Operational Assessment - The Achilles Heel of Effects-Based Operations?
Abstract
With the promise of war-winning efficiency, the effects-based operations (EBO) concept has rightly become the subject of intense joint study. For all this enthusiasm, however, operational commanders ultimately require more than the highly-theoretical EBO concepts. They also require a method of assessing, during a campaign's execution, whether or not the more sophisticated EBO approach is working. Unfortunately, the current ability to assess the success or failure of an effects-based campaign is far less mature than the EBO concept--this 'assessment gap', then, prevents commanders from fully embracing EBO. This analysis suggests that assessing effects in war has never been possible with the clarity a commander desires; it is unlikely the current joint focus on technological solutions will succeed in creating this clarity in the future. Instead, overcoming this assessment 'shortcoming' can and must begin with operational commanders and their staffs. Operational commanders must begin to leverage EBO's potential now by designing campaigns that account for both the capabilities and limitations of the operational assessment process. This paper supports such an effort by developing a new framework for operational assessment--one that focuses on the decision making needs of the operational commander. Following these recommendations might just allow future JFCs to design potent EBO campaigns, regardless of the ever-present uncertainty; ignoring these recommendations, on the other hand, will likely allow assessment to remain the Achilles heel of EBO.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA405868
Entities
People
- Christopher W. Bowman
Organizations
- Naval War College