

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES

by

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June 2002

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM
INITIATIVES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this research was to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DoD) effectiveness of implementing acquisition reform through workforce training. The research examined several acquisition reform initiatives proposed since 1990 and DoD's primary sources of acquisition workforce training. A survey was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of training sources as perceived by acquisition workforce members. The data gathered from the sample of 411 responses indicated survey respondents were only "somewhat" satisfied with the training received in support of acquisition reform. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) resident courses, Government funded training and in-house acquisition reform advocates were rated as "most effective" sources of training. These three sources provided training perceived as adequate to functionally implement reform initiatives and targeted to members' work responsibilities. In contrast, training provided by DoD's Acquisition Reform Week, DAU web-based courses and non-Government sources were perceived "least effective" sources of acquisition reform. Research results suggest DoD increase its focus on recently implemented Continuous Learning Policy, strengthen and support the role of in-house acquisition reform advocates, and increase the quality of web-based instruction.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense's (DoD) capability to accomplish its mission is significantly impacted by its ability to acquire supplies and services. DoD acquisition personnel have been exposed to a rapidly changing environment forcing DoD to dramatically reform the way it manages the acquisition process. Constrained resources, large reductions in the size of the acquisition workforce and changes in the commercial environment have driven several major acquisition reform initiatives. These acquisition reform initiatives involve business practices that have substantially differed from existing practices and procedures, resulting in the need for significant workforce training.

The challenge of implementing acquisition reform initiatives through training cannot be underestimated considering the acquisition workforce size, occupational diversity and geographical dispersion. In addition, the number, frequency and magnitude of reform initiatives have further compounded difficulties implementing meaningful acquisition reform.

It is clear acquisition reform has been a success at the policy level. Current acquisition reform initiatives have been developed after extensive planning by DoD senior acquisition leadership and appear to be consistent with achievable goals that should result in substantial improvements in the acquisition process. Unfortunately,

the true success of acquisition reform remains with effective implementation at the acquisition workforce member level - not within the beltway or the Pentagon.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the DoD's effectiveness of implementing acquisition reform initiatives through workforce training programs. The primary focus of the research is on workforce perceptions regarding the adequacy of training supporting select acquisition reform initiatives. This research will attempt to identify potential areas of improvement necessary to establish and implement acquisition reform training objectives for the DoD Acquisition Workforce.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following primary research question will be addressed in this thesis:

- Are the Department of Defense acquisition reform initiatives fully supported by current acquisition workforce training?

Subsidiary research questions are:

- What is the recent history of Acquisition Reform with the Department of Defense?
- What training is available to the Department of Defense acquisition workforce supporting Acquisition Reform initiatives?
- Does the acquisition workforce perceive that available training effectively supports Acquisition Reform implementation?

D. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD

This thesis examines select acquisition reform initiatives and associated acquisition workforce training implemented by the DoD since 1990. The primary focus of the research and corresponding conclusions and recommendations are based on the acquisition workforce survey conducted by the author and the supporting literature review.

Literature research included a review of Government and professional journal articles, Federal and DoD regulations, policies and procedures, Defense Acquisition University course materials, and United States General Accounting Office reports. The majority of these documents were obtained through publicly available Internet resources. The scope and research methodology associated with the acquisition workforce survey is discussed in Chapter IV.

The thesis is focused on a limited number of acquisition reform initiatives due to the magnitude of changes proposed since 1990 and limitations associated with the survey conducted supporting this research. Eleven reform initiatives were selected based on their potentially broad application across various acquisition workgroups, commands and services considering mission diversity. Rationale for selection of specific acquisition reform initiatives selected is included in Chapter III.

E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis is divided into the following four chapters:

Chapter II, Literature Review and Background, provides a review of select acquisition reform initiatives and acquisition workforce training since 1990.

Chapter III, Survey Methodology, Data and Analysis, discusses and analyzes the results of the acquisition workforce survey.

Chapter IV, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides a summary of the thesis findings and potential areas of improvements.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical review of select DoD acquisition reform initiatives and acquisition workforce training and education sources in effect since 1990. This chapter also includes brief discussions regarding events driving acquisition reform within the DoD and barriers to acquisition reform implementation. The information presented in this chapter provides a conceptual basis for understanding and examining the analyses, recommendations and conclusions provided in subsequent chapters.

B. EVENTS DRIVING ACQUISITION REFORM

The last decade for the DoD acquisition workforce could best be characterized as one of constant change, as exhibited by the continuous stream of acquisition reform initiatives. The pace of change has not subsided. According to author and acquisition scholar Stanley Sherman, "...new [reform] proposals emerge almost daily".¹ Since 1991, the impetus for DoD to implement various acquisition reform initiatives can be attributed to:

- Increased reliance on acquiring commercial products
- Increased importance of Service contracting
- Budgetary constraints

¹ Sherman, Stanley N., "Public Purchasing Reform: Have FASA, FARA, and ITMRA Made the System Better?", On-Line, <http://www.fasmg.org/sherman2.html>, May 1997.

- Acquisition workforce reductions

1. Reliance on Commercial Products

Historically, DoD has been the leader in supporting and encouraging new technology through the development of "state-of-the-art" weapon systems. Unfortunately, DoD's leadership in developing new technology has not only faded, DoD now finds itself unable to timely acquire commercially developed new technology. Advancements in commercial technology far exceed DoD sponsored research and development in areas that are critical underlying technologies to support the development of next generation military systems. The DoD Military specification structure is predominately out-dated, no longer recognized by the commercial marketplace as the "standard." There is no evidence DoD's preeminence in supporting research and development will return, considering DoD's Research and Development (R&D) dollars, adjusted for inflation, have decreased 31 percent since 1985². Recognition of these facts has forced the DoD acquisition community to find new ways of acquiring and leveraging emerging technological opportunities developed by commercial sources.

One of the most significant challenges facing the acquisition workforce in leveraging new and emerging technology has been private industry's reluctance to do business with the DoD³. This is especially true in markets such as the semiconductor industry where DoD is no longer

² General Accounting Office. "Federal Acquisition: Trends, Reforms, and Challenges", GAO/T-OGC-00-7, March 16, 2000.

³ Defense Acquisition Deskbook. "Secretary of Defense Acquisition Reform: Mandate for Change", September 2, 1994. On-line, <http://web2.deskbook.osd.mil/scripts/rwisapi.dll>.

the dominant customer. Between 1965 and 1995, DoD's share of all U.S.-produced semiconductors fell from 75 percent to approximately one percent⁴. In this and other high tech industries, DoD can no longer dictate terms and conditions under which firms will sell their products. According to DoD leadership, costly administrative procedures mandated by Congress have added little value to DoD acquisition process; and the intrusive nature of Government contract oversight and potential loss of proprietary data discourage beneficial public-private partnerships⁵. The requirement for commercial organizations to establish and maintain separate business procedures to account for DoD's mandated cost and accounting data is both disruptive to commercial business practices and is considered by many (inside and outside DoD) to carry costs far exceeding potential benefits.

2. Increased Importance of Service Contracting

The DoD has recently recognized the value of outsourcing services currently performed in-house as a means of focusing efforts on core missions and responsibilities. Outsourcing has especially gained momentum in functional areas where DoD has not been able to compete with the private marketplace to recruit and/or retain a qualified workforce. Outsourcing these types of services enables DoD to focus on core competencies consistent with best commercial business practices and acquire critical skills.

⁴ Ibid, 3.

⁵ Ibid, 2.

Outsourcing is also a politically popular vehicle to reduce the size of Federal Government and as such has received renewed attention. This attention has been in the form of recent legislation including the 1998 Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act discussed below. Within DoD, reform of service contracting will also continue to receive increased attention since it now constitutes the largest contracting category by dollar in the Federal Government as indicated by the following chart⁶:




Figure 2.1. Contracting Dollars (From: Federal Procurement Data System).

⁶ General Accounting Office. "Federal Acquisition: Trends, Reforms and Challenges", GAO/T-OGC-00-7, March 16, 2000.

3. Budgetary Constraints

DoD's budget constitutes a significant portion of the discretionary Federal budget; it will come under increasing scrutiny as Federal entitlement programs such as social security and health care demand greater resources. Internally, the DoD has been forced to make budgetary decisions at the expense of force modernization. Considering aging weapon system platforms, force reductions and the increasing acquisition lead-times for complex systems, this trend cannot continue if DoD hopes to dominate the battlefield into the next decade and beyond. Funding challenges have been compounded by a 22 percent decrease in defense spending over the last eleven years as exhibited by the following chart (constant 2002 dollars):




Figure 2.2. Defense Spending (From: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001.

There is no reasonable expectation of sustainable increases in the defense budget considering the growth of entitlement programs and the political realities of deficit spending. Therefore, potential cost savings and/or cost avoidance from acquisition reform initiatives has been identified as a major opportunity to finance much needed force modernization⁷.

4. Acquisition Workforce Reductions

Congressionally mandated reductions have decreased the acquisition workforce by 42 percent since 1989⁸. This reduction in the workforce without a corresponding workload reduction has forced DoD to search for and implement reform initiatives that enable the acquisition workforce to more efficiently and effectively manage defense acquisition processes. These acquisition reforms require extensive re-training throughout the workforce and a shift in organizational culture that has been rule bound for decades.

C. MODERN ACQUISITION REFORM

Although acquisition reform could conceivably be traced back to the Hoover Commission in 1949, the "modern"

⁷ DefenseLink, "Reform Initiatives: Reorienting the Way DoD Does Business", <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999>.

⁸ Office of Secretary of Defense. "Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce Vision", On-line, <http://acq.osd.mil/ar/912crpt.htm>, April 1, 1998.

era of acquisition reform commenced in 1986 with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission). The results of DoD acquisition reform initiatives evolving from the Packard Commission and implemented since 1990 are observable in many of today's acquisition practices. This historical review of acquisition reform initiatives will be limited to a group of initiatives implemented since 1990.

The majority of acquisition reform initiatives proposed prior to 1990 were in response to isolated criminal incidents, public outcry of perceived wasteful purchases and major weapon systems cost overruns. Prior to 1990, acquisition reform could best be characterized as a constraint to acquisition workforce decision making.⁹ Since 1990, acquisition reform initiatives have been proposed in response to the rapidly changing business environment, allowing greater latitude in the decision-making processes.

Many current acquisition reform initiatives have their foundations in a few different legislative acts. These include:

- Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990
- Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994
- Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996
- Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of 1998

In addition to these acts, select initiatives germane to the research survey used in this study are examined at the end of this section. They include

⁹ Ibid, 1.

evolutionary/incremental acquisition strategy, share-in-savings contracts, performance-based contract payments, alpha contracting and integrated process teams. The rationale for including these initiatives is discussed in Chapter III, Survey Methodology. This section concludes with a discussion of barriers to acquisition reform.

1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990

Although not typically considered an acquisition reform initiative itself, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) is one of the major milestones that has shaped the way education and training is provided to DoD acquisition personnel. DoD-provided education and training of the acquisition workforce is recognized as the key to successful acquisition reform implementation¹⁰. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of DAWIA. The types and methods of acquisition reform training provided as a result of DAWIA will be discussed later in the Acquisition Reform Training section of this chapter.

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Act (DAWIA) of 1990 (Public Law 101-510) required the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense (then Acquisition & Technology), to establish education and training standards, requirements and courses for the DoD civilian and military workforce. Two requirements of interest to the subject research resulted from DAWIA, the establishment of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)

¹⁰ Verton, Daniel. "Defense Gets Tough with Acquisition Training Criteria", Federal Computer Week, January 25, 1999, pp. 14-15.

and certification standards for specific career fields/assignments.

a. Defense Acquisition University

The DAU was established on October 22, 1991 under DoD Directive 5000.57. The purpose of DAU is to:

- Educate and train acquisition professionals for DoD
- More effectively coordinate the existing sixteen Army, Navy, Air Force and DoD schools
- Develop education, training, research, and publication capabilities for DoD in the field of acquisition

In April 1998, seven years after DAU was established, DAU transitioned from a consortium of unique service sponsored schools into a unified "corporate university" with five regional and seven training sites providing mandatory, assignment-specific and continuing education courses for military and civilian personnel.

b. Certification Standards

DoD Directive 5000.52-dated October 25, 1991, established mandatory experience, education, and training standards for specific acquisition workforce position categories, career fields and certification guidelines for acquisition workforce members. DAWIA divided each acquisition position category into three career levels for the purpose of establishing qualifications for

certification standards. Table 2.1 summarizes the three-certification levels:

Level	Grade/ Rank	Description
I	GS-5/9 O-1/3	Basic/Entry level, establishes fundamental qualifications and expertise in Individual's career field
II	GS-9/12 O-3/4	Intermediate/Journeyman level, initial emphasis on specialization, career development including rotational assignments
III	GS-13 & above O-4 & above	Advanced/Senior level, cross functional perspective, focus on issues cutting across organizational boundaries

Table 2.1. DAWIA Certification Levels.

As an example, the current Level III DAWIA certification standard for the GS-1102, Contracting, career series according to DoD Directive 5000.52 includes:

a. EDUCATION: Have ONE of:

1. Baccalaureate degree

2. At least 24 semester hours among: accounting, law, business finance, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, organization and management

3. At least 10 years acquisition experience as of 1 Oct 91. (Those individuals meeting this criteria where "grand-fathered" and need not meet any other education requirement).

(Desired) Master's degree in Business Administration or Procurement

b. EXPERIENCE:

Four years contracting experience

(Desired) An additional four years of contracting experience

c. TRAINING:

CON 301 Executive Contracting

Prerequisites: CON 201, CON 204, and CON 210

(Should be taken every 3-5 years as a refresher, but does not have to be repeated to maintain certification)

CON 333 Management for Contracting Supervisors

Prerequisite: At least one year experience in a contracting position after receiving Contracting Level II certification

(Desired) 2 weeks Management and Leadership Training

2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994

The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 was a product of Vice President Gore's National Performance review. FASA was the first major legislative effort to provide meaningful reform to the Federal acquisition process by establishing legislative foundations to adopt and incorporate best commercial practices. As noted by Sherman¹¹, FASA was a substantial movement away from decades of increasingly restrictive Federal acquisition laws and regulations providing the acquisition workforce with greater discretion in decision-making. FASA

¹¹ Ibid, 1.

resulted in a significant number of individual reform initiatives impacting a range of topics including:

- Simplified Acquisition Procedures
- Commercial Items
- Past Performance Evaluation
- Alternative Dispute Resolution
- Electronic Data Interchange
- Performance Based (Service) Contracts
- Performance Based Contract Payments

a. Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP)

FASA provided DoD acquisition workforce personnel with a more streamlined process for acquiring purchases under the simplified acquisition threshold (then and now \$100,000.00¹²). Specifically, buying organizations were no longer required to solicit, evaluate and award relatively low dollar value contracts utilizing the same laborious procedures reserved for much more complex procurements.

FASA not only permitted streamlined procedures, it eliminated burdensome paperwork associated with larger procurements. FASA eliminated many certification requirements such as FAR 52.223-5, Certification Regarding a Drug-Free Workplace, and compliance with several clauses and provisions ranging from FAR 52.52.215-1, Examination of Records by Comptroller General, to the requirement to identify suppliers and sources of supply. Initially, authority to utilize SAP up to the simplified acquisition threshold was limited to those organizations that had fully

¹² Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101.

implemented Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) into their acquisition process (discussed below). Those not utilizing EDI were provided with increased authority up to only \$50,000.00 pending Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET) implementation.

A second component of SAP included the initiation of the "micro-purchase" concept for acquisitions under \$2,500.00. Previously, any purchase under the simplified acquisition threshold was reserved ("set-aside") exclusively for small businesses as defined by Federal Acquisition Regulations. The micro-purchase concept provided wide discretion to the source of the purchase and significantly reduced documentation. This relief was of significant importance for two reasons. First, purchases under \$2,500.00 constituted a large percentage of all procurement actions and attached a relatively high administrative cost. Second, the benefits of allowing individuals outside the purchasing office to use the Government Purchase Card within the \$2,500.00 micro-purchase threshold was gaining wide-spread acceptance. The Government Purchase Card allows organizations to buy goods and services directly from vendors without processing request through procurement offices, thus substantially reducing cycle time and administrative costs. Today, the Government Purchase Card is widely used throughout DoD. In FY2000, DoD organizations made approximately 10 million transactions under \$2,500.00 worth \$5.5 billion utilizing the Government Purchase Card program¹³.

¹³ DoD Purchase Card Program Office, "EDI Slide Briefing", undated. On-line, <http://192.86.241.22/RIA.ppt>.

b. Commercial Items

Enactment of FASA encouraged the procurement of commercial or "off-the-shelf" products in place of purchasing to Government-unique specifications. This was done with the intent of reducing costs and developing new business sources with those firms previously reluctant to comply with burdensome Government requirements that are inconsistent with best commercial practices. Specifically, FASA included an expanded definition of commercial items, and offered additional exemptions from:

- Submission of cost and pricing data required under the Truth in Negotiating Act (TINA),
- Compliance with cost accounting standards (CAS) and
- Other Government unique requirements on commercially designated items up to \$100,000.00.

c. Past Performance Evaluation

FASA emphasizes the relevance and propriety of evaluating a contractor's past performance as a critical source selection factor.¹⁴ FASA required evaluation prior to contract award of past performance information for negotiated procurements in excess of \$1,000,000.00; and, after full implementation in 1998, the criterion value was lowered to \$100,000.00. Previously, past performance information was used informally to support responsiveness and responsibility determinations. Past performance evaluation as a source selection factor is consistent with

¹⁴ Government Executive. "Details of the New Procurement Law", August 30, 1999. On-line: <http://www.govexec.com/procure/articles/0195prs2.htm>.

best commercial practices that recognized the importance of contractor past performance.

Notwithstanding FASA's emphasis on past performance as an evaluation factor, the Federal Government and DoD have yet to fully benefit from best commercial practices in this area. The DoD Past Performance Automated Information System (PPAIS) is not uniformly updated in a timely manner or consistently utilized by acquisition personnel across all services. In addition, there is a cultural resistance to using past performance as a meaningful discriminator because it is thought to be too subjective.¹⁵ Even DoD recognizes that past performance as a critical source selection factor has not been fully implemented as intended and re-issued the initiative in November 2000 as a key strategy in support of Price-Based Acquisition.¹⁶

d. Alternative Disputes Resolution

The purpose of Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR) is to provide a method of resolving disputes that is less fractious than normal litigation venues. ADR furnishes the Government and contractor the opportunity to resolve differences in less expensive and more expedient forums such as mediation or arbitration. FASA placed renewed emphasis on broad implementation of the previous Alternative Disputes Resolution Act of 1990 by requiring that agencies choosing not to use ADR must provide

¹⁵ Ibid, 12.

¹⁶ Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology). "Price-Based Acquisition", November 29, 2000.

justification in writing. FASA also encouraged the use of ADR as a proactive partnering technique to establish mutually satisfactory goals and identify expectations in an effort to prevent future disputes.

e. Electronic Data Interchange

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), also commonly referred to as Electronic Commerce, was introduced to convert the paper intensive DoD acquisition process into a computer-based automated process built on a standard electronic format. Electronic commerce networks not only provide wide access to a geographically dispersed supplier base but also increase the potential to efficiently manage the supply chain from inventory, requisitioning and ordering functions to vendor payment. FASA required the creation of an EDI network called Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET).

f. Performance-Based Contracts

Performance-Based service contracting was a reform initiative proposed under FASA to address the increasing importance of service contracting. The Government's preferential approach to service contracting previously relied on defining how the contractor was to accomplish a specific effort. Performance-based service contracting was introduced as a method of reducing acquisition costs and improving contractor performance by encouraging innovative approaches to conducting the work

within desired outcomes. Like many acquisition reform initiatives, performance based service contracting was not a new idea.

The initiatives to utilize performance-based contracting were originally proposed by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in 1991¹⁷. Today, the initiative to implement widespread use of performance-based contracts has only made modest progress. During the period October 2000 through March 2001, Government-wide performance-based service contracts only accounted for 15 percent of total obligations for services.¹⁸

g. Performance Based Payments

DoD's traditional method of making interim contract payments has been based on process inputs ("cost-ed"). The initiative to move to performance-based payments reduces performance risk to the Government and more accurately associates contract progress with financing. Performance based payments also have the potential to incentivize contract performance, reduce administrative effort, reinforce program manager roles, and increase technical and schedule focus.¹⁹ The contractor benefits from performance based payments by being provided access to a larger percentage of the overall contract value prior to final completion. Table 2-2 summarizes the

¹⁷ United States Office of Procurement Policy. "Policy Letter 91-2, 9 Apr 1991.

¹⁸ United States General Accounting Office. "Contract Management: Improving Service Acquisitions", GAO-02-179T, November 1, 2001.

¹⁹ Acquisition Reform Today. "Performance-Based Payment", Vol. 6, No. 2, May/June 2001, p. 2. On-line: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ar>.

current regulatory guidance on payments prior to contract completion:

Payment Type	Payment Ceiling (Not-to-Exceed)	Regulatory Reference
Cost-Based Progress Payments	Large Business: 80 Percent Small Business: 85 Percent	Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 32.501-1
Performance-Based Payments	All Businesses: 90 Percent	Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 32.1004

Table 2.2. Progress Payment Rates (From: Federal Acquisition Regulations).

3. Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996

The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Clinger-Cohen), also known separately as the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 and the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996, made further advances to those initiatives implemented under FASA. Among the most important changes included:

- Amended Simplified Acquisition Procedures
- Amended Commercial Items procedures
- Permitted Efficient Competitive Range Determinations
- Changed Information Technology Acquisition Processes

a. *Simplified Acquisition Procedures*

The Clinger-Cohen Act increased the authority to use simplified acquisition procedures for commercial items initially granted under FASA from \$100,000.00 to \$5,000,000.00, enabling DoD to significantly reduce acquisition related costs associated with acquiring low risk, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items. Second, it allowed procuring organizations to utilize simplified acquisition procedures for all requirements between \$50,000.00 and \$100,000.00 without the use of FACNET (as required under FASA). This relief was granted to allow additional time for the Government to fully implement Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchange and to leverage the benefits from the reduced administrative expenses associated with simplified acquisition procedures. Third, it eliminated Government requirements frequently cited by private industry as barriers to conducting business with the Federal Government.

b. *Commercial Item Definition*

The Clinger-Cohen Act broadened the definition of commercial items, eliminated certain certifications required by law. The legislation also initiated an examination of procurement laws and regulations potentially inconsistent with acquiring commercial products, and exempted commercial-off-the-shelf items from Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and submission of cost and pricing data required under TINA.

c. Efficient Competitive Range Determinations

The Clinger-Cohen Act permitted the Procuring Contracting Officer to limit the number of proposals to be considered for award ("competitive range") to an efficient number while still complying with the precepts of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984. Previously, the general rule of thumb followed the adage "when in doubt, leave in". Under FARA, "when in doubt, leave out" may be considered more appropriate.

d. Information Technology Acquisitions

The Information Technology Management Reform Act made substantial changes to the acquisition of information technology including revocation of the General Services Administration (GSA) as the mandatory purchaser and manager of Information Technology (IT). This legislation also transferred the IT protest forum from the GSA Board of Contract Appeals to the General Accounting Office (GAO), and established the position of agency Chief Information Officers. These changes were in response to the increasing importance of acquiring IT and the rapid evolution of information technology.

4. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998

The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act was signed into law on October 12, 1998 (Public Law 105-270)

requiring Federal agencies to submit to congress and make publicly available each year an inventory of all activities performed by Federal employees not inherently Governmental in nature. A function (activity) that is performed by the commercial marketplace is one not generally considered to be inherently governmental in nature. The purpose of the act was to use outsourcing to increase productivity and enhance quality at the lowest costs through competitive forces in the commercial marketplace.

Outsourcing of Government functions is not a new initiative beginning with the introduction of FAIR. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, originally published in 1966 and revised in 1996, provides specific guidance on whether a Federal activity should be commercially obtained and specific processes for conducting the public-private competition. FAIR expanded, clarified and codified some of the policy guidance provided under OMB Circular A-76 into law, mandating agencies to proactively examine outsourcing as a potential source of cost savings. Outsourcing of Governmental activities has become increasingly important as Federal agencies seek ways to reduce costs while maintaining acceptable levels of service to the public. In February 2002, DoD agreed to study competing (outsourcing) 70,000 positions, or 15 percent of positions identified within DoD to be "commercial like"²⁰. Although outsourcing has gained some notoriety and momentum in the last few years, DoD and other Federal agencies have failed to make meaningful gains. Outsourcing, like many reform

²⁰ Dembeck, Chet. "OMB Wins Pentagon Pledge on Job Studies", Federal Times, February 4, 2002, p. 1, 18.

initiatives, has been mistakenly viewed as a panacea for budget shortfalls when attention should be directed towards re-engineering business processes. Even the Department of Navy has recognized that "...the Navy is far from having achieved the anticipated and necessary savings [from outsourcing]".²¹

5. Other Recent Acquisition Reform Initiatives

The remaining initiatives discussed below and examined during the research survey were selected from Under Secretary of Defense J.S. Gansler's memorandum dated November 29, 2000, regarding Price-Based Acquisition. The initiatives followed panel recommendations resulting from Section 912c of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998.

a. Evolutionary/Incremental Development Strategy

Evolutionary/Incremental development is a risk mitigation strategy allowing for the incremental fielding of technological improvements ("blocks") after they reach some pre-defined level of maturity. These block upgrades may be initially defined in the acquisition strategy but do not prevent the fielding of the basic configuration or contract completion. One of the primary benefits of such a strategy is to enable the program to maintain schedule by reducing dependence on unproven technology. Evolutionary

²¹ United States Department of Navy. "Implementation of Acquisition Reform: Outsourcing Initiative", April 1998.

development strategy has its foundations in life cycle management and system engineering concepts prior to 1994²².

b. Incentive Term Contracting

Incentive term contracting provides the vendor an opportunity to earn additional contract periods of performance based on good past performance. This initiative is mutually beneficial to the Government and contractor. The Government is able to reduce administrative costs by reducing the number of procurement actions and reduces overall acquisition risk by continuing performance with a proven source. The contractor also does not have to incur additional expenses re-competing for the same effort and is able to amortize these and other applicable fixed costs over a longer period of performance, providing the opportunity for increased profit by reducing overhead expenses.

c. Share-in-Savings Contracts

Share-in-Savings contracts allows the Government to leverage limited resources by requiring the contractor to initially fund a project in return for a percentage of substantiated savings realized by the Government. Share-in-Savings type contracts have their conceptual foundations in the Value Engineering (VE) program establish by the DoD

²² Naval Information Systems Management (NISMC) Life Cycle Management (LCM) Review Handbook; April 1994.

in 1963²³. Like the share-in-savings type contract, a VE Change Proposal clause incorporated into contracts prompted contractors to independently develop changes beneficial to the Government. Contractor-suggested improvements beneficial to the Government above and beyond contract requirements result in a pro-rated sharing of substantiated savings.

Two substantial challenges to share-in-savings contracts has been the need to establish an accurate baseline of existing cost data and a reliable method of measuring the degree of improvement over the status quo. According to the General Service Administration (GSA), most GSA projects reviewed for share-in-savings incentives were rejected because agencies could not determine baseline costs.²⁴

d. Alpha Contracting

Alpha contracting primarily relies on a team approach to concurrently develop a Statement Of Work (SOW), negotiate a price and prepare the contract in final form. The integrated team is composed of all key stakeholders including representatives from the requiring organization, contracting, administrative organizations (such as Defense Contract Management Agency), audit (Defense Contract Audit Agency) and the contractor along with any vital subcontractors. Alpha contracting takes advantage of concurrent and integrated, rather than serial processing,

²³ DoD 4245.8-H, Value Engineering, March 1986, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Logistics, Historical Background.

²⁴ Ibid, 16.

to reduce acquisition cycle time in the preaward phase. Jointly, the team's effort replaces the traditional solicitation and proposal phases of classic acquisition management.

Alpha contracting fosters open and early communication between the contractor and Government, a mutual understanding of the statement of work, and overall Government objectives and priorities. In addition, there is the potential that any collaborative partnership developed may enhance future conflict resolution and limit subsequent litigation. Under certain types of acquisitions such as sole source, alpha contracting has resulted in substantial savings of both time and money.²⁵ Unfortunately, alpha contracting is also very labor intensive early in the acquisition cycle and may be difficult to manage for those organizations with limited personnel resources. One alternative for organizations with limited staffing requirements is tailoring the approach to specific tasks such as SOW generation or contract formation.²⁶

D. BARRIERS TO ACQUISITION REFORM

Acquisition Reform: It's Not As Easy As It Seems

Mark Cancian²⁷

²⁵ Meyer, Thomas C. "Alpha Contracting: Applying the IPT Approach to Contract Negotiations", Army RD&A, January/February 1997, pp. 20-21.

²⁶ Ibid, 21.

²⁷ Cancian, Mark. "Acquisition Reform: It's Not As Easy As It Seems", Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1995, pp. 189-198.

Mr. Cancian, Director, Land Forces Division, Program Analysis & Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense, succinctly summarizes the DoD's attempts to effectively implement acquisition reform over the last decade. The complexity and difficulty cannot be underestimated considering:

- Resistance to change
- The physical size and geographical dispersion of the acquisition workforce;
- The diverse composition of occupational specialties supporting the acquisition process;
- The number and influence of the stakeholders impacted by DoD acquisition reform initiatives; and
- The number and magnitude of acquisition reforms proposed within the last several years.

1. Resistance to Change

A 1997 industry survey of DoD contractors, conducted by Coopers and Lybrand, cited cultural resistance as the most frequently cited barrier to acquisition reform implementation.²⁸ Not surprisingly the same results were repeated one year later in a DoD-conducted survey at the conclusion of Acquisition Reform Week III.²⁹ Reform initiatives are not only slow to gain momentum in an organization the size of DoD, they require people to move out of their "comfort zones," challenge organizational attitudes and cultures, and threaten personal "rice bowls."

²⁸ Coopers & Lybrand. "Acquisition Reform Implementation: An Industry Survey", October 1997.

²⁹ United States Department of the Navy. "Acquisition Reform Week Survey Results", July 1998.

Based on past experience, reform initiatives may be characterized by the workforce as a passing fad. As exhibited in previous discussions, many initiatives have lingered for years without being meaningfully implemented or vigorously pursued. This lackluster performance sends the wrong message to the workforce and potentially has the tendency to reduce interest in future reform initiatives. Successful reform implementation requires "buy-in" at all levels of the organization.

2. Size and Geographical Location

The DoD acquisition workforce includes approximately 135,000 DoD civilians and uniformed service members stationed at thousands of locations throughout the United States and around the world.³⁰ Although the advent of the computer age, through email and the Internet, has dramatically improved communication within the acquisition community, the logistical concerns of reaching out to and clearly communicating reform initiatives to a majority of the workforce remain challenging.

3. Workforce Composition/Diversity

The contract specialist/purchasing agent occupational specialties only comprise approximately 22,000 positions or 16.6 percent of the overall acquisition workforce³¹. The

³⁰ Burman, A. V., Cavallini, N. M. and Harris, K. N. "Identification of the Department of Defense Key Acquisition and Technology Workforce", Jefferson Solutions, D.C., September 2000.

³¹ Ibid.

vast majority of acquisition workforce members provide direct or indirect support to the actual process of acquiring supplies and services. Therefore, effective acquisition reform implementation must be institutionalized not only by contracting personnel, but also by a diverse group of (occupational) specialties. These different groups often have competing and contradictory goals that influence their interpretation of reform initiatives within the same organization. Engineering personnel strive for technically superior solutions while contracting officers pursue the best overall value for the Government considering technical, instant procurement and life cycle cost trade-offs. However, some consensus is necessary for these reform initiatives to be effectively implemented. Table 2.3 exhibits the diversity of the acquisition workforce membership as defined by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1991³²:

Unfortunately, there is more than one method of classifying the number of individuals in the DoD acquisition workforce. Occupational specialties other than Program Managers and Contracting Specialists may only be temporarily assigned to a position classified within the acquisition workforce. This method categorizes acquisition workforce members across all occupational specialties into four categories (including uniformed services members)³³.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid, 30.

Engineers	36,790
Contracting	19,078
Management	15,567
Business & Industry	11,502
Computers	9,101
Admin. & Programs	6,004
Financial Mgt.	3,970
Scientists	3,401
Auditing	3,605
Math and Statistics	2,411
Procurement Asst.	1,912
Purchasing	1,388
Supply Mgt.	1,830
Other	3,580
Total Civilians	120,139
Total Military	14,875
Total DoD A&TWF	135,014

Table 2.3. DAWIA Workforce Count (From: Jefferson Solutions).

a. Category I Personnel

Category I includes contracting and program management personnel performing acquisition-related work regardless of where they are located within the DoD. All personnel in these occupations are always counted as part of the workforce. Uniformed service members are not counted in this total. Of the 135,014 included in Table 2-3, these individuals account for 24,110 personnel or 17.9 percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition workforce.

b. Category IIA Personnel

Category IIA includes occupations such as engineers or computer scientist and are only counted when they are serving in acquisition-related organizations such as the Army Material Command. Of the 135,014 included in Table 2-3, these individuals account for 85,454 personnel or 43.3 percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition workforce.

c. Category IIB Personnel

Category IIB includes occupational specialties such as microbiology and are only counted when they are serving in technology related organizations such as the Office of Naval Research. Of the 135,014 included in Table 2-3, these individuals account for 6,609 personnel or 4.9 percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition workforce.

d. Category III Personnel

This is a "miscellaneous" category to provide flexibility to organizations to add personnel to improve the overall accuracy of the count. This category accounts for the military officers assigned to acquisition, logistics or technology related organizations. Enlisted personnel are generally not included in the count. Of the 135,014 included in Table 2.3, these individuals account for 18,841 personnel or 14.0 percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition workforce. Considering the military

account for 14,875, the remaining 3,966 individuals (18,841 - 14,875) are civilians (assuming no enlisted personnel are counted).

4. Acquisition Process Stakeholders

Several influential players have a strong interest in the defense acquisition process including Congress, the defense industry, small business concerns, and the military services. Each sees acquisition reform as an opportunity to further serve their own special interests whether it be corporate profits, constituent votes or satisfying perceived or actual needs of the end user. Frequently these parties' interests are in direct conflict with the intended purpose of acquisition reform. Trade-offs and compromises are a political reality and must be made to garner support from powerful special interest groups often at the overall expense of establishing and gaining approval of the most effective and efficient acquisition reforms. Congress greatly influences Federal and DoD acquisition policy through various legislative actions and there is no evidence they will relinquish control to DoD or any other executive department.

5. Number and Magnitude of Acquisition Reforms

The frequency and number of changes in acquisition reform has been so significant that in 2000 the General Accounting Office (GAO) characterized the resulting turbulence as one of nine management challenges facing

DoD.³⁴ During the last decade there have been an estimated forty major acquisition reform initiatives proposed by the DoD and the individual services³⁵. These reforms have been imposed on organizations that are ill equipped to effectively manage change - particularly in the Federal (DoD) civil service workforce. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform acknowledged this concern in a 1999 quote: "The rapid pace of change and re-engineering has outstripped employees' ability to stay abreast of acquisition reform and new business practices."³⁶ According to research, there is an overall lack of consideration regarding the impact on the workforce of the turbulence cause by the large number and magnitude of reform initiatives³⁷. This is of particular concern considering congressionally mandated acquisition workforce reductions that are seemingly motivated by political agendas and without regard to actual workload.

The DoD faces serious barriers to acquisition reform. These barriers are internal and external to the DoD. Some major acquisition reform initiatives depend on congressional and/or presidential support to push through meaningful legislative change. Although many other issues such as socio-economic programs and multi-year funding issues significantly hinder acquisition reform initiatives, DoD must focus on those internal and external areas where

³⁴ United States General Accounting Office. "Observations on the Department of Defense's FY99 Performance Report and FY01 Performance Plan", GAO/NSIAD-00-188R, June 30, 2000.

³⁵ General Accounting Office. "Best Practices: DoD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs Implement Best Practices", GAO/NSIAD-99-206, August 1996.

³⁶ Ibid, 6.

³⁷ Ibid, 33.

meaningful progress can reasonably be expected. Of equal importance, DoD needs to focus its efforts on a limited number of reform initiatives, fully follow through with initiatives proposed, and clearly communicate to the workforce some "order of priority".

E. ACQUISITION REFORM TRAINING

Our military and civilian acquisition personnel are clearly the key to the success of our reform and modernization issues, and I am strongly committed to providing them with the tools they will need to meet future challenges.

- J.S.Gansler³⁸

Secretary Gansler's 1998 memorandum recognized the importance of training in the successful implementation of acquisition reform initiatives. The purpose of this section will be to briefly discuss the sources and types of acquisition reform training available to DoD acquisition workforce members. The primary sources providing training to support implementation of acquisition reform include the Defense Acquisition University, Acquisition Reform Advocates, DoD Road Shows, Acquisition Reform Weeks and various Non-Government Sources. Advantages and disadvantages of each source will be discussed as applicable in Chapter IV, Survey Data and Analysis.

Acquisition Workforce training has been dictated by policy resulting from two specific initiatives. The first

³⁸ Office of Undersecretary of Defense. "Reform Through Learning: USD(A&T) Policy on Continuous Learning for the Defense Acquisition Workforce", 15 Dec 1998.

policy resulted from the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 as previously discussed. The second is the Undersecretary of Defense Continuous Learning Policy implemented 15 Dec 1998³⁹.

The purpose of the Continuous Learning Policy is to provide continued professional growth and development of the acquisition workforce including staying current with appropriate acquisition reform initiatives. The continuous learning policy requires acquisition workforce members to earn a minimum of 80 Continuous Learning Points every two years⁴⁰. These Continuous Learning Points may be earned through participation in Functional/Technical training, Leadership Training, Academic Courses at Institutions of Higher Education, Developmental Assignments and Professional Activities.

1. Defense Acquisition University

The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is the primary source of training to the DoD acquisition workforce. DAU currently offers eighty-five acquisition courses supporting certification in eleven defense acquisition career fields⁴¹. These courses are offered in residence at one of twelve campuses and regional training sites, on-site (in person at the organization's work site), web based and a hybrid of resident and web based. DAU's primary method of providing acquisition reform training is

³⁹ Ibid, 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 14.

⁴¹ Defense Acquisition University. "Business Plan 2001", 21 Nov 2000. On-line, <http://www.dau.mil/news/whats-new.htm>.

through insertion of "drop in" modules in the eighty-five certification courses and the Internet-based Continuous Learning Center⁴². In addition, DAU offers one specific acquisition reform resident/on-site course, Contemporary Approaches to Acquisition Reform (CAR) 805, scheduled six times during FY2002.

The purpose of DAU's Continuous Learning Center (CLC) is to augment acquisition training standards for career field certification, provide DoD Acquisition Workforce members training to implement current acquisition reform initiatives, and meet DoD continuing certification requirements. As of 15 Feb 2002, DAU's CLC had 33 operational modules serving approximately 2,400 registered users⁴³. Review of the 10 Contracting and 12 Program Management courses offered through the CLC indicated course formats could be divided into three categories:

- Courses directly linked back to regular DAU web-based courses and requiring DAU access privileges
- Courses that were copies of recent Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Training Modules (slide shows)
- Courses brief in nature explaining subject fundamentals, definitions and regulatory references

DAU's greatest potential to provide timely acquisition reform training to the workforce is through their distributed-learning courses. These courses are thoroughly developed, interactive in nature utilizing current technology and have an evaluative component-focusing

⁴² Defense Acquisition Continuous Learning Center. On-line, <http://clc.dau.mil/kc/main/>.

⁴³ Defense Acquisition University. "DAU CLC User Survey Statistics", 15 Feb 2002.

student's attention on specific learning objectives. Equally important, these courses have proven to reach a relatively large portion of the workforce. The enrollment in these courses has increased from 630 students in 1998 to 12,800 in 2001⁴⁴. This trend will continue to rapidly increase considering 11 courses were offered on line in 2001 and 13 more will be added in 2002⁴⁵.

Although the DAU was originally established in 1991, their ability to effectively integrate education and training into the DoD acquisition workforce came seven years later in 1998 with the consolidation of the service acquisition schools. Until this time, training provided across services was not consistently managed. Considering long-standing inter-service rivalries and reluctance to yield control over service unique processes and philosophies, this should have come as no surprise. The revised DAU structure is still evolving and has received criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO) particularly in the DAU's ability to support acquisition reform initiatives:

While the proposed structure offers improvements, it does not discernibly address key weaknesses in the training of best (commercial) practices.⁴⁶

The same GAO report expresses concern regarding the ability of the DoD's continuous learning policy to direct training in any specific acquisition reform initiative. After reviewing the DoD continuous learning policy and

⁴⁴ Defense Acquisition University. "The DAU Road Map for e-Learning and Performance Support", On-Line: http://www.dau.mil/pubs/misc/Technology_Roadmap.pdf, dated 27 Aug 2001.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 22.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 16.

considering the range of options for satisfying the annual 40-hour continuous learning policy, there appear to be no checks and balances in place to ensure that training supporting current acquisition reform initiatives are received.

2. Acquisition Reform Advocates, Roadshows and Acquisition Reform Week

DoD and the individual services have used a combination of vehicles other than traditional training methods and approaches to provide timely training of current acquisition reform initiatives to the acquisition workforce. The first of these methods (Roadshows) have focused on sending subject matter expert teams to conduct on-site seminars, especially to areas with high concentrations of acquisition workforce members. The frequency of these on-site seminars appears to be currently on the decline in favor of video and web based delivery of subject materials, enabling greater participation at a lower cost.

The Acquisition and Logistics Excellence week training materials previously discussed and presented via video teleconferencing or over the Internet appear to represent the future. These training materials can be accessed at the member's discretion on a "just-in-time" basis. DAU projects the number of Distance Learning courses provided over the Internet to rapidly increase and is a trend consistent with those at public and private universities

and other nongovernmental training sources⁴⁷. Unfortunately, many of these training sources have provided workforce members with only a general awareness of current reform initiatives and lack detailed information necessary to support functional execution.⁴⁸

3. Non-Government Sources

Non-government sources of training such as professional organizations and public and private universities have proven to be a valuable source of acquisition training to the DoD acquisition workforce. Universities and professional organizations attract and develop leaders in the public and private acquisition communities. In many cases, these organizations, through lobbying efforts, frequently are involved in shaping acquisition legislation that ultimately translates into acquisition policy and reform initiatives.

The National Contract Management Association (NCMA), the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) and other similar organizations provide a variety of acquisition related courses to Government and non-government acquisition personnel. These courses are provided through various types of seminars and instructor-led and self-paced web-based formats. DoD has long recognized the value of career development opportunities and certifications offered by professional organizations in the contracting career field. In 2001, the OSD(AR) requested ISM and NCMA to develop two

⁴⁷ Ibid, 27.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 17, p. 58.

training courses (Integrating Commercial Practices through Government Business Practices and Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA)) supporting these two high priority acquisition reform initiatives.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provided a discussion of recent acquisition reform initiatives and training sources available to DoD acquisition workforce personnel. Acquisition reform has been driven by DoD's recognition that best commercial practices offer substantial opportunities to improve existing acquisition processes. Significant acquisition reform initiatives have been codified into public law through important legislative acts. These acts include the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining (FASA) of 1994, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. In addition to legislative acts, DoD has promulgated regulations and policies supporting numerous acquisition reform initiatives.

The importance of acquisition workforce training has significantly increased considering the magnitude and pace of acquisition reforms proposed during the last decade. DoD training sources have been forced to evolve to meet changing priorities that effect both workforce training needs and organizations' resource constraints. Meeting these priorities has and will continue to challenge DoD's education and training institutions. Traditional training

methods are giving way to those provided via maturing electronic media over the Internet on a "just-in-time" basis.

III. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II provided an overview of acquisition reform initiatives since 1990 and potential sources of acquisition reform training available to the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition workforce. In this chapter, survey development and methodology is presented. The purpose of the survey was to study the acquisition workforce's perception of available training in support of acquisition reform implementation. The data gathered from the survey provide the foundation of this research. Survey data presentation and analysis are discussed in Chapter IV.

B. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

1. Overview

The survey was formulated after a thorough literature review was conducted. This review indicated that most significant acquisition reform was proposed after 1990. Therefore, the research survey content was limited to initiatives and training resources proposed or implemented after 1990. The online survey, conducted from December 10 to December 19, 2001, utilized the SurveySaid software and was coordinated with the Naval Postgraduate School Office of Strategic Planning, Education Assessment and Institutional Research.

The survey was initially intended to be widely distributed to Army and Navy contracting offices within the United States. Unfortunately, due to multiple layers within various commands, the survey did not reach some potential Navy respondents until after the scheduled cut-off date. The communication error was not discovered until after the survey had closed and a significant amount of the data analysis had been completed. The survey request was successfully distributed to several Army contracting organizations providing 411 total responses. The potential number of respondents receiving the survey is unknown. The survey in its online form and accompanying survey cover sheet provided to respondents are included in their entirety in Appendix A.

2. Framing Survey Questions

The first concern in developing the survey was to keep the survey short enough so respondents could answer all questions within 10 minutes. Anything longer might lose the respondents' attention and decrease the number of responses. Prior to publication, the final version of the survey was provided to three Naval Postgraduate School students and two current acquisition workforce members to estimate the average time to complete the survey. Although the survey contains 36 questions, the average completion time was eight minutes with no respondent taking over ten minutes. These test responses are not recorded as part of the final survey results.

Survey questions were formulated within survey software constraints and the research objectives. The decision as to which reform initiatives and training sources to include in the survey was based on the literature review and the need to meet the practical survey constraints previously discussed.

The structure of survey questions was formulated around the constraints of the SurveySaid software utilized in the research survey. SurveySaid provides various options to structure survey questions. Survey questions were formatted with the intent of facilitating respondent's understanding of the question and providing data in a useful format considering research objectives. The ability to analyze the data was partially constrained by the tools provided in the SurveySaid software. Some of the data analysis was accomplished by extracting raw data from the SurveySaid software and manually inputting it into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The analysis relied on descriptive statistics including numerical means and response frequencies.

3. Purpose of Questions

The purpose of the first five questions was to gather demographic information about survey respondents. The remaining 31 questions pertain to acquisition reform training. The following provides the underlying rationale for each question. Because of software constraints in yielding data output, three of the original survey questions were divided into several questions. The first

question was divided into eleven separate questions (7 through 17). The other two questions were each divided into eight separate questions (18 through 25 and 26 through 33). The purpose of the three original questions will be discussed collectively.

a. Question 1

Question: I am (select only one):

- Civilian
- Active Duty Military

The amount of training and education provided by DoD to the military member of the acquisition workforce is considerably higher when compared to their civilian counterpart⁴⁹. Therefore, the researcher anticipated military and civilian member's survey responses may differ.

b. Question 2

Question: Please indicate your Primary Occupational Career Field or military equivalent (select only one):

- Engineers (all)
- Contracting
- Program Management
- Business and Industry
- Information Technology

⁴⁹ Disney, Diane. "Investing in People: Educating the Civilian Workforce", The Armed Forces Comptroller, Summer 2000, Vol. 45, Issue 2, pp. 61-65.

- Administration and Programs
- Scientist
- Auditing
- Financial Management
- Procurement Assistants
- Mathematics and Statistics
- Purchasing
- Supply Management
- Inventory Management
- Equipment Specialists
- General Supply
- Miscellaneous

The DoD acquisition workforce as defined by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 includes a diverse group of career fields. For research purposes, the respondent's career field may provide insight into their perspective on acquisition reform training provided.

c. Question 3

Question: What is the highest DAWIA certification level you have attained in your Primary Career Field (select only one)?

- Level I
- Level II
- Level III
- No certification

As discussed in Chapter II, DAWIA certification levels are directly associated with mandatory training standards. DAWIA certifications levels may correlate with implementation of acquisition reform initiatives.

d. Question 4

Question: Number of years at Highest DAWIA Certification Level (select only one):

- 1-2 years
- 3-4 years
- 5-6 years
- 7-8 years
- 9-10 years

The number of years at highest certification may be significant in the event a substantial portion of the workforce has fulfilled DAWIA level III requirements. After DAWIA certification, there may be reduced incentive to actively seek out additional training. This factor may impact reform implementation considering acquisition reform initiatives are constantly evolving. The available choices were limited between one and ten years since DAWIA certification started in 1991 and therefore, as of 2001, there should not be anyone certified over 10 years.

e. Question 5

Question: I work in a (select only one):

- Program Management Office (ACAT I, II, or III designation)
- Major Systems Command or equivalent
- Inventory Control Point (Service or DLA)
- Base/Installation Level Contracting Office
- Contract Policy/Administrative Support Office

The acquisition workforce is employed acquiring an extremely diverse group of products and services. As a result, acquisition organizations' missions differ substantially. Depending on the type of organization, a workforce member's perspective/interest on any specific type of acquisition reform initiative may vary.

f. Question 6

Question: Which of the following Acquisition Reform initiatives have you been involved in implementing (select all that apply)?

- Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition Development Strategy
- Incentive-Term Contracting
- Share-in-Savings Contracts
- Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
- Performance Based Contract Payments
- Alpha Contracting
- Performance Based Contracts
- Outsourcing (A-76, Fair Act, etc.)
- Commercial Items and Simplified Acquisition Procedures
- Integrated Process Teams
- Past Performance Evaluation

The purpose of this survey question is to determine if the respondent has been involved in implementing any or all of the target acquisition reform initiatives. Respondents' responses were limited to yes or no. According to research, some of the acquisition reform training provided by DoD has only accomplished initiative

awareness⁵⁰. The distinction between awareness and actual implementation is important.

The eleven selected initiatives are among dozens (perhaps hundreds) proposed since 1990. These initiatives were selected with two objectives. The first was to select a reasonable number of initiatives that potentially have broad application across various acquisition groups considering the significant mission diversity in DoD. As discussed, a primary concern was also not to make the survey so time consuming that a respondent would not participate while still gather meaningful data supporting the research objectives. There was no expectation all selected initiatives would apply to all workforce members.

The second objective in selecting the initiatives was to provide a basis for examining DOD's success implementing select acquisition reform initiatives over a period of time. The first seven are select initiatives from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) memorandum dated 29 Nov 00⁵¹. These initiatives are reflective of current reform priorities within the DoD acquisition community. Some of these seven initiatives are "re-runs" from previous legislative initiatives (FASA, Clinger-Cohen) that are several years old. Including these "re-runs" in the survey may provide some correlation between the success (or lack thereof) of implementing these initiatives and acquisition reform training.

The eighth initiative, outsourcing (of in-house service contracts), has gained particular prominence since

⁵⁰ Ibid, 34.

⁵¹ Ibid, 16.

enactment of the Fair Act in 1998 and, as previously discussed in Chapter II, the increasing importance of service contracting.

The last three initiatives were key elements of FASA and as such have been available as tools to the acquisition workforce for several years and are applicable to a substantial percentage of the workforce. Including these three initiatives should provide a basis for analyzing the success of implementing acquisition reform across the workforce.

g. Question 7 through 17

The purpose of these eleven questions was to identify the source(s) of training a respondent received for each individual acquisition reform initiative previously identified. Each question permitted multiple choices. The acquisition reform initiatives are the same as those identified in Question 6. The selection of available training sources was based on the literature review conducted and includes the majority of sources available to DoD acquisition workforce members. This section of the survey started with the basic question seven and was followed by the eleven sub-questions addressing each of the eleven reform initiatives. As an example:

For the following Acquisition Reform Initiatives, please indicate (if any) the Sources of Training you have received for each initiative:

7. Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition Development Strategy (select all that apply):

- DAU Resident Courses
- DOD "Road Shows"
- Acquisition Reform Week
- DAU Web-Based Courses
- In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- Non-Gov't Sources
- No Training Received

All eleven questions can be viewed at Appendix A.

h. Questions 18 through 25

The purpose of questions 18 through 25 was to gather qualitative data from respondents regarding "most effective" acquisition reform training from a single source. Lead Question 18, ask the respondent "Of the Acquisition Reform Initiatives you have been involved in implementing (if any), which training source provided you with the MOST EFFECTIVE acquisition reform training" Questions 19 through 23 were selected based on elements of effective acquisition reform training identified during the literature review:

- Adequacy of training to support functional implementation
- Dissemination of information to create mutual understanding
- Follow-up support and refresher training
- Applicability of training to targeted to specific responsibilities
- Timeliness of training

Questions 24 and 25 provide the respondent an opportunity to state other reasons for effective training

for the source specified and rate the alternate source identified by the respondent, respectively.

The questions were originally constructed to permit the respondent to rate the question on a sliding continuum corresponding to scale ratings from 1 to 10, with an adjective rating of "Inadequate" to "Excellent", respectively. The center of the scale indicated a rating of "Average - 5". Due to software constraints the sliding continuum was converted to 24 possible linear choices (see Appendix A for specific question layout). The numerical scale and adjectival rating anchors remained unchanged.

i. Questions 26 through 33

The rationale, framing, and physical structure of questions 26 through 33 were identical to questions 18 through 25, only the purpose of the questions was to examine "least effective" training sources. The researcher postulated the same training elements supporting effective acquisition reform implementation could apply equally as barriers to implementation when inadequate training was provided. The researcher anticipated responses from these two sets of questions (18 through 25 and 26 through 33) might provide a basis for comparing and contrasting identified training sources.

j. Question 34

Question: Overall, to what extent do you feel that the training you have received has contributed to preparing you to Implement Acquisition Reform Initiatives?

The purpose of this question was to provide the respondent with the opportunity to summarize their perception of training provided. The question also provided the researcher a method of generally validating survey responses. This question used the same rating methodology as Questions 18 through 34 except the adjective ratings were changed to correlate with the questions being asked. Scale ratings of 1 and 10, respectively, corresponded with adjective ratings of "Not at All" and "Greatly". The center of the scale (5) indicated a rating of "Somewhat".

k. Question 35

Question: Has your workload/schedule prevented you from participating in Acquisition Reform Training Opportunities (select only one):?

- Frequently
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

According to the literature review, the ability of the acquisition workforce to obtain necessary training may be related to work schedule demands. This question

provides a method of evaluating this concern. Responses may also support DoD's increasing focus on Distance Learning and web-based courses as a means to mitigate work schedule conflicts.

1. Question 36

Question: Please provide other comments regarding the value of Acquisition Reform Training received.

The researcher recognized the limited scope of the survey. As such, there may be specific workforce concerns that were missed in the literature review and not included in the survey. The final question provides respondents an opportunity to express those concerns and/or provide other comments as appropriate.

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IV. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and discusses the results of the acquisition workforce survey conducted in support of the subject thesis research. The data presented generally follows the order of questions included in the survey (See Appendix A). Cross-comparison of responses between two questions are provided as appropriate. For purposes of data analysis, the survey questions have been divided into the following five areas:

- Respondent Demographic Information (Questions one through five)
- Respondents' Training Received and Acquisition Reform Implementation (Questions six through seventeen)
- Respondents' Single Source of Most Effective Training (Questions 18 through 25)
- Respondents' Single Source of Least Effective Training (Questions 26 through 33)
- Respondents' General Perception of DoD Provided Training Supporting Implementation of Acquisition Reform (Questions 34 through 36)

As discussed in Chapter III, Survey Methodology, the survey did not reach a significant portion of the intended Department of Navy (DoN) audience. Although no survey data was gathered identifying the respondent's service branch, the researcher postulates that a majority of the respondents are employed by the Department of the Army based on the survey distribution. The concentration of Department of Army respondents should be considered in any

attempt to generalize findings to other Department of Defense (DoD)/Service acquisition workforce groups.

The statistical data as extracted from the SurveySaid software package utilized to conduct the survey is included at Appendix C. The total number of individuals responding to the web-based survey was 411. Unless otherwise stated, the statistical data presented and analyzed is based on the total number of individuals responding to a specific question. All tables presented in this chapter were prepared by the researcher based on the data obtained from the survey. Minor discrepancies between tables created by the researcher and raw statistical data provided in the SurveySaid software output is subject to insignificant rounding errors. Any further explanation for such rounding errors is omitted.

B. RESPONDENTS' DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Uniformed Service Members

The total number of military members responding to survey question one was 31 of 411 or 7.54% which is consistent with the actual DoD workforce composition (11.02%) as discussed in Chapter II, Figure 2.3, DAWIA Workforce Count by Occupation. Cross-comparison of other survey questions did not indicate any noteworthy differences between civilian and military acquisition workforce members. Thus, all findings presented below represent the total combined sample of military and civilian respondents.

2. Occupational Career Field

As exhibited in Table 4.1, the survey respondents' career field is heavily concentrated in the Contracting area. Of the remaining fifteen potential career field choices (plus one miscellaneous "catch-all" category), only three others had any meaningful response rate. Three of the 411 respondents failed to identify their career field.

Career Field	Frequency	Percent of Total Responses
Contracting	337	82.60%
Engineering	17	4.17%
Administration & Programs	13	3.19%
Program Management	10	2.45%
Totals:	377	92.40%
Total Responses:	408	

Table 4.1. Respondent's Occupational Career Field.

The response to survey question two is not in proportion to the distribution of occupational career fields within the acquisition workforce as previously discussed in Chapter II, Literature Review, Table 2.3. Although the response is heavily distorted, Contracting careerists do comprise a large majority of those individuals permanently classified as acquisition workforce members. Many of the other occupational specialties may only be temporarily assigned to a position classified within the acquisition workforce. This conclusion is supported by a

related method of categorizing acquisition workforce members discussed in Chapter II.

Although contracting should logically be the nucleus for acquisition reform, many other professions play significant roles and therefore, also require access to effective acquisition reform training. Unfortunately, the limited response from respondents classified outside the Contracting career field may provide a distorted view when examining the effectiveness of implementing some acquisition reform initiatives. This is especially true in situations requiring organization-wide support to effectively implement acquisition reform initiatives.

3. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Certification Level

Responses to survey questions 3 and 4 are consolidated into Table 4.2, Respondent's DAWIA Certification Level. This table cross-compares the respondents' highest DAWIA certification level (question 3) with the respondents' number of years at the highest certification level (question 4).

Years at Highest Certification Level	DAWIA Certification Level			Total
	Level I	Level II	Level III	
1-2 Years	16	22	60	98
3-4 Years	3	18	48	69
5-6 Years	0	25	44	69
7-8 Years	0	35	26	61
9-10 Years	2	32	54	88
Totals:	21	132	232	385
Percent of Total Responses:	5.45%	34.29%	60.26%	100.00%
Average Years at Certification Level:	2.5 Years	6.1 Years	5.2 Years	5.4 Years
Missing Responses/No Certification: 23				

Table 4.2. Respondents' DAWIA Certification Level.

The majority (94.55%) of the survey respondents are certified at the journeyman (Level II) or senior (Level III) DAWIA levels and on average, have been certified at these levels for at least five years. These data indicate the vast majority of acquisition workforce members responding to the survey have met all mandatory acquisition training to satisfy DAWIA requirements for their current positions for some time. Within Level II and III, there is a relatively even distribution of respondents between the number of years certified at the highest level.

Notwithstanding the establishment of continuous learning education requirements by Under Secretary of Defense Gansler in December 1998, these figures suggest that a significant portion of the acquisition workforce may not have received any formal training in the last several years. This is indicated by the average number of years

(five or greater) spent at the highest DAWIA certification level. Resources to support formal training after mandatory DAWIA certification are scarce and may adversely impact the ability of DoD to provide adequate training to support acquisition reform.

4. Employment Site

Responses to survey question 5 identifying respondents' employment site are summarized in Table 4.3. The lack of Inventory Control Point responses is directly attributed to the late distribution of the survey to DoN activities as previously discussed.

Employment Site	Frequency	Percent of Total Responses
Major Systems Command	157	39.25%
Contract Policy/ Admin Support Office	123	30.75%
Base/Installation Level Office	96	24.00%
Program Management Office	20	5.00%
Inventory Control Point	4	1.00%
Total:	400	100.00%
Missing Responses:	11	

Table 4.3. Respondent's Employment Site.

With the exception of Program Management Offices, the distribution of respondents among employment sites provides

a cross-section of acquisition workforce task responsibilities throughout DoD.

C. RESPONDENTS' TRAINING RECEIVED AND ACQUISITION REFORM IMPLEMENTATION

Table 4.4 provides a summary of acquisition reform training received by respondents for each target initiative and the rate of the degree of engagement in implementation for each acquisition reform initiative. Participants had the opportunity to select more than one initiative and training source.

Initiative	Received Training	Implemented Initiative	Implementation Rate	Missing Response
Evolutionary	54.83%	7.55%	13.77%	14.36%
Incentive-Term	43.28%	15.89%	36.71%	18.49%
Share-in-Savings	20.78%	4.69%	22.57%	25.06%
ADR	63.56%	23.96%	37.70%	16.55%
Perform Based Contract Payments	59.48%	30.73%	51.66%	15.33%
Alpha Contracting	52.91%	43.49%	82.20%	16.30%
Performance Based Contracts	79.47%	58.59%	73.73%	8.76%
Outsourcing	43.81%	18.75%	42.80%	19.46%
Commercial Item/SAP	83.55%	69.01%	82.60%	6.81%
IPT	73.35%	63.28%	86.27%	11.44%
Past Performance Evaluation	72.46%	70.05%	96.67%	9.00%

Table 4.4. Respondent's Acquisition Reform Training/Implementation Rates.

The percent of respondents receiving acquisition reform training for each initiative and the "missing responses" category are based on the total number of responses received for the corresponding survey questions,

seven through seventeen. The percent of respondents implementing a specific reform initiative is based on responses to survey question six. The implementation rate was calculated by dividing the Implemented Initiative percent by the Received Training percent (i.e., for evolutionary contracting strategy, $7.55\%/54.83\% = 13.77\%$). At best, the implementation rates presented in Table 4.4 assume all respondents receiving training followed through with reform implementation, which is unlikely. In this case, the assumption has the effect of possibly overstating survey respondents' actual implementation rates.

The implementation rate analysis does not account for those individuals not provided with the opportunity to implement any single reform initiative for which training was received. Regardless, the researcher made a reasonable assumption that the survey respondents did not participate in training without the expectation of practical application within assigned duties. Further, acquisition management personnel are required to plan and approve acquisition workforce personnel training through the Individual Development Plan (IDP) process on an annual basis. During this review process any training not applicable to an individual's duties would most likely be disapproved and thereby prevent attendance to unnecessary training. The following two paragraphs discuss in detail respondents' training received and implementation rates.

1. Training Received

The training received by survey respondents from three employment sites (Major Systems Commands, Policy/Support Offices, and Base/Installation Level Activities) constituting the majority (94%, See Table 4.3, Respondent's Employment Site) of the respondents is summarized in Table 4.5. The "All Employment Sites" column in this table includes responses from all five possible employments included in the survey.

Initiative	Training Received			
	Major Systems Command	Base/Installation Level Activity	Policy/Admin Activity	All Employment Sites
Evolutionary	51.85%	54.76%	55.88%	54.83%
Incentive-Term	44.19%	49.37%	36.73%	43.28%
Share-in-Savings	17.65%	26.03%	20.00%	20.78%
ADR	62.60%	54.55%	70.48%	63.56%
Performance Based Contract Payments	60.74%	55.84%	60.00%	59.48%
Alpha Contracting	63.50%	46.15%	43.56%	52.91%
Performance Based Contracts	81.25%	86.36%	70.27%	79.47%
Outsourcing	40.00%	49.38%	41.67%	43.81%
Commercial Item/SAP	86.30%	91.21%	76.52%	83.55%
IPT	74.31%	62.96%	76.85%	73.35%
Past Performance Evaluation	79.17%	71.91%	64.55%	72.46%

Table 4.5. Acquisition Reform Training Received by Employment Site.

The percent of training received for any single acquisition reform initiative varied by employment site. Part of this variance can be attributed to the workforce member's employment site that is closely matched with their specific work responsibilities and corresponding applicable

acquisition reform initiatives. As discussed in Chapter II, Literature Review, reform initiatives such as an evolutionary contracting strategy, predominately apply to the acquisition of major weapon systems and those activities managing such programs. Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation that Base/Installation Level Contracting Office personnel, comprising 24 percent of the survey respondents, would demand or benefit from this type of training. Unfortunately, according to Table 4.5, survey respondents indicated that more evolutionary training was received by Base/Installation Level Personnel (54.76%) than by Major Systems Commands (51.85%). If this trend is consistent throughout the acquisition workforce, the method of prioritizing or rationing of training resources may need to be scrutinized.



As previously discussed in Chapter III, Survey Methodology, some initiatives were selected specifically because of their potential application to all acquisition workforce members. These include incentive term contracting, share-in-savings, commercial items/simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) and past performance evaluation. Of these four initiatives, only commercial items/SAP and past performance evaluation training was received by a substantial number of the respondents, 83.55 percent and 72.46 percent, respectively. In contrast, and contrary to expectations, the percentage across all sites receiving training in incentive term and share-in-savings contracting initiatives was only 43.28 percent and 20.78 percent, respectively.

Again, the employment site that closely correlates with a respondent's work responsibilities influences the overall level of training received for any one initiative. Considering past performance evaluation is mandatory for all procurements in excess of \$100,000.00, the 79.17%, 71.91% and 64.55% percent rate of training for respondents from Major Systems Commands, Base/Installation Level Activities, and Policy/Administrative Activities, respectively, is inadequate. This level of training received supporting past performance evaluation is unexpected since 94.55 percent (See Table 4.2) of the survey respondents are journeyman or senior contract personnel responsible for acquisitions above the mandatory past performance evaluation level of \$100,000. Thus, the expected level of past performance training received should have exceeded 94.55 percent.

2. Acquisition Reform Implementation

The frequency of acquisition reform initiatives implemented, as exhibited in implementation rates, also varies by location. The variation in the extent to which training ultimately leads to initiative implementation may be attributed to at least three possible situations.

First, training is being provided to those individuals who do not require the subject training and resources are being wasted. In this case, management is not providing adequate oversight during the IDP review and approval process as previously discussed.

Second, the training is reaching the appropriate audience and due to resistance to change, the training is being disregarded. This implementation barrier may be attributed to the individual or lack of leadership support. Prior DoD sponsored surveys have cited resistance to change as the number one barrier to improving the acquisition process and implementing meaningful acquisition reform⁵². Although the researcher recognizes changing the culture within DoD is critical to the overall success of implementing any proposed acquisition reform initiative, an exhaustive discussion of change management is beyond the scope of this research.

The third potential explanation is that training is being provided to the appropriate audience but is inadequate for the individual to functionally implement the subject initiative. This certainly appears to be the case with some initiatives such as the evolutionary contracting strategy having a low, 13.77 percent, implementation rate. The opportunity (frequency) to implement any single initiative may also have a significant bearing on the implementation rates presented. Many individuals (especially civilians) may be assigned to a single program with a life cycle exceeding ten years. In these cases, the timing within the program cycle may not accommodate implementation of reform initiatives regardless of the potential benefits.

Unfortunately, the survey methodology cannot distinguish between these three possibilities. Later in this chapter, survey questions nineteen and twenty-seven

⁵² Department of Navy. Acquisition Reform Week III Survey, July 1998 and Ibid, 26).

attempt to address the adequacy of training sources supporting functional implementation of acquisition reform.

Again, like the amount of training received on the four broadly applicable initiatives (incentive term contracting, share-in-savings, commercial items/SAP and past performance evaluation), the implementation rate for incentive-term and share-in-savings, appears to be poor (36.71% and 22.57%, respectively) based on the survey response.

The actual implementation for any single initiative is strongly influenced by the respondent's duty assignment/employment site. Table 4.6 cross-compares a summary of respondents' employment sites with the frequency of individual reform initiative implementation. The implementation percentage for a single initiative per employment site is the numerical frequency divided by the total number of responses for each employment site (i.e., for Major Systems Command/Evolutionary contracting strategy: $16/157 = 10.19\%$). Responses from Program Management Offices and Inventory Control Points were insignificant in number (20 and 4, respectively) and omitted.

Reform Initiative Implemented	Employment Site					
	Major Systems Command		Base/Installation Level Activity		Policy/Admin Activity	
Evolutionary	16	10.19%	3	3.13%	7	5.69%
Incentive-Term	28	17.83%	12	12.50%	18	14.63%
Share-in-Savings	7	4.46%	3	3.13%	7	5.69%
ADR	37	23.57%	16	16.67%	30	24.39%
Performance Based Contract Payments	53	33.76%	15	15.63%	40	32.52%
Alpha Contracting	82	52.23%	28	29.17%	41	33.33%
Performance Based Contracts	96	61.15%	52	54.17%	57	46.34%
Outsourcing	30	19.11%	17	17.71%	20	16.26%
Commercial Item/SAP	109	69.43%	76	79.17%	64	52.03%
IPT	110	70.06%	32	33.33%	79	64.23%
Past Performance Evaluation	121	77.07%	64	66.67%	64	52.03%
Total Site Responses	157	100.00%	96	100.00%	123	100.00%

Table 4.6. Acquisition Reform Initiatives Implemented by Employment Site.

As exhibited in Table 4.6, reform initiatives such as evolutionary contracting strategy (10.19% vs. 3.13%), alpha contracting (52.23% vs. 29.17%), and IPTs (70.06% vs. 33.33%) are more frequently utilized in high dollar, complex procurements managed by Major Systems Commands than lower dollar value procurements managed by Base/Installation Level Activities. Conversely, Commercial Item/Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) are more frequently utilized at the Base/Installation Level than in Major Systems Command (79.17% vs. 69.43%) due to the relatively low task complexity and dollar values.

The overall success of a specific training source supporting acquisition reform implementation for any single initiative can be evaluated by cross comparing survey responses to questions six and eighteen. Question six identified the frequency respondents implemented target

reform initiatives. Question eighteen requested the survey respondent identify the training source perceived to be most effective.

Table 4.7, Most Effective Training Source by Initiative, provides a cross-comparison of responses between survey questions six and eighteen. The individual percentages are based on the total number of responses for each initiative divided by the number of responses for each individual initiative. For example, seven survey respondents rated DAU as the most effective source for evolutionary training with 29 respondents rating evolutionary as most effective across all training sources; therefore, $7/29 = 24.1$ percent.

Initiative	Most Effective Training Source						
	DAU Resident	Road Show	Reform Week	DAU Web-Based	In-House Advocates	Gov't Funded Education	Non-Gov't Sources
Evolutionary (n=29)	24.1%	6.9%	6.9%	0.0%	17.2%	20.7%	24.1%
Incentive-Term (n=59)	23.7%	10.2%	3.4%	1.7%	25.4%	11.9%	23.7%
Share-in-Savings (n=16)	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	31.3%	18.8%	25.0%
ADR (n=89)	21.3%	9.0%	12.4%	4.5%	18.0%	12.4%	22.5%
Performance Based Contract Payments (n=110)	25.5%	8.2%	8.2%	3.6%	25.5%	10.9%	18.2%
Alpha Contracting (n=157)	25.5%	7.6%	10.2%	1.3%	30.6%	10.2%	14.6%
Performance Based Contracts (n=214)	23.8%	7.5%	7.9%	4.7%	27.6%	9.3%	19.2%
Outsourcing (n=65)	32.3%	4.6%	4.6%	1.5%	16.9%	15.4%	24.6%
Commercial Item/SAP (n=254)	29.1%	6.3%	9.8%	3.5%	26.4%	7.9%	16.9%
IPT (n=230)	22.6%	7.0%	11.7%	1.7%	30.0%	10.9%	16.1%
Past Performance Evaluation (n=253)	23.3%	4.7%	10.3%	3.2%	27.7%	12.6%	18.2%
Training Source Totals	367	102	138	43	393	162	271

Table 4.7. Most Effective Training Source by Initiative.

Based on cross-comparison of survey questions six and eighteen, DAU Resident Courses and In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates account for the majority of most effective training sources across most initiatives. Based on frequency cited, these two training sources accounted for over 50 percent of the most effective training sources. Non-Government sources of acquisition reform training were also frequently cited in four of the eleven initiatives. The remaining four training sources were ranked consistently below these three in almost all eleven initiatives.

D. RESPONDENTS' SINGLE SOURCE OF MOST EFFECTIVE TRAINING

Survey questions 18 through 25 provided the respondents an opportunity to identify the single most effective training source and rate the effectiveness based on criteria identified during the literature review as being key criterion in supporting successful acquisition reform training. See Appendix A for specific survey questions and formats.

1. Training Source Ratings

Comparison between survey respondent's actual ratings between criterion and training sources provides slightly different results as indicated in Table 4-8, Most Effective Training Source Ratings and Qualitative Criteria. Ratings are based on an average rating of survey responses on a possible scale of 1 to 24, with 1 being inadequate and 24

being excellent. Note: Although the survey question scale provided three labels, "Inadequate - 1", "Average - 5" and "Excellent - 10", due to the question format and software constraints, the possible choices on the question continuum and the actual data output from the SurveySaid software ranged from 1 to 24 (See Appendix A for question format). Thus, the highest numerical ratings are associated with the most effective training sources.

Table 4.8 presents average ranges of training sources each evaluation criterion (questions 19 through 23). The average rating of training criteria was calculated on a weighted average basis across all training sources. It was calculated by summing the product of the individual training/criteria ratings and the frequency each was cited by survey respondents.

Reason Most Effective (Questions 19 through 23)	Training Source/Average Respondent Rating							Avg. Rating of Training Criteria
	DAU Resident	Road Show	Reform Week	DAU Web-Based	In-House Advocates	Gov't Funded Education	Non-Gov't Sources	
Adequate to Functionally Implement	16.5	14.7	12.7	14.2	15.2	17.3	15.4	15.4
Adequate Dissemination								
Creating Mututal Understanding	13.7	13.2	13.3	11.8	13.9	13.8	11.8	13.3
Follow-up Support/Training	10.8	8.3	9.8	8.3	12.2	11.4	10.5	10.8
Targeted to Work	15.5	14.8	12.6	13.9	14.8	16.2	13.2	14.6
Provided in Timely Manner	14.1	13.2	11.9	10.6	13.6	15.1	12.9	13.4
Average Training Source Rating	14.12	12.84	12.06	11.76	13.94	14.76	12.76	N/A
No. Respondents/Training Source	475	126	215	65	463	179	299	N/A

Table 4.8. Most Effective Training Source Ratings and Qualitative Criteria.

Based on the results provided in Table 4-8, the most highly rated criterion by survey respondents across six of seven training sources focused on the adequacy of training to support functional implementation of reform initiatives (question 19). The traditional training sources such as DAU resident courses and Government funded education were perceived to be the most effective in supporting practical implementation of acquisition reform initiatives. On average, reform training targeted specifically to a respondent's work responsibilities (question 22) was also highly rated as an effective training criterion.

Government funded education was the most highly rated training sources for three of the five criteria included in Table 4.8; functional implementation (17.3), targeted to work responsibilities (16.2), and provided in a timely manner (15.1).

The remaining two criteria of effectiveness are providing adequate dissemination of acquisition reform training creating mutual understanding within the organization (13.9) and providing follow-up/refresher training (12.2). Ratings indicate that, for these criteria, the most effective training was attributed to in-house reform advocates. This is consistent with the overall frequency (see Table 4.7) showing in-house advocates were cited as the "most effective" training source by survey respondents. The physical presence and access to these advocates within respondents' organizations logically supports these survey results. They have the ability to provide alternate solutions to time and place issues that may constrain other forms of training reviewed.

With the exception of in-house advocates, the ability to provide follow-up/refreshers training supporting acquisition reform was the lowest rated criterion across all training sources. The low rating suggests a lag time between reform policy implementation and supporting training being provided to the acquisition workforce. This lag may be attributed to the rapid pace of change and the inability of training providers such as DAU to react in a timely manner.

2. Respondent's Narrative Comments on Training Effectiveness

The final two questions of this section examining the effectiveness of training sources provided survey respondents the opportunity to identify (short "fill-in the blank" narrative) and rate their unique reasons for training effectiveness, questions 24 and 25, respectively. Due to constraints inherent to the utilized SurveySaid software and the desire to keep the survey to a reasonable size, the individual reasons could not be matched with specific respondent ratings. Therefore, only an average rating for all individual reasons is provided. As with survey questions 19 through 23, the average rating is based on a possible scale of 1 to 24.

The researcher categorized the 157 narrative responses (question 24) into eleven categories including a single miscellaneous category. Table 4.9 summarizes narrative response categories as defined by the researcher and the overall average rating associated with those responses.

The researcher did not include the 27 negative responses in the percent calculations since they did not address the purpose of the question - to identify reasons/criterion supporting "most" effective training.

Respondent's Most Effective Narrative	Frequency	
Hands On/Lessons Learned	29	22.3%
Quality of Instruction	22	16.9%
Targeted to Responsibilities	19	14.6%
General Awareness	9	6.9%
Access/Refresher Training	9	6.9%
Resident Training	4	3.1%
Leadership Buy-in/Support	4	3.1%
Resource/Tool	4	3.1%
External Source	3	2.3%
Misc. Single Topics	27	20.8%
Subtotal	130	100.0%
Negative Comments	27	
Total	157	
Average Rating - All Responses	16.2	

Table 4.9. Respondents' Most Effective Narratives.

Three of the eleven researcher-defined categories: Hands On/Lessons Learned, Quality of Instruction, and Target to Work Responsibilities, comprised a majority (53.8 percent) of the total narrative responses. Of these three, Quality of Instruction and Targeted to Work Responsibilities are directly associated with and further support the perceived importance of original criterion listed in survey questions addressing adequate information being provided to functionally implement reform initiatives (question 19) and targeted to my work responsibilities (question 22). It is noteworthy that these two criteria

received the highest overall average rating (15.4 and 14.6, respectively; see Table 4.8). This demonstrates the value of these criteria in assessing training effectiveness. Unfortunately, a large number of respondents (27) also misunderstood and viewed the question as an opportunity to provide negatives comments, which was not the purpose of this question.

The overall average rating for all narrative responses of 16.2 exceeds the average criterion ratings summarized in Table 4.8. This result is not entirely unexpected considering these are reasons uniquely identified by survey respondents and as such, have personnel significance to individual respondents. The number of single topic responses (27) also supports the importance and uniqueness of individual responses outside the limited bounds of potential survey responses contained in survey questions 19 through 23.

E. RESPONDENTS' SINGLE SOURCE OF LEAST EFFECTIVE TRAINING

Survey Questions 26 through 32 provided respondents the opportunity to identify the single least effective training source and rate the effectiveness based on criterion identified during the literature review as being key elements supporting successful acquisition reform training. The same criteria used to evaluate "most effective training sources" (survey questions 19 through 23) were used in evaluating "least effective training sources" (survey questions 27 through 31).

1. Training Source Ratings

Comparison between survey respondent's actual ratings between criterion and training sources does provide slightly different results as indicated in Table 4-10, Least Effective Training Source Ratings and Qualitative Criteria. As with the most effective ratings, ratings are based on an average of survey responses on a possible scale of 1 to 24, with 1 being inadequate and 24 being excellent. Note: Although the survey question scale provided three labels, "Inadequate - 1", "Average - 5" and "Excellent - 10", due to the question format and software constraints, the possible choices on the question continuum and the actual data output from the SurveySaid software ranged from 1 to 24. (See Appendix A for question format.) Thus, the lowest numerical ratings are associated with the least effective training sources. The average rating of training criteria was calculated on a weighted average basis across all training sources. It was calculated by summing the product of the individual training source/criteria ratings and the frequency each was cited by survey respondents.

Reason Least Effective (Questions 27 through 31)	Training Source/Average Respondent Rating							
	DAU Resident	Road Show	Reform Week	DAU Web-Based	In-House Advocates	Gov't Funded Education	Non-Gov't Sources	Avg. Rating of Training Criteria
Adequate to Functionally Implement	10.5	8.4	7.2	8.0	8.0	12.8	7.9	8.1
Adequate Dissemination								
Creating Mututal Understanding	9.1	9.6	8.1	7.2	7.3	10.0	7.7	8.3
Follow-up Support/Training	8.6	7.1	6.0	6.6	7.5	10.3	7.0	6.8
Targeted to Work	9.5	8.9	7.9	8.5	8.6	5.7	7.6	8.4
Provided in Timely Manner	8.8	9.1	8.6	8.9	9.0	11.0	8.0	8.8
Average Training Source Rating	9.30	8.62	7.56	7.84	8.08	9.96	7.64	N/A
No. Respondents/Training Source	140	369	590	186	185	16	116	N/A

Table 4.10. Least Effective Training Source Ratings and Qualitative Criteria.

Acquisition Reform Week and DAU Web-based acquisition reform training are clearly the least effective forms of training as perceived by survey respondents. This is a particularly noteworthy finding because Acquisition Reform Week was the most frequently cited source of acquisition reform training. Of equal concern, given these survey responses, is DoD's increasing emphasis on the use of web-based courses to accomplish the majority of the acquisition workforce training goals.

Less clear are the perceptions of acquisition reform training provided by non-government sources and DoD Road Shows. Training provided by Non-Government sources was rated nearly as low as Acquisition Reform Week (7.64 vs. 7.56) but only cited (approximately) as least effective

only 7.2 percent vs. 36.5 percent, respectively. Most of this variation can be attributed to the large number of survey respondents participating in Acquisition Reform Week training when compared to Non-Government.

2. Respondent's Narrative Comments on Training Ineffectiveness

The final two questions of this section complete the examination of least effective training sources by providing survey respondents the opportunity to identify (short "fill-in the blank" narrative) and rate their unique reasons for training ineffectiveness, questions 32 and 33, respectively. Due to constraints inherent in the SurveySaid software and the desire to keep the survey to a reasonable size, the individual reasons could not be matched with specific respondent ratings. Therefore, only an average rating for all individual reasons is provided. As with survey questions 26 through 31, the average rating is based on a weighted average of survey responses on a possible scale of 1 to 24.

The researcher categorized the 156 narrative responses (question 32) into nine categories including a single miscellaneous category. Table 4.11, Respondents' Least Effective Narratives, summarizes narrative response categories as defined by the researcher and the overall average rating associated with those responses. The researcher did not include the one positive response in the percent calculations since it did not address the purpose

of the question - to identify reasons/criterion supporting "least" effective training.

Respondent's Least Effective Narrative	Frequency	
Lacks Substance/Poorly Developed	52	33.5%
Lacks Relevance	32	20.6%
Poor Quality of Instruction	16	10.3%
Inadequate Access to Training	13	8.4%
Web Based Training Ineffective	7	4.5%
No Leadership Buy-in	7	4.5%
Work Schedule Conflicts	6	3.9%
Quick Pace of Change	3	1.9%
Misc. Single Topics	19	12.3%
Subtotal	155	100.0%
Positive Comments	1	
Total	156	
Average Rating - All Responses	7.8	

Table 4.11. Respondents' Least Effective Narratives.

Similar to the most effective narrative responses, the least effective narrative responses generally support the results previously presented. Comments regarding the overall lack of substance and poor quality of instruction accounting for 43.8% of all least effective narrative responses and are consistent with the perceived importance by survey respondents of survey question 27, Training providing adequate information to functionally implement subject reform initiatives. The second most cited reason for least effective training, Lacks Relevance, accounting for 20.6% of all narrative responses, is consistent with survey question, number 31, Targeted to my work responsibilities.

Almost all the remaining narrative responses can be directly associated with one of the five survey evaluation criteria. Although there were 19 unique, single topic narrative responses, there were no unique insights into other potential problem training areas impacting acquisition reform.

F. RESPONDENT'S GENERAL PERCEPTION OF DOD PROVIDED TRAINING SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM

Survey question 34 provided respondents the opportunity to identify their overall impression of how training they have received has contributed to preparing them for implementing acquisition reform. The scoring methodology was the same as the 1-24 scale ("1" - Not at All, "24" Greatly) utilized in survey questions 19 through 23 and 27 through 31. Survey question 35 was utilized to gauge work/schedule conflicts on training. The final survey question, 36, provided respondents the opportunity to comment on other aspects of acquisition reform training received.

Responses to survey question 34 were cross-compared with survey question 3, respondents' DAWIA certification levels, and survey question 5, respondent's employment site. These two comparisons and a summary of the most and least effective ratings (see Average Training Source Rating, Tables 4.8 and 4.10) are provided in Table 4.12, Survey Respondents' Overall Perceptions.

	Number of Responses	Average Ratings (Scale = 1 - 24)
By DAWIA Certification Level		
Level I	20	12.4
Level II	121	11.4
Level III	207	12.7
By Employment Site		
Program Management Office	17	10.0
Major Systems Command	138	12.4
Inventory Control Point	4	10.8
Base/Installation Level Activity	90	13.1
Policy/Admin Support	108	11.4

Table 4.12. Survey Respondents' Overall Perceptions.

According to the adjectives anchoring the rating scale values on survey question 34, the ratings in Table 4.12 translates into respondents being only "somewhat" satisfied with training received in support of acquisition reform. There does not appear to be any noteworthy variation among survey respondents regardless of employment site or the level of DAWIA certification level. With the exception of Program Management Offices and Inventory Control Point activities, the variance of ratings from an average possible score of 12 is not noteworthy. Due to the low number of responses received, the Program Management Offices and Inventory Control Point activities may not accurately represent the overall workforce and individual comparisons were omitted.

Table 4.13, Workload/Schedule Training Conflicts, provides a summary of responses to survey question 35 cross-compared with respondents' employment site. Responses from respondents assigned to program management

and inventory control point activities are not included due to the low number of responses, 20 and 4, respectively.

More than two-thirds of survey respondents reported that workload/schedule conflicts significantly limit their participation in necessary training at least on an occasional basis. And for more than 25%, this problem is "frequent." A survey respondent's employment site does not appear to significantly change the impact workload/schedules have on training participation.

	Employment Site			
	Major Systems Command	Base/Installation Level Activity	Policy/Admin Activity	All Sites
Frequently	30.26%	28.57%	21.85%	26.84%
Occasionally	40.79%	42.86%	36.97%	40.25%
Seldom	21.71%	20.88%	25.21%	23.04%
Never	7.24%	7.69%	15.97%	9.87%
Totals	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 4.13 Workload/Schedule Training Conflicts.

Approximately 70% of the 149 narrative responses from survey question 36 are repeat comments from the open-ended least and most effective narrative survey questions, 24 and 32, respectively. Of the remaining 30 percent, the following is a consolidation of other noteworthy comments provided by survey respondents.

- Acquisition reform training has added more workload
- DoD has not budgeted adequate funding to provide appropriate training for all personnel
- The number of acquisition reform changes needs to be reduced

- Training is inappropriately scheduled at fiscal year end preventing attendance
- The best training method is on-the-job training (OJT)
- Staff reductions are impacting the ability of the workforce to keep current with new changes
- DoD needs to provide more web sites specific to support acquisition reform topics
- DoD does not evaluate the effectiveness of acquisition reform training provided
- Too much emphasis is placed on DAWIA certification levels, no link to practical applications
- Training budgets are being spent to support mandatory DAWIA certification training at the expense of acquisition reform training.

G. SUMMARY

This chapter presented and discussed the results of the Acquisition Workforce survey that was conducted by the author in support of the subject research. The primary focus was on workforce member's overall perception of the success of specific training sources in relation to demographics and specific acquisition initiatives proposed since 1994. The results of this chapter suggest that current acquisition workforce training inadequately supports acquisition reform initiatives for a variety of reasons. Chapter V concludes with a discussion of these reasons and some potential recommendations to improve DoD acquisition workforce training as a means of supporting acquisition reform.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this research was to determine if DoD acquisition reform initiatives are fully supported by current acquisition workforce training. Although a definitive answer, yes or no, is difficult to provide, information presented in Chapter II, Literature Review and Background, and results from the acquisition workforce survey do support some general conclusions.

Unfortunately, even among those sources rated most effective, survey respondents' average ratings were only slightly above average (14.76 out of a possible 24) and there was little meaningful differentiation between the lowest and highest rated training sources (14.76 and 11.76). Considering the results from both survey respondents and information discussed in the literature review, the evidence suggests that DoD acquisition reform is not adequately supported by current acquisition workforce training.

The conclusions resulting from the research survey varied with respect to the identified sources of training and between specific acquisition reform initiatives. Based on the survey results, some sources are more effective than others at providing acquisition reform training. The more effective sources of training include traditional forms of education and training such as DAU resident courses and Government funded education.

The strong negative perception (rated 7.84/24.00, Table 4.12) of DAU web-based courses as a least effective source of training by survey respondents is of serious concern. According to survey results, DAU web-based courses lack substance necessary to functionally implement acquisition reform initiatives (See Table 4.12). Budget constraints and continuing reductions in the size of the DoD acquisition workforce will continue to increase the importance of web-based training. This trend has significantly changed DAU's focus and has resulted in a large number of web-based training courses being developed and fielded during the last few years. If DAU is to be successful in providing web-based instruction, courses must be developed that are perceived by the workforce as being a valuable training resource.

The data suggest the turbulence caused by the number and magnitude of proposed acquisition reforms may be adversely impacting the ability of DoD to effectively provide functional training supporting acquisition reform. In a rush to leverage the latest and greatest reform initiatives, the size of DoD frustrates effective attempts to timely coordinate with training providers. According to survey results, DoD continues to struggle providing acquisition reform training supporting such initiatives as past performance evaluation that have been fielded for several years.

Results of the literature review also indicate the workforce is overwhelmed by the large numbers of current initiatives proposed and are disenchanted by DoD senior leadership's expectations that reforms are panaceas for

dwindling personnel and acquisition resources. The ability of DoD to functionally implement key acquisition reform initiatives even after training has been provided is less than impressive as evidenced by data generated by this research (see Table 4.4). Based on survey results, many promising initiatives such as incentive term contracting and share-in-savings are only being implemented by a small percentage of the workforce, potentially due to inadequate training.

Considering the scarcity of training resources in terms of both acquisition workforce members' time and the availability of training funds, DoD should completely re-examine the overall focus of acquisition workforce training. Since the implementation of DAWIA in 1991, acquisition workforce training has been focused on meeting DAWIA mandated certification standards. This may not be an appropriate focus if the intent is to provide the workforce with the tools to successfully operate in today's rapidly changing business environment. Given finite resources, the co-existence of both acquisition reform and DAWIA certification training goals may not be practical unless those certification standards are aligned with reform objectives.

The majority of these conclusions are based on the workforce survey conducted in support of this research and are the perceptions of a relatively small and segmented (Army) sample of the acquisition workforce. Although acquisition workforce members are the training recipients and implementers of acquisition reform initiatives, they represent only a small constituency of a highly complex

process that influences meaningful progress in acquisition reform. Congress, private industry, socio-economic special interest groups and others exert considerable influence over the DoD acquisition process and the subsequent effectiveness of meaningful acquisition reform. Therefore, it would be shortsighted for the reader to attribute the success or failure of acquisition reform solely to the effectiveness of workforce training.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides recommendations to improve acquisition reform training provided to the DoD acquisition workforce. These recommendations are based on the information provided in Chapter II, Literature Review and Background, and the results of the acquisition workforce survey discussed in Chapter IV, Survey Data and Analysis. The recommendations are divided into the following four areas:

- Strengthen the DoD Continuous Learning Policy
- Strengthen/Support In-House Advocates' Role
- Improve Quality of Web-Based Instruction
- Reduce Number of Reform Initiatives

1. Strengthen the DoD Continuous Learning Policy

The intent of the DAWIA was to "professionalize" the defense acquisition workforce through certification standards based on various levels of specialized training. Unfortunately, DoD did not anticipate the rapid number of

changes and subsequent proliferation of acquisition reforms proposed since the implementation of DAWIA in 1991. In principal the 1999 Continuous Learning Policy should have corrected this shortcoming, but failed to correlate specific training objectives or acquisition reform initiatives and fulfillment of minimum continuous learning standards (80 "qualifying" hours every two years).

Continuous learning standards cannot be generically applied to all workforce members if the subject training is to be used to support meaningful acquisition reform. As discussed throughout this study, members assigned to different acquisition positions and organizations have widely divergent responsibilities. As such, acquisition reform training must be tailored according to individual workforce member needs and responsibilities. Effective training must also meet the other critical criteria discussed in the acquisition workforce survey (see survey questions 18 through 33):

- Adequate in detail to functionally implement
- Adequately disseminated in organization to create mutual understanding
- Follow-up/refresher training provided
- Provided in a timely manner, not too late or too early

The responsibility to identify directed continuous learning objectives and subsequent appropriate training sources rests with the supervisor. Supervisors must understand the goals of the Continuous Learning policy and be willing to tailor their workforce members' Individual Development Plans to focus on appropriate training. Based

on the literature review, no such training is currently being provided to acquisition workforce leadership.

Part of the solution may require realignment of supervisor incentives to proactively identify appropriate training for their acquisition workforce members. Annual performance goals of acquisition workforce supervisors should include identification and scheduling of appropriate continuous learning opportunities as one of their critical evaluation criteria. During annual performance reviews, the success of accomplishing these training objectives should be assessed against individual and organization goals.

In addition, DoD should consider shifting the focus away from DAWIA certification to targeted training more attuned to the prevailing business climate. The generic application of DAWIA training across DoD's diverse acquisition missions and organizations is not practical nor has the training kept pace with the rapid proliferation of acquisition reform initiatives and DoD's subsequent attempts to leverage best commercial practices. Shifting to targeted training will provide better utilization of scarce training resources and provide necessary funds to support meaningful acquisition reform training to a greater percentage of the workforce.

Another potential recommendation is to allow partial credit of acquisition reform training toward DAWIA certification requirements. This policy would provide flexibility based on workforce member's individual responsibilities and optimize use of training budgets.

2. Strengthen/Support In-House Advocate's Role

Based on survey results, in-house Acquisition Reform Advocates were frequently cited and highly rated as an effective source of acquisition reform training (see Tables 4.7, 4.9 and 4.10). Considering DoD's movement away from resident training courses and the current negative perception of web-based training, these in-house advocates will continue to be a valuable source of acquisition reform training. DoD should leverage in-house acquisition reform advocates' unique advantages by providing specialized training to enhance and reinforce their ability to effectively support acquisition reform.

The "train-the-trainer" concept has been widely utilized throughout DoD and appears to be a potentially useful approach with in-house advocates supporting effective acquisition reform training. Not only are in-house advocates perceived as an effective source of training, they solve many time and place constraint concerns inherent to other training sources.

One potential drawback to the in-house advocate is the availability of properly trained in-house reform advocates in smaller acquisition organizations. Although individuals in any size office can assume acquisition reform advocate responsibilities, the importance of excessive collateral duties is quickly diluted when individuals "wear too many hats." This should be less of a concern as the Army (and possibly other services) realigns into the three proposed Army Contracting Agencies, consolidating acquisition

responsibilities and most personnel into "super" contracting centers.

3. Improve Quality of Web-Based Instruction

Due to financial constraints and decreasing personnel resources, travel to off-site resident courses will continue to decline. Distance learning technologies such as web-based instruction provide the greatest opportunity to provide necessary acquisition reform training and still meet time and place concerns associated with the current and future acquisition workforce. Unfortunately, according to the research survey, web-based acquisition reform training was poorly rated across all effectiveness criteria.

The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) must aggressively invest in the development of quality web-based training resources consistent with the objectives of specific acquisition reform initiatives. The training should be provided in sufficient detail and depth to support functional implementation by the acquisition workforce member.

DAU should take notice of current acquisition reform initiatives and divest itself of activities that do not reflect core competencies, especially those that can be accomplished much more effectively in the private marketplace. Partnering with or completely outsourcing the development of web-based courses may be a potential solution to the current situation. As discussed in Chapter II, DAU has made minor progress in this area by sponsoring

the National Contract Management Association and Institute for Supply Management to co-develop two acquisition training courses supporting acquisition reform initiatives. If the outsourcing of these courses proves successful, DAU should consider outsourcing future course development to non-Government sources.

4. Reduce the Number of Reform Initiatives

Based on this research, the overall number of acquisition reform initiatives proposed during the last decade has been excessive. Given this fact, DoD may benefit from selecting and focusing their training efforts on a few key initiatives that have the potential to yield substantial benefits. Considering the diversity of missions and costs associated with providing effective training, doing a few things right appears to be more beneficial than attempting to do everything with mediocre results at best.

Leadership and the acquisition workforce are still struggling to implement reforms that were introduced as early as 1994 with the introduction of FASA. Perhaps Ross Branstetter best describes the acquisition workforce's perception of acquisition reform "... in recent years acquisition efforts and the acquisition process have been buffeted by profound, nearly constant disruption.⁵³" This perception is not encouraging and has the potential to lead to widespread apathy in the workforce.

⁵³ Branstetter, Ross W. "Acquisition Reform: All Sail and No Rudder", The Army Lawyer, pp. 3-14, March 1998.

DoD needs to reduce the number of acquisition reform initiatives, clearly prioritize those initiatives that are in existence today, and provide resources to follow through on new initiatives fielded. There is widespread agreement among Congress, DoD Leadership, the acquisition workforce and contractors that substantial changes are necessary in the management of DoD acquisition. Unfortunately, the acquisition workforce is confused as to the relative importance of the various initiatives.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

DoD acquisition reform and training related issues provide innumerable opportunities for future research. The following is a summary of potential issues that surfaced during the subject research and merit further consideration.

- Does DoD change management training adequately support implementation of acquisition reform initiatives?
- How does DoD acquisition reform training compare with other federal, state and local Governments' efforts? What are the opportunities to consolidate/leverage training resources between these entities?
- How do socio-economic goals complement/conflict with acquisition reform initiatives?
- What are the costs and benefits of providing acquisition reform training via web-based courses when compared to tradition resident courses? Considering the costs and benefits, what is the Best Value to the Government?
- How do the different services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) manage acquisition reform training? Has the Defense Acquisition University



effectively coordinated/consolidated these efforts?

- Is adequate funding provided to support acquisition training consistent with DAWIA mandated certification and the DoD Continuous Learning policy? Should the structure and intent of the DAWIA be changed to meet today's rapidly changing business environment?
- What incentives are provided to the workforce to motivate successful implementation of acquisition reform initiatives? To what extent are these incentives applied and how effective are these incentives?

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APPENDIX A. SURVEY

Cooper Survey



SPEAR

Strategic Planning, Educational Assessment and Research

This is an Official Survey of the Naval Postgraduate School
Office of the Provost
Monterey, CA 93943

Acquisition Reform Training

Please respond only to those questions that apply to you personally. Thank you.

DEMOGRAPHICS:

1. I am (select only one):

- ☐ Civilian
- ☐ Military

2. Please indicate your Primary Occupational Career Field or Military equivalent (select only one):

- ☐ Engineering (all)
- ☐ Contracting

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- ☐ Program Management
- ☐ Business and Industry
- ☐ Information Technology
- ☐ Administration and Programs
- ☐ Scientist
- ☐ Auditing
- ☐ Financial Management
- ☐ Procurement Assistant
- ☐ Mathematics and Statistics
- ☐ Purchasing
- ☐ Supply Management
- ☐ Inventory Management
- ☐ Equipment Specialist
- ☐ General Supply
- ☐ Miscellaneous

**3. What is the highest DAWIA certification level you have attained in your Primary Career field?
(select only one):**

- ☐ Level I
- ☐ Level II
- ☐ Level III
- ☐ No certification (Skip to Question #5)

4. Number of years at HIGHEST DAWIA certification level (select only one):

- ☐ 1-2 Years
- ☐ 3-4 Years
- ☐ 5-6 Years
- ☐ 7-8 Years
- ☐ 9-10 Years

5. I work in a (select only one):

- ☐ Program Management Office (ACAT I, II or III designation)
- ☐ Major Systems Command or equivalent
- ☐ Inventory Control Point (Service or DLA)
- ☐ Base/Installation Level Contracting Office
- ☐ Contract Policy/Administrative Support Office

6. Which of the following Acquisition Reform initiatives have you been involved in implementing (select all that apply):

- ☐ Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition Development Strategy
- ☐ Incentive-Term Contracting
- ☐ Share-in-Savings Contracts
- ☐ Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
- ☐ Performance Based Contract Payments
- ☐ Alpha Contracting
- ☐ Performance Based Contracts
- ☐ Outsourcing (A-76, FAIR Act, etc.)
- ☐ Commercial Items/Simplified Acquisition Procedures
- ☐ Integrated Process Teams
- ☐ Past Performance Evaluation

For the following Acquisition Reforms Initiatives, please indicate (if any) the Sources of Training you have received for each initiative:

7. Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition Development Strategy (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week

- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

8. Incentive-Term Contracting (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

9. Share-in-Savings Contracts (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

10. Alternative Dispute Resolution (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

11. Performance Based Payments (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

12. Alpha Contracting (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates

- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

13. Performance Based Contracts (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

14. Outsourcing (A-76, FAIR Act, etc.) Select all that apply:

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

15. Commercial Items or Simplified Acquisition Procedures (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses

- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

16. Integrated Process Teams (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources
- ☐ No Training Received

17. Past Performance Evaluation (select all that apply):

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources

- ☐ DAU Resident Courses
- ☐ DOD "Road Shows"
- ☐ Acquisition Reform Week
- ☐ DAU Web-Based Courses
- ☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates
- ☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)
- ☐ Non-Government Sources

19. The training provided me adequate information to functionally implement the subject reform initiative(s). In this respect, the training provided was:

20. Was adequately disseminated in my organization creating mutual understanding and facilitating implementation. In this respect, the training provided was:

21. Provided follow-up support and/or refresher training. In this respect, the training provided was:

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☐ ☐

22. Targeted to my work responsibilities. In this respect, the training provided was:

Inadequate - 1

Average - 5

Excellent - 10

☐ ☐

23. Was provided in a timely manner (not too early or not too late) to support reform implementation. In this respect, the training provided was:

Inadequate - 1

Average - 5

Excellent - 10

☐ ☐

24. Other Key Reason for Training Effectiveness. Please state reason and rate in Question #25.

25. Rate "Other Key Reason" for Most Effective Training from Question #24.

Inadequate - 1

Average - 5

Excellent - 10

☐ ☐

26. Of the Acquisition Reform Initiatives you have been involved in implementing, which one of the following sources from which you received training, provided you with the LEAST EFFECTIVE Acquisition Reform Training? (Select only one):

☐ DAU Resident Courses

☐ DoD "Road Shows"

☐ Acquisition Reform Week

☐ DAU Web-Based Courses

☐ In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates

☐ Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.)

☐ Non-Government Sources

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32. Other Key Reason for Least Effective Training. Please state reason and rate reason in question #33.

33. Rate "Other Key Reason" for Least Effective Training from Question #32.

Inadequate - 1

Average - 5

Excellent - 10

☐ ☐

34. Overall, to what extent do you feel that the training you have received has contributed to preparing you to Implement Acquisition Reform Initiatives?

Not at All - 1

Somewhat - 5

Greatly - 10

☐ ☐

35. Has your workload/schedule prevented you from participating in Acquisition Reform Training opportunities (select only one)?

- ☐ Frequently
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

36. Please provide other comments regarding the value of Acquisition Reform Training received.

[Click Here to Send Information](#)

Return to the [Home Page](#), without sending answers.

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