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TRANSFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

BY

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Transforming The Intelligence Community

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ABSTRACT

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The United States is on a course to eradicate transnational terrorism. The U. S. Army will clearly play a major role in this effort at home and abroad. The Army has also begun to transform itself. The Army G-2, Lieutenant General Robert Noonan has developed an intelligence transformation plan that depends on the ability to reach back to access intelligence fused at the national level. Responsibility for providing this service belongs to the Intelligence Community. However, the American intelligence apparatus is still organized for the Cold War. The thirteen loosely grouped agencies of the Intelligence Community are not structured to effectively provide the intelligence necessary to support national decision makers, much less tactical commanders. The Central Intelligence Agency is 'central' in name only. It does little to effect an overall coordinated intelligence effort by the government's different agencies. Congress must act now reorganize an intelligence apparatus that can effectively and efficiently prioritize intelligence requirements, manage collection, conduct analyses and disseminate usable intelligence products in a timely manner. These functions must be capable of supporting leaders at all levels within an environment of diverse threats and complex U.S. responses.

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Transforming The Intelligence Community

The challenge to the Intelligence Community is to harvest the vast amounts of information and ensure commanders are not overwhelmed or deceived during their decisionmaking process.

—Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan
U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

President George W. Bush, Jr. has set the United States on a course to eradicate transnational terrorism. The U. S. Army will clearly play a major role in this effort, both at home and abroad. Essential to success will be the support provided by the national intelligence community. Unfortunately, America's intelligence efforts, although well-meaning and well-funded, are not organized to support this campaign or other national security efforts. The Central Intelligence Agency is 'central' in name only. It does little to coordinate an overall coordinated intelligence effort by the government's different agencies. As a result, the nation needs to restructure the roles and responsibilities of the numerous and varied agencies that conduct intelligence operations. Congressional intervention is the only feasible means to affect the changes necessary to provide America with the security that a \$30 billion budget for intelligence should buy.¹

Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Bush declared war on terrorism. He and his administration made clear they will use all the resources of the national government, including diplomatic, military, informational and economic, to destroy transnational terrorism. The effort has begun in Afghanistan against the Al Queda network and Taliban regime. But, the operations in Afghanistan are only the beginning. There are indications the military focus will move to Somalia, while others call for direct action to eliminate Sadam Hussein's regime in Iraq. In his 2002 State of the Union address the President argued there were at least a dozen countries which harbored terrorists and mentioned Iran, Iraq and North Korea specifically as an "axis of evil."

Meanwhile, the United States Government is taking unprecedented measures to ensure the security of the Homeland. Bush has designated former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the first director for Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense will likely modify the Unified Command Plan to establish a new regional Commander in Chief (CINC) responsible for defense of the homeland. In any case, the

role of Army forces in the continental United States has changed for the foreseeable future. Soldiers now patrol the nation's airports and guard nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructures. The President himself has announced a fortyeight billion-dollar increase in the defense budget to provide, among other things, the security of America's borders.

The Army has a role in both aspects of this new war –the elimination of transnational threats and homeland security. In neither will the Army act alone. In each case, it must be supported by, in support of, or in coordination with other services, agencies and, in some cases, other national partners. In the larger strategic framework, the Army may have to support the U.S. Government's or coalition diplomatic, military, informational or economic efforts.

America has declared war on terrorism, but increasingly the U.S. government and its citizens are realizing that the threat, and the effort required to defeat it, is much greater than initially thought. Terrorism itself is one of a group of transnational threats, along with drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, and attacks on computer networks. Such threats are usually categorized by their geographic nature. Yet, they truly represent asymmetric ways for groups, subnations, and even nations to achieve their political aims. Regardless of how distorted and legitimate those aims may seem, asymmetric means will be an integral part of twenty-first century conflicts. These new and emerging threats have appeared at the same time that a new American way of war has appeared - one in which, although the undisputed world power, the United States pays great deference to international and domestic opinion. Collateral damage, civilian casualties, fratricide and risk of casualties have all become major considerations in the use of force.

The Army has begun its transformation to meet the security requirements of the twenty-first century. Information dominance is key to transformation success. The Army's intelligence transformation campaign plan describes a future where "Army Intelligence will be a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledgebased force"² with its basic tenets "see first, act first and finish decisively."³ It aims to link intelligence experts with decision makers and their staffs. Its goal is an Army "that meshes with the intelligence community as a whole to fill future requirements in its multimission [sic] agenda."⁴ Unfortunately, the intelligence community is not on course to meet the Army's transformational requirements.

The emergence and proliferation of asymmetric threats combined with the complex and accepted American way of using force creates unprecedented demands on intelligence. No longer does American national security depend on monitoring a single evil – the Soviet Union. But, America's intelligence community was organized, albeit not well, to counter this monolithic threat. In the post Cold War security environment, intelligence requirements have become increasingly complex, thus making the business of identifying requirements, establishing priorities, collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence much more challenging. Yet, the Intelligence Community remains mired in its Cold War organizations and compartmented parochial procedures that prevent it from transforming to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The thirteen organizations that comprise the intelligence community are a community in name only and are not a tightly structured organization serving national security. Sometimes they share valuable information –and sometimes not. The Director of Central Intelligence has the responsibility for managing collection priorities and coordinating the analysis of information to provide intelligence for decision makers. But, he has no statutory authority, beyond the Central Intelligence Agency itself, to accomplish these tasks. Instead the Director must rely on a network of collaboration and his powers of persuasion with organizations larger and better funded than his own. Moreover, the management of collection priorities and coordination of information is difficult business. The threats facing America in the twenty-first century are complex and multi-functional. These features alone would make analysis a challenge. But to make matters worse, there is no coordination or central management in place to guide or direct effective analyses.

The poorly organized intelligence apparatus has resorted to a conglomeration of *ad hoc* committees, cells, centers, and studies that attempt to pull together a myriad of intelligence functions and issues. In recent years, the community has successfully consolidated some functions under the Department of Defense. The National Reconnaissance Organization and National Imagery and Mapping Agency have integrated functions formerly performed across various governmental departments and agencies. As a result, they have become the preeminent organizations in their fields. The National Security Agency is already the world's preeminent signals, electronic and communications intelligence organization. Although preeminent in their fields, none of these agencies answer directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. The relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and Department of Defense intelligence

organizations is exacerbated by the Director's position as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency have developed cultures with a general disdain, or at best, distrust of one another. The current situation is worse than that faced by Eisenhower when he realized that each of the military service's intelligence agencies was operating independently. The fix came in 1961 with the formation of the Defense Intelligence Organization that brought together each service office and a number of functional offices within a single organization.

It took an act of Congress to create the intelligence community, and it will take Congress to fix it. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Each, as originally organized, represented compromises between Congress, the executive, and the military services. None possess the organization and authorities warranted by their mandated missions. The National Security Council has evolved by presidential decree (Presidential Decision Directives) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff through Congressional oversight, debate and most significantly the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Yet Congress has failed to address organizational and statutory authorities necessary to make the Central Intelligence Agency the coordinating body that it was originally intended. Whether the solution is to give more authority to the Director of Central Intelligence, transform the Central Intelligence Agency into a true central intelligence and analysis agency or create new organizations while eliminating others, Congress must transform the intelligence community to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The security threats of the twenty-first century require an intelligence apparatus that can efficiently and effectively manage collection priorities, conduct analysis and disseminate intelligence to national and tactical decision makers alike in a usable and timely manner.

Transnational Threats

A quick look at the extent of those threats suggests why Congress must address the issues involved in a fundamental reorganization of U.S. intelligence. America's war on terrorism has quickly broadened to include other transnational threats. The Defense Intelligence Agency defines transnational threats as "any transnational (across international borders) activity that threatens the national security."⁵ Terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction represent the

predominate threats. The Bush administration has made clear that each of these, along with nations that support them, is a target for the war on terrorism. These threats present a more complex intelligence challenge than that posed by the former Soviet Union.

U.S. law defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."⁶ A recent National Intelligence Council report assessed that terrorism:

...will be directed at the United States and its overseas interests. Most anti-US terrorism will be based on perceived ethnic, religious or cultural grievances. Terrorist groups will continue to find ways to attack U.S. military and diplomatic facilities abroad. Such attacks are likely to expand increasingly to include U.S. companies and American citizens.⁷

International terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda are sophisticated in their use of legitimate and illegitimate means to execute asymmetric attacks. Smuggling, drug trafficking, international crime organizations, computer networks, and in some cases sovereign nations provide the means for terrorist organizations to achieve their aims. The National Security Strategy states that additional transnational threats include "other criminal activities, and potential threats to critical infrastructure such as computer network attacks."⁸ The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines International Organized Crime as a "continual criminal conspiracy having a firm organizational structure."⁹ They operate by "fear and corruption." Some such organizations are powerful enough to influence nations and provide a means for the financing, equipping and transportation of terrorists. President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-42, calls transnational criminal syndicates a "threat to U.S. national security"¹⁰ and to countries and regions all over the world. Such criminal activity includes narcotics trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering, smuggling of nuclear and chemical weapons material, assassinations, and bribery of government officials. "Criminal enterprises now move large sums through the international financial system that dwarf the gross national product of some nations."¹¹

While illegal narcotics trade undermines U.S. society and costs America "over \$110 billion per year,"¹² it also provides substantial financial support for terrorist

organizations. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan, Latin and South America provide funds for terrorist organizations that target America. There often is a nexus between terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking. Links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers take many forms ranging from facilitation or protection, transportation, and taxation to direct trafficking by the terrorist organization itself in order to finance its activities. Traffickers and terrorists have similar logistical needs in terms of material and the covert movement of goods, people and money.

Relationships between drug traffickers and terrorists benefit both. Drug traffickers benefit from the terrorists' military skills, weapons supply, and access to clandestine organizations. Terrorists gain a source of revenue and expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of proceeds from illicit transactions. Both groups corrupt officials whose services provide mutual benefits, such as greater access to fraudulent documents, including passports and customs papers.

Drug traffickers may also gain considerable freedom of movement when they operate in conjunction with terrorists who control large amounts of territory. In the past, state sponsors provided funding for terrorists, and their relationships with terrorist organizations secured territory or provide access to arms networks. Lately, however, as state sponsorship of terrorism has come under increased scrutiny and greater international condemnation, terrorist groups have looked increasingly at drug trafficking as a source of revenue. But trafficking often has a two-fold purpose for the terrorists. Not only does it provide funds, it also furthers the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Some terrorist groups believe that they can weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with addictive drugs.¹³ Cracking into these organizations and their connections requires sophisticated and tightly orchestrated intelligence efforts employing a variety of collection functions and agencies.

The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest concern to U.S. officials. That threat includes the employment of chemical, biological, nuclear and high explosive weapons. Thus far, the United States has witnessed the effects of both biological (anthrax) and high explosive (commercial airplanes) weapons. Presidential Decision Directive 39 gives the Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy with "four elements: intelligence and warning; prevention and deterrence; crisis and consequence management; and acquisition of equipment and technology."¹⁴ Information obtained from caves in Afghanistan indicates the intent and willingness of Al Qaeda to use weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, both the technology and materials are available. Following the demise of the Soviet Union there have been some indications of the smuggling of unsecured fissile materials. There have been reports of "tons of weapons grade material and thousands of warheads in Russian facilities" with rudimentary to nonexistent security. Moreover, Russian counterintelligence reported "90 thefts from military and nuclear camps and 700 of related technology."¹⁵ Tracking these materials requires a huge effort across intelligence functions and in cooperation, wittingly or otherwise, with a variety of actors.

Terrorist organizations themselves have become increasingly adept at the use of modern technology. In a recently released Al Jazeera interview conducted in October 2001, Bin Laden scoffed at U.S. concerns that he might use secret signals on media releases. In the interview, he wonders how Americans could underestimate his use of modern communications systems; saying, "as if we were living in the time of mail by carrier pigeons, when there were no phones, no travelers, no internet, no regular mail, no express mail, no electronic mail."¹⁶

In the twenty-first century, computer network attacks are already a growing concern. Although merely a nuisance so far, they could threaten the disruption of critical services and economic systems. The "Final Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, "estimates that by 2002, a worldwide population of approximately 19 million will have the skills to mount a cyber attack."¹⁷ A recent public report by the Department of Defense (the National Communications System), indicates that currently at least ten countries possess offensive information warfare capabilities comparable to our own. Moreover, the Government Accounting Office reports that approximately 120 nations have some sort of computer attack capability.¹⁸

Each of these threats represents a transnational threat based on their geo-strategic nature. Yet, each represents an asymmetric threat as well. Asymmetric means are "any unconventional or inexpensive method or means used to avoid our strengths, and exploit our vulnerabilities."¹⁹ It is more valuable to view transnational threats not as a distinct set, but merely another approach for other nations, sub-nations, or groups to achieve their objectives with the available means. It would be naive to think that nations such as Iraq and China are not clever enough to recognize they can not match America's conventional military strength. Thus, it is in their interest to pursue asymmetric methods. So, perhaps these threats should not be characterized on the basis of their geographic nature, but rather on their characteristics. The U.S.

Government's approach to dealing with transnational threats should be no different than that used to counter any threat to national security. The National Security Strategy requires the capacity to shape the environment, deter such threats, detect and interdict activities, protect forces and civilian population, and mitigate consequences should an attack occur.²⁰ In any case, the intelligence community is critical to the implementation of the strategy. Yet, the U.S. Intelligence Community remains organized for the last war – the Cold War.

The Intelligence Challenge

Accurate intelligence significantly enhances the effectiveness of diplomatic and military undertakings; while good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure.²¹

Intelligence requirements to support the National Security Strategy and the Bush administration's war on terrorism and meet the challenges presented by transnational and asymmetric threats are complex, multifunctional, interagency, and multinational. The effort requires intelligence functions from high-tech to human intelligence and analysis of open sources; it requires a variety of communications and interpretation systems; and it challenges compartmentalization. Requirements range from identifying Taliban or Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan to assessing the stability of the Pakistani government; from protecting Americans abroad to tracking weapon of mass destruction materials, or investigating illegal immigrants. The intelligence challenge is complicated by the way the U.S. Government employs the elements of its national power –especially the use of force. Rather than transform the U.S. intelligence community to meet these requirements the national security establishment continues to create ad hoc organizations to face new and emerging threats.

Intelligence is "information not publicly available, or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for policymakers or other actors inside the government."²² The ultimate purpose of U.S. intelligence is to enhance national security by informing policymakers and supporting military operations. To perform this function the intelligence community must identify intelligence requirements, prioritize collection, conduct analysis, and package it into timely and useful information. The functions of intelligence are generally identification of requirements, prioritization,

collection, analysis, and dissemination. Requirements are what one needs to know to support policy or operations. Prioritization involves the allocation of resources to obtain information. Collection is the act of obtaining information from open or protected sources using active or passive means in various mediums such as human, signals, electronic or measures and signatures. Analysis is the process of turning raw data or information into usable intelligence. And, dissemination is the distribution of intelligence in a timely and usable form to the customer.

In his article "Projecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of the Interim Brigade Combat Team", Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P. Perkins has identified intelligence requirements for tactical units in the future combat environment. He notes that it will require a "coordinated effort by the Intelligence Community (services, joint, and national/interagency) to provide an Army or Joint Strike Force with the ability to achieve intelligence superiority throughout the battle space." He anticipated before the events of 11 September, that "the most challenging scenario for American forces and the Intelligence Community lies in a nonlinear, asymmetric battlefield that encompasses America, its allies and a geographic command's area of operations." The current effort includes each of these, but with operations in nearly every regional command.

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Lieutenant General Robert Noonan, notes that "the Army will require a vast amount of information from a wide variety of intelligence sources and needs to find new and better ways of operating." He argues that, the Army is "trying to integrate what we call 'space to mud', which is an architecture that can leverage everything that pertains to the commander's requirements." The accomplishment of such an objective requires "a collaborative environment that allows [the commander] to grab information that resides within the intelligence community."²³ The ability to reach back to this fusion of intelligence is essential for success in the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the intelligence community Noonan wants to reach back to is not organized to provide the 'fused' intelligence he needs – particularly given the complex way in which America uses force.

The new American way of war pays deference to world opinion and gives a great deal of consideration to the risk of casualties, collateral damage and the inadvertent killing of noncombatants that may have strategic consequences. Perkins notes that intelligence can support such rules of engagement by providing situational and cultural understanding. Consideration of risk must be a key aspect of how the American

government operates. Many perceive Americans and especially the military as risk averse. Risk to forces and the consequences of action are considerations, but are not obstacles to action. Nonetheless, such considerations demand a high level of resolution and certainty in intelligence, whether to support the execution of dominant maneuver and precision engagement or to defend the homeland.

As the U.S. Government becomes increasingly sophisticated in its use of the elements of national power, intelligence requirements become likewise more sophisticated and complex. The orchestration of these elements is the purview of the National Security Council. President Clinton added the National Economic Council to focus government efforts on the economy. The attacks of 11 September prompted Bush to establish the Office of Homeland Security on par with the National Security Council. Further, National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, called on retired General Wayne Downing to serve as Deputy Director for Counter Terrorism. Together these organizations are responsible for orchestrating each element of the Government toward the common security objective. The intelligence community must now respond to the requirements of each of the national offices. In recent years, the line between national and tactical activities has become less distinct. In fact, national and tactical capabilities are increasingly complementary. Unfortunately, the U.S. Intelligence Community is not effectively organized to coordinate intelligence and create the fused, reachback sources of intelligence that Noonan hopes to get nor is it optimized to serve the increasing array of national level organizations. Reorganization of the intelligence community must be the basis for transforming U.S. intelligence. Organizational changes are necessary to bring coherence to collection functions, eliminate duplication in non-critical areas, and integrate administrative activities.²⁴

The Intelligence Community

The organization and leadership of the intelligence community is a structural oddity.

—Report of an Independent Task Force on
Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of
U.S. Intelligence

The U.S. intelligence community, although the largest and most expensive in the world, is not organized to effectively support national security requirements. The National Security Strategy states that the intelligence community provides:

Critical support for the full range of our involvement abroad. Comprehensive collection and analytic capabilities are needed to provide early warning of threats to U.S. national security, give analytical support to policy, law enforcement, and military communities, enable near-real time intelligence while retaining global perspectives, identify opportunities for advancing our national interests, and maintain our information advantage in the international arena.²⁵

In view of what happened on 11 September, the intelligence community failed in nearly all of these tasks.

The intelligence community is a concept through which the intelligence functions of national agencies and government departments coordinate and share intelligence. It comprises thirteen organizations representing various functions and departments of government loosely tied together under the auspices of the Director for Central Intelligence.




FIGURE 1: The Intelligence Community

One can divide national intelligence into broad categories that include 1) strategic – supporting policy decisions, 2) operational and tactical – supporting military commanders, 3) foreign intelligence – the charter of the Director for Central Intelligence, and 4) domestic – the purview of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additionally, the intelligence community supports national security requirements by conducting clandestine, covert, counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. government's intelligence apparatus performs one or more of these functions, to a greater or lesser extent, in each of the thirteen organizations. The Intelligence Community's efforts are tied together through community cells and centers such as the Crime and Narcotics Center, the Nonproliferation Center, and the Counterterrorism Center, all managed by thirty-two separate panels, committees, groups and boards.²⁶ Congress provides operating funds through the six different departments and agencies with oversight from up to eight different Senate and House committees. Finally, the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for coordinating the intelligence community's effort to provide the nation's intelligence; he is the head of the community and is responsible for "directing and conducting all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities." ²⁷

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible as head of the intelligence community for carrying out intelligence activities for the conduct of "foreign relations and U.S. national security" to include the "production and dissemination of finished intelligence." ²⁸

Despite his title, the director of Central Intelligence neither by law, directive, or otherwise, is the central director of the total intelligence effort of the government. Actually, his control of intelligence operations is restricted to those of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the other hand, he does have a broad responsibility for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence related to national security. ²⁹

Without statutory authority the Director of Central Intelligence's "effectiveness in carrying out these activities largely depends on continuous and effective communication between personnel of the intelligence and policymaking elements of the government." ³⁰

Former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, in the wake of a series of bureaucratic defeats, gave up on attempts at managing the intelligence community. He later observed to his staff that while he

was theoretically responsible for 100 percent of the nation's intelligence activities, he in fact controlled less than 15 percent of the community's assets--and most of the other 85 percent belonged to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³¹

Under such circumstances, Helms concluded, it was unrealistic for any Director of Central Intelligence to think that he could have a significant influence on U.S intelligence resource decisions or the shaping of the intelligence community.

The original intent behind creation of the Central Intelligence Agency was to serve as a coordinating body for government intelligence activities. But, from the "outset no department was willing to concede a centralized intelligence function to the CIA."³² The National Security Act of 1947 established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. As with most things American, each represented a compromise of the optimal roles, responsibilities and organization. Legislation, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, has improved coordination between the military services. The National Security Council has been able to modify itself to the requirements of each president. Unfortunately, the Central Intelligence Agency remains an organization without the authority to perform its intended role of coordinating the American intelligence effort.³³

In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency has focused its efforts on the Cold War requirement for clandestine operations at the expense of analysis and is "considered one of the weakest links in our national security."³⁴ It is really two organizations in one. The Directorate of Intelligence is responsible for directing and analyzing intelligence, while the Directorate of Operations conducts covert and clandestine operations. Each has evolved and operates now "with separate personnel, vastly different cultures and missions ... [within] rigid organizational barriers."³⁵ Initially, the Directorate of Operations flourished without ever having been authorized by the National Security Act or any subsequent legislation and with little Congressional oversight; mostly because the serving presidents wanted it that way. It has conducted operations "solely on the basis of presidential orders, memos and directives."³⁶ Covert action is fundamentally different

from intelligence collection and analysis. It is intelligence used as an instrument of foreign policy. Such actions seek to influence the political, economic, or military situation in a foreign country without revealing American involvement in the activity."³⁷ While the clandestine role of the agency flourished, its coordination efforts –those for which it was created - have floundered.

Cultural problems in the intelligence community are serious, but are most severe at the Central Intelligence Agency. Former Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey was the first to state, publicly, that culture was a problem at the Central Intelligence Agency, "but he showed little understanding of it and its manifestations."³⁸ He also did little to change it before his departure. Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch noted the importance of changing the culture of the Directorate of Operations during his confirmation hearing.³⁹ The Directorate of Operations "jealously guards its information holdings, including those that could be of use to the analytic community."⁴⁰ Robin W. Winks, distinguished Yale University historian who served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and in its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency, concluded, "research and analysis are at the core of intelligence. [Most] 'facts' are without meaning; someone must analyze even the most easily obtained data."⁴¹ Analysis organizations filter and evaluate raw intelligence information for consumers. The Directorate of Intelligence has, "in aggregate, [the] finest analytic capabilities in the Intelligence Community, as well as the broadest range of responsibilities and consumers."⁴² The overall performance of intelligence depends critically on good analysis.

The National Security Act was a compromise that arose from intense bureaucratic conflict. Formation of the Central Intelligence Agency challenged the roles within the State, Defense and Justice departments. The price was statutory provisions that created a Central Intelligence Agency that was incapable of centralizing intelligence. So, Truman did not get the centralizing function he had hoped for and executives since "have developed alternative ways of centralizing and analyzing intelligence."⁴³ Consequently, thirty-two ad hoc organizations (panels, committees, groups and boards) manage national intelligence and represent executive, legislative or administrative fixes to perceived problems or emerging threats. The Central Intelligence Agency receives just over ten percent of the resources the United States spends on intelligence.⁴⁴ And, it is the only one of the four 'national' level intelligence agencies not operated by the Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense

At DIA and the military services, there is an element anti-CIA feeling that probably reflects portions of jealousy, lack of understanding, turf consciousness, and animosity toward civilians doing national security work. At the same time, in my experience, most uniformed personnel have little understanding of CIA's capabilities. If anything, the military's view of INR is even more negative--for even less reason.⁴⁵

The preponderance of national intelligence resides within the Department of Defense. Defense Department elements of the intelligence community include the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence components of each of the four military services --Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency is the senior military intelligence component of the Intelligence Community.

Established in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the armed forces of the United States. Its creation was intended to consolidate intelligence "activities duplicated in each of the military services and at major military commands."⁴⁶ Yet, each service has retained its intelligence roles to support their unique requirements. Each, in turn, operates an intelligence center such as the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center. The National Ground Intelligence Center provides "scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) and general military intelligence (GMI) on foreign ground forces in support of the warfighting commanders, force and material developers, DA [Department of the Army], DOD, and National-level decision makers."⁴⁷ The other service centers perform similar medium (air, land, sea, and space) based functions. In carrying out its missions, the Defense Intelligence Agency coordinates and synthesizes military intelligence analysis for Defense officials and military commanders worldwide, working in close concert with the intelligence components of the military services and the US unified commands.⁴⁸ According to a Georgetown University study in early 1995, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the services had some 13,000 people conducting analysis, versus 1,500 analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴⁹

Truman directed the establishment of the National Security Agency in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense. It is responsible for planning, coordinating, directing, and performing foreign signals intelligence and information security functions. In its signals intelligence role, the National Security Agency intercepts and analyzes foreign electromagnetic signals--many of them protected by codes, ciphers, and complex electronic countermeasures--to produce intelligence information for decision makers and military commanders. A fundamental mission and core competency of the National Security Agency is the ability to understand foreign communications while protecting its own. The United States leads the world in this capability. It confers a unique competitive advantage, but maintaining this advantage requires preservation of a healthy cryptological capability in the face of unparalleled technical challenges. Unfortunately, the valuable functions provided by the National Security Agency are not as closely coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency as they could or should. Opportunities to collaborate or augment between signals, communications or electronic, and human intelligence are often missed. Each agency operates in its own way, with different communications networks, separate analysts, and unique cultures.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was established October 1, 1996, by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996. The creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency centralized responsibility for imagery and mapping, represented a positive step toward achieving the Department of Defense vision of "dominant battle space awareness." The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was created to exploit the potential of enhanced collection systems, digital processing technology and the prospective expansion in commercial imagery than its separate predecessor organizations. The creation of National Imagery and Mapping Agency brought together the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and the Defense Dissemination Program Office in their entirety; and the mission and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Photographic Interpretation Center.⁵⁰

The National Reconnaissance Office is the single national program to meet U.S. government needs through space borne reconnaissance. The National Reconnaissance Office's assets collect intelligence to support such functions as indications and warning, monitoring of arms control agreements, military operations and exercises, and monitoring of natural disasters and other environmental issues.

The Intelligence Community also includes the agencies or offices that perform disparate intelligence functions in governmental departments and agencies. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) supports the development of intelligence community products and provides daily summaries, regional and functional summaries, and longer more substantive reports on specific issues for the Secretary of State. It has no collection capability, but analyzes information from other agencies and U.S. diplomatic posts. It is a small organization that focuses on conducting political analysis. The Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence Support is responsible for overt collection of financial and monetary information in countries where treasury officers are assigned. The Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence is responsible for intelligence on nuclear proliferation, foreign nuclear weapons materials, science and technology, international fossil and nuclear energy safety and waste developments, and economic and environmental assessments relevant to energy issues.⁵¹ Other departments performing intelligence functions, but which are not formally members of the intelligence community include the Department of Commerce's Office of Executive Support and its Office of Export Enforcement Intelligence; and the Transportation Department's Office of Intelligence and Security Division. Neither has collection capability. They each analyze information derived by overt means and produce reports relating to their functional areas.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The...terrorist attacks on our homeland proved that our efforts at intelligence collecting, breaking up terrorist cells, and limiting their movement, planning and organization are not up to par. In spite of the fact that the FBI counterterrorism budget and number of FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism had more than doubled since the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.⁵²

Law enforcement organizations also interact with the Director of Central Intelligence through specific boards or centers. The Drug Enforcement Administration's Intelligence Division supports counter narcotics and interacts with the intelligence community through the Director of Central Intelligence's Crime and Narcotics Center. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the law enforcement component of the

intelligence community. It functions to conduct the war on terrorism through a focus on counterterrorism, counterintelligence and counter narcotics and organized crime.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for protecting America from terrorist attacks. Its counterterrorism mission is to "identify and neutralize the threat in the US posed by terrorists and their supporters, whether nations, groups, or individuals."⁵³ Although the preeminent criminal investigative organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is hamstrung in its efforts to protect America from terrorist attacks. However, it has dedicated considerable resources to develop a strong response to the threats posed by domestic and international terrorism. Between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, the number of special agents dedicated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's counterterrorism programs grew by approximately 224 percent (to 1,669 nearly 16 percent of all Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents.⁵⁴ The major challenge facing the Federal Bureau of Investigation is keeping pace with the explosion and complexity of information derived from multidimensional terrorist activities. Senator Richard C. Shelby, a Republican from Alabama, the ranking minority member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the intelligence agencies were "caught flat-footed" and insisted that "there had to be some evidence, somewhere, of something being planned." He has referred to the events of 11 September as "a stunning intelligence failure."⁵⁵

Without an investment in personnel, analysis will continue to lag significantly behind the rapid flow of information. The number of analysts available to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation's requirements in the Counterterrorism Program is not sufficient to provide in-depth analytical coverage. For fiscal year 2003, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is requesting 110 new analytical positions and \$7,731,000 to address tactical and strategic intelligence gaps.⁵⁶ But, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is woefully short of qualified linguists. After 11 September, it "had to make a public appeal for people fluent in Arabic, Pashtun and other languages."⁵⁷ These shortfalls give merit to the argument for a reserve force of skilled analysts, academics, and linguists that can be recalled to the payroll as required.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation interacts with the intelligence community through a variety of centers. These ad hoc organizations are staffed by intelligence community members and in some cases the directors rotate between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense. Moreover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation takes his orders from the

Attorney General, not from the Director of Central Intelligence. President Reagan designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States. Congress expanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation's counterterrorism responsibilities in 1984 and 1986, when it passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or when certain U.S. interests are attacked. Since the mid-1980s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has investigated more than 500 extraterritorial cases. In addition to the investigation into the September 11 attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's other ongoing extraterritorial investigations include the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombing of the USS Cole. Established in 1996, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Center combats terrorism on three fronts: international terrorism operations both within the United States and in support of extraterritorial investigations, domestic terrorism operations, and countermeasures relating to both international and domestic terrorism. Eighteen federal agencies maintain a regular presence in the center and participate in its daily operations including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, and the Department of State, among others.⁵⁸

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Security Division supports its counterintelligence function—a role that has expanded greatly in recent years. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 24 (PDD-24) established the National Counterintelligence Policy Board. The establishment of the National Counterintelligence Center quickly followed to coordinate national level counterintelligence activities. The staff of the National Counterintelligence Center includes members from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and the National Security Agency. Its directorship rotates every two years. With respect to counterintelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for detecting and counteracting foreign intelligence activity that gathers information that adversely affects US national interests of security. Each of these functions requires close cooperation with the entire intelligence community. Each crosses the boundary between domestic and foreign jurisdiction. The requirement for cooperation between law enforcement and the intelligence community is greater than ever. Unfortunately,

...in the security realm, the conflict between CIA and the FBI is legendary. It goes back years, and has major cultural elements. CIA is mainly "offensively" oriented --that is, toward the recruitment of agents and the gathering of information--while the FBI is mainly "defensively" focused. The mind sets of the functions are very different.⁵⁹

Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Today there is no clear primacy for either the law enforcement or intelligence communities in the realms of international terrorism, narcotics, and proliferation (as well as, in some cases, counterintelligence). Still the law enforcement and intelligence communities remain designed and operated in fundamentally dissimilar manners, retaining different legal authorities, internal modes of organization, and governing paradigms.⁶⁰

On 26 October 2001 President Bush signed an anti-terrorism law known as the U.S.A. Patriot Act to provide the U.S. Government the means with which to fight the war on terrorism. The bill effectively tears down legal fire walls erected twenty-five years ago during the Watergate era, when the nation was stunned by disclosures about presidential abuses of domestic intelligence-gathering against political activists. The new legislation foreshadows an end to that separation by making key changes to the law underpinning it, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The U.S. Patriot Act empowers the government to shift the primary mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from solving crimes to gathering domestic intelligence. The intent is to have a Federal Bureau of Investigation that combines intelligence with effective law enforcement.

The law also provides authority for the Central Intelligence Agency to access domestic investigative information through direct liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Central Intelligence Agency will have the authority, for the first time, to influence Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance operations inside the United States and to obtain evidence gathered by federal grand juries and criminal wiretaps. Similarly, the Treasury Department has been charged with building a financial intelligence-gathering system, whose data can be accessed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The new law permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation to give grand jury information to the Central Intelligence Agency without a court order, as long as the

information concerns foreign intelligence or international terrorism. The information can also be shared widely throughout the national security establishment. Congress also authorized a secure, nationwide communications system for the sharing of terrorism related information with local police.

These new authorities provide an opportunity for the fusion of domestic and international intelligence. Unfortunately the intelligence community is not structured to integrate domestic and international intelligence requirements, collection, and analysis. Again, the fused effort is dependent on the working relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Recognizing the challenges associated with the merging of law enforcement and intelligence functions, a recent Congressional report observed that:

[coordination] sounds simple in concept. In reality, it is likely to prove very difficult, challenging constitutional limits on law-enforcement activity while drawing intelligence officers ever closer to proceedings that could compromise sources and methods of intelligence collection. The momentum is clearly headed toward something like a merger between the two worlds.⁶¹

The merging of law enforcement and intelligence is fundamental to meeting today's security requirements. This integration will require more than legal authorities – it requires a transformation of the intelligence community. There must exist a clear authority for prioritizing intelligence requirements, tasking collection across the apparatus functions, and for a multidimensional and thorough analysis.

Role of Congress

Agencies do not respond naturally or easily to changing international events, conditions and problems. They do not adapt to their environment. National Security agencies are likely to be poorly designed and built to stay that way.⁶²

Immediately following the 11 September attacks, the Senate Intelligence Committee “termed the intelligence community our ‘first line of defense’ against ‘transnational threats’ like terrorism, and authorized a first “installment of a five-year effort to correct serious deficiencies that have developed over the past decade.”⁶³ Although the 2002 intelligence budget is classified, the committee indicated it provided a “substantial” budget increase for overall intelligence activities.⁶⁴ But, money alone will

not prevent another potential national intelligence failure. Congress has historically avoided intelligence oversight. Not until 1974, "after press reports of CIA domestic surveillance activities, did the House and Senate begin to create an oversight structure."⁶⁵ The only major reform legislation following the organization of the national security structure by the National Security Act of 1947 has been the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.⁶⁶ Congress "authorizes the various instrumentalities [sic] of U.S. policy, appropriates funds, and conducts oversight."⁶⁷ This responsibility, the emergence of new threats and the failure of the intelligence community, require Congress to act decisively. There are two fundamental problems that Congress must address. First, it must redesign the organizations created by the National Security Act of 1947 for the Cold War for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Second, it must optimize its organization for oversight of the national security establishment.

Since its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has evolved with minimal Congressional involvement. Congressional oversight was limited prior to 1974 and since has been ineffectual in that it has not addressed the central issue of organizational effectiveness and coordination. "In the U.S. governmental system, the budget is usually the focal point of policy. The budget process for intelligence is overwhelmed by detail and unable to deal with basic issues."⁶⁸

Oversight of law enforcement, foreign policy and intelligence is undertaken by different sets of committees with different agendas. The way Congress oversees law enforcement and intelligence is not optimized.

Congressional oversight of the intelligence community is essential in a democracy. Such oversight is more constructive when it focuses on policy initiatives, such as reorganizing the intelligence community, and evaluation of existing programs and policies, rather than on attempting to manage current operations."⁶⁹

Law enforcement is overseen by the two judiciary committees. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's intelligence activities and all others are under the purview of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. However, there is shared jurisdiction with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees because the Department of Defense conducts the preponderance of intelligence. Such an arrangement makes it difficult, at best, to

provide seamless oversight of intelligence, military and law enforcement activities.⁷⁰ The intelligence and Armed Services committees often focus on procurement of advanced technologies and the links between intelligence and the military services rather than on operational practices.”⁷¹

Transforming Intelligence

Intelligence is like air. You don't realize you are using it until you don't have it.

—National Security Advisor Anthony Lake

First, the disparate intelligence organizations can not continue to be a community. Only a hierarchical organization with clear roles, authority, responsibilities and lines of communication can hope to meet the intelligence requirements of the twenty-first century. The intelligence community is even less an organization than were the military services prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; well intentioned in most cases, collaborative in others, but never fully coordinated to the optimal benefit of national security. Rather than trying to wrap his arms around a “community,” the head of national intelligence must have authority commensurate with his responsibilities. There must be a central organization to support prioritization of requirements and able to manage collection tasking in support of analysis.

Transformation will be difficult. In his book on transforming organizations, Leading Change, John P. Kotter notes that effective change requires, among other things, a sense of urgency, a clear vision and strategy, empowerment and a managing coalition.

The attacks of 11 September, Bush's declaration of war on terrorism, and ongoing U.S. Government efforts should provide a sufficient sense of urgency. Clearly, it is a challenge to transform while supporting the current effort. But, the end state for the “War on Terrorism” is a long way off. U.S. National Security can not afford to wait for this fight to end before transforming for the next challenge.

Paradoxically, the Army has begun a transformation, not based on the 11 September attacks, but on the changing Post Cold War environment. Nevertheless, the Army's Intelligence Transformation Plan observes that the “transformation extends far beyond the Army.” It identifies the requirement to articulate its needs “into the national

intelligence community so that we [the Army] are able to shape the development of both theater and national intelligence capabilities."

The vision should begin with the requirements articulated in the National Security Strategy 2000 and the pending Bush National Security Strategy. Key should be the formation of a hierarchical organization that gives authority along with responsibility. Effective development of intelligence requires an organization –perhaps, the National Intelligence Agency – that can identify and prioritize requirements, and then has the authority to task specific collection agencies – regardless of who owns them. This effort must be supported by and work directly with an analysis organization with experts from each field capable of conducting comprehensive analysis of information fused from multiple sources. The Central Intelligence Agency's, Directorate of Intelligence should form the nucleus of the new organization. It could be titled the National Intelligence or Analysis Center and augmented by analysts from each of the current intelligence community agencies. The Central Intelligence Agency should continue to conduct covert and clandestine operations in support of the National Intelligence Agency and in coordination with other collection sources. This central analysis center could provide the fused intelligence that would support national level decision making while providing the source for the reach back capability Noonan envisions.

The position of the Director of Central Intelligence should be strengthened and renamed so that the Director can wield direct control over the various components of the intelligence apparatus. Greater centralization promises to bring about high quality, coordinated analysis and make resource decisions that reflect national priorities, not choices driven largely by those who oversee the technical collection programs or who are concerned with military programs alone.⁷² The new head of the National Intelligence Agency must have budget authority and should hire the directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and have primacy in operational assignments for these three agencies in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.⁷³

In May 2001, former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft was appointed head of the White House's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He has formed a commission to examine the restructuring of the intelligence community and the results are widely anticipated. According to commission participants, chief among the recommendations is a proposal that would move the National Security Agency, the

National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, from under the Department of Defense to the control of the Director of Central Intelligence.⁷⁴

Historically, the elements of tactical intelligence were ceded to the military, while political intelligence had been the purview of other organizations. This separation has become increasingly awkward. This is a major issue in the Defense Department's transformation. The new emphases on jointness, long-range operations, precision strike, and global positioning system targeting are generating enormous pressures on the defense intelligence infrastructure.

This reduced level of Pentagon intelligence would come as little surprise in some circles. Early last year a commission headed by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman argued that national security is no longer just a military issue and, as a result, the Pentagon may not be the best steward of agencies that now gather a wider variety of intelligence. "The US intelligence community is adjusting only slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era," they concluded in their final report. "While the economic and political components of statecraft have assumed greater prominence, military imperatives still largely drive the collection and analysis of intelligence."⁷⁵

Transformation will require vision, empowerment and oversight. Congress is the body that must perform this function. Comprehensive legislation, similar to that applied to defense by the Goldwater – Nichols Act is necessary to begin transformation. Congressional oversight is key. Additionally, Congress must also reorganize its oversight of intelligence functions. Intelligence committees should be standing and not select committees. Service on intelligence committees should not be subject to term limits. These changes would make the intelligence committees more like other committees and "more representative of the House and Senate as a whole and less reflective of the leadership." The intelligence committees should be given jurisdiction over all components of the intelligence community - not only the Central Intelligence Agency. This will mean reducing the power of other committees such as the Armed Services and Judiciary committees.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The Nation cannot afford uncoordinated approaches among the domains of strategy –military, economic, diplomatic, or informational which often manifests themselves as institutional and bureaucratic barriers to unity of thought and action.

—Richard A. Chilcoat⁷⁷

Intelligence supports decision making at all levels. It is essential to national security. And, the intelligence challenges posed by today's threats are more complex and multifunctional than ever. Combined with the unique way in which the U.S. Government uses the elements of national power and the way in which its military employs force, demands on the intelligence are profound. To meet these demands the Government's intelligence apparatus must be transformed from the existing community of cooperating agencies into an efficient organization equipped with the means to effectively prioritize requirements, collect information utilizing all available means, perform comprehensive analysis, and package and disseminate intelligence efficiently. The creation of a modern intelligence capability in the United States predated the Cold War. More than anything else, "the desire to avoid another Pearl Harbor led to the creation of a centralized intelligence apparatus in 1947."⁷⁸ The legacy of the Pearl Harbor attack and the recognition of the importance of intelligence to national security following the Second World War led to the creation of the intelligence community. And, although poorly designed and with numerous failures and embarrassments over the last fifty years - it got us through the Cold War. It is now time to take those lessons and the forcing function of the 11 September attacks to transform the intelligence community to support national security requirements for the twenty-first century.

The Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan describes a future where "Army intelligence will be a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledgebased force." The plan describes its basic tenets as, "see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively." These basic principles hold fast despite the events of September 11

and the ensuing global war against terrorists. Traditional national assets now have applicability to the tactical commander, and many tactical intelligence assets are now useful to strategic decision makers. The key to making optimum use of all these assets lies in establishing strong relationships with other members of the intelligence community. Clearly, this is essential without a true "central" intelligence organization.

The task is "not to politicize intelligence, but to make it relevant."⁹ Intelligence supports policy. Nevertheless, American policy from here on out will be influenced by the events of 11 September. The U.S. government will use all the elements of its national power – diplomatic, economic, informational and military to provide for national security. National intelligence must support each element in a complex world of competing requirements, priorities and capabilities. The intelligence community must transform to more effectively support U.S. policy goals. More money and more people will help, but a complete transformation –including reorganization is necessary.

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ENDNOTES

¹ The intelligence budget is classified but various sources give a figure of approximately \$30 billion. Walter Pincus, "Senate Clears Bill Raising Intelligence Spending 7 percent; Graham Calls for Reorganization of Collection Agencies," The Washington Post, 9 November 2001.

² General Noonan is quoted extensively in this article by the director of the Army Intelligence Master Plan, Keith J. Masback, "Army Intelligence Deals With Two Transformations," Signal, 56 (January 2000): 2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John T. Chenery, "Transnational Threats 101: Today's Asymmetric Battlefield," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, (Jul-Sep 1999): 2.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts," National Foreign Intelligence Board, December 2000.

⁸ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy For a Global Age, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000) 9.

⁹ Chenery, 3.

¹⁰ The author notes that PDD-42 is addressed to the vice president, the secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury; the attorney general; the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations; the directors of, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the offices of Management and Budget, National Drug Control Policy and Drug Enforcement Administration; and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Clinton Targets Global Organized Crime As Security Threat," The Washington Times, 3 November 1995.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Clinton, 25.

¹³ Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Francis X. Taylor, Ambassador-At-Large For Counterterrorism, "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terror, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information," Washington, DC, March 13, 2002.

¹⁴ Aaron Weiss, "When Terror Strikes Who Should Respond?," Parameters, Autumn 2001.

¹⁵ Chenery, 2.

¹⁶ Despite objections from the Arabic-language television network Al-Jazeera, CNN broadcast an exclusive interview that Al-Jazeera's correspondent in the Afghan capital Kabul conducted with Osama bin Laden in October 2001. The Qatar-based network had never aired the interview and had denied its existence at first. Al-Jazeera told CNN in December 2001 that it would not air the interview because it did not meet the network's standards and was not newsworthy. CNN made the decision after a meeting in October 2001 between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani. During that meeting, Cheney aired U.S. complaints about Al-Jazeera's broadcasts of tapes provided to it by bin Laden's organization. Bin Laden's interview is available from <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html>, internet.

¹⁷ Center for Strategic International Studies, Transnational Threats Resource Center, Available from <http://www.csis.org/goc/threatsrc.html>, Internet.

¹⁸ Center for Strategic International Studies.

¹⁹ Cheney, 4.

²⁰ Clinton, 22.

²¹ Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York, 1996), 2.

²² Ibid., 8.

²³ General Noonan's comments can be found in Marc Strauss, "Army Intelligence to Shift Focus to Urban Battle In Asia," *Defense Daily International* (17 August 2001): 2.

²⁴ Dr. John Hollister Hedley, Checklist for the Future of Intelligence, (Gaithersburg, MD, 1995), 29.

²⁵ Clinton, 9.

²⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: 2000): 30.

²⁷ Ibid., 29.

²⁸ Ibid., 29.

²⁹ Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, (Cambridge, 1985) 339.

³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 29.

³¹ Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, (New York, Dell Publishing, 1974) 95, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ciastaff.htm>; internet.

³² Amy B. Zegart. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Stanford, 1999): 190.

³³ Ibid., 185.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 185-186.

³⁶ Ibid., 186.

³⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, 10.

³⁸ John A. Gentry, "A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community," 6 June 1995; available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/index.html>>; internet.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Zegart, 186.

⁴⁴ According to specialists, the combined intelligence budget, while classified, hovers around \$30 billion a year. They estimate that about half goes to the NSA, the NIMA, and the NRO, while the CIA receives less than \$4 billion annually for its entire operation. Bryan Bender, "U.S. Weighs Overhaul of Spy Services To Fight Terror," Boston Globe, 9 November, 2001.

⁴⁵ Gentry.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁷ National Ground Intelligence Center, available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inscom/ngic.html>>; internet.

⁴⁸ Director of Central Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community, available from <<http://www.odci.gov/ic/functions.html>>; Internet.

⁴⁹ Walter Pincus, "Military Espionage Cuts Eyed," The Washington Post, 17 March 1995, A1.

⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 8.

⁵¹ Ibid., 10.

⁵² Gerry Alexander, "Focus", Retired Officer Association National Security Report, 23, 30.

⁵³ Director of Central Intelligence.

⁵⁴ Louis J. Freeh, Threat of Terrorism to the United States, statement for the record, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the United States Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence, 10 May 2001, available from <<http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm>>; internet.

⁵⁵ R. W. Apple Jr., "Reticence on a Failure of Intelligence May End," New York Times, 14 December 2001.

⁵⁶ FAS Intelligence Resource Program, "Intelligence Community Budget Structure," available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/structure.htm>>; Internet.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Watson.

⁵⁹ Gentry.

⁶⁰ Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 16 January 2001): 2.

⁶¹ Found in Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, "Main Justice: The Men and Women Who Enforce the Nation's Criminal Laws and Guard Its Civil Liberties," 373, 374.

⁶² Zegart, 228.

⁶³ Frank Moring, Jr., "Intelligence Community Struggles to Transcend Cold War Roots", Aviation Week and Space Technology (24 September 2001).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Zegart, 227.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Best, 4.

⁶⁸ FAS Intelligence Resource Program.

⁶⁹ Best, 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Council on Foreign Relations, 4.

⁷³ Zegart, 218.

⁷⁴ Bryan Bender. "US Weighs Overhaul of Spy Services To Fight Terror," Boston Globe (Boston, 9 November 2001).

⁷⁵ FAS Intelligence Resource Program.

⁷⁶ Pat M. Holt, National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (Temple University, 2000): 210.

⁷⁷ Comments by Richard A Chilcoat in "USAWC Selected Readings, Course 1 Strategic Leadership," (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College) 19.

⁷⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, 12.

⁷⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, 16.

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