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THESIS

BUILDING PEACE IN WARLORD SITUATIONS

by

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BUILDING PEACE IN WARLORD SITUATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Peace operations are a relatively new phenomenon that emerged in the 20th Century. Because of a more interconnected world due to globalization, they have undergone rapid development as the nature of crises to which international intervenors respond have evolved to include events that were formerly considered sovereign affairs of a state. One such problem, pertaining more often than not to African countries, is the collapse of the state and the ascendancy of a warlord who exploits the state's resources for personal gain. International interventions in such a situation run the risk of having to return to retrace steps previously taken unless the true nature of the problem is addressed. This inherently requires solutions that go beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities toward far-reaching state-building goals. It is a difficult objective to achieve, and requires undoing the circumstances that allowed the country to devolve into warlordism in the first place. Understanding how warlordism develops and then raising critical issues for intervenors in such a situation, using Sierra Leone as a case study, will be constructive for future interventions under similar circumstances.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged at the end of World War I when the League of Nations was chartered to administer the Saar region, a region between Germany and France important for its strategic coal reserves that Germany was forced to relinquish as mandated by the Treaty of Versailles. The term “peacekeeping” eventually grew to include much more than its original meaning. The various types of peace operations stimulated the need for more accurate terminology to reflect the precise nature of the peace mission being undertaken. By and large this terminology has evolved to reflect whether peace operations are undertaken with consent of the warring factions and the extent to which peace operations will be carried out. Today, peace operations signify a variety of missions which can be categorized in four basic terms: peacekeeping –relatively benign and with consent; peace enforcement –potentially hostile and without consent; peace making –diplomatic efforts supplementary to peace enforcement, and peacebuilding –the most extensive, i.e. state building.

Coinciding with the amplification of peace terminology came an expansion in reasons for intervention. International humanitarianism and a swelling sense of belonging to a global civil society have redoubled the number of interventions over the past decade or so. Deciding why or when to intervene will remain uncertain and ill defined; nonetheless, expanding national interests within an increasingly integrated world society remains the primary motivation for intervention.

The question of how to intervene, though, is fundamentally simple. An intervention should have the ultimate purpose of inducing a populace to believe in its government and the system it represents. Mandating a political structure or running a surrogate government does not achieve this. Rather, intervenors must cultivate conditions that would allow for proper political structures to grow. In essence, the overall end goal is to restore and strengthen a responsible, popular, and legitimate government. If a populace does not believe in its government and, equally, in the standards of society as set by that government, then an intervention will fail regardless of how successful the intervenors were at remedying the conflict at hand.

A. CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY: PK, PE, PM, PB

Although a peacekeeping operation is a military operation, it is fundamentally different from peace enforcement because it does not need military force to bring the combatants to negotiations. Peacekeepers are present with the consent of all parties involved as a military operation to support diplomatic efforts. Peacekeepers are impartial facilitators of truces and negotiated agreements, and act as guarantors to the competing parties in a dispute.

Peace enforcement aims to stop armed conflict by separating combatants under duress with internationally sanctioned force or the threat of force. Unanimous consent from the belligerent parties is not required nor has it necessarily been obtained. Any hostile actions against members of the peacekeeping force must be summarily replied to with likeminded violence, e.g. military versus military. Rebuttal with force in kind will stabilize the peace process and demonstrate international resolve by demonstrating that aggressiveness will not be tolerated, and that the situation will not be allowed to relapse. “When a specific incident involves a military attack on international forces, it should be responded to in equal measure, not by a ranging foxhunt for the political leader but by a carefully planned and targeted strike against a specific unit of his forces.”¹

Although intervenors attempt to retain their neutrality, they typically become pawns themselves in the conflict, manipulated by either side against its competitor. Eventually, a peace mission will have to choose a stance—not necessarily a side—and through military action negate a competitor’s ability to persevere. It is important to remember that in many cases intervenors are sent in to stabilize an elected government, which comprises their neutrality from the start.

Whenever the relentless pursuit of an aggressor’s armed forces ensues, emphasis should be placed upon diplomatic efforts in order to lend a political tone to the peace mission—and thus try to induce the same within the conflict—rather than playing it out entirely in warfare. The conflict is pursued militarily until combatants’ armed capacity diminishes while simultaneous efforts are made to renovate combatants’ movements into

¹ William Zartman, “Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa,” in *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking*, ed. David Smock and Chester Crocker (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 101.

political parties. If no combat is occurring between competitors and no armed manipulation via violence is happening, then the process becomes easier and readily includes demilitarization and demobilization of soldiers. Peace-making is the step in between peace-enforcement and peacebuilding. It is the arduous process of mediation and negotiation designed to end dispute by establishing prospective resolutions.

Peacebuilding is the latest development in peace operations. Peacebuilding implements “the institutional, social, economic reforms that can serve to defuse or peacefully resolve conflict.”² Peacebuilding predominantly consists of post-conflict actions, chiefly economic and diplomatic that endeavor to rebuild the infrastructure and institution in order to avoid degeneration into conflict. It is a commitment by the international community to long-term development to forestall future outbreaks of armed conflict. Peacebuilding reflects the evolving nature of global conflict, exemplified by internal crises rather than problems between nations, and as such it focuses on determining a viable political process. Peacebuilding seeks the transformation of antagonism through combat into competition through politics. In other words, peacebuilding is:

Consolidating whatever degree of peace has been achieved in the short term and, in the longer term, increasing the likelihood that future conflict can be managed without resort to violence. Further, priority should go to the *political* dimension of conflict and its resolution. Although there will be many and various underlying causes of conflict, the proximate cause of internal violence is the fragility or collapse of political processes and institutions. The defining priority of peacebuilding thus becomes *the construction or strengthening of authoritative and, eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence.*³

B. FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

Steven Metz describes the confluence of three trends which converge to become the foundation of modern peace operations: (a) an immense increase in the danger that

² Michael Doyle, “Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 90.

³ Elizabeth Cousens, “Introduction” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 4.

regional conflicts might spread and escalate, (b) a paternalistic approach to security, (c) and a growing sense of interconnectedness and shared humanity.⁴ Prior to this contemporary approach based upon global interconnectedness and extended national interests, peacekeeping was quite unsophisticated and had a long road ahead of it to become what it is today. It used to be largely devoid of long-term political objectives outside of getting the combatants to the negotiating table to discuss an immediate end to hostilities.

Prior peace missions were triggered only when a government's capacity for governance and maintenance of law and order dissolved. In early peace operations, intervenors were satisfied with addressing only the absence of security and the presence of combat, considering the peace mission a success once law and order were established and elections held. Since the peace agreements after World War I, the nature of peace missions has developed considerably, from directly addressing security issues to implementing a responsible government with the capacity to address those issues itself.

There were three changes in the course of peace operations becoming what they are today. The first sort was the inclination of impartial nations to become involved in other nations' affairs with the purpose of global stability. Prior to the Great War, nations concerned themselves in another's affairs for direct, tangible gain. Before the League of Nations, established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 after World War I, there existed no all-encompassing, composite international body organized for the collective good. Committed to principles of self-determination, collective security, nonaggression, and arms reduction, the supra-national body of the League of Nations immediately stepped into the realm of conflict resolution for purposes of the common good.⁵

Although not always successful, ad-hoc, nonaligned conflict resolution had materialized for the greater good. The United Nations replaced the League of Nations in 1946 but retained the League's mindset to mediate international affairs. Almost from the

⁴ Steven Metz, "African Peacekeeping and American Strategy" in *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa*, ed. Robert Rotberg et al. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 42.

⁵ "World Government." Microsoft® Encart® Encyclopedia 2001. © 1993-2000.

outset, the UN interposed itself between warring states, monitoring cease-fires and impartially implementing peace accords.

Although there were several interpositions by the UN prior to its involvement in the Suez Canal, most historians consider the United Nations Emergency Force I of late 1956 to be the first United Nations peacekeeping operation. The undertaking was a success in that pressure by the international community immediately led to the end of armed hostilities by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt. This intercession involved United Nations personnel stepping into a situation with the combatant parties' consent, and the warring factions treating United Nations personnel as the neutral party they were.

Beginning after the First World War with the civil administration of the contested Saar region and evolving into the use of military force to consensually intercede between combatants, peace operations had grown from its infancy during the League of Nations' time into its new role of peacekeeping. A supra-national body separated acquiescent belligerents, who entrusted the peacekeeper to be an impartial monitor of the truce—one without any real enforcement power should violations occur.

The second advance in peace operations occurred during the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC) campaign between 1960-64. The United Nations' mission was to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo's transformation from a Belgian colony to an autonomous state. United Nations forces, however, soon found themselves in combat, and the role of peacekeeping forces changed with this event. No longer were peacekeeping forces simply a neutral intervening force—the blood of peace troops had been spilled and that of their aggressors in turn. It was now acceptable for peace missions to apply force or the threat of force, thus transforming passive peacekeeping into pro-active peace-enforcement. The significant changes were the absence of consent, and the application of military force or the threat thereof pursuant to international authorization. In retrospect, of course, the Congo might have provided a good case for the letting a conflict play itself out without intercession; arguably there is a “necessity of

war.”⁶ This suggests that international intervenors need to gauge whether their actions will ameliorate a conflict or temporarily impair it until it is re-aggravated at a later time.

The third transformation to occur was that peacekeeping forces would become involved in civil conflicts. Cold War polarization meant smaller nations’ interests were subjugated until the end of the East-West rivalry, but afterward latent domestic problems arose. As occurred in the 1960s, when autonomy for Africa’s countries came suddenly without their having had any real governing experience, abandonment by Cold War imperialists left African governments wobbly and uncertain. Since politics abhors a vacuum, when external support of superpowers withered within Africa, internal philosophies and the blossoming of a “politics of survival”⁷ supplanted it, creating unstable political situations characterized by the constant shuffling of bureaucrats, the granting of nonmerit appointments, and the use of dirty tricks to preempt competitors

At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union permitted western societies to reaffirm their commitment to democracy, human rights, and civil equality in a more vigorous way when they so chose. Particular attention was paid to democracy and free/fair elections. Violations of this norm were increasingly viewed as potential threats to international order, and so received closer scrutiny from the

⁶ An army’s business is war, and a nation its employer. If war is ‘an extension of politics through other means’ then careful must be given to whether to intervene when a conflict only involves plausible armies—regardless whether they are functionaries of a state or exist as a guerilla force.

Edward Luttwak described the necessity of war: “Although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.” He says that an imposed armistice artificially freezes a conflict in place, thereby perpetuating a potential state of war by shielding the weaker side from being strained to the point of ultimately having to yield and thus bringing about peace in yielding.

Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement.... Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin. Peace takes hold only when war is over.

For that reason consideration must be given to the condition of whether or not civilians are involved and to what extent. By no means is this prohibiting peace operations from separating armed combatants. There are certainly times when such operations are necessary and quite often welcomed by a weak government. Rather, this idea postulates the necessity of letting war between genuine armed combatants play itself out. A lasting peace can be achieved by exhausting one particular side’s will to fight.

Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36, 37-38.

⁷ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 214-226.

international community. Governmental activities by states that had previously been considered matters of internal concern beyond the scrutiny of international law or organizations became genuine issues of international concern and action.

C. PEACEBUILDING: A MODEL

Chetan Kumar provides a useful four-step model which can serve as the foundation for more detailed approaches to peacebuilding.⁸ First, a comprehensive analysis of the political landscape should occur. This analysis must include all antecedent factors to the current conflict and be completed for each competing perspective—individual, clan, community, national, regional and international—in order to ascertain gainful political objectives and resource requirements. Failing to adhere to Kumar’s first principle can produce catastrophic results for the peacebuilding process as evidenced by the failed peace mission in Somalia in the early 1990s. The clan-based system of Somalia society was initially ignored, which later caused deep trouble for the peace mission. The mission was too narrowly focused—feeding the populace—and the operation rapidly succumbed to “mission creep” to include tasks well beyond the original plan. More importantly, the ad hoc and uninformed nature of the peacebuilding mission was even more detrimental.

Kumar’s second step devises a carefully considered strategy which focuses not upon prescribing or operating political structures; but rather must identify appropriate conditions for these structures to emerge, as well as actions which will stimulate the appropriate conditions. This is a difficult stage because the quickest and most simplistic answer is to forcefully emplace the conditions upon the society. Compelling the conditions rather than cultivating them is akin to planting a tree without roots, which will topple over as soon as the supports are removed.

A positive example of this would be the well-devised peace mission in El Salvador. The characteristics of the 12-year civil war that started in 1979 were very similar to problems seen today in Africa. Over a half million people were internally

⁸ Chetan Kumar, “Conclusion” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 184.

displaced, over one million fled to foreign soil, the economy was devastated, political and social institutions suffered great reversal due to underfunding and corruption, and there was no recognizable government in conflict zones (68 out of 262 municipalities).⁹ The UN entered in 1990 and by identifying and addressing the major root causes of the war was able to turn El Salvador into a success story. “Balancing pragmatism and principled action” resulted in El Salvador avoiding a return to war, improving the human rights situation, building new institutions, strengthening the economy, and fostering democracy.¹⁰

Thirdly, modern peace operations are complex, involving multi-faceted organizations and therefore require coordination among the various intervenors to avoid contradictory or incompatible implementation. Purely military operations passed into extinction years ago. Besides several non-military yet governmental organizations such as the UN World Food Program or the UN High Commission for Refugees, the contemporary world has a plethora of non-governmental organizations eager to assist the needy. In a peace mission all the types of organizations—military, diplomatic, governmental aid agencies, and non-governmental aid groups—are very adept at successfully carrying out their callings. Because of the number of sundry outfits present, careful coordination and common deference to an overall leader must be made in order to avoid mutually negating or even coincidentally destructive activity. The tactful coordination and cajoling of the various benefactors can be one of the most difficult parts of the entire peace process.

In order to uphold and carry on with the positive renovations of the political process, Kumar’s fourth step seeks ongoing criticism and feedback, which is continually applied toward all of the preceding steps. Again, perspective from all areas is desired such that an accurate analysis can be made of the peacebuilding process’ current situation and future direction. As progress is made, the situation will certainly change from what

⁹ Robert Orr, “Building Peace in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 153.

¹⁰ Robert Orr, “Building Peace in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 153-176.

was conceived in the original plan. Therefore, the implementation phase has to be open to continual reassessment and adjustment.

In short, peacebuilding efforts will be most successful if they address a society's ability to manage tensions without resorting to violence. Peacebuilding takes into account the long-term factors that caused the violence but does not seek to remedy them as the peace mission's primary focus.¹¹ "The holding operation of yesteryear has been superseded by the multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace process. Where peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling the root causes of armed conflict in favour of containment and de-escalation, they are now mandated to seek just and lasting solutions."¹² Success will be signaled if the benefactors, especially the military and foreign governmental organizations, can depart without disrupting or setting back the process. Constant re-evaluation will encourage and maintain the momentum toward the ultimate goal of a self-sustaining political process. "The end of an intervention comes only when lawless forces are imprisoned or disbanded, and when a government exists that fully controls its territory, is regarded as legitimate, and has the means to prevent civil strife."¹³

D. PEACEBUILDING IN A WARLORD SITUATION

In a warlord situation, the ultimate criterion for success is a viable and stable political process, one in which domestic actors are convinced that their options exist purely in the political realm, and expression through force is rendered implausible. This, of course, entails a long, tedious process of transformation. Factions have to be demobilized and converted into nonviolent political movements. The process must have a spirit of credulity to it such that the politicians themselves believe in it. Only once the politicians, i.e. the leaders of the combatants, have settled their differences with votes instead of violence will the populace then begin to place its faith back in the political

¹¹ Chetan Kumar, "Conclusion" in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 185.

¹² Trevor Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping" in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 13.

¹³ Robert Rotberg, "Preventing Conflict in Africa" in *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa*, ed. Ericka Albaugh et al. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 166.

process and, in this fashion, the government. In short, the final objective is to strengthen a responsible government such that the common people restore legitimacy to it.

The most effective path to preventing renewed hostilities, then, is for international efforts to help a given society build its political capacity to manage conflict without violence. Moving beyond cease-fire to a deeper, self-enforcing peace depends on the emergence of social, political, and legal mechanisms to resolve conflict authoritatively, though this may not always mean democratically...Peacebuilding is not designed to eliminate conflict but to develop effective mechanisms by which a polity can resolve its rival claims, grievances, and competition over common resources.¹⁴

In effect, intervenors convert the problem at hand from a competition waged through war to a competition waged through politics. This is especially true when considering collapsed states and their progression towards warlord rule, wherein the population has lost its faith in the government. An intervention cannot focus solely upon stopping violence; it must address the absence of political institutions.

In essence, when intervention does occur it will require a long-term perspective—beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities—in order to establish a viable political system. Intervenors cannot diffidently stand between belligerents, but must instead transform those belligerents into politicians. This means that warlords will need to be debased by having their source of power removed. Disarmament and demobilization, however, should be recognized as a contingent step; not a sufficient goal in and of itself

Debasing warlords will give intervenors sufficient maneuvering room to bolster political stabilization strategies. Even then, the process does not stop with the first election. Elections are an indispensably vital step, but not the last. Representatives from the international community will have to remain beyond elections as a guarantor of human rights, the political process, and an example of international resolve in order to vitalize and sustain the process. Intervenors must become underwriters for the whole society and not just the embryonic government. Reconditioning a government without

¹⁴ Elizabeth Cousens, “Introduction” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 12.

co-opting the populace is nothing more than icing without a cake—it is sweet and pleasing but has no real substance underneath.

Intervenors will have to act as the “big brother” for the government, both in the familial and Orwellian senses. In the familial sense, intervenors are the backers of the government, enabling a fledgling government to foster political competition without militant antagonism. On the other hand, in the Orwellian sense of being a big brother, the intervenor will likewise inhibit foul play by the new government and restrain corruption and the excessive use of force. As an underwriter of the new political system, an intervenor gives the emerging political society room to agitate without having to resort to violence as a means of oppressing the competition.

In this regard, the political system is separated from personalized politics and in its place a new system is established. This new system permits political challenges to authority and peaceful power transfers. Unlike hegemonic rule, where power accumulation is deep but narrow, the new system should be both deep and inclusive. Domestic perspectives will be changed from an allegiance to personalities to dedication to the political system as an enduring process. In the end, warlordism must be replaced by nationalism.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The remainder of this thesis examines the events in Sierra Leone, its descent into warlordism, and the subsequent international peacebuilding mission. It outlines the process of warlordization while looking at the specific historical roots of Sierra Leone’s decline. Continuing with the historical background, the efforts of the various international intervenors will be studied, followed by an analysis of what remains to be done for the peace process to be complete. The overall intent is to discuss the essential points of peace missions in warlord situations, using Sierra Leone as the backdrop, in order to deduce practical lessons that can then be applied to future interventions.

Sierra Leone, a West African country slightly smaller in size than the state of South Carolina, is an ideal test case because it is a classic example of so many things gone awry in Africa. Granted independence in 1961 by Great Britain, the country

enjoyed early prosperity followed by a rapid downward spiral. From about 1970 onward the course was set for what is now being dealt with: a country whose governance degenerated into warlordism, but is now being restored due to international intervention. Its circumstances are ideally suited as a case study to examine international intervenors' prospects of building peace in a warlord situation. In the appraisal of Sierra Leone's situation, the first step of Kumar's four-step model—understanding the political landscape—is the subject of the next chapter. This chapter will establish the milieu by covering Sierra Leone's most important historical facts leading toward its warlord condition. It is important to develop a thorough understanding of warlordization so that it can potentially be avoided in the first place or, subsequent to that, successfully navigated during intervenors' reconstruction of the country.

The third chapter examines the second step, international interventions by way of a carefully considered strategy. Sierra Leone will be used as a case study to examine the appropriateness of intervenors' actions, with Executive Outcomes (a private security firm), ECOMOG (the military arm of ECOWAS), the United Nations, and Great Britain considered as the main intervenors. The on-going peacebuilding mission is a fitting example of what peace operations have evolved into, and the necessary longevity and depth of commitment required on intervenors' parts.

Because the last two steps, coordination among intervenors and continual reassessment incorporating mission feedback, are not yet complete in Sierra Leone they cannot be thoroughly analyzed. With those in mind the final chapter considers the intervenors' efforts and then brings forward the general conclusions to be made.

II. SIERRA LEONE'S SAGA

A. MODEL OF WARLORD PROCESS

This chapter examines the process of a state devolving into warlordism. It details the circumstances particular to Sierra Leone in order to set the background for analysis of peace missions specific to this case. In keeping with the first step of Kumar's 4-step model, for intervenors to respond to warlord situations they must first understand the protracted process of warlordization. The progression is a chain of more or less sequential events that can be described by a model: nationalism→hegemonic regime→venal networks→shadow state→warlord state. (See diagram at end of section.)

Nationalism at independence inflames politics in new states. Political leaders are eager to assert their agendas. Owing to the fact that these new states have had very little experience with sovereign politics, the dominant party behaves toward political competitors with little if any cooperation and believes any political concession detracts from its power. It strives to secure its preeminent position by constantly warding off competitors rather than building cooperative alliances. This is what Joseph Migdal calls the "politics of survival."¹⁵

Together with its intransigence, a regime seeks to retain its leading position by accumulating power at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is in large part a response to the weak ties between post-colonial institutions and society. Over time, state institutions are enfeebled by an increase of patronage appointments, which has the effect of displacing allegiances outside the bureaucracy's hierarchy and toward the regime leader. A leader's power becomes based increasingly upon his ability to grant non-merit access in exchange for political loyalty. The establishment of informal networks—first based upon political favors and later economic ones—accomplishes this personalized power concentration.

The patrimonial networks in reality represent a side-stepping of government as a formal process. Shifting power from within the bureaucracy to personal networks

¹⁵ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 214-226.

weakens the state. The unofficial networks eventually grow to replace the weak state with a shadow state that operates parallel to the weak state and outside of formal practices. Actions that once were governed by formal rules and regulations become accomplished within informal networks without regard for institutional procedure.

Eventually, a regime leader exhausts his means to grant further favors—he has reached the limits of his venal networks. He must then find other power bases, which he does in the international realm through his control of state resources in the international markets. His new power source is attained through the control of foreign income flows into his country and the ensuing distribution of non-merit access in exchange for political allegiance. As the strongman's politico-economic influence develops, so does the political clout he diverts from the legitimate government. If the state's bureaucracy is institutionalized enough, i.e. if it is strong enough, it might prevent the country from disintegrating into warlordism. If the big man, however, is stronger than the state, then it is doomed: the state's resources become prostituted for the warlord's profit.

The degree to which a person or organization is able to follow a warlord tack depends upon how weak the state is. Some states collapse further than others and it is the absence of a measure of institutional control that creates warlord opportunities. Warlords arise from the struggle among individuals competing for influence once held by government. In a weak state there is some small semblance of control that still exists independent of regime leaders within the bureaucracy. In a warlord state, informal associations and control of resources completely replace the institutionalized processes, thus transferring power entirely to individuals—the warlords.

In short, warlordization is a progression whereby early politico-economic competition among internal state leaders becomes corrupted into conditions promoted strictly for personal financial gain. Warlordization is the struggle within the shadow state for control, power, and security. Allegiances are pyramidically constructed out of patrimonial networks—from the top-down in terms of provisioning political/economical power and from the bottom-up for obtaining needs once furnished by the state. In this process, legitimacy once provided to state institutions is transferred to individuals and

groups through the guise of personalized power accumulation. Using Sierra Leone as a historical account, this decline into warlordism is subsequently examined.




Figure 1

B. BACKGROUND

From its colonial days, Sierra Leone inherited two principal legacies. First, its leaders learned that a convenient way to deal with opponents was through acute force. Quasi-judicial force had been applied by their colonial masters upon Sierra Leoneans, who then employed the lesson against their own opponents. Second was the system of patrimonialism imposed upon the country as a way of government. Political challengers were placated with extended favors.

Beginning with their “discovery” by the Portuguese in 1446, the indigenous people endured a territorial tug of war among the Portuguese, French, and British over the next couple of centuries.¹⁶ The British at long last prevailed, somewhat by default. Philanthropists established a freedmen’s colony in 1787, which the British government later used as a naval base to force emancipation on any slave ships it encountered on the high seas. Re-settling the newly freed slaves within the peninsula colony brought together a diverse mixture of people, in contrast to the autochthons on the mainland. It is here that the stage was set for the first fissures in Sierra Leone’s citizenry.

Creoles as a society flourished. From the beginning, significant importance had been placed on schools, with the first school opened in 1792. Another school, opened in 1815, was upgraded and relocated a few times until it was finally situated at Fourah Bay on the peninsula and later became Fourah Bay College, a university-level institution.¹⁷

Aided by their high education levels and European mortality given the infectious tropical climate, Freetown Creoles began to occupy increasingly important colonial civil service posts throughout West Africa. This society of shopkeepers and public servants was in strong contrast to the agricultural colony intended by the original settlers. The ability and ambition of the Creoles of the Freetown Peninsula resulted in their obtaining leading roles in government service and trade throughout West Africa, such as in Liberia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and The Gambia. Because of its elevated cultural status, Freetown became known as the “Athens of West Africa”.

¹⁶ A.P. Kup, *Sierra Leone 1400-1787* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 1.

¹⁷ Irving Kaplan and others, *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 22.

In 1884 and 1885 the Conference of Berlin began the allocation of West Africa by entente. By 1888 European powers had divided up all of West Africa, which solidified by default Sierra Leone's future borders even though Great Britain was reluctant to get involved with the Sierra Leone mainland. In large part due to a more imperialistic parliament in Britain, on August 31, 1896 Sierra Leone's governor Fredrick Cardew declared the mainland a "Protectorate" directly under British control. Sierra Leone now consisted of the "Colony" on the peninsula and the "Protectorate" on the mainland, divided as much by culture and custom as by geography. In due time these two groups would develop into political competitors—the Creoles lived in the Colony and the Protectorates on the mainland.

This friction manifested itself in the Hut Tax War during the final years of the nineteenth century when the natives of the mainland Protectorate attacked Creole traders and Whites, and were then consequently targeted by the British troops protecting the colonists and the colonial administration's policies. The natives rebelled at this tax, imposed to pay for administrative costs, as a symbol of British oppression. In the six months it took British forces to regain control, over one thousand Creoles and Whites were killed by the native Mende and Temne. Over two hundred of the chiefs involved were arrested and at least eighty-three hanged. The Protectorate's rebellion was the first spark of organized nationalism, as people in the Protectorate strained at the restraints placed on them by their colonizer.

The overall outcome of the Hut Tax War was a sort of two-way repulsion. The natives of the interior now firmly resisted the "Creolization" that had been creeping inward. At the same time, the British no longer trusted Africans, Creoles among them, and from about this point forward appointed only British to interior posts of importance.¹⁸ "So it came about that by 1912 Africans in Sierra Leone, for example, held only one in

¹⁸ "Sierra Leone Colonial History", *NewAfrica.com*. 2000. Available [Online] <<http://www.newafrica.com/history/history.asp?countryID=44&subweb=History&category=Colonial>> [24 January 2002].

six of the senior official posts, whereas as recently as 1892 they had still held nearly half of those posts.”¹⁹

Furthermore, the Hut Tax War provided the British with the opportunity to impose political structure upon the Protectorate. The British created an all-inclusive hierarchical system of chiefs where none had previously existed. The British compelled the native groups to subordinate themselves to “paramount” chiefs who were chosen by the British from among the most important groups because of their loyalty to the British. Subchiefs were then compelled to answer to Paramount Chiefs. The Paramount Chiefs were liable to the colonial administration, and if their actions—no matter how legitimate from the chief’s point of view—did not coincide with the desires of the administration, he was often but not always summarily dismissed and replaced by a more “cooperative” chief: a sycophant who was willing to toady himself to the administration, even to the detriment of those he was representing. In exchange, the truckler would receive personal enrichment of one form or another. This design made patrimonialism throughout the territory, especially within the Protectorate, routine.

The 1930s would mark the next profound set of changes for Sierra Leone, such as a strong economic transformation away from tradition. The Great Depression saw a drop in the demand for Sierra Leone’s agricultural products, but the discovery of diamond deposits in 1930 and the opening of a large iron mine in 1933 countered this decline. By 1938 the two mineral deposits accounted for 65 percent of the country’s exports.²⁰

In 1937, in a move designed to bring the populace more under government control, Sierra Leone adopted the same administrative system as was in place in another British colony, Nigeria. The chiefs were deemed salaried officials. Salaries replaced their traditional sources of income and additionally burdened them with the responsibility of providing local services paid for from taxes collected in the locality. Consequently, they were thus further removed from being chiefs over their people and instead became bureaucrats, as the government unsuccessfully attempted to co-opt the populace, i.e. the

¹⁹ Basil Davidson, *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1992), 41.

²⁰ Irving Kaplan and others, *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 30.

chiefs' subjects, more directly beneath it. Many chiefs, however, were resistant to these changes, which was implemented only piecemeal throughout Sierra Leone. They were therefore able to defend some of their traditional authority and thus retain a local-level organization somewhat separate from that of the government. To illustrate how resistant the chiefs were to being drafted into the government, as late as post-World War II only half the chiefdoms had official treasuries.²¹

Educated autochthons also appeared in the 1930s. The sons of chiefs had been among the first to be educated and now, grown up, they began taking part in the politics and administration that their fathers had been warding off. One of the first Protectorate men to assert his rights was Milton Margai, who would later become Chief Minister in 1953 and the first Prime Minister in 1960. From the outset he was a Protectorate activist who campaigned for the Protectorate to be placed on an equal footing with the Creoles' colony.

Margai was instrumental in Sierra Leone's self-governance, having organized a council of chiefs and elites that met annually beginning in 1940. This council, known as the Protectorate Education Progressive Union (PEPU), was a conglomerate of Protectorate elites whose purpose was to educate their compatriots in the Protectorate about their political and civil rights. It was, however, more or less only an unofficial council. In 1946, under Margai's leadership and in cooperation with John Karefa-Smart, the Sierra Leone Organization Society was established. Known as "SOS" and composed of Protectorate elites such as the educated and chiefs, this society was the first true organized political voice for the Protectorate. "Essentially conservative, it was based on an alliance between chiefs and educated hinterlanders, two groups who were closely related by family ties."²²

By 1947 there were basically four different interest groups in Sierra Leone: Creole settlers, Protectorate chiefs, Protectorate elites, and Protectorate commoners. The Creoles aligned themselves under the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCSL). In the Protectorate the SOS allied itself with the chiefs to form the Sierra

²¹ Irving Kaplan and others, *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 30.

²² Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 13.

Leone's People's Party (SLPP), which was under Margai's leadership. "From the end of the nineteenth century until independence, the most divisive ethnoregional conflict pitted colony Creole elites against Protectorate African elites. The Creoles, separatist in their political attitudes and aspirations, rejected political equality with protectorate Africans and the latter resented both the assertion of superiority by Creoles and their relative dominance in local politics prior to decolonization."²³ (Because Creoles were concentrated on the peninsula they consequently dominated municipal politics in the country's capital.) Sierra Leoneans had become politicized in large measure.

The 1950s saw development of party politics, future leaders, and riots. The SLPP continued to be the controlling faction within Sierra Leone, but Protectorate commoners felt increasingly alienated from the objectives of the SLPP and from their chiefs. Widespread rioting in 1955-56 resulted from an increase in taxes, which was an SLPP decision implemented by the chiefs. The SLPP could have successfully defended the increase by pointing the finger of public attention at the chiefs, being the bureaucrats responsible for levies within their chiefdoms. Unfortunately, the SLPP failed to take advantage of the riots as an excuse to politically distance itself from the chiefs.

Dissatisfied with SLPP, some of its younger leaders joined forces under the leadership of a moderate Creole, Cyril Rogers-Wright, to form the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1956. UPP consequently suffered from the perception that it was nothing more than a Protectorate mask worn by a Creole party. Although it never was able to gain broad-based support, the UPP did manage to win some seats in the 1957 elections. It gained five seats but was written off as too Creole-led to be effective.²⁴

After the elections, another group hived off from the SLPP to form the People's National Party (PNP). By a single-vote margin Albert Margai was elected to lead the SLPP in place of his brother Milton, but later stepped down after Milton promised that Albert's ally, Siaka Stevens, would be returned to the cabinet. This gesture was another early example of extending favors to assuage political challengers, but it did not fully work. It was Milton's failure to honor this and other pledges, along with Albert's more

²³ Sahr Kpundeh, *Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone* (Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1995), 130.

²⁴ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 14.

progressive ideology, that triggered Albert to form the PNP in 1958—a short-lived alliance that would further evolve into other political parties.²⁵

Party Name (date)	Leader	Support base	Platform
SLPP (1951)	Milton Margai	• Protectorate educated elite and Paramount Chiefs • Mende (southerners)	• Advancement of the Protectorate
NCSL		• Creole	• Protection of the Colony
UPP (1956)	Cyril Rogers-Wright	• Moderate Creoles and younger SLPP	
PNP (1957)	Albert Margai Siaka Stevens	• UPP and younger, more progressive SLPP • Dominated by Mende • Close to the chiefs • Northern commoners • Less well-connected and less well-educated townsmen	• More nationalistic policies • More rapid social change • More rapid progress toward independence • African control of civil service and industry
Kono Progressive Movement (1957) (SLPIM)	Tamba Mbrwa	• The Kono farmer	• Focused exclusively on the Kono commoner
APC (1960)	Siaka Stevens	• Northerners (initially) • Commoners	• Socialism • Need to curb chiefs
NDP (1970)	Ibrahim Taqi	• Younger, more radical APC members	• Anti-communists
UDP (1971)	John Karefa-Smart	• NDP • Temne	• Anti-Stevens

Table 1: Early Political Parties

C. NATIONALISM

The nationalist regime in power at independence, the new but formal-process-building regime, is the starting point for possible state collapse. The beginner-government under the charge of the nationalist regime is too inexperienced to be secure with political opposition. Even though greater collaboration is called for, the nationalist regime in charge instead rebukes the opposition rather than negotiate with it. The opposition is either co-opted, and thus eliminated, or it reacts with ever-increasing fervor,

²⁵ “Sir Albert Michael Margai”, *Sierra Leone Web*. Available [Online] <<http://www.sierra-leone.org/heroes8.html>> [07 February 2002].

more or less equal to that to which it is subjected, and the competition escalates. As one side counters the other's move, the struggle for government intensifies.

It should be recalled, however, that imperialists introduced political restrictions as a way of dealing with earlier nationalist challenges. Even before reaching the starting block of an autonomous government, the nationalists had been taught that the best way to deal with a government's exigencies is to silence enemies through persecution, exile, imprisonment, or execution. The combination of the political system lacking lengthy temporal legitimacy as an adhered-to formal process, combined with the inexperience of the controlling faction and its uneasiness in dealing with opposition, engenders heavy-handed behavior, which consequently sets the stage for the emergence of hegemonic regimes. The nationalist regime in control clings to the power it has, believing itself to be overly vulnerable. By doing this it severely hinders the development of the government as a legitimized institution, and also chokes off healthy political competition.

The up-and-coming political parties that developed during the few decades before independence in Sierra Leone epitomized the tension between Creoles and Protectorates, as did the harsh methods the colonial administration used to suppress it. By independence, however, the Creoles came to recognize the electoral supremacy of the hinterland and realized they must align themselves with hinterland-based parties in order to exert political influence. Similarly, the hinterland based parties recognized the value-added that the Creoles brought with them; namely, wide-ranging access to the civil service, judiciary, and professions.²⁶

In early 1960 Great Britain began talks with the ruling SLPP party to discuss independence for Sierra Leone. Many, however, were opposed to the SLPP's platform of post-independence elections instead of elections held beforehand. In March of 1960 Milton Margai eliminated the opposition's grumbling by building a coalition before the final pre-independence constitutional conference. This umbrella coalition, the United

²⁶ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 14. Although not necessarily in the positions of power they had been prior to the turn of the century, the Creoles continued to hold a disproportionately large number of important jobs due to their superior educational qualifications. Irving Kaplan and others, *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 69.

National Front, presented a common front to Great Britain at the upcoming conference, thus satisfying Great Britain's requirements for its colony's independence. Designated as Prime Minister, Milton had promised ministerial appointments to opposition leaders in return for their cooperation, another clear case of trying to oil squeaky wheels.

At the same time, a new quarrel crystallized around one man in particular. Being concerned that the government's configuration would be cemented in place upon independence, Siaka Stevens insisted on having a plebiscite before independence to reorganize the government. When that did not come to fruition he promptly vocalized his objections and gained immediate widespread support. The lines were drawn between Margai's Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and Stevens' All People's Congress (APC). Sierra Leone's main political dichotomy between the Protectorates and Creoles was thus configured into one between opposing nationalist factions.

It should be noted that at this point Stevens was simply organizing a group of people within the SLPP sharing the same political viewpoint on nationalism—that the government should be reorganized before independence. It was not until the SLPP resisted the idea of governmental reorganization that Stevens' splinter group hived off and found fairly widespread initial support. The SLPP, in essence, was too inflexible in defending its lead role in the government at the time of independence. The main political personages had for the most part been pacified, save for Stevens. In this sense, the SLPP's unwillingness to compromise created what would become its most troublesome political competitor, the APC.

The SLPP granted no political leeway to the APC on the issue, irritating APC followers to the point of violence. Riots broke out protesting the lack of elections. Beyond completely abandoning the progress toward Sierra Leone's self-governance that had been made, Great Britain had no other course but to press on. A state of emergency was declared to restore order. Forty-four APC leaders, including Siaka Stevens, were jailed in March. They were released a month after Sierra Leone was granted independence, which came on April 27, 1961. Their imprisonment served as a final colonial reminder to Sierra Leone's first government, with the SLPP in charge, that the easiest way to deal with the opposition was to remove it from the equation.

Although several other political parties came into being, the succeeding decades would witness the continued of the SLPP/APC struggle in Sierra Leone's politics. Upon his death in 1964 Milton's brother Albert Margai replaced him as Prime Minister and SLPP leader. Albert was not as skilled a politician as Milton, and compounded his difficulties by openly pushing for a one-party state, and trying to concentrate power further into his own hands and those of his close associates within the party. As a result, the SLPP found its popularity declining in the APC's favor, which the 1967 elections showed.

Albert Margai tampered with the electoral machinery with the aim of ensuring his own return, but did not manipulate the system enough to assure his reinstatement.²⁷ The elections were held in two phases. The first phase on March 17 selected the popularly chosen members from the various political parties for the slightly enlarged House of Representatives. The second phase, to occur on March 21, was to determine which Paramount Chiefs chosen by the district councils would win the additional 12 seats reserved for them.

The SLPP won twenty-eight seats to the APC's thirty-two, but six independents yet held the determining balance. Furthermore, the twelve Paramount Chiefs' seats were still a factor as well. When four of the independents indicated their opposition to the SLPP, Governor-General Henry Lightfoot Boston—a Creole earlier appointed by Milton Margai—swore in the APC's Siaka Stevens as the new Prime Minister on March 21 without awaiting the results of the Chiefs' elections which could have still determined a different majority winner. Perhaps Boston had assumed the chiefs' compliance with the winning party (APC) because "chiefs as administrative agents have to act in concert with the government of the day."²⁸

At this point three consecutive military interventions occurred. These actions can be identified as "seesaw coups" that winnowed the competition in a game of attritional politics.²⁹ At the behest of Albert Margai, the military commander of Sierra Leone's

²⁷ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 15.

²⁸ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 83.

²⁹ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 484-486, 497-499.

1,200-soldier army, Brigadier General David Lansana, arrested Stevens and declared martial law on the pretext of needing to await the outcome of the Chiefs' election and claiming that the constitution had been thus violated.³⁰ Lansana then mandated a meeting to occur on March 23 among all the newly elected, including the Chiefs, to vote on their choice of Prime Minister.

It should be noted that Lansana had close family ties to Margai through Lansana's sister-in-law, a cabinet minister in Margai's government.³¹ Also of special note is that the coup would not have been possible without the assistance of Lieutenant Samuel Hinga-Norman, who was then the aide-de-camp to the Governor General.³² Hinga-Norman initiated the coup by refusing to let the Governor General hand over power to the elected official.

The response to this coup was intense. On March 23 a group of senior army and police officers arrested Lansana and formed what they called an interim government named the National Reformation Council (NRC). Meanwhile, Stevens fled into neighboring Guinea. The NRC's proclaimed objective was to avoid violence and investigate the SLPP government's corruption and inefficiencies—but without the “limitations” of a democratic political process. NRC would then return the government to civilian rule.

The NRC, though, never won the support of the chiefs or the educated civilian elite (SLPP's power base), and also alienated commoners (APC's power base) by placing too much reliance upon the very civil service NRC was supposed to be investigating for corruption. A year later, on April 17, 1968 a revolt among the army's noncommissioned officers and enlisted men ended the NRC's rule. Nearly all officers and ranking police were jailed. Nine days later, Siaka Stevens returned from exile, along with other ostracized APC leaders, and was sworn in as prime minister. “But Stevens' accession did

³⁰ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 15.

³¹ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 484-486, 463.

³² Hinga-Norman is the Deputy Minister of Defence in the current (2002) government, and will shortly become the Minister of the Interior, overseeing the police and border control functions.

not restore the government's responsiveness to hinterland electoral pressures so much as enable a new regime...to gain access to the sources of control.”³³

This synopsis of events confirms a lack of formalized politics. In the few short years since its independence Sierra Leone had diverged from instituting an enduring political system that incorporated inherent and self-enforcing respect for its procedures. In its place personalized power struggles played out via political favoritism that served to severely weaken the government as an institution. Equally important, Sierra Leoneans were introduced early on to the idea that politicking was not limited to politicians—the army could play whenever it wanted. Unfortunately, this would serve as a poignant precursor of events to come.

D. HEGEMONIC REGIME

The first step toward state collapse suggests that political structure as a formalized process had insufficient time to take root. This step represents the metamorphosis of the nationalist regime into a purely hegemonic one, or the appropriation of power by a prospective hegemonic regime. Given intensifying political efforts, rival regimes eventually become exclusionary power-hungry ones, in quest of asserting dominion over others. If and when one emerges as dominant to assume the hegemony, the next step toward state collapse has been taken.

A hegemonic regime transfers power from the government to the people of its inner circle as a means of self-preservation. In other words, the regime makes its leaders inseparable from government as a way to stave off competitors and protect its power. The act of personalizing power destabilizes the government by undermining the citizenry's belief in governance as a formal process. This marks the transition to a hegemonic regime.

In the months after the counter coup in April 1968, when the “Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Government” returned Stevens to power, the fragile peace between the APC and the SLPP began to fall apart with both sides accusing the other of instigating the NRC coup. The APC continually strengthened its governmental control, while SLPP

³³ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 43.

supporters expressed resentment in riots throughout the SLPP's southern strongholds. To add insult to injury, in elections that same year twenty-six of the twenty-eight SLPP members elected to parliament were declared by the courts to have been improperly elected.

The unrest in the south peaked in November of 1968 during elections held to fill the vacated SLPP seats. Consequently, the APC government declared a state of emergency which granted it broad powers of arrest and detention without trial. The government promptly used its fortified power to imprison members of the opposition. More than ninety SLPP politicians, including the new leader Jusuf Sherif, were held from November 1968 until the state of emergency expired in February 1969. The APC had remembered well from when its members were incarcerated years earlier that extra-judicial imprisonment was a convenient method to deal with competitors. In so doing it was strengthening its role as a hegemon in general, and winnowing Stevens' political competition in particular.

The APC's influence continued to increase and Stevens' along with it. In January 1969 Stevens announced plans to formalize Sierra Leone's severance from the crown in order to become a republic. This strategy would convert the governor-generalship into a presidency to be occupied by the leader of the ruling political party. Many, however, feared that such a process would grant Stevens too much executive power at the expense of weakening the rest of the government. In an ironic twist of fate, Albert Margai had initiated the move toward a single party state in 1967. Margai was only partially successful, though, in that the motion required approval by two different parliaments. Although Albert Margai and his SLPP were unseated before reaffirming the proposal with a second parliamentary vote, the stage was set for the APC's benefit.

In September 1970, apprehension about Stevens' potentially enormous presidential powers caused members to break with the APC. John Karefa-Smart, who had been out of the country for the previous several years while serving at a United Nations posting (an example perhaps of political shuffling to distance potential rivals), accused Stevens of failing to lead the country and of trying to assume dictatorial powers. Karefa-Smart demonstrated his opposition to Stevens in the form of another new political

party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). The formation of new political parties was a clear example of other hegemonic hopefuls vying for the top. “The Sierra Leone system...depended not on any single group with a strong vested interest in maintaining the existing structure, but rather on a balance between competing groups each of which hope to achieve some of its objects through it.”³⁴

The UDP concentrated on dethroning Stevens by capturing his basis of political support; specifically among the Temne in the north. Although Stevens was a Limba (at the time the third largest group comprising 10% of the population, behind the Mende’s and Temne’s 30% each³⁵) his political strength resulted from his support by Temnes. Mounting resentment towards Stevens’ emergent presidential powers and the depreciation of his political support base triggered Stevens to declare another state of emergency. In addition, he also accused the UDP of being financed by foreign interests worried about Sierra Leone expropriating a majority concern in British mining companies operating in Sierra Leone.

UDP supporters demonstrated their growing frustration when they reacted to these events with violence, attacking APC offices and other government targets in the north and Freetown. The government forcefully suppressed the violence, banned UDP and its newspapers, and jailed sixty-six UDP leaders. Outside of Sierra Leone, supporters of the UDP and the SLPP joined forces to form the National Liberation Movement in opposition to the APC.

Additionally, on October 13, 1970 the government arrested twelve soldiers for allegedly plotting another coup. These twelve were noncommissioned officers and warrant officers, to include Warrant Officer Alex Conteh—a major player in the April 1968 coup that overthrew the army officers’ NRC, restored Stevens to power, and returned Brigadier Bangura as head of the army. The main organizers of this 1970 coup were sentenced to death. In January 1971 Stevens traveled to Guinea to establish an initial agreement of mutual security with Guinean President Touré. Impelled by this, but also with other intentions, a drunken army major led a very clumsy attempt to assassinate

³⁴ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 69.

³⁵ Irving Kaplan and others, *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 66.

President Stevens on March 23, 1971. The president's guards repelled this wayward army unit's attack, along with a second attempt at noon. Brigadier Bangura took charge of the rebel forces later that day and continued the rebellion, but loyal government forces suppressed the uprising. Four of the eighteen military men implicated in this failed coup were sentenced to death, with Bangura among them. Their executions by firing squad a few months later, in June 1971, were the first capital punishments to be carried out. Even those responsible for the 1967 coup were still in jail.

With the aim of fortifying his personal control, Stevens flew to Guinea to sign a mutual defense pact on March 25, 1971. As a result, two hundred Guinean troops took up residence in Freetown as his presidential guard, a safeguard against Stevens' own chaotic army.³⁶ (The last Guinean guards did not leave Sierra Leone until mid-1973.) Stevens had sought international assistance in producing a personal praetorian guard whose loyalties were strictly to the president and not to the country of Sierra Leone.

Once Stevens became president in April 1971, he made speeches, with undertones of a push toward a single-party state, about the voluntary amalgamation of the existing parties while at the same time he worked to make life difficult for APC's main opposition, the SLPP. In the 1973 by-elections, for example, many SLPP members were physically prevented from filing their nomination papers. Of those who were able to file, twelve were declared to have improperly done so and their applications were therefore annulled. In response to this treatment, the SLPP boycotted the elections entirely. As a result, the APC won ninety-nine of the available one hundred seats (with one seat remaining vacant), and Sierra Leone became a de facto one-party state. Regrettably, boycotting the elections only served to help the APC.

It was at this point that the government sought to gain SLPP support via reconciliation efforts. All of the leaders (largely SLPP-oriented) of the 1967 and 1968 military coups were set free in 1973. This was not the first time opposition leaders had been released. In February 1972 the government liberated twenty-eight jailed UDP leaders. Despite this attempt to appease the opposition, a state of emergency remained in force.

³⁶ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 67.

This measure was proved prudent given another attempted coup in January 1974. While President Stevens was out of the country the acting Vice-President, Christian A. Kamara-Taylor (then Finance Minister), survived an attempt on his life. Fifty-five people were arrested, most of whom were associated with the previously banned UDP rather than the SLPP. Twenty-four were tried, twenty sentenced to death, and eight were actually executed. Those sentenced to death included Brigadier General David Lansana—instigator of the first coup in March 1967, Lieutenant Colonel A. Juxon-Smith—chairman of the subsequent NRC coup, and Private Morlai Kamara—a leader in the 1968 coup that overthrew the NRC and returned control to civilians.

In March 1976, Parliament elected Stevens to his second and, according to the constitution, final five-year term. Growing dissatisfaction with Stevens' government materialized into student demonstrations in January and February 1977. The APC's counter-demonstrations devolved into rioting that sparked additional violence throughout the country. Declaring another state of emergency, Stevens used considerable force to suppress the situation. It was plain to see that the political opposition was accustomed to violence as the government's means of exhibiting political might. Equally, the party in power did not hesitate to escalate the conflict via its own violent demonstrations. Such use of violence has been described as a way to maintain subordination and allegiance,³⁷ and violence played a persistent role in Sierra Leonean politics:

The Stevens government after 1968 made the most systematic use of detentions...On occasions...the government showed itself prepared to exercise whatever coercion was necessary to stay in power, and to suppress the opposition violence which resulted...What *is* clear is the continued role of violence [force used against the government] and coercion [force used by the government] in Sierra Leonean central politics.³⁸

In the general elections held in May 1977, the APC again won. The APC had grown stronger in the SLPP's absence because it was able to court favor among subgroups without having to worry about the SLPP counteracting its political

³⁷ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 35.

³⁸ Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 66.

maneuvers.³⁹ Even though the SLPP participated in the current elections it only managed to gain fifteen of the one hundred seats. Again, displeasure with the process was manifested in violence and allegations of electoral infractions.

Stevens was finally able to officially make Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978, and “a personality cult developed around Stevens.”⁴⁰ The diminutive numbers of SLPP MPs were unable to mount any significant opposition to the June constitutional referendum, which concomitantly proscribed the SLPP. When the House of Representatives reassembled, the new single-party constitution forced the former SLPP members to either resign or cross the aisle.

The democratic, decentralized system that initially existing [sic] upon Independence was progressively dismantled, culminating in a highly centralized regime that did away with local government and imposed one-party rule in 1978, concentrating power and resources in Freetown, disenfranchising the populations, and depriving the rural population of infrastructure, education and health care.⁴¹

The first single-party elections were held in May 1982. Even these were still spoiled by violence when at least fifty people were killed as a result of vicious campaigning.⁴² Earlier having suggested that he would step down as early as the 1982 election, Stevens held onto his presidential powers and, in fact, did not retire until the end of 1985.

Stevens had at last succeeded in formally strengthening his individual control over the government and its resources. Moreover, he did so at the expense of participatory politics. Anyone who wanted to participate in the government, including bureaucrats, had to be a member of the political party over which Stevens reigned. Rather than diminishing political quarrels, single-party rule weakened the system of governance by pushing political differences into the dark where they festered. Stevens had succeeded in transforming his hegemonic APC regime into one of personalized

³⁹ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 437.

⁴⁰ Stephen Riley, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?* (London: The Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996), 5, Conflict Studies 287.

⁴¹ “Key Challenges: Instituting Good Governance,” *Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone {Draft Version}*, World Bank Office Sierra Leone, 28 Nov 2001.

⁴² *Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia: 1995-96* (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited, 1995), 36.

power—those who wanted to play a part now officially had to court Stevens’ favor rather than be able to be engaged in participatory politics.

E. VENAL NETWORKS

When a hegemonic regime devolves into venal networks the state itself is progressively debilitated. Its citizenry, instead of looking to the government for action and assistance, turn to power figures. The more a hegemonic regime hoards power, the more the state begins to fall apart, thereby creating a seedbed for warlords. The way a hegemonic regime holds on to its power is by distributing public resources in return for political loyalties.

In a situation where the state is the principal employer of labour and almost the sole provider of social amenities, and where a personal ambition for power and wealth and influence rather than principle determines political affiliations and alliances, power to dispense patronage is a very potent weapon in the hands of the President, enabling him to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people at various levels of society. Loyalty of this type secured by patronage produces an attitude of dependence, a willingness to accept without question the wishes and dictates of the person dispensing the patronage.⁴³

Even though Stevens and his APC were successful in converting Sierra Leone into a single-party state, the hegemonic push for this feat began with Albert Margai’s SLPP in the late 1960s.⁴⁴ “Although liberal democratic and competitive politics was a feature of the first post-independence years, under Milton [Margai] (1961-64) and Later Albert Margai (1964-67), the democratic process was limited by Albert Margai’s growing authoritarianism and undermined by the failure of the political leadership to respect the results of the 1967 election, which Albert Margai lost.”⁴⁵ Although Albert Margai had initiated the push toward consolidating power within his party—and therefore increasing his personal power—it was Stevens who completed the deed.

⁴³ Mbu Etonga, “An Imperial Presidency: A Study of Presidential Power in Cameroon,” in *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification*, ed. Ndiva Kofele-Kale (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980) 142, quoted in John Mukum Mbaku, *Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Africa* (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Co, 2000), 47.

⁴⁴ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 40.

⁴⁵ Stephen Riley, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?* (London: The Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996), 4, Conflict Studies 287.

Under APC's hegemonic rule all the institutions that might have served to check government agencies were eliminated, and debauched political patronage stepped out into the daylight. Consolidation of the one-party system in 1978 begat widespread abuse and scandals because it closed the door on internal accountability.⁴⁶ The economy, after growing 4% per annum in the 1960s, deteriorated sharply over the next two decades as a result of rampant corruption.⁴⁷ "Politicization of the civil service escalated during President Stevens' tenure and is still primarily responsible for its inefficiency...In return for their loyalty, civil servants were often shielded, pampered and allowed to increase their powers and pursue opportunities for self-enrichment with impunity."⁴⁸ Thus, the politicization of the civil bureaucracy—which is considered to be generally nonpartisan in democratic states—only served to bring it under Stevens' jurisdiction, thereby reducing the autonomy of the civil service by making it more immediately answerable to Stevens. The obvious effect was to undermine the civil service as an institution and strengthen Stevens' grasp.

Age began to take its toll on Stevens, who announced in July 1985, at age 80, that he favored military-commander Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his successor. In the October presidential election Momoh reportedly won 99% of the votes cast, although there were no candidates running opposite him.⁴⁹ Siaka Stevens' seventeen-year presidency ended upon General Momoh's inauguration in November 1985. Stevens would fade from political life, and after suffering a stroke in 1987 would die some five months later at the age of eighty-three.

Momoh was a young forty-nine-year-old when he took office. Initially Momoh's government was received in a spirit of national euphoria, since it was viewed as promising a break with the past, an end to corruption, and an opportunity for the nation to

⁴⁶ Sahr Kpundeh, "Controlling Corruption in Sierra Leone: an Assessment of Past Efforts and Suggestions for the Future," in *Corruption and Development in Africa*, ed. Kempe Hope and Bornwell Chikulo (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 201.

⁴⁷ "Background: Poor Governance and Poverty," *Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone {Draft Version}*, World Bank Office Sierra Leone, 28 Nov 2001.

⁴⁸ Sahr Kpundeh, "Controlling Corruption in Sierra Leone: an Assessment of Past Efforts and Suggestions for the Future," in *Corruption and Development in Africa*, ed. Kempe Hope and Bornwell Chikulo (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 202.

⁴⁹ *Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia: 1995-96* (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited, 1995), 37.

live up to its potential. Momoh was fortunate in that he had the same cross-ethnic support base as Stevens did, and lacked any outside obligations to any interest group save for the army (which is important in its own right as a tool of force and patrimony). But at the outset, Momoh began to falter by appointing few new faces to his cabinet. Immediately his popularity began to disintegrate. Agitation against the old guard and calls for a fresh cabinet compelled Momoh to call general elections a year early, in May 1986.

Apparently the transfer of personalized power—that by Stevens to Momoh—is a very difficult and fragile thing. Personalized power depends in large part on personality and one’s ability to render favors. Momoh was only able to hold on for a short while before he had to make concessions. Early events remained relatively peaceful until widespread political tumult in 1990, which brought about demands for the country to return to a multiparty system. The resulting national referendum in August 1991 was overwhelmingly in favor of altering the constitution to permit political pluralism. In view of that, registration of political parties began again in November 1991, and hegemonic rule was somewhat reversed.

While initially popular, Momoh’s APC government faced mounting odds. Although multi-party politics were permissible, these did little to change the entrenched patrimonial system and venal networks, which in turn sustained the government’s fragility. Moreover, the decrepit economy Momoh had inherited crumbled further. The economy had shifted in the previous decades from one based on cash crops to one not depended by and large on Sierra Leone’s mineral resources, such as iron ore, diamonds, rutile, and bauxite. By this time, however, Sierra Leone’s most important iron ore mine had been exhausted and diamond smuggling was more than just rampant.

By the 1990s Sierra Leone had become the fourth largest gem diamond producer in the world, with its stones highly prized on the world market—but only powerful individuals benefited and not the national treasury. Records illustrate that official diamond exports dropped from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,000 carats in 1980 to an

absurdly low 48,000 carats in 1988.⁵⁰ While some believe the cause is due to mismanagement of the mines by the nationalized mining company—the government had acquired a 51% share in 1970 and almost exclusive control by 1984⁵¹—the real reason is almost solely due to the corruption and smuggling which took place. For example, as late as 1995 it was estimated that 90% of the diamonds exported from Sierra Leone still left the country illegally.⁵² Consequently, in both 1991 and 1992, Sierra Leone’s abysmal economy earned the country the dubious reputation of being declared the poorest country in the world, with 65% of its population living below the poverty line.⁵³

With official exports declining, the revenue from diamond smuggling became an obvious necessity for sustaining the venal networks.

De jure sovereignty usually grants leaders a place in the international forum and immunity from serious outside scrutiny of their internal affairs. Rulers of weak states receive recognition of sovereignty from the international realm because of their identifiable status as those who can speak for domestic matters of global interest. It is for that reason that a leader’s ability to provide answers when it comes to foreign concerns is of more importance to the outside world than are internal policies.⁵⁴ A weak state may not have full political legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents, but so long as other states recognize it as sovereign, it gains a certain ipso facto legitimacy. Sovereignty is indeed contextual.⁵⁵ By matter of circumstance, this in turn provides linkages to external resources, such as international aid agencies and foreign government credits, which the regime uses to bolster its control within its “sovereign” territory.

⁵⁰ Sahr John Kpundeh, *Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone* Lanham, Maryland: Univeristy Press of America, Inc., 1995), 29.

⁵¹ *Country Profile: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia*, (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1995), 48.

⁵² *Country Profile: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia*, (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1995), 48.

⁵³ Sahr John Kpundeh, *Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone* Lanham, Maryland: Univeristy Press of America, Inc., 1995), 27.

⁵⁴ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 222.

⁵⁵ John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization*, 47:1 (Winter 1993), 139-174, quoted in William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 18.

Though Momoh had demonstrated through his introduction of multiparty politics that he was open to reform, this was only superficial. Actual power continued to reside in Momoh and his close associates with which he surrounded himself. These were a band of Limbas largely from Binkolo, Momoh's home village, who formed an impregnable wall around Momoh and formed the apex of the venal networks that had become the state.⁵⁶

In the meantime, Momoh's difficulties were compounded by the outbreak of violence in neighboring Liberia when, on December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor led a rebel force into his homeland in Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire. What began as a series of border skirmishes later developed into an invasion of parts of the country by Liberian rebels. While Sierra Leone's economic condition worsened, its military defended the borders against the Liberian rebels and, later on, also internally defended the country against the Sierra Leonean rebel movement spawned by it.

The fiscal demands of supporting a war effort and implementing economic reforms in compliance with international agencies' mandates proved too much. In late 1991 Momoh's government lost the capacity to pay civil servants and the military for a period of three to four months. Moreover, the diamond business had slipped out of the hands of those close to Momoh and into the hands of Charles Taylor. This further undermined Momoh's venal networks, and therefore his grasp on power and, indeed, the state itself.

When Momoh had taken office in 1985 the situation on the surface looked bright at first. He had taken a firm anti-corruption stance but over time was plagued by the entrenched patrimonial system. The miserable economy he had inherited upon his accession was exacerbated by his administration's serious lack of financial discipline.⁵⁷ By April 1992, Momoh and his politicians had lost their credibility and legitimacy. This reality was demonstrated when Sierra Leonean troops from the eastern front traveled to Freetown purportedly to protest conditions and their lack of pay. In actuality, twenty-

⁵⁶ Sahr John Kpundeh, *Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone* Lanham, Maryland: Univeristy Press of America, Inc., 1995), 33.

⁵⁷ *Country Profile: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia*, (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1995), 41.

seven-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser had led his men to take over the government on 29 April, citing corruption, nepotism, and general mismanagement. Momoh was forced to flee to Guinea and Strasser announced the formation of a National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), whose priorities were to end the border war, restore multiparty democracy, and set in motion reform of the economy.⁵⁸ After Momoh's government was ousted in 1992 by the NPRC, governmental inquiries into corruption exposed Momoh's government as more financially fraudulent than any thus far.⁵⁹

F. SHADOW STATE

Eventually a regime leader reaches the limit of appointments he can dole out, and turns to the next obvious power source. He uses his control as a regime leader to manipulate state resources in the international market. In short, he replaces straight political favoritism with economic influence.

A regime leader is able to accomplish this via the vehicle of de facto sovereignty granted to him by the international realm, which in turn grants the political leader access to foreign money sources. These he uses to seize more control within his territory by amassing a personal fortune and by granting non-merit access in exchange for political allegiance. "It is widely misunderstood that this money, quietly salted away from kick-backs on contracts, concessions and export deals, is for personal enrichment. In fact patrimonial accounts are political resources. The 'personal fortunes' of patrimonial leaders are political bank accounts used to fund the working of...the 'shadow state'."⁶⁰

The extra-legal control of state resources by an individual is patrimonialism, but can also be considered early warning signs of devolution into a warlord state. This commercializing of a leader's role, when he is cast as the conduit between the resources of a country and the global economy, provides him a form of internal security through the creation of a quasi-state offering informal linkages with economic benefits. Internal

⁵⁸ *Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia: 1995-96* (New York: The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited, 1995), 37.

⁵⁹ Sahr Kpundeh, "Controlling Corruption in Sierra Leone: an Assessment of Past Efforts and Suggestions for the Future," in *Corruption and Development in Africa*, ed. Kempe Hope and Bornwell Chikulo (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 207.

⁶⁰ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 35.

security heretofore furnished by the state as an institution is subsequently missing because the enervated bureaucracy is no longer able to regulate or enforce state policy.

With the creation of informal linkages, a regime's loyalties derived by granting non-merit access to resources only weakens the state further and enhances the crisis. Alongside conventional bureaucratic state capabilities appear progressively stronger informal political networks.⁶¹ "To sustain a meaningful semblance of sovereignty—the exclusive control over territory and people—rulers needed to cut informal deals with individuals who exercised power in their own right."⁶² In effect, a "shadow state" is created that parallels the bureaucracy. The patronage system embodied in the shadow state, stemming from a ruler's control over resources, is very real but not formally recognized.⁶³

Again, we see a paradoxical cycle. State rulers make choices that strengthen the leader's position which, inversely, weaken state agencies.⁶⁴ Rulers of weak states are forced to make choices to ward off competing strongmen and other potential opponents at the cost of state-building. Joel Migdal identifies this as the "politics of survival." "This elite fears the consequences of political and economic instability and therefore justifies the concentration of power at the political center to ward off possible fatal challenges to its authority."⁶⁵ When the political survival of state leaders becomes the priority at the cost of effective government, they are discounting tomorrow in order to survive today. The state and its institutions are increasingly weakened while power is concentrated by the ruler.

It was not until Valentine Strasser's 1992 NPRC government that Sierra Leone tipped heavily toward warlordism. Initially, the NPRC—supposedly a selfless government that had taken control with the proletariat in mind—was determined to

⁶¹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2.

⁶² William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2.

⁶³ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2.

⁶⁴ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 214-226.

⁶⁵ Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 83.

eradicate patrimonial politics. The military government tried to sidestep the patrimonial civil bureaucracy and investigate it for corruption. Yet, the NPRC grossly underestimated the structure of the entrenched patronage system, and succumbed to focusing its investigations only on low level or exiled officials while manifestly overlooking the strongmen.⁶⁶ In so doing, the NPRC degenerated into a model of corruption itself. For example, Strasser's people in late 1993 allegedly sold 435 carats of diamonds to Sweden.⁶⁷ "Despite these [image-building anti-corruption] measures, [Strasser's NPRC] rapidly lost popular support as it became evident that he and his ruling clique were benefiting from the fruits of office."⁶⁸

Even before the disintegration of the NPRC's anti-corruption objective came increased heavy-handedness. The NPRC military regime suspended the constitution in May 1992, instead ruling by decree of the Supreme Council of State (SCS), a mix of military and civilian members appointed by the NPRC. A failed counter-coup by the Anti Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) led to consequent executions and a general state of tightened control.⁶⁹ These factors along with the mounting corruption compounded by the government's economically exhausting situation of having to fight the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) growing insurgency began to push the country through the portal of warlordization.

Also, Strasser's access to resources was being choked off by the RUF's continued push into the diamond fields. The RUF's targeting of the government's revenue source proved effective. Since at least 1980 Sierra Leone's Gross Domestic Product had declined, along with its import earnings.⁷⁰ By the early mid-1990s, RUF fighters and rogue soldiers controlled an estimated \$250 million in annual trade in diamonds and, moreover, denied the government another \$60 million in agricultural export earnings

⁶⁶ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 126.

⁶⁷ Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., and Bornwell C. Chikulo, *Corruption and Development in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000) 209.

⁶⁸ Stephen Riley, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?* (London: The Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996), 10, Conflict Studies 287.

⁶⁹ Sahr Kpundeh, *Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone* (Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1995), 159.

⁷⁰ "Sierra Leone at a Glance," *The World Bank Group* Available [Online] < http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/sle_aag.pdf > [15 May 2002].

from within the RUF-dominated areas.⁷¹ The combined effect was to stifle Strasser's authority and also diminish other strongmen's resources, thereby reducing any concerted effort they could make to fight the RUF while also limiting their capacity to reinforce patrimonial networks.

In a last grasp at regaining control Strasser's NPRC hurriedly increased inductions into the army in an effort to bring about a quicker end to the war. "Those recruited in this hasty exercise were 'mostly drifters, rural and urban unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves'. They came from the same social group as the RUF combatants."⁷² The not-surprising consequence was that these soldiers descended into banditry, with the civilian populace now being victimized by both sides and little being accomplished toward subduing the rebellion. "Both the soldiers and the RUF were much more interested in killing civilians than fighting each other. To ordinary Sierra Leoneans, soldiers and rebels were often indistinguishable, so much so that they became known as 'sobels'."⁷³

Sierra Leone might have been knocking at warlordism's door but it did not step through just yet. It had become fully "a 'soft' state—one low on legitimacy and deficient in the ability to implement policies on a countrywide basis."⁷⁴ Its only redeeming character was that there was not one man who could exercise unconstrained power, which meant that political maneuvering room still existed. When Strasser attempted to force the NPRC to pass decrees enabling him to stay in power he was deposed in late January 1996 by his second-in-command, Julius Bio, who then promptly turned around and held valid elections.⁷⁵ Strasser had failed to adequately garner support among his subordinates and Sierra Leone was back on the road to improvement, albeit in a broken down bus, but there was at least a chance for the better.

⁷¹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 126.

⁷² Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 182.

⁷³ William Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 197.

⁷⁴ Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 7.

⁷⁵ Stephen Riley, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?* (London: The Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996), 23, Conflict Studies 287.

Because of popular demand and mounting international pressure, Bio insisted that elections should go ahead in order to return the country to civilian rule. In March 1996 SLPP's Ahmad Tejan Kabbah ultimately won with 60% of the votes. Kabbah's election meant the SLPP was once again in power; the first time since it was militarily forced to concede to the APC in 1967.

However, little seemed likely to change with the 1996 election because political legitimacy remained rooted in patrimonialism. Indeed, some lamented that it was difficult to see how any of the thirteen contesting political parties would have any new idea or effect "for bringing the shadow state to heel while the clandestine extraction of diamonds in the forest remain[ed] such a large factor in the political economy of Sierra Leone."⁷⁶ It was also noted that by the time of President Kabbah's 1996 election "many state institutions were near collapse with most managerial, professional and technical personnel having fled, leaving behind a dysfunctional civil service;...; and expenditure controls, budgeting, accounting and auditing were weak or non-existent."⁷⁷

On the other hand, times had changed somewhat. Although patrimonialism still underpinned politics it was nowhere near as open as in Stevens' time. The two administrations prior to Kabbah's, those of Momoh and NPRC, had succeeded at least in maneuvering their patronage influences somewhat back into the shadows. All the same, those three administrations were directly tapped into the international investment market, which served as a substitute for the domestic corruption they were pretentiously fighting against. This was an unsettling degeneration in that it marked the deterioration of some patronage networks in favor of warlord-type control of the revenue generated by state resources internationally.

Unlike Stevens but like Momoh, Kabbah could not use state assets or manipulate economic policies as the major incentives to attract supporters, since corruption, creditor prescriptions, and military offensives against rivals had drastically pared down or eliminated those options. Instead, as with warlords in Liberia, Kabbah used his privileged ties to

⁷⁶ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 42.

⁷⁷ "Key Challenges: Instituting Good Governance," *Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone {Draft Version}*, World Bank Office Sierra Leone, 28 Nov 2001.

foreigners to facilitate favored private business operations or at least to deny them to disfavored groups or individuals.⁷⁸

Things continued to fall apart. Shortly after taking office, Kabbah negotiated a peace treaty with the rebel insurgents. The rebels, however, failed to honor the peace pact. Then, in addition to that, army leaders led a violent coup against Kabbah on May 25, 1997 whereupon they installed Major Johnny Paul Koroma as the head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

G. WARLORD STATE

According to William Reno control of markets is the foundation of political authority and economic globalization has led to the warlordization of weak states.⁷⁹ Warlords are created in response to global capitalism and internal struggle over control of resources. The global economy permits a weak ruler to respond to political grappling by acting in his own self-interest, and thanks to the de facto sovereignty granted by the international community to a weak-cum-warlord state.⁸⁰

As power is distilled from the state's institutions into the regime's hands the state ceases "helping people to meet their needs or building up a sense of legitimacy among them."⁸¹ It becomes a weak state. No longer possessing dominion through the very state agencies he has emasculated, a regime leader now finds his power based purely upon patrimonial networks. As he reaches the extent of his client distribution capabilities, he is forced to find other methods of influence. He readily does so by controlling the state's resource in the global market. According to Reno,

Contemporary rulers who lack capable administrations find markets to be useful for controlling and disciplining rivals and their supporters. Intervening in markets enables rulers to accumulate wealth directly, which is then converted into political resources they can distribute at their discretion. This strategy directly contradicts liberal

⁷⁸ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 135.

⁷⁹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 30.

⁸⁰ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 15-18, 39-40.

⁸¹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 4.

principles of private markets, since it is designed to block entrepreneurial activity among threatening rivals.⁸²

To all intents and purposes, such action initiates a downward spiral, which increasingly detracts from the legitimacy of the state. Political leaders succumb to the pressure of dealing with short-term security by foregoing long-term development plans. Leaders' relations with foreign firms cause them to focus their politics externally rather than for their public's interest. Control over distribution of foreign income permits a leader to divest himself of his bureaucracy and thrust aside threatening internal actors. In due course, the patrimonial network so carefully cultivated in earlier days is discarded. The hegemon's goals have changed from one of political power accumulation into personal wealth appropriation.

Normally, a leader's power is regularly checked by the bureaucrats in his service who are responsible for implementing and overseeing policy. Whether a weak state ruler is able to fully pursue a warlord strategy depends upon how weakened his bureaucracy is. The essence of bureaucracy is to take the "individual" out of the equation, to make him fungible by means of having standard operating procedures and written rules. Technically specialized personnel are one result and, more importantly, efficient government is the other. This works so long as the bureaucracy remains apolitical. Once a leader turns the civil service into a political organism, bureaucrats' advancement becomes based on who they know rather than their job performance.⁸³

Sweepingly radical changes in policy are difficult to effect within a strong bureaucracy because of pedantic adherence to established regulations and norms, and for that reason serve to curtail drastic alterations to bureaucratic conventions. The more a state leader weakens his bureaucracy, the more he condenses the decision-making and policy enforcement into his own hands. It becomes, therefore, much easier to implement arbitrary and indiscriminate changes. "[W]arlord politics...jettisons almost entirely many

⁸² William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

⁸³ Sahr Kpundeh, "Controlling Corruption in Sierra Leone: an Assessment of Past Efforts and Suggestions for the Future," in *Corruption and Development in Africa*, ed. Kempe Hope and Bornwell Chikulo (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 203.

internal components of conventional states, such as bureaucratic hierarchies, or any autonomous definition of an interest of state that has characterized even very weak states.”⁸⁴

Where weak states base their control on bureaucratic institutions, warlords base power on their control of resources. The degree to which a ruler follows a warlord strategy depends on the prior extent of “privatization of ruler alliances with external and domestic partners in efforts to control internal rivals.”⁸⁵ In other words, transformation to a warlord situation is “a turn away from conventional state structures.”⁸⁶ The accommodation of elites continues at the expense of weakening state institutions, but these patrimonial networks are in time replaced by a warlord’s focus on pecuniary rather than political gain. Where the state as an institution is sufficiently strong enough to counter the draining of state power away from the bureaucracy, it might successfully prevent the state from fully degenerating into a warlord situation. Once the bureaucracy has lost complete economic and political control, the state has collapsed.⁸⁷ The situation then becomes extremely desperate.

There were many times when Sierra Leone almost lapsed into absolute warlordism, but the attendant hegemonic regimes’ partial adherence to the rule of law staved off complete degeneration. It is acknowledged that violence was employed as a political tool by the various regimes. Only one regime, however, wantonly used violence against any and all. Sierra Leone came closest to being a warlord state under the NPRC in 1991-96 in view of the fact that the NPRC summarily discarded the constitution and ruled by decree. “Strasser backed his authority with strategies that did not depend on effective bureaucracies or state spending, such as executing prisoners...and investigating

⁸⁴ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 222.

⁸⁵ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 15.

⁸⁶ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 28.

⁸⁷ William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 9.

corruption among civil servants.”⁸⁸ Yet, it was not until the abhorrent acts inflicted upon the civilian populace under the AFRC regime of 1997-98 that Sierra Leone wholly slipped from a shadow state into warlordism. Save for the international military effort that restored the weak but legitimate government, warlords would likely still be fighting over and plundering Sierra Leone.

Since 1990 the border skirmishes with the Liberian rebels had festered, inspiring dissidents within Sierra Leone until the state of affairs had grown into a full-blown guerrilla war. The Government of Sierra Leone’s (GoSL) forces were pitted against rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), formed in 1991 by Foday Sankoh in an alliance with Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for Liberia. (Sankoh was a former corporal in the Sierra Leone army and had been previously incarcerated for his complicity in an earlier coup attempt.) Within a matter of days of assuming office in 1996, President Kabbah signed a communiqué at Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire with RUF leader Corporal Sankoh, in which they effectively agreed to a permanent ceasefire. That agreement opened the way for substantive negotiations between the Government and the RUF, culminating in the Abidjan Peace Accord of 30 November 1996.

Unfortunately, Kabbah mistakenly overlooked the army as a significant player in the patrimonial system. The troops were incensed at the government’s decision to cut military spending, which only exacerbated the perception existing in the army at the time that the government had greater trust in the militia (the Civil Defense Force, i.e. CDF) than its own army. (The majority of personnel in the CDF were Kamajors from SLPP’s southern strongholds.) Feeling marginalized, the army deposed democratically elected President Kabbah on May 25, 1997 in Sierra Leone’s third military coup in five years. “This latest coup demonstrated the true nature of the Sierra Leone Army.... The army...now revealed itself to most Sierra Leoneans as a brutal and corrupt institution riddled with criminals...”⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Willaim Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 126.

⁸⁹ John Laggah, Joe Allie and Roland Wright, “Sierra Leone,” in *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts*, ed. Adebayo Adedeji (New York: Zed Book Ltd, 1999), 185.

The coup conspirators sprung Major Johnny Paul Koroma from prison (where he had been since plotting a coup in 1995) and asked him to lead the new military government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koroma began a reign of terror, destroying the economy and murdering enemies. Probably as a means of pacification and to retain power, the AFRC invited RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his rebels to join forces with it. In a “coalition of momentary convenience”⁹⁰ not having to concentrate on fighting a war allowed the former foes to collectively pursue plunder.

As a warlord state under Koroma’s AFRC, Sierra Leone was unsurpassed. Koroma turned the country into his personal domain. In forming a coalition with Foday Sankoh and his RUF rebels, Koroma had co-opted his greatest political challenger and, as a consequence, fortified his supremacy. Indeed there had been previous despots who had almost succeeded in achieving personalized unilateral control over the entire country. However, of the first three coups—which altogether lasted from March 21, 1967 until April 17, 1968—only the National Reformation Council endured for more than a few days. Even then, infighting among its leadership never let a true ruler prevail over his contemporaries and therefore saved Sierra Leone from becoming an earlier warlord state. Because none of these earlier hegemon was able to completely build up and sustain sufficient personal power, none was able to enlarge his dominance into that of a warlord’s.

The various civilian administrations also approached warlordism but never fully stepped over the threshold. The presidents certainly used patronage networks to retain their political positions, switching from plundering state resources outright to eventually controlling foreign income into Sierra Leone. What kept them, however, from fully turning Sierra Leone into a warlord state was the lesser degree of violence employed and the extent to which they followed the constitution. Without question, all made use of a variety of measures of extra-legal suppression to silence their opposition, even quasi-judicially executing some opponents. None, though, were as statutorily flagrant or

⁹⁰ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 365-377.

committed the boldfaced murders and atrocities on the scale of the AFRC.⁹¹ In addition to suspending the constitution and banning political activity in general the AFRC “killed, tortured, or arbitrarily detained anyone they perceived threatening their hold on power.”⁹²

In addition, previous political leaders’ dismissal of the army as nothing more than a political toy caused it to decay such that it was incapable of responding to foreign aggression or maintaining internal peace. This left the back door wide open for Sankoh and his rebels. Adroit soldiers remained in Freetown where they could maintain their own resource linkages while the underpaid, under-trained and often under-aged soldiers were sent out to confront an elusive enemy with whom they actually had a great deal in common.

H. CONCLUSION

To summarize, Sierra Leone’s problems started before its independence. Patrimonialism and the use of force characterized the system of governance taught by its colonizer to Sierra Leone’s people. Compounding this was the fact that Sierra Leoneans had little experience at autonomous government by the time of Sierra Leone’s independence. These aspects induced an exclusionary political system whereby those in control became uncompromising because they believed any concessions were potentially a divestment of their power to their competitors.

Furthermore, in order to maintain and strengthen the regime’s control, patrimonial appointments were bestowed as political favors. The effect was that the regime’s leaders, instead of being replaceable implementers of the state, grew to become an inseparable part of the state. In other words, they became the state itself, whereby individuals superseded the state as an institution.

The political intransigence increased as those in control consolidated their power by making politics more exclusionary. The regime employed extra-judicial force while

⁹¹ “Sixteen ‘Collaborators’ Get Death Sentence in Sierra Leone.” *Electronic Mail & Guardian*. 27 August 1998. Available [Online] < <http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98aug2/27aug-sierra.html> > [14 March 2002].

⁹² Susan Rice, “Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone” (testimony by the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs to House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, D.C., 23 March 1999) [Available Online] < http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990323_rice_sierra.html > [15 March 2002].

endeavoring to officially convert Sierra Leone into a single-party state. When this finally occurred, it significantly strengthened Stevens' individual power as the regime leader, thus allowing him to have greater personal autonomy in Sierra Leone's governance. Another outcome of the single-party state was the additional weakening of the bureaucracy. Patrimonial appointments within the civil service converted the formerly apolitical bureaucracy into an organization obligated to the regime's demands, in place of institutionalized rules and regulations.

The net result of the exclusionary politics, the patrimonial networks, and the politicized bureaucracy was to weaken the state as an institution and to engender a parallel shadow-state formed by the conversion of the formal system of governance into one constructed of informal networks derived from patrimonial influences. In other words, devotion to duty was made subservient to allegiance to political leaders. This enhanced the personal control of the regime leader and allowed him to further turn away from conventional state structures—clearly a downward spiral for the state.

In addition, corruption typified all of Sierra Leone's administrations. Although each successive regime promised to eradicate corruption, it was instead beguiled by it. The entrenched patrimonial system was too strong to overcome and the lure of personal enrichment enticed each leader to use the state's resources for the personal accumulation of wealth, which was correspondingly used to satisfy the patronage networks.

Political rivalry lingered, however, which eventually caused Sierra Leone to return to a multi-party system. By that time, though, Sierra Leone's deep-rooted corruption, the disastrously disheveled economy, and the incipient rebel war proved insurmountable. The combination of these dynamics collapsed the state and opened the door for increasingly warlord-like regimes, ultimately resulting in the outright plunder of state resources strictly for personal gain and a complete disregard for any formalized system of governance. In short, Sierra Leone became a warlord state. When the circumstances have reached that stage the problem became far more entrenched and difficult to rectify, because warlords have an intrinsic interest in maintaining the status quo so that they may retain access to wealth.

Using these historical details to delineate the warlordization process illuminates the depth of the hole out of which a failed state must climb and that the restructuring course of action is not a simple reversal of the steps leading into warlordism. By examining the progression it becomes clear that the essential resolution is to bypass many of these causes that lead to warlordism in order to implement a government sufficiently strong enough to stand on its own as a formalized institution immune to the pressures that formerly brought down the state.

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III. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE

This chapter will analyze the responses of various external intervenors in Sierra Leone in accordance with Kumar's four-step model. Consequently, this chapter will assess the strategies of each intervenor, in terms of the warlord model from Chapter 2, and the peacebuilding goals.

A. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES

The mercenary firm Executive Outcomes operated in Sierra Leone from May 1995 until February 1997. Strasser recognized his own insecurity and the ineffectiveness of his army, and therefore hired a private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to train his soldiers and safeguard the diamond areas. In May 1995 thirty Executive Outcomes personnel arrived and quickly trained 150 soldiers. Army leadership feared a professionally trained cadre and therefore rebuffed sending more than the first group of 150 trainees for military instruction. Accordingly, EO began to train the local militia: the Kamajor of the Civil Defense Force.⁹³ By the time Executive Outcomes departed in February 1997, the Kamajor had grown to 10,000 strong and quickly proved themselves an effective fighting force.⁹⁴ This was significant given that the RUF's strength was only a few thousand fighters, and that the army had some 14,000 "soldiers"—two-thirds of whom had been hastily recruited.⁹⁵

The RUF now had to face the fact that its enemy was no longer the army but the Kamajor. Under the leadership of Executive Outcomes, combined army-Kamajor operations proved highly effective in 1996. Several thousand RUF were killed or forced to flee, and in November 1996 a comprehensive peace accord was signed between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone.⁹⁶

⁹³ Herbert Howe, *Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 201.

⁹⁴ Herbert Howe, *Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 204.

⁹⁵ Herbert Howe, *Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 200.

⁹⁶ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 187.

There are several incidents which suggest Executive Outcomes had a strategy for Sierra Leone's national development. For example, Executive Outcomes' presence brought security and facilitated a cease-fire. It is even argued that Executive Outcomes' presence brought about Sierra Leone's 1996 elections. Taken together, it might appear as though Executive Outcomes had a state-building strategy. However, beyond the security objective and Executive Outcomes' possible insistence on elections, there was little strategy involved outside its profit motive as a private security firm, as evidenced by its threat to leave in 1995 due to nonpayment.⁹⁷

Although Executive Outcomes demonstrated military efficiency and political loyalty to its client, it had no real political responsibility. Money was its goal, not the cessation of conflict. At best, its intervention can be considered a limited peace enforcement mission. It was limited in time and strategy—enduring as long as there was income for the company. For that reason, the result of Executive Outcomes' actions was only to prop up the weak government. It should come as no surprise that the security situation immediately deteriorated upon Executive Outcomes' departure, and Sierra Leone found itself in the same situation as before, if not worse.

Concerning the peacebuilding goals in a warlord situation, at best Executive Outcomes functioned to temporarily debase the warlords by countering the rebels' military might and retaking some of the diamond areas.

B. ECOMOG

When Executive Outcomes personnel left Sierra Leone in February 1997, it quickly became clear that the interval of peace in Sierra Leone was directly related to Executive Outcomes' presence. The private military firm's departure left the way clear for rebellious soldiers to violently overthrow the government in April 1997, destroying what little security existed in Sierra Leone. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council's (AFRC) military government criminalized itself further by partnering with the RUF in a combined pursuit of plunder.

⁹⁷ Herbert Howe, *Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 204.

President Kabbah, forced to flee to Guinea, appealed to the international community for help. Fortuitously, troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in their mission to protect Monrovia, Liberia's capital, from the encroachment of Charles Taylor's forces were already rear-based in Sierra Leone. Nigerians composed the largest part of the ECOMOG forces—about 70% in Liberia and 90% in Sierra Leone.⁹⁸

In Liberia, diamond-digging ECOMOG troops and their insurgent-collaborating, profiteering commanders tarnished ECOMOG's reputation.⁹⁹ Describing ECOMOG's activities in Liberia, Stephen Ellis writes, "The ECOMOG intervention... created new economic opportunities which ECOMOG itself exploited, making the peace-keeping force a party to the war itself."¹⁰⁰ Given the Nigerians' conduct in Liberia, Kabbah's petition to them for help was a little like asking the fox to guard the henhouse.

However, the Nigerians did respond to Kabbah's request for assistance and, in the end, though they may not have looted Freetown, they reacted only marginally better than the rebels themselves with regard to civilians caught in the conflict. In June 1997, with intentions of dislodging the RUF, they recklessly shelled Freetown from the sea causing numerous civilian casualties. The Nigerians then hunkered around the Lungi International Airport across the bay from Freetown until February 1998, at which time they made a successful but bloody push to evict the AFRC and its RUF allies from Freetown. In October 1998, the RUF and its AFRC colleagues were ready to return and began intensifying its attacks against ECOMOG's 15,000 soldiers. In December 1998, the rebels launched an all-out offensive on Freetown, occupying most of the capital for a brief period in January 1999 before being driven back into the jungle. Some six thousand people were killed that January in Freetown alone.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Herbert Howe, *Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 166.

⁹⁹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 104-5.

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Ellis, "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 187.

¹⁰¹ "Sierra Leone History," *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. 2000. Available [Online] <<http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/11864History.html>> [24 February 2002].

Equally hazardous to the civilian non-combatants during this period were the Nigerians. Sierra Leone's Information Minister, Julius Spencer, warned that because Nigerian troops were having difficulty engaging the rebels who were mixing with civilians in the streets, anyone found in the streets would be considered a rebel and would be shot on sight. To compound the situation, when the rebels captured the eastern and central parts of Freetown, they forced residents to come out and demonstrate for peace, threatening to burn down their houses if they did not participate in these compulsory rallies. When the citizens yielded to rebel coercion, Nigerian jet bombers were dispatched to drop bombs on them.¹⁰² After weeks of bloody fighting, the Nigerians retook the capital and once more forced the rebels out of Freetown.

In this light it is easy to see how ECOMOG troops were not in Sierra Leone on a peace mission but rather as the country's substitute army. ECOMOG acted in Sierra Leone on behalf of the president to restore his elected government to power. The only problem was that eventually ECOMOG would re-deploy back to its own country, leaving Sierra Leone under pretty much the same pre-conflict circumstances; the weak state would not have been changed.

ECOMOG's actions were very similar to Executive Outcomes'. Theirs was nothing more than another limited peace enforcement mission which would serve only to sustain a weak government without improving matters. If anything, ECOMOG's performance can be considered worse than Executive Outcomes'. Contrary to Executive Outcomes, ECOMOG did not enjoy popular support and targeted civilians. Moreover, ECOMOG accomplished little toward debasing the warlords. It never took real control of diamond areas away from the rebels.

C. THE UNITED NATIONS

In June 1998 the United Nations decided to become directly involved beyond the sanctions and diplomatic language to which it had previously resorted, by establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL's purpose was to monitor and advise on efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the country's military, and

¹⁰² Abass Bundu, *Democracy by Force?* (United States: Universal Publishers, 2001) 63.

document reports of atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians.¹⁰³ The operation failed because in January 1999 UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated due to the fighting in Freetown.

In another stab at peace, the parties to the 1999 Lomé peace accord, signed July 7, requested the UN's returned presence and an expanded role for UNOMSIL. The UN obliged in October 1999 by establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was a newer and much larger operation. In November 1999 the first troops arrived as part of an authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL.

Violence again erupted in May 2000, when rebels seized some 500 United Nations peacekeeping troops, mostly Zambians.¹⁰⁴ At least four Kenyan UN peacekeepers were killed¹⁰⁵, and inside Freetown RUF members gunned down nineteen people demonstrating outside Sankoh's house against RUF's violation of the peace accords.¹⁰⁶ It was not until July that the last couple hundred of these hostages were released. Fighting between pro-government forces and the RUF resumed, re-igniting the civil war that had supposedly ended in July 1999 with the conclusion of the peace accord in Lomé, Togo. The RUF appeared ready to forcefully re-enter Freetown in mid-2000 until the British deployed combat troops.

UNAMSIL faced many difficulties. The force was initially bolstered by Nigerian troops, who were there as a follow-up to ECOMOG. Changed politics back home and the rising cost of the war abroad eventually triggered Nigeria's intended withdrawal from Sierra Leone by May 2000. Their pending withdrawal underscored the weakness of the

¹⁰³ "Background—United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Available [Online] <<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>> [15 May 2002].

¹⁰⁴ Sue Cullinan. "Time Trail: Sierra Leone", *Time Europe*. 2000. Available [Online] <<http://www.time.com/time/europe/timetrails/sierraleone/>> [24 February 2002].

¹⁰⁵ Simon Robinson, "Peacekeepers in Peril", *Time Europe*. 15 May 2000. Available [Online] <<http://www.time.com/time/europe/timetrails/sierraleone/sl000515.htm>> [24 February 2002].

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, "History", *Background Note: Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C., January 2002), Available [Online] <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/5475.htm>> [24 February 2002].

UNAMSIL force, which was poorly resourced and composed mostly of mixed troops from lesser militaries.

Other problems further compounded the UN's task. In September 2000, while citing its decision as a "routine matter," India decided to withdraw its 3,000-member faction. Unfortunately the Indian soldiers were among the best equipped and trained in UNAMSIL, and their withdrawal came at a time when the UN was trying to secure more troops to augment UNAMSIL's authorized increase. Moreover, a memo by the Indian contingent surfaced asserting charges of corruption against important members of the Nigerian faction.¹⁰⁷

Despite seemingly insurmountable difficulties the Secretary General has continued to garner support for the mission and the operation in Sierra Leone has persevered. Today, the UN mission stands as the largest peace operation ever undertaken, having grown from its initial deployment of 6,000 peace troops to a currently authorized strength (March 2002 resolution) of 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers and 90 civilian police personnel.

In addition, the UN's task has grown beyond just the military aspect of successfully negotiating an end to the conflict. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates humanitarian aid, while Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officers ensure mutual understanding between civil and military authorities of their respective responsibilities. It has also established a Humanitarian Information Center (HIC), the purpose being to promote

a more inclusive and effective approach to the collection, sharing and use of information supporting both the individual activities of UN agencies, NGOs, donors and the government as well as a more cohesive response by all these actors combined. At its simplest, an HIC offers a neutral space for the sharing of information and provides the service of disseminating contact information and daily reports. Alternatively, in a complex emergency with many diverse actors, an HIC can play a vital role in focusing the combined energies towards common goals.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Mark Devenport, "UN Announces Sierra Leone Shake-up," *BBC News*, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_938000/938281.stm> [17 May 2002].

¹⁰⁸ "Mid-Year Review Status Report 2002," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 May 2002, Available [Online]:

Coordinating civilian inputs has rounded out the UN's approach to coherently addressing resolution of the conflict.

Retrospective analysis of the UN's entrance into Sierra Leone indicates how and why its first mission was destined to fail. UNOMSIL came in as a peacekeeping force to stand between what it mistakenly believed to be consenting parties.¹⁰⁹ UNOMSIL was purely a peacekeeping operation in that its purpose was to monitor the implementation of peace accords between the combatants. That was very shortsighted given the heinous nature of the conflict and the façade of consent—keeping in mind previous peace agreements and subsequent renegeing. Tellingly, despite the fact that Sankoh had signed the peace accords, he had no representative present when the first UN troops arrived in Sierra Leone in November 1999.¹¹⁰ The UN's myopic perception of circumstances was embarrassingly evident when the mission was forced to evacuate in January 1999.

The UNAMSIL mission which replaced UNOMSIL's was a step in the right direction, deploying from the outset as a peace-enforcement operation, albeit a Pollyannish one. UNAMSIL troops were posted throughout the country to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and assist it in disarming the combatants. Even then, the mission was reticent to fully execute its role as a peace enforcer. This was exemplified when rebels in the eastern part of the country took hostage several hundred UN troops.

Despite the weakness of both UN missions, they have been by far the best prospect to date for Sierra Leone's survival, and this is especially true of UNAMSIL. From the outset this mission acted as the Government of Sierra Leone's guarantor, and sought to establish a stable and viable political process—a necessary precondition to induce a sense of nationalism among the populace. Additionally, the Secretary General recognized the need for longevity, and continually petitioned for the mission's reauthorization.

<<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/6a83c8a75fa19476c1256bc3004de094?OpenDocument>> [24 May 2002].

¹⁰⁹ "United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Available [Online] < <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm> > [15 May 2002].

¹¹⁰ William Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 406.

Moreover, the UN's initial efforts were again shortsighted. The UN did target the warlords' power base, but UNAMSIL fixated on disarmament without addressing how the arms were supplied. Once the UN imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone's diamond industry in July 2000, things quickly took a turn for the better. The UN had erred by incompletely performing the first step of the peacebuilding model—thoroughly assessing the situation. Without debasing warlords, the end result would still have been a weak state, just not as weak as under the previous two intervenors. Fortunately, Britain had enough awareness to recognize the UN's shortcomings.

D. BRITAIN

Triggered by the RUF detention of UN forces, but ostensibly to protect its own, Great Britain rapidly deployed about 1,000 paratroops to evacuate its citizens from Sierra Leone in May 2000. While there, the paratroops' mission was enhanced to include securing part of Freetown and assisting UNAMSIL.¹¹¹ By June 2000, the British presence had been drawn down to only about 200 troops, who remained there as military trainers and to provide unobligated assistance to UNAMSIL. On August 25, 2000 the “West Side Boys,” a group of former soldiers turned bandits, took eleven British soldiers hostage. A dramatic British rescue operation on 10 September not only released the prisoners but put an end to the West Side Boys. This demonstrated Britain's willingness to use force and its resolve to stay in Sierra Leone as a backup force to both UNAMSIL and the new Sierra Leone Army, which Britain now began to recruit, train, and equip in earnest.

When India pulled its 3,000-strong contingent out of the UN force in Sierra Leone in September 2000, Britain came under pressure to take a lead in strengthening the UN operation. Although the British government had been debating about sending British military units to take part as a specific contingent of the UNAMSIL mission, it instead chose to maintain its separate training force. Britain also partially yielded, however, and

¹¹¹ “Operation Palliser,” 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment, Available [Online] <http://www.parachute-regiment.com/history/sierra_leone_3.htm> [15 May 2002].

consequently decided to send a few senior officers to participate in UNAMSIL as military observers and to serve in senior staff positions.

Britain's strategy was comprised of three key elements: to assist the government of Sierra Leone, to restore the peace, and to rebuild Sierra Leone.¹¹² To carry out the mission its cadre of troops re-trained the Sierra Leonean army from the ground up. Without a doubt, British intervention helped improve the police and army, and reduced the institutionalized-bullying of misguided soldiers.

A second Abuja Agreement, signed May 2001, set the stage for a significant reduction in hostilities. As disarmament of the rebels progressed, the British cadre led the Sierra Leone army into formerly rebel-held areas with the intention of reasserting government authority there. A September 2001 meeting between President Kabbah and RUF's General Sesay culminated in inchoate peace, with about 16,000 fighters from various groups, out of a total of 45,000, disarmed at that time.¹¹³

A significant reason for the success experienced by Britain is that it came into Sierra Leone with a realistic grasp of the situation and a willingness to use force. Unlike the diplomatic flailings exhibited by the UN when its soldiers were taken hostage in May 2000, Britain's reaction to British soldiers being taken hostage in August 2000 was swift, violent, and deadly for the instigators. Furthermore, Britain correctly assessed the army as another warlord tool and remedied UNAMSIL's oversight of it. Rectifying this potential trouble spot notably strengthened the Government of Sierra Leone by furnishing it a means of self-protection. Britain arrived in Sierra Leone as a hard-line peace enforcement mission that advanced a peacebuilding objective complementary to UNAMSIL's efforts. Both these efforts together, though still ongoing, will likely recondition the government enough to stand on its own.

¹¹² "Sierra Leone News," Foreign Commonwealth Office Available [Online]: <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/dynpage.asp?Page=10054&Theme=16>> [17 May 2002].

¹¹³ "Sierra Leone History", *Infoplease.com*. The Learning Network, Inc. 2002. Available [Online] <<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107959.html>> [24 February 2002].
The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 2000. Available [Online] <<http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/11864History.html>> [24 February 2002].

E. ASSESSMENT

In considering Kumar's four-step model, the faults and merits of each intervention become clear. The early interventions completed little, if any, assessment of the situation before becoming involved. Moreover, they did not have any real strategy beyond the application of combat power.

Executive Outcomes as a private security firm received its mission from its employer, the government of Sierra Leone. However, the leaders in government lacked the insight and perhaps the will to effect changes, beyond just holding off the rebels, to include those necessary within the government to permit a more peaceful avenue of advance for the rebels. In brief, although Executive Outcomes stepped in without assessing the situation and therefore had no real strategy, it was almost inadvertently a successful mission, but the success would have only been temporary until its departure.

Executive Outcome's best accomplishment was retaking possession of some of the diamond fields. Cutting off the rebels' source of earnings would have eventually stifled their momentum. The irony of the situation, however, is that Executive Outcomes recaptured the diamond areas not because of a well-planned strategy, but simply because that was the only way the security firm was going to be paid.

If the government of Sierra Leone had been able to keep Executive Outcomes in its employ, then quite possibly, had Executive Outcomes regained control of all diamond areas, the war might have ended sooner. Even so, this would have only been a temporary setback to the rebels, since the government as an institution would not have been changed. Had Executive Outcomes pursued the war until it dried up the rebels' resources, then the rebels—though temporarily made combat ineffective—only had to wait until Executive Outcomes' departure before resuming their fight. Had Executive Outcomes reassessed the situation as in Kumar's fourth step, it likely would have come to the correct conclusion that depriving the rebels of the diamond fields was the key to initial success. Still, this success would have been short lived without fundamental changes in governance—something well beyond Executive Outcomes' scope.

The measuring of ECOMOG's actions amounts to something worse. Whereas Executive Outcomes almost unwittingly defeated the rebels, ECOMOG never came

close. ECOMOG intervenors were already in Sierra Leone for their intervention mission in Liberia and therefore did not assess the circumstances in Sierra Leone before taking action. They simply faced in a new direction and started fighting another enemy. Accordingly, they had no real strategy above the tactical level. This is evidenced by their uncomplicated, straightforward application of combat power against rebels' combat power. ECOMOG was content to slug it out with the rebels, believing themselves to be successful so long as the capital did not fall. However, ECOMOG failed to consider the rebels' willingness to sustain combat so long as they continued to be able to gain profits from the diamond areas.

In comparing the UN's and Great Britain's actions, one can see that, separately, neither was the correct path to success. By good fortune they were in reality complementary and mutually reinforcing. The UN was the first willing to step into the sticky situation, but then Great Britain had the prescience to recognize the UN's shortfalls and instead of duplicating efforts simply took on a balancing role.

Both meticulously calculated their involvement, with the correctness of their calculations evidenced by the successes and failures of their individual strategies. For instance, the UN's first attempt at peace in Sierra Leone was chased out because it lacked sufficient combat power, a fault owing to an inaccurate assessment of the situation. Its assessment obviously improved, however, when it returned with a stronger force. Yet, it remained shortsighted as exemplified by its reticence to use the force it had. Fortunately, Great Britain stepped in to fill this gap.

All told, the UN's strategy was far better than that of Executive Outcomes or ECOMOG's, being that it not only had a strategy in the first place, but also one that integrated goals more far reaching than the simple defeat of the government's enemy. Nonetheless, the UN had overlooked one key detail in its plan—Sierra Leone's army—a mission that Britain importantly adopted in tandem to UNAMSIL's actions. Professionalizing the army, i.e. converting it into a reliable organization wholly accountable to the elected government, creates the stability needed for UNAMSIL's governance issues to take hold, to rebuild the infrastructure, and to reincorporate the people—both combatants and civilians—collectively into a single society.

Also, both the UN and the United Kingdom are assisting the fledgling Sierra Leonean government gain control of its diamond industry. It is a country very rich in natural resources and, just as these have worked to its disadvantage in the past, if properly supervised they can be the driving force to build the country back up again. Not until UN Security Council Resolution 1306 in July 2000 did the UN finally accept this fact by imposing sanctions on the illicit diamond trade originating in Sierra Leone, thus trying to dry up warlords' profits. In addition to the sanctions the UK has been extraordinarily instrumental in training and pushing the Sierra Leone army back out to the reaches of its territory. Trailing behind the soldier's advance are police and officials from other government ministries. The UN is assisting these civil administrators to bring the diamond trade under government control, yet the consolidation of these initiatives will take a good deal of time.

Enabling the government to realistically and successfully take charge of the diamond trade will be an enormous task. The illicit diamond industry is comparable to drug smuggling in the United States. To Sierra Leone's advantage, though, it is not trying to eradicate an industry so much as redirect the business away from Liberia and through the government of Sierra Leone. A substantial impediment is diamonds' diminutive size and ease of transportability. This is compounded by the virtual impossibility of identifying a diamond's origin, which the closed society of the diamond industry indifferently uses to its advantage to make diamonds an extremely fungible currency. The complementary efforts of the UK and UN to reassert government control in the diamond areas, followed by assisting government oversight of the industry, will go far toward recouping their significance for Sierra Leone's benefit and undermining the potential for re-warlordization.

Restoration of Sierra Leone as a country appears to be a probable success. It still faces, however, two equally hazardous dangers. Although the UN Secretary General may comprehend the necessary duration of his mission in Sierra Leone, convincing the Security Council to support it for any length of time is a large obstacle. Generally, the Security Council's consent is given for only short periods—the current authorization only endorses UN operations until September 2002. The fact that UNAMSIL must

continuously receive short-term authorization for its operation implies it could be abruptly withdrawn midstream in the peacebuilding process.

UNAMSIL's early withdrawal would open the way for the second danger. Too many political figures from Sierra Leone's appalling past are prominent on today's stage. The international community must monitor these individuals to prevent them from metamorphosing into warlords. Foday Sankoh may be in jail and in poor health but one of his lieutenants, Sam "Mosquito" Bockerie, has taken his place. Bockerie continues to operate as a minor warlord in the bush between Sierra Leone and Liberia, and could quickly grow into another menace with the approval of Charles Taylor. Equally profound is the fact that Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the killer, ultra-corrupt AFRC regime is again a figure in politics, having unsuccessfully run for the presidency but nevertheless having received a disproportionately large quantity of soldiers' votes—therefore perhaps sparking tempting ideas about another army takeover. John Karefa Smart, an octogenarian with all the political baggage from the Margai days, also unsuccessfully ran for the presidency. In addition, Deputy Minister of Defence Sam Hinga-Norman, who still exerts an enormous amount of patrimonial influence and has been appointed the Deputy Defence Minister in the new government, is another potential threat to Sierra Leone's fragile stability. The dismantling of the Civil Defence Force, over which he is in charge, has been continuously postponed.

In conclusion, the intervention actions that are taking place are on the right track. Great Britain enforced the peace while UNAMSIL worked through the peacemaking portion. Together, their efforts have gradually evolved into peacebuilding, and whether peace will hold and good governance will prevail will be evident in the coming years. What remains to be seen is if the international community's steadfastness will last and if its efforts will be sufficiently tenacious enough to outlast the once and possibly future warlords.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. STEPS TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION

The case of Sierra Leone well shows that failure to follow Kumar's four-step model can make it very difficult for an intervention to succeed. In the first place, as we have seen, failure to correctly assess the situation sets up consequential problems in the determined strategy. Secondly, careful evaluation of the circumstances will lead to a much better strategy and will help intervenors avoid likely future mistakes. Also, it is necessary that the developed strategy be sufficiently carried through to an end state such that the intervention's efforts to recondition a government become self-sustaining. Too-short efforts only serve to protract the conflict by propping up a weak government, thus renewing its power just enough to continue but not win the struggle. In consideration of Kumar's third step, the peace mission must integrate all intervenors' efforts. This step is well exemplified by the harmonizing outcomes of UNAMSIL's and Great Britain's feats. The last aim is a continual process of incorporating feedback into the peace mission for the duration of the campaign. A clear example was the stronger resolution issued by the UN to its second mission in light of the first's flimsiness.

Along with those steps, it is necessary to take into consideration the warlord model. This is used to understand the devolution into warlordism such that an incomplete peace plan can be prevented. The warlord model that was developed demonstrated that the problems are deep-rooted and become progressively worse. By the time the situation becomes manifested in warlordism, circumstances are dire, indeed, and the solution, therefore, requires a sense of longevity—intervenors have to see the process through beyond the redesign of the state toward the creation of a stable and viable political process. To facilitate this, intervenors will have to identify and remove a warlord's power base and stand behind the fledgling government as its guarantor.

A viable state would have the following characteristics, as identified by Ali Mazrui:¹¹⁴

1. Sovereign control over territory¹¹⁵
2. Sovereign oversight and supervision...of the nation's resources
3. Effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods, and services
4. Capacity to build and maintain an adequate national infrastructure
5. Capacity to render social services such as sanitation, education, housing, fire brigades, hospitals and clinics, and immunization facilities
6. Capacity for governance and maintenance of law and order

¹¹⁴ Ali Mazrui, "The African State as a Political Refugee," in *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking*, ed. David Smock and Chester Crocker (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 11.

¹¹⁵ Jeffrey Herbst offers an interesting addendum relating to Mazrui's first function. He notes that there is a relationship between the geographical size of a country, how weak a state is, and the likelihood of success.

Due to the problems posed by low population density, small countries are more likely to retain control over their populations for longer periods of time than geographically large countries where the capital is far away from large segments of the population.... It is particularly notable that in wars in small states, the capital itself becomes the battleground...because it was so easy for combatants to get to the center of power. In contrast, wars in larger states have the potential to end with a territorial division...or simply to drag on because the capital cannot reach the rebels in the countryside and the rebels cannot march on the central state....¹¹⁵

In brief, large countries fail in a different manner than small ones. Because smaller countries have less territory to control they would be better candidates for intervention and overall success. Herbst's theory should not be used as an excuse to write off large countries as likely to fail and thus unwinnable—which would certainly be the case if they were treated with neglect. Instead of using his theory as a reason to ignore large countries, it is better employed as a reminder that larger countries sometimes require special attention with regard to legitimate control over their sovereign territory.

Carrying on with respect to difficulties associated with dealing with a larger territory, the difficulties related to geographic size do not stop with intervenors helping a government to assert control over its large territory, i.e. having control of the borders. Any intervention must seek to include the provincial people, to gain control of not just the borders but also the hinterlands. Typically, the last refuge of a weak state is its own capital, where it would completely close its eyes to the rest of the country in desperation to save itself. Of course, this is self-detrimental in the end, inducing or reinforcing in rural areas a turning away from the nationalism necessary for the polity to evolve as a nation. Incorporating backlanders into effective public institutions along with meaningful political inclusion is, therefore, more difficult in a larger territory, but a necessary step in any intervention.

Jeffrey Herbst, "African Peacekeepers and State Failure," in *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 21-22.

All of Mazrui's six functions should be the measure by which an intervention's success is gauged; interventions have too often concentrated on the sixth function while ignoring the others. Once an intervention occurs, the government in place or to be emplaced must be built up so that it has the capacity to realistically carry out all those functions, taking into account its resources and the task at hand.

In addition to the aforementioned stipulations, there are several general conclusions from the Sierra Leone case that can be advantageous to interventions in other warlord situations. Recognition that the conflict itself facilitates a warlord's access to the state's resources will therefore cause intervenors to see that a warlord will consider any attempt at conflict resolution unwelcome. Hence, intervenors' troops must have the authority and willingness to apply the necessary force in order to deprive the warlord of his access to resources, and also to force him to the negotiating table. A subsidiary outcome of the sufficient application of force by peace troops is the creation of security and a sense of predictability in an environment where little previously existed. In other words, the use of force engenders a stable political climate, which is necessary for the improved governance issues to set in with any permanence.

In such a complex situation, it follows that intervenors must do more than just sustain a weak government. A long-term perspective readily substantiates the necessity of establishing a viable political system. This ultimately entails fostering within the people a sense of legitimacy toward the government and a corresponding sense of nationalism. What this means is that, consequently, intervenors cannot mandate a political structure but instead must cultivate the appropriate conditions such that an accountable government develops and the citizenry is engaged. Finally, owed to the multi-faceted approach required to bring about such a demanding goal, institutional reconstruction must be conducted under the auspices of a centralized coordinating agency.

Perhaps the most important of the aforesaid conclusions is the need to recognize that warlords have an intrinsic interest in continuing the conflict because cessation of hostilities is an unwelcome precursor to denying them access to wealth. They do not

fight to win, but only to sustain the instability by which they thrive. For that reason, intervenors must identify warlords' assets and then appropriately target them.

In Sierra Leone's case, weapons were incorrectly initially identified by UNAMSIL as the warlord's principal source of power. In reality, weapons were only the means to obtain and retain control of diamonds. This misperception led to reneged peace accords and cost the lives of early intervenors.

To be sure, reducing the number of weapons available correspondingly reduces the possibility of combat, and for that reason appeared to be a valid goal in Sierra Leone. However, unless the way to get more weapons is also curtailed that objective is pointless. Once intervenors recognized that disarmament was futile without also disconnecting a warlord from his resources the peace process took a huge step forward. The obvious conclusion for intervenors is to not only disarm the combatants but also deny them the method for rearmament.

Although United Nations' sanctions did not stamp out diamond smuggling, it did wrestle control of the diamonds out of the hands of the rebels. The UN is currently endeavoring to recapture this resource as revenue for the legitimate government by encouraging effective administrative oversight of the industry. Moreover, sanctions against other countries implicated in the illicit diamond trade further cut RUF access to international monies. The Sierra Leone case, therefore, demonstrates that attacking warlords' resources can be effectively accomplished with a multi-faceted approach involving international sanctions, diplomacy, and traditional military operations.

Concerning military operations in a peace mission, intervenors in warlord situations cannot be reluctant to use force. When UNAMSIL failed to take aggressive action in response to its troops being taken hostage, rebel forces moved toward Freetown. They would likely have overrun the UN troops had the British not immediately deployed soldiers to Sierra Leone. The analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that decisive British military action demonstrated that international intervenors were committed and serious about peacebuilding, which was important toward establishing stability. More generally, what this suggests is that in international interventions in warlord situations, a little force can go a long way. This was further exemplified by Great Britain's willingness to use

force when its soldiers were taken hostage. Britain's demonstration of force and negligible casualties drew positive attention to Sierra Leone's case, while publicizing intervenors' resolve among Sierra Leoneans. In view of the above, a warlord situation will almost always require a heavy-handed peace enforcement mission with peace-making aspects dovetailed onto it. Once the conflict is adequately subdued, then the peace process can make headway toward improving the political system.

Honing a viable political system will not be possible without recapturing the government's revenue base. Redirecting the profitable diamond industry in Sierra Leone through the government will allow the government to expand its domain beyond the capital. Currently, most social services outside the capital and a few other main cities are provided by philanthropic non-governmental organizations, or they are not provided at all. As the government takes in revenue it should make a determined effort to extend its reach throughout all parts of its territory. This will show the people that the government of Sierra Leone is putting back into the country what it is receiving, rather than filling big men's pockets.

The immediacy of the government's rebuilding of social services and infrastructure has a positive double effect. The first is that it causes the people to look toward Freetown with renewed faith in their government. In other words, it plants the seeds of legitimacy. The second benefit is also reinforcing. Improving distributions out of the capital conversely improves flows into the capital—so long as the government has control of its borders.

This portion of the recovery is critical. The intervenors have taken control of warlords' resources and are trying to put the assets back into the hands of the government. At the same time, they are keeping a wary eye on government, such that it properly makes use of its revenue earnings. In other words, intervenors are propping up the weak state while maintaining their guard against patrimonial influences that might create another shadow state. This is precisely what it should be doing, and what it must continue to do in the time coming.

Congruent to getting the government to put back into its society rather than just take from it, the intervenors are encouraging society to place its faith back in government.

In addition to deploying police and other government officials to the limits of the country, elections were recently held under the attentive eye of government voting officials and police, who were likewise watched and assisted by foreign agencies. With the successful elections of May 2002, in which President Kabbah was reelected with 70% of the vote, international intervenors' job might appear to be complete. However, Sierra Leone's slow decline into warlordism demonstrates that an election is not the end, but only a means of persuading the groups within society to express their differences at the ballot box rather than with force. Peaceful elections do not mark the end of the peacebuilding process. "The last time we had elections [in 1996] everyone thought things were going to be OK," said Sieh Mansaray, 49, whose right hand was chopped off by the rebels in 1998. 'But then the war started again.'"¹¹⁶ Intervenor will have to remain longer than elections in order to ensure that peaceful adherence to the formal political institutions can be sustained, thus coincidentally preventing a hegemonic regime from taking root.

To be sure, political favors are inherent in all politics. The difference between the good and the bad, however, is the degree to which politicians are compelled to abide by the rules and procedures of their political institutions rather than making them up for their own benefit. Conformity and deference to the political institution shrinks the unpredictability which is part and parcel of hegemonic regimes and their more corrupt derivative, patrimonial networks.

Intervenor will have to continue to nourish Sierra Leonean politics as an institution, encouraging concession over intransigence. This is not a quick, cursory task but will have to be sustained over time, with the short run being defined as the next few years. The idea is to develop durability within the political institution while having Sierra Leone gradually regain control over its own life. Eventually, as the government is able to more capably perform for its society, and as the interactions of government and society tend toward decency and mutual acceptance, a sense of nationalism will be generated that will be the true mark of success for the peacebuilding process.

¹¹⁶ "Sierra Elections to Test Peace," *CNN.com/World*, 14 May 2002, Available [Online]: <<http://europe.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/05/13/sierra.vote.ap/index.html>> [17 may 2002].

Fittingly, there is an inherent longevity to such a comprehensive mission. Intervenor's accomplishments thus far have existed mostly in the peace enforcement and peacemaking realms, but with increasing progression into the peacebuilding sphere. Each passing day brings greater achievement for the intervenors as peacebuilders. Great Britain took into account the lengthy, vital time that would be required to succeed before it became involved. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan likewise understands the lengthy time requirement for the task at hand.

As stated in my last report (S/2001/1195), the elections will not by themselves provide a lasting solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. Without well-established State institutions throughout the country, and security agencies that are capable of defending the country from both internal and external threats, the stability so far achieved in Sierra Leone will remain vulnerable. In the period immediately following the elections, the efforts of the newly elected government and the international community must therefore focus on peace consolidation. Urgent attention will need to be paid to the unfinished aspects of the peace process, particularly the extension of State authority, the reintegration of ex-combatants and the restoration of the Government's control over diamond mining. Those efforts will need to be complemented by the reactivation of the judicial system, the strengthening of the law enforcement agencies, the restoration of basic public services and recovery efforts throughout the country.¹¹⁷

In addition to the fundamental enforcement role of UN diamond sanctions discussed above, UNAMSIL has played a crucial coordinating role. Installing OCHA as the coordinating agency among the various and diverse assistance groups has ensured a more coherent, rotund use of available aid. The implication points to the need for synchronization among the various interest groups. For example, the Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO) reports that there are 145 NGOs operating in the country, to include 16 international organizations.¹¹⁸ Considering the breadth of purpose of these NGOs—education, human rights, social welfare, health and sanitation, micro-finance, skills promotion, refugee and displaced persons' assistance, agriculture, to name

¹¹⁷ United Nations Secretary General, "Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone," United Nations S/2002/267, 14 March 2002, Available [Online]: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2002/267e.pdf>> [18 May 2002].

¹¹⁸ "SLANGO At a Glance," < <http://www2.reliefweb.int/sle/hic/slango.pdf> > [07 June 2002].

but a few—it is easy to see the necessity of a coordinating body to ensure that all oars are rowing the boat in the same direction.

B. CONSOLIDATING GAINS, AND LAYING A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE STABILITY

This thesis has argued that the UNAMSIL/Great Britain intervention in Sierra Leone has been largely successful. Despite the difficulties of a long-term involvement, reduction in commitment could result in the loss of any gains made and the consequential return at a later time to start over. Due to the enticement diamonds offer on account of their value in the world market, the ultimate cost of near-term withdrawal will potentially be a renewal of offensive operations and, subsequent to that, intervenors having to retrace steps already taken. For that reason the international community must remain committed to and involved in Sierra Leone. This may become difficult as the sum of the expenditures continues to grow and other priorities arise.

If state-building initiatives are not carried through, the progress made thus far could still be lost. This means a comprehensive peacebuilding mission might take years of commitment. Peacebuilders therefore must be given adequate time to foster a viable and stable political process characterized by compromise, where competition among local actors is carried out purely in the political realm rather than with force. Inability to institute a political system that achieves legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry will allow seeds to germinate within potential fissures and widen latent divides. Among these seeds are the holdover powerful personalities from previous times.

The question of legitimacy is perhaps the most significant objective of the entire peacebuilding process. Concomitant with the need for good governance is the necessity to give the people reason to believe in their government. Legitimacy previously bestowed upon charismatic leaders has to be redirected to the state as an institution. Once institutionalized legitimacy sets in, the populace's confidence in their security will be renewed. Only in this fertile soil can a sense of nationalism, which is the ultimate benchmark for peacebuilders' triumph, grow.

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