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**CONTAINMENT REVISITED:
AN OLD APPROACH TO FUTURE CHALLENGES**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the Cold War marked the termination of what is to date America's longest struggle for national security. But as the Cold War and its inherent fears of nuclear exchanges and World War III subsided, a new era of complex and intense national security concerns began. World order has changed but America's basic approach for securing its national interests may not have. The precepts of George Kennan's original containment strategy could prove to be the winning combination in the years ahead. The global nature of the new world order provides a grand setting for a revisit to Kennan's thoughts, giving America an unprecedented opportunity to secure itself and her allies without the "rapid and sustained build-up" of military might described in NSC 68. America's position as the world's lone superpower lends new credence to all of her instruments of national power, making classical containment the most viable option for a future national security strategy.

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CONTAINMENT REVISITED: AN OLD SOLUTION TO FUTURE CHALLENGES

It's been called the New World Order. The stable predictability of the linear U.S. versus Soviet confrontation is dissolved, and in its place a new collection of states, players, and interests assume center stage in world peace and politics. The world no longer is best depicted as a map or a globe. It's a kaleidoscope. Every turn of the bezel yields a new dimension, a new perspective, a new arrangement. And how these changes are perceived in the context of the New World Order depends entirely on who is holding the viewer.

The conditions of the New Order present some tough security challenges, but they aren't necessarily new. The explosion of information technology holds the potential of bringing the world into every home and office in real time. Access to data, references, archives – knowledge, in general – is unlimited. This proliferation has opened new venues for trade and diplomacy. Information is now considered a weapon. All of these present new conditions, but the underlying threats to national security have remained fairly constant. New states are emerging as old states struggle with their identities, creating pockets (some much larger and deeper than others) of instability. There is no shortage of oppression, hunger, and inequity. Individuals and states hungry for power work feverishly to build new capabilities they can use to coerce weaker, less capable states. The conditions of the New Order may not represent new challenges, but they have made *old* challenges more complex.¹

As we work to understand the New Order, we look for a bold, new strategy for meeting the complexities it embodies. However, the dilemma of meeting the challenges of this new age may not necessarily require a new idea. Our Cold War experience may provide the perfect foundation for a focused yet flexible approach to the montage of security issues we will be forced to confront. The basic precepts of the containment strategy and the key elements through which it was ultimately executed may be the solution to the incongruity of the New Order.

Containment in its classical sense offers a unique opportunity to influence and shape, while affording supporting states an equally unique opportunity to participate in the process. The non-military instruments of national power can enjoy unprecedented dominion in problem resolution in our globalized environment. The potential to apply all of the instruments simultaneously can be realized through a synchronized, synergistic approach to identifying, isolating, and responding to – in short, containing – emerging threats. Existing collective security agreements and organizations can provide the framework for exercising the containment strategy. With emphasis on diplomacy, economics, and information capabilities, states that could not afford the “rapid and sustained” military build-up proposed by NSC 68 can now assume an active role in global security, and do so without fear of conceding sovereignty.

This broader, more flexible avenue for the application of containment represents a full spectrum approach – from identification to response, to threat reduction, to restoration – and gives all in the New Order a share of the responsibility for its security.

The U.S. response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is a living example of containment in action against a complex global threat. An analysis of the Bush administration's approach to eliminating the al Qaeda terror network shows that containment is a viable option for a security strategy in the new age. Further more, it shows that the collective security premises under which the United Nations was formed and functioned during the Cold War are still pertinent today. With a concerted effort to foster cooperation among the nations of the world, their collective resources and resolve to respond to existing and emerging threats is more than enough to contain them.

PRECEDENCE AND PERSPECTIVE

The post-World War II era was one of tumultuous uncertainty. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers. These former allies found themselves juxtaposed – politically, militarily, and culturally – in a contest of influence and control. America's strategy for meeting this threat was containment. The original theory is attributed to George Kennan, who served as an envoy to the USSR after the end of World War II. Having seen first hand the mounting momentum of the Soviet system, Kennan proposed that a cooperative effort among non-communist states to "encourage other peoples to resist" coercion and to "defend the internal integrity of their countries" would be effective in keeping the Soviets in check - in other words, contained.²

What evolved out of the much-debated origins of containment was NSC 68, America's strategy for fighting the Cold War. At its heart was a "rapid and sustained build-up" of military power within the U.S. and its allies.³ Through the build-up of military strength (the principle effort), the collectivization of that power, and through aggressive diplomatic and economic investments, the expanding Soviet sphere would be contained. The parallel effort – diplomatic and economic endeavors – would be key in building and sustaining the will of the collective anti-communist bloc in what promised to be a protracted effort.⁴

The catastrophic implosion of the Soviet empire in 1989 was the result of many contributing factors – unsound economic practices, exorbitant defense expenditures, expansion beyond its means to sustain, internal opposition to its oppressive nature, and others. As you pan the causes of the collapse of the Soviet system, the efficacy of the Cold War containment

strategy is acknowledged. The combination of diplomatic, economic, and military pressures placed upon Moscow throughout the fifty year history of the Cold War was too much to bear. The aggressive military build-up was something only the U.S. economy could support and sustain. Global and regional alliances formed a bulwark about the expanding threat. The U.S. nuclear arsenal filled the gaps where military and diplomatic alliances did not suffice or exist.

In spite of the extraordinary changes that have taken place since 1946, there are some similarities shared by the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras. There is a need to 'rebuild' those parts of the world adversely affected by years of communist rule, much like Western Europe was restored under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. A few of the former Soviet satellites have made significant progress in re-establishing themselves as independent states, but the process is incomplete.⁵ The African continent remains impoverished. Emerging and failing states remain the most vulnerable to hostile influence, both internal and external. Once hot beds for communist expansion, these struggling nations now find themselves susceptible to new parasites like terrorist networks and organized crime.⁶

The lines of similarity are quickly complicated by what is perhaps the single greatest difference between the two eras – the explosion in information technology and subsequent globalization. While wealthier states are able to afford the expenses of transitioning into the Information Age, struggling states cannot. As struggling nations try to keep pace with the demands for change and accountability in this new era, the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' grows.⁷ The potential for unrest and instability grows as the chasm widens. New leadership, money, military hardware, schools, or a network of computers alone will not solve the problem of maintaining peace and stability. Piecemeal application of the instruments of national power simply will not work.⁸ The security challenges of the new era require a deliberate effort to bring all of our capabilities together, working in concert with those of our allies and partners, to address threats, effect change, and guarantee peace. Re-enter containment.

Kennan's vision of stronger nations – mentor states, if you will – using a combination of social, economic, and military programs to encourage and assist struggling states in their efforts to resist coercion and maintain sovereignty enjoys renewed profundity in the New Order. A pure military response, especially if taken unilaterally, will not draw much support from a global community. Diplomacy can be effective in setting the conditions for containment, but again, a unilateral approach will not suffice. Economic sanctions and impingements alone tend to do more damage than repair, and again, if imposed unilaterally, will not garner the necessary cooperation to make the desired end state a reality.⁹ With the ability to collect and disseminate

information in real time, using a wide assortment of platforms and fora, mentor states are well disposed to bring into play all of the necessary tools needed to dissuade hostile regimes or actors.¹⁰ Bradley Thayer suggests that information, when used as an instrument of national power, strengthens the other instruments and lends greater credibility to a response. Information, according to Thayer, can also impart credibility to allies in a cooperative response.¹¹ Information, applied as a coercive or persuasive instrument can serve as the glue that binds the means through which the desired ends are achieved.² The coercive or persuasive powers of diplomacy, economics, military forces, and global real time access to information can be convincing, if not devastating.¹³

REDEFINING GLOBAL SECURITY – COOPERATIVE, NOT COLLECTIVE

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines *collective* as "similarity among or with the members of a group." This implies an effort must be made to gather components or constituents with like qualities or qualities that can be effectively reconfigured to suit the task at hand. During the Cold War, *collective* security focused on gathering the assets – equipment, formations, weapons, technology – needed to maintain balance with the massive military apparatus the Soviet Union had assembled. Cold War containment was implemented by collecting the military capabilities of the non-Warsaw Pact and placing them where they could exert the most influence on the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Allies were encouraged to pursue supporting military, diplomatic, and economic programs, but for the most part the United States paid the bill. The U.S. also played the major role in defining what Cold War security policy would be and how it would be executed.

The same Webster's dictionary defines *cooperative* as a "willingness to work with others for mutual benefit." There is no implication of commonality here. There is no requirement to assimilate participants into a particular mold or system. A *cooperative* security effort is bound by common purpose and objective. The principles that bring the *cooperative* effort together impart restraint and provide focus, thus ensuring the means employed are consistent with their values.¹⁵ Richard Haass contends that the world, in the wake of globalization, has become multipolar. He defines 'multipolar' as a simple description of the distribution of power, not a commentary on the quality of relationships between and among states. Haass proposes that the "multipolar world could be one in which . . . a number of states . . . work together in common." He emphasizes that the objective of our security policy should be to "persuade other centers of political, economic, and military power . . . to believe it is in their self-interest to

support constructive notions of how international society should be organized and should operate." Haass concludes this argument by offering that the goal in this vein would be "to encourage a multipolarity characterized by cooperation."¹⁶

Davis and Sweeney, in their book *Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era*, contend that the U.S. must develop "more intense strategic partnership[s]" in regions where none currently exist so that we can emplace the regional alliances and coalitions needed to respond to and contain threats across the globe.¹⁷ The term 'partnership', like Haass' 'multipolarity', is the essence of *cooperative* security. It implies that participants, irrespective of their size or power, will have a role in determining the priority and objectives for security strategies. The U.S. may not always need nor want to call the shots. W. Michael Reisman argues that for many states, their only opportunity to establish a base of power or influence - their place in the New Order - will be through *cooperative* security efforts.¹⁸ Stewart Patrick argues that this is the very reason the U.S. should pursue an active, but not domineering, role in *cooperative* security. By fostering a participatory system we establish a global base of support, united behind common ideals and objectives, thus setting the conditions for containment.¹⁹

In the ambiguous, asymmetric New Order there appears to be an unprecedented opportunity to not only mold a security strategy that addresses the complex challenges, but, as Richard Haass argues, "to foster a world that protects U.S. interests."²⁰ The complex and unpredictable nature of today's transnational threats require an equally global response. The authors of NSC 68 laid out a containment strategy that relied on a collective defense effort led and underwritten by the U.S. Cooperative security brings new light and efficacy to containment. Through an integrated system of new and existing alliances and agreements, a base of support can be established across the globe from which a cooperative response to instability or threat to national security can be launched. States can contribute along a broad range of options. Support will range from something as simple as an official statement of support, to sharing intelligence, to granting overflight or basing rights, to providing forces for military operations. The key here is that the contribution is consistent with means. There is a place for every nation to contribute to the cooperative security effort.

THE FUTURE OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY

In pondering cooperative containment as an approach to a national security strategy, the roles of the United Nations, NATO, and other collective security bodies must be considered. Some would be quick to discount their efficacy since they were derived and instituted to counter

a threat that no longer exists.²¹ Others would argue that there is a place in the modern era for such organizations, that the framework they provide for international cooperation and security could be easily adapted to address the more complex asymmetric threats now before us.²²

Globalization puts limits on what the U.S. can accomplish alone, argues Stewart Patrick.²³ Though we stand as the lone super power, we simply haven't the means to take on the complexities of the new order. Patrick states that a decision on the part of the U.S. to disregard or opt out of cooperative security regime "would cripple that institution's capacity to function."²⁴ The unmistakable implication is that the world needs U.S. involvement, yet the converse is also true. The U.S. needs the rest of the globe to play an active role in the security effort. Patrick adds that "multilateral cooperation is more attractive to the weak" because it gives them a degree of leverage absent in bilateral arrangements.²⁵ This perhaps is the most profound argument in support of pursuing a role for cooperative security as we wage our war against terrorism. A cooperative effort gives struggling states a way to work themselves into the fold and obtain the necessary assistance they need to protect their sovereignty, effect the necessary changes to keep pace with developments in commerce and technology, and provide the basic services for their constituents. The implied task for stronger states becomes one of mentorship. Through this mentoring process struggling states gain their footing and enjoy an opportunity to advance where before none existed. The benefit to the collective is that these potential hot beds for insurgency and interference by terrorist networks are denied. Internal stability and the watchful eye of the mentor serve as an enhancement to containment.²⁶

There are some controversial implications America and her security partners will have to consider as they contemplate their roles in cooperative security organizations. First, the organization and mandates under which these alliances and collective security bodies functioned during the Cold War will have to be redesigned to address current and future threats.²⁷ Second, if these institutions are to succeed in their new mandates they must have resources. There will be requirements for forces, for equipment, for joint training and exercises, and for facilities. Day-to-day operations will require some form of operating capital. This means all must pay their way, within the limits of their means, if they are to benefit from the blanket of security these organizations provide. Third, the United States will assume a lead role in many circumstances, but not all. There will be occasions where leadership by another nation will do more to foster the long term stability and potency of the cooperative effort than any amount of U.S. domination.²⁸ The weaker nations will always look to the U.S. for guidance and leadership even when it assumes a supporting role, but smaller states must be given a voice. Finally, our

future security strategy must include a plan for maintaining alliances and coalitions. The U.S. must approach the maintenance of its strategic partnerships with balance across all of the instruments of national power, argues Rachel Bronson.²⁹ She adds that the long term success of a containment strategy is underscored by “positive social, economic, and political vision.”³⁰ The critical element of this vision must be a concerted effort to preserve strategic partnerships and build on their cooperation.

THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM - CONTAINMENT IN ACTION

PRESIDENT BUSH SETS THE STAGE

The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. and America’s response offer a superb example of the application of containment theory in its classical form. President Bush set the stage for what would become OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM by making his most significant contribution to the effort - clearly defining the objective. In his remarks the day after the attacks, Mr. Bush announced that the focus of his administration was to identify and eliminate the perpetrators of not just the New York and Washington attacks, but terrorism around the world.³¹ His famous quote, “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,” served as both warning and call to arms. States that supported terrorist activity – directly or indirectly – were put on notice.

At the same time, Mr. Bush began a deliberate process of building global support for what would become a global effort. He declared the events of September 11 an attack on “all peace-loving nations.”³² In his address before a joint session of Congress on September 20th, Mr. Bush referred his audience to Article 5 of the NATO charter: an attack on one is an attack on all.³³ He likened the al Qaeda’s relationship to terrorism with the mafia’s role in crime, and in so doing initiated what would become an intense effort to discredit bin Laden’s network, the Taliban, and Islamic extremism in general.

His objective clearly stated, President Bush set the stage for what he openly declared would be a protracted, costly effort. He forewarned Americans that much of what would transpire in the coming weeks would not resemble the war they had seen in Iraq ten years previous. The nature of the threat and the means required to destroy it mandated an unprecedented level of secrecy and security. The president made no apologies for potential voids in media coverage. He made it clear that this was a small price to pay in order to bring

about the objective of ENDURING FREEDOM – “every terrorist group of global reach . . . found, stopped, and destroyed.”³⁴

THE INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN CONCERT – DIPLOMACY

The objective of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the earliest hours of the war on terrorism was to isolate known terrorist organizations and those who supported them. The first targets were the Taliban and the al Qaeda network. Drawing from the outpouring of international sympathy and support that flowed into the White House on September 12th, the Bush administration rapidly converted this momentum into a coalition building effort.

For the first time in its history the North Atlantic Treaty organization invoked Article 5 of its charter on September 12th. A press release by the BBC in the days immediately following revealed that the U.S. had presented its NATO allies with “clear and compelling evidence” that the attacks of September 11th were the treachery of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorism network.³⁵ The NATO announcement stated that, in accordance with Article 5, “each ally was obliged to assist the United States” as it moved forward with its war on terrorism.

On that same day the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution condemning the attacks and called for “international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September.”³⁶ The UN followed with another resolution on September 28th reiterating its condemnation and announcing the unanimous adoption of a “comprehensive resolution with steps and strategies to combat international terrorism.”³⁷ This document - UNSCR 1373 – also established a Committee of the Council to monitor the resolution’s implementation, and called upon “all States to report on actions they had taken to that end no later than 90 days from” from the date of the announcement.³⁸ UNSCR 1373 went on to direct states to refrain from supporting terrorism in any manner. This directive gave international recognition to President Bush’s declaration, “you are either with us or you are with the terrorists.”

Other regional collective security and economic bodies offered similar statements of support and solidarity. On September 21 the Organization of American States issued its official statement as Secretary of State Powell presided over its emergency session. The Group of Seven and Group of Twenty economic consortiums issued their statements of condemnation and support on October 5th and November 17th respectively. The European Union announced its solidarity in an official statement released on October 17th. APEC followed with its statement

on October 21st with President Bush in attendance. With the advent of these statements the Bush administration enjoyed support for its war on terrorism from every continent on the globe.³⁹

What occurred in the days following these decrees was an unprecedented level of international support and cooperation. Perennial allies like Great Britain, Germany, and France offered not only their official statements condemning the attacks, but armed forces to assist in the military campaign. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates broke off diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. Egypt pledged its full cooperation. A host of European states offered statements of condemnation and support for the effort.⁴⁰ Nations not previously considered strong allies also offered assistance. Uzbekistan allowed the stationing of U.S. troops and use of its airfields near the Afghani border. Pakistan offered its full cooperation in sealing its border with Afghanistan to prevent the escape of Taliban leaders and soldiers. Armenia and Azerbaijan granted overflight rights to facilitate troop deployments and air operations. Russia offered the use of its bases near the region and its troops in the ensuing military campaign. China condemned the attacks in public forum and pledged its support in the fight against terrorism. Libya, long a source of concern and frustration in the fight against terrorism, called on Muslim agencies to offer support to the victims of September 11 and declared that the U.S. had the right to take revenge.⁴¹ The concerted parallel campaign on the part of the Bush administration to reassure Islamic nations that the war was targeting terrorists and not Muslims no doubt played a huge part in rallying the support it received, and offered an additional venue from which pressure could be exerted on the Taliban regime.⁴² The foundation laid by President Bush in the early hours after September 11 now buttressed what became a global coalition united in the fight against terrorism.

ECONOMICS

The objective of this facet of the anti-terror effort was threefold: first, identify and deny the financial assets of international terrorist organizations; second, prepare the U.S. and its partners for the pending war on terrorism; and finally, rebuild and restore the facilities destroyed on September 11th and re-energize the struggling U.S. economy. This last step would serve as the ultimate statement of U.S. resolve.

A coordinated effort between the State, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice Departments confirmed a number of nations and non-state actors who had played an active role in financing al Qaeda and other terrorist organization operations. Using this information and other data provided by international partners, these assets were frozen, along with those of suspected

sympathizers. This effort enjoyed the complete support of UNCSR 1373, which called for all states to "freeze without delay funds and other financial assets" which might be tied to terrorist activity.⁴³ A State department release made on October 11th revealed that \$24 million from terrorist organizations had been frozen worldwide.⁴⁴

The State Department employed a wide range of economic incentives as a token of thanks to those states offering support. Over \$30 billion in national debt relief was granted to Pakistan by the U.S. and the U.K. Pakistan also received emergency aid to assist with its support and humanitarian relief efforts.⁴⁵ The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. announced on September 28th that sanctions against Sudan would be lifted as a result of the "substantial steps" it had taken to combat terrorism.⁴⁶ On October 6th the G-7 unveiled its plan to combat the financing of terrorism at its meeting in Washington, D.C. It also announced the establishment of a Financial Action Task Force to monitor this effort, which met October 29th and 30th to develop specific guidelines for financial institutions to use in monitoring and regulating monies flowing into known and suspected terrorist organizations.⁴⁷ Throughout this period, Afghanistan received a steady stream of international financial support from many nations and a plethora of relief organizations.

At home, President Bush passed emergency legislation appropriating \$40 billion to rebuild the facilities and communities destroyed in the September 11 attacks. In addition to providing immediate support to New York City and Washington, D.C., this legislation set aside money to enhance law enforcement, diplomatic, and military efforts to combat terrorism.⁴⁸ The Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation Departments all received funding for improvements in security and law enforcement efforts.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The objective of this portion of the anti-terror campaign had three integral parts: isolate extremists from mainstream Islam; reassure the mainstream Muslim world that the war on terrorism was targeting terrorists, not Muslims in general; and maintain popular support for and interest in the global war on terrorism abroad.

Osama bin Laden was announced as the prime suspect in the September 11 attacks on September 15th. Intelligence was still being developed, but by September 27th the FBI had uncovered the plot, the identities of the hi-jackers, and their ties to the al Qaeda network. As the plans were being drawn up for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, other terrorist organizations and supporters were put on notice. Secretary of State Powell issued a statement

on October 5th listing 28 international terrorist groups being watched. President Bush followed suit five days later with a list of the 22 most wanted terrorists.⁴⁹

While the Bush administration labored to build popular support for its war on terrorism, it waged an equally industrious campaign that targeted the general Islam population. President Bush spoke directly to Muslims in his September 20 address before a joint session of Congress, reaffirming America's respect for their faith and ideals. He compared the teachings and values of Islam with those in America, adding that "many millions of Americans" were practicing Muslims. Mr. Bush closed this segment of his speech by stating that "the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; its is not our many Arab friends."⁵⁰ This point was reiterated many times over the following weeks in a host of venues by a number of senior leaders and diplomats.⁵¹ The House of Representatives codified this effort by passing House Resolution 227 on September 15th, a bill that renounced bigotry against Muslim- and Arab-Americans. This bill passed unanimously and enjoyed bi-partisan sponsorship.⁵²

To satisfy the appetite for information at home, the White House, and State and Defense Departments instituted a number of initiatives. Secretary Rumsfeld held daily briefings in the Pentagon, updating the media on military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Secretary Powell's office also conducted daily briefings outlining the progress of diplomatic efforts. In addition, the State Department expanded its International Information web page to include official statements, press releases, and other information related to the war on terrorism. The White House's home page also was expanded to include the president's official remarks, media clips, and links to other federal agencies' web sites for detailed information on the anti-terror effort. While none of these efforts are necessarily new, the amount and detail of the information they provided was enormous. Throughout, the president and his two principle cabinet members reiterated the global nature of the threat and that the war to eliminate terrorism would be a long and costly one. This effort built and sustained an unprecedented level of national will within the United States, as indicated by President Bush's approval ratings.⁵³

MILITARY OPERATIONS

The objectives of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM were two-fold: first, destroy the Taliban military apparatus and kill or capture al Qaeda leadership; and second, to send a clear and succinct message to terrorist organizations and supporters everywhere – that the U.S. and its anti-terror coalition would go anywhere to do what it had to in order to eliminate terrorism.

Military operations in Afghanistan began on October 7th as U.S. and U.K. aircraft bombed Taliban command and control nodes, air defense assets, airfields, and military installations. Within a matter of hours, the Taliban leadership was blind, unable to coordinate or monitor its defenses. The Northern Alliance resumed its attacks on Taliban strongholds in northern Afghanistan, supported by coalition close air and special forces advisors. Special operations assets patrolled the mountainous border with Pakistan in an effort to cut off fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Bombers targeted Taliban defenses and the numerous cave complexes in an effort to drive out Taliban and al Qaeda hardliners. By December 9th, the Taliban regime officially came to an end with the surrender of Kandahar.

Forces and resources for the military effort came from all over the world. NATO offered up five AWACS aircraft. Japan deployed intelligence and security units. In addition to its air assets, Great Britain's special operations forces, the Special Air Service, also played a vital role. France and Germany offered the use of its conventional and special operations forces. Pakistan offered not only its forces but the use of its territory to support operations in Afghanistan. Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan granted overflight rights and the use of their military bases to support both military and humanitarian assistance operations. While every nation making an offer of troops or resources to support the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda is not listed here, it is imminently clear that the overwhelming outflow of support did not end with official diplomatic statements. Many came to the table prepared to fight, perhaps not in Afghanistan but certainly within their own countries. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM was a fight against a transnational threat being waged by an international force on an international battlefield.⁵⁴

A SNAP-SHOT OF ENDURING FREEDOM

Using September 11th as the start point and the end of the Taliban regime as the end, Chapter One of the story of the war against terrorism lasted 85 days. There are still some hold-outs in the caves in eastern Afghanistan and no doubt many Taliban and al Qaeda officials escaped in the sea of refugees, but the nest of support for bin Laden's network is gone and in its place is a new government that has committed itself to cooperating in the fight against terror. A warning has been issued to those on known or suspected terrorist lists: Mr. Bush wasn't kidding, and he enjoys a lot of support from around the world.

When combat operations began in Afghanistan on October 7th it had been only 26 days since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In four weeks, Afghanistan and the scourge it harbored had been contained – politically, economically, militarily, and culturally. Through a relentless effort across the instruments of power, the U.S. was able to pull together and effect a security strategy that served it and its allies and partners alike. In a fraction of the time it took during the Cold War, and against a complex and unpredictable foe, we implemented containment. United behind a common objective and fueled by an unprecedented level of international cooperation, containment worked.

CONCLUSION

The containment of NSC 68 served us well during the Cold War, but at great expense and with often inconsistent results.⁵⁵ The nuclear- and military-heavy aspects of NSC 68's plan for global security don't afford much credibility in an era void of large formations of tanks, artillery, and infantry. The new world order requires a new approach to national security. Or does it?

What George Kennan postulated as a cooperative effort to encourage peaceful coexistence in the 1940s became a reality in 2001. Under the auspices of President Bush's 'declaration' of war against terrorism, nations came together behind a common cause and a common set of values. Using resources from across the instruments of national power, the Taliban regime was isolated from the rest of the world and ultimately ejected. In its place a new government struggles to put Afghanistan back together with the aid of the same coalition responsible for removing its predecessor. The fighting in Afghanistan is but the first stage in a long-term war to rid the planet of the scourge we call terrorism, but it provides a modern example of how effective an old theory can be.

Most significant of the Afghanistan example is the holistic approach to the challenge. No sooner had the fighting begun than allies offered to participate in the ensuing peacekeeping effort. Other allies offered to broker the formation of a transitional government. Still others provided support to the many refugees and relief organizations in the region.⁵⁶ There was no band-aid policy in place for this operation. The plan was a complete one, encompassing the surgical removal of the threat, the installation of a healthy transition government, and the subsequent rehabilitation that will be needed to get Afghanistan back on its feet. The Afghans were a part of the process throughout. They never once surrendered their sovereignty. The support of nations of similar cultural background ensured that Afghanistan's unique culture

would remain intact after the fighting was over. As the new government works towards rebuilding, the same coalition that destroyed the Taliban is poised to assist in Afghanistan's re-entry into the peaceful world order.

The coalition formed for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM was an *ad hoc* organization, but it enjoyed unprecedented popular support and the backing of existing international security, trade, and diplomatic organizations. An effort as long in duration as the war against terrorism promises to lead the discussion of the future of the coalition to an interesting crossroads. Do we continue as we are or do we formalize its existence? If we formalize, what different role would the anti-terror coalition play from the U.N. or NATO? If we take anything away from our opening salvo in Afghanistan it should be that security can be cooperative and many believe that existing collective security bodies can serve as the core around which *ad hoc* coalitions can be formed on an as-needed basis to address specific threats.

COOPERATIVE CONTAINMENT – THE NEW BUSH DOCTRINE?

The war against terrorism will have to endure a campaign or two more before we can discern a clear trend in the Bush administration's approach to battling this spectre, but the Afghanistan example does shed some light on what might be considered a unique approach to national security policy. The response to September 11th has some distinguishable features that delineate it from previous security strategies and, as the history books will undoubtedly attest, are well worth emulating.

The process begins with a clearly defined objective, which serves as the springboard for the next step – building international support and, through an aggressive information campaign, attaining legitimacy from international and regional security organizations. Next, an *ad hoc* coalition is built to address a specific phase or threat. As the coalition assembles the threat is isolated (contained) using diplomatic, economic, and informational means. Concurrently, the military postures itself for its role. The threat is ultimately attenuated or destroyed using the same instruments that isolated it. The final step involves a cooperative effort to restore order and government in the region in crisis and begin the process of rebuilding and reentry into international society. The legitimacy of this approach is vested in the charters of existing diplomatic, economic, and security organizations. Its credibility is vested in the depth and breadth of international cooperation and resolve.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM marked the dawn of *cooperative* containment. Allies, former foes, and previously unknown partners have contributed to the war on terrorism – military and otherwise – and for the most part have paid their own way. The efforts by the Bush administration to paint a picture of terrorism as a global threat for the purpose of unifying global resolve has been effective. The willingness of the members of this new security effort to support the initial campaign against the Taliban regime marks a new level of participation and perseverance. The focus in this case is on principles, not materiel or personnel. This focus has allowed nations with limited means to play a role alongside the perennial powers in determining the outcome.

Richard Haass wrote that a security policy that encourages cooperation as a primary function, much like Kennan prescribed in 1946, would be the key to building “international consensus for the 21st century.”⁵⁷ Robert Tucker echoes this thought by saying that existing alliances can become “a community of power and principle.”⁵⁸ With an empowered, resourced cooperative security apparatus in place, gaining and maintaining global support for security and other issues has a framework for progress.

The challenge in developing a national security strategy for the 21st century is met by balancing the application of the instruments of national power to an end that allows for established and dysfunctional societies alike to evolve into functional ones *on their own*. Stronger states will have to assume a lead role in assisting struggling nations through the perils of evolution and change. Cooperative containment is the vehicle for this process. Just as the anti-terror coalition used containment to isolate and defeat the Taliban regime, those same resources and applications can be employed to help struggling and emerging states achieve stability and prosper. The Afghanistan example shows that this can be done without sacrificing sovereignty or national and cultural values.

Much work remains in Afghanistan, but the early stages of our efforts there offer us a unique opportunity to embrace a security strategy that is flexible enough to meet a wide variety of complex threats and provide for restoration or rebuilding where force must be used. Furthermore, this strategy shows that we can cooperate without conversion – to a particular political system, to a particular military organization, or to a particular set of cultural norms. The final measure of containment’s effectiveness in ENDURING FREEDOM will not be known for some time, but the early indications strongly suggest that containment *can* and *does* work.

Word count – 6468

END NOTES

1. William R. Hawkins, "U.S. Advantage in Asymmetrical Warfare", *The Washington Times* (Washington, D.C.), 14 November 2001.
2. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), pp 361-362.
3. NSC 68, pp 54-55.
4. *ibid*, pg 55. There was heavy emphasis within the diplomatic front to sow seeds of democracy among those nations on the Soviet periphery. In retrospect U.S. efforts to "spread" democracy looked a lot like Soviet efforts to "spread" communism. See also Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp 805-806.
5. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pg 817-820.
6. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*. (New York: Random House, 1993), pg 129.
7. Taken from the author's class notes during a session with Professor Gabriel Marcella. This thought, that struggling states have difficulty with managing change and providing for accountability within their governments, is attributed to Professor Marcella. See also Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), pp 228-233. Kissinger makes the same argument, pointing out that the gap between successful states and those that do not manage to keep pace with change or make the effort to change in face of globalization (economic- and political-wise) will widen, ultimately leading to catastrophic consequences.
8. U.S. actions in Somalia in 1993 provide an example of piecemeal application of power and the consequences of those actions. See Kissinger, pg 809.

9. A. Cooper Drury, "Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions", *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (September 2001), pg 504.
10. Kennan, *Memoirs*, pg365.
11. Bradley A. Thayer, "The Political Effects of Information Warfare: Why New Military Capabilities Cause Old Political Dangers", *Security Studies* 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp 56-58.
12. *ibid*, pg 84.
13. *ibid*, pg 57.
14. Martin Walker, *The Cold War: A History*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993), pp 237-244. Also see NSC 68, pg 56.
15. William H. Luers, "Choosing Engagement", *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 5 (September/October 2000), pg 4.
16. Richard N. Haass, "What to do with American Primacy", *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999), pg 38.
17. Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, *Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era*. (Dulles: Brassey's, 1999), pg 296.
18. W. Michael Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions", *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999), pg 62.
19. Stewart Patrick, "The Perils of Going it Alone", *World Policy Journal* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pg 9.
20. Haass, pg 43.
21. Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), pg 42.

22. Patrick, pp 4-5; and Jeffrey Gedmin, "Collecting the Anti-Terror Coalition", *Policy Review* 109 (October/November 2001), pp 15-18.

23. Patrick, pg 6.

24. *ibid*, pg 9.

25. *ibid*, pg 5.

26. Gedmin, pg 16. See also Haas, pg 41. Haass likens our role in determining future security strategy to that of Great Britain during the 19th century.

27. Warren Christopher, *IN the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign policy for a New Era*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp 329-330.

28. Davis and Sweeney, pg 289.

29. Rachel Bronson, "Beyond Containment in the Persian Gulf", *Orbis* 45, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pg 209.

30. *ibid*, pg 193.

31. President, Address to the American People, 12 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; internet. Hereafter, "Bush, 12 September".

32. President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; internet. Hereafter, "Bush, 20 September".

33. *ibid*, pg 5.

34. *ibid*, pg 4.

35. Department of State, Press Release, "NATO Invokes Article 5", 4 October 2001 (accessed 14 January 2002), available from <http://www.ibb.gov/editorials/09457.htm>; internet.

36. United Nations, UNSC Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01091221.htm>; internet. Hereafter, "UNSCR 1368".

37. United Nations, UNSC Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), pg 1, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01091221.htm>; internet. Hereafter, "UNSCR 1373".

38. *ibid*, pg 1.

39. Department of State, International Information Programs (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet. This site provides a by-day accounting of the war on terrorism, to include a complete list of White House, State, and Defense press releases. The State Department published a press release for every nation that offered a statement of condolence, support, or a commitment to provide resources for the war on terrorism. The OAS, EU, G7, G20, and APEC announcements are included in these releases.

40. The Associated Press, "Others Offer Help in Many Forms", *USA Today* (New York), 18 September 2001 (accessed 11 January 2002), available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/sep2001/e20010918others.htm>; internet. This article provides a list of nations that offered support for the war of terrorism. Each listing includes a brief description of the type of support rendered.

41. *ibid*.

42. Bush, 20 September, pp 2-5.

43. UNSCR 1373, pg 4.

44. Department of State, Press Release, "O'Neill Announces \$24 Million in terrorist Assets Frozen", 11 October 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
45. Department of State, Press Release, "President Bush Announces Additional Financial Aid for Afghanistan", 28 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
46. Department of State, Press Release, "U.S. – Sudan Press Statement", 28 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
47. Department of State, Press Release, "G-7 Press Release", 6 October 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
48. Bush, 20 September, pg 2.
49. Department of State, Press Release, "Powell Identifies ", 6 October 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
50. Bush, 20 September, pg 2.
51. Department of State, International Information Programs (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet. The chronology on this site's war on terrorism link provides a daily accounting of statements by senior U.S. officials.
52. Department of State, Press Release, "House Passes Anti-bigotry Resolution", 15 September 2001 (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet.
53. David W. Moore, "Confidence in Leaders", *The Gallup Poll* 432 (September 2001), pp 15 and 18. President Bush's job approval rating hovered around the 55-60% mark in the early months of his administration. After the attacks of September 11, his approval rating soared to over 90% (September 21-22) and has stayed above the 80% mark since.

54. Department of State, International Information Programs (accessed 15 January 2002), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror>; internet. The State Department International Information and White House web pages provide a complete listing of international contributions to the Afghanistan phase of ENDURING FREEDOM.

55. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp 755-756.

56. See 53.

57. Haass, pg 38.

58. Robert W. Tucker, "Alone or with Others", *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999), pg 17.

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