Operation MERKUR 1941 - A Failure in Strategic Leadership

Abstract

Operation MERKUR, the battle for Crete in May 1941, has been characterized by some as a "gory sacrifice" of German paratroops. In retrospect, it has been woven into a network of taboos and legends, in particular, the question as to whether large scale airborne operations could be used in future conflicts. Even though the operation was ultimately successful, the high toll of lives raises many questions. What was the point for making such sacrifices? What lessons can be drawn from the historical events to help shape both the present and future? It is not the writer's intent to recapitulate the entire course of the battle. Rather, this paper will place the decision-making process that led to Operation MERKUR within the politico-military and strategic-operational context of that time. Viewed in such a way, the battle of Crete can serve as a lesson for failures in strategic leadership in the implementation of national strategy.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 09, 2002
Accession Number
ADA404698

Entities

People

  • Kurt H. Schiebold

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Command And Control
  • Deployment
  • Employment
  • Europe
  • Governments
  • Military Operations
  • New York
  • North Africa
  • Students
  • United States
  • United States European Command
  • United States Military Academy
  • Universities
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Emergency Management and Homeland Security.
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.