

**STRATEGY
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X-LAM: ROOTS OF TERROR AND THE BATTLE AHEAD

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ABSTRACT

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Terror organizations with a global reach are actually few in numbers and stature. This general observation is particularly true of those groups which target the United States. However, certain Middle Eastern organizations steeped in traditional and fundamental teachings of Islam seek violent solutions to their grievances and, in the conduct of their execution employ more extreme methods and techniques than previously imagined. Given the "extreme" nature of this threat and the "extreme" fanaticism displayed by the perpetrators, this paper refers to this particular brand of Islam as "X-Lam". This paper researches the roots of Islamic extremism. It begins with a medieval emphasis on returning to the fundamental values of the prophet Mohammed. Over the Centuries, key Muslim intellectuals radically altered the philosophy of the faith and more recently, extreme followers have taken their faith even further towards the application of violent means, including declaring "war" against the crusader west. We must label followers and practioners of X-Lam as enemies of the United States and a threat to U.S. security. These are not ad-hoc groups relegated to killing themselves because of a set of social conditions and injustices that refuse them upward mobility. This paper is about a part of a generally peaceful religion that has gone bad. Defining the actors and their ideologies will be an integral part of my framework.

First, Islamic extremists (the terrorists with global reach as referred to by President Bush in his address to a joint session of congress and the American people on 20 Sept 01) are characterized by the use of violence or the willingness to use violence. This measure of violence is the major difference between Islamic extremists and Islamic fundamentalists. The roots of Islamic extremism go all the way back to (Ibn Tayamiyya in) the 13th Century. Taymiyya was a sheik during a time when the Mongols were attacking Islam and many Muslims were forced to live under Mongol rulers. His writings about Islam as a political ideology are the intellectual foundations for movements such as Wahibbism in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, and al Queda's global network of terror.

In order to understand these actors, we must examine the context of their goals and intentions. How they want to accomplish this in today's modern societies and global civilizations becomes somewhat of a conundrum embedded in an ancient ideology. For most Islamic nations, church and state cannot be separated, so Islam becomes the political ideology.

A second important premise is that the extremist wants to take Islam back to its origins as practiced by Mohammad in the 7th Century. Extremists have declared war on the West through a number of "fatwas" or proclamations. The West is a culture that threatens Islam. Christianity is only a part of the threat: technology and modernity are viewed as inherent evils of the West, as are democratic ideals. The more one learns about these 'global terrorists', the more one finds rampant manipulation of myths, perceptions and beliefs. The ideology that fuels the violent acts of extremists are today blamed on U.S. hegemony, of glory lost or stolen, of colonialism and of globalization.

The United States is conducting a war against terror. All nation states have responsibilities to their societies and more so, certain lead or core nations have greater responsibilities to the rest of the civilized world. Each state has a role in countering global terror. This paper is framed in the context of understanding who the enemy is, why he acts the way he does, and what leadership role the United States must play.

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X-LAM: ROOTS OF TERROR AND THE BATTLE AHEAD

AL SALAF AL SALIHOON: THE ORIGINAL PIOUS MUSLIMS

"I am Ashari. I believe that the Koran is a means which exists in Allah's essence, and it is an attribute from the pre-external attributes of his essence, and that it is uncreated, and that it does not consist in the letter nor the voice, and that his saying 'the merciful established himself over the throne' is not taken according to its external meaning, nay, only Allah knows it, and one speaks of his 'descent' in the same way one speaks of his establishment."

—Ibn Taymiyya ad 1263-1328.¹

'Ahmed ibn Abd al-Halim ibn Abd Allah ibn al Qasim ibn Taymiyya Taqi al-Din Abu al-Abbas ibn Shihab al-Din ibn Majjd al-Din al Harrani al-Dimashqi al Hanbali' is how he would have introduced himself. This paper will refer to 'him' as Ibn Taymiyya from this point forward. Ibn Taymiyya's introduction identifies his lineage, legitimizes his bloodline and portrays the cause to which he has committed his life. It also includes his address. This name merely foreshadows the complexity of the man and his writings and more importantly, the religion he helped shape into what today is the essential foundation of Islamic fundamentalism.

Ibn Taymiyya was a staunch defender of Sunni Islam based upon strict adherence to the Koran and authentic Sunna (practices) of the prophet Mohammed. He believed that these two sources contain all the religious and spiritual guidance to one's salvation in the hereafter. Thus, he rejected the many arguments of his era by philosophers and Sufi's regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices.² He believed that logic was not a reliable means of attaining religious truth and that intellect must be subservient to the truth as revealed by either the Koran or practices by the prophet Mohammed. Ibn Taymiyya came into conflict with many of the Sunni scholars of his time because of his rejection of the rigidity of the schools of jurisprudence in Islam at the time.³ He believed that the four accepted schools of Islamic jurisprudence had become stagnant and sectarian, and also that they were being improperly influenced by aspects of western thought (Greek logic), as well as by Sufi mysticism. His challenge to the leading scholars of the day was a return to an understanding of Islam in practices and faith based solely on the Koran and the Sunna.

Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, Syria, circa AH 661 / AD 1263 and died in Damascus around AH 728 / AD 1328.⁴ As are all influential people, he was a product of his time. He lived in the Levant during a period of time that was wrought with war and invasion by non-Muslim

armies. The Islamic world was suffering from both external aggression and from internal strife. The Crusaders had not been fully expelled from the region and the effects of Christian thought and western logic were diminishing the practice(s) of Islam. The Mongols had all but destroyed Islam in the eastern empire when they captured Baghdad in AD 1258.⁵ In Egypt the Mamluks were in power and had consolidated their hold over Syria. Within Muslim society, various Sufi orders were spreading beliefs and practices not condoned by orthodox Islam, while the orthodox schools of jurisprudence were ineffective in their messages on religious thought and practice. It was in this setting of turmoil and conflict where "Ibn Taymiyya formulated his views on the causes of the weakness of the Muslim [societies] and on the need to return to the Koran and the Sunna as the only means for revival"⁶

Few scholars in Islamic philosophy will deny that Ibn Taymiyya was a copious and eloquent writer and Hadith scholar. Likewise, it is equally accepted that Ibn Taymiyya was a controversial figure among Muslim leaders in his time. What is significant in our world today is that both Muslim fundamentalists and extremists are able to draw on the works of Ibn Taymiyya for historical precedent and intellectual and philosophical strength in their call for a return to strict adherence to Sunna and practice of Islam, justifying their movements and struggles. Not only did Ibn Taymiyya defend Islam against Jihad,⁷ the Crusaders, the Jews, the Mongols and the Tartars, but he also attacked the traditional dominant schools of Islamic jurisprudence; Maliki, Hanaffi, and Shafi-i. He challenged the Mamluk Turks (Muslims) and was particularly critical of the contemporary Ash'arite (Muslims) school of dialectics. He forcefully argued against the Greek philosophers and he refuted the mysticism the Sufis were infusing into Islam. Ibn Taymiyya placed primary importance on revelation as the only reliable course of knowledge about God and about a person's religious duties towards Him. The human intellect and its powers of reason must be subservient to revelation.⁸ According to Taymiyya, the only proper use of intellect was to understand Islam in the way the prophet and his followers did and then to defend it against 'deviant' sects. Furthermore, when discussing the nature of God, he argued that one must accept the descriptions found in the Koran and the Sunna without investigating the nature of these because the human mind is incapable of understanding the eternal God.⁹ For example: one accepts that God is mounted upon a throne high above the heavens without questioning how this happens. This literal meaning is also held for all of God's physical attributes such as His sight, His hearing and His touch. Many, if not all, the orthodox schools of thought (Maliki, Hanaffi, Shafi), including the Mamluks, denied these attributes based upon rationalization. However critical of these groups, Taymiyya did not declare them heretical for they deviated only in their interpretation of God's nature. This is an important point in the

development of the fundamentalist; to declare one heretical was to justify jihad, and Muslims did not kill Muslims. As the Fundamentalist movement becomes more extreme, leaders find a way around this "complication" as a means to facilitate change and to justify Jihad. Sayyid Qutb was the first to restructure the argument surrounding this "complication", as explored further into the paper. Ibn Taymiyya did label apostate those (Sufis) who also denied God's creation of the world and His emanation of the universe. In this respect Taymiyya felt that of all the internal threats to Islam, and they were significant, the beliefs and practices of the Sufis were far more dangerous than the ideas of the orthodox philosophers. The main tenant of Sufi thought, as espoused by Ibn al-Arabi¹⁰, is the concept of oneness of existence. Through this belief, the Sufis believe they are able to effect a merging of their souls with God's being. That is, when God reveals his truth to an individual, that person realizes there is no difference between God and one's self.¹¹ Although the philosopher would refute the ability of the human soul to flow into God's being, the mystical experience of the Sufis took these beyond the realm of intellectual discourse. "According to the mystic, a merging occurred but could not be expressed in rational terms. For Ibn Taymiyya, both the philosopher and the mystic were deluded; the former by reliance on a limited human intellect and the latter by excessive human emotions."¹²

Ibn Taymiyya argued against Sufism from an allegorical position. "First there is the theological position that God has attributes and one of these attributes is God as creator."¹³ Taymiyya believed that the Koran is clear that God is the one who created, originated and gave shape to the universe. "Therefore there exists a distinction between God the creator and the created beings."¹⁴ This distinction is absolute and cannot be merged in any way or thought. Taymiyya then went on to say 'those who strip God of his attributes and deny that he is the creator are just one step away from falling into the belief of the oneness of existence.'¹⁵ This is the basis for the second part of his argument. "[He] believed that a Sufi is simply someone who is overcome by an outpouring of emotion. For example, someone may deny God's attributes but could then be overwhelmed by a feeling of love for God. However; the basis for that person's knowledge is not the authentic (therefore authoritative) information from the Koran, and so their weak, intellectual foundation collapses with the onslaught of emotion. According to Taymiyya, sense perception and emotions cannot be trusted, and the likelihood of being led astray by them is compounded when one has a basis of knowledge which is itself 'errant' and 'deviant.' 'One holds a proper belief in God and maintains a proper relationship with Him,' Ibn Taymiyya argued, 'by establishing a foundation of knowledge based solely upon the Koran and the authentic Sunna.'¹⁶

Ibn Taymiyya revived an otherwise dying society. He surpassed all of the Islamic scholars of his time. His works continue to have a marked effect on Muslims, and he is recognized as the first intellectual who writes about Islam's Salaf al Salihoon. These are the namesakes of the original pious Muslims ... it is for this reason that Taymiyya and an Islamic revival is relevant today. His movement is often referred to as the Salafi movement; a return to the authentic Sunna. The writings and notoriety of Ibn Taymiyya were largely forgotten until the Salafi movement revived them through the publishing efforts of the Wahabi movement in the 19th and 20th centuries. Taymiyya provides the historical context for the fundamentalist salafiyya movement. From Taymiyya's fundamental approach will grow an increasingly radical following by groups such as Ibn Wahab and the Egyptian Brotherhood. From these radical interpretations of the sunna will emerge extremist groups whose stated goals are to kill Americans anywhere they can find them.

REVIVAL AND REASSERTION OF ISLAM: WAHHABISM

"When one of their righteous men or righteous slaves of Allah dies, they build a temple on his grave and draw their images inside it. These are the worst of Allah's creatures. May Allah damn the Jews and Christians, who turned the graves of their prophets into temples"

—Ibn Abd-Al Wahab, 1703-1792 ¹⁷

Socioeconomic and political conditions throughout the Ottoman Empire made it ripe for change. Control of the Arabian Peninsula had been a state of mind more than an actuality. The Ottomans never really had control of the interior and the Najd region of the Peninsula proper, and the warring Bedouin chieftains were looking for any advantage that could shift the balance of power toward their favor. Ottoman rule and its quasi-secular approach to governance set the conditions for the revival and reassertion of Islam. Much like the conditions of the 7th Century where Ibn Taymiyya founded a movement advocating a return to a Shari'a - minded orthodoxy that would purify Islam from worldly influences, the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula were searching for unity and commonality that would unite them under one banner. Taymiyya had set a pattern for the zealots of Islam, one of societal regression where the intellectuals of the faith were proven unable to influence change without compromise. Wahhabism, drawing its intellectual prowess from Taymiyya's fundamentalist Salafiyya movement centuries earlier, was the revival and reassertion of Islam promulgated by the decline of 500 years of Ottoman rule across Arabia. ¹⁸

Muhammad ibn abd al Wahab was born in Uyaynah, Saudi Arabia AD 1703 and died AD 1792. Traveling abroad to Iraq and Iran, he began to teach against what he considered to be the extreme ideas of various component of Sufi doctrine. As Sufism had gained influences across the Islamic world, Wahab was expelled from Uyaynah in 1744.¹⁹ He was welcomed into the Najd by a powerful Bedouin tribal chieftain named Ibn Sa'ud. The spread of Wahhabism originated from the alliance that was formed between Abd al Wahab and Ibn Sa'ud, who, by initiating a campaign of conquest which was continued by the Sa'ud family, made Wahhabism the dominant force (politically and religiously) in Arabia. The collaboration between Wahab and the Sa'ud line remains suspicious, as Sa'ud conquests were as much about power as they were about Islam. The struggle between church and state remain the number one threat to the Sa'ud regime and the root issue of extremist groups like al Qaeda.

Doctrinally, Wahhabism is not a new sect within Islam but a movement whose purpose is to purify Islam of perceived heretical accretions. The Wahhabis base their doctrines on the teachings of the 14th Century scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, and the rulings of the Hanbali school of Jurisprudence, the strictest of the four schools recognized under Sunni Islam. They believe that all objects of worship other than Allah are false and that anyone who worships in this manner deserves to be put to death. Simply adorning a grave site is considered false worship. To introduce the name of a prophet, saint or angel into a prayer, or to seek intercession from anyone but Allah constitutes a form of polytheism²⁰. In a broad definition, attendance at public prayer is mandatory and the shaving of the beard, smoking or imbibing is forbidden. Mosques should be architecturally simple, not ornate or luxurious. Prohibited is the celebration of the prophet's birthday, making offerings at the tomb of saints and playing music. The injunctions (Hadith) of the Koran are to be taken literally.

Historically, Wahhabism emerged in the middle of the 18th Century in Arabia as both a religious and political movement that responded to the decline of the Ottoman influence and to the increasing strength of the Shi'a in Iran. Throughout his travels, Wahab witnessed a concerning presence of religious laxity, superstition, and a growing allegiance to the Sufi saints. The political character of his movement took the form of opposition to the Ottoman Sultan. On the lam from officials loyal to the Sultan, Ibn Wahab was accepted into the Najd region of Arabia where he formed an alliance with Mohammed Ibn Sa'ud (AD 1765), who accepted his doctrine and championed its cause. Like Mohammed the prophet in AD 630, they marched an army into Mecca where they demolished shrines and tombstones (incidentally, the destruction of Buddhist Icons within the past year by the Taliban in Afghanistan was not by coincidence). The capture of Mecca alarmed the Ottomans who dispatched an Army to crush the movement. The Sa'ud

Bedouin troops were defeated in 1818, but a remnant of the Wahabi movement survived in a pocket of the Najd. In 1902, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, a descendent of the Saudi family and a follower of the Bedouin faith Wahabbiya, took Riyadh, the culminating event which led to the eventual conquest of the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The British, who had replaced the Ottomans as occupiers of the Arabian Peninsula, signed a treaty in 1927 with Aziz which gave Aziz full independence over Arabia. A kingdom was declared in 1932 and Wahabbism became the official doctrine of the state. Today the Saudi Kingdom remains firmly rooted in the Wahabbi creed.

Wahabbis claim a strict monotheistic code and use the absolute meaning of the concepts 'infidelity' and 'polytheism'.²¹ So what then, in the opinion of the Wahabbis, are polytheism and infidelity, and who are the polytheists and infidels? Jews and Christians are regarded as infidels in all forms of Wahabbi literature. Jews and Christians are polytheists as well because they "choose the graves of their prophets to say their prayers on them."²² Muslims who deviate from monotheism (apostasy) may be considered infidels. "Infidels are also those Muslims who introduce any innovations in religion"²³

The Jew and the Christian are lost causes, and Islam feels no compunction toward their salvation. It is, however, at this juncture in Islam where theological and philosophical thought attack themselves internally. This conflict, beginning with Wahabbism and prevalent in dogma today, is between Muslim and Muslim. Westernization and modernization (innovations with polytheistic ideals), both by-products that are promulgated by Jews and Christians, are merely tools in the extremist's employ to rally Muslims together, with an end toward implementing the conservative practice of Salafiyya. "It is a trait inherent in Wahabbism to regard as infidels the Muslims who deviate from monotheism. According to Islamic tradition, the believer who performs what is considered infidelity (like wearing an amulet, placing flowers at a monument or saying prayers at a grave site) remains a believer if this action is not a deviation from the symbol of Islamic faith – 'there is no God but Allah; Mohammed is his messenger.' However, any who deviate from monotheism become an infidel. Thus he becomes apostate, and the punishment for apostasy in Islam is death."²⁴ Pronouncing the formula 'There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his messenger' signifies the conversion of a Muslim. Wahabbis, however, assert that neither this formula nor the strict adherence to the postulates of Islam guarantee that a Muslim who deviates from monotheism by an act of infidelity will remain a Muslim. In fact, Wahabbism declares a Muslim ceases to be a Muslim if he deviates from monotheism even in the least degree. Under this justification "his life and property are no longer immune [Muslims don't kill Muslims...that is what this is about...] therefore, he may be killed and

deprived of his property.”²⁵ Keep in mind that when Mohammed returned to Mecca in AD 630, he refused to kill those who were Muslims, and generally speaking, in the Najd in AD1750, those driven to conquer had first to find a way around the Muslim-on-Muslim question. Wahabbism addresses this intellectually and provides an “escape clause” in its definitions of monotheism and the deviations therein.

The ‘hypocrites’ constitute a separate group of infidels. “A hypocrite is a Muslim who demonstrates adherence to Islam and conceals his infidelity.”²⁶ In other words, Wahabbis can proclaim any Muslim a hypocrite and an infidel. As previously stated, moderate interpretations of Islam forbid Muslims to attack fellow Muslims. Here we see a radical change in how Muslims view each other. In 1791, against the Emir of Mecca, Mohammed Abd al Aziz declared war, killed and tortured many Muslims, enslaved their women and children and usurped their possessions. Wahabbism permitted a legal and theological recourse to one Muslim killing another. This theory will be further advanced and defined by more extreme ideologues such as Hasan al Bana and Sayyid Qutb, who will use Ibn Taymiyya and Wahab as a moral foundation and in fact, a religious duty to rebel against Muslim leaders throughout the Islamic world.

Wahabbis also regard as infidels followers of all ideological movements without exception. Thus “adherence to atheistic movements, such as communism, secularism, democracy, capitalism, and other such movements of infidels is an apostasy from the Islamic religion. These movements also include Marxist socialism and atheistic masonry. Naturally, no exception was made for Judaism which “stands behind everyone and every destructive doctrine subversive of morality and spiritual values” to which also belong “Masonry, world Zionism and Babuwism.”²⁷ Wahabism began to attack any formula of socio-political organization that is not based completely in the Koran and the Hadith.

Perhaps the most significant piece of the Wahabbi movement to understand or appreciate is that hate is a religious requirement and jihad is obligatory. According to doctrine, “only complete obedience to the Wahabbi group and active hostility toward everyone else makes one a monotheist.”²⁸ One who adopts Wahabbism must confirm his faith by “hate and hostility.”²⁹ The true monotheist must hate all those regarded as infidels, polytheists and hypocrites. Since hate is an emotion and therefore difficult to control, much less judge, Wahabbis pay special attention to the visible behavior of the person. This is a self-preservation measure and explains a huge piece of the Islamic (Arab) culture. Perception is more important than reality. A visible manifestation of hate is what can preserve the Wahabbi from accusations of infidelity, otherwise his life and property is no longer immune from judgment. This rationalizes away all forms of violence and protest. This rationalization is foreign to western culture.

According to Wahhabis, jihad as an armed struggle is required for the purpose of spreading their teaching. [Imagine if you will, Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Wahab sitting in the tent, in the middle of the Najd desert, sipping tea and discussing 'ways,' 'means' and 'ends' toward their strategy to obtain more land and wealth. The only glitch to their grand strategy is that it is incompatible with their values – Muslims don't kill Muslims, at least not without good justification.] Jihad (in the extreme sense) is a war against infidels, polytheists and hypocrites. Wahabbism specifies various types of jihad: 1) jihad against Shaitan (devil), 2) jihad against the soul, 3) jihad against infidels and 4) jihad against hypocrites.³⁰ The word jihad is derived from the Arabic root meaning 'to strive' or 'to make an effort' and as specified above, connotes a wide range of meanings from an inward struggle to attain perfect faith to one of outward material struggle to promote the Islamic social system. Early in Islam, jihad generally referred to a struggle to establish Islamic hegemony over non-Muslims. Islamic jurisprudence separated the world into two spheres: the land of Islam where Islamic law applied and the land of war where there was no Islamic law and therefore, anarchy and immorality flourished. Although more complicated, the duty of Islam and Muslims alike was to reduce the latter through peaceful means if possible; through violent means if necessary. More moderate interpretations were almost apologetic to the West and preferred to allow war only for self-defense against persecution and aggression. In reality, moderates are motivated less by western criticism of jihad than by the desire to interpret the concept in a way compatible with international norms. You can believe the Wahabbiyya movement is unapologetic and interprets jihad as a means to an end. Based upon the final years of the prophet's life (this of course needs to be understood in context), the Wahabbi view jihad as a struggle to propagate the Islamic order worldwide. "The goal of jihad today ought not to be to coerce people to accept Islam, because the Koran clearly encourages freedom of worship (Koran 2:256); rather it ought to be to over-throw non-Islamic regimes that corrupt their societies and divert people from service to God."³¹

Although Muhammed ibn Abd al Wahab preached a message of strict and literal Islamic reform, Wahabbism today serves two purposes. The relationship between the Al Sa'ud family and the religious community remain the principle pillar upon which Saudi stability rests. The religious Puritanism of Wahab provides a basis for both the Royal Family's political authority and legitimacy. The Monarchy's legitimacy remains dependent on the consensus of the religious leadership (Ulema). Their support is essential to the sustenance of the monarchy's political power. As in all movements, some voices are more vocal than others and Wahabbism is no different. The moderates, even in opposition to the King, continue to stress reform, rejecting westernization rather than modernization. They are prepared to accommodate the

modern world in certain respects. But for the more radical opposition, Wahabbism becomes a way to subvert the ancient prohibition against overthrowing a Muslim ruler. As governments across Islamic civilization begin to struggle more with their identities, the groundwork is set for a new kind of jihad. This movement has a huge impact in declaring Muslim governments as illegitimate. Egypt becomes a hotbed of radical thought and extremist acts of violence. Hasan al Bana and Sayyid Qutb began to exploit post war (1919) orientation to apostasy and nihilism, attacks on tradition and orthodoxy and the secularist and libertarian trends and become voices of salaf al salihoon.

REFORM ORGANIZATIONS: VOICES OF EGYPTIAN ISLAM

"God is our purpose, the prophet our leader, the Koran our constitution, jihad our way and dying for God's cause our supreme objective."

—Hassan El Bana, Al Ikhwan al Muslimiin, 1928 ³²

Egypt played a critical role in the Islamic Extremist movement, especially in the 20th century. Egypt has long been the cultural center of the Arab world. Emanating from Cairo cafes and shops, religious and social thought permeate the masses. Cairo always harbored intellectuals from the Arab world. Cairo was and is the nerve center of Arab thought... using innovations in media and telecommunications, serving as a synapse to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, as western influence penetrated further into the fabric of Islamic society, groups and organizations gradually came into being whose goals were to reform society in practice along stricter Islamic lines and to resist the secularization of western influences and values. This was the continuation of the great clash of civilizations as defined by Samuel Huntington. The most prominent of these organizations is the Muslim Brotherhood; Al Ikhwan al Muslimiin.

"The association of Muslim Brotherhood, described as the first wide-ranging, organized and international Islamic movement of modern times, was born in Ismailia, Egypt, at the hands of Hasan El Bana in March 1928. In the first few years of its existence, branches were set up in other Suez Canal cities such as Port Said, Suez and Abu Sueir. An underground paramilitary wing was also established, primarily to fight British occupation forces, but its targets also included Jewish interests and government figures."³³ Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhood as a vehicle for change. His dream was the resurrection of a great Islamic empire, dynastic in its religion and culture. His enemy was the crusader west, the foreign occupation and the cultural

threat it introduced into Islamic society. His intent was to reach out to the masses with a great Islamitization program which focused on using education venues, all mediums of information, the mosque and other social gathering places such as coffee houses, and using acts of charity on behalf of the community and the Ulema. A Grass roots approach that addressed grievances, filled an absence of government services and provided an identity that has, to some degree, been infringed upon by western influences. Bana succeeded in capturing Muslim hearts and minds and with great alacrity, his momentum enabled him to start a jihad against the infidels and non-believers.

We see similar political and societal circumstances in Egypt as those which were prevalent in the previous eras of 7th Century Islam and 18th Century Islam. External interests and occupying powers foreign to Islam were perceived to be forcing a new set of values and interests on the Muslim world and, more importantly, the Arab leaders appeared complacent or incapable of addressing the growing grievances. Once again, the reaction was to regress toward the pure sources of the holy Koran. *This reaction is interesting because one might argue that Islam is not a living religion, and is therefore incapable of allowing itself to keep pace with a growing and changing world. When confronted with challenge, it regresses rather than presses forward. This may be a cause of one of the great cultural divides between the clash of Islam and the West; one presses forward, and one backward.* This historic pattern also raises an introspective view about Islam; was it born of its social needs and place in history, and in particular, because of its geography? Therefore, is it (or will it be) relevant 500 or 1,000 years later when those initial conditions have long since ceased to exist? Was it born to spiritually guide man through life's changing and often violent tribulations and can it meet the needs of a living and changing society?

"The Brotherhood rejects the secularist approach of confining Islam to a relationship between man and his creator. It becomes a political movement because it demanded a reform of government and a reconsideration of the relationship of the Muslim nation (Umma) with other nations.³⁴" The Brotherhood needed to be taken seriously; they had a creed and a way of worship, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, a spirituality, a book and a sword. Bana had organized and was executing a textbook insurgency complete with political leadership,³⁵ an underground, an auxiliary and a paramilitary wing. By 1948 the Muslim Brotherhood was an international movement boasting 2,000 cells and branches in Egypt, 500 in Sudan and others in Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

Success was swift. Their message was quickly and strongly internalized throughout the coffeehouses, madrassas and mosques of the urban communities. In order to translate the call

for jihad into action, the groups paramilitary wing was established in the late 1930's. They began to carry out significant acts of violence in the 1940's. The "secret apparatus"³⁶ was a network of underground cells capable of purchasing various weapons, establishing training sites, training cadre, forming underground assassination squads and sleeper cells of subversive operatives in the government ranks waiting to be activated. In 1942, the Brotherhood's political arm ran an overt campaign for election into the Egyptian parliament. They were soundly defeated. With calls of corruption against King Farouk and the Egyptian government, this defeat became the trigger which started the Brotherhood's armed activity. Urban terror became the modus operandi with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940's. In 1946 a group of Brotherhood officials were indicted and found guilty of killing and injuring over 128 persons in violence - related incidents. A few months later, the Brotherhood assassinated the presiding judge. The paramilitary had taken on a life of its own. They were characterized with a revolutionary zeal and endless persistence at whatever the cost and were soon out of control. Several Jewish businesses in Cairo were bombed. Volunteers fought and gained experience in the Palestinian-Israeli war (lessons and similarities to al Qaeda fighting in Afghanistan notwithstanding...). These successes enabled and emboldened the military arm. Simply standing up to the British and the Israelis boosted confidence levels and strengthened resolve. The Egyptian government found more and more safe houses with cached arms and ammunition.

In 1948 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mohammed el-Noqrashi, issued a military decree dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood on the grounds that it had secretly plotted to overthrow the monarchy. A few days later the Brotherhood assassinated Noqrashi in broad daylight in the middle of Cairo. Bana realized he had lost control of the group's paramilitary wing and declared this act of assassination had been carried out by neither brothers nor Muslims.³⁷ To no avail. Bana was killed by government agents 12 February 1949. The Egyptian government dealt harshly with the Brotherhood in the aftermaths of the Noqrashi assassination. Large numbers were arrested and incarcerated. By 1949, 4,000 members were in detention. Egyptian security forces were effective in capitalizing in the absence of Bana's leadership and moved quickly to dismantle the infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Arab regimes walked a thin line balancing religion and government. A court of law later exonerated the Brotherhood of the charge of plotting to overthrow the monarchy and with the new Egyptian government of the Wafd Party, the government looked for a compromise. The Brotherhood was permitted to return to activity under very limited conditions. What an unusual, yet symbiotic relationship. Needless to say, their involvement in political activities was completely forbidden.³⁸

THE RIGHT TO REVOLT: SAYYID QUTB.

“Every young man took the hand of a young woman. And these were the young men and women who had just been singing their hymns! Red and Blue lights with only a few white lamps, illuminated the dance floor. The room became a confusion of feet and legs: arms twisted around hips; lips met lips; chests pressed together.”

—Sayyid Qutb ³⁹

As the United States and the west struggle to come to grips with the war on terror, we inevitably turn toward Usama Bin Laden and his network of terror for clues that will help explain the who and why. Moreover, as we search for useful insights into what shaped UBL, it is likely the answers will not be found in the mountains of Afghanistan or in the rampant materialism and degradation of Saudi Arabia of the 70's, but instead in the writings of Egyptian fundamentalist scholar, Sayyid Qutb.

Qutb was born in Upper Egypt in 1906.⁴⁰ Throughout the 1930's and 40's he was a literary man about town. Employed by the Egyptian ministry of education, he haunted the cafes and schools of the intellectual circles in Cairo. This shadowy life brought him into contact with the Muslim Brotherhood. While on a study program abroad to the U.S., Qutb unabashedly decided the west, led by the Americans, was a shocking mixture of materialism, lust and egotistical individualism. He knew he hated it. In the early 1950's he returned to Egypt and joined the Brotherhood. In 1954 he and many of his Muslim brothers were rounded up by Nasser's regime. He spent 10 years in prison. Though the conditions were harsh, Qutb was permitted to continue writing. He was released in 1964 and arrested again in 1965 after the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser. During his investigation by the police, Qutb was asked; “Don't you think that the establishment of a Muslim underground can bring about a civil war and bring down such a dreadful holocaust that Islam itself would be destroyed?” Qutb did not hesitate, “Its definitely possible that we will encounter such a civil war,” he replied, “but the blame will then fall on whoever forbids the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and pushes them underground. My obligation is to uphold the commands of our faith.”⁴¹ Based upon the many writings from his years in prison, Qutb was sentenced to death. In 1966 he was executed for crimes against the state, despite protests and requests for amnesty on behalf of Arab leaders and intellectuals from around the world. He left behind his many works, novels, contemplations and criticisms of the Koran and most notably his most popular book Signposts Along the Way.⁴² His message became more extreme toward the end:

violent and uncompromising. Qutb could no longer fulfill his own satisfaction in academic endeavor, preaching or community activity on behalf of the Islamic revolution. He could no longer be patient for the gradual achievements and mass support that would eventually bring about change. The revolution must be executed from the top down; by capturing the regime and forcing Shari'a into society. To Qutb, it became clear: it was necessary to struggle (jihad) against a secular government in every way possible.

Qutb began by dividing the world in two parts: the sacred (a perfect Islamic state) and the profane (the non-Islamic world). Ultimately, Qutb rejected democracy and nationalism as western ideas incompatible with Islam. Even pan-Arabism, which was extremely popular in the Arab world at the time, was viewed as an obstacle toward establishing the Islamic state. Qutb attacked the world economic system as well, attempting to prove to the Muslim Umma that the options were not black and white, capitalist or communist, but that Islam was an economic option as well. Furthermore, he espoused the notion that religion was not necessarily an 'opiate of the masses' but also potentially a force of liberation. Qutb believed that religion was a concrete social entity, the embodiment of political and economic structure.

Some would argue that Qutb was above all a realistic political theorist. He felt that the detriment of western religion was the separation of church and state and as such could not share a comprehensive vision-- he feared this trend was beginning to prevail in modern Egypt. Qutb spent time studying the historical development of both Judaism and Christianity, showing that the 'hideous schizophrenia' -- that separation of church and state - had been a corrupt byproduct of western civilization. He maintained Islam was a universal ideology and philosophy of life that accepted no separation of politics and religion: "This hideous schizophrenia took place under lamentable circumstances, leaving its destructive traces in a [reformed] Europe, and from there to the whole world wherever western views, institutions and ways of life have conquered other human societies."⁴³

Perhaps even more important in Qutb's thought was that he was the first Sunni Muslim to find a way around the ancient prohibition against overthrowing a Muslim ruler. Qutb said the Muslim rulers of the world were no longer Muslims, and in doing so he basically declared them infidels. The infiltration of western ideals, or jahaliyya, was perceived as a huge threat to Islam. According to Qutb, the Umma, the Islamic constituency, could not exist if there was oppression. Qutb began to strategize about how to realize his vision. He internalized the struggle by targeting other Muslims as a means to coerce change. Bin Laden and al Qaeda change tactics from Qutb's approach, they externalize the jihad by targeting western states and interests. On the other hand, Qutb chose realistic and pragmatic tactics to bring about change. He targeted

moderate Muslims rather than the whole of the western world. Qutb looked for ways to find a “new mentality whose task will not simply be to evaluate the existing state of things, but rather to produce a new state.”⁴⁴ He further articulated that his “foremost objective [was] to bring about a revolution in the practical system of society. The jahaliyya order [Egyptian government in this context] has to be exterminated root and branch.”⁴⁵

What is most important to Qutb though, is that the Muslim Brotherhood continued to be an organization that will engage in an active struggle against the Jahilil. He felt strongly that the true believers in Islam embraced the opportunity to overcome personal ambitions and instead to participate in jihad and if need be, to even die for its cause. “Those who perceive themselves to be Muslim but do not struggle against the different types of oppression, and who do not defend the rights of the oppressed and who do not cry out in the face of the dictators are either wrong or hypocrites or ignorant of the rules of Islam.”⁴⁶

Sayyid Qutb thus articulated a new and much different view of society for modern Muslims dissatisfied with their conditions. In order to fight against an unjust government, Qutb provided an ideological framework by which Muslims could use the principles of Islam rather than those of western institutions like capitalism, socialism, democracy, etc. As much as Qutb despised the west, his was an internal struggle. It was Muslim on Muslim, a jihad that attempted to put his house in order rather than to attack the west. His was a root cause argument. He failed, but in short order the Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and others would take the war to the west.

REVIVAL AND REFORM TO RESURGENCE AND RELEVANCY

“...Kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an individual duty on every Muslim who can do so in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Saudi Arabia] from their grip, and in order that their enemies move out of all the land of Islam defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim in compliance with the words of almighty God ‘fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together’”

—Sheik Usama Bin Laden (UBL), Feb 1998 ⁴⁷

“The biggest threat to U.S. national security is the Muslim extremist network of Usama Bin Laden. His organization is continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame and retaliation.”

—George J. Tenet, Feb 2001 ⁴⁸

When extremist Islamic leaders such as Bin Laden, Al Zacahiri and others issue proclamations to 'kill Americans, civilian and military wherever they may find them', all of a sudden, what had been judged as an Islamic resurgence takes on new relevancy.⁴⁹

Transnational actors like Bin Laden use 'fatwas' or declarations as instruments of foreign policy to justify their holy war against Americans and her allies. According to the Islamic science called "usal al-fiqh" (principles of jurisprudence) a fatwa is a binding agreement between Islamic leaders and their Umma.⁵⁰

Mr. George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, warns that Bin Laden (UBL) and the Muslim extremist network is the biggest threat to U.S. national interests and security. Although UBL has not been indicted for any crimes yet, the U.S. government believes he has financed, and likely encouraged, some of the most devastating terrorist attacks in recent years. Those include:

- World Trade Center bombing, Feb 26th 1993. Six people died and more than 1,000 were injured. Until then there had not been a major terrorist attack on American soil.

- Riyadh bombing, Saudi Arabia, Nov 13th 1995. A car bomb exploded outside a Saudi National Guard facility in the middle of Riyadh. Five Americans were killed and 34 injured. Two groups claimed responsibility saying 'if Americans don't leave the Kingdom as soon as possible we will continue our action!'

- Dhahran, Al Khobar bombing, June 25th 1996. A large explosion ripped through a U.S. Air Force housing complex killing 19 and injuring at least 300 others. Saudi officials were quoted as saying that was a terrorist act directed at the foreign presence in the Kingdom.

- U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Aug 7th 1998. These coordinated attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 200 people and injuries to more than 4,000 people. The U.S. filed criminal complaints against UBL and his al-Qaeda network.

- USS Cole bombing in Yemen, Oct 12th 2000. Two men sidled up to a \$1 billion destroyer in Aden harbor with a rubber dinghy and without warning detonated an explosive device killing 17 sailors.

- The events of 9/11, Sep 11th 2001. In a complex, coordinated attack against America, four commercial jet liners were hijacked from U.S. airports on the eastern seaboard and flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon in Washington DC and one plane crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside. Deaths to innocent civilians remain unaccounted for at the time of this writing but will exceed thousands.

Aside from those described above, UBL and his network are suspected to have some involvement in the following acts:

-December 1992 hotel bombings in Yemen that targeted U.S. servicemen on their way to Somalia as part of a UN peacekeeping force.

-Assassination attempt in 1993 of Jordan's Crown Prince Abdullah.

-Assassination attempt in 1995 of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Sudan.

-Bombing of Egypt's Embassy in Pakistan in 1996 that killed 17 people.

UBL has issued as many as four fatwas condemning the U.S. since 1994. The real question needing to be asked is, are these a by-product of the current al Qaeda campaign; is the U.S. or Israel the primary target or merely a means to an end; or rather is the primary target the corrupt Arab monarchies? John Miller of ABC television interviewed UBL May 26th 1998 from his hideout in the mountains of Afghanistan. UBL's message to the American people was to leave Saudi Arabia or die. In his Fatwa of April 1998, Bin Laden says "Allah is the one who created us and blessed us with this religion, and orders us to carry out the holy struggle of jihad to save the word of Allah above the words of the unbelievers."⁵¹ He makes it clear that the actions of all Muslims are justified by Allah. He stirs a sense of duty among Muslims. "Allah ordered us [those who live in the region] to purify the Muslim land of all non-believers, and especially on the Arabian Peninsula We believe that the biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans... we do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa."⁵² The United States and its ties to Israel, its Crusader roots, and its Pax Americana becomes a likely antagonist, one in which UBL attempts to mobilize the Ulemma against, as a tool in support of his primary interest, that of establishing an Islamic state grafted from the dogma of the venerable forefathers, Taymiyya, Wahab, Bana and Qutb.

Samuel Huntington in his book "The Clash of Civilizations" claims Islam is "consciousness without cohesion."⁵³ Presently, the conditions in the Middle East are lacking leadership capable of unifying the Muslim world. Political loyalty amongst Muslims has differed greatly from that of western thought and practice. In the west, the nation state has been the apex of loyalty and served as a unifying catalyst. For the Muslim, ever since the time when Mohammed was exiled from Mecca, it has been the "family, the clan, the tribe and the unities of culture, religion and empire on an ever larger scale."⁵⁴ UBL and the others before him are but manifestations of a complex and obviously durable sociopolitical phenomenon. This phenomenon involves the exploitation of Islam as a political weapon. The west took advantage of this as well; they used it to fight fascism and communism throughout the 20th Century and this

is why so much of the Muslim world came to be dominated by corrupt, stagnant, undemocratic but stable pro-western governments and the traditional forces of political Islam.

The Muslim regimes exploited the Muslim peoples as well. Saudi Arabia for example financed (with petro-dollars) thousands of religious schools (madrassas) from Pakistan to Egypt and the world over; schools that taught only isolationism, backwardness and which breed hostility. The Arab elites have abused their power and have politicized Islam as a means of keeping it. In the post cold war decade, and while the whole world is gearing up to join in the march toward globalization, democracy, liberty and human rights, the Muslim world looks like a war zone. Political oppression, socioeconomic despair and cultural stagnation rooted in a return to the dark ages, create an ideological void that extremists are more willing and better prepared to fill than are the totalitarian regimes governing most of the Muslim world.

Dub it Wahabbism, call it primitive Islam or Salafiyya, Bin Laden's is a hybrid and simple form of fundamentalism. It seeks to eradicate all forms of Islam other than its own strict literal interpretation of the Koran. According to the Fatwas, it came packaged with a well known set of political grievances. More often than not these are directed at the U.S., but that's not the issue. It justifies violence as a means of purging Islamic nations of secularism and corruption that has brought about a moral and spiritual degradation. It is taught in a proliferation of madrassas and preached in mosques across the Middle East and the world. What Islam needs is its own reformation, not a resurgence.

As the Islamic resurgence gathers momentum, one's credentials as a true Muslim are increasingly predicated upon one's willingness to use violence and, in extreme cases, to die for the cause. The culture of jihad is spreading between the more moderate and especially the younger Muslims. "Part of the appeal of Bin Laden is that he can look people in the eye and say: 'I know you live in a police state, I know you're living in poverty, and the reason for it is clear: Satan is doing this to you. So come join my holy war.'" ⁵⁵ Although steeped in the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, UBL seems to have departed from the Qutb doctrine by asking all Muslims to put aside their differences while focusing together on expelling the western enemy from Muslim doorsteps. "But that may be merely a shift in tactics, not in over all strategy. 'Bin Laden is using the U.S. as an instrument in his struggle with other Muslims', he wants the U.S. to strike back disproportionately, because he believes that will outrage Muslims and inspire them to overthrow their governments and build an Islamic state." ⁵⁶

THE BATTLE AHEAD

“Would to heaven we had a navy to reform those enemies to mankind, or crush them into non-existence”

—George Washington lamenting over the Barbary Pirates, 1786

“It’ll be over in three to four weeks”

—Leonid Brezhnev, winter 1979 ⁵⁷

Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, said “The United States of America represents something so important to the world – our free way of life. If you care about human beings, you have to care that the U.S. model, which benefits not just the people in our country but across the globe, succeeds. If you value that you have to be willing to defend that way of life.” ⁵⁸ The United States of America is at war. President George W. Bush said so. The enemy is exactly as the analysts and pundits alike have predicted; transnational and asymmetric. Its ideology is a religion, and its religion is a political ideology. Its very culture clashes with western civilization in more ways than not. Its soldiers don’t care about living, but thirst for martyrdom. Its weapons are suicide bombers and its leadership so decentralized it is seemingly impossible to identify and disrupt. They are operationally adept and as tactically proficient as anyone. The use of surrogates confuses the trail of terror that characterizes their grand strategy. The failure of moderate Islam States to create governments responsive to the needs of their people has created an expanding pool of potential recruits.

How are we going to win this war? How are we going to deal with an irrational, vengeful and elusive global enemy embedded in unknown numbers at home and abroad; an enemy with an array of modern and mobile weapons; an enemy who distorts a religion to suggest God permits a massacre of the innocents and suicide is a passport to heaven? This enemy destroyed the basic elements of America’s strategic defense, which years of major power confrontation and cold war could not touch. These elements are early warning, preventive strike and deterrence. Surprise attacks are terrorists’ modus operandi and have put every American on constant alert, whether emotionally or practically. It is very difficult to launch pre-emptive strikes against an enemy we cannot find. The principle of deterrence is based upon the premise that there are two sides fighting who seek to survive and to defend their own interests. How can such a people who strive for death *more than anything else*, be deterred?

Ralph Peters in his book "Fighting For The Future", proposes a hard-line military solution to fighting the war against terror organizations.⁵⁹ He argues that America must not be afraid to be powerful. We must speak bluntly and clearly and maintain our resolve. Peters proposes that when in doubt, hit harder against the terror networks than necessary. Force begets force. Kill terrorists on the spot, never flinch and successes will be forgiven. Turn the tables on terrorist organizations. Do not allow terrorists sanctuary in any country. Instead, do everything possible to make terrorists and their supporters live in fear themselves; that is, provided their concept of fear coincides with a western definition of fear. The criticism of this fatalistic approach will accuse the U.S. of fighting terror with terror, thus legitimizing its use. Undoubtedly there will be a double standard to be applied with regard to U.S. policy. If we must play by the rules established by the terrorists, then so be it.

From a philosophical perspective, the military and law and order approach to solving the battle ahead is probably not feasible and it is definitely not *realpolitik*. The U.S. is entering a type of warfare we have never faced before. The enemies loyalties do not lie with a specific Nation-State, but with an ideology. An ideology, at least in its moderate terms is embraced by a whole region of the world; in its extreme form, an ideology committed to the destruction of all nations that threaten it or to peoples who fail to adopt its premise. This is not a war the U.S. can project power against alone. We will need a coalition. We will need the moderate constituency of Muslims to help defeat the extreme followers of the faith.

The Islamic extremists would like to see the start of the "Clash of Civilizations" as predicted by Samuel Huntington. The U.S. can ill-afford to declare war against all Muslim Extremist groups and succeed unilaterally. This would very likely polarize the west against the Islamic world. It is not in the interest of the United States to view this 'battle ahead' as a clash of civilizations. To do so would draw the moderate Muslims from the sidelines into the camp of the extremists. Keep in mind the extremist is a very small minority, albeit with a powerful psychological message. It is that message we need to defeat. Additionally there are 6 million Muslims and 3 million Arabs living in the U.S. The perpetration of a clash of civilizations could do irreparable damage to the political and civil liberties of our way of life.

Islamic extremists have been at pointing out the weaknesses and problems afflicting current Islamic societies but they have yet to propose the details of solutions that will finally create an identity and society that fits into the modern world. So what we can expect is the extremists like Bin Laden and the al Qaeda to continue to cause conflict with the west and attempt to create a larger gulf between east and west, but it is not likely that they will be able to implement a challenge that is able to constitute a successful alternative order.

It is clear that America is detested by a number of countries and people for what it is: a successful and dynamic modern society. This has created envy among the dispossessed and those who ideologically see America as antithetical to their own values or aspirations. President Bush told a United Nations conference on global development in Monterrey, Mexico that Americans have an obligation to "share our wealth" with less fortunate nations⁶⁰. Nations are poor for at least three reasons: They have the wrong governmental system, which does not allow for their citizens to choose their leaders, thus making them responsible to their constituency for their actions; they have the wrong economic system, which stifles free enterprise; and /or they have the wrong religious system which fails to provide them a loving God and hence gives them purpose to their lives. These symptoms are nowhere more prevalent than in the Middle East.

Policy-wise the United States will need to make some serious adjustments all around the Middle East. Engagement in the region is more important than ever. While it is true the Islamic extremists hate America for what it stands for, the moderate Arab world takes exception to America for what it does. The root cause arguments: the failure of moderate Islamic states to create modern governments responsive to the needs of their people; and the fundamentally unrepresentative and corrupt economies that have failed to provide a vision of progress that competes with the dark forces of Islamic regression, manifesting itself in acts of extremist violence. These root causes have inadvertently helped create the terror networks we are battling today. Support provided by Islamic states for terror networks endorse violence, so long as it is directed at others. Terror training camps and madrassas throughout the region are the fruits of this labor. The United States has tolerated these regional dynamics for too many years.

This war on terror will need to be fought and won from within the Islamic world. Where are the Islamic counterparts to those extremist ideologues? There must be Muslim thinkers, clerics and intellectuals who are immersed in their faith, sensitive to the frustrations and resentments of the Muslim world, and yet appreciative of western liberties not as a threat to Islam, but as a means of reaffirming their faith and determining full religious integrity. What can be done to encourage a network of Muslim thinkers without compromising them? The U.S. must ask the question: Where are the ranks of moderate Muslims who have attitudes toward the west and towards democracy that allow for its integration, and providing Islamic law a dominant role in Muslim societies? Governments and leaders in the region must counter this breed of extremist, anti-western / anti-liberal theorists or ideologues of militant movements.

U.S. policy must be clearer. The U.S will need to decide on how it will help solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem, and how it will solve the Iraq conundrum, without continuing to be

fodder for the extremists in their informational war against the U.S. Even harder policy questions for the U.S. require defining our interest in occupying land in the region. Military bases in Saudi Arabia and throughout the region are a bone of contention and a huge grievance that has very little support by any Muslim. What will an absence of bases do to our power-projection base? To our force structure? America will need to better articulate that she will never abandon Israel. Yet how will we assure the Arabs of our loyalty and commitment to their stability?

The U.S. will need to come up with new and innovative ways to help its friends in the region move forward and make the reforms that are required to alleviate the grass roots issues of government, economics and religion.

These are Grand Strategy considerations in the battle ahead. The U.S. will need to bring all instruments of power to bear on the issue of security in the region. There-in lies the solutions to America's victory in her war against terror. We can win this war, but not alone. The columnist and editorialist George Will sums it up best: "Sept 11 forcefully reminded Americans that their nation-state – not NATO, and not the United Nations – is their source of security. And they relish the clarity of the Bush doctrine, which is that nation states have the great utility of locating responsibility: national regimes are responsible for terrorism that issues from our sphere of control.⁶¹" This includes our friends and allies in the Middle East as well. We shall see who is held to that accountability, but first a comprehensive grand strategy must be formulated, articulated and implemented. The world awaits.

WORD COUNT = 9,599

ENDNOTES

¹ Translated from Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani's biography of Ibn Taymiyya in ["The Hidden Pearls Concerning Famous People of the Eight Century, ah, Islamic]. Hyderabad: Daa-irat al-ma aarif al uthmaaisiyya, 1384H, vol. 1: p. 148.

² Sufism is to a great degree inherent in Islamic philosophy. Sufism is the school of thought that actualizes divine ethics. It involves an enlightened inner being, not intellectual proof; revelation and witnessing, not logic. Devine ethics transcend mere social convention; a way of being which is the actualization of the attributes of God.

³ Islamic Juristic literature has generated two major literary genres: 1) the roots of jurisprudence and 2) the branches of jurisprudence. In the course of the 9th and 10th Centuries AD, the Islamic communities became committed to a pattern of juristic loyalties whereby in the end all Muslims identified themselves with particular schools of the law. With in the Sunni tradition there are four dominant schools: 1) Maliki 2) Hannafi 3) Shafi'I and 4) Hanbali. Taymiyya was a Hanbali scholar and had earned the title of Sheik, meaning he was a learned man of the book (Koran). A Sheik is able to issue religious proclamations otherwise known as 'fatwas' and the Islamic community must consider them seriously. Ussama Bin Laden claims the title of Sheik as well. This is neither readily accepted by the Ulema, the religious leaders in Islam who are professionally occupied with the elaboration and interpretation of the Muslim legal system from a study of its sources in the Koran and the hadith, nor the Umma, which is the community of Muslims.

⁴ S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman, eds., "Sunni Kalam and Theological Controversies by J. Pavlin" , in History of Islamic Philosophy, (London: Routledge , 1996), Ch 7, p.105.

⁵ Ibid., 106.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jihad has several meanings and insinuations under the Koran. The most popular is 'a struggle.' The extremists use it to mean war. In this instance Taymiyya uses it to refer to Paganism.

⁸ A.A.M. Qasim and M.A.A. Qasim, eds., "Ibn Taymiyya (ad1263-1328) Concerning the Matter of Intellect and the Soul", in Majmu Fatawa Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyya, volume 9, (Riyahd: Matba'ah al Hukama, 1996), This is a short essay in which Taymiyya summarizes his views on the relationship between intellect and the soul.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibn al Arabi was born in Southeastern Spain in AD1165. In addition to being a mystic he was also a theologian. At midlife he began wandering east espousing his mystic view of Islam. He lived at a time when Sufism was at loggerhead with legalitarian Islam embodied by the leaders of the law known as Fuqaha. Ibn al Arabi is the leader and founder of the Sufism movement Ibn Taymiyya opposed.

¹¹ Nasr and Leaman, p.111.

¹² Ibid, p.113.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.114.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.115.

¹⁶ James Pavlin, "Ibn Taymiyya, Taqi al Din (1263-1328)." Available from <<http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/rep/h039.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 15 Dec 2001

¹⁷ Alexander Ignatenko, "Ordinary Wahabism, Part 2," Russian Journal, December 4, 2001. Available at <<http://english.russ.ru/politics/20011117.html>>, Internet. Accessed 27 December 2001, p.1 of 6.

¹⁸ Salafiyya comes from the term Salaf al Salihoon and means the venerable forefathers. Its reference is to the original pious Muslims of the 7th and 8th Centuries. Salafiyya is a movement that suggests a return to those roots.

¹⁹ Britannica Online, "Wahab, Muhammad ibn Abd al". Available at <<http://www.eb.com:180/cgi-bin/g?DocF=micro/628151.html/>>. Internet. Accessed 27 December 2001.

²⁰ Ironically, in "The Book on Monotheism" by Wahab and as well in contemporary English translations (see F.W. Fawzan, "The Book of Monotheism", Makhachkala, Badr, 1997) Wahab never really defines monotheism, but defines what is polytheism.

²¹ Ignatenko, p.1.

²² Ibid, p.1.

²³ Ibid, p.2.

²⁴ Ben Baz, "The Necessity of Obeying the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah and Declaring those Who Repudiate it Infidels." (Riyadh: Waqaf Ministry's General Print Board, 2000), p.17.

²⁵ Ibid, p.29.

²⁶ Ignatenko, p.3.

²⁷ Baz, p.39.

²⁸ Ibid., p.48.

²⁹ Ironically, The fundamental views of Islam, stepped in the Koran and its Hadiths, are quite clear about God being the only entity who can judge man, but here in the case of hate being a religious requirement, a visible manifestation of this emotion is a precondition in order to be judged acceptable as a monotheist by Wahabiyya - who incidentally have worked their way around this dogma in the religion.

³⁰ Robert Wuthnow, ed., "Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion", 2 vols. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly INC., 1998), p.425.

³¹ Ibid, p.426.

³² "Politics in God's Name", Al Ahram Weekly, Issue no. 247, 16-22 November, 1995. Available at <<http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/archives/parties/muslimb/polgod.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 3 January 2002, p.1 of 5.

³³ Ibid, p. 2 of 5.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 2 of 5.

³⁵ The Brotherhood is led by a supreme guide, assisted by a general guidance committee, the executive body responsible for formulating policies and running the groups activities. There is also a constituent assembly called the Shura Council.

³⁶ Amit Cohen and Ron Leshem, "Islamic Terror: The Muslim Brotherhood", Yediot Ahronot, September 28, 2001 (translated by Jonathan Silverman), available from <http://www.jdl.org.enemies/islam/muslim_brotherhood.html>. Internet; accessed 7 January 2002.

³⁷ Muslims don't fight Muslims and in general do not overthrow Muslim governments. The extremists did not follow that doctrine. Bana needed to overcome this obstacle if he were to change from within the Islamic civilization. At this point in his revolution there was an ideological bridge down: moderate Muslims would not be sympathetic to Muslims assassinating Muslims. Sayyid Qutb would eventually bridge this gap.

³⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood, banned from forming a political party in Egypt, had acted as a force advocating Islam as a solution to the continuous problems and in fact provided cradle to grave, so to speak, social programs for the community that the government could not provide. Since the 1970's the organization has dropped violence as a means to an end. However, splinter groups from the 1950s not agreeing with the Brotherhood's direction have pronounced to take up the sword and Jihad, continuing the use of violence as was the case prior to its dismemberment in the 1950s. As of note: among those splintering from the Brotherhood include; Hamas, Gamma al Islamiyya, and the Islamic Jihad. The latter two are believed to have merged with Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network.

³⁹ Robert Worth, "The Deep Intellectual Roots of Islamic Terror", New York Times, 13 October 2001, available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/13/arts/13ROOT.html>>. Internet; accessed 14 October 2001, p. 2 of 3.

⁴⁰ Ibrahim Abu Rabi, "Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World" (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), p.2.

⁴¹ Leshem and Cohen, p.7 of 13.

⁴² "Signposts on the Road", was published in 1964 and is Qutb's signature work. Its Arabic translation is 'Ma aalim fil-Tareeq'. It is often quoted by researchers but I am unable to find an English translation. Therefore I rely on the translations of others.

⁴³ Ibrahim Abu Rabi, "Sayyid Qutb: From Religious Realism to Radical Social Criticism", Islamic Quarterly (1984, vol 28), p.115.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.109.

⁴⁵ Robert Lee, "Overcoming Tradition and Modernity" (Colorado: Harper Press, 1987), p.89.

⁴⁶ Rabi, p.113.

⁴⁷ Ussama Bin Laden, "Fatwa: Kill Americans Everywhere", London, Al-Quds al-Arabi, 23 February 1998, available from <<http://www.emergency.com/bladen98.htm>>. Internet; accessed 27 November 2001.

⁴⁸ Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of the central Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World", 7 February 2001, available at <<http://www.cia.gov/cia.public-affairs>>. Accessed 27 November 2001.

⁴⁹ The Fatwa was contained in a statement faxed to Al Quds al Arabi Newspaper in London, and signed by Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Amir of the jihad group in Egypt, Abu Yassir Rifai, Ahmed Taha, leader of the [Egyptian] Islamic Group, Sheik Mir Hamza, Secretary of the Jamiat al Ulema e Pakistan, and Fazul Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.

⁵⁰ A Fatwa becomes binding to the Muslim constituency (Umma) when these four conditions are satisfied: 1) It is in line with relevant legal proofs deduced from Koranic verses and Hadiths, 2) It is issued by a person or group having due knowledge and sincerity of heart, 3) It is free from individual opportunism and not depending on political servitude, and 4) It is adequate with the needs of the contemporary world. It must be issued by a Sheikh....like Bin Laden.

⁵¹ Jeremy Zakin, "Usamma Bin Laden" ERRI Terrorist Group Profile, ERRI Risk Assessment Services, 30 June 1998, Available at <<http://www.emergency.com/bldn0798.htm>>. Internet; accessed 2 January 2002, p.4 of 7.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order"(Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 174.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Worth, p. 2 of 3.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 3 of 3.

⁵⁷ Leonid Brazened announcing his deployment of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan in the winter 1979.

⁵⁸ Donald Rusted interview with "Parade" magazine, published 18 November 2001.

⁵⁹ Ralph Peters, *Fighting For The Future: Will America Triumph?*, Stackpole Books, 1999.

⁶⁰ President Bush addressed the UN Conference on Global Development in Monterrey, Mexico the week of march 19-22 March 2002. In his remarks he obligates US support to developing and failing states by pledging more aid and relieving debt.

⁶¹ George Will writing for the Washington Post Writers Group. This article was nationally syndicated and published as an editorial in the Harrisburg Patriot – News, Dec 3, 2001.

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