

**STRATEGY
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DEFENDING THE HOMELAND: WORKING AT THE SEAMS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Joint Doctrine dictates that we will train as we intend to fight. By staying trained and ready, our military is able to execute its constitutional responsibility of protecting America, its people, its borders, and its global interests. If the tragic events of September 11, 2001 are a sign of what's ahead, then the way we train must also focus on non-traditional threats at home. Most importantly, we must forge new training partnerships with local, state, and federal civilian responders in order to strengthen the civil-military seams in the effort to ensure domestic preparedness. The recent creation of the Office of Homeland Security and a new combatant command responsible for homeland defense, represent sweeping organizational changes in DoD and the federal government. These changes demand a new approach to training readiness as the military maps its doctrine for civil support. The international security environment is fraught with many challenges. This paper examines existing response capabilities at the local, state, and federal levels to determine the adequacy of our current response mechanism. It explores the roles, missions, and functions of the key actors, while assessing the training programs at each level. The paper looks at current organizational structures and operational concepts for securing and defending the homeland at every level in order to ascertain whether existing response systems adequately prepare for the security challenges in the new environment. Finally, focusing on JFCOM's training support role, this paper will recommend a solution set where DoD assumes an expanded role to meet America's training requirements that helps synchronize national assets for homeland defense.

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DEFENDING THE HOMELAND: WORKING AT THE SEAMS

We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.... Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen...we are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans... I have a message for our military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.

— President George W. Bush

The day America came under attack, September 11, 2001, brought to reality the chilling predictions of the 1999 Hart-Rudman Commission on national security that: "States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers."¹ Since 1993, America and its national interests have come under attack at home and abroad. The scale and magnitude of terrorist attacks directed at the United States (U.S.) and its national interests escalated from the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, to the Khobar Towers bombing in 1995, to the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and to the attack on USS Cole in 2000. Terror comes home to America, leaving the nation and its people to accept the reality that we as Americans are the targets of hatred and we must now deal with the threat by being vigilant. The American way of life changed on September 11, perhaps forever.

The end of the Cold War and the arrival of the 21st century represent the major changes that triggered a cascade of destabilizing events that present new challenges to international security. The breakup of the former Soviet Union sparked a shift in the global balance of power, yielding opportunities for rogue states and disaffected extremist groups to seize opportunities and amass weapons of mass destruction. China's recent entry into the World Trade Organization promises major changes fifteen to twenty years that will impact the power balance in Asia, potentially altering America's influence in the region. In Southeast Asia, Islamist extremist are threatening our allies, forcing the U.S. to remain engaged by deploying military forces to assist those governments. Escalating tensions between nuclear powers India and

Pakistan pose tremendous risks to that region's stability while Iraq and other rogue states continue belligerent behavior against their Arab neighbors. The world is still a dangerous place.

The new world order that formed following the Gulf War, saw America emerge as the world's most self-sufficient nation, postured for global leadership. The U.S. was hence perceived as the sole superpower capable and willing to use its national power to enhance peace and security at home and abroad, promote global prosperity, and advance democracy and human rights around the world.² As a free and open society, America finds herself extremely vulnerable to hostile attack. Our enemies, in their global terror campaign, have found a means to attack our way of life and bring the fight to the American homeland with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).³ These acts of terror are their only means to challenge our power and influence. The military campaign abroad, in concert with political and economic efforts, has every indication that our forces are ready, well equipped, and well led for the task.

But as the war on terrorism is waged overseas, the country must refocus and fix its attention to domestic preparedness and on defending the homeland against a wide array of threats. The full dimension of threats that could potentially threaten our homeland includes attacks on our information systems, transnational organized crime, and proliferation of WMD. In order to preserve the nation's survival against these threats, vigilance must become the new American way of life. The president's promise to bring to bear the nation's resources and power to win the war on terrorism embodies the core of this country's resolve. The military and diplomatic elements of our nation's power went into motion immediately after September 11. Sustaining the war on terror abroad and at home demands the highest level of preparedness in order to effectively respond to further attacks on American soil. The military will continue to train and be prepared to sustain the fight on terror until victory is achieved — whatever that may entail. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DoD) must expand its training support role to build training partnerships with civil response authorities.

Training civilian and military responders at the local, state, and federal levels is a key enabler for ensuring the nation's preparedness to secure and defend the homeland. The military element of national power as a culture has the organizational structure and training methodologies to actively contribute to homeland security. DoD has the capability to assist in preparing responders by providing training support through partnerships across all levels of government. It must complement existing civil and military response mechanisms at all levels by employing its vast training resources and its institutional approach to maintaining readiness. DoD, as a military institution, is on point and postured to make a difference in defending the

homeland. A civil-military training partnership under the federal response system is vital to success.

A focal point for effective DoD training support is directed at the seams -- from local to state, and from state to federal levels -- where synchronizing military assistance to civilian authority (MACA) plays a significant role. The response managers at city, state, and federal governments are charged with identifying "trigger points" for requesting and integrating military support in response to crises -- they reside at the seams. Their proficiency in their response skills makes a difference in providing a level of security. Taking inventory of these response organizations, assessing their proficiency, and determining the synchronization points at the seams across the local, states, and federal governments will define the required level of DoD involvement in their training readiness.

A Presidential executive order established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) at the federal level and gave it the mission to coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. The order also granted authority to the director to coordinate domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack within the U.S. and coordinate programs and activities for training federal, state, and local employees who would be called upon to respond to such a threat or attack.⁴ The creation of the OHS is a move in the right direction. However, it exists in a problematic and challenging environment where the OHS director faces a monumental task of coordinating homeland security without the vital mechanisms and scope of authority crucial to an effective response system. The OHS lacks the necessary processes to assess the situation, identify its missions and enabling tasks, and establish its operating procedures.

The military, through its training doctrine and planning ability, is capable of assisting OHS establish these processes. More important, the military has a vested interest in seeing a vibrant and effective OHS -- their partnership is key to the solution set in planning, coordinating, and synchronizing an effective national response. The creation of a new unified command (tentatively named NORTHERN COMMAND, or NORTHCOM) solely responsible for defending the homeland, adds to the scope of responsibilities of the Commander in Chief (CINC) U.S. Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM). The 1993 Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned two key missions to CINCFJCOM -- to provide trained and ready joint forces to the regional CINCs and to provide joint training for CINCs and their staffs and forces.⁵ CINCFJCOM's joint training mission is a critical link to training readiness for homeland defense. Further, there are six categories of training support provided within CINCFJCOM's joint training mission. One of those

categories focuses on training with government agencies, primarily in warfighting and peace operation scenarios. Enhancing DoD's role in interagency training is a step in the right direction; however, civil-military cooperation will require National Command Authority (NCA) and department level sponsorship to put into action.

Securing and defending the homeland against terrorist attacks demands vigilance and preparedness. DoD has a wide array of capabilities to complement select federal agency training programs in the effort to provide training assistance to homeland defenders across all levels of government. These include defense training centers, centers of excellence at senior service colleges, and battle simulation centers. This paper focuses on training for domestic preparedness against WMD events. **Section I** examines existing response capabilities at the local, state, and federal levels. A comprehensive look at the training environment will illustrate the depth and scope of ways and means currently in place for effectively responding to terrorist attacks on our homeland. It explores the roles, missions, and functions of the key actors; assessing the training programs at each level. **Section II** looks at current organizational structures and operational concepts for securing and defending the homeland at every level in order to ascertain whether existing response systems adequately prepare for the security challenges in the new environment. Finally, focusing on JFCOM's training support role, **Section III** will recommend a training-centric solution set where DoD assumes an expanded role to meet America's mission requirements that helps synchronize national assets for homeland defense.⁶

I. DEFINING THE TRAINING LANDSCAPE

America's preparedness was challenged on September 11 – our ability to defend the homeland is in question, there is much work to be done. As the world witnessed the attacks on our soil unfold live across all forms of media, America's immediate response to the consequences of the terrorist attacks took center stage at home. An analysis of the response will help illustrate the local, state, and federal mechanisms in place. In New York and in Virginia, local, state, and federal emergency response agencies mobilized resources in accordance with applicable emergency response plans. Existing mutual aid agreements between neighboring states, allowing for the rapid deployment of emergency personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts came into play. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, DoD rapidly responded to the air, maritime, and land force requirements of defending the homeland. JFCOM deployed Air Force tactical aircraft and Navy ships to provide early warning and sea-borne combat air patrol. JFCOM also marshaled its Joint Task Force- Civil Support (JTF-CS) and dispatched an assessment team to New York City to evaluate whether military resources were

needed in the consequence management efforts and to coordinate support with the designated lead federal agency (LFA). Within six hours of the attack, federal authorities made their first formal request for DoD assistance. According to established procedures, DoD's Director of Military Support (DOMS) took the request from federal authorities and passed it to JFCOM for action. JFCOM components also prepared forces to deploy and protect critical military infrastructure. Concurrent with these domestic support efforts, trained and ready joint forces deployed to the area of operations as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to support the war on terrorism abroad.⁷ In New York and Virginia, the civilian and military responders' exemplary actions revealed some measure of preparedness to mitigate the consequences of the attacks --- attributable in part to their training proficiency.

In any type of operation, whether civil or military, training readiness has a profound impact on the outcome. For the U.S. military, the success of warfighting campaigns throughout history hinged on training readiness. The war on terrorism at home demands total fusion of America's resources in both the civil and military domains. The lessons from the September 11 attacks cover the continuum of civil and military areas of responsibility, laws governing civil and military roles, local-state-federal jurisdictions, and the preparedness of emergency response agencies at all levels. This section discusses who the key actors/agencies are at the local, state, and federal levels; and what roles they play in the response mechanism. The aim is to define the critical seams where synchronizing their operations in time and space will help derive the mission essential tasks that will shape the desired training programs at the appropriate level of response.

Local Level – First Responders

Civilian first responders consisting of fire and rescue personnel, law enforcement agencies, emergency medical technicians, and hazardous material (HAZMAT) units provide the immediate response to the incident site of WMD attacks at the local government level. Local responders are the first on the scene. Mutual aid compacts established among neighboring city and county authorities allow local emergency managers to integrate the assets of all response capabilities from neighboring communities at the site. As the first responders spring into action at the site, local authorities will begin coordination with state officials to provide status information and to alert the state that additional assistance may be needed.⁸ Local authorities plan and coordinate these procedures with the aid of current legislation that provides training support.

The Defense Against WMD Act of 1996, known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, established guidelines for the Domestic Preparedness Program. Designed to improve the capabilities of first responders in managing the aftermath of a WMD incident, the program trains first responders in 120 of the largest cities in the country. The U.S. Army was initially responsible for training first responders. The Justice Department (DoJ) assumed operational lead for the program in October 2000 which now includes a combination of DoD- and federal agency-sponsored training courses. Each city received \$300,000 for personal protection, decontamination and detection equipment.⁹ A typical team's equipment list is a combination of 30% Army standard equipment and 70% commercial off-the-shelf equipment. The list includes service common, standard chemical defense, mission unique, nonstandard operational, nonstandard chemical defense equipment, and a response vehicle fleet.¹⁰ DoD maintains program oversight through DOMS.

The federal government's Domestic Preparedness Program offers 29 formal training courses. A host of federal agencies, DoD, and the National Guard Bureau sponsor these courses that are designed specifically for first responders. The sponsors under this training program include DoJ, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the U.S. Army Chemical School, and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). The curriculum offers a range of courses that focus on counter-terrorism for HAZMAT/EMS/Hospital Provider technicians (e.g., 9-1-1 operators/dispatchers), local responder trainers (i.e., train the trainers), physicians, incident commanders (e.g., fire department Battalion Chiefs), and senior management officials (e.g., city mayor and his/her cabinet). A combination of federal civil servants and government contractors teach the courses at several off site locations in the country. Course length varies from 2 to 40 hours and some are home study programs. With the exception of two courses, there is no tuition charge for the training; however, students are responsible for the cost of lodging, travel, and meals.¹¹ In spite of the federal government's well-intended effort to provide training support to local responders, this program is an underutilized training resource.

Significantly low attendance records at these courses prior to September 11, reveal a predictable trend that's attributable to the federal government's lack of ability to mandate participation. Since its establishment in 1998, DoJ's Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, Alabama has only trained 6,000 of the nation's estimated 11 Million police, fire, and emergency personnel.¹² Since the attacks, the center has seen an exponential jump in requests for enrollment and there is a potential risk for overcapacity beyond its annual ceiling of 10,000

students. To mitigate the risk, distance learning technology offers a feasible option as an efficient means of bringing the training to the audience at their respective home stations. The U.S. Army and other major commands in DoD already rely a great deal on this methodology for its cost effectiveness and high payoff value. As director of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, an organization focused on domestic anti-terrorism initiatives, GEN(Ret) Dennis J. Reimer strongly advocates increased use of distance learning technology -- especially for its potential for integrating local, state, and federal emergency response units in training.¹³

Complementing the Domestic Preparedness Program, the National Guard Bureau provides home station training opportunities for local first responders through the respective state National Guards. The state Guards have a limited role in training first responders on uniquely military tasks to include preventive measures and operational techniques related to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents. State training sites such as the Guard's Distance Learning Network offer state-of-the-art learning centers to first responders.¹⁴ Additionally, most state Guards have a robust communications network that serves as the command and control backbone for the state's response capability. The network links support capabilities of neighboring states that currently exist under interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements. Local first responders, in their training partnership with the state Guard, benefit tremendously from this network as they plan and coordinate emergency contingency plans with state authorities. A well-established and trained linkage between local and state emergency managers is important to federal civil-military authorities in their efforts to fuse and synchronize federal capabilities to state and local governments. The local-state linkage allows the LFA and DoD to assess the situation and marshal support assets to the local site in anticipation of a formal request.

State Level -- State National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams

The state government is responsible for providing the next level of support once crisis requirements exceed the response capabilities of local authorities. As the situation warrants, the governor will likely alert the National Guard to the incident site under Title 32 U.S. Code authority --- the normal peacetime status of Guard units. Twenty-one of the fifty states' Adjutants General (usually a Major General) are dual-hatted as commanders of their state Army and Air National Guard units and as directors of state emergency management. State emergency managers are primarily responsible for mobilizing state level support to the incident site --- to include WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs). A typical Guard support package consists of air and

ground transportation, medical, mess, security and force protection, supply and services, communications, administrative and other specialized units.¹⁵

The Guard's unique federal-state status gives it the versatility to perform across the full spectrum of conflict, ranging from domestic response to a major theater of war. The Guard is the nation's primary provider of MACA, trained to respond to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and other events requiring military assistance. The Guard's close relationship with DoD plays a vital role in the Guard's readiness in peacetime and war. Shared military assignments, common structure, parallel training, and interoperable equipment characterize the Guard's historical relationship with DoD that provides a strong leverage for synchronizing state and federal military assets in times of crisis. The Guard may be employed in support of the LFA after a hostile event to save lives, to prevent human suffering, and to mitigate property loss. It can also assist local law-enforcement authorities with restoring civil order.¹⁶

Recognized as the governor's "911 Force for WMD," the Guard CSTs represent a state's primary military capability to rapidly respond to a WMD incident. Under EMAC agreements, the supported governor has operational control over their employment. Capable of responding from home station within 8 hours of activation inside a 250-mile radius, a CST's mission is to advise civil authorities on appropriate response actions, and facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces. It consists of 22 full-time Army and Air National Guardsmen trained and equipped to provide technical advice and "reach back" to other military experts who can assist the incident commander. When activated, the team deploys rapidly to a suspected or actual incident site. There, the team conducts reconnaissance, provide situational understanding and technical consultation to local authorities on managing the effects of the incident to minimize the impact on the civilian population, and facilitate follow-on military support. Congress provided funding and directed DoD in 1999 to organize, train, and equip 10 National Guard WMD CSTs to provide the military capability to a state's emergency response mechanism. Today, there are a total of 32 congressionally authorized CSTs operating under the provisions of Title 32.¹⁷ The Guard provides a potent military capability to state governors and emergency managers.

State emergency managers advise the governor when to request reinforcements beyond the state's capacity to respond to a crisis, including interstate and federal support. Under the provisions of state level EMAC agreements, neighboring states mutually reinforce one another's response capabilities. A state emergency manager faced with crises demanding greater than his/her state's capacity to respond, can count on support assets from other states under these agreements. These interstate resource-sharing compacts, coupled with state National Guard assets, significantly boost the response capabilities that any single state emergency manager

can muster to deal with the crisis. State managers also advise the governor when a request to the President for federal resources is appropriate. The formal support request is coordinated through FEMA. Should the governor request federal assistance and the President issue a disaster declaration, FEMA will activate the Federal Response Plan (FRP) that may call for additional DoD support. At the state level, the relationship among local, state, and federal authorities represents a critical juncture where the integration of all available response assets come into play.

The increase in availability of resources at this level corresponds to a potential rise in the complexity of cross-boundary coordinations. Delineating responsibilities among response managers at all levels, establishing assessment methodologies for determining additional requirements, and defining the trigger points for responding to the crisis demand a robust and well-trained command and control structure. This structure pulls together ad hoc players from federal agencies, DoD, state response organizations, and local authorities. Response plans imbedded in mutual aid agreements, EMACs, and the FRP must include an integrated, multi-echelon training program that will serve as the "glue" to harness these tremendous capabilities. As the focus shifts to federal capabilities, there are key organizations at this level that provide opportunities for training initiatives that can potentially streamline the synchronization of local, state, and federal response assets.

Federal Level — Joint Task Force — Civil Support/Joint Forces Command, Federal Agencies, and the Office of Homeland Security

At the federal level, many agencies and departments share responsibility for responding to WMD events. The roles and functions of these organizations are pertinent to building the needed training programs to close the seams in the federal response system. Among the organizations vital to the national response system is JFCOM.

As the chief advocate for jointness, JFCOM maximizes the Nation's future and present military capabilities through joint concept development and experimentation, recommending joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training, and providing ready CONUS-based forces and capabilities to support other CINCs, the Atlantic Theater, and domestic requirements including the land and maritime defense of the continental United States and military assistance to civil authorities.¹⁸

— JFCOM 1999 Mission Statement

The 1999 UCP expanded JFCOM's joint force provider and trainer mission to include providing DoD support for consequence management planning and response on the Continental

U.S. (CONUS). This mission gave CINCJFCOM operational-level command over all DoD support.¹⁹ JFCOM's new role was a vital part of DoD's strategy for assisting local and state responders with a simplified process of delivering military support in times of crises. To support this strategy, CINCJFCOM established the Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) as a standing joint force headquarters (i.e., without assigned troops) responsible for command and control of DoD forces responding to WMD events. JFCOM, under its role as joint force provider, provides forces to JTF-CS from active and reserve component units with organic response capabilities for use in managing WMD consequences. These vital capabilities include transportation, chemical/biological/ radiological reconnaissance and decontamination, mortuary affairs, medical, logistics, and communications.²⁰

JTF-CS serves as the DoD lead in the interagency process and is fully authorized to directly coordinate with the LFA in the conduct of training and planning for federal level response to a WMD event. JTF-CS liaison teams to the CSTs provide a training and planning partnership where federal and state military assets continuously collaborate on domestic preparedness issues.²¹ The JTF-CS's principal focus is to plan for and integrate DoD support to the LFA (e.g., FEMA) designated as the government's lead in managing the consequences of a WMD event within CONUS, its possessions, and territories. JTF-CS is not a lead agency nor does it provide a first-response capability. Its mission is to deploy forces to the vicinity of a WMD incident site in support of the LFA in order to establish command and control of designated DoD forces and provide military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, mitigate injuries, and provide temporary critical life support. JTF-CS's implied tasks run the gamut from command and control to a wide variety of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, medical, transportation, and other logistics requirements.²²

JTF-CS brings four major advantages to the DoD effort in providing MACA. First, it designates a full-time General Officer and a standing headquarters to focus exclusively on the multitude of WMD consequence management issues. A National Guard Major General commands the task force and reports to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through CINCJFCOM and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).²³ JTF-CS has an organizational structure capable of anticipating the required military support for responding to a catastrophic WMD incident. Its day-to-day tasks includes performing detailed analyses, forecasting required military support, and conducting iterative exercises internally and/or with state and federal government agencies so that it can accomplish its mission of responding to support civil authorities.²⁴ Second, it provides a single DoD point of contact for federal, state and local authorities in the incident area. JTF-CS plans, coordinates, and trains with the key emergency

management agencies across these levels through the NGB CSTs and FEMA. Third, it provides a staff of highly trained experts to act as a focal point for critical information analysis and dissemination. Finally, it ensures unity of command of the federal forces operating within the confusion of a WMD incident area.²⁵ JTF-CS is a follow-on consequence management force behind local first responders and state Guard CSTs.

Following the September 11 attacks, JFCOM assumed an expanded mission for the land and maritime defense of CONUS. This necessitated the joint employment of U.S. Navy ships and the Department of Transportation's (DoT) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to help protect our nation's coastline, ports, and waterways. This operational partnership between DoD and the USCG, focused primarily on coastal patrol and interdiction along the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and west coasts, adds to JFCOM's capabilities to defend U.S. shores.²⁶ The USCG, as lead agency for maritime homeland defense, is responsible for protecting more than 360 ports and 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline. The joint use of USCG and U.S. Navy assets represents an application of a long-standing legal principle that allows USCG law enforcement detachments aboard U.S. Navy ships to perform port security to maritime interdiction operations on U.S. territorial waters or overseas on support operations missions.²⁷ This operational partnership represents an effective fusion of existing core competencies that are trained and ready. It also creates opportunities for expanding the standard training programs with local and state law enforcement authorities across all coastal territories.

JFCOM's Director of Joint Training and Doctrine, J7, is responsible for executing the CINC's joint force training mission. Dual-hatted as the Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), the 2-star general is responsible for improving joint readiness by providing world-wide training and training support and by assisting in the preparation of integrated and interoperable forces for future joint and multinational operations. He also provides support for managing and integrating joint capable modeling and simulation tools and provides leadership in the development of joint doctrine and joint training initiatives.²⁸ The JWFC's Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) is a state-of-the art training facility that hosts a wide array of joint and interagency training exercises conducted in a synthetic computer assisted environment. It is important to note that although the focus is on JFCOM's capabilities, there is a wide array of DoD strategic training centers that provide training support to senior military leaders as well as federal agency and industry senior leaders. These centers of strategic excellence include (but are not limited to) the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership war-gaming center, the National Defense University's Joint Forces Staff College and War-Gaming and Simulation Center, the Air Force Warfighting Institute, and the U.S. Naval War

College. These DoD centers complement the federal agency training centers such as State Department's Foreign Service Institute, and recurring executive level training exercises sponsored by FEMA and DoJ. Together, these centers cover a broad range of scenarios that focus on domestic preparedness.

Established in 1993, the JTASC serves as the nation's focal point for joint and multinational doctrine development, computer war-gaming, and theater commander training. During a typical joint and/or coalition exercise (e.g., a Joint Task Force (JTF) Exercise Unified Endeavor), commanders, staffs, and agency representatives from the U.S. government and armed forces, NATO, and Partnership for Peace nations synchronize military operations in response to a variety of simulated crises situations resembling Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti or other small-scale contingencies and peace operations. Strategic level seminar war games designed for high-level commanders, staffs, and agency leaders employing consequence management scenarios figure prominently in JWFC's exercise support schedule, consistent with CJCS guidance.²⁹ Future training initiatives will address domestic WMD scenarios at a much higher fidelity through distributed learning networks in order to encourage a more active participation of state and federal response managers. Simulated exercises offer a tremendous utility at this level for federal and state responders, agency managers, and DoD to conduct planning and coordination in a realistic scenario-driven environment. JFCOM possesses a wide array of tools (e.g., facilities, simulation models, and technical expertise), making the pursuit of building training partnerships with non-DoD response organizations a logical outgrowth.

These missions, functions, and facilities of JFCOM provide the basis for a training partnership with the response management agencies across all levels. JFCOM's training support mission assumes a prominent role in domestic preparedness especially where it affects the operational functions of the newly formed OHS. While a detailed study of OHS is beyond the scope of this paper, it begs clarification that OHS is the initial point of entry for JTF-CS's MACA efforts at the interagency level. JFCOM serves as the conduit in the line of communication between DoD and OHS. Under the President's executive order issued on 8 October 2001, the Director of OHS is tasked with the responsibility for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, and responding to WMD events. The complexity of these tasks presents the director with a monumental challenge where his scope of responsibility extends across various aspects of domestic security scattered among 40 federal bureaus and offices in 20 government agencies. The coordinating agencies, which include JFCOM, FEMA, DoJ, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), DoT, the USCG, the Border Patrol, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the FBI, report to over two-dozen congressional committees.³⁰ Recognizing

that the director's actual authority to hold these agencies accountable to OHS is questionable, from a strategic and operational perspective, this presents a seemingly hopeless dispersal of authority. The initial OHS staff structure issued in a 29 October 2001 White House Press Release shows an austere organization that lacks a mechanism for interagency cooperation (e.g., training and exercises) among others.³¹ The operational functions of OHS within this interagency environment must take shape if it is to become a viable organization in the national response system. JFCOM, given its organizational structure, training support mission, and resources, is in a strong position to serve as the "glue" to synchronize the seams of the local, state, and federal response systems through a training program aimed at assisting OHS, the agencies under its scope of responsibility, and the state and local emergency management authorities. The effectiveness of the national response system in dealing with a catastrophic incident will be tested at the state level where the simultaneous application of local, state, and federal response assets will come to play.

Legal Considerations

There are legal issues related to the domestic employment of the military. These issues have far reaching implications for the public and civil-military responders especially where it concerns potential infringement of civil liberties, federal usurpation of state and local authority, and the military's law enforcement role in CONUS. It is essential that these legal implications are integrated into the response training program at the federal, state, and local levels. Understanding to whom and under what circumstances the laws apply is imperative. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was intended to prevent U.S. military forces from becoming a national police force by prohibiting the use of the military to "execute the laws". This is purely a civilian police function. The statutory language of the PCA does not apply to all U.S. military forces; it has no applicability to the USCG and the National Guard. Specifically, the National Guard, when operating in its state status pursuant to Title 32 is not subject to the prohibitions on civilian law enforcement, whereas federal military forces operating pursuant to Title 10 are subject to PCA. One of the express missions of the Guard is to preserve the laws of the state during times of emergency when regular law enforcement assets prove inadequate. Only when the Guard is federalized under Presidential authority it becomes subject to the PCA limitations.³² Response training programs must directly address real or perceived civil concerns for constitutionally protected individual liberties.

A potential source of legal friction is over the domestic employment of JTF-CS where Title 32 and Title 10 responsibilities may potentially conflict. To mitigate the risks, JTF-CS's mission

is governed by four core principles.³³ First, its chain of command and civilian oversight within DoD are clear. The commander reports directly to CINC JFCOM, who in turn reports to the SecDef and President. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASDSO/LIC) provides civilian oversight. Second, JTF-CS is never the lead agency. It will always support an LFA such as FEMA and under FEMA's direction; JTF-CS supports the federal agencies responsible for each of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF).³⁴ Third, the primary mission of the military is to fight and win the nation's wars. It does not include domestic law enforcement or civil administration nor does it encompass long term recovery or restoration operations. These functions are civilian responsibilities and they will remain so. Finally, JTF-CS promotes and leverages the unique skills of the reserve component by integrating Guard and Reserve forces in day-to-day functions.

Ultimately, a legal component of a response training program must emphasize the point that the PCA is not a constitutional prohibition but a statutory creation that the Congress and the President have repeatedly worked-around over the years in order to meet a variety of law enforcement challenges. The President's constitutional powers provide a broad basis for using the military for homeland defense. This is the President's inherent right and duty to preserve federal functions --- recognized as the President's authority to preserve the freedom of navigable waterways and to put down armed insurrection. The intent here is not to render the PCA irrelevant. It is merely to point out the fact that the PCA is not an absolute limitation on the military's mission to defend the homeland, yet it is key to a legal training program for local, state, and federal responders.³⁵

II. FORGING TRAINING EFFICIENCIES: MAPPING CAPABILITIES TO REQUIREMENTS

The attacks of September 11 signaled the beginning of the first war of the millennium. Given the inventory of national response assets and organizations at all levels of government, the focus shifts to analyzing the possibilities of integrating these separate mechanisms so that our response is seamless. At the epicenter of this effort is the creation of NORTHCOM -- a tenth combatant command solely responsible for homeland security that will serve as the nucleus of DoD's efforts against global terrorism. America's war on terrorism created the OHS and forced DoD to consider revolutionary changes in its organizational structure and training focus. This new combatant command, responsible for defending the homeland and North America, is the first of many changes to come.

Exact details of the new command's structure and operational functions are not yet known; however, 1 October 2002 is the effective date for the command's establishment. In the

interim, JFCOM's Homeland Security Directorate (HLSD), established in October 2001, provides the nucleus for the new combatant command.³⁶ HLSD was officially renamed Joint Forces Headquarters for Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) on 1 February 2002. The response systems currently in place at the local, state, and federal levels provide a workable framework for forging an integrated homeland defense campaign plan. Training programs for authorities and organizations responsible for the command and control of the response plans at all levels are the threads that will bind the unique capabilities at every echelon. The state level, which represents the critical juncture where the near-simultaneous application of local, state, and federal response assets will likely come into play, must be the focus of the training programs. These programs must shape the tactics, techniques, and procedures in a training environment that integrates all echelons of response. This will allow for the fusion of information and intelligence into a common operating picture, yielding the right situational understanding. Distributed simulation and distance learning technologies are just some of many training resources that will enable non-DoD response headquarters to actively participate in the programs.

There are adequate training resources and programs in existence that can potentially raise the proficiency levels of local responders, state emergency managers, and senior leaders from federal agencies, DoD, and the reserve components. Current DoD directives governing cooperation with law enforcement officials, the protection of critical assets, military assistance and support to civil authorities, and anti-terrorism/force protection responsibilities are integrated into a new joint publication that establishes doctrine for civil support.³⁷ One of the major implications of this emerging doctrine is the synchronization of operations at the state and federal level that is vital to an integrated and effective response. First responders and state emergency organizations can leverage the National Guard Bureau's Distributed Learning Network and learning centers across the country to participate in training. This serves as the local-state level module that can be integrated into JFCOM's interagency training program.

Training programs that hone desired skills at all echelons and especially at the critical seams are crucial to gaining proficiency and overall preparedness. These seams are where emergency managers and decision makers at all levels fuse intelligence and information, determine additional requirements from the next higher echelon, and where they ultimately synchronize operations. The crisis environment dictates that decision makers assess specific threats and risks and identify the critical tasks at each phase of the response plan, from problem identification to mobilization to crisis action to stabilization to recovery. Understanding the operational policies and structure (i.e., who does what to whom), enumerating the mission

essential tasks for each mission through a comprehensive task analysis, and defining a realistic set of conditions for each task begin the process of developing a viable training program. This will help response managers prioritize the investment of training dollars. Availability of and accessibility to these training resources are not central to the issue -- taking advantage of them is.

Inside the Toolbox – Taking Inventory of Capabilities

Federal agencies and DoD sponsor a number of training centers that offer interactive courses to first responders. One of the training sites in existence today is the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) at Anniston, Alabama -- formerly the Army's center for chemical warfare training center, Ft McClellan. Congressionally directed, DoJ opened the center in June 1998 to establish a national, state, and local public training center for first responders to domestic terrorist acts. It is the only center in existence that serves as a federally supported training facility aimed at state and local law enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and other key agencies such as public works and state and local emergency management agencies. The focus of the training is to prepare relevant state and local officials to deal with chemical, biological, or nuclear terrorist acts and handle incidents dealing with hazardous materials -- where individuals are trained in a contaminated environment using live agents (actual toxic substances). The CDP is invaluable in both providing training on the use of specialized equipment and in providing the confidence gained by being able to train in an actual contaminated environment.³⁸

The site also provides medical preparedness training. On Ft McClellan's former Army hospital is the U.S. Public Health Service's mock hospital, Noble Hospital Training Center (NHTC), where health-care providers and hospital officials train on drills involving biochemical attacks. The NHTC trains the medical community on responding to WMD terrorism incidents. It includes a patient-holding area, complete with a private side room where the FBI could question witnesses and an outdoor triage area equipped with a shower system to decontaminate victims before they enter the hospital. The NHTC aims to reverse a negative trend where emergency medical response is viewed as the weak link in the homeland-defense program. Prior to September 11, these underutilized centers have only trained about 6,000 of the nation's 11 million first responders.³⁹ Given the change in national focus and urgency since then, coupled with the likelihood of increased federal funding, first responder enrollment is expected to significantly rise.

Distance learning and distributed network technology provides a means to deliver the training to the target audience at their home stations. This is a technological prescription for cases where the large population of first responders are simply too busy to attend two-to-four week schoolhouse courses away from their primary workplace. For example, it is estimated that there are more than 70,000 law enforcement agency departments in the U.S. today, making it extremely difficult to conduct integrated training.⁴⁰ Network technology enables the distribution of training to remote locations. Distance learning technology allows for tailoring the program to meet the target audience's specific training needs. Whereas the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program opened the door for training first responder teams in 120 cities, distance learning expands the population to include all major cities in the country. As this technology matures, domestic preparedness planners can take advantage of its utility for gaining individual skill competency for first level responders, crisis managers, and incident commanders. It also provides a means for state CSTs and emergency management authorities to integrate local and state level training into federally sponsored exercises.

Adding to the inventory of training tools, network technology can also distribute simulation-based training to the target audience at local and state home stations. This method of training is focused on command and control organizations --- the decision making nodes consisting of response managers at all echelons. This simulation-based training employs interactive, automated tools that simulate random operational conditions that force the target audience to respond to situations -- as opposed to tactical simulation systems such as virtual simulators (e.g., the Air Force's flight simulators) or tools that aid predictive analysis. The Army's Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) is responsible for developing and managing simulation-based training systems for the Army.⁴¹ Other services have similar research and development organizations responsible for leveraging technology to build simulation-based tools for training.

Simulation technology provides the military a way to experience a virtually realistic environment, absent the physical risks or dangers of real-life combat. Nothing can take the place of live training; however, simulation allows the training audience to experience something quite close to the real thing. Local authorities, Guard CSTs, state and federal response managers, and JTF-CS can train together at this critical seam through simulation-based training in an integrated, computer-assisted environment. As a module, this echelon of training can "plug-and-play" into a federal level exercise (e.g., FEMA or DOJ executive level training exercises and JFCOM's JTF exercises) as the scenario dictates. Today, training managers are able to design exercises that incorporate specific objectives, given a realistic scenario, and

integrating organic command and control equipment into the architecture. Most important, the nature of simulation-based training allows for quick-turn-around iterations. That is, by repeating the selected portion of training to get the desired effect without costly setups associated with live training, the audience develops skill competency with each iteration, thereby enhancing the potential of gaining proficiency in less time.

The Virtual Emergency Response Training Simulation (VERTS) is a training system under development that promises to enhance CST training when fielded to all 32 CSTs by 2006. STRICOM is the system developer, Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) at Ft Leonard-Wood, MO manages VERTS, and DOMS is the DoD-lead for overseeing its development. The VERTS architecture leverages existing software technology and the most recent innovations in the video game industry. It rides on existing networks and when linked to organic communications networks, it will have "reach-back" capability, enabling CSTs to access on-the-spot information from government experts and databases.⁴² VERTS promises to deliver training realism through the use of virtual images of urban infrastructures and key facilities created from geographic information files to generated data. According to plan, the Army would configure VERTS to link into a distributed learning network, enabling dispersed units (e.g., CSTs, federal and state emergency managers, and DoD leads) to train together. The intent of the program is to combine conventional classroom training, interactive courses, and decision support tools with simulations.⁴³

At the national level, JWFC's JTASC is a premiere simulation-based training facility that supports JFCOM's joint force training mission. Two of the six training categories that JFCOM sponsors, are critical enablers to domestic preparedness training.⁴⁴ The first is a 5-day computer assisted exercise (CAX) involving a joint/combined task force or a CINC headquarters (e.g., joint force commanders and their staffs) and select government agencies in realistic scenarios primarily focused on peace operations, small scale contingencies, or a major theater of war. The exercise design is built around the target audience's mission essential tasks and force structure. Depending on the desired level of fidelity, the tailored CAX is driven by one of JWFC's four simulations systems.⁴⁵ The joint force headquarters deploys a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to JWFC's JTASC in Suffolk, VA from where the CAX is distributed to component home stations via existing networks. Interagency participation in these exercises usually includes the National Command Authority (NCA), DoJ, and State Department (DoS) role players. The exercise architecture can accommodate multiple distributed training nodes that can theoretically include local and state law enforcement agencies in a civil-military counterdrug scenario, for example.

The second category focuses on interagency and intergovernmental training that supports the national strategy to combat terrorism.⁴⁶ It includes events that assess the nation's crisis and consequence management capacity. This training is based on applicable standing operating procedures as derived from NCA directives. It is designed to assist in preparing interagency decision makers and their supporting staffs to respond to NCA requirements. These exercises vary in design from senior leader seminars to command post exercises (CPXs) that can be simulation-based. The principal training audience includes the JFCOM battlestaff, JFCOM components, JTF-CS, and state-level special task forces oriented on national security special events (e.g., Olympics). This training is an appropriate forum for understanding homeland security processes and command relationships. Active interagency participation is sought after and strongly encouraged; however, JFCOM has no authority over agencies to mandate their participation and requires the mutual agreement of agency directors.

Lines of communication between DoD and the federal agencies are critical to the success of building interagency cooperation in training. A typical interagency exercise in domestic preparedness would involve senior leaders in a seminar environment exchanging information, discussing/resolving key policy issues, and developing an action plan. The plan would aim to align DoD and agency crisis management and consequence management capabilities to support national homeland security missions. In a recent interagency command post exercise (CPX) held at JWFC in preparation for the winter Olympics in Utah (a national security special event), JFCOM subordinate commands, Joint Staff, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), DoD, DoS, DoJ, the National Guard Bureau coordinating CST support for the olympics, and other government agency leads discussed homeland security issues via a series of joint information briefings by DoD and interagency organizations using crisis management and consequence management scenarios.⁴⁷ More important, the CPX involved local, state, and federal response authorities whose participation was driven by existing mutual aid agreements, EMACs, and the FRP.⁴⁸ This was the first major multi-echelon training event since September 11.

In an environment rich with high and low technology tools, discovering training efficiencies are often just one step away from convention. That is, by accounting for all available training tools and integrating innovative ideas for employing these tools into every level of the national response system potentially will yield the desired efficiencies. Gaining training efficiencies at the critical state level is vital to domestic preparedness and the thread that binds this architecture is interagency and intergovernmental cooperation. JFCOM will continue to provide ready joint forces and to train joint forces to the CINCs, including CINCNORTHCOM. Harnessing the power

of technology and realigning training management concepts toward more innovative, collaborative, and integrated programs will help gain the desired skill proficiencies and synchronization of our responders and preparedness officials. This is a training philosophy deeply rooted in the notion of using all available tools and making the system work. DoD and in the federal agencies involved with homeland security have the necessary training resources in hand. The true challenge lies in changing the paradigms of how we train, to establish clear lines of communication, and to build partnerships that best-train the target audience to attain and maintain domestic preparedness.

Putting it All Together: Building Partnerships

Both OHS and JFCOM are in an ideal position to form a non-traditional training partnership that will lay the groundwork for sub-partnerships with local and state responders. OHS's mission to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks demand an effective training support program that will help build and maintain domestic preparedness.⁴⁹ OHS's responsibilities for domestic security are spread out across 40 federal bureaus and offices in 20 government agencies -- a near-hopeless dispersal of authority. The President's 8 October 2001 executive order granted authority to OHS to coordinate domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack. Additionally, OHS has authority to coordinate programs and activities for training federal, state, and local employees who would be called upon to respond to such a threat or attack.⁵⁰ However, without the authority to hold agencies accountable and with no real means to assess OHS's training status, the director is faced with a huge challenge. JFCOM's joint training mission, its state of the art resources and facilities in JWFC, and the command's institutional training methodology provide a model for assessing and managing training. Ultimately, this robust resource base postures JFCOM to expand its training support role and join the training seams where all echelons of response authorities can train in an integrated environment. The conditions and tasks facing JFCOM and OHS prime the environment for a establishing a training relationship between the military and civilian agencies that focuses on homeland security.

Immediately following the September terrorist attacks, JFCOM began the process of coordinating and synchronizing its efforts with the organizations vital to homeland security. Leveraging the insights and concepts gained from JFCOM's joint training and experimentation work, prompted a shift in training application concepts toward a more active role in the conduct of interagency training. To this end, JFCOM conducted a comprehensive homeland security

planning initiative, working closely with the office of the SecDef, the Joint Staff, other combatant commands, and OHS. Through OHS, JFCOM coordinated extensively with relevant government agencies that are vital to the domestic security effort. As previously discussed, JFCOM's HLSD emerged, internally resourced and led by an Army Major General to oversee planning, organization, and execution of the command's responsibilities for homeland defense and MACA. HLSD, redesignated as JFHQ-HLS, is now the nucleus for NORTHCOM. As the joint force trainer, JFCOM continues to set the conditions toward collaborative training that targets key leadership and command and control headquarters engaged in homeland security.⁵¹

JFCOM already leverages the power of simulation-based training in order to exercise the homeland security responsibilities of the JFCOM battlestaff, JTF-CS, JFHQ-HLS, and combatant commands. As the training scenario requires, this training support is extended to the National Guard Bureau, state CSTs, and critical federal agencies. Existing interagency relationships were forged from collaborative efforts under the FRP, where DoD provided support to federal efforts in dealing with natural disasters (e.g., wildfires, floods, and storms); however, interagency training needs greater emphasis. CINCJFCOM has no command authority to direct agency participation; rather, agencies are requested to play in training exercises. Likewise, the OHS Director's span of real authority is still taking shape under challenging lines of authority. A combination of political negotiation and mutual agreement among interagency directors will drive the level of non-DoD participation. On a positive note, the unprecedented level of agency participation in a December 2001 JFCOM interagency exercise for the Winter Olympics points toward improved agency participation in these exercises. While this is only one data point, in the long run, this degree of training coordination and synchronization will codify the ways and means of bringing together the state and federal response authorities and command and control headquarters into a fully integrated exercise — done in an integrated environment that aims to develop core competencies.

III. THE ROAD AHEAD

The nature of the September 11 attacks illustrates an aspect of our nation's critical vulnerabilities at home. The depth and scope of our domestic preparedness and response system must address the full dimension of the potential threats we face. Ensuring the training readiness of all key actors at the federal, state, and local governments is our primary means to prepare and this is best done through an integrated, multi-echelon training environment. Having identified the state level as the critical seam in the national response system, this is where the complexity of cross-boundary coordination among federal, state, and local response authorities

operating in an ad hoc environment could yield success or compound the disaster. Exercising the critical tasks of response managers, staff and interagency coordination, routine support of operational procedures, and testing contingency operations at this level demands a robust training program. The extent of New York City's strong response capability narrowed the focus of providing military assistance to civil authorities. There are no guarantees that all the 120 large cities in the country, funded for training in 1996, will have equal response capabilities in the face of a similar catastrophe. A similar WMD attack will unquestionably demand the near-simultaneous application of the nation's local, state, and federal resources. A uniform set of standards in preparing for and responding to these events is the key to a sustained national training program for domestic preparedness. DoD has the doctrinal methodologies to assist civil authorities in training to respond to such events. It also has training management programs and abundant training support resources to assist the nation in preparing to deal with domestic threats. Ultimately, DoD has a constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.

A viable solution set for developing a sound national training program for domestic preparedness requires the following elements. First, in order to defend the homeland, JFCOM (as DoD's principal trainer) should expand its training support role to the state and federal levels. Currently, JTF-CS is DoD's link to the LFA and to the state CSTs for planning and training. It is likely that these partnerships will be realigned to NORTHCOM when it stands up on 1 October 2002. Second, the lines of authority between OHS and the agencies may require some measure of Presidential intervention over time until the interagency relationships mature. The intent is to establish sustained agency participation in federally-sponsored domestic preparedness exercises. Third, local authorities should continue to take advantage of state and federally sponsored training programs and facilities, ensuring that first responders are proficient and train in their respective skills while performing their day-to-day jobs. Local authorities are responsible for exercising contingency plans governed by existing cross-jurisdictional mutual aid agreements and plans for requesting state level resources. Fourth, the NGB should continue to oversee the training and certification of CSTs and maintain the readiness posture of state National Guards. At present, 24 of the 32 CSTs nationwide are certified, bringing the readiness posture closer to the objective standards.⁵² This enhances the strength of the linkage between JTF-CS and the state National Guards. The strength of a national response training program ultimately rests on the capabilities of state emergency authorities and federal agencies.

The lash-up between JFCOM and OHS is a crucial link for mobilizing federal support to local and state responders. Expanding JFCOM's interagency training program provides a

vehicle for strengthening the interagency process and for integrating NGB and state emergency managers into the training. DoD's specified mission in the FRP and support to the LFA for each of the ESFs underscore the importance of DoD's role in domestic preparedness. Training readiness is vital to a sustained response system where DoD assumes a larger role in providing training support to civilian authorities. The military joint training model serves as a viable tool for assisting OHS define its essential tasks in the effort to streamline its command relationships with the 40-plus federal bureaus and offices spread across some 20 agencies. This is an essential first step in establishing its operational policies and in defining lines of authority and accountability. With NORTHCOM coming into being, a lot is at stake for JFCOM to ensure the OHS can exercise the Presidential authority granted in executing its mission. Through staff exercises, command post exercises, and collaboration on actual consequence management missions with key agencies and the military, OHS can gain a foothold in defining its destiny.

JWFC's interagency training provides a workable domain for exercising the homeland security support relationships among key players in the FRP. JWFC has, in the past, served as the training camp for interagency cooperation ranging from strategy-setting seminars, to prioritizing the strategies in staff exercises, to rehearsing the campaign plans in command post exercises. These training modules employed a variety of tools ranging from seminar discussion to computer-assisted, scenario-driven exercises. Future audiences should include the JFCOM battlestaff, JTF-CS, JFHQ-HLS, Office of the SecDef, the Joint Staff, DOMS, the LFA, the NGB, NORAD, USSOCOM, state WMD CSTs, state adjutant generals/emergency managers, and select local authorities. However, coordinating the active participation of non-DoD command and staff elements is problematic. Unlike the military command structure, the federal agencies do not have a formal chain of command that could mandate their participation. Compounding the problem, a combination of undermanned staffs and several competing priorities all working inside compressed timelines, prevent agency players from actively participating. The intent for interagency exercises is not to train civilians the military way, but rather for the training to make sense to both civilians and military leaders.

A training partnership between JFCOM and OHS requires strong emphasis from the respective leadership – the President and the SecDef. This partnership must direct active interagency participation where the mission and exercise scenario drive the level of participation. JFCOM, in close coordination with OHS, will define the key non-DoD participants. Given the current authority landscape in the OHS and the urgency of improving civil-military lines of communication, a Presidential directive to the agency directors to mandate participation in federal homeland security exercises is a needed stimulus for the national response training

program. A recent exercise held at JWFC serves as a good-news story. As a national security special event, providing civil-military security for the 2002 Winter Olympics provided an event where the interagency training process scored a significant victory. Participation from key players was highly encouraging, which allowed the target audience to achieve the training objectives. A series of senior leader seminars and staff exercises culminated in a computer-assisted command post exercise that essentially validated the joint training model for interagency training. The success of security operations at the Olympics validated this particular interagency exercise. Ultimately, OHS can leverage this training construct to assert and reinforce its role as the President's lead cabinet office for homeland security.

There are other agency-sponsored interagency-specific exercises already in existence that serve as training vehicles for building core competencies. Ideally, the operational training objectives common across these civilian and military exercises should cover a range of enabling tasks that include staff coordination, interagency coordination, exercising routine support operations, testing contingency operations, intelligence and information sharing, establishing/organizing/ operating a joint headquarters, developing a liaison structure, conducting joint staff operations, and coordinating consequence management operations. The range of flexible scenarios (e.g., natural/man-made disasters, WMD, or civil disturbance/disobedience incidents) that cover the full spectrum of MACA should determine the training objectives.

Recognizing that limited time and manpower can be training distractions, the exercise architecture should make full use of distributed technology in order to bring the training to the target audience at their home stations. The exercise communications architecture should facilitate the use of the command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) systems that are organic to the training audience (as applicable). Distance learning technology and existing networks in state and federal governments and within DoD provide a leverage for distributing the exercise to the maximum number of response headquarters, at the appropriate levels, and at their home stations. Whether the forum of the exercise is a seminar or a computer assisted staff exercise or command post exercise, regardless what exercise support tool is chosen, the exercise architecture should integrate as many of the partners as practicable. Leveraging the power of technology in JWFC creates a playing field that embodies a common operating picture where the target audience operates with a common situational understanding created from a fusion of information and intelligence. This is an iterative and bloodless environment where the target audience responds to a very realistic scenario. This is the way ahead.

As we continue to witness rapid changes take place across the globe, the events illustrate a progressive state of disorder and instability that demand our vigilance as a nation. The international security environment is fraught with many challenges. By staying trained and ready, our military is able to execute its mission of protecting America, its people, its borders, and its global interests. Most importantly, we must forge new interagency training partnerships that will ensure domestic preparedness. If the tragic events of September 11, 2001 are a sign of what's ahead, then the way we train as a military force must focus on non-traditional threats at home and abroad — just as we train to meet other threats. We have the systems in place across all echelons of the response system. Where there are varying degrees of preparedness at each level, the thread that will bind them to a common standard is training. Let's make the system work.

WORD COUNT = 10, 252

ENDNOTES

¹ Bruce M. Lawlor, "Military Support of Civil Authorities: A New Focus For a New Millennium," October 2001; available from <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Lawlor.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2001.

² William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, (Washington D.C.: The White House, December 2000), iii.

³ U.S. Code Title 50, Chapter 40, Section 2302, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), defines it as follows: The term "weapon of mass destruction" means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity. Consistent with the events of September 11, 2001, WMD (as defined in this paper) is as a deliberate or unintentional event involving a nuclear, chemical, radiological weapon or device, or large conventional explosive, that produces catastrophic loss of life or property. A large explosive event is also considered a WMD because initially the cause of the explosion has not been determined and the resulting damaged site may be contaminated (i.e., contain a radiological, biological, or chemical agent).

⁴ George W. Bush, "Executive Order Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council," October 8, 2001; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011018_2.html; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001.

⁵ Don Weter, "Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command: Command Briefing," briefing slides, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA, 10 December 2001. From the 1993 through the 1999 UCPs, JFCOM's missions have expanded to include Joint Force Trainer, Joint Force Interoperability, Joint Force Requirements, Joint Force Provider, and Joint Force Experimentation.

⁶ William F. Kernan, "United States Joint Forces Command Responsibilities for Homeland Defense: Testimony presented to the 107th U.S. Congress Committee On Armed Services U.S. Senate", October 25, 2001; available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/NewsLink/StoryArchive/pa102501.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 November 2001. Throughout this paper, Homeland Security refers to the prevention, deterrence, and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, population or infrastructure. It actually consists of Homeland Defense... plus...Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. Homeland Defense is primarily the military's responsibility to Homeland Security with the principle focus on protecting against military attacks emanating from outside the U.S.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Bruce M. Lawlor, "Domestic Preparedness against Terrorism: How ready are we: Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, United States Joint Forces Command Before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs And

International Relations United States House of Representatives Second Session, 106th Congress," 24 March 2000; available from <http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/hearings/testimony/lawlor327.htm> ; Internet; accessed 30 December 2001.

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¹⁰ Adrian T. Bogart III, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams," Army Logistician 33 (July/August 2001): 23.

¹¹ A complete listing of these 29 courses is found in http://www.rris.fema.gov/compendium_wmd_aug_2000.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 December 2001.

¹² Jeanne Cummings, John J. Fialka, and Sarah Lueck, "On Guard? Vulnerability Exposed, U.S. Confronts 'Maze' of Homeland Defenses --- Gov. Ridge's Big Challenges: Melding Bureaucracies, Pumping Up Budgets --- Training School's Empty Beds," Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2001, p. A.1.

¹³ Erwin, 27.

¹⁴ Michael P. Fleming, "National Security Roles for the National Guard," August 2001; available from <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/article.cfm?article=20>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2001.

¹⁵ Lawlor, "Military Support of Civil Authorities: A New Focus For a New Millennium."

¹⁶ Fleming.

¹⁷ Bogart, 22.

¹⁸ Weter, "Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command: Command Briefing."

¹⁹ Weter.

²⁰ Lawlor, "Domestic Preparedness against Terrorism: How ready are we?."

²¹ Don Weter, "Joint Task Force -- Civil Support Briefing to CINCFCOM," briefing slides, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA, 10 December 2001. The brief outlines the relationship between JTF-CS and each of the FEMA regions where JTF-CS liaisons provide training and planning support to National Guard CSTs.

²² Lawlor, "Military Support of Civil Authorities: A New Focus For a New Millennium."

²³ William F. Kernan, "Transforming America's Armed Forces: Remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute Symposium in Norfolk, VA," October 4, 2001; available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/NewsLink/StoryArchive/pa100401.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2001.

²⁴ Lawlor, "Domestic Preparedness against Terrorism: How ready are we?."

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Navy, Coast Guard Joint Forces for Homeland Security," Joint Media Release, November 5, 2001; available from http://www.uscg.mil/overview/article_jointrelease.htm; Internet; accessed 2 January 2002.

²⁷ Ibid. From a legal perspective, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act normally prohibited the U.S. Navy from participating directly in law enforcement activities. The USCG, however, is authorized under 14 USC 89 to board vessels to enforce U.S. law. This arrangement allows a USCG boarding team aboard a Navy ship -- similar to the one employed for years in joint Navy-Coast Guard counter-narcotics operations, dating back to the 1980s.

²⁸ Weter, "Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command: Command Briefing."

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08, Vol I, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996).

³⁰ A complete listing of the key agencies include: Border Patrol, Centers for Disease Control, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Joint Forces Command, National Domestic Preparedness Office, National Institutes of Health, National Guard, National Security Council, and State Department.

³¹ Under the OHS Director and Deputy Director are ten co-equal subordinate elements in the organizational structure. These staff sections include functions for communications, protection and prevention, legislative affairs, intelligence and detection, research and development, executive secretary, policy and plans, public liaison, and response and recovery.

³² Craig T. Trebilcock, "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," October 2000; available from <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/article.cfm?article=7>; Internet; accessed 3 January 2002.

³³ Lawlor, "Military Support of Civil Authorities: A New Focus For a New Millennium."

³⁴ Under the Federal Response Plan, there are a total of twelve Emergency Support Functions (assigned to agencies for proponentcy): Transportation (Dept of Transportation), Communications Nat'l Communications System), Public Works and Engineering (Dept of Defense), Firefighting (Dept. of Agriculture), Information and Planning (FEMA), Mass Care (American Red Cross), Resource Support (General Services Administration), Health and Medical Services (Dept. of Health and Human Services), Urban Search and Rescue (FEMA), HAZMAT (Environmental Protection Agency), Food (Dept. of Agriculture), Energy (Dept of Energy).

³⁵ Trebilcock.

³⁶ HLS Directorate mission is to plan and integrate the full spectrum of JFCOM Civil Support and Homeland Defense support to Lead Federal Agencies from prevention through crisis response and consequence management. Homeland Defense is defined as the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military and terrorist attacks emanating from outside the U.S. Together with Civil Support, which is DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and designated law enforcement efforts, make up Homeland Security -- the preparation for, prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic civil support.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Civil Support, Joint Pub 3-07.7 (First Draft), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 December 2001).

³⁸ Office for Domestic Preparedness, Center for Domestic Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs); available from <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2002.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Erwin, 27.

⁴¹ Harold Kennedy, "Simulations Help Train For 'Extreme Risks': Military drills by all services rely increasingly on computer-based modeling," National Defense, November 2001, p.34.

⁴² Sandra I. Erwin, "Virtual Metropolis Underpins Emergency Response Trainer," National Defense, November 2001, p. 42.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Weter. The six training categories include: Cat 1-Service Component Individual and Unit Training which is the sole Title 10 responsibility of service components (NTC/JRTC/Red Flag); Cat 2- Live, Multi-Service Training (JTFEX, Roving Sands); Cat 3-Computer Assisted Commander and Staff Joint Training (Internal Look, Unified Endeavor); Cat 4-Live Multi-National, Multi-Service Training (Unified Spirit); Cat 5-Computer Assisted Multi-National, Joint HQs Training (Bright Star); and Cat 6-Interagency/Intergovernmental Training (Unified Endeavor, Topoff).

⁴⁵ The four simulation models used in JWFC are found in http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/genpublic/jw500/modsim_dev.html.

⁴⁶ Joint Staff, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, CJCSM 3500.03A (Coordinating Draft), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, November 2000), 1-3.

⁴⁷ USJFCOM Message "Senior Leadership-Interagency Seminar and Staffex", 28 September 2001; available from http://www.jfcom.mil/jwfc/jfcom_staffex_and_cpx_msg; Internet; accessed 7 January 2002. The actual conduct of the exercise met the objectives of the memorandum.

⁴⁸ Don Weter, "Joint Task Force – Olympics Briefing to CINCJFCOM," briefing slides, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA, 29 October 2001. The brief outlines the mission and task organization of JTF-O. It also highlights all the participating authorities at the local, state, and federal agency levels.

⁴⁹ Bush.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Kernan.

⁵² "Seven More WMD Civil Support Teams Certified, DoD Says," Aerospace Daily 30 January 2002; available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2002/s20020130seven.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2002.

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