Operation Allied Force: Operational Art & Task Force Hawk
Abstract
Many view Operation Allied Force as a model of efficiency from plan to execution. No conflict in history, of this magnitude, can claim zero combat fatalities. The United States led a complex coalition effort under the NATO umbrella that saw an end to the ethnic cleansing atrocities in Kosovo and ultimately the removal of Slobodan Milosevic from power. So why isn't this 78 days war the model for future conflicts? What have we learned in the application of operational art and how will we apply it to future conflicts? What decisions led to the deployment of a 5500 soldier strong Army contingent known as Task Force Hawk and why were they never employed? Analysts almost universally agree that below the surface, Operation Allied Force was an operation flawed in political and strategic direction that never applied the optimum means to accomplish the ill defined and constantly evolving objectives. Probability and chance played as much a role in the positive outcome as did operational design factors. It worked against a weak foe -- a risk we should avoid in the future. The strategic (political) and operational conditions never existed for the employment of Task Force Hawk as an operational maneuver force. The systems were appropriate for conducting joint operational fire and maneuver, however the timing all but eliminated any chance of employment. Without surprise, multiple directions of attack, and a legitimate ground threat to occupy ground forces, Task Force Hawk could at best hope to achieve tactical effects. Future Joint operations will present the same challenges experienced during Operation Allied Force. We see many of the same in Afghanistan today. Let's hope we have learned from our 'successes' of the past instead of mirroring them.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA405646
Entities
People
- Mark J. Mckearn
Organizations
- Naval War College