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**NEW MEXICO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:  
A TRADITION OF AIR DEFENSE READY FOR CHANGE**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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The New Mexico Army National Guard has an Air Defense history. In the past thirty years the soldiers of the 111th Air Defense Brigade have diligently trained on the Duster, the Roland, the Chaparral, the Hawk, the Avenger and the Patriot systems. None of these units have been deployed to perform their war-time air defense mission. Due to the changing world climate, the Army is involved in a variety of missions around the world and at home. The New Mexico Army National Guard must become a relevant member of the team and transform part of its air defense organization to units that will meet their Country's call.

The Army has a viable total force concept. It was the active and reserve components together that were successful in Desert Storm. Since that time this combined team has been deployed to numerous peace-keeping operations and domestic emergencies. Presently we are in a war against terrorism and our primary mission has become homeland security. The New Mexico Army National Guard has the responsibility to meet the full spectrum of missions. It has an opportunity to create a new type of Guard unit capable of deploying faster, training more efficiently and equipped to perform homeland security, domestic emergencies, peacekeeping operations and their war fighting mission. Times have changed and so should the New Mexico Army National Guard.



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## **NEW MEXICO ARMY NATION GUARD: A TRADITION OF AIR DEFENSE READY FOR CHANGE**

The New Mexico Army National Guard is born from a culture of National patriotism derived from the heroic service of our ancestors.<sup>1</sup> New Mexico is a state primarily consisting of small hometowns where most people recognize each other and share a common background. Part of this neighborhood connection is a duty to serve their country and their community. There is an Army Guard Armory in almost every community in New Mexico, thus making it a viable and accessible option for those that choose to serve their community by defending their country.

If the Army National Guard is to remain a legitimate option it simply must be organized, equipped and trained to effectively perform the spectrum of missions necessary to protect our National interests. The New Mexico National Guard's air defense units have not been ordered to deploy for our Nation's wars or operations other than war in over 55 years. This is partially due to not being equipped properly and partially due to a diminished enemy air threat. It has become difficult to rationalize the New Mexico National Guard's air defense mission as relevant when its position on the Army team remains sidelined on the bench without a foreseeable use in the future.

This paper recommends a paradigm shift in a moderate manor. The recommendation is based on the Army's missions of fighting our Nations wars, peacekeeping operations, homeland security and other domestic emergencies. The first section will discuss a new force transformed by equipment and training. The change in the force structure is to ensure the New Mexico Army Guard is a relevant force prepared to respond to the full spectrum of Army missions. The sections that follow will describe the necessity to provide this type of force for the missions that are ever present and most probable in the future. The New Mexico Army National Guard has a Constitutional based responsibility to protect our Nation and serve our communities: It is time for a change to effectively respond to the challenging situations of our time.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

"We are entering a new era: The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can and must be different."

—President George Bush,  
Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990

A strategic plan is necessary to develop a force trained for "other than war missions" with a soldier prepared for combat and capable of guarding our homeland. This force should be less expensive and more effective. We start today by returning heavy track vehicles, air defense

systems, heavy artillery weapons and other systems that no longer meet the requirements of the future Army nor sustain a need for a present threat. We retain the existing service support missions and acquire equipment that enhances security operations including medical equipment, communication systems and light fighting force equipment. The states and territories will be organized in regions and assigned different areas in the world. The new Guard soldier trained will be a combination of a military policeman and a light infantryman that can speak the prevailing language of its assigned region under a multi-state division level structured command.

The basic training structure can begin immediately with the use of existing military training in modified form. The training will be initiated with a month acculturation program to instill the ethics and soldier values and develop the heart of a warrior. The second phase will begin the specialty training. It will be intensive training focused around the light fighter and military police to achieve the objective of developing a diverse security force. The final phase of the basic training will be: a three day MOUT course, a 10 day Ranger course and a seven day airborne course. These courses will transform the soldier into a lifetime warrior. After graduation of these Guardsmen, they will attend their mission's language school that can be conducted at their Regional Training Battalions. The soldiers will then return to their hometown and become the traditional guardsmen, ready for either state or federal emergencies.

The training program will develop a force trained for peace-keeper operations with a soldier capable of combat. This force will be less expensive and more efficient. The long technical schools associated with air defense radars, computer systems and the equivalent systems of other combat arms branches will not be necessary. The cost of purchasing and maintaining these heavy, complicated systems will also dramatically reduce. New training equipment qualifications every time the active forces turn over their old systems will be a thing of the past. The guardsmen will no longer need to be retrained every time he or she relocates. The mission of all selectively transformed National Guard units will be the same: To guard the nations interests at home and around the world.

The Army and the Army National Guard will continue to train as a team. The training will be battle focused on communications, insertion of a battle strike force, and security operations. The guardsmen will have the inter-nation mission while the Joint military force will be prepared to enter the operation if a combat situation develops. The Guard units will then transition to their Rear Area Operations Security mission. The outcome of this new Guard military specialty will be a trained force capable of a war-fighting mission, homeland defense and peace-keeper operations.

## **BACKGROUND: THE LAST THIRTY YEARS**

It is a long-standing axiom to train as you would fight. The 111<sup>th</sup> Air defense Brigade has been training to fight the Soviet Union for the last thirty years. In the 1970's the Brigade was equipped with an antiquated 40 millimeter double barrel tracked vehicle known as the Duster. The effective firing range was 1.5 kilometers, which was half the distance of the threat's standoff capability. The crewmembers of the dusters were proud of their equipment and their expertise that was acquired over the years of maintaining this system. The key to high moral and success on their duster was due to the continuity of their training; each squad staying together for a constant period of time resulted in members that were bonded war fighters dedicated to being the best platoon in the best battery.

In the mid 80's, the Army's short-range air defense transitioned out of the Chaparral system and assigned it to the Guard. New Mexico Guardsmen went through their first change of equipment in over twenty years but accepted the new standard as a chance to get in the game. The complete transition took over five years including Military Occupational School training, receiving equipment and qualifying batteries to Army training standards. Along with this change of equipment came a change of expertise. The Army's advisors that were associated with unit training were now the experts and would assume a greater role during the training on drill weekends. The unit's primary trainers, being the platoon sergeants and squad leaders realized their leadership was diminished by a lack of experience on the new system. By the time the crews became certified the Cold War ended and the Soviets were no longer considered our air threat. This event should have triggered a drastic change in the 111<sup>th</sup> Air Defense Brigade and New Mexico National Guard's training and organization since the threat based Army Plans no longer had a short ranged air defense threat.

In 1992, America went to war against Iraq, which was rated as the fourth best equipped military in the world. There was never an Army National Guard Air Defense unit considered for deployment. There were a number of active Air Defense units deployed but the Patriot units were the only ones that played a vital role. The Allied Air force controlled the skies in Desert Storm and would not authorize the ground Air Defense units to fire a shot except for the Scud interceptions by Patriot. This was additional evidence the Air Defense mission in the Guard did not equate to a first string or even second-string player on the Army team. This situation of Air Defense still did not prompt a change in the 111<sup>th</sup> ADA Brigade or New Mexico National Guard.

After Desert Storm the Army began to downsize and the Air Defense community transitioned most of the Avenger Air defense systems to the Guard to replace the already outdated Chaparral System. It was another five years before a fully trained battalion performed

collective training tasks at an annual training. The same transition problems with lack of expertise on the system and the soldiers realizing the irrelevance of the mission became noticeable in the retention statistics.

During the 1990's there was a continuous decrease in retention in the New Mexico National Guard Air Defense units. Besides the over used answer of the economy being good, other issues should be addressed that include: soldiers who had prepared for years to serve their country were not even considered during Desert Storm; the numerous changes of equipment which deleted expertise from the NCO ranks; and the continuation of training as an Air Defense unit with a non-existing threat. There are a number of other areas that concern retention but at the strategic level we can control a major issue -- if a unit 's self worth is relevant or not. Accepting change will be difficult and to promote change may be next to impossible but to be a relevant force in the future -- change must occur. There are a number of ways that the New Mexico Guard could better support Army operations. Sincere analysis is required to present future needs and make our Guard a relevant member of the team.

### **ONE ARMY – ONE VISION**

The Army National Guard has not sincerely been involved in the overall transformation portrayed in the Army's Vision. The purpose of this section is to address how the Army National Guard strategic leader must change the culture and conceptual thinking of the Army National Guard to meet our nation's future needs. The paradigm shift is necessary for a successful transformation of the New Mexico Army National Guard.

The Army is transforming to become proactive in meeting the future challenges facing our national interests. The Nation demands our Army to be responsive and dominant in a spectrum of operations including peacetime operations, deterrence, and fighting its wars.<sup>2</sup> The Army has become a technically superior combat arms team that leads the world in the ability to place a devastating force anywhere in the world in a responsive time.<sup>3</sup> External authority directed the Army to reduce in size and become more efficient.<sup>4</sup> This added to the existing limitations to sustain this force. The Army National Guard's role in the Army's transformation can be the solution to nourish this power by its reserve forces being accessible and relevant.

The challenges facing the strategic leader of the Army National Guard are far beyond those standard of the Army. The Army National Guard must redefine and establish its position on the team. The strategic leader must analyze the historical relationship with its active brethren and review their accomplishments as well as their shortcomings. The Army Guard

leadership must then understand where the transformation of the Army is heading and identify if the Army National Guard is playing a vital role in the Army vision.

The Army Vision, "Soldiers on point for the nation; Persuasive in peace, Invincible in war,"<sup>5</sup> embodies a transformation necessary to be prepared for future environments. The Army will be prepared to serve in a variety of missions including homeland security, peacetime operations, deterrence and war fighting.<sup>6</sup> The Army's vision will prepare its force for tomorrow's challenges while remaining ready to fight and win our nation's wars.<sup>7</sup>

The Army's vision does not address any major change in the Army National Guard's role to support its objectives.<sup>8</sup> It is up to the Army National Guard to balance its role toward the social and cultural conditions that influence our national interests. It is the duty of the leadership in the National Guard to reinforce the vision of the Army's strategic position around the world and strengthen the Army Guard's capabilities to confront the increasingly diverse domestic enemies. The Army National Guard Vision 2010 addresses its continual support role ancillary to the Army Vision.<sup>9</sup> The Army Guard vision is entrenched with statements like, "The Guard's traditional role as the expansible combat base of the Army will continue to be relevant in the future; This will not change."<sup>10</sup> And, "Our equally vital role of providing assistance and support to our states and territories will not change."<sup>11</sup> It appears the present Army National Guard vision applauds the Army's future direction but remains satisfied rooted in the past.

The Army National Guard must consider the predictable uncertainties of the future and add to this vision. The National Guard cannot remain content boasting that the Army Guard counts for 54% of the Army's combat force, 46% of the combat support and 32% of the combat service support.<sup>12</sup> The strategic leader must recognize these are meaningless numbers unless there is a necessary and earnest plan to use these forces for a military purpose and not just political gamesmanship.

The National Guard leader must also evaluate and comprehend the future complexities and threats that make our local communities vulnerable, along with the traditional assistance and support roles presently performed in our states and territories. Because the Army appears satisfied with the vision sponsored by the National Guard Bureau, it will be the responsibility of the strategic leaders in the states and territories to change the cultural and conceptual thinking of our leaders in Washington and develop a vision for the future instead of an image of the past.

#### **UNITS BEST SUITED FOR THE FUTURE: EFFECTIVE AND DEPLOYABLE**

We must plan and pursue our future by deciding what type of training is truly feasible in the amount of time an Army Guard unit trains. We must also address the type of equipment that

supports this training and how available it is. The purpose of this section is to provide a position concerning what types of units should be placed in the Guard. For the purpose of this recommendation I will address light and heavy units and also combat arms versus combat service support units. The recommendation equates from the tenants of relevance, training requirements and mobility.

Historically the National Guard is deeply rooted in a tradition of being part of the first combat units needed to fight America's battles since the Revolutionary War through World War II.<sup>13</sup> The Army National Guard was not the first combat unit deployed in the Korean conflict but two Guard divisions did serve in this war.<sup>14</sup> To that point in time the National Guard's training was not managed by an Army standard and Guard units were never equipped equally to the active components.<sup>15</sup> The guard was not deployed to Vietnam to the detriment of the Army; and the Guards three round-out brigades were not deployed to the Persian Gulf, to the detriment of the Total Force concept.<sup>16</sup> The New Mexico Army National Guard only deployed its transportation company and medical aviation company; leaving behind all its combat arms air defense units and soldiers. Never the less, the Army National Guard and its political powers remain deeply entrenched in the ideals of being a combat organization.

The embedded parochialisms need to be addressed for a successful transformation in the Guard structure. After reviewing what may appear to be archaic viewpoints it becomes obvious that the values of the combat organization lend strong merit to their continuous relevance. Combat units develop strong leaders, which face unique challenges that are not as apparent or decisively destructive if improperly faced as in combat support units. Combat arms units develop highly motivated soldiers disciplined to loyally complete their mission without considering their own needs. If history has proven anything, it is the warrior spirit of the combat Guardsmen that has overcome any deficiency in training and equipment to be successful in all domestic and foreign missions for our nation.<sup>17</sup> The heart and soul of any combat unit derives from within the leaders and soldier's warrior spirit.<sup>18</sup> Because of these respected traits developed in combat arms, the Guard would not be as effective if the organizational structure of combat units were to be depleted from its inventory.

When considering what types of units the Guard needs to be relevant it would be easy to suggest all units should be combat support to fill the Army deficiency. It is evident the Army does not have the capability to support any major operation without deploying reserve combat service and service support units, but the answer is not to make all reserve units combat support. The Reserve combat support mission has never been more relevant but the fact is that they remain inadequately equipped.<sup>19</sup> In 1992, around the Desert Storm time period, the

Reserve combat service units were only equipped at 66% and the Guard combat support units were only equipped at 75%.<sup>20</sup> If there were not enough equipment to field the existing reserve units during the time of larger military budgets, it would not be in the Nation's best interest to transform Guard Combat units into non-equipped support units.

The New Mexico Army Guard should continue to be organized as a combat and combat support state. This is a necessary mix for domestic missions and war trace training. The percentage is presently an efficient equation for ongoing missions and future situations.

The New Mexico Army Guard is presently made up of one air defense brigade consisting of three Avenger battalions and one Patriot battalion; a regional training battalion; a maintenance battalion; a field artillery battalion; transportation companies; and a medical aviation company.

The leadership of the New Mexico Army National Guard has traditionally been developed and groomed from the air defense combat arms inherent leadership organization. It is in this organization that the strength of the Guard is highlighted, from the platoon leader position through the 111<sup>th</sup> Brigade Commander, where a great deal of leadership and responsibility is always present. The organizational structure of a combat arms unit is the key to success in the Guard being able to integrate its capabilities within any of the missions in the Army Spectrum.

The more vital issue is whether the Guard combat units should be heavy or light. The cold war is over and the future calls for change in the way the Army plans to meet its future threats; this resulted in changes of the Army's organization.<sup>21</sup> The vision of the Army is to become lighter, agile and more responsive.<sup>22</sup> The Army vision only displays a cursory view of the Army National Guard's requirements during this transformation period, lacking an optional plan or competent guidance.<sup>23</sup> This historically means the Army will go lighter and the Guard will receive the heavy outdated equipment.

The present time is revealing global situations where America must deploy peacekeeping forces to strengthen stability in highly volatile regions.<sup>24</sup> At the same time our own homeland has been attacked.<sup>25</sup> The Guard presently consists of 54% of the Army's combat units and must be capable of continuing to meet the peacekeeping operations, the defense of our country, and prepared to respond to expand the Army's active force in the face of a Major Theatre War (hereinafter MTW).

The Army vision initiated a lighter interim force to face the future threat. The Guard's training challenges that include time constraints for long training schools, training sites, qualification tables, and mobility of equipment reinforce the need to become a light combat fighting force. The citizen/soldier does not have the luxury of attending long schools on

equipment like Bradley fighting vehicles, or 14J training for radars they rarely get to work on.<sup>26</sup> When the equipment does become available there is rarely a nearby track vehicle maneuver area for a Guard unit to attempt collective training. The qualification tables required for heavy units require three times the amount of time as a light combat unit. A Guard unit has 39 training days a year; it must be equipped with equipment it is able to master in this time period.

Mobility of equipment is a key to success in all of the Guards missions. Heavy units are also a mobilization distracter when trying to find airlift or other means of transportation. Heavy combat equipment like tanks and other track systems would be the least effective vehicle in most domestic requirements due to their mobility restrictions. The inherent mobility of the light units becomes a strategic enhancer in domestic and foreign mobilizations. Also, since heavy units will not be the Army's future inventory<sup>27</sup> – training, repair parts and doctrine will diminish as time passes making a Guard heavy unit less capable and responsive. On the other side, light combat units have the proper training and equipment to be relevant in the total spectrum of all Guard missions. Light combat forces are presently used in peacekeeping operations, domestic emergencies, natural disasters, humanitarian efforts, and our nations wars. Light units are less expensive and easier to maintain; they are clearly better suited for the New Mexico Army National Guard.

The New Mexico Army National Guard should maintain a proportionate force of combat units and combat support units. The Guard should modernize its force based on present and future requirements. Light combat units are more economically efficient and better suited for Guard units to maintain training and maintenance standards. Light combat units are more mobile and readily available for domestic emergencies and over sea deployments. A light Guard would be a relevant player on the Army team better able to accomplish Homeland Security, Peacekeeping Operations and deploy to Major Theatres of War.

### **A VITAL WARFIGHTING MISSION: REAR AREA OPERATIONS**

The war-fighting mission of the newly organized Guard units is to be responsible for Rear Area Operations. The rear area in any theatre has increasingly become a target in both a planned air-land battle concept by an organized military force and an asymmetrical attack by an indigenous force.<sup>28</sup> Rear area installations may be targets of introducing large Special Forces by way of ground infiltration or air assault.<sup>29</sup> They may also be attacked by way of sabotage or terrorism.<sup>30</sup> The security of rear area operations is vital to enable fluent and effective operations and planning throughout the battlefield adding to mission success.

The rear area security responsibilities supports the commanders present concept of operations and is capable of adapting to future operations.<sup>31</sup> The supported commander will complete a risk assessment of potential targets and prioritize these assets of potential targets and prioritize these assets in the order most critical to perform the mission.<sup>32</sup> Rear area security units will then be assigned their missions. The required forces are dependant on the threat level.<sup>33</sup> For a threat level 1, assets organic to the base cluster may be appropriate. As the level rises to a level 2, it is most appropriate and common for military police units to secure these areas.<sup>34</sup> At the highest stage, threat level 3, it may become necessary to assign larger units with adaptable capabilities like light infantry units.<sup>35</sup> A complete rear area force will consist of military police and light infantry with incorporated provisions and procedures to react against weapons of mass destruction.

The proposed transformation of the New Mexico air defense battalions into a new force structure based on the military police and light infantry specialty skills will be tailored for this mission. This military specialty is also structured to meet the necessary requirements of homeland security and peace-keeping operations. The training for all missions of the Army spectrum will enhance the ability to effectively transition and adapt for each separate mission without needing additional time for special training.

The unit's light structure will accommodate a quicker mobility date to any theatre of operations. It can integrate into the rear area operations security and on call be used to enhance future operations by way of air assault or land transportation. The flexible and versatile capabilities of this light security force structure will enhance the overall concept of operations. The New Mexico Army National Guard will have a viable war-fighting asset to fill a necessary position on the Army team with the addition of these newly trained units.

#### **THE PRIMARY MISSION: HOMELAND SECURITY**

The United States position as the world leader and dominant power has had a truly positive effect on world globalization. At the same time it has become a target for those that would gain world attention for their own causes, beliefs, biases, and hate.<sup>36</sup> Today we live in an environment of emerging asymmetric threats capable of attacking our homeland. The United States Government has recognized and prioritized this threat publicly for years now as seen in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Report (hereafter referred as QDR) but the action taken remained a work in progress prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.<sup>37</sup> Homeland Security can no longer be taken for granted.

The 2001 QDR published weeks after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the United States clearly defines Homeland Security as the military's number one priority.<sup>38</sup> This calls for a distinct paradigm change in force planning placing the defense of our homeland as the Department of Defense's primary mission.<sup>39</sup> In theory this will be accomplished with strategic deterrence and the ongoing development of a national missile defense.<sup>40</sup> In addition the Department of Defense will use its forces to support civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters and terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction on United States' territory.<sup>41</sup> Our Homeland's security will be achieved by the Guard's ability to timely respond to the needs of the first responders by reinforcing the actions of civil authorities. The first responders will naturally include local law agencies and emergency medical teams. The closest department of defense member capable of responding is the National Guard.

The National Guard has the inherent responsibility to ensure a proper and effective response. As the lead deployable asset of the Department of Defense the National Guard must be "properly organized, trained, equipped, and postured to provide for the effective defense of the United States."<sup>42</sup> If this challenge is achieved then the National Guard can be used to conduct counter terrorism training across the spectrum of civil authorities and support a proactive ability instead of just managing consequences.<sup>43</sup> The 2001 QDR is clear on this mission; the National Guard needs to accept this role and quickly develop a feasible plan.

There are presently 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (hereinafter WMD-CST) in the Army National Guard throughout the country.<sup>44</sup> Less than a fourth of these teams have been equipped or certified. The National Guard must become proactively persuasive in this area to gain the assets needed for an initial assessment during emergencies. The WMD-CST is only a start. It is a small team with the training and equipment necessary to derive at an initial assessment only.<sup>45</sup> Much more support will be required to respond to the effects of the weapon. It is estimated that "four light infantry battalions; five medical companies; three chemical battalions; three engineer construction battalions; three military police companies; four ground transportation battalions; an aviation group; three direct support maintenance battalions; and two general support maintenance battalions"<sup>46</sup> are needed for an 10 kilo-ton nuclear detonation and one third of this force structure will be needed for a chemical attack. It is obvious that more than one WMD-CST is required to meet a State's needs in a time of such an attack.

Homeland Security is the Department of Defense's primary mission. The National Guard is the team member best suited to be immediately responsive. The Guard must emerge as the

leader of this mission and construct a task force within the State to perform this mission and remain an asset in all other military missions. The force structure required to respond to a nuclear or chemical attack is a model the New Mexico National Guard should transform towards proportionally scaled down in the appropriate unit ratio presently existing. The change can be accomplished by the transition of two of the Avenger battalions. The 111<sup>th</sup> Brigade Headquarters will continue with its I Corps mission including the Patriot battalion. The 111<sup>th</sup> will oversee the two Avenger battalions transformation to light combat homeland security/peacekeeper units. This type of force structure must be able to support Homeland Security missions and also support Major Theatre Wars, Small Scale Contingencies, and natural disasters. Instead of settling with one WMD-CST, a complete task force could be developed with the ability to be effective in all spectrums of the Army's missions.

### **PREPARED FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Peacekeeping operations have cemented the idealism of "One Army – One Team." The past decade has been inundated by the major peacekeeping deployments to Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.<sup>47</sup> The amount of deployments for these non-traditional missions have forced the Army to accept the Total Force policy as being necessary and effective in Peacekeeping operations. The National Guard was always part of America's battles until Vietnam.<sup>48</sup> In the early 70's, following the unfavorable results of the Vietnam war, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams implemented a Total Force policy that integrated Guard and Reserve units into active Army units forcing the next war to include calling up the National Guard and Reserve.<sup>49</sup>

The years between the introduction of the Total Force policy and Desert Storm have resulted in conflicting assertions of policy success.<sup>50</sup> On one side, most observers agree the Guard and Reserve have been equipped and trained to a higher standard.<sup>51</sup> On the other side, both Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf successfully worked against deploying National Guard round out combat brigades to the Persian Gulf; although, over 230,000 reservists did serve during Desert Storm.<sup>52</sup> Desert Storm supported the historical necessity and tradition of the reliability of America's National Guard and reserve forces.<sup>53</sup>

Since Desert Storm, the Total Force policy has strongly embraced Peacekeeping operations. In 1995, during the peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, the Army National Guard was tasked to deploy a battalion size element on federal duty for this operation. Since this period through 2001, over 32,000 reserve soldiers have deployed though out Europe, including the Balkins and Kosovo in support of peacekeeping operations.<sup>54</sup>

There is a long standing legal basis for National Guard soldiers to be used for operations other than war. Once the National Guard is activated under federal authority for a federal mission, the activated Guard unit's chain of command falls under the National Command Authority. The legal basis for the National Guard is found in Articles I. and II. of the Constitution.<sup>55</sup> In the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, the President was authorized to provide United States armed forces to serve in non-combat roles.<sup>56</sup> The foreign assistance act of 1961 further authorized the President to furnish assistance in operations that are presently classified as peacekeeping operations.<sup>57</sup> Since then, Congress has enacted law authorizing the President to call 200,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists to active duty for up to 180 days under section 673 (b), Title 10 United States Codes.<sup>58</sup> This call up was first invoked in August 1990 for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.<sup>59</sup> In 1994 the 180 days period was extended to 270 days.<sup>60</sup>

The United States has other treaty obligations; one of these treaties is the United Nations Charter where the United States is obligated to support United Nation missions.<sup>61</sup> Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes is the legal authority for peacekeeping missions under the United Nations Charter.<sup>62</sup> The United States objective for peacekeeping operations "is to enhance the process of diplomacy as a preventive measure to remove sources of conflict before violence erupts or spreads."<sup>63</sup> President Clinton simply defined the objective as helping nations preserve the peace.<sup>64</sup>

At the same time the Army's forces were being reduced, the tempo for peacekeeping operations greatly increased.<sup>65</sup> There were issues presented that units were losing their combat edge from not being able to train on their wartime mission.<sup>66</sup> The Army appeared to be over-extended and personal issues like moral, retention, and family problems began to rise.<sup>67</sup> The Army had a given mission and had to quickly reevaluate their resources to accomplish the nations objectives. The Total Force policy was one answer.

Since 1995, the President's authority to activate reserves has been continuously used. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the Reserve would be assigned to provide rotation forces for extended peace operations.<sup>68</sup> In the Guidance and Terms of Reference for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense review it is stated that a proper mix of reserve components and active components remains a theme for mission assignments.<sup>69</sup> At a recent town meeting, Donald Rumsfeld declared that we had a Total Force concept when answering questions about future Guard missions.<sup>70</sup>

The Guard has been heavily involved in peacekeeping operations for the last six years. Facts and assumptions are beginning a serious review of deploying Guard units for this type of

untraditional mission. On one side, articles have been written confronting training issues, employer problems and family separation.<sup>71</sup> A unit is usually activated for nine months to perform the peacekeeping mission; causing the unit's training schedule for their war trace to completely change. Employers have historically supported an employee's call to defend their nation but patience may vary for an operation that appears the duty of an active soldier. A natural problem is also present since Guard soldiers are mobilized from everywhere in America, most hometowns do not have military bases that the traditional Army families depend on for a number of necessities causing additional burdens on the separated Guard family.

On the other side, articles have confirmed that Guard units deployed for Peacekeeping missions believe they finally have been accepted in the Total Force.<sup>72</sup> Training opportunities are numerous, including leaders planning and preparing for daily missions. Most Guardsmen believe they are performing a mission that is vital to their Nation's interests.

Similar to Desert Storm, New Mexico's air defense units have not participated in peacekeeping operations due to a void in an enemy air threat. It is time to have the New Mexico National Guard focus on types of operations that are foreseeable in the future. The Guard does consist of over 54% of the Army's combat units but if the Army will not deploy these units then valuable resources are being wasted. If Guard combat units were transformed into a light-fighter/military police unit they would be the model of a peacekeeper force. This is a type of force that would also be suited for homeland defense operations and the training would be relevant to future war situation threats.

Units across America could be trained in the same military specialty allowing rotations to consist of multiple company level units across the country to form a task force alleviating the situation of a large number of citizen/soldiers leaving a local area at the same time. Also, this would lessen the rotations from nine months to six months because the units would already be trained for this type of mission and mobilization. This type of force would also convincingly benefit their home state in domestic emergencies more than a traditional combat arms unit because the focused training needed for these non-traditional missions relates closer to local threats and needs.

## **CONCLUSION**

"In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military."

—General Douglas MacArthur,  
Army Chief of Staff Annual Report, 1933

The Army is transforming towards the future. The reason for the change is due to the complex future security environment and increasing sources of conflict and tension. The Army must be responsive and dominant in a spectrum of operations including peacetime operations, deterrence, and war fighting. It must be a technically superior combat arms team that leads the world in the ability to place a devastating force anywhere in the world in a very short time. There are limitations to the sustainability of this power so the Army must count on its reserve forces to be accessible and relevant.

Our nation's interests changed after the end of the Cold War. Technical advances and economic growth will continue to spawn new interests throughout the world. The advanced information exchanges now allow instantaneous changes to be witnessed around the world. During this period that our national interests have grown in variety our standing Army has shrunk. The smaller Army has been called upon to engage in a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The Army's after action reports continually address issues of not having the unique training necessary, not understanding the mission, and deteriorating mission readiness. The national interest's have changed and so must the Army team. It now must finally face the mission of Homeland Security.

The national policies are strategic in nature. Our government's ideas and plans are formed and based on how the world will view these initiatives and react to the consequences. Strategically we understand that to best serve our national interests we must include the effects on the world. The future of our interests is in understanding the next generations and the technical advances that will become the strengths of our world and the enemies of our nation. Our country is now viewed as the super power therefore its military is expected to enter a variety of turbulent situations in the name of peace and humanity.

The Army Guardsmen is the ideal answer to fill these missions our country needs and expects us to be prepared for. The Guardsmen is a soldier who works everyday in this societal and economical world that is rapidly evolving. The Army National Guard soldiers have the civilian talents necessary to enter a distraught nation and effectively stabilize the situation and rebuild the society. The guardsmen will not do this with tanks and air defense artillery, but with their teachers, carpenters, engineers, business people and all the other civilian occupations necessary to successfully complete these future missions. Along with the guardsmen's inherent talents they remain professional soldiers capable of executing traditional combat roles with an excellent combat active force kept in reserve.

In order for the Army and Army National Guard to follow a clear direction to their target, a viable vision must be present for the National Guard. This vision should resemble something

like "Guardians of our nation, at home and around the world." This is a vision that can be methodically followed with ways and means to be prepared for future environments. This is a vision that could credibly support the Army's objectives.

The benefits of transforming the New Mexico Guard are numerous. The obvious is that the Army and the United States have a vital force that can perform the "other than war missions." This means the New Mexico Guard will be deployable to protect our national interests at home or abroad. Because the National Guard has Constitutional requirements, policy makers will be forced to attentively consider their solutions ensuring the call up is for a necessary and legitimate reason. The National Guard will become a relevant force to be used only after our policy makers have made a prudent decision to deploy their citizen/soldiers.

This transformation in culture of the New Mexico National Guard will also enhance their abilities to be effective during their traditional state missions but now also place them in a posture to counter our future domestic threats. Instead of training as an air defense unit they can train by supporting the local authorities during major events. Rather than scanning the skies with Avengers, they can train in mountaineering and survivability exercises to reinforce their rescue missions at home station. The training opportunities greatly expand with these new Guard units and the benefits gained by the local communities will place the soldier and his values in the eyes and hearts of their fellow Americans.

The Army and the Army National Guard remain and Army of one. The Army just becomes stronger because one of its team members improves its ability to perform the full spectrum of missions. The New Mexico Army National Guard must convince the Army and National Guard Bureau to support these cultural and conceptual changes. Only then will the government, the people, and the military have a domestic and international integration described as a modern Clausewitzian Trinity.<sup>73</sup> The transformation of the New Mexico Army National Guard is necessary for the organization to be relevant and to further the defense and security of our home states and our national interests abroad.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> National Guard of New Mexico 1606-1963 (Copyright 1964 by John Pershing Jolly).

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army. Transformation Campaign Plan, 10 April 2001, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Course 1 Strategic Leadership Volume II, 153.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (Gary Hart Copyright 1998), 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 151.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Army Vision, [http://www.army.mil/army\\_vision/chain.htm](http://www.army.mil/army_vision/chain.htm).

<sup>9</sup> Army National Guard. Army National Guard Vision 2010, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Course 1 Strategic Leadership Volume II, 110-124.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid at 114.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Charles E. Heller and William A Stoff eds., America's First Battles 1776 – 1965, (1986 by University Press of Kansas).

<sup>14</sup> Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, (1994 by The University Press of Kentucky): 42.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid at 40.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid at 46.

<sup>17</sup> Charles E. Heller and William A Stoff eds., America's First Battles 1776 – 1965, (1986 by University Press of Kansas).

<sup>18</sup> John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 302-303. "In one of the most highly regarded modern studies of the battlefield, British military historian John Keegan has suggested that all battles have something in common; that the common factor is not something strategic, or tactical, or material, or technical; that it is not something that colored maps or collections of statistics of strengths and casualties or readings from military classics will reveal. Rather, "what battles have in common is human: the behavior of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honor and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them."

<sup>19</sup> Stephen Duncan, Citizen warriors: Americas National Guard and Reserve Forces and Politics of National Security (Stephen Duncan Copyright 1997), 106.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army. Transformation Campaign Plan, 10 April 2001, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Course 1 Strategic Leadership Volume II, 1.

<sup>22</sup> Army Vision, <http://www.army.mil/armyvision/chain.htm>.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> David T. Fautua, "Transforming the reserve components," Military Review: Fort Leavenworth, vol. 80 no 5 (Sept/Oct 2000): 49.

<sup>25</sup> On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by terrorists using hijacked commercial airlines as missiles at New York City and Washington DC.

<sup>26</sup> In the New Mexico Army National guard, 14J radar mechanics were trained up to two years before the unit received the Sentinel radar system to work with.

<sup>27</sup> Transformation Campaign Plan, 10 April 2001, at note 1.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Rear Area Operations, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1999) VII-15 – VII-19.

<sup>29</sup> Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Rear Area Operations, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1999) VII-15 – VII-19.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (Copyright 2001 by Peter L. Bergen) 26.

<sup>37</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001) III.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid at 18.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid at 17.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid at 19.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid at 19.

<sup>44</sup> LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II, The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective, Strategic Studies Institute Army War College, March 2001.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid at 15.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid at 11.

<sup>47</sup> James Kitfield, "The Peacekeepers," Government Executive Washington, vol. 33 no 3 (March 2001): 44.

<sup>48</sup> Charles E. Heller and William A Stoft eds., America's First Battles 1776 – 1965, (1986 by University Press of Kansas).

<sup>49</sup> Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (Gary Hart Copyright 1998), 141.

<sup>50</sup> Stephen Duncan, Citizen warriors: Americas National Guard and Reserve Forces and Politics of National Security (Stephen Duncan Copyright 1997), 65.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>54</sup> Chris Maddaloni, "A bigger piece of peacekeeping," National Guard; Washington, vol. 54 no 1 (Jan 2000): 20. See Also "29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Prepares for Bosnia," National Guard; Washington, (July 2001). On March 7, 200, the 49<sup>th</sup> Armored Division Headquarters from the Texas Army National Guard became the command and control element for the United States and allied forces serving in Bosnia. Since that time the Army has announced a number of Army National Guard units are on the rotation schedule for Bosnia.

<sup>55</sup> The Constitution of the United States, Articles I and II. Article I Section 8 declares: "Congress shall have the power to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, ...." While Article II gives the President the authority to deploy soldiers on federal status.

<sup>56</sup> United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 72-264).

<sup>57</sup> Foreign Act of 1961 amended, Sec 551, Chap 6, Part II (Public Law 87-195).

<sup>58</sup> Duncan, Citizen warriors: Americas National Guard and Reserve Forces and the politics of National Security, 11.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> "Just what the Doctor Ordered," National Guard, vol. 44, no 9 (Sept 1995): 28.

<sup>61</sup> Charter of United Nations. See Also Constitution of the United States, Article VI.

<sup>62</sup> Charter of United Nations, Chapter VI.

<sup>63</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 25 (May 1994).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> David T. Fautua, "Transforming the reserve components," Military Review: Fort Leavenworth, vol. 80 no 5 (Sept/Oct 2000): 49.

<sup>66</sup> Kitfield, "The Peacekeepers," 49.

<sup>67</sup> Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple deployments on Soldiers' peacekeeping attitudes, morale, and retention," Armed Forces and Society: New Brunswick (fall 2000).

<sup>68</sup> William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC: Department of Defense, May 1997) 32-33.

<sup>69</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Guidance and terms of Reference for the 2001 QRD (Washington DC: DoD, June 22, 2001)20.

<sup>70</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, "Defense Secretary's town hall meeting touches on Guard," National Guard; Washington, vol. 55 no 9 (Sept 2001): 16.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton University Press Copyright 1976).

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