

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND CONFLICT:
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, transnational threats were revisited with a new urgency. The terrorist attacks on America's economic and military centers of power awakened the nation to the dangers posed by asymmetric and non-traditional threats. Transnational organized crime, in particular, is now recognized as one of the most dangerous and pervasive threats to national and international security. Profits from drug trafficking, smuggling, and other illegal activities fuel terrorism, violent conflict, and corruption around the world. Moreover, transnational crime is undermining military assistance programs, and peace operations in several regions. Law enforcement agencies have the lead role in combating organized crime, but current trends demand a close examination of how transnational crime is changing the national and international security environments and the strategic implications for the military. The growth of transnational criminal activity cannot be ignored and a greater support role by the military is vital and necessary. This paper will examine the nature of transnational organized crime, the principal criminal activities that contribute to violence and armed conflict; the impact of transnational crime on nation assistance programs and peace operations; and the strategic implications for the military.

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TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND CONFLICT: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Changes in the international security environment often defy prediction and occur faster than most policymakers and security analysts can anticipate. Less than a decade ago, rising states with large conventional armies and arsenals were considered the major threats to regional and global stability. However, the September 11th terrorist attacks on America's economic and military centers of power awakened the nation to the dangers posed by asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The ability of non-state actors to wreak havoc and destruction on par with nation-states has created asymmetric challenges for which few nations are prepared. Transnational organized crime, in particular, is now recognized as one of the most dangerous and pervasive threats to national and international security.

The end of the Cold War and the dynamics of globalization have precipitated a dramatic increase in transnational organized crime and criminal activity. Some of this increase is due to the large number of stateless actors (terrorists, insurgents, warring factions, militias, gangs, etc.) who have turned to transnational organized crime to fund terrorism, armed conflict, corruption, and many other forms of violence and crime. Transnational criminals are not only the principal enablers in many of the world's conflicts, but they are quickly becoming the principal catalysts as well. This is not to suggest that the economic incentive to engage in transnational crime is any less than that found in traditional organized crime groups, but self-enrichment is a secondary aim in groups motivated by ideology. Conversely, the political and ideological fervor that sparks many conflicts is often displaced over time by the incentive to acquire or retain the wealth and power derived from transnational crime. In fact, those who profit from transnational crime will frequently prolong conflict and undermine any efforts to establish peace and the rule of law.

The growing nexus between organized crime and conflict has made it difficult for traditional nation-states to make clear distinctions about where law enforcement actions end and military operations begin. Law enforcement agencies have the lead role in combating organized crime, but current trends demand a close examination of how transnational organized crime is changing the domestic and international security environments and the strategic implications for the U.S. military. Since there is a direct correlation between security and transnational criminal operations, the military has a vital interest in supporting law enforcement efforts in combating this non-traditional threat.

Transnational organized crime is a threat to America's national security and undermines regional stability and peace operations in many parts of the world. Terrorism, drug trafficking,

corruption, and the illegal flow of arms, precious stones, and people across international borders are just a few of the many by-products of transnational crime. These and many other illegal activities frequently lead to political upheaval, armed conflict, and economic instability. Moreover, military peace operations and nation assistance programs in several regions are at a standstill or deteriorating because of transnational criminals who deliberately subvert the peace process and oppose the establishment of democratic institutions. Without legitimate and strong institutions to maintain the rule of law, weak democracies and states in post-conflict transition may plunge into lawlessness and renew armed conflict.

The recent growth and effectiveness of global crime networks clearly indicate that law enforcement agencies are no longer resourced or equipped to fight transnational crime alone. Today's nation-states are witnessing a convergence of internal and external threats; therefore, the military and law enforcement agencies must work in tandem to confront foreign and domestic dangers.¹ After all, security and the rule of law are the essential elements of a civilized and safe society.² The military and law enforcement organizations are bound together by the shared purpose of protecting U.S. citizens at home and abroad. This shared sense of purpose must transcend traditional roles and institutional differences. The Bush administration has already tasked the military to provide greater support to law enforcement organizations in the battle against transnational crime. Since September 11th, the armed forces have helped law enforcement officials bring transnational criminals to justice without violating the Posse Comitatus Act and other legal constraints. As the military prepares for new threats in the 21st century, defense planners must reexamine longstanding assumptions and perceptions about the military's support role in the war against transnational organized crime. The military's core mission of fighting the nation's wars should not and will not change with the emergence of asymmetric and non-traditional threats. However, just as the drug war forced the military to expand its support to law enforcement missions, the growth of other transnational crimes such as terrorism may redefine the way the military supports domestic and international law enforcement agencies. The war against terrorism in Afghanistan and the arrest of terrorists linked to al-Qaeda by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia illustrate the point that transnational organized crime is more than just a law enforcement issue.³

This paper will examine the nature of transnational organized crime and five major crimes that contribute to conflict and instability [transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, diamond trafficking and the exploitation of other natural resources, and corruption]. The paper will also address the impact of transnational crime on peace operations and the strategic implications of this growing threat for the military.

The Nature of Transnational Organized Crime:

Transnational organized crime is an unpredictable and complex threat that was propelled to the forefront of national attention in the 1990s. The United States was cognizant of organized crime families and the illegal drug trade for decades, but it was during the post-Cold War era that other transnational crimes, such as terrorism, diamond smuggling, and money laundering captured national and international attention. In October 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42, which identified international organized crime as a major threat to the national security and economy of the United States.⁴ This directive gave transnational crime the same level of attention and visibility as traditional threats. In 1997, U.S. Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) articulated his concern about the new threat during congressional hearings on international crime and terrorism:

“...The Cold war is over. There are no more wars to be fought. A war every bit as intense and every bit as catastrophic for freedom and for the free world is going on, but its character is entirely different now. It isn't SS-18s that we need to be concerned about. It's organized crime on a world-wide basis...”⁵

Transnational crime is seldom the root cause of armed conflict, but it is a major source of revenue for terrorists, warring factions, insurgencies, and underdeveloped states in conflict. Conflict intervention and peace agreements are much more difficult to achieve when opposing forces have the resources to continue fighting.⁶ Likewise, the establishment of democratic institutions through nation assistance programs or peace operations takes longer when organized criminals undermine the rule of law through various forms of corruption and violence.

The difficulty in confronting this threat comes in part with the inability of scholars, law enforcement agencies, and the international community to agree on a common definition of transnational organized crime. There are numerous definitions of organized crime, but one of the simplest and most straightforward is offered by Phil Williams. According to Williams, organized crime is “a continuation of business by criminal means.”⁷ At first glance, this definition may give the impression that organized criminals engage primarily in “white collar” or business related crimes and their activities have little, if any, impact on military operations or international security. Williams' definition is sufficiently general to cover a wide range of criminal behavior, but it does not specifically address the sinister nature of crime and its associated violence and brutality. Alessandro Politi takes the definition further by identifying some of the

principal criminal activities found in several definitions of organized crime: "... the acquisition of profits through crime; the use of force and intimidation; and recourse to corruption in order to maintain impunity."⁸ Within the law enforcement community, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines "an organized crime group or enterprise as a continuing and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy, having an organized structure, fed by fear and corruption, and motivated by greed."⁹ When viewed in the context of international security, transnational organized crime goes beyond the borders of one nation and can be broadly defined as: organized criminal operations in which violence or the threat of violence and corruption are used as the principal tools to acquire power or protect illicit transnational operations and enterprises. Although this definition does not resolve the debate over how transnational organized crime should be defined, it does reflect the proclivity of organized criminals to use coercion and corruption in achieving their political and economic aims.

What is missing from the definitions is a discussion about the many powerful forces that influence organized crime. An exhaustive analysis of these forces is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the rapid growth of transnational crime, its adaptable nature, the disparate motives of criminal elements, and the absence of a comprehensive international criminal code are the core conditions and variables that make transnational crime an amorphous and complex threat.

Core Conditions and Variables:

First and foremost, transnational organized crime has grown at an unprecedented rate in the last decade. While there are numerous factors responsible for this trend, the rise in transnational crime is due largely to the removal of physical, political, social, and economic barriers that were present during the Cold War. International trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and multilateral agreements in Europe and Asia have opened borders and trade around the world. International trade in the U.S. alone is twice the volume of what it was in 1994, and if current trends continue, it will double again by 2005.¹⁰ Consequently, as world trade increased and international border controls decreased, there was a significant, if not exponential, increase in the illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, women, children, diamonds, minerals, and other commodities.¹¹ Furthermore, advances in telecommunications, information technology, and international finance have facilitated the movement of information and capital across international borders. While the impact of globalization on poor states remains a subject of vigorous debate, there is little disagreement about the way transnational criminals have prospered in the new global economy. Today's

transnational criminals can operate in multiple jurisdictions without fear of prosecution and move millions of dollars to safe havens around the world.

Second, the dynamic and adaptable nature of transnational crime makes it a difficult phenomenon to comprehend and combat effectively. Unlike a conventional ground force bound by the terrain, transnational criminals adapt quickly to changes in the environment. If excessive pressure is put on a criminal enterprise, the organization will often find ways to eliminate the source of the pressure or circumvent it. In addition, Van Duyne contends that criminals are market oriented and respond to the changing demands for illegal goods, services, and capital.¹² If the demand for illicit goods changes, criminals will establish new markets and schemes to satisfy the new demands. Van Duyne's point is particularly applicable to criminal enterprises that are driven by profit or greed. This capitalistic feature makes criminal enterprises unpredictable because they are constantly shifting in size, character, and intensity in response to market forces. The ever-changing nature of criminal organizations further complicates the development of effective law enforcement and security strategies.

Motivation is another powerful influence that shapes the character of transnational criminal organizations. Since motivation varies by individual and group, the goals, strategies, and patterns of criminal behavior are virtually limitless. For instance, traditional crime syndicates operate primarily for economic reasons (i.e., the vast wealth derived from organized criminal activity), but many transnational terrorist groups are driven by political, ethnic, or religious ideology. For these latter groups, transnational crime is simply a tool to fund their terrorist operations and pursue their political goals. Traditional syndicates use violence to advance or protect their criminal enterprises, but there is seldom a desire to destroy government institutions. On the other hand, transnational terrorists are often committed to political goals, which call for the collapse or destruction of a domestic or foreign government. Revenue from transnational crime enables these groups to sustain terrorist or insurgency operations for months or years.

Beyond the growth, adaptable nature, and varying motivations of criminal enterprises, it is difficult to find consensus in the international community on what activities should be treated as a crime. Disagreements over international sanctions and differences in national civil codes, especially between modern and developing states, further complicate the use of traditional criminal justice approaches to transnational crime. For example, transnational terrorism is often treated as a separate threat to national security because terrorist acts may be viewed as a crime, an act of war, or a justified use of force by a "freedom fighter". During a general debate at the United Nations in November 2001, delegations from several countries underscored the

need for the international community to differentiate between terrorism and the legitimate use of force to pursue self-determination or fight foreign occupation.¹³ When considered in the broad context of criminal activity, transnational terrorist acts are a violation of domestic or international laws, but they may or may not be viewed as a war crime based on the laws and perspectives of the perpetrators, victims, and international community. In the United States, terrorism in any form is considered a crime. Ambassador Sheehan was adamant about this point during testimony before a House Judiciary Subcommittee:

"TERRORISM IS A CRIME Mr. Chairman, in looking at the broad picture of narcotics, terrorism, and international crime, we should start with the basic fact that terrorism itself is a crime, not a political statement. Hijacking aircraft, kidnapping innocent people, and bombing buses, buildings or ships are all forms of a crime, which must be viewed separately from the so-called "cause" that prompts some people to commit this crime."¹⁴

While speaking to other nations who lost citizens in the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers, Secretary of State Powell echoed Sheehan's position: "...terrorism is a crime against all civilization."¹⁵ This underlying view of terrorism as a criminal act often complicates U.S. strategies and responses to terrorist activity. It's not uncommon for military and law enforcement roles to overlap; this is especially true when it comes to the pursuit of terrorist overseas. Law enforcement agencies usually have the primary responsibility of investigating and apprehending terrorists, but military forces are often employed to deter or respond to attacks by state-sponsored or transnational terrorist groups.

Commonalties Among Organized Criminal Entities:

As discussed above, the many factors that influence transnational crime continuously evolve and often lack clearly definable and measurable qualities. However, despite the vague and ambiguous nature of these forces, organized crime groups do share some important qualities:

-- Organization: Although transnational crime syndicates will vary greatly in size and structure, leadership and subordinate positions are clearly defined in most organizations. In addition, duties, responsibilities, rewards, expectations, and punitive measures are generally understood.¹⁶ A hierarchical structure is common in traditional organized crime groups like the American and Italian Cosa Nostra families. Conversely, horizontally flat and internationally distributed networks have become prevalent in the last decade. Transnational networks are

typically organized in tightly controlled and compartmentalized cells that are responsible for different phases of criminal operations.¹⁷ This structure is very mobile and efficient. Thus, transnational criminals have enhanced their ability to expand global markets and at the same time reduce their vulnerability to law enforcement organizations.

-- Diverse Criminal Operations: Transnational organized criminals seldom engage in just one type of criminal activity. Illegal operations may include, but are not limited to: drug trafficking, fraud, extortion, bribery, counterfeiting, money laundering, kidnapping, corruption, and the smuggling of arms, people, diamonds, minerals, and other commodities and natural resources. Since the fall communism, law enforcement officials have witnessed an alarming convergence of traditional organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.¹⁸ The linkage between terrorism and drug trafficking is not new. The term "narco-terrorism" was coined several years ago to characterize the violence and terror associated with the drug trade in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. What is new is the large number of terrorist groups that have turned to the illicit drug trade and other criminal markets for revenue. Leader and Wiencek report that "almost all the major insurgent/terrorist groups in the world rely on drug-trafficking in some form as a method of fund-raising."¹⁹ In many respects, the differences between transnational terrorists and other organized criminals have become very subtle. Their patterns of operation are almost identical and it is increasingly difficult to find any distinction between the violence perpetrated for political reasons and the terror and intimidation associated with organized crime.

-- Ethnic, Religious, or Family, Ties: Most transnational criminal networks share a common ethnic, religious, cultural, or family background.²⁰ These connections create an environment of loyalty, trust, and security. Recruiting and selection is usually a very meticulous and secretive process to prevent infiltration by law enforcement and rival groups. Periodically, alliances are established between different groups to expand operations, but these relationships are usually superficial and do not expose organizations to substantial risk.²¹

-- Infiltration of Government Institutions and Legitimate Enterprises: In many countries, a sub-culture of criminal networks operate within the basic institutions of government. By supplanting legitimate institutions, transnational criminals are in a better position to undermine law enforcement initiatives, block anti-crime legislation, and create an environment where they can operate with impunity.²² Developed states are not immune from criminal infiltration, but states undergoing major political and economic reforms are much more vulnerable.

Another challenging aspect of transnational crime is the practice by criminal syndicates to maintain both legal and illegal businesses. Illicit enterprises generate far more capital than what they can consume in the underground economy. Therefore, profits from transnational crime are channeled into the global economy at every level through legitimate businesses, front companies, charities, and international banking and investment firms.

-- Alliances with Failed, Weak, and Rogue States: Transnational criminals thrive in states where the rule of law is weak or absent. Many weak states do not have meaningful laws or the resources to combat corruption, money laundering, and other forms of organized crime. In fact, the passing of legislation in states where criminals have a grip on power is often dangerous and difficult to achieve. Throughout the Cold War, weak and fragile governments were able to hold on to power and maintain order because of the economic and military support of the United States or Former Soviet Union (FSU). With the collapse of communism, state sponsorship of democratic and communist regimes declined sharply. The FSU was no longer in an economic position to provide foreign assistance and U.S. foreign aid declined sharply [as a percentage of gross domestic product] during Clinton's two terms in office.²³ Consequently, several nations underwent turbulent political, economic, and social transitions. Political stability and economic growth were fragile and unsustainable in many transitioning societies. Unfortunately, violence and corruption have overtaken stability and the rule of law in many parts of the developing world. Transnational criminals have stepped in and filled the void in weak and failed states such as Somalia and Lebanon. In addition, transnational criminals frequently find refuge in states that sponsor terrorism. The State Department's annual report on global terrorism identified Iran, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism.²⁴ The terrorist groups these countries support and harbor are often linked to major transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and arms smuggling.

-- Advanced Technologies: The commitment to advanced technologies may vary from one organization to the next, but the digital revolution is opening new markets and opportunities for many transnational crime enterprises. Advanced computers, information systems, instant communications, encryption, and counterintelligence systems are driving the rapid movement of information and capital, the accelerated growth of illicit wealth, and the ability of criminals to avoid detection and apprehension. Moreover, advanced information systems have enabled criminal enterprises to adopt many of the business practices of multinational corporations. Like legitimate businesses, some organized crime groups study market trends and statistics and use sophisticated economic models as guides for future decision making.

Transnational Organized Crime and Conflict:

Given the diverse and complex nature of transnational organized crime, it's not surprising that there is a direct correlation between transnational crime, armed conflict, and instability. Regardless of the activity, criminal behavior is the common denominator in a wide range of interrelated activities that may have a direct or indirect impact on regional peace and stability. A brief examination of terrorism, drug trafficking, the illegal flow of diamonds and other natural resources; and corruption will demonstrate the dangers posed by transnational criminals. One or more of these crimes may be the primary cause of conflict, as in the case of terrorism, or provide the revenue and resources to prolong conflict, which is usually the case in illicit drug and diamond trafficking. Corruption works in a more subtle way by undermining the rule of law and the basic institutions of civil society. Moreover, complicity with criminal elements facilitates the establishment of underground institutions that threaten the sovereignty of the state and corrupt the legal structures of society.

Transnational Terrorism and Conflict:

As previously mentioned, transnational terrorism and transnational organized crime are often viewed as separate and distinct threats to national security.²⁵ However, transnational terrorism is just one of the many dimensions of transnational organized crime. After all, terrorism is a crime, and quite often, the only discernable difference between a transnational terrorist network and an organized crime network is motivation. Transnational terrorists are often driven by political, religious, or ethnic ideology and most traditional organized crime groups are motivated by the profits produced from illicit activity. Shelley affirms the two groups mirror each other in multiple ways: organizational structure, money laundering, similar or identical criminal operations to generate revenue, an attraction to regions where the rule of law is weak or absent, reliance on corruption as a tool of influence, secrecy, and the exploitation of advanced communications and technology.²⁶ In addition to these similarities, terrorism is a common form of violence used by organized criminals and the principal cause of conflict and instability in many countries.

Throughout history, terrorist acts have contributed directly or indirectly to violent conflicts and instability. For example, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist was the pivotal event that led multiple nations into World War I. Likewise, terrorism is the principal strategy used by many insurgency movements and criminal elements in small wars throughout the developing world. Terrorist attacks on India's parliament in December 2001 pushed India and Pakistan to the edge of war. Finally, the on-going war in Afghanistan provides

the most recent and unambiguous example of how terrorism can lead to armed conflict. Before discussing this conflict, it is useful to examine America's responses to terrorism in the 1990s.

The American Response to Terrorism in the Post Cold War Era:

Before President Clinton took office, the United States did not view terrorism as a major threat to its national security for three principal reasons. First, most terrorist acts took place within national boundaries and were perpetrated by indigenous combatants or opposition groups. For the most part, terrorism was viewed as a domestic security issue and the extent of the threat varied from state to state. Second, America's geographical position created a false sense of security. Isolated by vast oceans on the east and west and bordered by friendly neighbors to the north and south, many Americans never felt threatened by terrorist attacks that were commonplace in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world. Finally, non-state actors were treated as a peripheral security concern. Less than 600 Americans died from 1981-1992 in international terrorist incidents.²⁷ Furthermore, defense analysts and foreign policy experts considered rival states [a powerful China or a resurgent Russia] the most dangerous threats to national security. By preparing almost exclusively for conventional military conflicts, the nation became vulnerable to unconventional non-state actors.

Islamic extremists opposed to Western policies in the Middle East and the presence of U.S. forces on the Arabian Peninsula pursued a more destructive and vigorous form of terrorism in the 1990s. Inspired by a fanatical vision of Islam and Osama bin Laden's calls for a holy war against Western and moderate Arab states, terrorists across the globe conducted suicide bombings and engaged in other kinds of violence to prosecute what Hoyt describes as an "unlimited war with limited military means."²⁸ The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 alerted the Clinton administration to the dangers of radical Islamic Fundamentalism. Although the number of fatalities in this particular attack was relatively small, the attempt to murder thousands of innocent civilians represented a sharp departure from the fragmented and isolated attacks that typically occurred in foreign lands. Terrorism, like other forms of organized crime, had grown into a transnational phenomenon.

Osama bin Laden and his transnational terrorist network, al-Qaeda [The Base], organized terrorist training camps and supported armed conflicts in several regions (e.g., Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Sudan, and the Philippines).²⁹ In addition, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have established formal or informal ties with terrorist cells operating in more than 50 countries.³⁰ The ambush of the U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia in 1993; the

attacks on the U.S embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and the suicide attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000 were linked directly or indirectly to Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network.³¹ This gradual escalation of transnational terrorism was alarming, but the trend did not arouse public outrage and administration officials were sharply divided over a military response. Ultimately, President Clinton responded to the progressively destructive terrorist attacks with essentially the same policies and counter-terrorism measures used by past administrations.³²

Criminal justice actions included efforts by law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial agencies to pursue, apprehend, prosecute, convict, and punish suspected terrorists. Diplomatic measures involved the use of extradition treaties; international sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism; and international conventions designed to suppress terrorist bombings and cut off international funds to terrorist groups.³³ A series of economic sanctions were applied to freeze or confiscate the financial resources of known terrorists and the assets of nations and organizations that support them.³⁴ The military's role in the fight against terrorism was limited to proportionate strikes intended to prevent and deter future attacks. For example, the 1998 cruise missile strikes against a suspected chemical weapons plant in Khartoum, Sudan and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan were carried out in response to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.³⁵ According to Wedgwood, the 1998 strikes "...can be justified within a classical framework of armed attack and proportionate self-defense."³⁶ A proportionate military response may have seemed reasonable and appropriate at the time, but the tragic events of September 11th would reveal an enemy that was far more resourceful than assessed and far more dangerous than imagined. Terrorism moved to the top of the national security agenda and the country was galvanized in a way that has not been observed since the opening days of World War II.

War in Afghanistan:

The surprise terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11th propelled the United States into a global war against terrorism. As previously noted, this was not the first time that U.S. citizens were the victims of terrorism, but the violence unleashed against innocent civilians was unparalleled in American history. Nearly 3000 people were killed or injured and Americans were left struggling with the bitter realization that mass murder and mayhem are no longer endemic to the Middle East and developing world. The devastating attacks were characterized by the media, politicians, and ordinary citizens alike in monolithic terms (i.e., "a watershed event", "a second Pearl Harbor", a "defining moment in history", etc.). These simple, but apt descriptions provide the historical context for what the country

experienced. The horrifying images of September 11th are deeply etched in the minds of the American people and the nation's collective sense of security will never be the same. Shock and anger gave way to an explosive and widespread call for immediate and decisive action. It was against this backdrop that President Bush declared war against terrorist organizations and states that harbor them.³⁷ The Taliban government in Afghanistan was singled out for harboring the suspected mastermind of the attacks, Osama bin Laden, and his al-Qaeda network. Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and many other countries joined the U.S. led coalition and offered military assistance in the campaign to capture bin Laden and destroy his global terrorist network.

The military phase of the war on terrorism, "Operation Enduring Freedom", began in October 2001 with a relentless bombing campaign in Afghanistan. Special Forces units played a central role in ground operations by gathering intelligence, coordinating precision-guided air strikes, and organizing anti-Taliban resistance forces. With close air support and less than 3000 U.S. troops on the ground, the Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban Pashtun tribes were able to topple the Taliban government in the first 100 days of fighting.³⁸ Pockets of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters dot the Afghan landscape, but the transnational terrorist network has been severely disrupted and many of its senior leaders are dead or on the run.

Within weeks after the Taliban's fall, additional U.S. troops were deployed in the theater to hunt down Osama bin Laden and remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite a larger ground presence, the U.S. military "footprint" did not approach the massive build-up that took place during the Persian Gulf War. The uncommon strategy of relying heavily on air power and Special Operations Forces kept U.S. casualties low and subdued anti-American sentiment in the region. With indigenous proxy forces doing the bulk of the ground fighting, the Afghan people were able to claim victory over the repressive Taliban regime and establish a broad-based interim government. United Nations peacekeepers occupy the capital city and efforts are underway to reconstruct the war-ravaged country. However, sporadic fighting between regional warlords and the reconstitution of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters has raised new questions about the future stability of Afghanistan. In January 2002, the chairman of Afghanistan's interim government asked the UN Security council for more peacekeepers until the new government can establish national police and military forces.³⁹ This task may take years and reveals the long-term commitment required to establish and maintain security and the rule of law. Because of the volatile situation on the ground, the U.S. military may be in Afghanistan for several more months or years.

The war against terrorism began in Afghanistan but it will not end there. President Bush has vowed: "our war on terror will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."⁴⁰ While visiting Egypt and other Arab allies in the Middle East, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, compared the war against terrorism to the Cold War: "...in the Cold War it took 50 years, plus or minus. It did not involve major battles. It involved continuous pressure. It involved cooperation by a host of nations. It involved the willingness of populations in many countries to invest in it and to sustain it..."⁴¹ The war against terrorism may take longer than the Cold War and achieving a clear victory infinitely more elusive.

State sponsors of terrorism, terrorist groups, and individuals involved with terrorist activities span the globe. In September 2001, President Bush blocked the assets of 168 groups, organizations, and individuals linked to terrorism under Executive Order 13224.⁴² These groups are connected to thousands of terrorists in several countries and they remain a major security threat to U.S. citizens and interests. The challenge facing the military and other government organizations is enormous, but several diplomatic, political, economic, and military initiatives are underway to help countries fight terrorism within their borders. A brief overview of terrorism and U.S. counter-terrorism actions in the Philippines and Bosnia will provide additional insight on the kind of threat confronting fragile democracies and states undergoing political transition.

Terrorism and Conflict in the Philippines:

Long before President Bush declared a global war against terrorism, the Philippine government was mired in an armed struggle against Islamic separatists who are known to have ties with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.⁴³ Several members of the Abu Sayyaf rebel movement fought against the Soviet army in Afghanistan and trained with al-Qaeda in the early part of the 1990s.⁴⁴ Of the various Islamic groups seeking self-rule, Abu Sayyaf is the most radical and violent. The terrorist group began its quest for an independent state in 1991 when it broke away from the more moderate Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).⁴⁵ What followed was a decade of bombings, indiscriminate killings, and assassinations. Abu Sayyaf is notorious for kidnapping wealthy Filipino businessmen, government officials, and foreigners. The practice of beheading hostages when demands are not met has generated fear and anxiety in the largely Roman Catholic country. The same fears spilled over into neighboring Malaysian Borneo in April 2000 when members of Abu Sayyaf conducted a raid on Sipadan Island and took 21 people hostage.⁴⁶

Abu Sayyaf has received millions of dollars in ransoms and most of the funds are used to purchase military equipment, gain support from the local populace, and recruit more followers.⁴⁷

In fact, kidnapping has become an attractive criminal enterprise for inhabitants in impoverished areas. Even more unsettling is the prospect of renewed fighting between the MNLF, one of the largest separatist factions, and government forces. In November 2001, the former leader of the group, Nurullaji Misuari, denounced a 1996 peace agreement and about 600 followers attacked military and police positions on the southern island of Jolo.⁴⁸ Whether this recent outbreak of violence will lead to sustained conflict remains unclear, but the apprehension of Misuari on rebellion charges has sparked bloody clashes between government troops and Muslims loyal to Misuari.⁴⁹

During her November 2001 visit to Washington, Philippine President Arroyo asked the Bush administration for assistance in her country's military campaign against Abu Sayyaf. At the time, President Bush pledged over \$90 million in military equipment and agreed to ask Congress for a \$1 billion aid package.⁵⁰ Military training and economic assistance programs are not novel approaches to U.S. military and security strategy in the Pacific theater. U.S. Military advisors have assisted the Philippine military for years and combined exercises are an annual event. A heightened awareness of terrorism and the deteriorating security environment provided the impetus for the Bush administration to commit more resources to the Philippines. The southern islands are quickly becoming a place where terrorists and outlaws are entrenched, where torture and atrocities are common, and where the rule of law is under a constant state of siege.

In early 2002, several hundred U.S. Special Operations Forces and support personnel arrived in the Philippines to participate in counter-terrorism exercises aimed at destroying Abu Sayyaf. These troops do not have a combat mission, but they will provide training and escort Philippine units patrolling areas occupied by the renegade group. The potential for violent confrontations is high, since U.S. forces are armed and have the freedom to defend themselves if they come under hostile fire. The exercises will last six months to a year and may signal the start of a new phase in the global war against terrorism.

Combating Terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

The Islamic movement in the Balkans mirrors the radicalized movements in other parts of the world. With the collapse of Yugoslavia, Islamic veterans who fought against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan migrated to Bosnia to defend Muslim communities and fight against Serbian forces. The military capability of Bosnian Muslims was due in large measure to the training and military aid they received from the mujahideen, Iran, and Hezbollah.⁵¹ Ranstorp and Xhudo argue that a second aim of the mujahideen in the Balkans conflict was to establish a "base for future operations against the West."⁵²

The dragnet for terrorists with links to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda was extended to Bosnia in the latter part of September 2001. With the support of Italian Carabinieri, an elite military police unit under the operational control of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), U.S. Special Forces soldiers participated in a series of raids to capture suspected terrorists, gather intelligence, and preempt planned terrorist activities directed against U.S. forces and other peacekeepers in the region.⁵³ Conventional forces assigned to SFOR have also played a role in combating terrorism and smuggling by conducting raids on arms caches and by providing training and equipment to the Bosnian Border Service.⁵⁴

Another constructive development in the campaign against terrorism is the support SFOR is receiving from the Bosnian government. Despite local opposition, Bosnian authorities turned over six terrorist suspects to SFOR in January 2002.⁵⁵ The group is believed to be an al-Qaeda "sleeping cell" that was activated to conduct terrorist attacks against American citizens and facilities in Bosnia, including the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.⁵⁶ The actions by U.S. forces to counter terrorism in Bosnia reflect the depth and versatility of the military and provides another concrete example of how the military is supporting law enforcement efforts in the war against terrorism.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

Conventional terrorism can leave deep physical and psychological scars on a nation, but the darker shadow lingering over America and many other countries is the potential for radical terrorist groups to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction [nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons]. The political, economic, and psychological impact of these weapons is many times greater than conventional weapons; and therefore, they are an attractive option for transnational terrorists and others committed to political or ideological violence. As recently as 1999, Osama Bin Laden publicly asserted the right of Muslims to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities.⁵⁷

America's vulnerability to chemical and biological warfare was exposed shortly after September 11th when the FBI arrested 10 suspects who had fraudulently obtained hazardous material licenses.⁵⁸ Additional arrests and investigations revealed that one of the terrorists killed in the September attacks had made inquiries earlier in the year about the capabilities of crop-dusting aircraft.⁵⁹ These events prompted the FBI and Federal Aviation officials to issue national warnings about the potential for terrorists to use hazardous material trucks or crop-dusting aircraft in chemical or biological attacks. In addition to commercial delivery systems, terrorists may try to achieve their aims by attacking industrial nuclear and chemical plants and facilities.

Documents found in abandoned compounds, safe houses, and caves in Afghanistan confirmed what many had already suspected about al-Qaeda: the transnational terrorist organization was actively pursuing the capability to develop and use weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁰ The discoveries related to al-Qaeda and current trends in proliferation have raised new fears that corrupt security officials or rogue nations may sell nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, components, or fissionable material on the black market.

Russia's vast stockpile of nuclear and chemical weapons is especially vulnerable to organized criminals who may funnel these arms to radical terrorist groups. Webster [et. al.] points out that soldiers responsible for securing Russia's nuclear and chemical weapons are underpaid and disillusioned with the gradual decline of state institutions.⁶¹ As long as uncertainty and economic instability plague Russian society, organized crime syndicates have the potential to buy access to Russia's NBC arsenal. A related concern centers on the recruitment of scientists who have the knowledge and skills to develop weapons of mass destruction. At one time, the potential for terrorist groups to acquire NBC weapons was considered low because of the cost, infrastructure requirements, and the international system of nonproliferation agreements. However, the convergence of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other forms of organized crime in recent years has enhanced the capability of transnational terrorist groups to buy NBC weapons and circumvent international safeguards (i.e., export controls, treaties, conventions, etc.).⁶² The NBC weapon scenarios that were once dismissed as wild conjecture in military simulation exercises, have now become part of a growing list of credible and realistic threats.

Voicing strong opposition to states that may deliberately put NBC weapons in the hands of terrorists, President Bush described Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as "an axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union Address. According to the President:

"By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."⁶³

Russia and many of America's European allies did not fully embrace President Bush's speech or characterization of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, but they are keenly aware of the dangers of proliferation. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles contributes to regional and global instability. As these countries expand their conventional and WMD capabilities, other states may feel threatened and respond by using force [i.e., Israel's raid on

the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in 1981] or increasing their stockpiles of weapons and other military hardware. Once the cycle of proliferation begins, regions become more militarized and the potential for transnational terrorist groups to develop or obtain a NBC capability increases dramatically.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran:

Iran has maintained close religious and military ties with Hezbollah and other transnational terrorist groups. Prior to September 11th, Hezbollah, was known or suspected of killing more Americans than any other terrorist group (i.e., the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996). The repressive regime continues to export a radical Shiite version of Islamic Fundamentalism to the Balkans, parts of Africa, and Southeast Asia. Iran's affiliation with radical terrorist groups like Hezbollah makes the prospect of WMD proliferation even more alarming.

In recent testimony before Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence warned that Iran is expanding its WMD and missile capabilities.⁶⁴ It is clear that Iran's build up is part of an effort to counterbalance the WMD capabilities of regional powers, including Iraq, India, Pakistan and Israel. As the country modernizes its infrastructure, dual-use technologies and the construction of a nuclear power reactor are especially worrisome.⁶⁵ Dual-use materials and technologies may conceal and facilitate the rapid expansion of NBC weapons programs.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq:

Iraq is not as active as Iran in supporting terrorists, but the country has provided safe haven and support for the Abu Nidal terrorist network for many years. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) has committed terrorist attacks in at least 20 countries and killed hundreds of people in the process.⁶⁶ The group's capabilities have been diminished in recent years because of internal dissension and the radical sect has not attacked Western citizens or interests since the late 1980s.⁶⁷ While it's unclear whether Iraq has the desire or capability to sponsor a WMD terrorist act, the Bush administration considers Saddam Hussein's NBC capabilities a more immediate danger than proliferation in Iran or North Korea.

Many experts believe that Iraq started reconstituting its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs after UN inspectors were forced out of the country in 1998.⁶⁸ The UN has imposed stiff international sanctions to prevent proliferation, but revelations about Iraq's NBC programs at the end of the Gulf War are a powerful reminder that a determined despot can find ways to bypass international arms control agreements. Iraq, like Iran, is aggressively pursuing dual-use technologies to rebuild former missile production and chemical warfare-related facilities.⁶⁹ The Bush administration has repeatedly called on Saddam Hussein to give

UN weapons inspectors unrestricted access to suspected facilities, but the Iraqi leader remains intransigent. In February 2002, Secretary of State Powell admitted that the U.S. is looking at several options to bring about a "regime change" in the totalitarian state.⁷⁰ There is strong resistance in the international community to direct military action against Iraq, but the Bush administration appears prepared to act unilaterally, if necessary. Many policy and defense analysts believe the U.S. waited too long to take decisive action against Osama bin Laden and it's obvious the Bush administration does not want to make the same mistake with Iraq.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea:

North Korea has harbored members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army since 1970, but there are no indications that the isolated regime has directly supported any major terrorist activity for the last several years.⁷¹ In 2000, Pyongyang joined the U.S. in renouncing terrorism and agreed to support the international community in suppressing terrorist activity.⁷² Nonetheless, the country's relentless sale of ballistic missiles and weapons technology to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Libya threatens stability in the Middle East and creates an indirect avenue for terrorist groups to get advanced technology and delivery systems.

Seven years of severe famine and a crumbling infrastructure have left North Korea desperate for hard currency. Ballistic missiles are one of the few exports that generate some of the cash needed to keep a million soldiers in uniform and fund WMD improvement programs.⁷³ The country's economic hardships are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Foreign aid is down substantially because most international relief efforts are currently directed toward Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Despite the country's economic hardships and heavy reliance on the international community for food, North Korea seems determined to maintain its current defense posture and programs.

Drug Trafficking and Conflict:

The UN World Drug Report 2000 reported a 20% reduction in coca leaf and cocaine production between 1992/93 and 1999.⁷⁵ Opium poppy cultivation was 17% lower in 1999 than in 1990.⁷⁶ Despite these downward trends in drug production, drug proliferation and trafficking remain a pernicious and deadly threat to U.S. citizens and institutions. Few crimes have the reach and impact of the global drug trade. By way of contrast, less than 3000 people were killed in the September 11th terrorist attacks, but almost four times as many Americans (11,651) died in 1999 from drug-related incidents.⁷⁷ The war against terrorism deserves the focus and attention it currently receives, but the war against drugs, although decades old, is far from over. Drug related crime continues to undermine the rule of law and ravage many segments of American society. Moreover, the multi-billion dollar drug trade generated tremendous wealth

and power for organized crime syndicates and financed the operations of guerilla movements, paramilitary organizations, transnational terrorist networks, rogue states, failed states, and a host of other criminal elements.

The U.S. military has supported the war against drugs for over two decades. Military involvement was made possible when legal restrictions against the use of the armed forces for law enforcement purposes were eased by a series of congressional acts during the Reagan administration. Since the early 1980s, U.S. military units have supported federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in counter-drug operations. Most military support missions were limited to interdiction along suspected air, sea, and ground transit routes; training in military planning and tactics, joint exercises, intelligence support, logistical support, and construction projects.

In 1989, the role of the armed forces in law enforcement functions was expanded. The Justice Department made a legal determination "that the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits arrests by the military in the United States, does not apply abroad."⁷⁸ The 1989 invasion of Panama occurred in part because the military dictator, General Manuel Noriega, was indicted by two federal grand juries in Florida on drug trafficking charges. Panama was a major drug transit point and one of the military's primary missions was to capture Noriega and turn him over to law enforcement authorities for trial.⁷⁹ At the time, the Panama invasion (Operation Just Cause) was the largest military intervention of its kind since the Vietnam war. Over 27, 000 U.S. troops participated in the conflict and Panamanian Defense Forces succumbed to a swift assault in less than ten days.⁸⁰ After surrendering to the military, Noriega was arrested, prosecuted, and subsequently imprisoned in Florida. The use of the military to apprehend a head of state for drug trafficking was unprecedented and paved the way for a wider military role in law enforcement functions overseas.

Although narcotics trafficking was not the sole reason for the invasion of Panama, stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. was a desired outcome of the Bush [Senior] administration. In other countries, the underlying nexus between drugs and conflict is established for very different reasons. Illicit drug profits have financed armed conflicts and terrorism across the globe. Furthermore, the drug trade has brought misery to the lives of millions, undermined the rule of law in developed and developing states, and subverted peace operations and agreements in several regions.

During the Cold War, insurgency groups depended on state sponsors to finance their operations. With the fall of communism, more and more insurgency groups are financing their operations with profits from the drug trade. The transnational trade has even reached religious

extremists who have overcome their historical aversion to drug trafficking. Terrorist groups in particular see the drug trade as a way to overcome declining revenues from patrons, state sponsors, charities, front companies, and banks that have had their assets frozen or seized under national and international conventions. Some Islamic leaders have gone as far as issuing fatwas or decrees condoning the distribution of drugs to non-Muslims.⁸¹ These religious leaders view illegal drugs as a destructive weapon that can be used against Western society.⁸²

Organized crime, terrorism, and conflicts have a tendency to intersect at the major drug-producing regions of the world: the Andean region of South America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia), the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand). Organized crime, corruption, and violence are deeply entrenched in these areas and the drugs exported from these states threaten domestic and international security. Colombia, Afghanistan, and Burma are three countries that graphically illustrate the way illegal drug production and trafficking can contribute to armed conflict and regional instability.

Drug Trafficking and Conflict in Colombia:

Colombia, the world's largest producer of cocaine, remains entangled in violence and conflict spawned by the illicit drug trade. After decades of counter-drug and counterinsurgency programs, the Pastrana government is struggling for its survival against "narco-guerillas", terrorist groups, and organized criminal elements. These groups frequently terrorize civilian populations and commit serious and violent crimes with impunity. At least 50 percent of Columbia's territory is under the control of insurgency or paramilitary organizations.⁸³ About 40,000 Colombians were killed in the last decade from the country's internal conflicts⁸⁴ and 1.7 million people have been internally displaced.⁸⁵ Shelley points out that Colombia was a stable democracy before organized crime became a dominant feature of the country's economy.⁸⁶ The insidious impact of the drug trade and internal fighting has led to a breakdown in the rule of law and seriously challenged the state's sovereignty.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia [best known by its Spanish initials (AUC)], are armed factions that are responsible for much of the country's violence. All three are on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.⁸⁷ They obtain most of their revenue from the drug trade by taxing coca production, processing cocaine, or charging substantial fees for protecting coca plants, production facilities, and transshipment routes.⁸⁸ Some armed groups may get as much as 70% of their operating funds from the drug trade.⁸⁹

Drug profits are used to purchase weapons, recruit new members, and fund military and terrorist operations.

In an effort to bring some stability to the country, President Pastrana initiated peace talks with the FARC in 1998. The FARC, the largest guerilla movement with more than 17,000 combatants, was allowed to operate freely in a "safe" area about the size of Switzerland while peace talks were underway.⁹⁰ Throughout the three-year peace process, the leftist rebels continued to generate revenue through extortion, drug trafficking, and kidnapping. In February 2002, the peace process collapsed when rebels hijacked a civilian airliner and kidnapped a Colombian senator.⁹¹ President Pastrana responded by announcing an end to the peace talks and sending army units to establish control of the demilitarized zone. The FARC went underground to renew its 38-year struggle with the Colombian military. Many suspect that the FARC was never committed to Pastrana's peace process. The group's original ideology as a peasant movement was supplanted a long time ago by the more immediate desire to retain wealth and power through the illicit drug trade.

In addition to confrontations with the Colombian military, the FARC must also contend with the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) of Colombia -- a coalition of right-wing paramilitary units and "death" squads that were started in the 1960s by wealthy drug traffickers who were tired of being exploited by leftist guerillas.⁹² Like the FARC, these groups have enriched themselves in the drug trade by taxing drug traffickers, coca growers, and businesses.⁹³ As the paramilitaries increased their involvement in the drug trade, there was a corresponding rise in their influence and ability to attract unemployed youth.⁹⁴ Paramilitary groups are now twice as large as they were in 1998⁹⁵ and bear responsibility for the vast majority of human rights atrocities, including mass murder, torture, and assassinations.⁹⁶

The major armed factions keep Colombia in a continuous state of war with few interruptions. Internal conflicts and organized crime are sapping the nation's strength and economic development. The U.S. is providing \$1.3 billion in aid to help the Colombian government make drastic reductions in illicit drug trafficking and production. Because the drug trade and insurgency movements are so closely intertwined, any success achieved in counter-drug operations will diminish the capacity of guerilla and paramilitary forces to fund military operations. The twin strategies of counter-narcotic and counterinsurgency operations have dovetailed into an integrated campaign that gives the Pastrana administration the best opportunity to reduce the level of drugs and violence in Colombian society.

In the long-term, the economic component of "Plan Colombia" takes on greater importance. Without adequate social reforms and viable economic options, the illicit drug trade

will continue to attract corrupt and violent criminal elements. Crop substitution and eradication programs in Bolivia and Peru expose the possibilities of what can happen in Colombia. During the last six years, coca cultivation dropped by more than 70 percent in Bolivia and Peru.⁹⁷

Drug Trafficking and Conflict in Afghanistan:

Years before the U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taliban from power, armed factions fighting for control of the country relied on taxes and profits from the drug trade to fund their operations and purchase military hardware.⁹⁸ After the withdrawal of Soviet forces at the end of 1989, Afghanistan was engulfed in civil war. The country's economy was destroyed by years of conflict, and as a result, opium and heroin production became major sources of income for most of the warring groups, including the Northern Alliance.⁹⁹

The Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and emerged from the turmoil and violence as the dominant faction in the country. Eventually, the group was able to seize control of about 90% of the country with the assistance of al-Qaeda and thousands of foreign recruits.¹⁰⁰ Although the new regime had a reputation for strictly enforcing Islamic law, the government's drug control policies and actions were superficial and contradictory. While publicly renouncing opium production, the Taliban taxed smugglers, poppy farmers, and heroin labs.¹⁰¹ Despite prohibitions in Islamic law and a ban by the Taliban on the cultivation of opium poppies, Afghanistan produced more than 70 percent of the illicit opium that reached global markets in 2000.¹⁰² In addition, the country was a major source of heroin for Central Asia and Europe. Opium production declined substantially in 2001, but this positive development was overshadowed by the fact that the country had stockpiled enough opium to satisfy the demands of international markets.¹⁰³ Some U.S. officials speculate that the Taliban may have cut poppy production in the summer of 2000 to drive up the wholesale price of opium, which increased tenfold in the early months of 2001.¹⁰⁴ Conservative estimates suggests that the Taliban took in \$20 million a year in taxes on opium alone and an estimated \$3 billion a year in transit fees on all contraband, including drugs, arms, and consumer goods.¹⁰⁵ Bodansky goes further and argues that the Taliban raised an estimated \$8 billion from all drug-related activities.¹⁰⁶

The millions raised from the drug trade funded the Taliban's meager government and counter-insurgency campaign against the Northern Alliance. The combination of illicit drugs, weapons, and radical Islamic Fundamentalism made Afghanistan more than just a failed state; the country became an outlaw state. Terrorist training camps were established and militant groups like al-Qaeda were given sanctuary. The Taliban's refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden and his followers to the U.S. created the conditions for a violent military confrontation and led to the radical regime's demise as a political and military force in the country.

Recognizing the significance of the drug trade in Afghanistan, the U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan pointed out: "after the elimination of terrorism... the elimination of drug trafficking in Afghanistan was the second highest priority."¹⁰⁷ Accomplishing the second priority – eliminating drug-trafficking—may be very difficult given the pervasive poverty and fractious nature of Afghan society. The country's roads are littered with mines, the infrastructure is in ruins, and real economic development is many years away. Any eradication efforts may spark civil unrest among farmers that depend on poppy cultivation for a living. Likewise, competing warlords control the rural areas where poppies and heroin are produced. Like the Taliban, these warlords have relied on the drug trade for many years to purchase weapons and military supplies. Attempts by the weak interim government to implement drug control measures may provoke hostilities. Farmers and powerful tribal leaders may not be inclined to give up the lucrative drug trade until peacekeepers and the international community can establish a secure environment, the rule of law, and viable economic alternatives throughout the country.

Drug Trafficking and Conflict in Myanmar (Burma):

Because of the Taliban's ban on poppy cultivation in 2000, Myanmar (Burma) became the world's largest source of illicit opium in 2001 and remained one of the largest producers of heroin and amphetamines.¹⁰⁸ Most of the country's drugs originate in a region under the control of ethnic groups that were given limited autonomy as a concession for ending their armed struggle against the government. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the strongest ethnic minority and the largest producer and trafficker of illicit drugs in Myanmar.¹⁰⁹ The UWSA's drug operations are known throughout the region, but the Myanmar government is reluctant to challenge the group for three reasons: (1) the current cease-fire agreement prevents Myanmar troops from entering the group's territory without permission from UWSA leaders, (2) the ruling government agreed to give the UWSA until 2005 to eliminate opium in their territory,¹¹⁰ and (3) the UWSA remains a powerful armed force with over 20,000 fighters under arms.¹¹¹ Any counter-drug or military operations against the Wa army could result in a bloody and protracted civil war.

As long as the UWSA has the freedom to produce and smuggle drugs, Southeast Asia will remain awash in opium, heroin, and amphetamines. The explosion of amphetamines in particular threatens to destabilize the region militarily and economically. Myanmar produces about 800 million amphetamine tablets a year and the vast majority are produced in UWSA territory and smuggled into Thailand.¹¹² About 21 million amphetamine tablets were seized in Thailand in 1997; more than 60 million tablets were seized in the first six months of 2001.¹¹³

Thailand sees the flood of amphetamines across the 1800-kilometer border as a serious national security threat. The country's amphetamine market has about three million consumers¹¹⁴ and there are more than a million addicts among this group.¹¹⁵ Crime and drug-related violence have skyrocketed and threaten domestic security. The current crisis has escalated tensions between Thailand and Myanmar. Thai demands for Myanmar to stop the production of illicit drugs in Wa-held territory have gone unheeded. The Thai military has stepped up interdiction operations and conducted raids on suspected drug production facilities along the Thai-Myanmar border.¹¹⁶ Brief, but violent border clashes are not uncommon. In addition, Thailand has periodically closed off border crossing points adjacent to UWSA territory.

A proxy war in the ethnic-held territories of Myanmar may be underway. The UWSA has moved thousands of civilians and military personnel into territory held by the Shan State Army (SSA), a rebel movement that has a history of being heavily involved in the drug trade.¹¹⁷ The UWSA is working with the Myanmar military to suppress the rebellion and expand its control of the narcotics market.¹¹⁸ Myanmar has accused Thailand of covertly backing the Shan State rebels as a way to undermine the UWSA and disrupt the flow of amphetamines into Thailand.¹¹⁹ Although the proxy war has not led to a major conflict in the region, illicit drug production and trafficking will continue to strain relations between Myanmar and Thailand and threaten stability in neighboring states.

Diamond Trafficking and the Exploitation of Other Natural Resources:

Corrupt armies and corporations, insurgents, organized criminals, transnational terrorists, gangs, and bandits are stripping diamonds and other natural resources out of the heart of Africa. Wealth generated from the illicit diamond trade and exploitation of other valuable resources continue to fuel the flames of political and ethnic conflict and undermine peace initiatives in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and other African states.

Conflict diamonds – “diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate or recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments...”¹²⁰ – make up anywhere from 10-15% of the world's multi-billion dollar diamond industry.¹²¹ While some of the money from diamond trafficking is used to sustain operations (i.e., armed interventions, insurgencies, terrorist operations, etc.), a substantial amount of the profits are funneled to the bank accounts of transnational criminals, corrupt government officials, rebel forces, and a host of other actors.

Africa has paid a heavy price for the diamond wars and the crime and greed that sustains them. Millions of Africans have died from diamond related conflicts and millions more displaced.¹²² But the dirty trade extends far beyond the shores of Africa. In the closing months

of 2001, Farah reported that strong evidence exists that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have obtained millions of dollars worth of illegal diamonds through Lebanese connections in Sierra Leone and the DRC.¹²³ Diamonds are an ideal commodity for terrorist groups because it is easy to exchange them for cash and they are difficult to trace by law enforcement organizations.

Exploitation of other natural resources such as gold, uranium, copper, cobalt, bauxite, and timber is another transnational crime that has perpetuated conflict in several African states, most notably the DRC. Funds from these natural resources fill the pockets of the greedy and finance the terrorist acts and wars of armed factions. Few in the DRC are left untouched by the hostilities and damage to the environment.

On the surface, the bloody wars over diamonds and other natural resources in Africa may not seem to have much relevance to the U.S. military and national security. In fact, the opposite is true. Transnational crime, violence, and conflicts in Africa threaten stability across the continent and will ultimately have economic or military consequences for the world at large. Africa's political, economic, and social ills are staggering and transnational crime is making them worst. During a four-country visit to West Africa, Prime Minister Blair emphasized the need for developed states to invest in the security and economic prosperity of democracies in Africa. Blair declared emphatically that illicit drugs, terror, and extremism emanate from "failed states, dictatorships, and the economically and politically bankrupt."¹²⁴ Conflict and chaos in the diamond and mineral rich areas of Africa are a magnet for predators, terrorists, and other transnational criminals. Terrorism against U.S. citizens and interests can come out of Africa the same way it came out of Afghanistan. Just as terrorist groups found safe harbor in Somalia and Sudan, these same groups can migrate to other collapsed states on the African continent. To think that states in conflict can be ignored is to view national and international security in a very finite and narrow dimension.

Diamond Trafficking and Conflict in Sierra Leone:

In the spring of 1991, insurgents from Sierra Leone, combatants from Liberia, and mercenaries from Burkina Faso launched attacks into Sierra Leone to overthrow the ruling government.¹²⁵ The rebel group, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), began a campaign of death and destruction against innocent civilians. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to neighboring countries and thousands of children were abducted and forced to serve as soldiers.¹²⁶ The RUF relied on torture, massacres, mutilations, and other atrocities as a means to undermine confidence in the Freetown government. Within a year, the RUF had taken control of the main diamond mines in the southeastern part of the country. Like so many insurgencies, the conflict in Sierra Leone was proclaimed as a revolt to bring an end to a corrupt

regime.¹²⁷ The movement evolved into a self-sustaining criminal enterprise. Leaders of the RUF enriched themselves and exchanged diamonds for weapons and equipment throughout the civil war.¹²⁸

By March 1995, RUF forces captured most of the major mines in the country, but the Sierra Leone army was able to stop further advances and hold the capital with the assistance of peacekeepers from Nigeria and Ghana.¹²⁹ Unable to seize the capital, the RUF signed a peace agreement with the government in November 1996. Military dissidents overthrew the government in 1997 and formed an alliance with the RUF.¹³⁰ Nigeria, Cote d' Ivoire, Guinea, and Ghana -- members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) -- led diplomatic overtures to return the civilian government to power. The United Nations supported the non-violent approach and banned arms shipments to Sierra Leone.¹³¹

Impatient with the pace of negotiations, Nigeria led a successful counter-coup in February 1998 and the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).¹³² The following year, the RUF and government signed the Lome Peace Agreement. However, the RUF quickly violated several terms of the accord. The rebel group remained armed and continued its struggle to control the country's diamond fields. By the early months of 2000, violent clashes with government troops and atrocities against civilians were on the rise. Furthermore, the RUF held several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage. In May 2000, Britain deployed military units to Sierra Leone to restore order in Freetown and evacuate its citizens and other foreign nationals.¹³³ While the safety of British citizens and foreign nationals was the principal reason for military intervention, Britain's historical ties with the former colony provided the impetus for a British peacekeeping force. British peacekeepers helped stabilize the country and initiated a training program for indigenous police and military forces. The U.S. backed the UN peacekeeping efforts by sending military equipment, survey teams, and Special Forces trainers to Nigeria and Ghana.¹³⁴ This initiative, "Operation Focus Relief", strengthened the capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian peacekeepers to provide security, disarm rebel forces, and facilitate the repatriation of refugees.

In September 2001, the rebels agreed to a cease-fire, but a lasting peace is far from certain. Leadership of the national government has changed five times in the last 11 years and Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 2002. The UN mandate in Sierra Leone is scheduled to end in September 2002, but peacekeepers may be needed until government authority and civil institutions are restored throughout the country. As in the Balkans, the peacekeepers have brought an end to violent conflict, but a long-term peace based on the rule of law may be many years away.

Diamond Trafficking, Exploitation of Natural Resources, and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):

Recent political and ethnic conflict in the DRC can be traced back to 1994 when fighting in neighboring Rwanda and Burundi forced several hundred thousand refugees into Zaire. The new demographic make-up of eastern Congo contributed to ethnic strife and a civil war broke out in 1996.¹³⁵ Within a year, the rebel movement backed by Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda overthrew the government in power and realigned the distribution of natural resources in the country.¹³⁶ Once foreign armies established a foothold in the DRC, they took advantage of the weak Congolese government and consolidated their control over mineral deposits and other resources.

In August 1998, Congolese militants supported by Rwanda and Uganda plunged the country into another civil war. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Sudan responded to the crisis by providing troops and aid to the DRC.¹³⁷ Further complicating the conflict was the presence of insurgents from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. These groups, operating from bases in eastern Congo, frequently attacked civilians and government forces in their respective countries. A report from Human Rights Watch concluded that rebel and government forces on all sides killed, raped, tortured, and kidnapped thousands of civilians.¹³⁸

The President of Zambia tried to end the carnage in 1999 when he invited the principal combatants in the war to a peace conference in Lusaka, Zambia. The Lusaka Accord called for an immediate cease-fire; the withdrawal of foreign troops, except peacekeepers; and a UN peacekeeping force of about 5,500 troops.¹³⁹ Rwanda and Uganda remained in parts of the DRC to protect their populations from guerilla attacks, but an equally, and perhaps more important motivation for their occupation was to control the minerals, agriculture, and timber in the country.¹⁴⁰

A report published by the UN in April 2001 noted that The DRC was "undergoing mass-scale looting and the systematic and systemic exploitation of natural resources." The report went on to say:

"Top military commanders from various countries, for different reasons, needed and continue to need this conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily solving some internal problems in those countries as well as allowing access to wealth. They have realized that the war has the capacity to sustain itself, and therefore have created or protected criminal networks that are likely to take over fully if all foreign armies decide to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo."¹⁴¹

As of February 2002, the armed combatants have not complied with all the provisions outlined in the Lusaka agreement. Uganda and Rwanda still occupy eastern Congo and violent clashes between various armed groups have increased in recent months.¹⁴² Less than 4000 U.N. peacekeepers are on the ground and thousands more are needed. With so many criminal and corrupt elements looting and profiting from the DRC's natural resources, the economic incentive to maintain conflict and chaos is greater than the desire to establish the rule of law and maintain peace. Violence and anarchy in the DRC continues to threaten stability in at least ten countries that share a border with the giant nation. President Buyoya of Burundi noted during a recent visit to the U.S. that peace and stability in the Great Lakes region depends on the withdrawal of foreign armies from the DRC and an intra-Congolese dialogue involving all the parties.¹⁴³ Without a significant change in the prevailing conditions, a viable peace process remains problematic.

Diamond Trafficking and Conflict in Angola:

Rebels of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), have fought off and on against the government of Angola since the country declared independence from Portugal in 1975. Throughout the Cold War, UNITA received weapons, training, and equipment from the U.S. and South Africa. The Marxist government -- dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party -- was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. With the fall of communism and the subsequent change in East-West relations, international support for UNITA and the MPLA began to fade.¹⁴⁴

A cease-fire was signed in 1991 and national elections were held in the fall of 1992. The Angolan government won a close election, but UNITA rejected the results and renewed its efforts to seize power. In 1993, UNITA controlled over 70 percent of the country's territory and the illicit diamond trade became the movement's primary source of revenue.¹⁴⁵ Silverstein reports that the insurgents reaped almost \$4 billion dollars from diamond smuggling in the 1990s.¹⁴⁶

The warring parties signed the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, but the provisions of this peace agreement were never fully implemented.¹⁴⁷ UNITA refused to give up rebel-held diamond fields and full-scale hostilities erupted again in 1998. UNITA's former leader, Jonas Savimbi, admitted in 1996 that the diamond fields in Northeastern Angola were essential to his movement's survival.¹⁴⁸ In an effort to cut off the flow of illegal diamonds, which were financing UNITA's arms and equipment, the UN imposed an embargo on the exportation of unofficial diamonds (i.e., diamonds that didn't have a Certificate of Origin from the internationally

recognized Angolan government).¹⁴⁹ Acting in collusion with corrupt diamond dealers and companies, UNITA was able to smuggle enough diamonds out of the country to fund its military operations.

UNITA's campaign of violence against civilians and government forces continued. Towns and villages that supported the government were destroyed without hesitation. UNITA rebels were content to kill anyone who refused to acquiesce to their demands. Violence against the government and international workers was equally intense. After multiple rebel attacks against peacekeepers and the suspicious disappearance of two UN aircraft over UNITA-held territory, the UN became convinced that the country was too volatile and dangerous for the peacekeeping force.¹⁵⁰ In 1999, after more than a decade of peacekeeping operations, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw the UN Observer Mission. Over the next two years, UNITA lunged deeper into terrorism and guerilla warfare. A recent UN briefing revealed, "...the rebel movement was still conducting guerilla warfare, attacking mostly civilian targets, destroying infrastructure, killing innocent people and laying landmines."¹⁵¹

The persistent civil war in Angola has scarred the country and created a humanitarian crisis. Massacres, torture, rape, terrorism, and other atrocities pervaded every sector of society and left the country in shambles. As many as 1.5 million civilians have been killed since the start of the war.¹⁵² Over four million people were displaced in the last two years; 60% of the population lives in poverty, and life expectancy is about 44 years.¹⁵³ The tragedy in Angola illustrates the way a transnational crime like diamond smuggling can extend the duration of conflict, undermine the rule of law, and subvert international peace initiatives. Perhaps the recent death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's founder, will give both sides of the conflict an opportunity to resurrect the peace process.

Corruption, Conflict, and Peace Operations:

Corruption may not necessarily lead directly to conflict, but this particular crime does facilitate the presence and rapid growth of transnational crimes that do cause or prolong conflict and instability. Organized criminal elements are aided substantially by two important elements in society at large: (1) a constant demand for illegal goods and services, and (2) a willingness on the part of those in authority to aid or ignore criminal behavior for personal profit or gain.¹⁵⁴ The second element, corruption, must be resolved by political and legal institutions, but U.S. military leaders should understand how this crime contributes to instability and obstructs peace operations and military assistance programs in foreign countries.

Thachuck argues convincingly that the battle against corruption and the battle against terrorism and other organized crimes are one in the same.¹⁵⁵ Corruption gives transnational terrorist groups and criminals the capacity to buy protection from law enforcement and conduct operations with impunity. Corruption is so ingrained in some states that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate institutions is completely obscured. Corrupt military, economic, social, and political institutions compete with law-abiding organizations for power and economic prosperity. Weak democracies and young nations trying to adapt to a market economy are especially vulnerable to the corrupt influences of transnational criminal networks. Law enforcement and military organizations in weak states seldom have the manpower and resources to counter transnational terrorists and crime syndicates that have vast amounts of wealth. These criminal networks are often involved in arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and other types of transnational crime. They continuously undermine NATO, UN, and U.S. peace operations and nation assistance programs by corrupting indigenous military and state officials.

Corruption is like a cancer that eats away at the lawful and legitimate institutions of a nation, including the military institutions. As such, corruption is insidious and leads to the breakdown of legitimate institutions and the rule of law. Like a long-term illness, symptoms are often times imperceptible in the beginning. Beneath the guise of democratic and market reform in corrupt states, a degenerative process is underway. An underground economy flourishes, organized crime is rampant, and crime related violence permeates society. The legitimacy of the government is challenged in corrupt states and there is a general lack of trust and confidence in existing leaders and institutions. When there is no faith in national power structures, confidence in national security is eroded. An unsafe environment impedes investment, reconstruction, and long-term economic development.

In many post-conflict regions, peacekeepers are unable to withdraw because of the prospect of renewed fighting between factions waiting patiently to seize power. The fact that peacekeepers are approaching their seventh year in Bosnia reveals the limitations of military power in resolving political, economic, and social problems in post-conflict societies. The military component of national power can bring security and stability to a state, but the other instruments of national power -- economic, information, and diplomatic -- elements are necessary for long-term peace and economic growth.

The U.S. military can help stem systemic corruption in foreign militaries by maintaining military-to-military contacts, exchange programs, and international military education and training programs. All of these programs promote discipline, the rule of law, and democratic values and principles. These values and principles are not always accepted in societies that are

guided by a different set of norms, values, and traditions, but this reality should not deter efforts to reform corrupt military organizations. It's important for the U.S. to remain engaged in friendly states and emphasize accountability, the rule of law, good governance, and democratic principles. In many developing and transitioning states, the military has the greatest influence on society. If the military is seen as a law-abiding organization, then the armed forces can serve as a model and temper the growth of corruption in other institutions. A brief look at corruption in the Balkans will amplify the reasons why anti-corruption efforts are important to stability and U.S. peace operations in the region.

Corruption and Transnational Organized Crime in the Balkans:

Corruption in the Balkans is deeply embedded and has its origins in the authoritarian structure of communism.¹⁵⁶ The elite communist party members, secret police, and those in charge of industry maintained close ties with organized crime networks.¹⁵⁷ Corruption was a common practice. The complex underground of criminals and gangs operating in collusion with political, military, and economic officials controlled most of the wealth and the movement of goods and services in every major industry.

Before the Dayton Peace Accord was implemented, organized criminal activity and widespread corruption allowed countries of the former Yugoslavia to circumvent international sanctions.¹⁵⁸ Corruption remains a prevailing condition today. A World Bank survey conducted in the summer of 2000 found that, "Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by (a) high level of public concern with corruption, (b) low level of public trust in the governments, (c) state capture and conflict of interest, (d) public administration inefficiencies reflected in widespread bribery in public offices, (e) distorted business environment and (f) a significant burden on poor households, exacerbating poverty and inequality."¹⁵⁹ This environment has created the conditions for organized criminals to flourish. Crime is prevalent and most of the area is major hub for trafficking in drugs, arms, aliens, and other contraband.¹⁶⁰ In August 2001, the UN mission chief in Bosnia Herzegovina reported that organized criminals earn at least 500 million DM [\$450 million] a year in smuggling.¹⁶¹

Corruption is having a direct impact on peace operations. Peacekeepers in the Balkans have been very successful in separating and disarming the warring parties, but institutionalized corruption and organized criminal networks have blocked efforts by the international community to establish or rebuild legitimate and effective political and judicial institutions.¹⁶² As long as corrupt elements maintain their grip on power, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) are not in a position to withdraw from the region. Without the restraining influence of international police and peacekeeping forces, hostilities are

likely to erupt again. Peacekeeping forces are trapped in what appears to be an intractable impasse. The United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines outlines what can happen to a society when criminal elements are embedded in political, social, and economic institutions:

"In the worst case scenario, the entire spectrum of law enforcement institutions, including the legally constituted police agencies, if they exist at all, may be crippled by the activities of parallel illegal structures and organizations who wield de facto policing powers because their origins and authority are rooted in the conflict. These parallel illegal structures may, in fact, dominate the political and economic landscape and, thereby, subvert or mold governmental institutions to further their own criminal enterprises. In such cases, local stability and sustained political and economic development depend upon the successful removal of these criminal enterprises from their sources of control and power."¹⁶³

U.S. military forces remain engaged in the Balkans and there are no indications that the Bush administration will withdraw U.S. troops anytime soon. Until legitimate and sustainable civil institutions are established in Bosnia and Kosovo, significant reductions in U.S. troop strength are unlikely. The establishment of these institutions will be a long and difficult process as long as persistent corruption empowers criminal elements that are committed to derailing the peace process. Since transnational crime threatens the development of legitimate civil and economic institutions, SFOR and KFOR have forged a unique partnership with multinational specialized [military police] units (MSUs). The MSUs [primarily Italian Carabinieri] are helping the U.S. military in a wide range of public security tasks (i.e., patrolling, crowd and riot control, weapons searches and seizures, criminal intelligence, security of repatriated refugees, and counter-terrorism).¹⁶⁴ The MSUs have a long tradition of combating organized criminals in Italy and provide the U.S. military critical capabilities to counter groups that undermine security and good governance.

Strategic Implications for the Military:

The rapid growth of transnational organized crime will have far-reaching and profound implications for the U.S. military. The sovereignty and security of nations in the developed and underdeveloped world are being challenged by non-state actors willing to use force or corruption to achieve their political or economic aims. Warring factions, insurgents, paramilitary forces, transnational terrorists, militants, armed bandits, and many others are able to continue

violence and conflict at a horrific pace because of the tremendous wealth amassed from organized crime activity. Revenue from organized crime pays for the weapons, military hardware, and supplies needed to sustain terror and conflict. While the nature of war has not changed, the kind of enemy (non-state actors) and their methods of operation are changing. Just a few years ago, non-state actors were largely ignored by the military. Terrorist groups, organized criminals, and similar groups were under the sole domain of law enforcement. It is obvious from the events of September 11th that all the elements of national power are needed to stop organized criminal elements, especially, transnational terrorist groups. One of the major implications for the military is a greater role in bringing transnational criminals to justice. Since law enforcement agencies are not resourced and equipped to capture non-state actors under the protection of a rogue or failed state, the military must assume the lead role in this endeavor.

The U.S. military is essentially leading the world's largest posse in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. But this role is not without precedent. A dozen years ago, U.S. forces invaded Panama and brought General Manuel Noriega to the U.S. for trial on drug trafficking charges. More recently, U.S. forces have participated in the apprehension of terrorists and war criminals in the Balkans. What is notable about the military's role in pursuing a terrorist organization is the sheer number of transnational terrorist groups and networks scattered around the world. The rapid spread of radical Islamic Fundamentalism has created a reservoir of groups opposed to U.S. citizens and interests. If transnational terrorists attack the nation again, the military may have to fight on multiple fronts in remote parts of the world.

Shortly after September 11th, President Bush adopted a much more aggressive national security strategy. Two foreign policy objectives have come forth: (1) stop transnational terrorist organizations and states who harbor them, and (2) stop the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President Bush's global campaign against terrorism is analogous to the policy of "containment" that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. Just as the nation opposed communism on a global scale during the Cold War, the military is now committed to opposing transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Several significant implications emerge from this commitment. First, the military must remain prepared to use force against states that sponsor international terrorism or provide sanctuary to transnational terrorist groups. During a recent interview, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reiterated America's determination to deny safe haven to global terrorists anywhere in the world.¹⁶⁵ Afghanistan may be the first confrontation in a series of armed conflicts aimed at stopping global terrorism.

An important lesson from the conflict in Afghanistan is that the military must maintain the versatility to engage in two very different kinds of warfare. Traditional ground warfare may not always be desirable or possible in the war against terrorism. Some transnational terrorist threats can be defeated surreptitiously with proxy forces as in Afghanistan and others will have to be subdued with conventional ground forces. Heavy reliance on air power and Special Operations Forces is not a panacea or blueprint for how the military should fight future wars.

A second implication of the nation's campaign against terrorism revolves around the requirement for the military to expand its training and support to friendly states combating terrorism. During a commemorative address marking the sixth month after the September 11th attacks, President Bush called on nations around the world to bring an end to global terrorist groups within their borders. The President declared, "If governments need training or resources to meet this commitment, America will help."¹⁶⁶ In addition to Special Forces trainers and advisors in the Philippines, the U.S. will provide counter-terrorism training to military units in Yemen and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Additional support may come in the form of intelligence, logistics, military equipment, and economic aid.

More countries are likely to request support in the war against terrorism, especially in regions where security forces are poorly trained and equipped. Combined exercises, security assistance, military exchanges, and military-to-military contacts may increase dramatically over the next several years. Counter-terrorism training in foreign states may root out some terrorist groups, but there are potential pitfalls to a wider engagement strategy. A larger U.S. military presence overseas may ignite anti-American sentiment in certain regions and increase the likelihood that terrorist groups will target U.S. troops. Another pitfall to guard against is the potential for host governments to become overly dependent on U.S. military training and assistance. A heavy influx of U.S. military personnel, equipment, technology, and other resources in a poverty-stricken region may create new dependencies. The military must ensure that assistance efforts are aimed at helping nations establish self-sustaining counter-terrorism programs.

Another implication of President Bush's campaign against terrorism is related to efforts to deny transnational terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction. These weapons pose the greatest danger to national and international security. Current trends in proliferation may pave the way for terrorists to acquire NBC weapons and duplicate Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 nerve gas attack in Tokyo. The U.S. has the freedom to act unilaterally against states that may smuggle NBC weapons to terrorist groups, but multilateral approaches are much more effective in the long run. Military coordination, intelligence sharing and strict enforcement of international

treaties and conventions can go a long way in preventing or thwarting NBC-related terrorist attacks. Strong international cooperation is an essential element in any strategy to suppress the flow of NBC weapons to terrorist.

In a similar vein, domestic interagency cooperation takes on greater importance in the war against terrorism. Transnational terrorism can't be defeated by military power alone. Terrorists are not always vulnerable to the common tools and warfighting concepts of the armed forces (i.e., dominant maneuver, target acquisition, lethal fires, etc.). Secretary of State Colin Powell has emphasized the need for a comprehensive interagency approach to defeat terrorism: "We are approaching this not as a single battle to be fought by the military but as a campaign that will involve all the elements of national power..."¹⁶⁷ As one member of a much larger team, the military will have to coordinate with dozens of other federal agencies that have counter-terrorism responsibilities.

The strategic implications of transnational organized crime are not limited to the crime of terrorism. The convergence of terrorism, drug trafficking and other kinds of transnational organized crime raises important implications for the military. First, the military has supported the war against drugs for over two decades. Since illegal drugs finance the operations of many global terrorists, U.S. counter-narcotics operations complement and reinforce counter-terrorism initiatives. It's in the nation's best interest for the military to continue its support to domestic law enforcement agencies. Likewise, an increase in military personnel at the nations borders, airports, and other ports of entry have made it more difficult for terrorists to enter the country. At the same time, the military's presence has led to an increase in drug seizures and reduced the flood of illegal migrants attempting to enter the country.¹⁶⁸

Historically, the American people have had strong reservations about the use of the military in domestic law enforcement missions. A common concern is that military-backed security measures will impinge on individual freedoms or erode civil liberties. However, heightened security measures, have not aroused serious public debate or attention since September 11th. On the contrary, a wider military support role in homeland security seems to have eased the fears of a nation worried about a cataclysmic terrorist attack.

Beyond the nation's shores, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other kinds of organized crime continue to undermine peace operations and nation assistance programs like "Plan Colombia". In many developing states, ruthless and violent criminals have carved out a niche in national political and economic structures. A struggle is underway between law-abiding citizens and criminal elements. The military's peace operations and nation assistance programs are a lifeline to legitimate institutions struggling for survival. The U.S. military can help ward off the

influences of criminal elements by maintaining security, promoting the rule of law, and reforming and training foreign militaries, police forces, and border services. On rare occasions, the military must continue to perform police and law enforcement functions in places where basic executive, legislative, and judicial institutions are rebuilding (i.e., Bosnia and Kosovo).

An obvious danger and implication for a broader military support role in law enforcement functions at home or abroad is strategic overreach. After the Gulf War, the U.S. made significant reductions in the Armed Forces. As troops deployed for peace operations [Bosnia] and humanitarian missions [Somalia], a common refrain in Defense Department circles was, "The U.S. military can't be a police force for the entire world." Prior to taking office, President Bush echoed this sentiment and expressed his antipathy to the concept of nation building. Since September 11th, the President now realizes that the nation cannot afford to neglect failed states and conflicts that have the potential to spiral out of control. The military may get stretched too thin if additional personnel and resources are not provided to meet its growing commitments at home and abroad.

Claueswitz said, "...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date..."¹⁶⁹ Clearly, this reference was meant for nation-states, but the dictum may have even more application to non-state actors who engage in terrorism, drug trafficking, and other transnational crimes that cause or contribute to armed conflict. The origins of criminal behavior can often times be traced back to the conditions that cause conflict (poverty, ethnic strife, territorial disputes, etc.) and they may also originate from the very heart and nature of man. Therefore, a final and decisive victory over transnational organized crime may never be realized. It may be more useful to look at transnational crime as a permanent condition that must be contained rather than a threat that can be eradicated.

Conclusion:

The military has learned much from its conventional victories of the past, but it's also important to learn from the non-traditional and asymmetric dimension of warfare. Events since September 11th bear out the fact that transnational organized crime is no longer a tangential concern for the military. Terrorism, drug trafficking; diamond trafficking and the exploitation of natural resources; and corruption are just a few of the seemingly disparate organized crime activities that fuel terrorism and the roughly 41 violent conflicts taking place in the world today.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, these crimes undermine peace operations, nation assistance programs,

and regional stability. A wide range of other organized crime activities could have been selected for study, but the conclusions would be the same: Transnational organized crime is a dangerous threat to international security and all the elements of national power, including the military must be used to address the problem. The military's expanded missions in the war against terrorism, its long-standing support role in the war against drugs, and recent experiences in peace operations offer new opportunities for the Department of Defense to reexamine its approach to national and international security. The war against terrorism is reshaping the nation's foreign policy and national military strategy. But terrorism is just one dimension of transnational organized crime. The multiple manifestations of organized crime must be recognized and confronted. Otherwise, organized criminals, insurgents, transnational terrorists, "narco-guerillas, armed factions, and others will continue to get the necessary revenue they need to sustain conflict and terrorist operations. Prolonged conflicts typically produce catastrophic consequences beyond the deaths and casualties that occur during war: displaced civilians, mass migrations, extreme poverty, rampant disease, and a breakdown in basic civil institutions. These problems usually spill over into the international community in the form of wider conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, terrorism, more organized crime, and lawlessness.

In addition to its impact on violent conflicts, transnational crime continues to undermine the sovereignty and strength of legitimate governments around the world. Many nations lack the capacity to challenge organized criminal networks and could experience the kind of internal strife and violence seen in Colombia today. The Balkans and other post-conflict societies are especially vulnerable. The U.S. military is not in a position to disengage from peace operations in the Balkans because civil institutions are still under development. It may take years or decades to establish self-sustaining executive, judicial, and legislative institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Peace operations and other conflict intervention measures are critical to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and the destabilizing effects of conflict in the region.

The U.S. military has proven that it is an organization with the capabilities, versatility, and depth to adapt to varying requirements and contribute more to law enforcement missions. The armed forces should not become subordinate to the Department of Justice and the military's basic mission of fighting the nation's wars should not change. However, the increasingly dangerous union of organized crime and conflict suggests that a closer partnership with law enforcement organizations is not only prudent, but also necessary. An expanded partnership will go a long way in protecting the American people from the growing threat of transnational organized crime.

WORD COUNT = 15,993

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