Micromanagement and a Commander's Lack of Operational Vision: A Case Study of Operation Allied Force
Abstract
An operational vision disconnected from the political end state and dependent on scripting of the enemy is not likely to deliver the desired outcome. The operational commander must be prepared to assert himself with political leaders to create the conditions necessary for success of his organization and to advise properly of the actions that may be ultimately required, that is, the worst case as well as the probable one. In order to achieve fast-paced, decisive operations, he must state clear objectives, empower his subordinates, and resist the temptation to micromanage them. This work analyzes General Wesley Clark's operational vision and how he tried to implement it during Operation Allied Force. Although victory was achieved, General Clark's operational vision throughout the operation was disconnected from the desired political end state and relied heavily on scripting Serbian leadership. General Clark discounted Serbian capabilities and thereby reinforced the NATO political leadership's belief that a three day air operation would coerce Serbian President Milosevic back to the negotiating table. When that didn't occur, the operation evolved into micromanaged escalation, whereby command by VTC and CINC approval of individual targets became the order of the day.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA405926
Entities
People
- Russell Dumas
Organizations
- Naval War College