINE

In its official statements, Ukraine continues to declare a western approach in its policy, recognizing NATO as the most important pillar of European security.²⁶ The perspectives of a continuation of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine to some extent are subject to the development of the internal situation in Ukraine. Currently, Ukrainian policy towards the Alliance

is measured by the following endeavors: ratification of PFP SOFA and Open Sky Treaty; the participation of the Ukrainian contingent in SFOR and KFOR mission; the creation in 1998 of the NATO Liaison Team in Kiev; and participation in the multinational exercises, i.e., Sea Breeze 2001. Moreover, the presence of Ukrainian officers in SACLANT and AFSOUTH is a sign of desire for cooperation from Ukrainian side.

Cooperation between Poland - a member of NATO - and Ukraine is developing very well. Both sides have expressed the will to continue politico - military relations which were established in 1994. Both, Poland and Ukraine strive to develop good neighbor cooperation, though its dynamics is influenced by not only Ukrainian financial constrains, but also its specific relations with Russia.²⁷

Poland for long time has initiated different forms of support for Ukraine including:

- Support in creation of civil control over military.
- Support in defense system reforms.
- Support in restructuring of the army.

As it is reflected in the document "Assumptions for planning cooperation between the Ministry of Defense Republic of Poland and Ministry of Defense of Ukraine for 2001-2003",²⁸ Poland proposed close cooperation with reference to a politico-military dialogue, consultations, military cooperation including defense planning, defense doctrines and military technology.

POLUKRBAT is a visible confirmation of bilateral military cooperation. Its significance is recognized in efforts to build better concept of Ukrainian armed forces in the Alliance as well as to help in the process of getting experience in interoperability by the Ukrainian army. Realization of tasks by POLUKRBAT during 2000/2001 rotation of KFOR operation in Kosovo was positively accomplished. It contributed to further Ukrainian involvement in a peace process, as it is one of its declared foreign policy objectives.²⁹

Poland, in its international endeavors, supports a view of Ukraine as a stable and democratic country important for building security in East Central Europe. Politico - military cooperation with Ukraine is a direct contribution to strengthening stability and security in the region. The specific location of Poland has an impact on the security situation in Ukraine, and it is a factor which shapes Poland's foreign and security policy not only bilaterally with Ukraine but also more broadly in the Euro - Atlantic framework. For the security of Poland, it is essential that Ukraine is stable, developed and open for international cooperation (including cooperation with Russia).

SLOVAKIA

Poland was one of the first states that signed politico- military agreements on cooperation after the Republic of Slovakia came into the existence. Bilateral relations between Poland and Slovakia with regards to security and military cooperation has undergone an important period in which Slovakia has developed its relations both with its neighbors and the rest of Europe. In these contacts Poland has been placed in a position that Slovakia, by objective and subjective reasons, has not yet fully benefited from.³⁰ Nevertheless, close cooperation between these two countries has been a significant factor in strengthening the regional stability and security.

Since 1993, Poland and Slovakia have been exchanging their experiences on the transformation of their armed forces, the modernization of defense systems, training and education. Currently, Slovakia's development of democratic institutions and integration processes with western structures also has had a positive effect on the security situation in the region. It strengthens cooperation in the region and leads to the creation of a cohesive area of stability in Central Europe. Poland consequently supports Slovakia's integration efforts, especially in its desire to join NATO.

Practical elements of this support are close politico-military cooperation, promotion of a positive view of Slovakia's efforts in the international arena, and most recently the creation of the multinational Polish-Slovak-Czech Brigade.³¹

In conclusion, the responsibility of Poland as a NATO member is related not only to how Poland strengthens its own security but also how it further develops cooperation with its neighbors. In the context of NATO membership, Poland should conduct its policy towards its neighbors consistent with its institutional obligations to NATO.³²

Poland's knowledge of the East Central European region should help NATO members better understand this region's distinct character and needs. Taking note of the friendly and good - neighbor relations with the states around Poland, first and foremost to its east and north-east, Poland could become these countries' informal ambassador in the NATO forum.³³ In this way, Poland would work towards a better understanding and development of mutual relations.

NATIONAL ASPECTS OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

The North Atlantic Alliance can be of great help to us. Yet, it cannot do our job for us. If we want to win this big, lifetime award, which is lasting security, we must give our fate a chance, and fill in our application for this game.

———Witold Waszczykowski

The deposit of the instruments of ratification in Washington in March 1999, marking Poland as a NATO member completed one process of integration. Another process of integration started with Poland's effort to build the foundations of cooperation and communication with the Alliance. The most important part of this process is building Poland's military capabilities. This directly influences Poland's abilities to fulfill its allied obligations and in the end will contribute to Poland's place in the Alliance.

Interoperability is the most important military requirement pertaining to integration with NATO. Equally important is standardization, as well as education and training of military personnel and the development of compatible armaments and military equipment.³⁴ From an Alliance perspective, the most significant military aspect of integration is the ability of new members to cooperate with the armies of NATO members and the NATO command and control structure and mechanisms.

Poland has taken on three groups of military tasks. First were those undertaken during the accession talks, which followed the decision of the NAC to gradually open the Alliance's structures and agencies to the countries involved in the enlargement process.³⁵ The primary goal of this process was to enable immediate military integration on the first day of NATO membership at the level of minimal military requirements. Their fulfillment by Poland (and other new invited countries) was necessary to:

- Set the conditions for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) to fulfill the obligations deriving from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
- Contribute its military capabilities to NATO's overall defense potential.

The second group of tasks results from the need for better interoperability and compatibility between the Polish armed forces and the Alliance. The third group results from Poland's participation in the Alliance's defense planning. Operations in the second and third areas complement one another and are carried out at the same time.

The key areas of integration with NATO forces are:³⁶

- Defense Planning
- Interoperability
- Standardization
- Adaptation of the Military Infrastructure
- Armaments and Military Equipment
- Education and Training of Military Personnel

The collective defense planning process plays a key role in assuring that NATO is able to perform its functions related to both collective defense and the new missions and tasks. Effectively joining the defense planning process, in particular, the force planning process was among the principal tasks of Poland's integration with NATO. Poland's participation as a NATO member in the defense planning process has been a major spur to reform, and the latest program of reform is aimed at fulfilling Alliance objectives.³⁷

A key task for the armed forces is the ability to effectively cooperate with forces of NATO countries. This issue has been at the center of Poland's attention since the very onset of its military cooperation with NATO. Currently, Poland is taking part in another cycle of Force Goals 2002 planning. During the last cycle Force Goals 2000 planning, 136 interoperability objectives and 43 Long Term Requirements were agreed with NATO.³⁸ They were implemented in such areas as Reaction Forces structures, organization of mobile logistic systems for the Reaction Forces and the improvement of training capabilities in the armed forces. The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative³⁹ also led to the initiation of efforts in the following areas: increasing the level of interoperability especially with regards to command systems, improving the sustainability of units operating outside Poland, the purchasing of equipment and increasing the level of protection against WMD.

Interoperability is one of the essential levels of standardization, which plays an important role in ensuring effective cooperation of Allied forces and, in effect, in providing effective collective defense at minimum cost. In 1996, a system of military standardization services was created in Poland. Their principal current task is to collect, distribute and implement NATO standards in the Polish armed forces and the defense industry. The standardization services include the Office for Military Standardization, the Bureau of Military Codification, the Committee of Military Standardization and the Committee of Standardization of Armaments and Military Equipment. Currently, there are over 1200 STANAGs in such areas as communication, equipment, armaments, operations, and training which Poland has to assimilate.⁴⁰

The adaptation of the military infrastructure is another essential task to accomplish. There is a need to reduce the infrastructure inherited by the Polish armed forces from the Warsaw Pact era. In light of the expense of maintaining the "old era" infrastructure and the new missions for Polish armed forces, sharp cuts calling for a 35-percent reduction should reduce significantly the cost of keeping unnecessary infrastructure. Some part of this infrastructure can be made available for NATO and units of NATO countries already exercise on Polish training grounds. Moreover, by spring 1999, Poland prepared, as a part of Host Nation Support obligations, two

airfields, two seaports, and two storage bases according to NATO standards. Further installations are to be prepared for Host Nation Support (HNS) purposes.

Poland's membership in NATO has also stimulated the technical modernization of its armed forces. As the consequence of realizing the Force Goals of the 1998 and 2000 cycles, Poland modernized command, control, communication and reconnaissance systems. Between 1998 and 2002 the priorities of modernization include the increase of electronic, radio, and optic - electronic reconnaissance capabilities with emphasis on the relevant C3, reconnaissance, radio-electronic warfare, air defense, IFF, and artillery systems. This will enable the integration of national reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems into NATO systems.

Another key area of integration is the education and training of military personnel. The preparation of an adequate number of competent military personnel is a necessary condition of effective integration with NATO military structures. Since the early 1990's the Ministry of National defense has been developing a comprehensive program of education and training of officers for the needs of cooperation and integration with the Alliance. Since 1991, Polish soldiers have been systematically attending academies and training centers of NATO countries.

According to the "Report on Poland's integration with NATO", Officers sent to schools in NATO countries come primarily from those formations and structures, which are currently cooperating, or are in the future to cooperate with the structures of NATO and its forces. The priorities of foreign education include:

- Postgraduate operational level studies,
- Command- staff studies,
- Specialist courses and practices,
- Language courses and practices,⁴¹

Of significance is United States support in the form of assistance with education and training of Polish military personnel. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is important and Poland has benefited from it since 1991. By 2000, within various IMET programs, approximately 400 representatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) were trained. There are already 72 college and master's study graduates, including 5 generals who have graduated from the National Defense University.⁴²

Overall, the general expectation from modernization of the Polish armed forces is to make a positive contribution to Euro- Atlantic security. In the words of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, LTG Czeslaw Piatas:

"The reform and modernization of our armed forces will allow us to make a positive contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. The fundamental aim of our efforts is to achieve the interoperability of our armed forces with NATO. This will require further deep structural changes to create the capabilities required by the new NATO strategic Concept and the DCI. This process requires time and substantial expenditure. According to the " Polish Armed Forces reconstruction and the technical modernization program 2001-2006" we intend to adjust to NATO standards 1/3 of our armed forces by the end of 2006." ⁴³

POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

Poland's participation in the NATO Force Planning process is primarily focused on the integration of Poland's armed forces with the Alliance members' forces and with its command structure. This is why the plans of development of the armed forces have to be coherent with common decisions reflected in the NATO Force Planning process. According to the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Defense Strategy as well as "The Program of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006", participation in the NATO Defense Planning process is a part of the National Force Planning and Programming system. A coherent national Force Planning process will guarantee the reliability and contribute to the realization of national security interests within the Alliance. The process is based on the defense policy decisions of the government and reflects the development of tasks and then, based on resources, the formulation of goals which are to be accomplished. ⁴⁴

The inability of maintaining Alliance requirements would be seen as a failure of Poland's membership in NATO and could result in Poland's peripheral role in the formulation of NATO policy. This would also affect Polish ability to fulfill its own national security interests, since Poland's national security is based on the common defense capabilities of the Alliance. This is why it is critical that national defense planning be linked with the NATO defense planning process.

In April 2001, in accordance with the NATO Defense Planning cycle ⁴⁵, Poland received "The Initial proposal of Force Goals 2002 and Long Term Requirements". In this cycle, Polish participation includes negotiations, first with NATO military authorities on the Polish position with regards to "Proposal of Force Goals and Long term Requirements", and consequently negotiation with NATO civilian authorities on a final position with regards to Force Goals that will be included in a "Country Chapter". The final acceptance of the above documents will formally establish Poland's obligations towards the Alliance.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE SYSTEM - A NEW ROLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The Washington Treaty, especially article 5, defines the politico – military obligations of NATO members. Its military formulation is reflected in the Alliance's Strategic Concept.⁴⁶ The obligations of NATO members are defined in three different periods: peacetime, time of crisis and wartime. The Strategy of Prevention reflects the obligation during periods of peace. This strategy is defined by such political and military activities as conflict and crisis prevention, shaping international security environment and deriving from that - a strategy of deterrence. It is assumed that within the Strategy of Prevention, Poland's obligation includes:

- The permanent monitoring of security situation within its proximity.
- Participation with NATO forces in the protection of Poland's territory, especially the airspace and sea.
- Deterrence activities.
- The flexible build up of NATO forces on its territory.
- The multidirectional military contacts and military cooperation with neighboring countries.⁴⁷

Within its political dimension, Poland will be subject to the political efforts leading to conflict prevention and secure environment. In a similar way, NATO assigned these obligations to Poland:

- The leading role in monitoring of Poland's security situation in the region.
- The responsibility for defense of Poland's borders and the borders of the Alliance.
- The maintaining of a credible national defense system.
- Improving the capabilities of performing the Host Nation Support role.
- Maintaining good relations with the armies of neighboring countries, participation in the Partnership for Peace activities and development of military cooperation and contacts.

The Crisis Management Strategy reflects obligations during time of crisis. The strategy is defined by a quick response and full control over any conflict, limiting its scope and preventing the escalation of hostile activities that normally can lead the military conflicts or wars. In this period Poland can count on NATO support in following areas:

- Increased intelligence activities.
- The reinforcement of its border- especially airspace.
- The reinforcement by NATO forces.
- If necessary, the preparation of peacekeeping, peace enforcement or other operations.

Poland's obligations are defined by its responsibilities for Host Nation Support and the contribution with the armed forces.

During war, the main aim of military strategy is to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible. In this context, the strategic concept of Poland's defense, as the country on the Alliance periphery will be in concert with the concept of strategic defense of the Alliance's area of Central Europe.

The anticipated role of Poland's armed forces in such situation will be as follows:

- The strategic cover in accordance with NATO plans.
- Support in the flexible builds up of the Alliance forces and its deployment.
- The participation in Alliance operations - initially by defeating the enemy aggression.
- The organization of resistance on the territory under the enemy control.⁴⁹

Poland's specific responsibilities in this regard are also present during the peacetime. First and foremost, it is Poland's responsibility to defend the Alliance's borders including the permanent monitoring of its airspace, sea and land territory. The Alliance's membership responsibilities are especially important in the context of current threats and challenges facing all members of the Alliance, such as: international terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or international organized crime.

Poland's accession into NATO was a starting point of defense reforms and not a final stage of a dynamic political process. Until now, the realization of the tasks related to the integration with NATO has had a profound impact on Poland's strategic concept of defense system and consequently has been a spur to transform its armed forces. As the consequence of full participation in the NATO Force Planning process, the Polish armed forces need to be appropriately tailored to be able to perform their assigned role in the Alliance.

It has become clearer that military integration with NATO is a multidirectional process. Membership in NATO strengthens Poland's defense capability, but on the other hand it is a demanding challenge for the country. According to Poland's Security Strategy, of key significance to its integration with NATO are the complimentary legislative and executive measures, which serve to strengthen Poland's defense capabilities. It involves, besides the organizational and technical problems of integration, also civil – military relations, education and training, and budgetary challenges including legal and economic issues.

Nevertheless, it will be the military aspects of integration (a successful integration of the Polish armed forces into NATO), which will ultimately decide Poland's credibility and viability as an Alliance member.

THE FIRST YEARS IN NATO

Poland's accession into the Alliance was a starting point of a complex defense reform and demanding challenges for the country in which many national activities had to be reformed. With regard to military reforms, allied regulations for defense planning were learned and implemented. Answers to the Defense Planning Questionnaire (PDQ) were prepared and for the first time Poland participated in a full cycle of Defense Planning. Conclusions drawn on the basis of an analysis of that period helped to better prepare for negotiations of the 2002 Target Goals and Long-term Requirements. Work on these targets indicated a need for clear and constant procedures of financing of the required projects to be worked out at the MON (Ministry of National Defense) level and the amount of financial resources available to be defined early, prior to the negotiation stage. Also, some system had to be introduced for the process of defining the scope of tasks to be executed with partners in cooperation.

The accession of Poland to NATO made it necessary to adjust its armed forces to NATO requirements, including a need to up-date the system of combat readiness and to adopt concepts to facilitate the functioning of the army and its structures. This process included the preparation of new documents which set up standards of combat readiness in the armed forces. In accordance with the standards defined for armed forces of NATO member countries, under the new system of combat readiness, the military units of the Polish armed forces have been ranked in one of ten categories of readiness.

In accordance with the adopted criteria, military units of the reaction force have been ranked in categories of readiness from 1 to 4 assuming that they should be ready for action in the shortest time period. Military units of the reaction forces have reached a level of readiness consistent with NATO requirements at the expense of main defense forces.⁵⁰ Other army units of all types were ranked in categories of readiness from 5 to 10 assuming that the level of their combat readiness depends on operating tasks given to them and that they have the required personnel and equipment. Army units were able to adapt to the execution of tasks within NATO structures thanks to a delineation of military units including the immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction force, main defense forces and forces under national command, including some Navy forces which act as supporting forces. According to Gen Szumski, the former Chief of the Polish General Staff,

During adjustments of the combat readiness system to NATO standards, in spite of enormous efforts, one was not able to meet all requirements in this field or they were met on a minimum level.⁵¹

NATO membership also affected the organization and structures of the main headquarters and army to NATO standards. In accordance with adopted schemes, the new structures of General Staff of the Polish armed forces and the Commands of the Services have been built on the basis of a uniform organization structure joined with a NATO model. Introduction of a uniform structure of command and operational command made it possible to reach the required level of interoperability and formed the basis for planning and the transition of structures of commands into war structures.

During the organization of the training process, the main effort was directed to preparation of command staffs for planning and the organization of operations and tactical activities in accordance with NATO standards and procedures. Participation in various exercises allowed staff officers to learn skills and habits which are useful in multi-national headquarters and army formations. The training process related to the preparation of commands and units assigned for co-operation with NATO required a considerable effort. The preparations for NATO membership were connected with an obligation to know regulations and procedures and to learn and implement NATO standards and documents. The implementation process related to provisions and procedures contained in documents which set the standards and included preparation of national executive documents. This process has been too slow to meet the needs of all elements of the armed forces.

This was caused by a lack of systematic implementation and access to reliable translations of source materials. Moreover, the group of middle-level personnel whose linguistic competence is sufficient to participate in NATO specialist courses is unsatisfactorily small. Because of that, dissemination of experience and profiting from them in everyday operations of units is difficult.

Preparations of the army for its work in the structures of the Alliance also required a considerable effort connected with army equipment. The first period of Poland's membership in NATO raised the issue of the quality and modernity of army equipment. About 90% of the equipment of Polish army differs considerably as far as quality is concerned from NATO standards.⁵² Practically, all units which are to co-operate within NATO structures require additional technical equipment and means comparable with those currently used and required by NATO.⁵³ It was necessary to concentrate on accelerating the provision of additional equipment for reaction force units and exchanging old equipment for modern equipment compatible with NATO.

International cooperation is mostly based on the experience of forming the Multinational NorthEast Corps. Cooperation within the Corps is made difficult because of differing planning

cycles. The Command of the Corps and the Danish and German divisions plan on the basis of a general five year cycle and a detailed two year long cycle. The Polish army has different planning cycles.

The activities of contingents for peacekeeping operations provide a test on the preparation of Polish units for the execution of tasks. The following forces have been involved in peacekeeping missions as part of NATO:

- SFOR - Polish Army contingent that continues activity of IFOR from January 1997.
- KFOR - Polish Army battalion size unit in Kosovo. (Currently the Polish - Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion).
- Strategic Reserve Battalion of SFOR/KFOR of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Poland's accession into NATO at the same time as the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept, as well as launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative and NATO Force Structure Review forced the Polish government to review its previous 15- year program of modernization and development of the armed forces.⁵⁴

A NEW PROGRAM OF MILITARY REFORMS

Based on Polish Governmental Financial Strategy the "Program of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006" was developed in 2001. The reasoning behind Poland's new program of restructuring and modernization was addressed by Poland's Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski in NATO Review:

During the next five years, the reforms will change fundamentally not only the structure of the armed forces, their command, control, communication and intelligence systems, and operational procedures, but also the military education system and personnel structure. These changes will almost inevitably create social tensions and result in a different relationship between the military and the society.⁵⁵

Explaining the necessity of reevaluating previous 15-year program Komorowski argues,

Today, the 350,000- strong armed forces of the 1980s have been reduced to about 200,000. However, this numerical change failed to generate similar improvements in quality. Although the reforms aimed at creating smaller but more effective armed forces, the increase in effectiveness was modest due to the inability to allocate the savings generated by reducing the size of the army to its technical modernization. Those savings were returned to the state budget to meet most immediate needs.⁵⁶

The program is the first one developed after Poland's accession to NATO. The overall aim of the program is to initiate the armed forces modernization process, to phase out obsolete armaments and equipment and to make Polish forces more compatible for the new strategic requirements. Despite some improvement in the integration with NATO, the level of deployability and mobility of Polish forces is still insufficient. This program initiates the first steps of improvement in those areas. According to Minister Komorowski, the highest priorities were given to Poland's NATO commitments.

The Polish Government approved the program and the Polish Parliament agreed the defense budget for 2002 which provides the baseline funding to initiate it. The first important aim of this program is to achieve by, at least 1/3 of Polish Armed Forces, the average NATO standards, particularly in following areas: armament, equipment, training, level of readiness, deployability and mobility, effective engagement. That should increase the operational capabilities of Reaction Forces and Strategic Covering Forces.

Due to financial constraints, the program is a compromise between requirements and capabilities. As a result, it allows the modernizing of a limited number of formations and units to reach required standards. By the end of the planning period these forces will be the core of the deployable forces and ready to operate together with Allies.

It is estimated that about 80 % of armaments has exceeded more than half of its service life and almost 37% should be withdrawn.⁵⁷ This process should provide some additional savings, approximately 350 million PLN. At the same time, new armament and equipment will be purchased and fielded. According to Minister Komorowski, the priority will be given for the High Operation Readiness Units. The key armament acquisition program will concern C3I equipment, modern multi - role fighters, infantry wheeled armored vehicles, combat helicopters and new combat vessels.

The present organization of the Army is: six divisions and six independent brigades, including the airborne brigade and the air cavalry brigade. A new program calls for dissolving two divisions and reorganization of the brigades. The size of the Army will be significantly reduced from the present 104,000 to about 90,000. As a result it will have the right structure and capabilities for the most likely future military operations. It is estimated that in 2006 the structure of the Army will consist of: two corps HQ's, four divisions, one of them assigned to the Multinational Corps NorthEast, four independent brigades, two airmobile brigades, 6 - 7 territorial defense brigades and some command, logistic and support units.

Restructuring of Air Force will result in the Air Force HQ, Air Operation Center, two Air Defense Corps with tactical fighter squadrons (total 10 squadrons), SAM squadrons and radar

units. For better functioning, the command and control system of the Air Force will contain four Control and Reporting Centers (CRC). After the CRCs achieve operational readiness, the corps command structure will be closed down and the radar brigades will be reformed. The structure of other units will be adapted to the requirements resulting from the introduction of new equipment and the withdrawal from service of outdated equipment, including combat aircraft. The final status of the Air and Air Defense Forces will be nearly 31 thousand military permanent posts, with an increase of professional servicemen to nearly 54%. As a result of the execution of the restructuring program, the Polish Air Defense will be much better integrated with the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS).

The program calls for the Navy structure to be slightly improved. The structural changes include forming a Maritime Operations Center and reforming Naval Aviation. The new Navy structure will include the Navy HQ, Maritime Operations Center, three flotillas, and naval aviation, as well as logistic and training units. The Navy structure will be adapted to NATO standards and the operational function will be separated from logistics management. Due to the deployment of the new combat ships including the second "Oliver Hazard Perry" class frigate, and new anti-ship missile systems, the Polish Navy will be capable of assigning more ships to the Combined Naval Task Force operating outside the Baltic Sea.

The structural changes include the reforming the Naval Aviation. Due to the transfer of tactical air support of maritime operations to the Air Force, 28 obsolete MiG-21 fighters will be withdrawn from naval aviation. In the future, Naval Aviation will maintain maritime reconnaissance, ASW and SAR capabilities only. The Navy will be also reduced from about 17,000 sailors in 2000 to 13,500 in 2003. Additionally, 20 combat and auxiliary vessels will be scrapped.⁵⁸

Of all of the above the most difficult task is likely to be reducing personnel according to a tight schedule. By the end of 2001, 26,000 more posts, that is 13 % of the total, should have gone, leaving 180,000 personnel, including 36,000 officers and 52,200 other professional soldiers. The number of conscript soldiers will be reduced to 91,800. By 2003, the overall numbers should be reduced further to 150,000 of whom 75,000 will be professionals.⁵⁹

Personnel reductions are directly linked to recruitment in military schools as well as the system of discharge. While graduates of Polish military academies boast a high level of education and military skills, the schooling process is excessively long and expensive in relation to the armed forces' actual needs. It is estimated that the annual cost of educating a cadet comes to approximately 38,000 zloty, compared with 6,500 zloty for a university student.⁶⁰

As a result, in the first instance, the number of places in military academies will be reduced. Following this reduction, the armed forces will begin recruiting regular university graduates for officer posts on a contract basis and introducing a system of continuous education. The social costs of these reductions are likely to be extremely high and this may cause unrest among those officers - colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors - who will bear the brunt of the cuts, many of whom will be discharged within three years.

It is estimated that by 2006, the Polish Armed Forces should comprise the following units, equipped and trained to NATO standards: 11 combat units of the brigade-regiment type, 15 combat units of the battalion type, two units of the company type, five tactical air squadrons, 22 air-defense missile divisions, seven air bases, three radio-electronics units, 35 ships and two naval air squadrons. By that time, the Polish units of the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps NorthEast based in Szczecin, Poland, will have attained the required NATO standards.⁶¹

Although, the program has been drawn up on the basis of wide-ranging consultation with politicians of all persuasions and military experts and has been welcomed by all Poland's major political parties, implementation will be difficult and will require broad support.⁶² The program creates new challenges not only for the armed forces but also for all state structures. In the years to come its real effectiveness will be measured by a strong will to overcome emerging challenges.

FUTURE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

As outlined in previous paragraphs the security environment of Poland in the last decade has significantly changed. These changes have had a direct impact on the security of Poland, both on the domestic and international fronts. Never before, has Poland enjoyed such a favorable security environment and such a positive outlook for its development.⁶³ It results from the fact that there is no threat of any direct aggression against Poland. The possibility of war overwhelming the territory of the state is remote. At the same time, for almost three years Poland has had solid security guarantees as a member of NATO. Gaining EU membership and becoming permanently anchored within the community of developed countries is coming close to reality.

Poland, with its good and stable relations with all its neighbors and significant progress in democratization efforts as well as with its civil-military relations, can serve as an example for those countries seeking NATO membership. Poland's current economy, solid social support towards NATO, and favorable demographics with its almost 40 millions population permits an optimistic outlook in placing the state among the important partners of NATO.

Poland's current efforts to achieve a secure environment around its territory looks promising in guaranteeing the future strengthening of the state's security. However, all the above-mentioned aspects of prosperity are based on Poland's relationship to NATO and neighboring states and can be modified by how well Poland will be prepared to fulfill its obligations as a NATO member. Even with an optimistic attitude towards the prospect of the Polish security environment, Poland, as a strategically unique country, must also be aware of other challenges. Increasing globalization brings, on one hand, closer international relations. On the other hand, it exposes the state to the challenges of globalization including, local crises and conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled cross-border migrations, terrorism, and organized crime.⁶⁴

To counter these strategic challenges, Poland endeavors to tighten relations with NATO and the EU member states as well as with those countries seeking membership to these institutions. There is no doubt that Poland strictly links its security to NATO countries and EU members. This is reflected in the Polish Security Strategy:

Poland strictly links its security to that of the NATO states and the members of the European Union. Poland implements its own security interests above all within the framework of the North Atlantic system of allied co-operation and solidarity, supporting the efforts of the international community to strengthen European and world security, protect basic human rights and values and ensure conditions for the stable and free coexistence and development of all states.⁶⁵

In this context, the primary concerns of the political- strategic leadership of the Republic of Poland is focused on achieving a political consensus among member states, as well as on Polish security and stabilization efforts - especially related to NATO – Russia, NATO – Ukraine relations. Supporting these political efforts, the primary challenges facing the Polish strategic-military leadership will include meeting all the political and military standards of NATO.

During the last decade through the efforts of its political and intellectual establishments, Poland has already achieved the EU norms for a liberal democracy.⁶⁶ Rules of law, civil control over the armed forces, separation of powers, checks and balances, freedom of speech, respect for minorities, freedom of religion and property are clearly established in the Polish political and social system, thereby guaranteeing the stability of the current Polish political system.

With respect to civil – military relations, however, more civilians need to be prepared for positions within the defense ministry and other defense– related institutions. This should help to overcome an internal challenge with respect to policy planning. Clear security policy direction given by civilian authorities should help to assure its cohesion with the force structure and

defense system as a whole. In this regard, it has been a serious challenge to properly link national defense planning process with the Alliance.⁶⁷

Concerning military involvement, NATO's basic expectation of its new members is that they will contribute militarily to both Article 5 and non-article 5 missions. As outlined in previous paragraphs, currently, the key challenge for the Polish armed forces is in achieving the appropriate level of interoperability for forces assigned to the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), performing currently non - article 5 crises response operations (like Bosnia or Kosovo), and Main Defense Forces (MDF) assigned to Allied Command Europe (ACE). Poland, with its Warsaw Pact legacy, now finds the successful and timely transformation to NATO standards as one of the most challenging endeavors facing its political and military leadership.

The basis for such an assumption is the fact that the new Program covers only the selective investment and the modernization of the armed forces (approximately 30% of all forces to be prepared according to NATO standards). Inevitably, the rest of the military structure will be underdeveloped. This may lead to creation of a "two - level" force with the social and professional consequences of such a process. This is why Polish senior leaders must create a positive and supportive command climate in which transformation can take place and the overall consequences of the changes should be as painless as possible.

Ultimately, Poland must determine what level of operational forces should be maintained at high readiness and what kind of missions they will be capable of performing. Maintaining too high a level of allied obligations not reflected in financial and technical capabilities, will result in enormous difficulties. The NATO military assessment for year 2000, although, does clearly recognize Poland's important contributions to regional stability and active participation in NATO's PfP program.⁶⁸ However, due to financial shortfalls, the overall commitment to NATO for 2000 has not been fully met. The most "visible" areas of underdevelopment include: unreformed defense structure and personnel restructuring, to include significant reduction of the senior officer corps and the developing of the NCO corps.⁶⁹ Other areas include the lack of strategic transport capabilities, severely limited C2 capabilities and delay in procurement of a multi-role combat aircraft.

Balancing the country's defense needs with available resources is a huge challenge for defense reform. It is however very important not to allow the defense reforms to be resource-driven only. Such a reform may turn out to be ill fated from the beginning. Moreover, each defense reform must be built upon a policy guidelines foundation to be properly linked within existing budget limitations. In this respect, it is very challenging to build up strong support for the reform among the political circles before the reform is actually started. It is also crucial that the

spending for the maintenance of existing defense capabilities and the prospective upgrade of national defense systems need to be properly balanced.⁷⁰ A strength of the Program is in maintaining stable defense expenditures of about 1.95% of GDP during the planning period. However, It will achieve the Program's aims only if there is strong political will from the leadership to invest on the assumed level despite temporary domestic problems.

Personnel related challenges are key. Two important issues still remain to be unsolved. First, there is widespread uncertainty in the armed forces about the stability of the retirement, pay, and health systems, and the personnel system. These problems appear against a backdrop of turbulence generated by units being deactivated, others being moved to different garrisons, and new units being activated.⁷¹ Second, Poland's senior military leaders need to invest in the best young military personnel to serve in the future armed forces of the 21st century. Polish politicians and governmental officials must be willing to invest more in taking care of the Polish armed forces if they really want the military that the nation needs in the future.

Poland's major political parties, both those in government and those in opposition, by adopting in May 2001 a bill covering the reform program opened a "window of opportunity" for the future development of Polish armed forces. Undoubtedly, stable, long-term investment will be a critical factor for the overall success of Polish military reform.

CONCLUSION

All NATO members have a great responsibility for the preservation of this organization's credibility, strength and effectiveness. Real capabilities - beyond political declarations - determine the effectiveness of the Alliance. Only when its members are willing to commit their forces and resources to execute operational tasks can the strength and effectiveness of the Organization be preserved. In the case of Poland, the political will to allocate resources to meet the Alliance's requirements as well as the capability to commit its forces (even in harm's way) will ultimately decide Poland's position in NATO and consequently will determine its security.

What then has to be done? Poland's situation is difficult, if its location on the periphery of the Alliance is taken into account. Although a large-scale aggression at present is unlikely it cannot be excluded completely. Since there are no NATO forces stationed on the territory of Poland, Poland would have to fight with its peacetime forces. This requires some part of the armed forces to consist of heavy units - highly mobile with considerable firepower. However, these types of units are not only very costly but are less suitable for operations like Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan, the ones that the Alliance has been gradually more involved in.

Polish national security interests require the maintenance of some level of heavy units for national defense.⁷² Nevertheless, Poland's role in the Alliance will be defined by its ability to contribute with units which are most needed by the Alliance such as air- assault, commando or anti- terrorism, units which are highly mobile, highly trained and equipped and able to conduct combined operations with its NATO counterparts.

In addition to heavy units for national defense, Poland needs therefore to develop its airmobile, special operations and other capabilities for Alliance needs. Another contribution to the Alliance could be Poland's ability to gain information needed for conflict prevention or information for the military operations. The latest operations indicate a need for the development of human intelligence or small unit intelligence. Poland's ability of maintaining human intelligence in conjunction with the ability to analyze and verify information on the theatre or political level can be of much help to the Alliance.

Poland is at the beginning of its major reforms. Keeping up with NATO standards, from a financial point of view, causes a need for prioritization. While maintaining a minimal national defense potential, more has to be invested in what is needed for today and tomorrow in the Alliance. Poland has to transform its armed forces to be able to effectively commit itself to NATO's common defense. Inevitably, the emerging challenges place the current strategic military leadership in an extraordinary and crucial role in initiating new reforms and monitoring ongoing major changes in the armed forces. The goals imposed on the Armed Forces are intended to define a clear vision of their role in a changing world. The decisions made today must define their capabilities for at least the next two decades.

A long-range timeframe requires cohesion, persistence and vision by all major strategic players. That places the current senior strategic leadership in a unique situation, one that will require that their professional military judgment be heard and accorded due weight by the political leadership.⁷³

Both civilian and military strategic leaders have to work in concert to provide Polish society with a permanent reminder that the security opportunities created by membership in NATO can only be properly utilized when Poland possesses the political will and physical capabilities to share the security burden at the same level as the rest of the partners. The "window of opportunity" should not be allowed to close without Poland playing a significant role in the future security of Europe appropriate to its size and strategic location and according to the expectations of the Alliance.

WORD COUNT = 11,384

ENDNOTES

¹ Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, European security policy- Polish point of view, An address by Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 11, 2001 in Warsaw University. Available form <[http:// www.msz.gov.pl/polzagr/20010511bartoszewski.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/polzagr/20010511bartoszewski.html)>; Accessed October 22, 2001.

² Professor Bartoszewski used these words to describe the situation, "Becoming a member of NATO Poland became not only the member of the most powerful and reliable political-military pact in history. Our allies became the United States, Germany, France and many other democratic, stable, rich, and strong economically and militarily western countries. From the day of accession to NATO on March 12, 1999 and from the assimilation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept approved in April 1999, the principles of Polish security policy are defined through NATO security policy, and its goals are realized through the support and cooperation with the Alliance. We fully support the goals and tasks of the Alliance's Strategic Concept such as strengthening security and freedom of member states, providing stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, stabilizing the situation within the Alliance proximity, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. Thanks to Alliance membership, our close bilateral cooperation with such countries like the United States and Germany, as well as our active involvement in the OSCE activities and other international institutions, Poland became a safe country with traditional meaning of the word." See Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Information on tasks related to the Polish foreign policy in year 2001, The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland address to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on Jun 6, 2001. Available form <<http://www.msz.gov.pl/polzagr/20010606bartoszewski.html>>; Accessed October 22, 2001.

³ "The first complex of endeavors includes Poland's membership in NATO, her active participation in all current works within the Alliance, formulation of the Alliance strategy, realization of declared force goals which enable the Polish armed forces to meet NATO standards, their modernization and restructuring. We should aim at optimal manning and participation of Polish representatives in the Alliance political and military structure as well as keeping at least at present level our presence in KFOR and SFOR operations led by the Alliance. The second complex of endeavors is related to the idea of a broadening sphere of stability and security in Europe. Poland is actively involved in all activities initiated by European and Euro Atlantic security institutions. Their goals are to focus on economic development, political reforms and the prevention of new political divisions in Eastern and Southern European countries. We desire to broaden cooperation with NATO members, UE members and their partners in the field of crises management. We support idea of "open doors" of the Alliance for new members and we will be actively involved in the process of Alliance enlargement." Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Information on tasks related to the Polish foreign policy in year 2001.

⁴ In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in co-operation with other organizations, to prevent conflicts or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with International law, including through the possibility of conducting non-article 5 CRO. The Alliance preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objectives of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO Partners. See Part II point 6 The Alliance's approach to security in the 21st century. MC guidance for the military implementation of the Alliance strategy. MC 400/2, and based on the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Alliance's Strategic Concept the National

Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Available from <[http:// www.kprm.gov.pl/html](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/html)>; Accessed 17 June 2001.

⁵ Robert Kupiecki, "Poland's Place and Tasks in NATO," The Polish Quarterly of the International Affairs, Volume 8, Nr1. Available form <[http:// www.msz.gov.pl/html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/html)>; Accessed October 22, 2001, p 3.

⁶ "What is NATO?," NATO Handbook, Office of Information and Press, NATO- 1110 Brussels, Belgium, 1998, p 23.

⁷ The signature of the Protocols of Accession by the NATO Foreign Ministers on 16 December 1997 opened the way to Polish entry into the Alliance. The ratification process itself went ahead without interference. As early as 2 February 1998, Canada became the first member country to ratify the Protocols, and was followed a day later by the Danish parliament. In the next few months all the remaining members of the Alliance did likewise, thus creating the formal grounds for extending an official invitation to Poland and the two other candidates for membership to join the Alliance. On 29 January 1999, NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana completed the formalities. At the same time it began laying the groundwork for efficient and swift ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty by the Polish Parliament once the invitation to join had been received. A thorough analysis was also undertaken of the international law relating to NATO membership to ascertain what implications adoption of the relevant documents might have for the Polish legal system and what domestic regulations would need to be brought in line. On 20 October 1998, the government approved a draft of the ratification act and submitted it to the lower house of the legislature. The first reading and the debate on the floor began on 20 November. On 2 December the text of the bill was adopted at a joint session of the foreign, defense and finance committees and reported back to the house. The ratification process was completed in February 1999 on receipt of the official invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Alliance. See Bogusław Świątlicki, "Polish-NATO Relations on the Eve of Admission to the Alliance". Available from <[http:// www.msz.gov.pl/html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/html)>; Accessed December 23, 2001, p 2.

⁸ Andrew A. Michta, America's new Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, Chapter 2, Poland: a linchpin of regional security, (University of Washington Press, 1999), p 63- 64.

⁹ Przemysław Grudzinski, Srednia potega the interview with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1998, quoted in Robert Kupiecki, Poland's Place and Tasks in NATO, Available form <[http:// www.msz.gov.pl/html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/html)>; Accessed 22 October 2001.

¹⁰ Markus Meckel, "Towards NATO enlargement" Washington Times, December 17, 2001.

¹¹ The Baltic Sea region is the area of intensive cooperation carrying into effect within the framework of broad institutionalizes infrastructure (OSCE, Baltic Sea States Council, EU-North Dimension, Partnership for Peace, German-Danish-Polish Triangle, Cologne Initiative) as well as bilateral and multilateral activities. See "Poland in cooperation with the Baltic Sea region", Department of International Security, the Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 2001, p 3.

¹² For these reasons, Poland supports the Alliance "open doors" policy and develops political - military cooperation and promotes their integration into Euro - Atlantic structures. In the words of Minister of Foreign Affairs professor Bartoszewski, "We support the Alliance's

"open door" policy and we will be actively engaged in efforts leading to NATO enlargement in our region. By deepening our cooperation we still plan to support Euro-Atlantic aspirations, first of all our neighbors: Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia and Estonia." Information on tasks related to the Polish foreign policy in year 2001, p 4.

¹³ Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and Republic of Lithuania, Washington, January 16, 1998.

¹⁴ Co-operation with Poland's direct neighbor – Lithuania develops particularly well. One of the most important achievements is creating of the joint Lithuanian-Polish Battalion (LITPOLBAT), which achieved operational readiness in 1999. Apart from that one Lithuanian platoon served in Kosovo forces (KFOR) within Polish-Ukrainian battalion (POLUKRBAT). Among initiatives supporting efforts of candidate countries special attention should be paid to last year Polish-Estonian initiative announced at Sofia Meeting to create the *ad hoc* Polish Civil and Military Experts Team, structure of which would depend on expectations and needs of countries aspiring to NATO. Such a Team would act within PfP both in bilateral and multilateral formula in order to support countries executing Plan for Membership in NATO (MAP) in areas thought to be the most important for future integration with the Alliance. See "Poland in cooperation with the Baltic Sea region", Department of International Security, the Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 2001, p 5.

¹⁵ The so-called Northern Dimension, which is becoming an area of increasing activity on the part of EU countries, covers the Baltic States, the Kaliningrad Oblast, and northwestern Russia. The Northern Dimension concept is part of the EU's strategy on Russia. The EU countries most interested in cooperation under this dimension include Finland, Sweden, and Germany. Cooperation under the Dimension is described in the European Commission's document "Action Plan for the Northern Dimension in the external and cross-border policies of EU 2000-2003", See "The most serious challenges facing Poland's European policy", An analysis prepared for the Polish Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reports & Analyses, Center For International Relations, Warsaw 28 February, 2001, p 17.

¹⁶ "There is the challenge of managing Russia. No other single nation's development can affect European security more profoundly than the development of Russia. But only together with the North America can we develop a policy that firmly anchors Russia in Europe. Only by working with the United States can we sustain an approach towards Russia that will foreclose a return to traditional Russian reflexes of pursuing her security interests at the expense of her neighbors. So far I would say that NATO has mastered this challenge astonishingly well. The fact that Poland is today a NATO-member is in itself a resounding testimony of what transatlantic solidarity can achieve. This transatlantic solidarity has enabled us to build NATO-Russia relations, yet without giving Russia a "veto" over crucial questions such as NATO enlargement. By contrast, if Europe and America would pursue diverging approaches vis-à-vis Russia, we would almost certainly fail. Russia would again be tempted to play Europe and the US against each other, and we would squander the opportunity." Ambassador Klaus-Peter Kliber "ESDI and the Future of NATO", speech addressed at the Center for International Relations, Warsaw, January 25, 2001, p 6.

¹⁷ Koncepcja i charakter polityczno-wojskowej aktywnosci resortu Obrony Narodowej RP na kierunku wschodnim. Department of International Security, the Ministry of National Defense, September 2001, p 3.

¹⁸ Cooperation between NATO and Russia is taking place in several NATO institutions, for example, NACC/EAPC and PJC in accordance with "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation". Recent tragic events on September 11, 2001 initiated the development of a new dimension in cooperation between Russia and NATO in the form of a council consisting of the 19 alliance members and Russia. See following articles: Alan Sipress, "NATO sets new Council, giving Russia a limited role" Washington Post, December 7, 2001, p 1. Alexander Gerry, War against terrorism: Radical departure for NATO, The Officer, November 2001. Karl- Heinz Kamp, Will Russia join NATO?, Defense News, November 19-25, 2001, p 15. Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld sees more involvement for Russia in NATO, New York Times, December 18, 2001.

¹⁹ If a subsequent round of NATO expansion brings in the Baltic republic, Kaliningrad would then be separated from the rest of Russia by a belt of NATO countries. That would create a "mirror image" of West Berlin during the Cold War- with the problem of military transit rights and other potential problems. Russian officials are already concerned about secure access to Kaliningrad. That is one reason among many that there is intensive Russian opposition to NATO membership for the Baltic republic. See Stanley Kobler, "NATO Expansion Flashpoint No.3: Kaliningrad". February 11, 1998, [database online]; available from CIAO, accessed December 9, 2001, and Bartosz Cichocki, Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, Andrzej Wilk "The Kaliningrad District in the context of EU enlargement", Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw. Available from <http://www.osw.waw.pl/arc/2001/07/0107.html>; Accessed December 12, 2001.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "The most serious challenges facing Poland's European policy", An analysis prepared for the Polish Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reports & Analyses, Center For International Relations, Warsaw, February 28, 2001.

²² President Wladimir Putin visited Poland on January 16, 2002. It was first after last 8 years official visit paid by the President of Russia in Poland. Russian senior officials stated:

Russia is ready to build relations with Poland on good-neighborly relations including pragmatic and bilateral interest approach. Poland's membership in NATO is not the obstacle to build good bilateral relations".

Pozytywne relacje Moskwa- Warszawa, Polish Press Agency, January 16, 2002. Available form <<http://www.onet.pl>> Assessed January 16, 2002.

²³ Koncepcja i charakter polityczno-wojskowej aktywnosci resortu Obrony Narodowej RP na kierunku wschodnim, p 8.

²⁴ Ibid, 9

²⁵ Ibid, 10

²⁶ Basic document which define cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is "Charter on Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Organization and Ukraine", Madrid, July 9, 1997.

²⁷ Polityczno-wojskowa współpraca Polsko-Ukraińska, Department of International Security, MOD, Warsaw, 2001, p 2

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ladoslav Svoboda, Miejsce Polski w Polityce Bezpieczeństwa Republiki Słowackiej in Bezpieczeństwo Polski w Zmieniającej się Europie, Wydawnictwo Marszałek, Warszawa-Torun, 1997, p 47.

³¹ Jiri Kominek, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia form a new Brigade, Janes's Defence Weekly, August 1, 2001. Available from < <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2001/s20010802czech.html>> Accessed September 12, 2001.

³² In the words of the former Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs Przemysław Grudziński, "Poland's Eastern policy must be in consonance with the program for the institutionalization of European security, which Poland belongs to and supports. We want to construct this program around NATO and the EU and want it to contribute to good and friendly relations between these institutions and states remaining outside their institutional limits." Stephen J. Blank, ed. European Security and NATO enlargement: A view from Central Europe. Army War College, 1998.

³³ Kupiecki, 8.

³⁴ Report on Poland's integration with NATO, Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, February 1998.

³⁵ Poland's representation in Brussels was systematically built up for performance of the role of Polish Mission to NATO. The nucleus of the future Permanent Representation (PERMREP) and Military Representation (MILREP) was created. In the course of 1998 preparations for Poland's full participation in the Allied defense planning process moved into the stage of concrete integration-related measures. After several months of negotiations, on 11 June the North Atlantic Council at a meeting of defense ministers approved a document, "Target Force Goals of the Republic of Poland", which prioritized the tasks of Poland's armed forces and set out a timetable for their implementation in accordance with the requirement of future collaboration within NATO's military structures. In late July, as part of measures for putting in place Alliance planning procedures, Poland for the second time submitted to the Alliance the Defense Planning Questionnaire that is routinely required each year of all the current member nations. That marked completion of the first stage of our participation in the force planning process the aim of which was, on the one hand, introduction of procedures and activation of the planning process by the future Allies, on the other, smooth integration of the new members into the Alliance system. In many respects 1998 was a transitional period. In accordance with its earlier declarations stressing the importance of co-operation in the PfP framework Poland participated actively in joint activities with other Partner countries. See Bogusław Świątlicki, "Polish-NATO Relations on the Eve of Admission to the Alliance", Available from <<http://www.msz.gov.pl/html>>; Accessed October 23, 2001, p 3.

³⁶ Report on Poland's integration with NATO, 22-26.

³⁷ The Program of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces Of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006, Ministry of National Defense official website, Available from <[http:// www.wp.mil.pl/html](http://www.wp.mil.pl/html)>; Accessed December 23, 2001.

³⁸ Up to now, Poland has participated in two cycles of Force Planning process. First, in 1997-1998, there were 17 Target Force Goals to be achieved "on the first day of membership" and the introduction of another 48 Force Goals to be achieved between 2000-2004. The main areas of transformation include: Legislation, Security, Personnel preparation, Air defense, Modernization and Host Nation Support. Consequently, in 1999-2000 Poland accepted 136 Force Goals and 43 Long Term Requirements. Waldemar Czarnecki, Progress on NATO integration, the General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, PPT Presentation, Warsaw June 27, 2001.

Lessons learned during Force Planning in 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 indicated a need for further development of the national defense planning system in order to achieve NATO Defense Planning standards. The main areas of concern during 1997-1998 planning period included lack of a new Security Strategy, lack of a new Defense Strategy, lack of politico-military guidance for defense planning 1999-2004. Lack of experts with sufficient language skills; Limited access to NATO classified documents; Lack of national long-term and middle-term plans for the armed forces development; Moreover, it was assumed that "Program on NATO integration and modernization of the Armed Forces 1998-2012" is lacking several major aspects of integration with NATO. During planning period 1999-2000 many of problems from previous period still influenced the planning process but with less impact. See *Doswiadczenia z uczestnictwa RP w procesie planowania sil zbrojnych NATO w latach 1997-1998 oraz 1999-2000*. Department Integration with NATO, Ministry of National Defense. Warsaw, 2001.

³⁹ Wojciech Stepek, Polish Military Overview, General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Warsaw, 2000.

⁴⁰ Marek Ojrzanowski, The problem of Interoperability of Polish Armed Forces with NATO, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2000), 12.

⁴¹ Report on Poland's integration with NATO, p 25.

⁴² Czeslaw Piatas, "Military Contribution of the Republic of Poland in Support of Transatlantic Security Policy", Speaking notes, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, July 2001, Available from <[http:// www.polandembassy.org/Speaking_notes18_07.html](http://www.polandembassy.org/Speaking_notes18_07.html)> Assessed January 21, 2002.

⁴³ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁴ Koncepcja udziału MON w procesie planowania sil zbrojnych NATO w latach 2001-2002, Department Integration with NATO, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 2001.

⁴⁵ New Force Goals and Long Term Requirements 2002 planning cycle was initiated by acceptance of basic planning document NATO Ministerial Guidance 2000 during NATO session of the Ministers of Defense during NAC session in December 5, 2000.

⁴⁶ The new strategic concept, which was announced at the NATO summit in Washington, together with the Defense Capabilities Initiative, paved the way for new NATO's defense

planning process and formed the foundation for further work on the new Alliance's strategy. While the new strategic concept confirmed the previous objectives of the Alliance such as ensuring the security of its Member States, deterrence, collective defense and consultation, it introduced two new essential objectives: crisis management and military partnership with countries who have declared their political will to co-operate with NATO. From the Polish Armed Forces point of view the most important challenge of the new concept is the new approach to the readiness category principle of NATO Armed Forces to respond to a wide spectrum of operations, not only those contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also crisis management and military co-operation with partners. Andrzej Kurek, The Polish Armed Forces, Briefing for USAWC students, Embassy of the Republic of Poland, Washington, January 16, 2002.

⁴⁷ Boleslaw Balcerowicz, Strategiczne Koncepcje Systemu Obrony, Mysl Wojskowa, nr 4, 2001, p 35.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 36.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 37.

⁵⁰ Henryk Szumski, Bilans Funkcjonowania Sil Zbrojnych RP w NATO oraz Misji Pokojowych, Mysl Wojskowa, nr 2, 2000, p 6.

⁵¹ Ibid., 6.

⁵² Ibid., 8.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ojrzanowski, 8.

⁵⁵ Bronislaw Komorowski, Reforming Poland's military, NATO Review, Summer 2001, p 26-27.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Kurek, 8

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The Program of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces Of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006,

⁶⁰ Komorowski, 3.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Komorowski, 4.

⁶³ Current state and perspectives of international security from Warsaw point of view. Department of International Security, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 2000,1.

⁶⁴ The Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland adopted at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 4 January 2000, Warsaw, 2000, Available from <[http:// www.wp.mil.pl/html](http://www.wp.mil.pl/html)>; Accessed December 13, 2001. p 4.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The New Allies: Approaching NATO Political and Military Standards," East European Studies/West European Studies. p, 37-48.

⁶⁷ Marcin Koziel, Implementing and Managing Defense Reform: A Polish Perspective, The Ministry of National Defense, NATO PfP Planning Symposium, Oberammergau, 2001.

⁶⁸ An example its extensive cooperation agreements with neighbors including formation of peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, support development of the Baltic countries' armed forces.

⁶⁹ The aim of Polish personnel policy is to shift the personnel structure by 2003 to one consisting of between approximately 25,000 –30,000 officers (30 percent), 25,000- 30,000 warrant officers (30 percent) and 40,000 –50,000 NCOs (40 percent). See Dr Paul Latawski, The transformation of the Polish Armed Forces: preparing for NATO, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1999, p 22.

⁷⁰ Koziel, 4.

⁷¹ Lech Zakrzewski, Joining NATO: Challenges ahead for Poland, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 1999), 43.

⁷² Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Nierealny Plan", Rzeczpospolita, Available from <[http:// www.rzeczpospolita.pl/gazeta/wydanie_020214/publicystyka/publicystyka_a_3.html](http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl/gazeta/wydanie_020214/publicystyka/publicystyka_a_3.html)>; Accessed March 3, 2002.

⁷³ Dr Martin Cook, Army Professionalism: service to What Ends?, U.S Army War College Selected Readings, Carlisle Barracks, 2001, 236.

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