

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL D. ELLERBE
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited

USAWC CLASS OF 2002



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20020806 221

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Ellerbe
United States Army

Colonel Jef Troxel
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michael D. Ellerbe

TITLE: SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002

PAGES: 24

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Every strategy or plan has at its beginning a perceived end, end state or objective. Looking to the 21st century the strategic end state we may desire is a global environment that ensures our national security and economic prosperity. The question is how to we achieve this end state. My assessment is that in order to achieve this end state we must change the way we see the world and we must change the organizational structure that deals with the international environment.

In every administration, the President has provided a vision of the future. For this administration I would offer that the vision should be centered on "Shaping the Global Environment". We are in a period of unprecedented and inevitable global change, and we must learn to accommodate and to help shape local changes constructively. We cannot prevent the future from arriving. Change is inevitable, how the world changes is not. We can play an instrumental role in what the world looks like in 2025 and beyond.

President George W. Bush Jr. provided a glimpse of his vision in the Jan 2002 State of the Union Address. President Bush stated

Our first priority must always be the security of our nation.... No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance

This is a start, but it is not complete.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	III
SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	1
WE MUST CHANGE HOW WE SEE THE WORLD	1
CHANGING THE STRATEGY	3
IS A CAPABILITY-BASED STRATEGY STILL VALID?	6
SHIFTING BACK TO A THREAT-BASED STRATEGY	7
CHANGING THE STRUCTURE	9
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	17

SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Every strategy or plan has at its beginning a perceived end, end state or objective. Looking to the 21st century the strategic end state we may desire is a global environment that ensures our national security and economic prosperity. The question is how to we achieve this end state. My assessment is that in order to achieve this end state we must change the way we see the world, develop a strategy that is centered on a multi-polar global community and change the organizational structure that deals with the international environment.

In every administration, the President has provided a vision of the future. For this administration I would offer that the vision should be centered on "Shaping the Global Environment". We are in a period of unprecedented and inevitable global change, and we must learn to accommodate and to help shape local changes constructively. We cannot prevent the future from arriving. Change is inevitable, how the world changes is not. We can play an instrumental role in what the world looks like in 2025 and beyond.

President George W. Bush Jr. provided a glimpse of his vision in the Jan 2002 State of the Union Address. President Bush stated

Our first priority must always be the security of our nation.... No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.¹

This is a start, but it is not complete.

WE MUST CHANGE HOW WE SEE THE WORLD

Since 1946 and the beginning of the Cold War, the strategic end state of the United States was the containment of the Soviet Union and communism. For 43 years we based the development of our National Security Strategy on a bipolar model that revolved around the United States and the former Soviet Union. In 1989 the world changed. We won the Cold War, the Soviet Union no longer presented a global threat and the bipolar model was no longer relevant.

At the start of this year the United States struggled to develop its National Security Strategy. We had a vision of the future, but the events of 11 September created some doubt about the accuracy of the vision. A National Security Strategy was not published by the new administration in 2001.

The last National Military Strategy is dated 1997 and the current Quadrennial Defense Review, indicates that, "contending with uncertainty must be the centerpiece of the U.S. defense planning."² The uncertainty outlined in the QDR is an indication of the struggle to replace the bipolar model that served us so well during the Cold War and the struggle to define an appropriate strategic end state. Samuel P. Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" argues that the 21st century will be a multi-polar global environment.³ I believe Huntington's analysis is correct, and that the multi-polar model he describes may be the most appropriate model to center U.S. national security strategy and help us develop a global campaign plan to shape the global environment for the 21st century to achieve our national objectives.

As World War II drew to a close there were only two dominant powers left standing, the United States and the Soviet Union. The fact that there were only two dominant powers in the world at the end of the war created the vision that the world was bipolar. What the vision did not account for was the emergence of other nation states over time. Some of the nations, Germany, France and Great Britain recouped much of their prewar status and this was predictable. What the vision did not adequately account for was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that would facilitate the emergence of nations like India, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and North Korea as significant actors in the global balance of power equation. The United States based the development of its foreign policy on the assumption that if it maintained good relations with the Soviet Union international order could be maintained. Secretary of State Cordell Hull outlined this concept in his statement that

There will no longer be a need for spheres of influence, for alliances, balance of power, or any other special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests.⁴

The United States believed that based on the good and lasting relationship we developed with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that peace and stability would be maintained through cooperation. The United States was slow to recognize the Soviet Union as a threat to European security. Through a series of events, specifically the Soviet postwar expansion into Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East the United States began to recognize that its postwar assumption of maintaining international order through developing good relations with the Soviet Union was false.

The recognition of the Soviet Union as a threat forced the United States to reassess its foreign policy. The reassessment of U.S. foreign policy did not change the vision of the world; it changed the strategy. The world was still seen as bipolar, but instead of a strategy of

cooperation with an ally, the U.S. developed strategies focused on countering a singular adversary. The strategies that were developed described what the United States was attempting to achieve with respect to the Soviet Union, strategies such as containment, frontiersmanship, detente and massive retaliation. The end state for each of these strategies was the containment or defeat of the Soviet Union. The belief being that if the Soviet Union could be contained or defeated a balance of power could be achieved that would lead to international stability and world peace.⁵

The East-West struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States was the centerpiece of the development of American foreign policy and naturally drove the development of national security strategy for forty-three years culminating in the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. Unfortunately, like former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, our assessment of the world was flawed. The U.S. defeated the Soviet Union and still failed to achieve international stability and world peace. Nations like Iraq, Iran and North Korea gained the technology to develop and employ weapons of mass destruction. Old borders and boundaries that previously defined nation-states are being challenged. Ethnic tensions that were suppressed or ignored during the Cold War have taken center stage and serve as one of the primary catalysts for regional instability in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Since 1945 the world's economy is inextricably linked. The economic epicenter is shifting from Europe to Southeast Asia. While the United States was engaged in the Cold War, the world changed. We are now in the midst of trying to redefine our vision of the world and what strategies are best suited to achieve our national interests and objectives. I tend to agree with Samuel Huntington. We should change our point of reference from a bi-polar view of the world to a multi-polar view. Both our National Security Strategy and our organizational structure should be reoriented to meet the demands of a changing global environment.

CHANGING THE STRATEGY

The current administration has demonstrated that it wants to shy away from the term engagement, in favor of security cooperation, but it is my assessment that the Clinton Administration's Engagement Strategy, however, with modifications remains a solid foundation for the development of U.S. National Security Strategy. The 1996-1999 National Security Strategies focused on the employment of all of the instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors and pronounced the will to exert global leadership. This strategy, at its core, recognizes the emergence of other state actors and the multi-polarity of the global environment.

By exerting our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous--by deterring aggression, fostering the resolution of conflicts, opening foreign markets, strengthening democracies, and tackling global problems. Without our leadership and engagement, threats would multiply and our opportunities would narrow. Our strategy recognizes a simple truth: we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home.⁶

President George Bush, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice came into office with a clear vision of how to refocus the National Security strategy to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Their vision was centered on the concept that the conventional threats associated with near competitors, like the former Soviet Union, were diminished. Their vision, as expressed by the 2001 QDR, outlined four defense policy goals; assuring allies and friend; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence failed, decisively defeating any enemy.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, drafted prior to 11 September 2001, provided the framework for the new administration's security strategy. It clearly defined the global environment as being uncertain with no near-competitors. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the administration's unrelenting pursuit of a National Missile Defense program provides valuable insight as to how the administration intends to achieve their stated defense policy goals.

In a fiscally constrained environment difficult decisions must be made in the development of any national security strategy. Initially, it appeared that the administration was willing to make cuts in the conventional force to finance the development of a national missile defense program. The events of 11 September put the Bush administration's plans on hold. The nation's immediate threats are refocusing the Bush administration's vision

The 1996-1999 National Security Strategies were moving in the right direction, but the change in administration seems to have derailed this process. The Quadrennial Defense Review, dated September 30, 2001 provided the framework for crafting America's defensive strategy. The foundation of the review was based on the concept that in the post Cold War environment, the future is uncertain and therefore, we must shift from the threat-based approach to strategy development to a capabilities-based approach.

The concept of shifting from a threat-based approach to a capabilities approach is not an insignificant issue because it is directly linked to both force structure and our ability to execute an engagement strategy. The approach we select will determine what options are available to the nation.

The capabilities-based approach supports the perception that the future is uncertain and that there are no near competitors. This perception can be used to justify force reductions. If on the other-hand you argue for a threat-based approach and you identify potential threats like North Korea, China, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, the failing states in Eastern Europe, Indonesia and the Philippines, you then must have the force structure to counter these threats, which is in direct competition for the limited dollars needed for missile defense. The approach we select provides a clear indication of how we see the world and will play a significant role in what capabilities we will have to shape the global environment.

Both the Guidance and Terms of Reference dated June 22, 2001 and the QDR emphasize the uncertainty of the future as a basic condition for developing our future strategy.

The U.S. cannot expect to foresee what countries or actors will threaten it or what wars it may have to fight decades from now. Contending with uncertainty must be a centerpiece of the U.S. defense planning. While facing a wide range of uncertainties about the future, the U.S. should attempt to preclude those eventualities that would be most detrimental to America's security position, such as the emergence of a hostile coalition of large military powers. The U.S. must enhance the science and technology base and the resilience of its defense posture to adapt to surprise when it occurs. Meanwhile, the U.S. must remain attentive to ongoing trends and phenomena that characterize the security environment.⁷

The implication is that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actors will pose threats to vital U.S. interests or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now. This line of thought concedes that because we do not know exactly what the world will look like, and therefore we must be prepared for anything. On the contrary, there is adequate knowledge of where the potential threats are, we have an idea of what we want the world to look like, and it is in our interest to attempt to influence it in that direction.

The events of 11 September 2001 brought the vagueness of the future into focus, we no longer have to conceptualize a threat, and the threat is real. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, acknowledged the events of 11 September 2001, but the QDR and the accompanying report were largely completed before the September 11 terror attacks on the United States and did not substantively change the concept that we must structure our National Security Strategy around an uncertain future. The failure to reassess the validity of the fundamental assumptions of the QDR, given the change in conditions, may indicate our inability to recognize or see the world the way it is. Many times over the course of history, leaders have developed a plan and during the execution of the plan the conditions changed. The challenge for the leader is to possess the ability to recognize when the conditions change and make the appropriate changes

to or abandon the plan as necessary. It is time to relook the plan to see what changes need to be made.

President Bush has shown signs that he understands the current complexities of the global security environment and has gone to great lengths to avoid defining the war on terrorism as a struggle between the West and Islam. It is clear that the National Command Authority understands the gravity and enduring nature of this threat. In a recent press interview, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld likened the war on terrorism to the Cold War, which was a conflict that dominated our strategy development for over 40 years. At every level we fully recognize the severity of this new threat and the consequences of failure, but we have not taken a step back to determine if the propositions that are the foundation for the QDR are still relevant and valid.

IS A CAPABILITY-BASED STRATEGY STILL VALID?

Is a capabilities-based approach appropriate given identifiable long-term threats? What is the potential for a theological struggle that could rival the ideological struggle of the Cold War? What is the probability that this war on terrorism could escalate into a war between civilizations that would create a significant rival military coalition in the Middle East and Central Asia? Given the emergence of a real and viable long-term threats in Central Asia, the Middle East and East Asia each having the potential to destabilize their respective regions, it is imperative that we revisit the QDR process to determine if our analysis is still valid. The guiding propositions in the 2001 QDR may no longer be valid and there may be a need to shelve the capabilities-based approach and employ a threat-based approach that is focused on the identifiable threats.

The concept that we face an uncertain future is based on the assessment that there will not be a rival ideology or rival military coalition in the next twenty-five years. This proposition may no longer be valid. Using the crisis in Afghanistan as an example, we can be certain that our actions in Central Asia will have an impact on essentially every Islamic nation. Every action we take will have a counteraction. Islamic fundamentalist movements will attempt to exploit our actions to garner support, build Islamic based coalitions, destabilize and topple the non-fundamentalist regimes throughout the Muslim world and to justify conducting asymmetric attacks against U.S. targets in the continental United States and abroad. We have the ability to war game our actions against likely threat reactions and use predictive analysis to enable us to formulate a strategy that will limit surprises and facilitate shaping the security environment to achieve our National objectives. The predictive analysis tools exist. Regional commanders conduct regional analyses to formulate their Theater Engagement Plans. The apportionment

and allocation of forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is based on predictive analysis of potential threats. What is needed is a comprehensive National Security Strategy that addresses the threats and integrates that tools that already exist. The future is not as uncertain as it was when the QDR process started. The actors and countries that will potentially threaten us are foreseeable and we can tailor a strategy that will address the identified threats.

The QDR assessment viewed the emergence of near-competitors as a current trend to be monitored, not a reality to be planned against. The linkages between anti-American state and non-state actors have been identified and are no longer a trend, but should be the centerpiece of our strategic planning effort. We did not envision the possibility of a coalition of rogue states bonded by theology, but the possibility exists and we must be prepared for it. Osama Bin Ladens' pre-recorded tape provides ample indicators of how information will be used to forge this coalition:

The nations of infidels have all united against the Muslims...This is a new battle, a great battle, similar to the great battles of Islam like the conquest of Jerusalem...The Americans come out to fight Islam in the name of terrorism. These events have split the world into two camps: the camp of belief and the camp of disbelief.⁸

Regardless of whether the U.S. chooses to define this struggle as a conflict between civilizations, if the average Muslim perceives that this is a struggle between the West and Islam, the U.S. definition is irrelevant. What is significant is that we have identified the worst-case scenario and we have the ability to shape its outcome.

Given the emergence of an identifiable long-term threat, a capability-based approach to strategy development, centered on an uncertain threat may no longer be valid. A threat-based approach may more accurately identify the specific strategic objectives, determine the specific requirements, prioritize resource allocation and more effectively shape the global environment to ensure we can prevent this from escalating into a protracted conflict between civilizations.

SHIFTING BACK TO A THREAT-BASED STRATEGY

We have identified the near term threats. This implies that if we know what the threats are we should develop a strategy centered on those identifiable threats. We have analyzed each of the regional actors, India, North Korea, China, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and non-state terrorist organizations, determined their ability to threaten our vital interests and now we must develop and employ a strategy that counters each of these threats. Instead of focusing on our relationship with one nation, as we did during the Cold War, the U.S. must focus its attentions on multiple nations to shape the global environment in the 21st century.

A threat-based approach to strategy development should be focused on attacking the threats center of gravity or source of power. Using terrorism as an example, terrorist, like insurgents, derive their power from the support, will and perception of the people. This is their center of gravity. The terrorist ability to generate support within the Muslim world will determine their ability to escalate this conflict to a level where they can achieve their aims. Popular local and regional support is vital to their survival, without it they will be vulnerable, exposed and more easily defeated.

The two most effective instruments of power needed to attack this center of gravity are diplomacy and information. A long-term strategy focused on redefining the perception of the West amongst the average Muslim people is fundamental to fighting terrorism over the long haul. It will deprive the terrorist of the ability to escalate the conflict and address the legitimate sources of friction that provide the fertile ground for the future terrorist to flourish. Like the policy of containment that achieved our goals during the Cold War, the adoption of a policy of enlightening the mass Muslim population will change the perception of the West in the Muslim world and enhance our security posture by neutralizing the breeding grounds of future terrorist.

An event has occurred that threatened our national security. We responded. There will be a counter-response. President Bush in his State of the Union address identified the Axis of Evil that immediately drew a response from Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The Iraqi Defense Minister and the Iranian Defense Minister initiated coordination, presumably to determine how they would respond if either were attacked by the United States. The emergence of a near competitor may occur in the development of a coalition between Iraq and Iran. Our actions will have a significant influence on the global environment. The threat is real, it is long-term, it has the potential to engulf the Middle East, Central Asia and Northeast Asia and it presents the greatest threat to America. If our goal is to dissuade adversaries from threatening our interests and deter aggression and coercion, the U.S. must develop a strategy that focuses on the threats.

What is needed is an effort to craft focused strategies that counter the threats, closely monitor the changes in the environment to capitalize on emerging vulnerabilities and shape the global environment on a daily basis. Shaping the global environment for the 21st century started yesterday. It is imperative that we see the world the way it is. The world is multi-polar, there are real threats to our national security and we must begin shaping the world today.

Regardless of what strategy we adopt, the U.S. must change its structure to keep pace with the rapidly changing world conditions. One of the key problems with the current structure is that our information and decision-making process is fragmented and inefficient.

CHANGING THE STRUCTURE.

The overarching strategic objective of our National Security Strategy should be to shape the global environment to ensure our national security and economic prosperity. The current threat analysis accurately identifies the global threats as, the dissemination of WMD, global terrorism with a global reach, the destabilizing effects of failing states, and computer network attack. The current administration is presently focusing on global terrorism and national missile defense and is only marginally modifying the security structure.

To date the only national security guidance that has been publicized is the work on the National Military Security Plan on the Global War on Terrorism and the creation of the Office of Homeland Defense. The only security structure are the creation of the Office of Homeland Defense, the streamlining of the Department of Defense the reduction of the size of the Secretariats staff and a revision of the Unified Command Plan to add a CINC for homeland defense. This is not to assume that this is the only guidance or that these are the only changes, but it does provide and indication of how this administration intends to approach national security.

In terms of changing the national security structure, we are moving in the wrong direction. The primary reason changes are being made to the security structure is to satisfy political objectives. The overriding political objective is to reduce force structure to leverage dollars for transformation and National Missile Defense. There appears to be a decided effort to move away from the Clinton Engagement strategy, because it is a hold over from the previous administration and it does not support the current administration's ability to draw down the force. Engagement is as important today as it was during the Clinton administration. The execution of the engagement strategy may have been flawed, but the concept is still valid. Representative Ike Skelton during the 2nd session of the 105th Congress, provides clear insight as to why we should stay the course.

Engagement, while not yet widely embraced as a characterization of our basic global posture, seems to me to express quite well what we need to be about in the post-Cold War era, that we need to be engaged in the world, and that we need to be engaged with other nations in building and maintaining a stable international security system.⁹

The question is not whether we will be engaged, but how and what security structure is needed to most effectively execute the strategy?

The Quadrennial Defense Review makes it very clear that we must center our National Security Strategy on uncertain future. The engagement strategy is based on the concept that what we do today will determine what the world will look like tomorrow. The concept set out in

the QDR postulates that we do not know what tomorrow will look like so we must shape the force to be prepared for anything. The engagement strategy focuses on shaping the world and the QDR focuses on shaping the force. It is my opinion that this divergence in concepts is based on how dollars are spent. If you side with the engagement strategy dollars are spent on maintaining forces abroad.

For the latter part of the 1990s and into the 21st century, international engagement has been and will be the defining term in America's national security and foreign policy strategies. This approach has resulted in a marked change in the rate and scope of US military deployments. On any given day the, for example, the US Army has more than 30,000 soldiers deployed over 70 nations, not including those soldiers routinely stationed outside the United States.¹⁰

If you side with the QDR, dollars are saved by reducing forces abroad, because there ^{are} no identified threats, and the savings are reinvested at home for transforming the force and National Missile Defense. Unfortunately, the world will not wait while we make ready. The 11th of September made this reality very clear. If we are going to ensure the security of this nation, we must do it everyday. There is no peace dividend, we do not have time to take a breath and there is no lull in the action. Transformation is not a national security strategy. Transformation does not address the realities of the international environment that exist today. Transformation is necessary, but it must be accomplished in addition to developing and executing a national security strategy that addresses today's threats.

The 1997 National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare provides for both transformation and engagement and should serve as the basis for the 2002 National Security and National Military Strategies. The 1997 National Military Strategy directs that we: shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis and prepare now for an uncertain future.¹¹ This strategy is sound and should not be abandoned. We must stay engaged and we must focus our efforts on building a security structure that effectively executes this kind of strategy.

In order to build a structure that allows for the effective execution of an engagement strategy, it is important to identify the shortcomings in the current structure. The major shortcoming is that there is

no central body or mechanism that will ensure the coherent integration of these national strategies and provide an overarching global engagement plan upon which to base the integration of regional Theater Engagement Plans.¹²

If we are going to effectively execute any national security strategy, this shortcoming must be resolved. In order to resolve this shortcoming Ralph R. Steinke and Brian Tarbet's in their article "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Toll of A Waste of Time", propose that the

National Security Council serve as the single body at the national level responsible for prioritizing and integrating national engagement activities. In addition, the Unified Command Plan should be realigned with the State Dept to ensure unity of effort, the NSC should formalize the development of national economic, information and diplomatic strategies, the NSC should synchronize the national military, economic, information and diplomatic strategies at the national level, regional ambassadors posts should be created to facilitate the coherent execution of the national diplomatic strategy and forces should be allocated to regional CINCs to effectively execute Theater Engagement Plans and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Given the shift from a bipolar international environment to a multi-polar environment, where each region presents a different set of challenges, it is essential that we craft a regionally specific National Security Strategy. The lack of formal strategic guidance by the National Command Authority force the regional CINC's to develop Theater Engagement Plans that may not be completely in sync with the other instruments of national power. It is assumed that there is routine dialog between CINCs and the appropriate embassies in their Area of Operation, but this lateral coordination falls short of a coherent National Security Strategy. To chart a process to satisfy the need for a coherent National Security Strategy and the Chairman's requirement to have deliberate plans drafted for shaping each theater I would continue to follow the 1996/1997 National Security Strategy methodology of an integrated regional approach with modification.

The overarching national objective is to ensure the security of our nation, people, territory and way of life. We set the conditions for achieving national security by shaping the international environment through diplomacy, military preparedness, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy. These are good broad based goals but they do not apply equally to all regions. To give the CINCs and ambassadors the focused strategic guidance necessary to efficiently develop Regional Engagement Plans the National Security guidance provided must be tailored to their specific regional issues. Requiring the National Security Council to develop an integrated National Security Strategy that provided regionally oriented guidance would resolve this issue.

We currently have a mechanism for the development of a National Security Strategy and a National Military Strategy. We do not have a National Diplomatic Strategy, National Information Strategy or National Economic Strategy. In order to have a cogent and coherent National Security Strategy that effectively synchronizes and employs all of the instruments of national power, an integrated strategy must be developed. Once this process is developed it must be refined to ensure it is focused by region to ensure Theater Engagement Plans are fully

integrated. In a perfect world the Theater Engagement Plan would be supporting plan to a Regional Security Plan that integrated all of the elements of national power.

Currently the Geographic CINCs AORs do not align with the Department of State. To enhance the coherent execution of the National Security Strategy, I would recommend restructuring the Department of State by creating Department of State AORs that are aligned with the Geographic CINCs AORs and creating Regional Ambassadors positions to synchronize the efforts of the ambassadors in each of the regional countries.

The purpose of the Unified Command Plan is to ensure unity of military effort. The Unified Command Plan divides the world into geographic regions and assigns responsibility to a designated command for protecting US interests in that region. The Unified Command Plan was created in 1946, when the US centered its National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy on containing the Soviet Union. The world has changed. Given the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the bipolar model that centered US strategic planning is no longer valid. It is time to rethink how we see the world. The current UCP does not assign responsibility for Central Asia or Africa to a single CINC. Responsibility for Africa is assigned to three different CINCs. Samuel P. Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" has provided a different vision of the global environment that is supported by recent world events and may serve as a viable model to center U.S. national security strategy and revise the Unified Command Plan.

Huntington contends that international politics will no longer be dominated by conflicts between nation states and ideologies, but by conflicts between civilizations. Huntington predicts future conflicts will occur along cultural fault lines separating seven or eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.¹³ This premise is based on the concept that the current nation states align themselves with and act in support of nation states that are from the same civilizations. If this concept is valid it may be more appropriate to engage and shape these civilizations as grouping of interrelated entities as opposed to separate and distinct nation states.

Conflicts between the Slavic-Orthodox and Islamic cultures in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Chechnya, conflicts between the West and the Islamic culture in Afghanistan and conflicts between the Islamic and Hindu cultures in Pakistan and India provide evidence that Huntington's premise has merit.

If Huntington's premise is correct it provides a multi-polar model to center US strategic planning and revise the Unified Command Plan. In order to increase unity of effort the Unified

Command Plan would need to be revised to mirror the eight civilizations outlined by Huntington in order to place the entire civilization under the responsibility of the appropriate CINC.

The civilization based UCP would assign all Western Nations (Western Europe, Australia and Israel) to EUCOM, all Islamic Nations to CENTCOM (including Indonesia, Malaysia), all Japanese and Confucian nations to PACOM, and all Latin American nations (including the Caribbean) to SOUTHCOM. JFCOM would be renamed NORTHCOM and assigned the responsibility for homeland defense. Two new commands would be created EEUCOM and AFRICOM. EEUCOM would be assigned the responsibility for Eastern and Central Europe and AFRICOM would be assigned the responsibility for the African continent, less the Islamic nations in the northeast.

This revision of the UCP would increase unity of effort for the CINCs by aligning the responsibilities with the manner in which nation-states have demonstrated they will act. It will fill the void in Russia and deconflict the responsibility for Africa. If our objective is to shape the global environment to ensure our national security in the 21st century, revising the UCP to reflect the realities of state behavior may be the most effective reorganization.

As important as the development of a coherent National Security Strategy is, if there is no mechanism to measure the effectiveness of the execution of the strategy, it is difficult to determine if the strategy is succeeding. In order to monitor the execution of the regional security plans I recommend the creation of a Joint Interagency Operations Center, collocated in either the Regional Embassy or the Geographic CINCs headquarters. The establishment of a Joint Interagency Operations Center would ensure the seamless execution of the regional engagement strategy across the national instruments of power.

In order for the CINCs to develop coherent Theater Engagement Plans, they must have clear and focused guidance from the National Command Authority. The Integrated Regional Approach to strategy development adopted in 1996 provides a solid framework for providing regionally focused guidance. Modifying this framework to incorporate an Integrated National Security Strategy, realigning the Geographic CINCs and State Department AORs to coincide, superimposing a regional ambassador over the individual country teams and creating a Joint Interagency Operations Center to battle track the execution of the Integrated National Security Strategy will enhance not only the CINCs ability to develop and execute the Theater Engagement Plans, but the nations ability to efficiently achieve its national objectives.

The last modification I propose is to prioritize the regional CINCs by immediacy of threat and change how we apportion and allocate forces to the regional CINCs. It is well understood that the uniformed services are limited by what America will spend on national defense. This

fact requires tough choices and the need to prioritize how to focus the limited defense assets available. Rather than make the tough choices, we defer the decisions by apportioning forces to the CINCs in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In short, the CINCs do not have the forces assigned to fight the most likely threat in their respective regions. The best example of this is Central Command (CENTCOM). Arguably, the regional unified command with the most immediate threat to our national security is CENTCOM, yet CENTCOM has no assigned forces ~~in~~ IAW the forces for memorandum. In order to more effectively execute a coherent national security strategy it is my assertion that the nation would be better served if we take some risk in less critical regions, prioritize the allocation of forces and allocate the appropriate force to the CINCs to execute their regional strategies. As an example, CENTCOM would have the forces allocated to it to execute its JSCP requirements.

The fundamental purpose of the National Security Strategy is to ensure the security of the nation. It is my contention that in order for us to achieve this fundamental national objective we must change. The U.S. must change the way it sees the world, change the strategy to focus on the multiple threats and change the organizational structure that is responsible for its coherent execution. The world does not follow the bipolar model of the Cold War. The conditions have changed. We live in a multi-polar world, with multiple threats and the emergence of new alliances and the U.S. must adopt a threat-based strategy that accounts for the changes in the world and realign our security structure to keep pace with change in conditions. We were not prepared for the attacks on the World Trade Center or the Pentagon. We can ill afford to be unprepared again. We must have clear coherent, comprehensive and specific guidance from our national leadership and they must remain engaged throughout the execution of the National Security Strategy. Now is not the time to shrink from our international responsibilities, for the sake of saving money. We must remain engaged and shape the global environment to our ends because the cost of failure is reflected in the eyes of families of those lost on the 11th of September.

WORD COUNT = 6327

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush Jr, "State of the Union Address", 29 January 2002; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>; Internet; accessed February 2002

² Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, 13.

³ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. (New York, New York: Touchstone 1996), 21.

⁴ John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 24.

⁵ Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 87.

⁶ Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, D.C: The White House, October 1996.

⁷ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001

⁸ Gwynne Dyer, "Battle misidentified by bin Laden, foes", *The Patriot News*, 11 October 2001, sec A, 19

⁹ Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Toll of a Waste of Time." Parameters 1 Spring 2000, 69.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹¹ John M. Shalikashvili, National Military strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, 1997), 1.

¹² Steinke and Tarbet, *Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Toll of a Waste of Time*, 69.

¹³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blechman, Barry M., O'prey, Kevin P. and Lajoie, Renee. "Grading Theater Engagement Planning." Joint Force Quarterly. Spring 2000 Issue 24, p.98. Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C: The White House, October 1998.
- Bush, George W., "State of the Union Address", 29 January 2002; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>; Internet; accessed February 2002.
- Cerami, John R. and Holcomb, James F., eds., U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (United States War College, Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001).
- Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement. Washington, D.C: The White House, February 1996.
- Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C: The White House, May 1997.
- Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C: The White House, December 1999.
- Clinton, William J. National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, D.C: The White House, December 2000.
- Crawley, Vince "Force-structure flexibility." Air Force Times, 9 March 2001, Vol 62 Issue 6, p.10.
- Dyer, Gwynne, "Battle misidentified by bin Laden, foes", The Patriot News, 11 October 2001.
- Howle, Roy C. "An Evitable War: Engaged Containment and the US-China Balance." Parameters 3 (Autumn 2001) p. 92-104.
- Howle, Roy C. "An Evitable War: Engaged Containment and the US-China Balance." Parameters 3 (Autumn 2001) p. 92-104. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001.
- Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, New York: Touchstone, 1996.
- Ippolito, Dennis S., ed., Budget Policy and Fiscal Risk: Implications for Defense (United States Army War College, Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001) Rumsfeld, Donald Guidance and Terms of Reference for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review WASHINGTON D.C.: The Pentagon, 22 June 2001.
- Manwaring, Max G., ed., ...to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for common defence... (United States Army War College, Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000) Spanier, John. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991).

Metz, Steven, ed., American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review (United States Army War College, Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2000).

Peters, Ralph "Stability, America's Enemy." Parameters 4 (Winter 2001-02) p. 5-20 Sokolski, Henry D., ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (United States Army War College, Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001).

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001.

Rahm, Julie M. "Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?" Parameters 4 (Winter 2001-02) p. 87-97.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Testimony Prepared for Delivery on the 2002 Defense Amended Budget to the House Appropriations Committee." 16 July 2001. Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>. Internet. Accessed 22 November 2001.

Shalikashvili, John M. National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1997.

Steinke, Ralph R. and Tarbet Brian L. "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Toll of a Waste of Time." Parameters, Spring 2000.

Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., Strategy and Force Planning. Naval War College Press, RI, 2000.

Wolfowitz, Paul and Carlson, Bruce. "Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Quadrennial Defense Review" 4 October 2001. Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>. Internet. Accessed 22 November 2001.