

**STRATEGY
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**A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE POLICY**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH P. DiSALVO
United States Army

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A Perspective on the European Union's European Security Defense Policy

by

LTC Joseph P. DiSalvo
United States Army

LTC Raymond A. Millen
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This SRP analyzes why the United States should support the European Union's European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) and why the European community must exercise strong resolve in order to successfully field ESDP. The analysis focuses on the following areas: 1) Background, the significant biases and strategies peculiar to the United States and Europe with respect to defense; 2) The reasons why the European Union initiated ESDP; 3) The initial response from the U.S. and NATO; 4) Issues of friction generated from ESDP; 5) Potential advantages of ESDP to the U.S.; 6) The current ESDP situation; 7) Recommendations for the U.S. position on ESDP; and 8) Conclusions.



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A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE POLICY

In December 1999 the European Union (EU) announced its decision to field an autonomous corps-sized military force separate from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to as the European Security Defense Policy.¹ A EU capability to possess an autonomous military force is in the best interest of the United States (U.S.), although realizing such a capability will require strong resolve within the European community. The EU's ESDP has significant dynamics that warrant analysis in order to acquire an educated appreciation for advantages and disadvantages from a U.S. perspective. The purpose of this research project is to analyze why U.S. should support ESDP and why the European community must exercise strong resolve in order to field ESDP successfully. The analysis focuses on the following areas: 1) Background, the significant biases and strategies peculiar to the United States and Europe with respect to defense; 2) The reasons why the EU initiated ESDP; 3) The initial response from the U.S. and NATO; 4) Issues of friction generated from ESDP; 5) Potential advantages of ESDP to the U.S.; 6) The current ESDP situation; 7) Recommendations for the U.S. position on ESDP; and 8) Conclusions. This analysis does not fully capture the ramifications resulting from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. because these ramifications have not become manifest at the time this analysis was conducted.

BACKGROUND.

At first glance the EU's decision to implement ESDP might appear as a logical initiative (no significant repercussions if ESDP succeeds or fails). This "logical initiative" becomes complicated quickly once U.S. and European cultures and strategies are examined. This section provides necessary background information in order to gain an appreciation for the complexities associated with ESDP.

THE DEFINITION OF ESDP.

The EU views ESDP as an integral instrument of power to garner international respect. The EU is determined to employ a force capable of executing missions across the spectrum of conflict, in response to an international crisis.² The "Petersberg Tasks" codify the ESDP charter. The EU will employ ESDP when "...NATO as a whole is not engaged."³ Specifically, NATO must approve the EU's request for use of NATO assets and capabilities in order to execute an operation under the EU's command and control.⁴ Additionally a NATO European commander will command the force.⁵

The Petersberg Tasks articulate that ESDP will contribute to international security as per the principles of the United Nations (UN) and other European charters. Missions include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management (peacemaking) tasks.⁶ Additionally the EU "...recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council with regard to international peacekeeping and security."⁷ The calendar year 2003 headline goal for the EU is to have the ESDP (a corps-size force of 60,000 troops) capable of deploying within 60 days and sustainable for up to one year. ESDP will have organic command and control, intelligence, logistic operating systems, as well as strategic lift transportation.⁸

U.S. TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY.

The current U.S. National Security Strategy (December 2000) articulates transatlantic security as a strategic objective for the United States.⁹ U.S. military forward presence is the primary method for achieving transatlantic security.¹⁰ Through NATO the United States has established a forward military presence essential to European security.¹¹ The U.S. military presence in NATO helps to deter conflict, support allies, demonstrate resolve, and encourages burden sharing in Europe.¹² Burden sharing has been a sensitive issue within the United States Congress in that Congress thinks the United States assumes too much of the European defense burden.¹³ The EU's decision to implement ESDP has advantages and disadvantages related to the U.S.'s transatlantic security objective.

THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE.

The United States expects Europe (collectively) to be globally oriented, especially when Europe's combined gross domestic product (GDP) and population approach the U.S. GDP and population.¹⁴ Assuming European countries can work together efficiently, they should be able to deploy collectively a robust and potent military force anywhere in the world. The United States continues to be concerned over Europe's lack of burden sharing with respect to European defense,¹⁵ in light of Europe's collective potential. Recent indicators signify that Europe's collective military potential is problematic. The NATO Kosovo campaign amplified the huge technological gap between European countries and the United States,¹⁶ which significantly hampers NATO interoperability. The diminished interoperability within NATO illustrates the hazards associated with assuming a collectively strong European GDP and robust population equate to an equally globally oriented, proficient military capability. Ironically, although the United States wants to see more aggressive and robust military programs in Europe, U.S. policy usually focuses on cautioning against Europe becoming too assertive.¹⁷ The U.S. concern

about Europe becoming too assertive has merit. European assertiveness can give rise to false expectations. The United States is sensitive to Europe's failures in executing military operations without U.S. involvement. In 1995 Europe deployed its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation Deliberate Force). Major deficiencies (lack of airlift, confusing staff plans, and lack of precision munitions) made the RRF mission execution extremely problematic.¹⁸ What was supposed to be a ground based force designed to alleviate the Sarajevo siege never materialized. An air campaign that had the United States flying 70% of the 3,500 sorties resulted.¹⁹ Although Operation Alba (Albania's pyramid scheme crisis in 1997) did show the WEU could execute an operation without the United States; the deployment and command and control were dismal.²⁰ The Albania collapse occurred in January 1997, and it was not until March 1997 the WEU began talking of sending a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) approved by NATO. The WEU could not obtain a consensus for intervention (Italy, Greece, France favored intervention; Germany and the United Kingdom opposed intervention). Eventually a multinational protection force (MPF) led by Italy was deployed in May 1997.²¹ The 1997 Albania crisis revealed the unsuitability of the WEU to react to crises. Although the intent in both operations was noble and within the Petersberg Tasks framework, the execution was not successful (slow to mature, lack of consensus, and lack of unity of effort). Some U.S. policy makers surmise the genesis of ESDP is the EU's embarrassment over its dependency on U.S. military capabilities.²² The actual genesis for ESDP may in fact be that the United States is getting what it has been asking for: a stronger, more independent Europe,²³ capable of executing successful military operations independent of the United States. The United States wants Europe to improve its military capabilities in order to decrease the U.S. European military burden, but it is wary of Europe's ability to obtain successfully such a capability. The United States is not paranoid that Europe may become too powerful militarily. The United States should be concerned over Europe's false sense of security with respect to European military capabilities.

THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE.

Europeans are sensitive to the U.S. burden sharing criticism. The European leaders view Europe as more regionally oriented, not globally oriented as the U.S. views Europe.²⁴ A regional oriented defense structure is far less expensive to maintain than a globally oriented power.²⁵ The EU is quick to cite that its generous host nation support to the United States coupled with economic assistance to economically challenged European states²⁶ off-set the perceived huge burden sharing imbalance (although an argument can be made that economic

assistance does nothing for the NATO alliance). Despite the collective potential of Europe, EU leaders recognize the absence of "broad capabilities" essential to shaping international environments (which precludes global orientation).²⁷ The absence of broad capabilities generate from legitimate legal stipulations European countries are subjected to. NATO membership stipulates each nation maintain a viable defense establishment. Independent national defense forces preclude a "theoretical economy of scale" analogous to the United States.²⁸ Instead of being able to capitalize on diverse industrial, economic, and technological strengths and synergistically mold a cohesive military capability, European countries are bound to uphold honor by maintaining separate independent military capabilities. The EU does have "consortium" capability as evident from the Eurofighter aircraft and Airbus strategic cargo airframe.²⁹ The European countries face the dilemma of losing out on contracts, sorting out who pays for what and how much when trying to modernize in an international consortium environment. The EU recognizes its technology gap with the United States and realizes the subsequent negative affect on interoperability.³⁰ Besides highlighting the U.S./EU technology gap, the Kosovo conflict (Operation Allied Force) also validated the need for the United States in a European regional crisis. Although not necessarily a point of decision, the EU is concerned that the United States has lost some respect for the European countries in light of Operation Allied Force.³¹ The United States probably maintains a high level of diplomatic respect for Europe, and that is important especially when the United States wants to leverage international political pressure against an adversary. The European military reputation probably did suffer because of its inability to contribute significantly to the air campaign. The EU does recognize the U.S. military dominance. The EU does not anticipate a peer competitor challenging the United States in the short and long term (although repercussions from the 11 September terrorist attacks are still due in). The key to global security from a European perspective is maintaining status quo,³² because potential adversaries that could destabilize Europe will not due to the U.S. military superiority (obviously the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack will necessitate re-looking this perception).

The EU approaches deterrence by "encouraging good behavior" instead of "the big stick" approach (which is how the EU characterizes the U.S. approach).³³ Europeans do not rush into programs. The EU also believes that addressing the roots of conflict (poverty, social inequities) is the correct way to enhance stability and security. The ESDP evolution illustrates the slow, deliberate treaty/summit processes the EU executes and is accustomed to (it took from 1991 until 1997 for the EU to codify ESDP's operational concept and associated tasks).³⁴ The EU's "soft" approach makes sense considering it does not possess "the big stick" capability the

United States enjoys. The U.S. missile defense (MD) initiative has raised significant angst and protest from within the European community. From a European perspective MD could upset the status quo because it makes the U.S. appear to act "recklessly" in a stable environment.³⁵ The EU is concerned about MD rekindling a new arms race³⁶ (with China and/or Russia) and destabilizing the European continent. More importantly, the Europeans place great faith in treaties. The fear is that the abrogation of the ABM Treaty will lead to a domino effect with other treaties.

The EU is frustrated by the U.S. unilateral "big stick" approach to deterrence and potential threat to the stabilizing affects of the status quo. The EU is very sensitive to U.S. unilateralism because it undermines dialogue and consultation on issues that could affect the European continent. The United States pays a price for military superiority, sometimes it manifests in categorically being labeled as a unilateralist, insensitive to allied countries' views and concerns.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY.

A popular criticism of the European community is its reluctance to resource adequately its militaries. This perceived reluctance fuels the overarching burden sharing complaint a lot of United States Congressmen maintain towards Europe. Upon closer examination of the European economy, it becomes evident that economic priorities, legalities, and finite resources dictate and influence defense spending to a higher degree than the "reluctance" factor. Domestic social welfare programs are the economic priority in Europe. Current economic trends indicate these social welfare programs are taking a heavy toll on the economy.³⁷ However, lower priorities, like defense, are done under an extremely constrained environment. European NATO countries strain to invest 2.2% of the collective GDP into NATO (compared to the U.S. investment of 3.3% of its GDP).³⁸ EU countries that belong to the European Monetary Union must keep deficits under 3% of their GDP. This strict spending ceiling severely limits defense spending throughout the EU.³⁹ The United States government does not have the same restrictions as evidenced by the government's deficit spending practices that fueled the huge U.S. military build up in the 1980's. The United States spends about 40% of its defense budget to maintain existing force structure and approximately 25% to buy new equipment.⁴⁰ The EU collectively spends 60% of the defense budget towards maintaining current troop levels and only 16% of the defense budget to buying new equipment.⁴¹ This budget apportionment results in a severely restricted research and development capability within the EU.

The United States spent \$37 billion on research and development in 1999 compared to a combined EU NATO member total of \$9 billion.⁴² The small research and development

investment accounts for the huge technology gap between the United States and Europe. Some argue the EU countries have been accustomed to the security of the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" and mutual support, which manifests small defense budgets.⁴³ This argument implies the Europeans have taken advantage of U.S. capabilities by executing defense on the "cheap." Europeans focus resources on maintaining existing force structure and not on aggressive technological advances associated with the United States. Although the EU is expanding (15 members now and another 15 projected by 2010),⁴⁴ the economic impact could prove stressful. Projected members could come from the economically challenged regions of the Baltic's, Central Europe, and Southeast Europe.⁴⁵ Although the "Copenhagen" criteria (stable democratic institutions, rule of law, human rights, and economic capitalism) are intended to prevent the EU from inheriting a suspect country,⁴⁶ the possibility still exists that the EU might have to direct economic support to these potential fragile economies at the expense of properly resourcing defense (ESDP).

NATO-DCI, ANOTHER EU ECONOMIC BURDEN.

NATO's Kosovo Operation Allied Force resulted in the NATO leadership critically analyzing the allies' performance. The NATO leadership identified fifty-nine issues associated with the Kosovo campaign that must be rectified in order for NATO to be more strategically and operationally proficient. These significant issues were categorized into five broad capabilities that NATO wants to improve. The formal title of this initiative is "NATO-DCI" (Defense Capabilities Initiative) and the broad capabilities include: 1) mobility and deployability; 2) sustainability; 3) effective engagement; 4) survivability; and 5) interoperable communications.⁴⁷ There are expensive, highly sophisticated platforms involved (armored gun system, ballistic missiles, precision guided munitions).⁴⁸ An obvious ramification of NATO-DCI is the economic price tag NATO EU countries must now pay if this initiative is to succeed. The challenge reverts back to Europe's ability to capitalize on its consortium potential. For NATO-DCI to succeed, NATO and the EU must work through potential issues generated from military efficiency and national agendas, and alliance cohesiveness and ESDP headline goals.⁴⁹

THE REASONS WHY THE EU WANTS ESDP.

ESDP could provide NATO a "tactical gap" capability. Currently NATO forces are required to execute full spectrum operations (from low intensity to high intensity missions). For example, the Balkans needs specialized police units (constabulary competencies) in order to sustain peacekeeping operations. NATO could direct task, purpose, and doctrine for low intensity

operations while ESDP forces execute the low intensity mission(s).⁵⁰ NATO forces would be able to stay focused on mid to high intensity military operations while ESDP bridges the tactical gap of low intensity operations. ESDP offers NATO the ability to conduct multinational operations without U.S. assets.⁵¹ A good example is Operation Alba. In 1997 NATO declined to employ a stabilizing force into Albania following the pyramid scheme debacle. Italy eventually led a coalition, and a clear message was sent. The United States will not always participate in a European crisis.⁵² Some analysts interpret ESDP as a EU mechanism for an independent defense capability (separate from NATO). The EU never advocated ESDP be that mechanism; instead ESDP is a mechanism that allows Europe to act (militarily) when the United States declines.⁵³ In some cases the issue may not be U.S. declination but rather the United States is simply being over tasked. ESDP has the potential to provide the U.S. with a credible manifestation of European burden sharing, thereby appeasing the United States.⁵⁴ EU expanded membership probably warrants an ESDP type capability. The EU members may exceed thirty countries by 2010. Newer members could come from the potentially volatile Baltic, Central European, and Southeastern European regions. Despite the Copenhagen criteria for EU admission, regional stability is not guaranteed. ESDP could assist in maintaining stability should circumstances require the need for such a low intensity type mission.⁵⁵ Additionally a military alliance like ESDP is a good mechanism to integrate and assimilate newer members into a union such as the EU. The official NATO position is that ESDP allows Europe to assume a greater responsibility for its own security, resulting in a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship.⁵⁶ As stated earlier in the European perspective section, the issue of European respect probably motivates the formation of ESDP. The Europeans have yet to field an effective and autonomous force, and Pan-European pride is highly likely the significant impetus.

INITIAL RESPONSE.

The United States superficially endorsed ESDP in the December 2000 National Security Strategy document.⁵⁷ There are significant caveats the United States has subsequently voiced that predicate endorsing ESDP. Then Secretary of State Madeline Albright articulated U.S. support of ESDP based on the "three D's": 1) No decoupling (maintain transatlantic link, ESDP stays linked with NATO); 2) No duplication (ESDP must produce concrete improvements in military capabilities and optimize scarce resources); and 3) No discrimination (non-EU NATO members must be consulted before activating ESDP).⁵⁸ The "no decoupling" caveat is probably the most important because the U.S. insists NATO has the first option (over the EU) to

determine if ESDP executes a proposed mission. This caveat emphasizes the U.S. would have the flexibility to "...accept or pass up an opportunity to take political and military leadership of the particular crisis."⁵⁹ This caveat also implies the EU would not possess a truly autonomous reaction force if ESDP cannot be employed without NATO approval. The "no duplication" caveat is somewhat ambiguous (this issue will be further addressed in this paper). No duplication predominately focuses on maintaining the same strategic planning staff for NATO and ESDP in order to maintain unity of effort and synchronization.⁶⁰ Examples include ESDP using the same technical data NATO produces from its Defense Planning Process and Planning and Review Process.⁶¹ No duplication also refers to focusing on efficiency instead of exacerbating bureaucratic procedures by redundant functions. The NATO leadership caveats ESDP endorsement with the NATO Secretary General's "three I's": 1) Indivisibility of transatlantic security (ESDP and NATO must maintain synchronization); 2) ESDP must increase European security capabilities; and 3) The EU must include all European allies (consultation) when missioning ESDP.⁶² NATO Secretary General Robertson does not want ESDP to evolve from a "security partner" to a "security competitor,"⁶³ hence his insistence on indivisibility (or unity of effort). This caveat recognizes the absolute necessity of NATO and ESDP remaining in sync. The Secretary General's second caveat focuses on resource stewardship. As with Albright's "no duplication," Robertson does not want to waste scarce resources. Former Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) General Rupert Smith warns that NATO in concert with the EU needs to develop a doctrine for employing ESDP in order to establish objectives that ESDP must resource, otherwise ESDP may fall victim to a strategy-resource disconnect.⁶⁴ Secretary General Robertson's third caveat appears to be the politically acceptable way of saying NATO approves ESDP missions. Robertson cannot afford to be as blunt as Albright's no decoupling and no discrimination caveats (NATO ministers composed of many EU members control the Secretary General's tenure). Former SACEUR General Wesley Clark recommends ESDP employ only when "...the alliance as a whole is not to be engaged."⁶⁵ GEN Clark's caveat implies NATO must have contingencies available (operational reserves) if ESDP necessitates reinforcement while executing an operational mission.

ISSUES OF FRICTION.

The EU's ESDP has evoked international friction while the program's milestones are pursued. The purpose of this section is to explain the complicated web of cause and effects associated with ESDP, which has significant impacts. Former Secretary of State Madeline

Albright's "three D's" supporting ESDP (no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination) has been labeled as condescending by some EU members.⁶⁶ Some EU members are perplexed by the United States' cautious endorsement (as opposed to strong endorsement) of ESDP despite the fact that ESDP could ease the U.S. European security burden. On the other hand, the United States' "three D's" caveat is a recognition of the EU's limited resources and the potential for the EU to field an ESDP independent of NATO, ultimately degrading rather than enhancing European defense. Additionally the United States is cognizant of the EU's reputation for declaring mission complete when in reality resources have been committed but not delivered⁶⁷ (which reinforces GEN Clark's concern for having NATO assets available when ESDP is deployed). From a U.S. perspective the "three D's" pragmatically address EU deficiencies (limited resources and past failures), even though the United States' lack of confidence may insult the European sensibilities. Some organizations and individuals speculate the United States is concerned about ESDP "pushing" the United States out of Europe.⁶⁸ This speculation is unwarranted, especially when one considers the United States' desire for greater flexibility regarding the employment of its forward positioned forces. A successful ESDP could permit the United States to position European based forces outside the European continent,⁶⁹ thereby enhancing U.S. military agility (for example, the United States forces could hand-off stabilization force missions to the ESDP and execute other missions). Another suspect speculation posits the EU turning its back on the U.S. once the EU has military self-sufficiency.⁷⁰ The EU does not espouse ESDP as a European defense panacea, rather a program to improve military capabilities.⁷¹ As stated earlier in section II (The reasons why the EU wants ESDP), ESDP could provide low intensity capabilities, not European military self-sufficiency. Additionally, the EU will not "turn its back" on an ally that has been forged on huge sacrifices and mutual respect over the course of two world wars and over forty years of collective defense (at least without significant debate).

The ESDP's area of operations is a controversial issue, specifically whether ESDP is constrained to the European continent or more globally oriented. French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin views ESDP as a globally oriented force that deploys under EU authority, not NATO authority. Jospin proposes ESDP be capable of supporting UN operations under UN command and control.⁷² Jospin's vision is not aligned with other EU members. A majority of EU members do not envision ESDP deploying outside the European continent.⁷³ The EU economy would have a major challenge deploying and sustaining ESDP in a global context. Some prominent U.S. security advisors advocate a global oriented ESDP based on the thought that a European continent-only strategy implies the EU handles European crises while the United States handles

the remaining global regions.⁷⁴ Again, the proponents of a global orientation for ESDP do not appreciate the resource shortfalls (strategic lift and sustainment capabilities) that preclude ESDP from sustained global operations.

ESDP command and control authority remains ambiguous. The U.S. wants ESDP linked to NATO (no decoupling); the NATO Secretary general wants ESDP and NATO synchronized, and (as stated above) the French advocate an autonomous ESDP without NATO as a command and control headquarters. The Petersberg Tasks address the importance of sharing resources with NATO, and maintaining "...transparency, cooperation, and dialogue between the EU and NATO."⁷⁵ Yet the Petersberg Tasks fail to address an ambiguous command and control architecture. NATO would like ESDP to resemble a combined joint task force (CJTf), yet no CJTF structure has been formally identified.⁷⁶ Although the DSACEUR is responsible for planning EU led operations, once the operation commences it is not clear how NATO and the EU "consult."⁷⁷ This issue must be addressed because (from a United States position) there are significant implications. If ESDP opts for a global area of operations separate from NATO command and control, a United States commander in chief's (CINC) area of operations may become complicated. A CINC may have to deal with ESDP under UN command and control operating in his (CINC's) area of operations with strategic objectives that do not align with the CINC's strategic objectives. If ESDP operates under UN command and control, it must have a staff capable of synchronizing efforts with UN agencies, governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. A corps-size staff would be severely challenged with multi-agency coordination. Another possible scenario is if ESDP becomes bogged down in an independent operation, NATO may be the only viable option to bail out/extricate ESDP. If United States involvement becomes necessary, this NATO bail out of ESDP scenario would irrevocably destroy ESDP credibility and severely damage the EU's stature. The United States will not have the patience to tolerate a less than effective force that requires United States assets to extricate it, even if this is a singular event.

The subject of duplication is another ambiguous issue that must be resolved. A majority of the key actors emphatically warn against duplication (doubling the demand for scarce resources between NATO and ESDP). ESDP will prove counter productive if parallel military and political bureaucracies materialize between NATO and ESDP.⁷⁸ The real issue is separating necessary from unnecessary duplication due to finite European resources (funding, manpower, and equipment). Establishing separate planning staffs between NATO and ESDP is an example of unnecessary duplication that must be avoided includes. If separate staffs results, conflicting objectives may preclude the NATO Secretary General's demand for indivisibility (less

unity of effort between NATO and ESDP). On the other hand, some duplication is essential for ESDP to be successful. Due to limited strategic lift and transport systems, ESDP must plan on using existing NATO strategic lift assets. Intelligence and communications architecture and equipment should be duplicated in order to enhance interoperability and compensate for current NATO shortfalls in these operating systems.⁷⁹ A significant detrimental repercussion to NATO may result if ESDP cannot resource necessary duplication in the aforementioned systems. The ESDP equipment shortfall will exacerbate existent NATO shortages and strain present day NATO levels if ESDP deploys. Non-EU NATO countries should be concerned about the prospect of ESDP "robbing" NATO resources.⁸⁰

The European economy poses a significant challenge for resourcing ESDP. There are multiple competing demands that preclude EU countries from having the luxury of focusing expected levels of funding on ESDP. As mentioned, NATO-DCI and EU expansion will stress and compete for EU economic resources. Additionally EU "power" countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Italy) are coming to grips with huge social program funding requirements due to a startling increasing elderly dependency rate (percentage of population over 65 years old).⁸¹ Some experts think the EU leaders have underestimated what ESDP really needs. General Naumann (former Chairman of the NATO Military Council) has serious reservations reference ESDP manpower. In order to man a 60,000 combat force, a total of 200,000 men will be necessary (when combat support and service support considerations are accounted for and also the need to rotate units for sustained operations).⁸² To date, none of the analyses have reflected any end strength above 60,000 men, which implies a significant shortfall in manpower funding. Additionally the cancellation of conscription could exacerbate a potential manpower shortfall. Some EU countries have abolished conscription (France, Belgium, Netherlands) while others have scaled back significantly (Germany).⁸³ Without conscription, countries will probably have to compensate with economic incentives in order to obtain effective recruiting and retention programs essential to necessary troop end strengths. The obvious concern is whether or not the EU economy can support all these programs (NATO DCI, ESDP, EU expansion, Social programs, Recruit/Retention programs). ESDP and NATO-DCI may be economically viable if they are resourced and executed in a complimentary mode. For example, if ESDP fields effective interoperable communications systems, DCI will also meet its interoperability capability initiative.⁸⁴ Even if the EU executes DCI and ESDP complimentary, it must still address the economic impact of EU expansion and the politically sensitive social welfare programs without detracting from ESDP. Western European Union (WEU) strategists opine the EU must obtain better-cost effectiveness via redesign of defense budgets and recognize

"cooperative" international structures.⁸⁵ Although these WEU strategists may have the appropriate remedy, revising defense budgets will be a Herculean task. The EU leaders are faced with the formidable task of improving on efficiencies within their respective defense structures, or increase defense funding at the expense of sensitive social programs.

The U.S. Missile Defense (MD) initiative presents a complicated dynamic for the EU and ESDP. Some EU leaders cannot imagine any potential adversary attacking the United States with missiles.⁸⁶ The EU fears an MD program may rekindle a new arms race with potential competitors like Russia and China.⁸⁷ Collectively the EU does not want the United States to compromise the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty⁸⁸ that could happen as a result of the MD. If the EU is adamant on preserving the ABM Treaty, the following repercussions could surface: 1) The EU countries (specifically the United Kingdom and Denmark) could refuse vital MD radar site upgrades thereby complicating MD; 2) The EU could purposely under-resource ESDP thereby propagating the current U.S. NATO burden; and 3) The EU could stall ESDP which potentially decreases the U.S. flexibility of repositioning forces⁸⁹ because no force would be available to fill the vacuum of repositioned U.S. European based forces. How feasible is it to postulate the EU will sacrifice ESDP in order to block U.S. MD? The answer may be feasible enough to prompt the Deputy Secretary of State to propose renaming MD to "allied missile defense."⁹⁰ Additionally, the European community revolves around treaties. The EU may be concerned an abrogated ABM treaty may set the stage for other treaties to dissolve. Setting the ABM Treaty aside, the EU views the MD budget with great angst.

An \$87.48 billion MD budget may result in severely restricting U.S. sponsored military monetary aid to Europe. Some EU leaders think any potential U.S. funding for ESDP will be redirected to NATO-DCI and sustainment programs.⁹¹ On the other hand, MD could afford the EU some advantages. If the United States included Europe in the missile program, MD could pave the way for a much needed increase in transatlantic technology sharing.⁹² Historically the United States has been extremely reluctant to share sensitive technology because of the proliferation potential. Improved technology would assist the EU in developing improved interoperable systems and intelligence gathering. MD could spark internal European dissension. A potential EU break in ranks may occur if the United Kingdom and Denmark agree to upgrade their MD radar sites despite other EU countries' objections.⁹³ Any EU divisiveness will undoubtedly negatively affect the ESDP because the critical resourcing requires 100% European unity of effort.

Although the U.S. MD will remain extremely sensitive with the EU, its angst will probably abate considering: 1) Russia's preliminary willingness to work with the U.S. on MD and reduction of its nuclear arsenal, decreasing the specter of a new arms race; and 2) the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack which proved every country is vulnerable to potentially any type of weapon of mass destruction. NATO will more than likely forge a constructive relationship with the EU members while ESDP develops, and the necessary duplications and counter productive duplications sort out. The most significant issues are: 1) The EU's economic ability to resource ESDP while simultaneously resourcing important social programs and NATO-DCI; and 2) The EU gaining a consensus on ESDP command and control, command authority, and transfer of authority.

POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES TO THE U.S.

The greatest advantage ESDP offers the United States is the potential to ease the U.S.'s transatlantic security burden. ESDP is a tangible initiative that provides the skeptical United States Congressmen (who criticize Europe's lack of defensive initiative and responsibility) credible proof that Europe is serious about improving its military capabilities. NATO has taken a prudent introspective examination and identified deficiencies that require attention. ESDP is a timely initiative that can facilitate NATO-DCI if done in accordance with the NATO Secretary General's "3 I's." If NATO successfully completes DCI, the United States benefits. The more Europe assumes a higher military burden, the more (potential) flexibility the United States will have with positioning forces (which helps the United States military transformation need for flexible force projection). ESDP has the potential to strengthen NATO by enhancing Europe's ability to conduct multinational low intensity operations without United States assets,⁹⁴ thereby freeing up United States forces for other SSCs (smaller scale contingencies missions). EU expansion into potentially semi-stable regions may necessitate ESDP missions, which the United States does not need to be burdened with. Even if regions are stable, ESDP could provide the EU a mechanism for smooth constructive EU enlargement, which ultimately could expedite opening up more markets to the United States economy. Additionally, if ESDP equipment fielding is executed from a force modernization aspect, interoperability with the United States should improve. United States support of ESDP should alleviate negative repercussions from the U.S "unilateralist" label popular among the EU. The EU's unilateralist view of the United States does not enhance synergy or flexibility between the United States and European countries. United States support of ESDP is a testimony to U.S. flexibility, and the EU could respond with being flexible towards MD support if MD remains a contentious issue.

CURRENT SITUATION.

The current ESDP situation is best described as tenuous. The ESDP initiative is executing; however significant challenges are emerging that indicates the 2003 milestone may be too ambitious. General Naumann (former Chairman of the NATO Military Council) does not think the EU will make the milestone of fielding the force by 2003 (as chartered in the December 1999 Helsinki Conference), and sees 2010 as more realistic.⁹⁵ The following challenges contribute to the probable milestone delay: 1) Participating countries may have a hard time recruiting the extra 140,000 troops needed for the Corps (reference to friction caused by needing a total of 200,000 troops to support 60,000 combat troops). A number of EU countries have downsized their militaries and no longer use conscription.⁹⁶ EU countries must now execute successful recruiting campaigns in order to meet manpower requirements. Successful recruiting campaigns more than likely will require funding (another economic burden generated by ESDP). 2) The EU is faced with a significant task of restructuring from a territorial military (heavy armored vehicles) to an expeditionary military (agile, sustainable, and light) and the current process does not have too much momentum.⁹⁷ This significant challenge is analogous to the United States Army's challenge of fielding Interim Brigade Combat Teams as a result of the transformation initiative. Designing and resourcing a force structure is a meticulous and complex process that takes time. Implementing a new multinational force structure process is even more complex due to challenges in obtaining consensus. 3) The EU's economy is on a ten year down slope, and research and development is under-funded; both contributing to a limited modernization process.⁹⁸ If the EU does not have the requisite funding available to resource ESDP in synchronization with NATO-DCI guidelines (which necessitates modernization) valuable resources will be wasted.

Despite the ESDP resourcing problems, there are positive aspects of the EU's execution. The EU's ESDP political leadership has established a close relationship with NATO, and has the requisite expertise in managing an alliance. The Chairman of the EU during the ESDP declaration was Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General. A large percentage of ESDP policy makers are also NATO ministers.⁹⁹ The EU is making a concerted effort to include non-EU NATO countries' input as ESDP develops.¹⁰⁰ This politically prudent approach helps to alleviate fears of ESDP proceeding in a EU vacuum. President Bush is still endorsing ESDP,¹⁰¹ although the administration will have to wait until 2004 for a more detailed assessment.¹⁰²

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Recommend the United States take the following steps with respect to ESDP:

1) Although the EU must work through extremely challenging issues, the United States should approach ESDP with a "nothing ventured, nothing gained" philosophy. Endorsing ESDP provides the United States an opportunity to shed the irritating unilateral label that is popular among European nations. Endorsing ESDP shows the United States recognizes Europe's responsibility to get their military capabilities up to standard. A successful ESDP could provide the United States with crucial forward presence flexibility, which has the second order effect of helping U.S. military transformation goals (specifically with respect to operational reach). If the European community seems reluctant to support MD (hence critical radar site upgrades may be in jeopardy), a United States ESDP endorsement could force Europe into a quid pro quo scenario. The United States cannot ignore the potential challenges the EU could assume as the EU expands membership and how ESDP could assist (stabilizing force in potentially volatile regions). The primary issue the United States must work out is what kind of endorsement it should extend to the EU for ESDP. The United States can offer ESDP support ranging from tacit approval to tangible resourcing (funding and/or technology sharing). It may be prudent for the United States to offer a strong political endorsement for ESDP coupled with limited technology sharing while the ESDP program matures.

2) The United States must be prepared to interject political pressure if the issue of command and control is not resolved. Despite France's preference for UN command and control for ESDP, the U.S. must apply pressure via its NATO connection to ensure ESDP is synchronized with NATO objectives. There is too much opportunity for conflict of interests if ESDP operates under authority external to NATO. As long as the EU adheres to Albright's "3 D's" or Robertson's "3 I's," ESDP will stay synchronized with NATO.

3) The United States must be prepared to interject if the EU becomes too ambitious with ESDP, especially with respect to the area of operations orientation. The United States should pressure the EU to keep ESDP restricted to the European region in lieu of a global orientation. The EU does not have economic resources necessary to support a global orientation (robust strategic transportation and logistic systems). A global orientation will more than likely over-stress ESDP and raise the possibility of U.S. economic assistance. The United States should encourage the EU to focus ESDP on Petersberg Tasks (peacekeeping, constabulary operations). This low intensity focus is usually less costly (less expensive platforms) and provides agility (reduces stress on limited strategic transportation assets). A reaction force that focuses on low intensity operations is easier to train and less expensive (compared to high

intensity operations).¹⁰³ A low intensity focus for ESDP offers the EU a number of advantages. If recruiting (for the necessary ESDP manpower requirements) becomes difficult, the EU may have to rely on new member nations to resource ESDP manpower requirements. Perspective new EU members will come from Europe's less economically developed and stable regions. Low intensity focus is better suited for a less experienced and equipped force. Additionally, new member country assimilation could be expedited if these new countries have a significant role in EU institutions like ESDP. Because the EU is expanding into less stable regions, a stability trained force like ESDP could provide the EU a significant return on its investment by maintaining stability while these regions mature.

4) Finally, the United States may need to provide some economic aid if the EU's economy becomes over burdened by ESDP.

CONCLUSIONS.

A successful ESDP is in the best interest of the United States. The primary issue is European resolve. The center of gravity for a successful ESDP is the European's political will. Europe's political leadership must confront sensitive economic issues and be prepared to subordinate explosive social programs to ESDP funding if ESDP is to succeed. The EU members must be prepared to subordinate national interests to collective European interests if ESDP is to succeed. The EU cannot afford to fall prey to an over ambitious program. The EU should focus ESDP on low intensity operations (humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping) proficiency executing missions over a European region orientation.

The EU must be prepared to stay the course with ESDP when friction emerges (especially economic problems). Europe's reputation is at stake with ESDP. Europe must not abandon the EU's ESDP initiative otherwise the EU will have to answer to another failed military initiative.

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