

**STRATEGY
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**INFLUENCE MANAGEMENT:
A TOOL FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Influence Management : A Tool for the War on Terrorism

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ABSTRACT

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On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush said, "We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network." This paper explores the use of influence management, at the strategic level, to defeat terrorism. It examines how the U.S. government must use one of the elements of national power, information, to both protect the friendly center of gravity and should be used to attack decisive points to topple the enemy's center of gravity.

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INFLUENCE MANAGEMENT: A TOOL FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM

"The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim."

—Osama bin Laden

On September 11, 2001, the United States was thrust into conflict when terrorists hijacked four airliners and conducted attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Nine days later President George W. Bush addressed a Joint Session of Congress and the American people and said, "We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network."¹

One of the elements of national power is information and this paper explores the use of influence management, as a subset of information operations, as a tool to defeat terrorism. Further, it recommends modifications and changes to the way the U.S. Government is using influence in the ongoing campaign against terrorism so that its full effect can be synchronized with the other elements of power to defeat the enemy.

After defining terrorism, this paper will examine and evaluate the U.S. strategy to fight terrorism. This is followed by looking at how U.S. joint military planning doctrine for campaign planning when combined with psychological operations (PSYOP) planning principles can be used to develop a strategy to win the propaganda war on terrorism. While this strategy is much more than a PSYOPs campaign, the identification of centers of gravity and decisive points (only the decisive points that are applicable to information are addressed), as well as selecting media, and target audiences all are applicable to this fight. Each of these factors are reviewed independently and then combined to demonstrate how strategic synchronization can accomplish the desired results.

DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS

"Muslims burn with anger at America. For its own good, America should leave [Saudi Arabia.] ... There is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. ... The presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world. The existence of these forces in the area will provoke the people of the country and induces aggression on their religion, feelings and prides and pushes them to take up armed struggle against the invaders occupying the land. ... Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it."

—Osama bin Laden

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and has been employed for centuries as a method to gain recognition for a cause. Asymmetric warfare and normal criminal activity are both often confused with terrorism. While terrorists regularly use asymmetric means to conduct their attacks and their violence is criminal, there are distinct actions that set a terrorist apart from a common criminal or a soldier using an asymmetric weapon. It is important to understand what type of activity is involved before an effective counter strategy can be developed.

Terrorism

"We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa."

—Osama bin Laden

There are numerous definitions of terrorism, the Department of Defense describes it as, "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."² While this is a good description, a U.S. bombing campaign would then be considered a terrorist act. The Kosovo air war used violence (aerial bombardment) to coerce a government to accept a peace plan, a political end. While this is a literal interpretation of the meaning, few would classify an Air Force pilot as a terrorist.

Israel's Jonathan Institute better describes terrorism as, "the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends."³ Using this definition, the attacks on the USS Cole and the Pentagon would not be considered terrorist acts, simply asymmetric attacks on military targets. The word "deliberate" distinguishes terrorist violence from accidental civilian casualties of war.⁴ Similarly, "guerrillas" or freedom

fighters are not generally terrorists as long as they attack military forces and not civilians.⁵ The U.S. legal meaning of terrorism closely resembles the definition of the Jonathan Institute.

Title 22 of the U.S. Code states that, "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."⁶ Once again, one would not consider the attacks on the USS Cole a terrorist attack and the attack on the Pentagon questionable. However, almost all definitions acknowledge the attacks on the World Trade Center as a terrorist attack. The importance of using a consistent meaning while building and projecting information cannot be underemphasized. For the purposes of this paper, the Title 22 definition is used.

Information

"Information is the currency of victory on the Battlefield"

—Gen. Gordon Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

Information is considered one of the four elements of national power and for the few who decline to deem it a separate element, do agree that it is an essential part of political, economic and military power. Since non-state terrorist organizations are unable to compete head-to-head with the U.S. militarily or economically, they must use information as their primary element of power. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) publication 1-02 defines information as, "facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representations."⁷ Additionally, JCS defines information operations (IO) as, "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."⁸ Some important elements of IO are:

Psychological operations (PSYOPs) — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.⁹ Also called International Military Information because of the sensitivity to the term psychological operation.

Propaganda — Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.¹⁰

Counterpropaganda — Counterpropaganda includes activities directed at an enemy or adversary conducting PSYOP against friendly forces. Counterpropaganda can contribute to situational understanding and expose enemy attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. Preventive actions include propaganda awareness programs that inform US and friendly forces and friendly populations about hostile propaganda.¹¹

International Public Information — Actions using overt PSYOPs, foreign public information and foreign public diplomacy to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to U.S. national interests.¹²

Perception management — Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.¹³

Because DOD puts a restrictive meaning on perception management that only allow direct targeting of the policy maker or targeting through his intelligence and gives no consideration to counter-propaganda, a need for a new term exists. For the purposes of this paper, I have developed the following definition that encompasses the needed parameters.

Influence management — Actions to convey information to influence foreign audiences to sway their emotions, motives, and reasoning while countering opponents misinformation. This may include political, religious, civic and/or military leaders or a targeted population directly, through their leaders, or a creditable external source, ultimately resulting in behavior that is either favorable or neutral to the originator's objectives. It typically combines

international public information and counter-propaganda, but may also use other sub-sets of IO to influence a target audience. It is both offensive and defensive in nature.

ATTACK

"The world is divided into two camps – one under the banner of the cross, as the head of the infidels, Bush, has said, and one under the banner of Islam."

—Osama bin Laden

On September 11, 2001, the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, led by Osama bin Laden, conducted a suicide attack of the United States to destroy the World Trade Centers, the Pentagon and another unknown location. While the exact objectives are unclear, some of the goals of the network are thought to be the removal of non-Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula, creation of a Palestinian homeland that includes the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and fundamentalist Islamic states with shari'a (Islamic Law) established within Arab countries on the Arabian Peninsula. Other experts conclude the attacks were intended to be a catalyst for a massive "Arab street" uprising to overthrow existing regimes on the Arabian Peninsula and replace them with strict fundamentalist governments.¹⁴ Whatever Al Qaeda's goals, it is clear that terrorist organizations make the United States a target because of the worldwide media exposure they will derive from an attack.¹⁵

Following the September 11 assault, bin Laden immediately started a propaganda campaign against the United States. Using mainly video tapes passed to Al Jazeera, the all-news Arab satellite television channel, bin Laden targeted the "Arab street" and to a lesser degree non-Arab Muslims.¹⁶ Not only were the tapes effective on his target audience, the timing made them a masterful use of information. Further, the releasing and playing of one of his tapes as the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan began, was clearly one of the most effective uses of propaganda in recent history. It showed the world that bin Laden was a forward thinker and a formidable enemy that calculated his every move. Additionally, it clearly was aimed to begin the destruction of the U.S. center-of-gravity, the international coalition against terrorism. The U.S. response to counter this tape was weak and late in coming. Any formidable U.S. counter-propaganda efforts were in excess of eighteen hours after the unedited airing of the tape on Al Jazeera and amounted to asking foreign governments to have their media "tone down the rhetoric."¹⁷ While a "toning down rhetoric" may have seemed like an appropriate American governmental response, it was another miscue in influencing the Islamic governments in the Persian Gulf. Receivers of that request could only wonder about what was next from a country

that prides itself on having a free and open press. The U.S. left countries attempting to have a free press with little recourse but to ignore the request.

From the beginning, the American use of information influence the Muslim world has suffered. At first, it was because of the tight control of information by the Bush administration. U.S. officials did not respond to Al Qaeda or Taliban statements in the Arab press or television. Embassies in the region were prohibited from speaking publicly.¹⁸ In a three-month period, with the DOS taking the lead, the government began to develop programs and systems to support the war and try to influence targeted audiences.

The bin Laden influence campaign continued with tapes, faxes and handwritten messages, all of which played extensively in the Arab and Muslim press. His communiqués received at least a mention in all U.S news programs and major newspapers, although none of these tapes was played unedited as his October 7 tape was on CNN. Bin Laden's use of the media to project his message and especially the use of the television should have come as no surprise to anyone as he has used videos and taped interviews throughout the last decade to project his message.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

—George W. Bush

Nine days after the attack, President George W. Bush, addressed the world using a joint session of Congress as his venue. During his speech, he declared war, although not asking for a formal congressional declaration, on international terrorism and states that harbor and support terrorists. Additionally, he directed the use of all elements of national power to combat terrorism and prosecute the war.¹⁹ Almost immediately, the United States began using their economic and political power to wage war against Al Qaeda and Afghanistan a country that harbored the Al Qaeda leadership. Then on October 7, 2001 the U.S. set in motion a military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda within Afghanistan. However, the government was very slow to leverage its informational power to fight the new war except for the use of operational and tactical psychological operations within the theater of operations.

It was not until two and a half months after the September 11, attacks, that the Department of State (DOS) opened a public information center in the region to explain U.S. actions and counter Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda.²⁰ Until this time the DOS had been issuing statements from their Washington Press Center, but because of the time difference,

regional reporters were not printing or broadcasting U.S. positions and responses. This slow and ill-timed response disadvantaged the United States and allowed the Taliban and bin Laden to protect fundamentalist Islam, their center-of-gravity and the support it brought from the "Arab street" and other non-Arab Islamic populations as well as beginning to crack the coalition support of the United States.

Originally the foreign public diplomacy campaign platform had four tenets: the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacks not on America but on the world; the war is not against Islam; Americans do not seek to harm the Afghan people; and all nations must band together to eliminate international terrorism.²¹ While these all sound good and almost all Americans would understand and agree with them, but who are the targets of these tenets? If it was the Arab and Islamic governments, then what was the intended outcome of the message? If DOS wanted these governments to support our efforts during the war, then they had a moderate effect on the audience. The Arab League condemned bin Laden and publicly stated, "Osama bin Laden does not represent the Arabs and Muslims. He does not speak on their behalf. He is a man with his own policy that is not the Arab or Muslim policy."²² However, if the intent was to influence the Arab and Muslim street then they were marginally effective at best. A Gallup poll conducted in six Islamic nations found that only nine percent think that U.S. military action is justified and just 18% believe that the September 11 hijackers were Arab men.²³

Charlotte Beers, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs ultimately introduced more focused programs and processes. They targeted the Arab and non-Arab Muslim audiences. The steps included granting high level interviews (Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to key Arab television stations like Al Jazeera, Middle East Broadcasting, and Lebanese Broadcasting. In addition, DOS brought out of retirement Ambassador Chris Ross, a former Persian Gulf Ambassador and fluent Arab speaker, to tell the American story in Arabic. Other programs include, establishment of a foreign audience web site and creating banner ads on popular Arab websites to tease viewers to go to these DOS sites like, "Muslim Life in America," a website dedicated to telling about the freedoms Muslims enjoy in the U.S. Still others are increased cultural, educational and military exchanges, with Muslim countries, daily publication of a video for use on foreign media and programs like "Rewards for Justice," which offers rewards for information about terrorist organizations.²⁴

Of course, these steps were augmenting the DOS' already existing channels to influence foreign audiences. These vehicles include, the Foreign Press Center, the Washington File, international broadcasting, the Internet, speakers' programs, policy statements, press briefings, books and periodicals.²⁵ All the programs, both crisis and long-term, helped the U.S. to gain in the "propaganda war," but they were unsynchronized and largely untargeted. Additionally, they were Americans trying to sell America to the Muslim world which is effective for Muslims in the mid-west U.S., but lacked creditability for the Islamic populations in the Middle East and Asia.

As the U.S. gained ground with military operations, the human tendency to want to be on the side of a winner took over and the "Arab street" become less vocal. Fundamentalist leaning clerics were either becoming neutral or moving toward a more moderate stance and positive U.S. stories and cartoons were showing in the Arab press. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took a hardcore stance and said that the U.S. military was not "in the position to have people surrender to us. If people try to, we are declining." In the Muslim press Rumsfeld's "declining" of surrenders was seen as a barbaric order to kill anyone with a white flag.²⁶ These incorrect perceptions of Rumsfeld's remarks were not strongly countered by the U.S. Government and the ability to influence degraded. On December 13, the U.S. released the tape of bin Laden talking about his role in the attacks. The video shot with a home camcorder was poor quality, but the U.S. had it translated and provided the tape with English subtitles. The tape played on all major television stations in the U.S. and abroad. The problem, it was such a poor quality that Arab speakers could not understand the audio or read the English subtitles. The following week the same tape was release with Arabic subtitles, but once again the damage had been done with the U.S. accused of fabricating the video.

THE CENTER OF GRAVITY/DECISIVE POINTS

"The hub of power and movement, on which everything depends."

—Carl von Clausewitz

The first step in any strategic plan is to identify the friendly and enemy centers of gravity and further delineate the decisive points of both forces. When looking at Al Qaeda and where that organization draws its strength, one quickly becomes aware that fundamentalist Islam is the center of gravity. While this is an unpopular view and one that most strategic leaders and scholars will choose to sidestep, the fact remains that Al Qaeda draws its strength from this concept. "Islamic activism" or "Islamic revivalism" may be better terms because Western Protestant influence attaches a derogatory connotation to fundamentalism.²⁷ However,

fundamentalism is used for this research in the context of the resurgence of Islam within the global force of Muslim politics over the past 25 years.²⁸

If fundamentalism is Al Qaeda's center of gravity, then any U.S. attempt to influence a foreign audience becomes one of the most difficult to prosecute. Taking an open and direct approach is not acceptable especially since George Bush said that the U.S. war is not against Islam.²⁹ The U.S must undertake an indirect approach and attack decisive points to destroy the center of gravity.

Al Qaeda is well organized and financed and its economic power becomes the first decisive point. Within the organization, their ability to raise funds to finance their operations is unparalleled. While bin Laden's inheritance was between \$25M and \$250M, an organization the size of Al Qaeda is unable to operate without outside financial assistance. It gets the external assistance by laundering money with legitimate charities as the front organizations. Convincing Muslims to donate to charities is an easy practice since it is the third pillar of Islam, almsgiving or zakat. Typically, a Muslim is expected to give approximately 2.5% of one's income and although not compulsory in most Islamic nations, it is considered a religious commitment and adhered to by most Muslims.³⁰ Muslims donate to legal charitable organizations thinking that the money is going to the needy within their community or of another Muslim group of people. Al Qaeda religious sympathizers skim this money or even use it to do charitable work and take the credit. This is just one way that they are able to influence the population and gain strength. Additionally, they allow some of the money to go to madrasas (religious schools) that teach the fundamentalism the network needs for long-term recruitment and strength.

The madrasas are the long-term investment strategy of the fundamentalists. Through these institutions, fundamental clerics' interpretations are used for teaching Islam. Random sampling shows that students in these schools believe they are studying to become "jihadis," or holy warriors.³¹ These schools are popular in this education-starved Middle East because they are usually free since they receive funding from fundamentalists. If left unchecked, they become the breeding grounds for the next bin Laden. The second pillar of Islam is also related to one of Al Qaeda's decisive points.

Salah or prayer is the second pillar to which all Muslims must adhere. They are required to pray five times daily and a sermon follows Friday's midday prayer. An Imam, who is a religious scholar, preaches these sermons.³² While prayer does not seem like a decisive point, this is the place where news is spread and where religious leaders have an opportunity to influence his congregation. Because of the adherence to the pillars, Muslim religious leaders

can always count on full attendance at Friday prayer and an audience to receive their message. Islamic religious leaders are usually willing to spread the teachings of their religious superiors and usually use their sermons. This makes religious activities in the Mosque an area that cannot be forgotten in getting to the center of gravity. These decisive points have vulnerabilities and using influence management the U.S. could exploit them.

The United States' center of gravity is clearly the worldwide coalition built to fight terrorism. Without the cooperation and support that the U.S. receives from the participating countries, the prosecution of the war on terrorism would stop. The coalition countries are providing basing rights, intelligence and logistical support to the war effort. All of these may seem of insignificant consequence, but without them, the U.S. ability to fight the war would be diminished within the international rule of law. If bin Laden can fracture the coalition's unity, then the U.S. would almost surely be defeated. All of the Al Qaeda's propaganda is aimed at fracturing this alliance. The coalition must protect its center of gravity with a well thought out, synchronized counter-propaganda campaign.

THE AUDIENCE

But I should just say that marketing includes all the great disciplines of communication. It's not really about advertising; it's about communication, marketing strategy, understanding the audiences and bringing to bear those kind of disciplines.

—Charolette Beers

Carl Von Clausewitz identifies three elements of any state as the military, the government, and the population.³³ Within this "Trinity," the sender of information must decide who is the primary group, at a given time, that will influence the other segments. For influence management, the influential group becomes the primary target and by using a proper medium, the sender can project the message to sway them. In turn, if the original message was effective, the primary pillar of the Trinity will re-project the sender's message to the remaining pillars to complete the societal influence. When selecting a target in a Muslim state using the Clausewitzian Trinity, a key group is absent.

For the most part, within an Arab Islamic nation and to a lesser degree in non-Arab Islamic countries, the separation of church and state does not exist. Western democracies are "governments of the people, by the people, and for the people;" however, within the Islamic state, it is God and not the people who give government legitimacy.³⁴ Islam is a way of life that pervades politics, personal behavior, government and legal systems.³⁵ In Saudi Arabia, the

King is a religious monarch with the title, "Keeper of the Two Holy Mosques." He remains in power through the permission of the Islamic religious leadership. Democracy does not flourish within the Arab Islamic nations. Heads of Muslim governments appeal to religion for legitimacy and to mobilize popular support.³⁶ The application of the Trinity does not apply in these nations because there is actually a fourth pillar to society, the religious leadership. That is the clerics and religious scholars. This pillar often has primacy and can influence the rest of society. The four pillars exist in essentially all Arab countries, except Israel and Lebanon. All remaining Arab countries derive some or all of their legal system from Islamic law. The use of Islamic law vary and range from countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia that use Shari'a (law based on the Koran and the traditions of Mohammad) to countries like Qatar who only use Islamic Law for civil matters.³⁷ One only must remember back to 1979 and Iran to see what happens when a government strays too far from Islamic law and principles. Today, leaders of Muslim countries must walk a tightrope between tradition and modernity and remember that the populace demands religious observance.³⁸ The religious pillar's influence is far-reaching and often transnational.

Even bin Laden realized the importance of the clerics and their influence over the "Arab street." In a tape captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, bin Laden asked his Saudi Arabian guest, "What is the stand of the Mosques there (in Saudi Arabia)?" The visitor, an unknown Shaykh from Saudi Arabia, tells of the positive sermons and reactions from within the Mosques. Bin Laden thanks Allah.³⁹ Much of the first part of the tape is bin Laden asking about how Al Qaeda's actions are being played and projected on the "Arab street." Once again, bin Laden understands the importance of information in his fight and who he must target to get the maximum benefit to project his message.

It is important to understand that Islam has no formal central symbolic figure of leadership since the abolishment of the Caliphate (the successorship to Mohammad) in Turkey in 1924.⁴⁰ Even Ayatollah Khomeini was only an Islamic spokesman and not the Islamic spokesman.⁴¹ With the loss of a central religious hierarchy, the leadership responsibility resides with the ulema (intellectuals and leaders of the Muslim religious establishment). Many of the ulemas take their lead from the Islamic religious centers with El Azhar in Cairo, the historical center of Muslim learning and world's oldest university, the most influential.⁴² Recently El Azhar and other Islamic centers have become more influential because of their ability to communicate with the rest of the Muslim world. Instrumental in their ability to project their beliefs and interpretations are the use of the internet, facsimiles and other modern telecommunications.

They use these modern devices to get the word to the Imams at Mosques so that sermons are more effective in creating a common understanding, vision and goal within the Islamic community.⁴³ El Azhar usually takes a moderate stance, but similar institutions take a more fundamentalist and violent stance and they too influence some Imams. The message that the Imams in each Mosque deliver is the most significant means to influence emotions and positions throughout the Muslim world. This is not only because of their status but also because of the low literacy rates in Islamic countries.⁴⁴ If the U.S. is going to be effective in using information to convey a message to influence the Muslim world, it must direct that message at the fourth pillar, the ulemas.

THE MEDIA

A single deed makes more propaganda in a few days than a thousand pamphlets. The government rages pitilessly; but by this is only causes further deeds to be committed and drives the insurgents to heroism. One deed brings forth another; opponents join the meeting; the government splits into factions; harshness intensifies and the conflict; concessions come too late; the revolution breaks out.

—Peter Kropotkin, *Paroles d'un Revolte*, (Geneva, 1885)

Terrorists clearly have the advantage when it comes to using the media to get their message disseminated. As Kropotkin noted in 1885, the terrorist act is a statement of propaganda in itself. After Al Qaeda conducted their September 11, attacks, names like Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and Ayman Al-Zawahiri became worldwide household names and in some Muslim nations, they gained Robin Hood type status. Each day these men are not only on the front page of Arab newspapers, but also seen on worldwide and regional television, not to mention the number of sermons delivered in Mosques that speak of them or their cause. One of the easiest tasks that a communicator could achieve is getting the word spread in the Muslim world.

In the Muslim world, literacy rates are run between 20%-80% depending upon the country, so word of mouth is the medium of choice to spread any message. News is spread in every Mosque, street corner and coffee shop in the Islamic world. Mosques are especially important because of the perceived creditability of the clerics. Other forms of communication are important especially for projecting a message from an external source.

The largest viewed television station in the Middle East is Al Jazeera, the Qatar based 24-hour satellite all news channel. Anyone dealing with the Arab world knows that Al Jazeera is an important medium to convey a message and the DOS fully understands the weight that Al Jazeera carries. DOS spokesman Richard Boucher said, "I think we do recognize the

importance of Al Jazeera in speaking to the Muslim world, and we have tried to make American views available to them because they are an important media outlet."⁴⁵ It is equally clear that it is biased in its reporting and tailor its approach to suit the preconceptions of "the street."⁴⁶

Al Jazeera is more than happy to put a U.S. government official on the air and let him answer the tough questions from its staff, but they are more likely to ask easy questions of anti-American guests. Other Arab journalists say that even with cultural disparities taken into account; Al Jazeera's credibility is hampered by slanted coverage and a tendency toward sensationalism.⁴⁷ Despite Al Jazeera's bias, it is obvious it is a media outlet that must be used, but the U.S. needs to understand that the Al Jazeera message is limited to at best eight percent of the Muslim audience and then only to the elite population. A person must have a satellite dish to receive its transmissions. In the Arabian Peninsula, this equates to a media for the elite and "public broadcasts" in Arab shops. A more popular medium, because of the affordability, is radio.

There are hundreds of Arab and Muslim radio stations throughout the region and the world. The two leading stations in the Middle East are not regional stations but the British Broadcasting Corporation and Radio Monte Carlo.⁴⁸ Voice of America (VOA) has a little influence with the Middle East and maintains a market share of two percent.⁴⁹ VOA's reporting is usually viewed as unbiased, however, the editorials are thought of as American propaganda.⁵⁰

A growing means of communicating a message within these countries is the use of the Internet. DOS maintains an Internet site and since the September attacks increased banner ads and ensured that the site remained current. However, Boucher does admit that in the Arab world and South Asia, popular access to the Internet is not very wide.⁵¹ It appears that the DOS has all but discounted the true value of the Internet as an effective medium to convey the U.S. Government's message. The site needs to be interactive and have chat room type forums where the audience can communicate among themselves and with a creditable communicator from the U.S. Additionally the site(s) need visual appeal and the sophistication expected from a technological advanced organization.⁵² The issue remains, who is the target audience?

If the audience is the Arab and Muslim population, then Boucher is correct in his analysis that the Internet is of little use. If however, the DOS is trying to use the Internet to influence the ulemas to re-project the U.S. Government's message, then the Internet might be a viable medium. No single media source is the total answer to winning this war, just as no single

military weapon is the answer to a campaign. It takes a combination of the right media, at the right time, targeted correctly to deliver an effective and decisive blow.

ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF INFLUENCE MANAGEMENT TO FIGHT TERRORISM

Violence and propaganda have much in common. Violence aims at behavior modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion. Terrorism is a combination of the two.

—Alex Schmade and Janny deGraff, *Violence as Communication*

Since the beginning of time, information has been used as an element of power, but recently the speed at which information is disseminated has made it an even more effective tool. To be successful, the U.S. Government must realize that using information to influence a target is the one element of power that it does not have dominance. The reasons why a non-peer competitor can participate at the same level as a superpower by using information are numerous. Our strengths such as a free press, governmental checks and balances, adherence to the rule of law, and sheer size of the bureaucracy to govern the U.S. are weaknesses when it comes to projecting information to influence an audience. While these factors affect the U.S. use of information, the government cannot sit idle and allow this vital element of power go unused. The U.S. must understand the power information wields and the speed at which information sways opinions and actions.

After the attacks of September 11, the U.S. was very slow to mount a foreign information campaign. The Joint Information Center in Islamabad was a great start toward countering propaganda. It was late in coming and allowed Al Qaeda and the Taliban to gain information superiority. Their dominance may be so great within the region that the only way to defeat their propaganda is to destroy them militarily. Regionally positioned elements like this stay within the area's news cycle and help area press corps to meet deadlines and allow the U.S., as a minimum, an opportunity to counter an opponent's propaganda in a timely manner. Additionally, the center's ability to get to know the regional press has to be a plus. But the center is like a military unit forward deployed with an unclear understanding of the commander's intent and who to target.

The U.S. has yet to define fully to the public what terrorism is and who comprise the global terrorist network against which we are waging war. The combining of the Pentagon attack with the World Trade Center attack does not provide a clear understanding to the target audience as to why we are fighting this war and who is the enemy. The attack on the Pentagon is an attack against America, but not a terrorist attack. These were soldiers, either uniformed or supporting civilians, who were using "their weapons of war" when attacked. This is a tragic act

and should not be condoned; however, in this case, it does not have to be in the forefront. The attack on the World Trade Center is clearly a terrorist act and should remain the battle cry during the war. The U.S. has mixed the two and confused the target.

The target of the information campaign seems to be wide-ranging with credible spokesmen at a premium. The direct approach to influencing the "Arab street" is unrealistic. The U.S. Government's trustworthiness is an issue and the media it uses are considered biased. A narrowing of the target audience will focus our limited resources and if successful, the "street" will receive a positive message from an influential source. Using the right media to influence the target is another important step in any campaign.

All the tools are important, multiple weapons brought to bear at the critical place, and time are necessary to winning in battle. Information is no different. The use of Ambassador Ross on Al Jazeera is a good start and it is one tool but because of the media bias, the effectiveness is diminished. Senior administration officials speaking through regional media are important, but again it is an American trying to influence the "street." Products provided to the press must be in a language that is understandable to that media's audience. The U.S. publication of the captured bin Laden tape to the Arab press with English subtitles was a serious blunder because the Arab world was unable to understand the audio and could not read the subtitles which caused a loss of effectiveness.

All the established programs were late in coming and put the U.S. behind in explaining to the audience its position and why, but they were all noble attempts to win the propaganda war. The problem that remains is their unsynchronized application and "shotgun" targeting to accomplish an objective that is not clearly linked to a decisive point. You cannot suppress information like the administration originally tried, you must harness it and steer it to influence your target. The U.S. is not on that path.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYNCHRONIZING INFLUENCE MANAGEMENT

"Information is a strategic resource – less understood but no less important to national security than political, military, and economic power. In the information age, influence and power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that will mobilize publics to support interests, goals, and objectives."

—Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination

The U.S. cannot only win the military war on terrorism, but can win the propaganda war with systematic planning and proper dissemination of information to influence a target using the correct medium. First, it must use a clearly defined definition of global terrorism, with a consistent understanding throughout the world. The Title 22 definition seems acceptable

worldwide as long as the U.S. maintains consistency. With this as the foundation, influence management planning becomes easier.

Using military campaign planning to identify the centers of gravity, decisive points and vulnerabilities, the U.S. can develop a plan to conduct the operation. Because of the President's position that the war is not against Islam, accepting the realization that the center of gravity is Fundamentalist Islam is difficult but it must be the first step. An attack must be indirect and disguised or the war will fail because it will cause the International Coalition to crumble and thus destroy of the U.S. center of gravity.

The U.S. must counter any opponent's propaganda in a timely and rapid manner. The Foreign Information Center in Islamabad coupled with the ones in Washington and London are a strong step toward rapid counterpropaganda because of their ability to counter Al Qaeda propaganda within the news cycle. However, as the war expands, DOS must have these regional centers prepared on the first day, not two months after the application of other elements of power. Establishment of centers in the Pacific region and a Miami annex puts the U.S. in a position globally to conduct a rapid information operations. DOS requires a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) type organization to deploy to the "hot" area and augment these regional centers. Additionally, as military operations decrease in Afghanistan, the Pakistan center may need to relocate to another area within the Middle East. These centers require interagency staffing as well as coordination with the regional CINC, his JTFs and Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.

If military operations are ongoing, U.S. military liaison teams have to be in the "hot center" to be able to assist in countering the anti-military propaganda. As accusations surface about collateral damage and civilian casualties, available imagery both from aerial platforms and from combat camera teams will be needed as a good source for the counter evidence. Additionally, having these liaison teams allows better synchronization of operational and tactical PSYOPs and CINC military plans with strategic foreign public information and foreign diplomacy. There is both a long term and short-term element to this strategy.

The short-term problem of the U.S. is convincing the "Muslim street" that violence is not the answer to solving their problems. Because of past policies, winning the support of the street in the short term is unachievable. The best the U.S. Government can hope for is to move the audience back toward a moderate stance or a neutral position that will not support the terrorists or their networks. The U.S. must remain involved in the Muslim world and ensure it emphasizes the positive roll it is playing in solving problems. A good start would be to introduce and facilitate a peace plan in Israel. Short-term success should be defined as non-interference in

diplomatic and military efforts and allowing Muslim governments to take the best political path that is favorable to U.S. interests and in support of the coalition.

The long-term problem deals with the madrasas and their Fundamentalist teachings. The instruction within these schools needs to be brought back more towards a moderate interpretation of Islam or they will continue to feed Al Qaeda type terrorist organizations. Both the long term and short terms elements require an offensive information undertaking.

If anti-U.S. propaganda is being countered, then offensive influence management becomes feasible. The only way to reach the "Muslim street" is by using the uelmas as spokesmen. To accomplish this, a directed and sustained information operation has to be targeted at the Islamic clerics. One of the best media available to reach the clerics is the Internet. While the Arab and Muslim populations have limited access, the clerics often use electronic means to communicate. Having a targeted Internet site for these scholars that is professionally constructed and unbiased, but moderate, is a good medium for targeting the audience. Streaming video and interactive features like chat rooms allows the U.S. to articulate positive positions and counter negative information. U.S. manning needs to be by pro-American Muslim scholars that can facilitate discussions. Their views may not always be consistent with the U.S. government wants, but the goal is an overall move to moderate interpretations of the Koran. To be useful, these facilitators must maintain their creditability. Additionally, the ability to track hits is a good way to start the assessment process. Of course, media of this type must be useful to draw the audience. The site must have resources that these scholars find valuable to conduct their teachings and research.

Targeted relevant publications, facsimiles, videos, electronic mail, exchanges and telephone contacts are all viable means to help moderate these clerics. Newspapers, radio and television stations, like Al Jazeera, all require U.S. engagement to keep our story at the forefront, but have limitations and biases. All are good venues to deliver the message but they will never be as good as the local Imans throughout the Muslim world delivering a moderate sermon on Friday.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. can and will win this war on terrorism militarily and can win the associated information war with careful planning; understanding how and what the element of power is and what it can accomplish; and selecting the right media to project the message. As the President stated, this is going to be a long war, but it could be much longer than needed and cost more

lives than required without proper planning and synchronization of all elements of power including the use of information to influence terrorist supporters.

WORD COUNT: 7,315

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