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SHOULD U.S. JOINT MILITARY DOCTRINE GIVE THE "MEDIA" AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION TO
SUPPORT THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

SHOULD U.S. JOINT MILITARY DOCTRINE GIVE THE “MEDIA” AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION TO SUPPORT THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER?

To propose elevating the importance of media to an operational function is a significant demarcation from other researchers who reiterate the obvious advice of just doing a better job to incorporate the media into the operational planning process. This paper will examine the media’s importance to the operational commander through historical examples and show why the commander often continues to “get it wrong” by examining one commander who used the media correctly. It will also recommend that the media should have a separate and distinct operational function to support the joint commander, and conclude with media considerations for the operational commander.

The operational commander cannot just give passing thought to the media or leave it in hands of his Public Affairs Officer. The joint commander must personally provide guidance and direction to his subordinate commanders, and continue to answer media questions, but he must also be proactive in disseminating information (good or bad) to the media. He must effectively use the media as an enabler to assist in securing the military objective in support of our nation’s policies. However, the fact remains that in today’s technology-driven world, the media is a fourth dimension added to air, land, and sea and the operational commander must contend with this potent entity to be relevant. Moreover, the media is an accelerator of immense importance in today’s world in respect to the operational factors of time, space, and force affecting the operational commander decision-making.

"The environment of the modern battlespace has changed drastically and so has the media's ability to transmit information."¹ Media is today's decisive weapon that the operational commander has yet to fully embrace, whereas his adversary has already understood its lethal affects in propagating disinformation to discredit the United States and place the operational commander at an asymmetrical defensive disadvantage. It is well known by many that

"The media gravitates toward the sources that are most obvious and available; tyrants and terrorists like Saddam, Milosevic, and Bin Laden learned to welcome reporters. Future enemies can be expected to develop sophisticated strategies to draw attention to, and assign blame for, the suffering of their people; the possibilities available to them for distortion, manipulation, and disinformation are growing."²

The media should be added to the operational functions delineated in joint military doctrine. This paper will examine the media's importance to the operational commander through historical examples and show why the commander often continues to "get it wrong" by examining one commander who used the media correctly. It will propose that the media should have a separate and distinct operational function to support the joint commander, and conclude with media considerations for the operational commander.

There has been much debate on the military-media relationship with some favorable and unfavorable recommendations to reduce the inherent tension, while providing the public the news in a timely and unbiased manner without compromising operational security. However, the fact remains that in today's technology-driven world, the media is a fourth dimension added to land, sea, and air that the military must contend with and operate in to be effective. "The press is capable of influencing the outcome [of political and military action] without ever

firing a shot."³ It can be a significant operational force enhancer, and those who use it correctly reap the benefit, whereas for those who ignore or fail to understand it, "...its power falls to the enemy by default."⁴

Why is the media war of propaganda so vitally important to the joint operational commander today?

In answering this question the operational commander must know in part "What is the root of the problem of the media and military's inherent frictional relationship?" Without a doubt the differences are significant but they are not insurmountable and can be overcome. First, the commander must recognize that the democratic patchwork quilt nation we live in is teeming with the moralistic and idealistic beliefs of a free society that is woven together with the military and media. This is the very fabric that binds the military and the media, and it is what makes our nation so strong as it serves as the democratic "...part of the checks and balances system of the country."⁵ Yet it is possible for both the military and the media to have an amicable, healthy, and respectful relationship once the character of each competing cultures has been explained to the other. As for the American military soldier, the journalist characterizes him as a patriot which is the

"...bedrock of American ethos...reinforced by strong religious beliefs. The nature of the work attracts people with an orientation toward athletics and the outdoors and a tendency to prefer the certainties of science and mathematics to the abstractions of literature and philosophy. [These are the essential attributes that govern our military thinking and action] for a group living in peace and war and to the inhuman conditions of the trench and the foxhole."⁶

On the contrary, the American soldier sees the twentieth century American journalist as a

"skeptic—indeed, often hostility and ridicule—toward religion, patriotism, and authority...there is a tendency to avoid the [the rationale sciences] in favor of the abstractions...of

literature, sociology, and political "science." A dislike for any "regimentation" [to include, the]...ridicule of patriotism...to create a stereotype detested by the military."⁷

These two adversarial and idealistic relationships are further fractured by the media's belief "the public's right to know"...and it is the press' job to let them know what the issue is,"⁸ whereas the "...military is always concerned with operational security"⁹ and the protection of its soldiers' lives as was evidenced during the 23 October 1983, United States invasion of Grenada, Operation *URGENT FURY*. The military's distrust of the media in not allowing media coverage of the invasion until D+2 was directly attributable to the military's insistence on complete operational control and secrecy. Understandably, the U.S. military received a healthy dose of negative press coverage for its total prohibition of media access coupled with its inability to properly manage and integrate the press at the beginning of hostilities.

What can be stated as the truth about the military culture, is that the "...the military wants control. It always has; that's how it operates. Military people are control freaks. And the media are the hardest to control."¹⁰ Thus *URGENT FURY* can be seen as a watershed event for the military and media relations as it spurred the "...Sidle Panel deliberations [which produced a series of] recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that seem to suggest at least a peaceful coexistence between the military and the media."¹¹ The net result was direction as to how the military will accommodate the free press by establishing media pools into future military operations.

There is little question that the media will have already arrived at some distant location and begin its reporting on a major event which affects the strategic interests of the U.S., and which may require some measure of U.S. military response. The operational commander has few, if any, options today but to view the media in light of how the press

reports will affect military operations, and to do so, he must include the media as an operational function. The air campaign waged by NATO against the Serb forces is a case of the 24-hour media maturing to an unprecedented level, and the potential disaster, which could occur if the press is left to tell the story, and not in some manner guided by the operational commander. The staff of General Wesley K. Clark, then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was focused on the operational planning, implementation, and execution of the air campaign to stop the Serb genocidal atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians, but the staff failed to account for the press reporting and what General Clark viewed as a much bigger issue. His concern was

“...motivated by a larger political-military rationale... If we wanted to keep this campaign going...we had to protect our air fleet. Nothing would hurt us more with public opinion than headlines that screamed, “NATO LOSES TEN AIRPLANES IN TWO DAYS.” Take losses like that...time limits on the campaign would be clear. Milosevic could wait us out.”¹²

General Clark understood the potential damage of a hostile press adversely impacting operations. However, failure to achieve mission success quickly while ensuring adequate force protection of friendly aircraft without considering media as an operational function would have severely undermined NATO’s legitimacy, stated objective, and resolve. The media’s importance is clear to the operational commander in today’s 24-hour media war. This was never more poignant than when NBC reporter Tom Brokaw stated in a special report “...that the “American-led air strikes” had begun.”¹³ For NATO this meant that the media had undermined its authority and legitimacy, and NATO had

“...gotten off on the wrong foot with the public.”¹⁴ General Clark directed his Public Affairs Officer (PAO) to contact the news editor and provide them with the percentage of American to NATO sorties to discount and state this was not an American-led mission and that in fact “...these were NATO air strikes...NBC promptly changed the way it was characterizing the strikes.”¹⁵

Had General Clark and his staff been more proactive in providing military information to NBC at the start of hostilities instead of being

reactive, he could have prevented this damaging initial misperception of NATO's and the U.S. position.

Using the media as force multiplier.

Joint Publication 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, is the capstone document that provides authoritative guidance to the operational commander in managing the media and detailing responsibilities to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). Yet in the publication's prologue, the pamphlet merely proffers a generic set of tenets including "...U.S. military support to the media, guidance for command information support when communicating with internal audiences, aid in planning and training for joint operations, and focusing the training of commanders, their staffs and public affairs personnel."¹⁶ With this minimal doctrinal guidance, it fails to address the key point that the media can be a significant force multiplier, and show how the commander can leverage this medium to support his operational plan.

However, the fact remains that many of today's operational commanders prefer to not interact with the media or see its importance to the military operation, and simply will not trust the media because of operational security concerns. The truth remains, as Walter Cronkite has stated about the role of the journalist, "We have a duty to know what they're doing in our name.... They are keeping the war correspondents at arm's length. It's a very serious gap in our democratic procedures."¹⁷ General Eisenhower said it best when he explained the competing role between the military commander and the media with regard to operational security.

"The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open

publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations."¹⁸

What General Eisenhower clearly articulated was the need for cooperative interaction and trust between the commander and journalist. In essence, the media must have contact and relatively free access to military units and their soldiers, while the commander must always keep operational security at the forefront in his dealings with the press.

In discussing why the operational commander continues to "get it wrong" other than the obvious fact that our joint doctrine is incomplete and it does not readily provide the clear and convincing guidance to the commander on how to manage the media and use it advantageously, the answer is best illustrated by one operational commander who largely did it right. Commander, Marine Central Command (MARCENT), Lieutenant General Boomer, USMC properly applied and supported the media by making it an operational function and a force multiplier to enhance the U.S. Marine war preparation effort during OPERATION *DESERT SHIELD/STORM* in their eventual ground assault to evict Iraqi forces from the Emirate of Kuwait. During the Marines' deployment to Saudi Arabia during early August 1990, General Boomer released his first message to his subordinate commanders establishing the direction and tone as to how the media was to be treated, and explained that

"Operation *DESERT SHIELD* and related current events have captured worldwide attention and are the subject of intense new media scrutiny... This operation can demonstrate to Americans the flexibility, deployability, sustainability, and combat power of the Marine Corps... The long-term success of *DESERT SHIELD* depends...on support of the American people. The news media are the tools...which we can tell Americans about the dedication, motivation, and sacrifice of their Marines. Commanders should include public affairs requirements in their operational planning..."¹⁹

Today's operational commander can deduce from General Boomer's statement that it is essential that the operational commander must have a keen

appreciation and perception that the American strategic center of gravity is, and will always be, its people because of our democratic society. General Boomer leveraged the media through his intelligent use of it to answer the American public's questions and garner the country's continued support.

Even though military media pools were established to control the large number of reporters in country and ensure operational security, the media pools were allowed and encouraged to report on several live-fire exercises and talk with the Marines, with several members of the press eventually expressing a desire to be assigned to live with Marine units. Because of this openness and mutual trust to actively integrate the media with the military, the press was largely able to make their deadlines and report events favorably to the American people about what the U.S. military was accomplishing. However, as the deployment time and mission lengthened, the Marines noticed that the media's attitude had manifested itself in reporting negativism as some Marines had complained about the austere desert conditions. General Boomer again provided clear guidance and education to his subordinate commanders and Marine force by stating:

"I encourage commanders to accommodate members of the press corps... Your Marines and Sailors are encouraged to discuss their day-to-day duties...remind them that the shortage of amenities...are a direct result of a rapid deployment into a potentially hostile zone that required prioritization of shipment... This will remain an austere deployment, but a concerted effort is underway to improve mail...spare parts...enhance living conditions...comfort items."²⁰

Using the media in an operational function and as a force multiplier provides a very effective and near instantaneous communications method not only to report on what the U.S. and its coalition partners are doing, but also as a propaganda catalyst to

create uncertainty in the mind of a belligerent. In the Gulf, this was used to indirectly attack the Iraqi leadership. Saddam Hussein watched CNN and took notice of the press reports that the U.S.-led coalition had responded with an overwhelming air, ground, and naval force to defend Saudi Arabia and to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Notwithstanding, the "...most visible [individual] was CNN reporter Peter Arnett, the only reporter for a major Western news organization...allowed to stay in Iraq after the war began."²¹ Even though Mr. Arnett's broadcasts were censored by the Iraqi leadership and caused consternation among the American public, the government and U.S. troops, the live television reporting on coalition forces caused Saddam to react by deploying more troops into Kuwait and pinning down his ground forces along the Kuwaiti coast in response to the U.S. amphibious threat. In effect, the press reports had caused Saddam to expend "...a lot of effort and resources to counter the perceived maneuver. In *DESERT SHIELD/STORM*, it was clear that the Iraqis were watching CNN."²²

By the time the ground war started on 23 February 1991, there were nearly 1600 reporters and 30 media pools functioning in theater. No doubt this number of reporters severely strained the military's ability to manage and support the flow of information and personnel. The media pool and censorship became two of the most contentious issues, not only to the civilian press, but more importantly for the operational commander to resolve and manage during *DESERT STORM*. Compounding this, the Pentagon's 4 January 1991, newly revised media security-review process "...included a specific proviso that pool reports and visuals would be reviewed only "to determine if they contained information..."²³ on possible sensitive military information and equipment that could compromise the security of the operation, safety of the soldiers, or be

used by the enemy. Obviously the press was extremely displeased and vehemently "...protested that the security review process was overly restrictive, and amounted to de facto censorship."²⁴ This was further exacerbated by the Secretary of Defense-imposed news blackout at the start of the ground war in an effort to ensure operational security for the ground forces. Fortunately this was lifted on the same day because of the immense successes the coalition forces achieved, however, the revised security review procedure remained.

Without question managing the media was of critical importance and definitely challenging to the MARCENT Commander, and yet as "...the months wore on, a phenomenon developed...commanders actually began to enjoy having reporters around. Friendships and relationships developed between the [two]... Marines grew accustomed to having journalists in their midst..."²⁵ Clearly a sense of trust and bonding had been achieved between the two widely different groups. The credibility garnered by the military was at an all time high because of its positive association with the press. When comparing the relative value of the 1991 American confidence in its military, "A decade ago only half [of those] questioned in a *Post*-ABC poll expressed confidence...and today nearly nine out of ten Americans view the military positively."²⁶ General Boomer's top down and bottom up approach to accepting the media with its liberal ideals, along with establishing how the Marines were to interact with the media to espouse the command's leadership style in interacting, coalesced the two organizations to work together as a team. He elevated the media to an operational function, thereby achieving a key principle of war-unity of effort-and received very favorable press coverage of all MARCENT units during *DESERT SHIELD/STORM*.

The media should be elevated to an operational function.

In today's world, and especially for the U.S. military and government who retain global responsibilities, the time and speed to process information and react to an event is markedly compressed in comparison to years past. Time has now become even more critical and relevant to the military. For the media, time will always be the driving impetus and measure of effectiveness on how fast and well they can deliver their story to world. "The freshest Vietnam video was two to three days old. In *DESERT STORM* we had live feeds from satellite uplinks in Saudi Arabia. Video delays of several hours were considered a major problem."²⁷ CNN's breaking second-by-second 11 September 2001, World Trade Center attack reporting to billions of people and 184 world leaders points to the fact that the CNN's instantaneous effect has now become the "...medium for diplomatic dialogue [as] a statement ...on live television...[for]Governments [or even non-state actors to]...rely on the television medium to quickly issue their reply."²⁸ Real-time news coverage by the press has evolved into a new lethal weapon that the operational commander must take into account as world governments and the American public reacts and accepts what they watch and hear on television as the truth.

America's successful prosecution of the war on terrorism is vitally important to its survival, and in large part the battle will be fought through the media. Even though the U.S. military is fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the U.S. and its military are not pitted

"...against another superpower...[they are fighting] the super-empowered angry men and women...from failing states in the Muslim and third world. What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, the Internet [the media] and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. They turned our most advanced civilian planes into human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles—a

diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology.
Jihad Online.”²⁹

There is no second place, limited peace, or return to the status quo in this type of war. The mission for the operational commander is victory, and he needs to employ all the elements of military power and the media to the fullest extent. The deployment of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and combat deployment to the remote land-locked Afghan country marked a significant turning point in OPERATION *ENDURING FREEDOM*. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and Commander Fifth Fleet (C5F), directed Commander, Task Force 58 (CTF 58), to commence “...planning for three to five amphibious raids into Afghanistan and to establish a forward operating base in southern Afghanistan for over a 30-day period.”³⁰ Furthermore, he directed the CTF 58 to have journalist representation embarked aboard the USS PELELIU and afterward once established in Afghanistan. This guidance, along with one military PAO accompanying the Marines into Afghanistan, comprised the CinCCENT Public Affairs guidance to CTF 58.

Journalists accompanied the Marines from the 15th MEU into Afghanistan and reported to the world on 25 November 2001, “Lead Marine elements have landed in Afghanistan” and Brigadier General Mattis commented that ‘the Marines now own a piece of Afghanistan’. Within hours, CTF 58 received several phone calls from senior military leaders privately admonishing him for his comment as they believed he had fractured the coalition.³¹ The fact that the journalist was there alongside the military force reporting unfolding military events as they occurred impacted not only the operational commander in his planning and subsequent actions, but directly affected the senior military leaders in


Washington. Within a month after the public affairs incident, General Mattis met with senior anti-Taliban leaders in Kandahar and apologized for his comment. However, to prove right the Task Force Commander had not overstepped his authority and had told the truth, the senior anti-Taliban leaders responded that they were in no way offended and remarked with pride, "We knew that once the Marines had landed, we had won and spread the joyful news to all the Afghani fighters who celebrated as well."³²

The speed that the press relies on to get the story out has elevated the media to an operational importance that the military commander must now consider as a seventh operational function which can complement with the other six: command and control, intelligence, maneuver, logistics, fires and force protection. Media exists and operates in the time, space, and force continuum as do the other six operational functions and once "...allowed to pass [it can never be recaptured, and] unused, accumulates to the credit of the defender."³³ Viewed in this context, a weaker opponent now can have the capability to defeat a much stronger opponent through the application and use of the asymmetrical means of the powerful tool—media reporting. As another example, the Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid combined time and the media to defeat the U.S. government. Aidid achieved the withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces from their humanitarian intervention mission in Mogadishu after the unacceptable loss to Task Force Ranger personnel (18 dead soldiers) on 3 October 1993, to capture selected Habr Gidr clan leaders. Aidid forces provided CNN access to the battlefield victory over U.S. forces by using the most lethal weapon against the American public and military psyche, a homemade videotape of the dead body of crew chief Bill Cleveland tied at the wrists while being dragged through

the streets. CNN delivered this shocking and chilling news account to the world the next morning. Understandably the President of the United States was angered over the incident, and within days of the battle a top-level White House cabinet meeting convened to determine the U.S. response toward Somalia. The final decision by the President, which further resulted to the erosion of U.S. prestige and legitimacy, not only in Somalia but also throughout the world, was the result of technology of the video camera combined with the press' near instantaneous reporting of the incident. With the subsequent announcement "America was pulling out... The Somali warlord...had scored a major victory."³⁴

The speed at which technology has accelerated media's ability to transmit and disseminate information has profound influence on the military commander, the government, and its resulting impact on the people, was non-existent prior to the twentieth century. Professor Handel's in-depth analysis and comparison of Clausewitz' theoretical study of war to modern strategy provides a compelling argument that technology is now a critical side of the famous paradoxical trinity. As stated by Professor Handel, Clausewitz died before the industrial revolution, and what Clausewitz viewed in his trinitarian analysis "...was primarily political and social—not material."³⁵ Clausewitz could not have imagined in his time the immense impact that today's technological advances would have on his trinity. If he had, Clausewitz might well have added a fourth side to his trinity to properly capture and elevate technology's importance in war as illustrated in figure 1.³⁶ Moreover, the impact technology has on endowing the media with the ability, at a moment's notice, to stir the primordial passions of the people, the

government, and the military commander can spur a government into action.



Media considerations for the operational commander.

The operational commander is burdened with the immense responsibility to achieve mission success while ensuring operational security. Moreover, complicating the operational commander's ability to synchronize the available time, the geographic joint operating space, and the available military forces in the operational theater, is today's instantaneous 24-hour battlefield media transmission, and the dreaded 10-second sound byte that now has the awesome power to alter political and military objectives. Managing the media is not "...business as usual and (open access) is not [readily] possible in modern warfare..."³⁷ The commander requires the guidance and the tools to better deal with the media so he can clearly articulate the military's role and purpose in carrying out the nation's political goals to the American people.

Managing the media is clearly important, competes for the commander's time, and directly affects the operational challenges

confronting the joint force. To assist him in this capacity, one key person is the PAO assigned to the staff. However, a commander should carefully consider the following principles in managing the media.

1. Tell the truth because credibility is what matters—ignorance is no defense. “Military officers should be straightforward about what happens on the battlefield.”³⁸
2. Establish early, a joint information bureau as the “...single point of interface between the military and news media representatives covering operations.”³⁹
3. Publish commander’s guidance at the onset of a crisis to subordinate commanders and staff on expectations and treatment of journalists, and as required, provide updates.⁴⁰
4. Incorporate the PAO into the operational planning from the onset and throughout a crisis.
5. To enhance the creditability of the “operation it is imperative to have either the operational or tactical commander discuss matters at press conferences. Use the PAO as a facilitator, a provider, and a ‘filler’ of information (bios, stats, etc.) to the media. Using the PAO as the primary spokesperson can be [interpreted] as putting the ‘minister of propaganda’ out in front and [perceived] as the military has something to hide.”⁴¹
6. Direct the PAO to establish a proactive military media reporting and training program for the joint force and commander that encompasses incident/event-based reporting techniques and procedures in order to expedite the transmission of time-sensitive information to the media and senior command echelons.⁴²
7. Bring in the civilian reporters early and “establish media pools only as required to manage the press for operational security and safety issues but dissolve the media pools as quickly as possible when no longer required.”⁴³ Be cognizant that “all [reporters] want access to the military pool if created—no unfair advantage.”⁴⁴
8. Embed reporters in combat situations with troops whenever practicable and consistent with security considerations, as such methods...may provide viable alternative to pool coverage...”⁴⁵ Pool escorts [if required] should be experienced combat officers drawn from the services primarily involved in the operation...”⁴⁶
9. “In consultation with representatives of the news media, establish a clear set of military security ground rules [for operational security and safety of the journalists]...”⁴⁷
10. Understand that today many of “...the local news media do not have the [knowledge] and experience about the military”⁴⁸ of years past veteran journalists and will require assistance from the PAO.

11. "Military [operations] may require [security] review of news"⁴⁹ and "if it is undertaken, 1) conduct it quickly...; 2) reject [any] rules stipulating [that the information can never be released...; and 3) examine [each case on its own merits for release]...."⁵⁰

Conclusion

Comprehending the immense power that media has on influencing military operations and a government's political decision is an important factor for change to the operational commander's way of thinking. One wrongly taped statement or a shocking videotape of a dead U.S. soldier dragged through the streets of a third world city on television can and has damaged the legitimacy of military operations and negatively influenced the U.S. government and its military. Also, the operational commander can expect that the press will be present and reporting via live feed to 184 countries (even before the military arrives) wherever U.S. military intervention might occur. He must further accept the fact that he probably has little ability to fully manage the media. For the commander to succeed in this new media era he must understand the inherent tension between the journalist and the military, and that the press believes it is its duty and First Amendment right to report everything to the American people on what its military is doing. Building a lasting and trustful relationship between the military and the media is the right way to bridge this rift.

Managing the media as an operational function to support the military force and national goals requires a great deal of savvy on the part of the commander. General Boomer established the standard by directing his subordinate commanders from the onset to embed the media within Marine force, and provided the media an open access policy on reporting within the limits of operational security so the American

people could see and hear what their Marine Corps was doing. To the commander's credit, the Marines "...had 30% of the missions, got 70% of the press...while the Army and Air Force were stiff-arming the press, and the Navy had sailed over the horizon...."⁵¹ Moreover, the televised reporting of the air, ground, and amphibious coalition forces caused strategic paralysis in the mind of Saddam Hussein to where he had to deploy additional resources to Kuwait to counter both the immense land and the large amphibious threats.

The operational commander must elevate the media's importance in his operational planning and execution, and embrace the media by working with it by establishing clearly defined ground rules so as not to violate operational security.

Instantaneous press reporting to influence the emotions of the people, the military commander, and the government at a moment's notice, and a government's subsequent response being transmitted to its opponent has markedly changed military and diplomatic interaction in the new millennium. The media, through its technological channels of information dissemination, has propelled itself to an operational function that the operational commander has to account for and address from the very outset.

Recent discussions by the author with OSD (PA) and the lead agent at U.S. Joint Forces Command for revision of JP3-61 reveal that substantial changes are currently under way. Changes in the proposed Joint Public Affairs Guidance are substantive and provide clearer and more meaningful guidance to the operational commander as well as expound on recommendations

researched by this author. I am confident that in time, with the influence

the media has on national policy and the operational commander, the media

will become an integrated operational function because of its critical role

in military operations.

NOTES

¹ Joints Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-61 (Washington, DC: 05 February 2002, Revision Second Draft), I-4, II-1.

² Douglas Porch, "No Bad Stories," Naval War College Review, LV,1 (Winter 2002): 104.

³ Ellen K. Haddock, "Media on the Battlefield: An Underestimated Weapon," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1992, 30.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military-Media Boxing Match," Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, 27.

⁶ William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War (Connecticut: Praeger 1993), 13.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Trainor, 28.

⁹ Trainor, 29.

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¹¹ Thomas M. Daly, "Grenada and Media Access," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1987, 63.

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