Operational Fires: Improving Doctrine to Apply the Operational Art to Fires
Abstract
This paper analyzes whether joint doctrine adequately provides a framework for the Joint Forces Commander to apply the operational art to fires. With the increased lethality of precision, fires will play an increased role in campaign plans of the future. Joint Doctrine should enable the Joint Force commander to employ the facets of Operational art to the function of fires. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the capabilities and challenges of employing fires at the Joint Operational level. Operational fires facilitated the rapid collapse of Iraqi ground forces during the coalition's four day ground offensive. Friction, however, arose between the ground and air components, both while fires were shaping the battle space and during the offensive. The doctrine developed since Desert Storm still leaves unanswered questions concerning who is responsible for operational fires and where they will be delivered. This paper recommends that joint doctrine be developed for operational fires. New joint doctrine should prescribe the direction of joint-operational fires under a single joint command. Doctrine should also address how the battle space should be divided to facilitate the Joint Force Commander's concept of fires. Finally, doctrine should anticipate that maneuver may be conducted to support operational fires.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 04, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA405151
Entities
People
- Kevin Foster
Organizations
- Naval War College