The Total Force: How Can the CINC Utilize the Reserve Tactical Air Component?
Abstract
In the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, the challenges faced by the operational commander are growing rapidly. The last decade was a time of post cold war force and budget reductions that have impacted the active and reserve components of U.S. forces. The operational commander has to balance force employment to meet the needs of the continued war on terrorism, and the infrastructure and demand associated with Homeland defense and the continuously changing terrorist threat. He is pressured to meet all the requirements of current operations, forward presence, and homeland security, and do so with zero friendly casualties while enduring target selection by political micromanagement and ever shrinking resources. To meet these challenges, the operational commander must broaden the scope of planning considerations to entertain the combat power resident in reserve tactical air units in consideration of mass, economy of force, simultaneity and depth. This is not a force structure issue; it is an operational commander issue. This untapped resource has tremendous potential for impact at the operational level, but it must make it to the operation commander's 'tool kit'. It is a crime that active component tactical air units suffer extreme OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, negative impact to readiness and retention, and limitations to use at the operation level of war, while three F/A-18 squadrons wait in reserve, remnants of an old 'force-in-waiting' system, unutilized by the new system.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA405858
Entities
People
- Gregory S. Anderson
Organizations
- Naval War College