How Did a Lack of Strategic and Operational Vision Impair the Army's Ability to Conduct Tactical Operations in Korea in the Summer of 1950?
Abstract
When American combat forces were first deployed to Korea in 1950 the battlefield results were generally tactical defeats. The troops that were initially deployed came from occupation duty in Japan and were not prepared for combat operations. In this thesis, the causes of tactical failure are examined. The cumulative effects of executive decisions, service department decisions, and the decisions of the operational headquarters, the Eighth United States Army, served to create the conditions for battlefield results in the summer of 1950. Drawing on a range of primary and secondary source material, this thesis examines the decisions of each of these echelons and evaluates the effects of these decisions through four case studies. These studies represent two regiments from the 24th Infantry Division, one regiment from the 25th Infantry Division and one regiment from the 1st Cavalry Division. These studies represent one-third of the regiments deployed to Korea in the initial stages of the war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 31, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA406493
Entities
People
- Paul J. Cook
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College