

UNITED NATIONS' OPERATION IN SOMALIA: THE POSSIBILITY
OF SUCCESS WITH A DIFFERENT APPROACH
OR APPLICATION

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ABSTRACT

UNITED NATIONS' OPERATION IN SOMALIA: POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS WITH A DIFFERENT APPROACH OR APPLICATION, by Major Abul Fazal Md Sanaullah, 136 pages.

This study examines whether the UN Operation in Somalia could have succeeded with a different approach or application. Somalia plunged into catastrophic humanitarian crises amidst brutality by the repressive regime and the civil war that followed its overthrow in January 1991. After a costly lapse of time, the UN undertook a peacekeeping operation in Somalia on 24 April 1992 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 751. During the next three years of involvement, the UN sought to alleviate human sufferings, disarm the factions, and institute a government--areas that would eventually determined success or failure. Given the major turns of events, the UN proved unequal to the task in each stage because of a chain of continuing flaws. However, this study suggests that chances for success were there and a different approach and application were needed. First, an early involvement could have yielded a positive outcome. Second, decisive and pragmatic approach during the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I promised to be yet another way of being successful. The last possibility of success was linked with ability to capitalize on and continue the improved security and humanitarian situations that was achieved by the Unified Task Force. This particular possibility, as the study recommends, was the most practicable one.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	v
 CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY	16
3. SOMALI CRISIS: GENESIS TO THE END OF UNOSOM.....	26
4. CAUSES OF FAILURE AND POSSIBILITIES OF SUCCESS IN SOMALIA: AN ANALYSIS	75
5. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR SUCCESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	108
 APPENDIX	
A. MAJOR SOMALI MOVEMENTS.....	123
B. SUMMARY OF UN CHARTER CHAPTER VI, VII, AND VIII	126
C. MAP OF SOMALIA	128
D. SOMALI CLAN AND CLAN FAMILIES	129
E. DIVISION OF SOMALIA AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY	130
BIBLIOGRAPHY	131
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	134
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	135

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. UN Strategic Options	77
2. Chain of Key Flaws	79
3. Campaign Model	114

TABLES

Table	Page
1. Crisis in Somalia	46
2. Matrix for Option 1	116
3. Matrix for Option 2	118

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The United Nations' (UN's) mission in Somalia ended in March 1995, raising a host of questions. Some doubted the UN's effectiveness as a credible body in ensuring world peace, skepticism prevailed as to the manner nation-states contributed in the UN-sponsored peace effort, and, more importantly, the UN was definitely challenged in outlining its future course in dealing with problems around the world. The mission in Somalia started as a mere humanitarian assistance mission; it eventually became the first ever UN-sponsored "peace enforcement" mission, ultimately ending in failure.

The three years and two months that followed the UN resolution on Somalia in January 1992 saw twists and turns of an unprecedented nature. What happened in the end was most undesirable. Somalia presented a rather unprecedented problem wherein clashes among the clans intensified significantly to create an international security situation. The issue, therefore, was significantly different than experienced before.

There are different thoughts about what could have helped or what could have been the prerequisites for success in the operation in Somalia. The research problem in this study focuses on identifying the probable factors that contributed to the failure of the mission and also analyzing the preconditions that could have helped gain success.

Research Questions

Main Question. Could the UN mission in Somalia have succeeded with a different approach and application?

Secondary Questions. Given the genesis, nature, and magnitude of the problem in Somalia, what kind of response was necessary for a durable peace? Were the UN resolutions and follow-up efforts sufficiently responsive to address the problem from its core perspective? Were there existing issues that could have negated the positive outcome to the mission? What would have been the desirable response to succeed in the mission and was it affordable in the given circumstances?

Defining Success for the United Nations Operation in Somalia

Basically there were three key areas that would define the success or failure for United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM): humanitarian assistance and elimination of human suffering, disarmament of factions for ensuring peace, and instituting a legal governance of consensus. These can be ascertained from the key resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Appended here are essences from some of the early resolutions that would define long-term success for the mission:

1. The UNSC sought for parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia. It also called on all states to refrain from any action that might contribute to increasing tension.¹

2. The UNSC requested the Secretary General to pursue the humanitarian effort for addressing the urgent need for and also appealed to all member states to cooperate in the humanitarian relief effort. It also authorized steps towards reconciliation in cooperation with concerned international organizations and Somali parties. To that end the council was to remain resolved until a peaceful solution was achieved.²

3. The UN was determined to restore peace, stability, and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of political settlement under the auspices of the UN, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia.³

In the given circumstances, humanitarian assistance and elimination of human suffering were the central problem facing the UN. The UN had termed human suffering as the key security concern, which, by its definition, had impacted global peace and stability. The issues of “governance by consensus” and “disarmament vis-à-vis reconciliation” were also equally important, to bringing an end to human catastrophe and enabling durable peace.

Background and Context of the Problem

Somalia witnessed an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe beginning in the late 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s. The legacy of human suffering continues unabated even today. This rather newly independent country saw the end of colonial rule in 1960. The country, with a prominence of ‘clan’ and ‘subclan’ groups, experienced democracy only for a brief period of time. Siad Barre, a former military figure belonging to the Marehan subclan of the Darod clan, took over the presidency in 1969. This man somehow monopolized the political system. His clan in general, and the subclan in particular, dominated the political and state machineries. Infuriated and oppressed, other major clans voiced opposition to the regime. The Somali National Movement (SNM) led an uprising in the north of the country, only to be stifled and suppressed by skillful maneuvering and repression by Siad Barre. Clan fighting erupted in the north, slowly engulfing the whole country. This clan fighting sums up the story for Somalia. Siad Barre’s regime finally succumbed, and he himself was forced to flee the

country on 27 January 1991, but not before reducing the northwestern part of the country to rubble and igniting widespread clan fighting all over the country. Other factions, particularly the one led by victorious Farah Aideed, came onto the scene. Following an inconclusive effort at reconciliation, Al Mahdi was named the president, only to be deplored by opposing clans and subclans. Farah Aideed, belonging to the same Hawiye clan (but a different subclan--the Habar Gadir) as Al Mahdi, was first to criticize Al Mahdi.⁴ In the months following Siad Barre's retreat, the situation in Somalia worsened quickly. It was one of total anarchy, lawlessness, and a humanitarian catastrophe. It was further impacted by the declaration of independence by Somaliland (the northern part of the country corresponding to the colonial British Somaliland) and a severe drought. At this time there existed no government, no civic facilities, or public functions in Somalia. Armed hooligans belonging to the clans started dominating parts of the country. Mogadishu became the epicenter of clan fighting.

At this time there was hardly any international presence in Somalia. The UN had already evacuated all of its staffs. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), maintained their presence with extreme difficulty. Somalia was not on the list of important agenda items for the UN at the time. Different organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 16 December 1991, the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 1991, and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992 appealed to the parties for cessation of hostilities. Some countries, including the United States, did condemn the atrocities over the years, but nothing substantial was done to put an end to the situation.

Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun (who later became the first Special Representative to the Secretary General) outlined three “missed opportunities” that the UN could have availed to save hundreds of thousands of lives. The first was a possible intervention during 1989-1990, based on the human rights report. The second was capitalizing in late 1990 on a manifesto to restore order, on which most of the respected intellectuals and community leaders agreed. The third was cohosting a regional peace effort in mid 1991. The UN did not exploit any one of these opportunities due to a lack of attention on Somalia. World bodies were busy deciding on courses of action after the Gulf War, outlining their role in former Yugoslavia, and focusing on other issues, such as NATO’s post Cold-War role.⁵

The UN’s belated response to the problem became effective with the adoption of UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 733 on 23 January 1992. The resolution called for a total arms embargo and urged the conflicting parties to agree to a cease-fire and promote reconciliation. Later in February 1992 talks were held between the warring factions in New York under the auspices of the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Islamic Conference. The UN showed signs of a more active role in resolving the problem. Although a cease-fire agreement was signed, the fighting continued. Meanwhile, in March 1992, the first fact-finding mission from the UN headquarters reported the degree of devastation in Mogadishu, which, in fact, replicated most other parts of Somalia. By about this time some estimated 350,000 people had already died, 70 percent of the country’s livestock had been lost, and farming had been devastated. Some 500,000 people took refuge in neighboring countries and more than

3,000 people were dying daily. On the backdrop of such a gruesome situation the UN began its arduous journey.

The UNSC adopted resolution 751 on Somalia in 1992 on 24 April 1992. It requested the Secretary General to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and maintain a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of humanitarian assistance, established the UNOSOM.⁶ It also “decided to establish a committee on Somalia to recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries from the international community to support, with financial and other resource, the implementation of the 90-days Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.”⁷

The UNOSOM team started its operations with limited resources. It was, however, facing the daunting tasks of helping to supply food, provide administrative expertise, coordinate relief operations, restore the infrastructure, and mediate in clan disputes. There was no military option at this stage. The UN had to mostly depend on moral suasion to get things done. Skirmishes diminished significantly, and the majority of Somalis seemed to give their tentative consent to the UN deployment. NGO activities also revitalized. The UNOSOM could not, however, attend to the needs of a large humanitarian assistance operation and recovery program. In addition to the UN, some governments provided aid, but this was far short of the need. However, amidst such difficulty the UNOSOM team tried to mediate among the factions, often with inconclusive results. The mission began with 50 unarmed observers and was later augmented by 500-armed peacekeepers.

Throughout 1992 the UN worked out different peace strategies, including division by region, reconciliation, and “divorce by consent”--a means to keep some relatively peaceful areas out of the fighting. Some of these looked as if they might work well. Unfortunately, bureaucratic steps by UN management at different levels hampered the outcome, as did the lack of interagency coordination and a shortage of supplies. The UN seemed to focus on Mogadishu itself wherein the situation was most volatile and unpredictable all the time. Meanwhile actions by some of the countries undermined the UN’s credibility as a neutral body. When Russia flew illegal sorties, allegedly with weapons, to the northern part of the country in clear violation of the UN resolution, opposing factions saw it as a sign of the UN taking sides. Things deteriorated further after the first Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) resigned in October 1992 following what he called “bureaucratic and skeptical criticism by the UN of his attendance in the Seychelles conference.” In his opinion, this was yet another possibility of reconciliation efforts unaccomplished.⁸

In early November 1992, the Secretary General announced that the UN would send additional reinforcement to Somalia, an event that significantly affected later developments. On 24 November 1992 the Secretary General in his letter to the UNSC outlined five options for Somalia. The first option was to deploy the 2,400 troops authorized by UNSC Resolution 775.⁹ He believed that the situation was susceptible to peacekeeping treatment. The second option was to withdraw military elements from Somalia, which he later rejected. The third option was to deploy a show of force, which was not considered, since the Somali warlords possessed a good quantity of arms to undermine such a venture. The fourth option was to allow the UN to undertake a

nationwide enforcement operation within a given timeline. The US showed willingness to spearhead such an effort. The fifth option was to go for enforcement under UN auspices instead of the nation states.

The Secretary General, however, acknowledged the limitations of the UN's ability to provide command and control for such an operation. The fourth option was chosen in the end.¹⁰ On 3 December 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 794, reflecting this line of thought. The first US-led troops landed in Somalia on 9 December 1992 under the banner of "Unified Task Force" (UNITAF), comprising twenty-one countries. President Bush of the US, in his address to the nation on 4 December 1992, echoed the UN resolution and stated that UNITAF was meant to operate only for a short period of time to create a conducive security environment for onward operation by UNOSOM II.¹¹ Eventually the security situation in Somalia improved remarkably after UNITAF's arrival.

UNITAF, on successful accomplishment of its tasks, handed over responsibility to UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993. Its mandate included the task of nation building, whereas UNITAF was only responsible for providing the conditions necessary for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Given the combat power and staff level, UN forces seemed not up to the task of meeting the conditions set forth in the UNSC Resolution. Tension began to increase in Somalia. UNOSOM II and Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) were on a confrontation course.

Problems arose when Aideed felt as if the new SRSG (Ambassador Howe) and US authority were marginalizing him. He eventually started propagandizing against the UN, using all possible apparatus, including the radio station he controlled in Mogadishu. The UN was directly challenged when the SNA ambushed the Pakistani enforcers on 5

June 1993, killing twenty-four of them. The very next day the UNSC adopted Resolution 837, which basically amounted to a declaration of war against Aideed.¹² UNOSOM launched a five-day raid on Aideed's strongholds, with inconclusive results and earned media criticism for the collateral civilian damage and lack of neutrality. Although the cordon in a part of the crucial stronghold was effective, this was not exploited. Later, the effort to capture Aideed through a reward of \$25,000 for information was also counterproductive. UNOSOM II had slowly but surely become isolated. Ambassador Howe was adamant to hunt down Aideed amidst skepticism by some of the countries and organizations. Meanwhile, on 12 July a US-led Cobra raid on Abdi House (a Hawayie clan-based community center) sparked discontent among the UN forces, with Italy threatening to pull out. More importantly SNA openly vowed to resist the US troops--the predominant element of the UNOSOM II.

Following some attacks on US troops; Task Force Ranger (TFR) was sent to Somalia in late August to capture Aideed, amidst mixed feeling about the effectiveness and risk involved. It was tailored for this mission with minimum strength and equipment. On arrival, TFR conducted small raids with some success. It was on 3 and 4 October 1993 that the biggest tragedy in UNOSOM's history occurred. The TFR and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) sustained eighteen dead and seventy-eight injured while trying to raid a conference site to capture Aideed and his aides on the afternoon of 3 October. In the aftermath of this tragedy, President Clinton ordered the pullout of all US support for UNOSOM II, whether or not the objective was achieved, clearly demonstrating lack of coherent US policy on Somalia. On Aideed's part, however, he apparently looked shaken and decided to give up fighting, preferring peace. The task force's action on that account

was successful and provided a good opportunity to compel Aideed to support UNOSOM II. However, Clinton instead remained determined to pull out by a given deadline (1 March 1994).¹³

With the withdrawal of US troops and, more importantly, US support, the UN was left with few options in Somalia. Last ditch efforts for peace yielded no success. UNOSOM II was briefly extended, apparently to organize an orderly withdrawal of all forces rather than to proceed with its mandate. Towards the latter part of 1994 the Somalis once again increased their attacks on UN forces. Finally, the withdrawal began and on 28 February 1995 the last element of the UN forces left Somalia, covered by the US Marines.

The operation in Somalia aimed at humanitarian assistance, cessation of clan fighting and disarmament of different bands, and installation of a government of consensus. Apparently, none of these aims was achieved. Decisions at the highest levels were either flawed or not pursued from the correct perspective or met with unfortunate opposition on the ground. Some of the operational and tactical actions too had strategic-level consequences. Throughout the mission, there were twists and turns in the situation. It posed challenges of all dimensions, some of which may be common in crises around the world even today.

Chapter Outline

As planned, the thesis is designed to be finished in five chapters. Chapter 2 will encompass the review of literature in which the author shall summarize the relevant materials at hand and outline the research methodology. Chapter 3 is a historical outline of events relevant to the study. The last two chapters (4 and 5) are dedicated to the core

research. Chapter 4 shall analyze the causes of failure and hint possibilities of success, while chapter 5 shall recommend alternatives for success.

Definitions

The following is a list of definitions of terms that are relevant to this study.

Clan. In Somali culture, a clan is a large group of people who believe themselves to be descendants (through males) of a common ancestor. The clan takes the name after its ancestor.¹⁴

Clan Family. In Somali culture, a clan-family is a group of clans with an ultimate common male ancestor. There are six major Somali clan-families: Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Digil, and Rahanweyn.¹⁵

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life, or result in great loss of property.¹⁶

Peacekeeping. Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.¹⁷

Peace Enforcement. Peace enforcement operations are the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹⁸

Peacemaking. Process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement, that may include military peace support operations.¹⁹

Warlord. A casual term attached to the clan based faction leaders who were involved in fighting in Somalia. Often the term has been used to refer to the kind of non-compromising attitude of the faction leaders and their passion and preference for fighting over peace.

Limitations and Assumptions

Firstly, primary sources are difficult to find as far as the Somalis are concerned. Secondly, some of the discussions that led to significant developments are not recorded; these could have contributed to the research. However, a reasonable amount of material in the form of books, articles, official reports, summaries, limited correspondence, and research works on the related topic is available. These materials cover the details required to address the research question in this thesis.

Delimitations

In order to address the issue objectively and within the scope, the thesis shall be limited as follows:

1. It will encompass the whole period from the beginning of UN's involvement till the closure of the mission. Historical analysis will be limited to those issues that had direct bearing on the prevalent situation in the timeframe covered by this thesis.
2. The main focus of the research is the strategic level decisions and actions that have accounted for the failure or could have defined success if applied with jurisdiction.

Only those operational and tactical decisions that had strategic implications will be brought to light.

3. In studying the strategic decisions and implications the US DIME model (DIME-the acronym for Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic) of national power will be followed as a guideline.

4. The research will not look into the details of UN involvement in any peacekeeping operation or the details of UNOSOM beyond what is essentially required to address the research question.

5. Only unclassified sources available during the time of the research will be consulted.

Significance of the Study

The study of the UN mission in Somalia, the factors that led to its ultimate failure, and whether the mission could have succeeded had those factors not been present are significant in many ways. Firstly, the mission came at a time when the world had been experiencing relatively greater challenges. Apparently, the world bodies, and the UN in particular, seemed not to be responding to the task in time. It needs to be seen whether a timely intervention could have helped produce positive results. It also serves as a reminder of the necessity of settling more than one problem at a time. Secondly, stability and support operations (SASOs) are presumably increasing in importance. The Somalia operation can render invaluable lessons for successfully conducting SASO. Thirdly, the study can contribute to determining how similar crises with a multitude of demographic diversity (in the form of clans, for example), economic debacle, militancy, and human catastrophe can be handled.

¹UNSC Resolution 733 dated 23 January 1992; available from <http://www.un.org>; Internet; accessed on 10 October 2001.

²UNSC Resolution 746 dated 17 March 1992 available from <http://www.un.org> accessed on 10 October 2001.

³UNSC Resolution 794 dated 3 December 1992 available from <http://www.un.org> accessed on 10 October 2001.

⁴Samuel M. Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa* (Adelphi Paper 269, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 24-27.

⁵Mohammad Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 15-21.

⁶UNSC Resolution 751 dated 24 April 1992 cited at Sahnoun 64-67.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Sahnoun, 25-41.

⁹UNSC Resolution 794.

¹⁰ *United Nations Operation in Somalia* (Reference Paper, April 1995, 6-7); available from gopher://gopher.undp.org/o/unearth/PKO/SOMALIA.TXT; Internet; accessed on 5 January 2002.

¹¹Major Vance J. Nannini, USA, "Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia" (MMAS Thesis, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1994), 6.

¹²Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Daze, US Army. "Centers of Gravity of UNOSOM II" (MMAS Thesis, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1995), 59-76.

¹³Major Roger N. Sangvic, "Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1998-99), 13-46.

¹⁴Nannini, 9.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Department of Defense, Joint Publications 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), GL-7.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, II-1, II-2, and GL 8.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, viii and GL 7.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, GL 8.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are a host of available materials that contain useful information to support analysis in line with the research question at hand. Sources include books, articles, research papers, monographs, reports and unclassified official documents. Some of these sources deal with specific aspects or operations, while others are more general in nature. For the purpose of the thesis, exploration into the materials has been limited to those that have historic relevance or those with useful factual analysis covering any given aspect in its entirety. In so doing, these have been approached in line with the intended development and compartmentalization of the thesis paper.

Genesis of the Crisis

The area handbook *Somalia a Country Study*, published by the Federal Research Division and edited by Metz Chapin, is a very good source of background information on the country. It provides a consolidated account of the origin of Somalia; its terrain, including its impact on demographics, colonization, and postindependence developments; the social order; the economy; governance; and the security scenario in the pre-crisis period. The book has provided a great deal of base knowledge on the genesis, which is required to approach the Somalia issue from its core perspective.¹ Yet more reinforcing thoughts and a historical account along the same line have been found in the book entitled *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (revised edition) by I. M. Lewis. Useful information on the makeup of Somali society, nature of

governance, cultural mix, and their impact on the overall security situation of the country has been covered in the book entitled *The Somali Challenge from Catastrophe to Renewal*, edited by Ahmed I. Samatar. Although the book has picked up events leading to the human catastrophe and the development thereafter, it brings up some key issues that need to be pondered while addressing the genesis of the crisis. For example, values that the clans lived by, theories--real and perceived--that drove the Somali clans and leaders are some facets worth considering.² Apart from these books there are number of research papers that have rather aptly analyzed the issue. Although each of these papers is focused on any one issue, different views on a wide range of matters are equally valuable to consider.

In analyzing the genesis, it is important to trace back the legacy of the colonial era and the geopolitics impacting the “Horn of Africa” in general, and Somalia in particular. All of the aforementioned materials do reflect on such issues too.

Background of UN Mission in Somalia

A fairly comprehensive account of the UN involvement can be found in number of papers. Mohammad Sahnoun, in his book entitled *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, portrays developments preceding the first active UN resolution on Somalia and the role of the UN. This book provides a kind of biographic anecdote of the writer, as he himself was directly involved with the development in the initial stage, and eventually went on to become the first SRSG to Somalia. On this account the book can be taken as one of the primary sources of information. Some of Sahnoun’s thoughts need to be revealed in detail as they promise to provide strategic insight on matters related to early catalysts challenging the UN’s success.³

Hirsch and Oakley provide some relevant information in their book *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*. The book is basically designed to provide reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping with reference to the situation in Somalia. It addresses the twists and turns that impacted the early period in the Somali crisis, as well as later developments.⁴

Yet another good source of information is the book entitled *Network of Dissolution: Somalia Undone* by Anna Siomns. Although similar in content, the book provides factual analysis of how the players in the conflict and conflict resolution misunderstood each other, resulting into dissolution. The book is good for weighing the decision and timing of the UN's involvement in Somalia, as it primarily deals with the pre-involvement period in adequate details.⁵

Apart from these books, some of those named earlier in the chapter also contain valuable information. Particularly, the book entitled *The Somali Challenge From Catastrophe to Renewal* by Ahmed I Samatar offers analytical attributes on areas, including economy and governance that resulted in human sufferings and drew the world's attention in the first place.⁶

Besides the related joint publications and field manuals, there are some key sources that help reflect on doctrinal and theoretical issues governing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the role of UN. The book entitled *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* by Hill and Malik examines the history and nature of peacekeeping until the mid 1990s and reflects on role and responsibility of various bodies. It is a good source to examine why the UN and other players acted in the way they did. On the other hand, it is also useful to reveal disconnects in possibilities and performance.⁷

Yet another book, entitled *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, by Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, deliberates upon the collapse of a state with reference to Somalia. Although not quite theorizing the doctrine for intervention, the book is instrumental in identifying the gap between the required response and the actual response in the face of the challenges in Somalia. It has the listing of Somali factions in adequate details and is added in this thesis as appendix A.⁸

The School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph by Major Daniel J Schuster, *Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and the Operational Art* explores the dynamics between tactical decisions and strategic objectives and seeks to identify the challenges to the practice of operational art. In so doing, it takes as an example, amongst others, the issues of Somalia, thus making it a relevant material for this study.⁹

An MMAS thesis entitled “UN Peace Operations: Conditions for Success,” by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Fiedler, aptly outlines a wide range of aspects as key to success in UN peace operations. Besides deliberating upon moral and legal aspects, the thesis summarizes the theory of peace operations, which is good to reflect upon while considering the case in hand.¹⁰

Finally, the *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* and Joint Publication (JP) 3.07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, have been consulted for doctrinal aspects related to SASO and for discerning the parameters of relevant UN carters.¹¹ A summarized form of chapters VI, VII, and VIII are given at appendix B.

UN in Somalia--A Mission Unaccomplished Defining Success and Results on Ground

Viability of UN Mandates: The early UN mandates on Somalia called for humanitarian assistance against a backdrop of severe human catastrophe. Later mandates manifested apparently more challenging undertakings, including disarmament of factions, nation building and institution of a system of governance. The analysis is to take a holistic look at some of the key mandates. For that, it is important to see whether mandates addressed the situation on ground. What also needs to be seen is the key players in the formulation of the mandates, and whether or not there had been adequate resources to support the decisions. Such information is not available in consolidated form. However, some of the sources have been found relevant for the study.

Firstly, the book entitled *Learning from Somalia*, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, focuses on this matter. The first chapter “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia” outlines the magnitude of the existing problem and weighs against it the response of UN mandates. It also underlines the role played by some of the key players, such as the United States, in the formulation of UN mandates and in later execution of the same on ground.¹² Kenneth Allard, in his book *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, in the brief chapter on “Mandate and Mission,” highlights some of the disconnects with examples. Other chapters of the books basically deal with doctrinal aspects, deployment, and operations on the ground, which can also be related to the key mandates. Previously mentioned sources in this chapter also provide some useful information on which to reflect.¹³

Key Events and Impacts: It is important to analyze the major developments in Somalia that had strategic consequences as far as success is concerned. For that, an

overview of the entire mission is quite necessary. Most of the aforementioned sources contain accounts of physical events. However, besides the physical activities on the ground, there had been many decisions, developments, and activities within and away from the hotspot that led to major twists in the course of the mission. Some of the sources do provide valuable information on these accounts.

The MMAS thesis “Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia,” by Major Vance J. Nannini, provides some insights in its analysis chapter. While applying the FAS (feasibility, acceptability, and suitability) test to various actions and developments, the analyst has given a kind of sequential rundown of major developments. Although focused on the US’s role, some of these analyses are quite general in nature and as a whole quite relevant too.¹⁴ Yet another MMAS research paper, “Centers of Gravity of United Nations Operation Somalia II,” by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Daze, in its chapter 2 identifies some key decisive points for the UN operations in the country. Although the level is mostly tactical in this chapter, some of the events had strategic consequences that are worth considering. Later, in chapter 4, the thesis discusses the implication of some mandates and strategy followed in the UN operations, which are important for understanding major developments.¹⁵

Other Manifestations

Application of Power: As outlined in the previous chapter, the US DIME model of instruments of national power will be used as the model to evaluate the UN’s application of power in Somalia. As far as diplomacy is concerned, apparently there had been five strategic players in Somalia, namely the UN, Somali factions, other nation states, regional bodies, and various international organizations. Each of these players had

its share of the role played in the development and outcome of the operation in Somalia. Previously mentioned sources do provide adequate information for discerning the magnitude of their involvement. Besides, some of the official documents (available and cited in other research works) also bear good account of the role played by various actors. As far as “informational” power is concerned, the paper needs to analyze the role played by the media in particular. Besides, the UN’s own operations would also be studied as may be relevant. The MMAS thesis “Tactical Intelligence Support In Somalia: Lessons Learned,” by Major James M. Stuteville, indirectly reflects on operations on ground.¹⁶ Besides, there are a host of official releases, articles, and periodicals that contain information of significant value.

The account of military power is available in most vivid form and is found in most of the sources mentioned before. The economic dimension of DIME is imbedded in a wide range of activities, to include UN, multinational, and volunteer relief operations, various nation-building measures, and the enforcement of peace itself for the sake of humanitarian aid. Due account of it is found in most of the sources.

Anatomy of Failure: It is important to analyze the relative failure of the UN’s envisioned goal. To that end, the efforts that were undertaken will be examined with respect to time. This will include the effort of alleviating human suffering, disarming factions, and instituting a government. No consolidated factual or analytical evidence in these areas is available, but it can be found discretely in some of the sources and can be compiled for the research.

Research Methodology

Chapter 3 analyzes the history and background of the UN's involvement. It is designed to provide necessary historical evidence and rundown of the UN's involvement to establish correlations with event or argument throughout the thesis. Therefore, the bulk of the chapter has been dedicated to the required summarization of the background. However, part of the thesis question has been addressed in the process. First, whether or not there existed issues that could have negated any positive outcome has been briefly analyzed. Second, the viability of the UN mandate is also put under the spotlight for additional analysis in the later chapters. The chapter starts hinting at issues that were to be addressed for the UN mission to be successful in Somalia. Also in chapter 3 are some indirect questions that have been introduced in the process of discussing the UN's role in Somalia.

The analysis in chapter 4 is rather focused with details on the strategic level only. Initially it focuses on the DIME model, followed by other causes. All the secondary questions are conclusively answered here. In addition, some of the overarching issues, like doctrine, have also been analyzed in short. Most of the analysis will be made as the discussion progresses, leaving attributes for the chapter 5. Chapter 5 outlines the findings from previous chapters and suggests the broad paradigm for success. It would also recommend the most viable options.

Throughout the thesis both subjective and objective information have been taken for the analysis. Anything that did not match the parameters has been discarded. The criteria for selecting the information were the delimitations set at the beginning of the paper. In reviewing the information, both quantitative and qualitative values have been

ascertained. For example, data that supported facts earned quantitative value, while actions, decisions, and judgments have been analyzed for their qualitative relevance. That did not mean discarding bad decisions or poor judgment, but rather differentiating the material on the basis of importance and impact. Some of the apparently bad decisions appeared to be of the highest qualitative value.

In addition to this, the doctrinal parameters have also been kept in mind while viewing relevant information. Information and evidence have been analyzed following a method of check and countercheck. Moreover, in order to avoid being attracted to some relatively unimportant information, importance has been given to proximity and objectivity of the source material. There were some key events and developments that had direct and indirect strategic impact and are reflected for relevance in this study.

In collecting source material, the author gathered whatever was relevant in the first place and sifted thereafter. However, it was painfully slow and the later accumulation was driven by the research questions and chronology of events in hand. The subject, being one of common issues of concern, allows access to many sources. However, pertinent ones have been approached with due objectivity.

¹Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Somalia a Country Study* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army 1992).

²Ahmed I. Samatar, *The Somali Challenge from Catastrophe to Renewal?* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 3-251.

³Mohammad Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994).

⁴John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

⁵Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution Somalia Undone* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).

⁶Samatar, 3-146.

⁷Stephen M. Hill, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996), 5-25, 59-116.

⁸Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998).

⁹Major Daniel J. Schuster, US Marine Corp, "Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the Operational Art" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 1994-95) 1-30.

¹⁰LTC Micheal R. Fiedler, US Army, "UN Peace Operations: Conditions for Success" (Ph.D. diss., University of Idaho, 2000), 87-112.

¹¹Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Joint Warfighting Center), 1-22 and Appendix B; and Department of Defense, Joint Publications 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994).

¹²Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 3-42.

¹³Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Ft. McNair: National Defense University Press, 1995).

¹⁴Major Vance J. Nannini, US Army, "Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia" (MMAS Thesis, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1994), 104-132.

¹⁵Metz.

¹⁶Major James M. Stuteville, US Army, "Tactical Intelligence Support in Somalia: Lessons Learned" (MMAS Thesis, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 40-60.

CHAPTER 3

SOMALI CRISIS: GENESIS TO THE END OF UNOSOM

Genesis

The crisis in Somalia is rooted deep in the history of the country and the nation. In order to find what could be a desirable response to the crisis and to identify key catalysts to the problem, it is imperative to analyze some of the causes, including their share of responsibility in the civil war and the resultant effect.

Clan--A Source of Discord

Analysts agree that warlords and clannishness amongst the Somalis have contributed largely to the bloody civil war. Although warlords have been held primarily responsible for the brutality, warlords themselves are a creation of the clan culture and clan politics. Historically, Somalis have shown a fierce independence, an unwillingness to submit to authority, a strong clan consciousness, and frequent conflict among clans and subclans, despite their sharing of common language, religion, and pastoral customs.¹ Clan consciousness and struggle for clan recognition go right back to the creation of Somali nationhood. In every clan, as the analysts say, guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of culture, with women and children considered part of the clan's order of battle.² The very notion of individualistic or group identification over the greater nationhood caused gradually depleting and complicated social systems. A subsequent discussion would reveal that the Somali character is instinctively one of disagreement and opposition rather than one of togetherness or

harmony. Individuals and groups identify themselves as part of different groups based on the opposition in question. A Somali proverb best explains the position:

Me and my country against the world, me and my clan against my country, me and my family against my clan, me and my brother against my family, and, me against my brother. Anonymous

Somali Nationhood and Clannishness vis-à-vis Fragmented Society

The people of Somalia inherited an ancient history. The medieval Arabs called them Berberi, and archaeological evidence indicates that they had occupied the area known as the Horn of Africa by A.D. 100, possibly earlier. By the eighteenth century, the Somalis--their name derives from Samaal, their eponymous ancestor--had developed pastoral nomadism and were followers of Islam. As far as occupation and governance is concerned, historically the area was home to two peoples: pastoral and agropastoral groups living in the interior, with informal and varied political structures; and trading communities on the coast, which had developed administrative and legal systems based on Muslim sharia.³

Somalis lived sparsely scattered over a harsh, dry land. Other than the areas close to the two rivers in the south, the Jubba and Shabeelle, the rest of the country consists primarily of arid plateaus and plains, with some rugged mountains in the north (see appendix C for a map of Somalia). For this reason, as well as sparse rainfall, nomadic pastoralism has been the principal occupation of clan-families in much of the country.⁴

Somali society has been traditionally segmented following the hierarchical system of patrilineal descent groups; each said to originate with a single male ancestor. The most comprehensive of these groups were the clan families. Their constituent units were the clans, which, in turn, were made up of lineages (a genealogical depth of three to fourteen

generations, depending on the clan traditions), which themselves were further segmented. There are six major clan-families (see appendix D for Somali clan-families and clans). Four of the families are predominantly pastoral--the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye (representing about 70 percent of Somalia's population), and two are agricultural--the Digil and Rahanwayn (constituting about 20 percent of the population). The remainder of the population consists of urban dwellers and marginal non-Samaal groups, most of whom engaged in trade or crafts. While most Somalis live in a society defined by clans, there remained a small percentage of sedentary Somalis (mainly living between the rivers), amongst whom descent gave way, in part, to territoriality as a framework of social, political, and economic organization.⁵

In the segmented Somali society, membership in clans and lineages shaped the allocation of individual rights and obligations. One of the primary means of lineage delineation was through the *diya* paying--compensation for homicide and inflicting casualties upon others. Based on how they paid *diya*, such communities had their own elders and the community could be made up of only one hundred or so men. The social order has been marked by competition, often by armed conflict between clans and lineages, even between units of the same clan-family or clan. In a traditional society, most Samaal men lived as warriors and herders; a warrior considered his vocation nobler than any other, except the religious life.⁶

While the clans remained the major overarching denominator of the social system, the demographics within the clans were also influenced by categories of residents. In the 1990s, roughly 60 percent of an estimated population of more than 8.4 million was still nomadic pastoralists or semi-nomadic herders, subject to the vicissitudes of an arid

climate. The only and inconclusive census of 1975 distinguished three main categories of residents: 59 percent nomads (cyclical migrants by seasons) and semi nomads, 22 percent settled farmers (some were sedentary) and 19 percent nonagricultural urban dwellers, the vast majority of whom resided in Mogadishu, the capital. Areas of greatest rural density were the settled zones adjacent to the rivers, while northern Somalia was the most sparsely populated. Nomads did migrate to settled areas during periods of natural calamities, as was the case in the mid-1970s, when some 100,000 nomads moved in. Towns were mostly set up by the trade factor. Since the eighth century, ports were centers of commerce and the economy of the interior depended considerably upon these ports.⁷ It is important to note that each of these categories of people disliked interference from the other.

Yet another dimension of the demographics was the relationship between the Somalis and non-Somalis, *habash* groups being most prominent of those who differ culturally and physically from the Somalis. *Habashies*, who descend mainly from pre-Somali inhabitants and defected slaves, constitute less than 2 percent of the total population. They maintained their identity against absorption and enslavement. Slavery was, by the way, practiced in most of the Somali clans until formally abolished prior to World War II. Although the non-Somalis too were mostly religiously akin to Somalis and lived as near-equals in the rural neighborhoods, the Somalis still often treated them as inferiors. There was little social exchange between the two, and non-Somalis had to cling to a Somali clan as client for obtaining rights, such as land and water.⁸

Throughout its history, Somali society remained traditionally divided. There was an open tendency amongst the influential clans to look down upon minorities. The

segmented social order, characterized by clan dominance, was carried into the independent nation with relatively minor modifications. There were some efforts at different stages to forge a greater identity for Somalis, but the clan issue came back over and over again. Although Somalis were always passionate about their common identity and were fundamentally akin in values, the internal rifts and a greater passion for clan and lineage presented themselves as a stronger catalyst against unification of any sort. Lack of homogeneity--perceived and real--would reach its extremity when the cumulative effects of incoherent development, lack of education, subjugation, warlords vis-à-vis fighting for existence, poverty, revenge, and others are added to this dimension. The discussions that follow will touch upon these factors.

Preindependent Somalia--Political and Colonial History

The legacy of external occupation of Somalia goes far back into the history. Until the late nineteenth century, Somalia had been ruled by the Omans, Zanzibaris (present day Tanzania), Sarifs of Mukha (Yemen), and Otoman Truks for different period of time and under different political and territorial arrangements. Although relevant to the history of Somalia, it is not significant for the purpose of this thesis. However, the transformation witnessed by the Somali peninsula from the last quarter of the nineteenth century needs to be examined. During this period, the Somalis became the subjects of state systems under the flags of Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia, while Kenya too was a key player in the south.

The new rulers had various motives for colonization. The British came to north Somalia in 1884, as they did in Aden, for the purpose of securing the Red Sea for protecting the sea line connecting the commercial operations in the east. Eventually they

settled three vice consuls in the north after negotiating treaties with local clans. The French, having been evicted from Egypt by the British, sought a coaling station to strengthen naval links to Indo-China and to bisect Britain's vaunted "Cairo to Cape Town zone of influence." A French protectorate was proclaimed in the northwest (present day Djibouti). Recently unified, Italy was inexperienced at imperial power plays. It was; therefore, content to stake out a territory whenever it could do so without confronting another colonial power. Beginning in 1888, Italy slowly managed to establish its protectorate, exploiting the vulnerabilities and rift between the sultans. Later, by 1925, the British and Zanzibari possessions in the south were also ceded to Italy to form Italian Somaliland.

The Egyptian quest for a swath of territory in the Horn of Africa was short-lived because of the 1884 Sudanese revolt against Egypt. Ethiopia emerged as an unforeseen threat to the Europeans and to the region. Emperor Menelik II not only managed to defend Ethiopia against European encroachment, but also succeeded in competing with them for Somali-inhabited territories that he claimed as part of Ethiopia. Between 1887 to 1897, he successfully extended Ethiopian rule over the long independent Muslim Emirate of Harer and over Ogaden (western Somalia). Thus, by the turn of the century the Somali peninsula, one of the most culturally homogeneous regions of Africa, was divided into British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden), and what came to be called the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. (See appendix E for the division of Somalia at the end of the nineteenth century.)⁹

As the colonies began to consolidate their possessions, the first of the Somali anti-colonial movements found expression under Abdille Hasam, a religious leader from the

north. Britain downplayed his significance by terming him a “mad mullah,” but soon realized the gravity of the movement. Hasam’s agenda also included recapturing Ogaden from Ethiopia. Ethiopia had become a de facto ally to Britain. Hasam’s movement had been gaining large support from the people in the north. The dream, however, failed to materialize in the face of military operations, including aerial bombardment by the British prior to and after the death of Hasam in 1920. The cost of the fight to the Somalis was quite high. One third of the people in northern Somalia perished in fighting and starvation, and the economy was ruined during the time that came to be known as--Time of Eating Filth.¹⁰ However, the seed of disaffection was growing.

In 1935 Italy attacked Ethiopia over the Ogaden issue and reunified Ogaden with Somalia after forty years. In the process, emperor Haile Selassie was removed from the throne. As World War II began, Italy briefly ejected Britain from north Somalia in 1940 and called for the unification of all of Somalia. Britain came back powerfully the following year, captured Italian Somaliland, and reinstated the emperor of Ethiopia. Soon it established a military administration in the entire territory. Under intense pressure from Haile Selassie, Britain agreed to return the Ogaden to Ethiopia, thus alienating the entire Somali population.

Britain was faced with many challenges in the following years. However, despite security problems, the military administered two Somali protectorates until 1949 rather effectively. From 1945 to 1949, some developmental works were undertaken to appease the natives. In the south, experienced Italian civilians were inevitably reinstated in the administration. A host of Italian organizations also tried to reorganize pro-Italian sentiment into a political movement. Although there existed considerable Italian support

amongst the people, Somalis began to eye independence as the only path to emancipation. As a result, the first modern Somali political party, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), came into being in 1943, due in great part to British assistance to counter emerging Italian sentiment. The SYC expanded rapidly and renamed itself the Somali Youth League (SYL), opening offices throughout all Somali territory, including those in Ethiopia and Kenya. Their objective was to unify the whole of Somalia. The party voiced its platform against clannishness, although the leadership represented only four of the six major clans. Italy immediately exploited the situation and financed an initiative to raise another pro-Italian party, Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM), representing the two interriverine Digil and Mirifle clans. Some other political parties began to surface at the same time.

Following the end of World War II it was decided at the Postdam Conference in 1945 not to return the territories to Italy that it had seized during the war. The disposition of Somalia, therefore, fell to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers, representing Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Other members viewed Britain's claim for authority over all of Somalia as imperial machinations. As the commission arrived in Mogadishu in January 1948 for an on-ground assessment, the SYL and HDM locked in riot, causing seventy-five deaths. A multitude of respective interests and global power politics kept the commission divided as to whether to recommend independence to South Somalia or to suggest returning it to Italy. The matter was referred to the UN General Assembly, which decided in 1949 to make southern Somalia an Italian trust territory for ten years, granting full independence thereafter.

Italy soon brought in many reforms and introduced Somalis into various tiers of the government. Eventually the South Somalis gradually matured more in politico-

economic terms than their northern counterparts, where Britain still ran the system. South Somalia had its first SYL prime minister as a result of the election of 1956, while the northerners continued to press Britain to introduce representative government and allow unification with the South. In South Somalia, the four years of rule by SYL from 1956 till independence supervised by Italy was by far the most stable period of governance in Somali history. In this time clan differences remained within manageable limit and moderates within SYL tried to preach peaceful neighborly relations with surrounding countries. They vowed, however, to reunify the dismembered nation by peaceful means. The independent Somali flag with five pointers (representing five greater Somali regions) represents that vow.¹¹ In 1960 Britain ceded north Somalia, and British Somaliland declared independence on 26 June 1960. Popular sentiment resulted in unification of the north with the south, and the Somali Republic was formally established on 1 July 1960. Mr. Usmaan became the first president and was ratified a year later through referendum.

As Somalia unified as an independent nation, there remained a host of problems--the legacy of colonization. The country lacked infrastructure of notable description and was still reliant on her colonial masters, particularly Italy, for support. There was no concerted effort towards eradicating the real and perceived prominence of clans in the state mechanism, and the constitution did not address the matter. Between the people from two parts of the country there existed significantly challenging differences that could negate success. The south was administratively and politically better experienced and was the mainstay of the national economy, while the north lacked comparative experience or position. These problems continued to impact the administration of the country at different times. Besides, the Sammal people and the land inhabited by them in

Ethiopia and Kenya remained as key issues to be solved for materializing the dream of truly unified Somalia, which most Somalis aspired for.

Towards the end of colonial rule in 1950 and into the 1960s some of the traditional stratification was eroded, particularly in the urban areas, and new strata based on education and command of a foreign language--English or Italian--were forming. This led to the rise of two rather conflicting sentiments amongst the educated urban community. The first was expressed by those who distanced themselves from the traditional Somalis, while a group that preferred to hold on to the tradition of lineage and clan expressed the second. Eventually this gave a new dimension in the national politics.¹²

Decade of Independent Somalia

After World War II and during the first decade of independence, the government stressed loyalty to the nation in place of loyalty to clan and lineage. It earned apparent approval of the politicians in the early days. Nevertheless, persons meeting for the first time asked each other about their “ex-clans.” Clan families, once functionally unimportant, became increasingly significant as political rallying points, particularly as Somalia approached independence, and then continued to be so all the way through the 1990s.

The period of nearly a decade that followed Somali independence was one of relative consolidation, marked by a multitude of problems and prospects--as could be expected in a newly born country. Freedom of expression and mass political awareness began to become institutionalized. There were considerable indications of political and legal equality. However, such good trends were often marred by rebellion and extremism.

The northern part of the country had less representation in the center (33 out of 123) in the unicameral parliament. The president, Prime Minister and two top posts in the military were held by the southerners with promised rotation. However, people in the north, particularly the British trained young military officers vowed against it and tried to take control of the northern town of Hargeysa (1,000 miles from Mogadishu) in December 1961. The rebellion was put down heavy-handedly but left behind enough embers to burn through the years.¹³ The theory of pan-socialism surfaced, which meant unity of greater Somalia, by the use of force if needed. Analysts today hold that stance as a means to retain power by satisfying popular demand. This stance took Somalia to a course of direct confrontation with its immediate neighbors.¹⁴

The legacy of African colonization played its indirect part in Somalia. While Somalia can be said to have had the legal right to claim its historical possessions, mediators in the region were reluctant to support its cause because of realities along their own frontiers that were divided along colonial line too, without the respect for race and culture. When the eventual border violence between Somalia and Ethiopia erupted in 1964, Sudan mediated a settlement, with most other African countries remaining tight-lipped.

Socialism started to find its ground in Somalia from 1962 with financial and military support from the Soviet Union and an inclination toward China. Armed Forces in particular were slowly being indoctrinated along the Soviet line. By the late 1960s some 300 Soviet military advisors were working in Somalia and some 500 Somalis received training under the Soviet Army.¹⁵ Civilians in the government felt uneasy about this. This

could be partly held responsible for the eventual militarization of Somalia following the coup in 1969.

For most of the 1960s SYL led the government. There was occasional disagreement with the selection of the prime minister. Most of the hardliners and believers of pan-socialism and the military wanted a hardliner in the post, while others were in favor of a moderate. Eventually this led to a stand off from March to September 1964, when Somalia did not have a prime minister. In the process, bias to clans found covert expression, giving rise to the clannishness that politicians overtly opposed. Many interested clans and the military targeted the presidency for introducing socialism. At this juncture, rather coincidentally, the coup occurred. However, there is no proof of any interrelationship between the prevalent situation and the incident.

On 15 October 1969 President Shermarke's bodyguard assassinated him. As Prime Minister Iggal tried to find a possible replacement from the same clan, other clans, including the hardliners in Army, resented this. In the face of street protest and hostage taking by some of the military and police, the civil administration collapsed, and Major General Siad Barre assumed the command of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). He installed himself as president. Somali democracy ended in a fiasco. Politics were banned and the constitution suspended.¹⁶

Immediate Background

Siad Barre Regime

Siad Barre's regime was a contradictory mix of stability and instability, unification and depletion, and promises and failures. He stifled skillfully his philosophical, political, open, and perceived opposition to secure his position from the

very beginning. He tried many improbabilities to acknowledge his version of scientific socialism, including a guideline that he said, was based on the Quran and Marxism. He declared the country a socialist republic, although there existed no class conflict in Somalia. To his credit, however, he introduced the Somali alphabets and brought many popular reforms into the system that were highly welcomed in the early days.

For his hard-line approach to curbing opposition and boldness in decisionmaking, Siad lived with the image of “victorious leader,” at least for the first decade. Although he vowed to oppose clan politics, he slowly monopolized power by putting people from his own clans in all the key positions. During his governance the red berets (Army) were one of his key sources of strength.

Following the defeat in the Ogadan War with Ethiopia in 1977-78, the strength of Siad’s regime began to be challenged, and the eventual repression by the regime began.¹⁷ However, Western pressure for liberalization forced Siad to hold elections. Such an election under the one party communist system was a mock election to give the regime minimum legitimacy. Because of a lack of transparency and repressive measures, Siad continued to lose his external allies, and aid to the country was reduced considerably through mid-1980s. By the late 1980s human right violations were of highest concern. Except for some of the human rights organizations, most of the world, however, turned a blind eye to Somalia. Siad tried to reduce tension with his neighbors by signing treaties, which let the Somalis to accept painful compromises, including ceding rights over historical possessions. Siad’s problem was complicated by the prolonged drought in the region and consequent shortage of food, migrations of refugees, and so on. By 1986 an anti-Siad movement slowly began to take the shape of popular discontent. Siad began to

unleash a reign of terror upon the leading clans in the movement, namely the Majeerteen, Hawiye, and Issaq.

It is important to revisit the clan issue at this stage and see how it complicated the security scenario. The clan-family, which rose to considerable importance in Somali politics in the 1950s and 1960s, seemed in later years to lose its force as a rallying point. However, nepotism within the Siad Barre regime and its opposition distinguished the opposing platforms for the new lineages, mostly with brutal consequences. The clans within the Darood family led the post independent clannishness. Descending from the same clan-family (the Darood), president Siad Barre's clan, Mareehaan; his mother's clan, Ogaden; his son-in-law's clan, Dulbahante; and the opposition clan, Majeerteen were involved in bloody power politics. Monopolization of the power by MOD (a popular acronym attached to identify the clans of Siad Barre, his mother and son-in-law) was evident. Majeerteen's opposition was, to a large extent, more an expression against clan deprivation than one of popular discontent. Apart from them, most other clans remained subdued until the late 1980s. Issaqs (clan family in the north), one of the key clan families during the early stage of the civil war, maintained a tentative stance and briefly supported or opposed the regime until going into direct confrontation in late 1980s.¹⁸

The famine that struck Somalia during 1980s had also added extra dimension to the fighting. There are different views on causes of famine and its impact. Siad Barre's dictatorship from 1969 to 1991 was in fact directly responsible for the famine. The media tried to view otherwise and often held famine largely responsible for the fighting. The Somali Clan hardest hit by the famine, the Rhanweyn, was the group living adjacent to

the lands of Siad Barre's clan, the Marehan, and consequently had much of its fertile land stolen during the dictatorship.¹⁹

Beginning of the Civil War and Fall of Siad Barre

The Somali crisis started to take shape in the early 1980s and the situation deteriorated fast in the late 1980s. Domestically, the Ogaden War influenced it, amongst other things. On the backdrop of profound internal crisis, armed opposition, and diplomatic isolation abroad, the regime turned inward. President Siad Barre, an expert in the art of divide and rule since his early days as an intelligence officer under the Italian fascists, skillfully harnessed the limited resources of the state. His aim was to pit clan against clan and to inflame clan passions in order to divert public attention from his increasingly vulnerable regime. Finally, the fight for survival and mass uprising against the dictatorship regime gave way to revitalization of the clans, with increasingly hostile means, making the situation more volatile than ever before.²⁰

The civil war eventually began in early 1988, when the Majeerteen clan led the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) against the regime in the south. Soon the Issaq followed suit in the north, only to witness destruction of urban centers by the regime from May 1988 to mid 1989. Siad came down heavily on the Issaqs, while he was rather surgical in eliminating Majeerteen leaderships. The civil war, fairly dormant for so long in Mogadishu, engulfed the capital in mid 1989 with a huge Hawiye uprising under the clan-based leadership of the Somali National Congress (SNC). Siad Barre's existence was further complicated when northern Somalia declared itself independent. The situation deteriorated rapidly and Siad Barre's regime collapsed in January 1991 in the

face of an unprecedented popular uprising. Siad himself fled the country on 27 January 1991. By then some 50,000 people had already died in the fighting.

The Catastrophe and the Early International Role

Cold War Power Politics

Somalia has been referred to as “one of the most strategically sensitive spots in the world today: astride the Horn of Africa, where oil; Islamic fundamentalism; and Israeli, Iranian and Arab ambitions and arms are apt to crash and collide.”²¹ It had other importance too. The north contains mineral deposits and potential oil reserves. Considered analogous to oil-rich Yemen across the Red Sea, it has been the site of oil exploration by such companies as AMOCO, Chevron and CONOCO.²² A multitude of such reasons had made the country one of the Cold War hotspots for the tug of war between the US and USSR. The power politics mostly had a negative impact on the country. Given the internal and regional developments, it is interesting to note the swinging support for Somalia from the two Cold War rivals.

While the US withheld military assistance from Somalia, its military support to Ethiopia--Somalia's hostile neighbor, resulted in anti-US sentiment in the early years. Some analysts reluctantly relate this sentiment to the one that prevailed during the US involvement in Somalia in the 1990s. Similarly, the USSR too left Somalia alone from 1977 to 1978 and sided with Ethiopia during the Ogaden War to hand Somalia its worst defeat. On its part, to keep emerging socialism in Ethiopia at bay, the US renewed its position and befriended Siad Baree while earning naval basing rights in the north. The US had ignored Siad Barre's corruption and human rights abuses because “to Washington's satisfaction, he was more than willing to keep [Soviet-Allied] Ethiopia tied

down in a debilitating war . . . millions of innocent civilians paid the price.”²³ Beside the armory received from the USSR over the decades, Siad Barre received almost \$500 million in military aid (from 1983 to 1990) and almost half a billion in economic aid from the US. Somalia had no permanent affiliation; that factor, coupled with inconsistent governance, resulted in lack of transparency and political instability in the country. Although Siad Barre did not have permanent affiliation, he had enough weapons received from both the camps at different time. The US could have done more than freezing economic support package and military assistance. In fact, on 4 June 1988, the Somalis requested an air shipment of previously authorized military aid that included 1,200 M-16 rifles and 2.8 million rounds of ammunitions. The department of defense routinely shipped the materiel.²⁴ Unfortunately, when the repression began Siad Barre’s regime used Soviet and US weapons to ruthlessly suppress the Somali people through divide-and-rule tactics.²⁵ Therefore, the Cold War can be largely blamed for the Somali plight.²⁶ However, with the Cold War waning, it seemed to be in no state’s interest to care about the Somalis, who were in need of real help.²⁷

Opportunities, Degree of External Commitment, and Contemporary Concerns

There were few opportunities that could be exploited before the situation deteriorated completely. In 1989 and 1990, Amnesty International denounced the systematic torture of prisoners by the government security force, and human rights organizations around the world protested the repression. Besides the African outcry for intervention, violence in Somalia was documented in a number of separate reports, two of them conducted by the US government. In the absence of a democratic mechanism

allowing for corrective measures, the international community would come to the rescue of the victimized population. It did not.²⁸

At home, moderate Somalis made some key moves towards saving the country from being ruined. In May 1990, exactly two years after the beginning of the uprising in the north, 144 moderate Somali intellectuals, business people, tradesmen, and officials (also known as manifesto group) signed a manifesto calling for a national conference to reconcile various movements and bring a peaceful end to the war. Quite predictably, the members of this manifesto group, who were for the most part living in Mogadishu, had every reason to fear for their lives. They openly confronted a regime that thoroughly resented such moves as an affront to its authority.²⁹ This bold and benevolent step needed substantial outside support to be of some use, but such support was not forthcoming, and many of the signatories were arrested by the regime. Since there existed no concerted domestic peace efforts and outside efforts were barely significant, Somalia was left to the mercy of the regime and the clan warriors. When the regime collapsed, devastation multiplied many fold, for it was at that time that the fight assumed a multiple front.

Some of the manifesto leader appointed Ali Mahadi of the Hawiye clan (Abgal subclan), a prominent leader from United Somali Congress, as the interim president. His chief rival was his own clan man, Farah Aideed from the Habar Gidir Sub Clan. Despite tensions, a precarious cease-fire prevailed in Mogadishu. In February 1991 Ali Mahadi invited all the armed groups to a national reconciliation conference, but in the face of refusal from some groups the conference could not be held. Fierce fighting for power continued in increasing magnitude. Armed elements from the clans and subclans started controlling various parts of the country. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to

the problem.³⁰ Somalia was plunging into a catastrophe with no sign of recovery or recess.

The world was focused on many ongoing concerns during the time when the Somali Civil War was ripening. The war in the Gulf and its aftermath, the collapse of Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the crisis in the Balkans, tension on the Korean peninsula, and volatility in the Eastern Europe were some of the key issues facing the world community.³¹ For whatever reason, the response of the international community from the beginning of the civil war till 1991 was rather inadequate. Amnesty International's deploring of human rights violations, reports by various countries and organizations, and reduction of aid by the US could not bring the regime to a compromising stage. International actions were rather limited and yielded no apparent result.

After Secretary of State James Baker's caution on human right situation and pressure from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the US suspended military assistance to the country as of July 1988, although military support materials continued to be delivered through mid 1989. The US also had frozen a \$20 million economic support fund in June 1989. These moves, although limited, were significant, but few other governments took even such modest steps.³² No other country in the UNSC even protested about the deteriorating situation in Somalia.

From the beginning of the civil war, the UN, as well as most other international organizations and governments, gradually pulled out its staff from Somalia in the face of volatile infighting. In fact, the UN started to pull out as early as summer of 1988, when it vacated Hargeisa and some other areas of Somalia for safety reasons.³³ Some of the

nongovernmental organizations, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Save Our Soul (SOS) and Medecins Sans Frontieres were able to maintain their presence despite enormous difficulties. Meanwhile the UN High Commission for Refugees was in the middle of an embarrassing situation, following charges of infighting and wide scale corruption.

Neither the UN nor any of the regional organizations were providing any leadership for serious mediation efforts, and the fragile and isolated endeavors of a few governments could have no impact.³⁴ Governments in the region made some timid mediation effort at the fall of Siad Barre, but to no avail, while UN still remained absent. Following the inconclusive efforts by Ethiopia, Erithria, and Italy, the government of Djibouti tried a serious reconciliation effort in the third week of July 1991 and sought for UN assistance. The UN declined to participate calling it "too complicated" an affair--a posture that is held by some as a missed opportunity.³⁵ Because of failure of this attempt at reconciliation and the absence of any important alternative, the Somali factions were left to themselves, and soon intraclan fighting began in Mogadishu. That was the worst part of the civil war. The dangerous condition forced the remaining humanitarian organizations to briefly shut down their operations in Somalia.³⁶

By March 1992, the hostilities in Somalia had resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia--over half of the estimated population--were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease, with most of those affected living in the countryside. It was estimated that perhaps 300,000 people had died since by March 1992 while some 3,000

were dying everyday, and, at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk.³⁷ Almost two million Somalis, violently displaced from their home areas, fled either to neighboring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of governance and at least 60 percent of the country's basic infrastructure disintegrated.³⁸ The political chaos, deterioration in the security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and the extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.³⁹ At this juncture the UN began to get involved in Somalia with a view to finding a solution to the problem. In a brief and simplistic way the situation in Somalia from its genesis to the civil war and UN involvement can be summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Crisis in Somalia

Causes	Result	Effect
<u>Internal Factors</u> • Clan • Dictatorship • Absence of governance • Famine and poverty	Civil War	<u>Immediate</u> • Clan fighting • Huge loss of lives • Mass displacement (refugee) • Ruined infrastructure, agriculture and livestock
<u>External Factors</u> • Colonization • Cold War power politics • Regional hegemony • Lack of Early Commitment		<u>Ultimate</u> • Decay in moral values • Nation with no apparent destination • Outside intervention

Notes: (1) Compiled from different sources. (2) Causes and effects are not listed in order of occurrence, priority, or magnitude.

UN in Somalia

Early Efforts

With the backdrop of extreme human suffering, the UN started responding to the Somali crisis in January 1992. The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), League of Arab States (LAS), and Organization of African Unity (OAU) also promised cooperation to the UN Secretary-General. On 27 December 1991, four days prior to leaving office, outgoing Secretary-General of the UN Javier Perez de Cuellar revealed his intention to the Security Council of restoring peace in Somalia. This was followed by the early January 1992 visit to Somalia of a team led by Mr James O.C. Jonah, the Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The team aimed at cessation of hostilities and securing of access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. Besides unanimous support for the UN role in bringing about reconciliation, all but Aideed's faction expressed willingness for a cease-fire.⁴⁰

Based on the report and discussion that followed, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 733 on 23 January 1992, calling for a total arms embargo, and urged the conflicting parties to agree to a cease-fire and promote reconciliation. It also decided that all states should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.⁴¹ It was soon followed by a talk from 12 to 14 February 1992 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General at the UN Headquarters attended by, amongst others, representatives from LAS, OAU, OIC and the factions of Ali Mahdi and Aideed. The talk succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and maintenance of a cease-fire. Agreement was also reached for a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation

composed of representatives of the UN and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire agreement. The delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February and concluded an “Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease Fire” on 3 March, signed by Ali Mahdi and General Aideed. It also included deployment of fifty military observers to monitor the cease-fire, deployment of UN security personnel to protect UN personnel and humanitarian assistance activities, and subsequent consultation by the joint delegation for a reconciliation conference.⁴²

Following the UNSCR 746 of 17 March 1992, yet another technical team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April for developing a high priority plan to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance. Separate Letters of Agreement were signed with Ali Mahdi and Aideed on 27 and 28 March 1992 that entailed arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance. The Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a UNOSOM, comprising 50 military observers to monitor the cease-fire, and a 500-strong infantry unit to provide UN relief convoys with a sufficiently strong military escort. He also submitted a 90-Day Plan of Action to provide food and non-food supplies to some 1.5 million people immediately at risk and to help an additional 3.5 million people with food, seeds, and basic health and water supply.⁴³

Establishment and Strengthening of UNOSOM I

In response to the Secretary-General’s recommendation, UNOSOM came into being through UNSCR 751 on April 24 1992. The mandate authorized immediate deployment of fifty UN observers and agreed, on principle, to establish the UN security force under the SRSG as soon as possible.⁴⁴ The advance party of the observers reached Mogadishu as late as July 1992, while the 500-man Pakistani security battalion began

arriving on 14 September 1992 after the UN had forged a deal with local factions in the previous month, although the same should have been done based on the agreement reached in March 1992.

Meanwhile, the 90-Day Plan of Action was also put into effect and the council requested the member states and other organization for help. The resolution requested the Secretary-General “to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and maintain a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of humanitarian assistance.”⁴⁵ It also “decided to establish a committee on Somalia to recommend appropriate measures in response to violations.”⁴⁶ Mr Mohammad Sahnoun, an Algerian career diplomat, was appointed the SRSG on 28 April; he eventually began his work a month early through the fact-finding mission.⁴⁷ The UN began its humanitarian assistance mission under the peacekeeping banner of Chapter VI of the UN mandate. Although the 90-Day Plan of Action called for providing relief in the first place, it automatically entailed helping to supply food, providing administrative expertise, coordinating relief operations, helping to restore the infrastructure, and mediating in clan disputes. As the SRSG revealed, there was no military option at this initial stage. The UN mission had to rely to a large degree on moral suasion to get things done.⁴⁸

Following the hectic efforts by the UNOSOM team between May to July 1992, the situation in Somalia improved considerably. There were no large-scale confrontations in Mogadishu or in most parts of the country. The UN seemed to have gotten tentative approval from the common Somalis. People were particularly happier with those NGOs that, through goodwill and admirable courage, reached deeper and wider than the UN agencies did.⁴⁹

At this stage large-scale humanitarian assistance was the key to success. The provision of humanitarian assistance and the maintenance of the cease-fire were closely linked. Unfortunately, the UN proved unequal to the task in terms of adequacy, timing, and reach, let alone the bureaucratic burden and security concerns. Eventually, fighting erupted over the meager food supplies, which introduced new elements of animosity and violence. The head of the UN's World Food Program noted that the problems got out of hand in Somalia "because we've let things simmer without paying attention" and that "because of the disorganization of the United Nations, less than a third of the food that is needed had been delivered."⁵⁰

On the ground, the UNOSOM tried to work out deals with the SNM (dismembered northwesterners), the northeast and the south. The UNOSOM, and the SRSG in particular, insisted on equal focus on all parts of the country because of past devastations and sufferings, and also for a surgical approach for a solution. To him, the relatively stable northeast, because of less of factional fighting and "support to the UN," could serve as a model for and well be the "key to overall solution to the Somali problem."⁵¹ A proposal for dividing Somalia into four zones was endorsed in UNSCR 767 on 27 July 1992, although not effectively followed up as far as deployment and aid are concerned. Meanwhile, the concern for prevalent fighting over food was high.

As the situation deteriorated, the Secretary-General proposed enhanced involvement by the UN and recommended further assessment by a technical team. Following the approval by the UNSC, the technical team visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992. Then the Secretary-General, in his report of 24 August 1992, underlined the ineffectiveness of the 90-Day Plan of Action and proposed a "comprehensive programme

of action covering humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities, the reduction of organized and unorganized violence, and national reconciliation.”⁵² He also recommended measures, like enhanced airlift for humanitarian aids, more focus on central and south Somalia, establishment of four zone headquarters for UNOSOM, and importantly, deployment of four additional security units of 750 men each, which, by the way, did not arrive during UNOSOM I’s lifetime.

The Security Council approved the proposals and passed UNSCR 775 on 28 August 1992.⁵³ Later, on 8 September, the UNSC also approved the deployment of three logistics units totaling 719 personnel. UNOSOM strength thus stood at 4219. Meanwhile, the US government responded to the need and started airlifting relief supplies from 15 August 1992 under the Operation Provide Relief, which continued until 9 December 1992. It amounted to an average of 20 sorties carrying 150 metric tons per day and contributed to a large extent to the 2,000 metric tons daily need in mid 1992.⁵⁴

100-Day Action Programme, Contemporary Efforts, and Subsequent Deterioration

Following the UNSC approval and an interagency mission to Somalia, a meeting was held at Geneva on 12 October 1992. Chaired by the SRSG and attended by the donor countries and working agencies, the meeting approved the 100-Day Action Programme. It called for priority action to prevent famine and death. It also underlined the need for additional resources for wide range of activities, from vaccination to nation building. The SRSG reiterated the need for added focus on the northeast and the northwest.

The 100-Day Action Programme began with the \$67.3 million of the \$82.7 million requested. It was reviewed in the second coordination meeting from 3 to 5

December 1992, convened by the Secretary-General, and a conclusion was reached to follow up the program with a new plan in 1993.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, certain developments had caused enormous damage to the ongoing process. First, the UN had, before even the arrival of the 500-man security battalion, declared that 3000 troops were being sent to Somalia. The announcement had alienated the Somali political leadership and caught the UNOSOM headquarters by surprise, as no one was consulted or informed of the matter. Second, on two different occasions Russian cargo planes had flown to the area north of Mogadishu with suspicious cargo--supposedly money and arms, clearly siding with Ali Mahdi. One of these planes was hired by World Food Programme (WFP). Aideed was skeptical. Finally, in the aftermath of the SRSG criticizing these event, and later, because of his presence in a meeting of Somali intellectuals in the Seychelles (although under the auspices of the UNSC), the Secretary-General questioned his authority. The result was the SRSG's resignation on 29 October 1992.⁵⁶ UNOSOM had lost the service of a career diplomat who had brought great sensitivity to the job, despite being handicapped by resources.⁵⁷

Meanwhile the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate through October and November 1992. Mr. Ismat Kittani from Iraq took over as the new SRSG. The security situation was most complex at the time. Besides the increased faction rivalries, widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry, and general lawlessness marred the humanitarian relief. Various factions openly challenged the shipping, convoying, and distribution of supplies. Troops were being fired upon. Amidst such complexities very little of the aid was reaching the people in need.⁵⁸

The secretary-general, having informed the council of the situation on 24 November 1992 and being consulted, in return, by the council on the following day, proposed on 29 November 1992 five possible options for ensuring uninterrupted delivery of supplies. The first option was to continue deployment of UNOSOM in accordance with the existing mandate, while the second was to abandon military protection of the relief activities and let the agencies work out whatever they could with the factions and clan leaders. He admitted, however, that, neither of these options was responsive enough. He went on to recommend three more “responsive” options. The first was to use a show off force by UNOSOM in Mogadishu, which, by the way, had to be extended throughout the country to have real effect, and could be undermined by the heavily armed clans.⁵⁹ The next was to authorize a group of member states to undertake a countrywide security enforcement, which, he added; the US showed interest to lead. By the way, earlier, on 25 November, then US Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed the Secretary-General of such willingness of his country. The last of the Secretary-General’s options was to undertake a similar enforcement program led by UN, of which, he conceded, the UN was not capable. He concluded by saying that there was a necessity of Chapter VII enforcement for definite timeline, after which there would be a “return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.”⁶⁰ The council eventually agreed on the US-led enforcement option.

The Unified Task Force and Contemporary Developments

On 3 December 1992 the council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted UNSCR 794 authorizing the member states the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia.” In an

unprecedented development, the resolution was first drafted at the Pentagon.⁶¹ The strong willingness of the US to get decisively involved seems to have materialized. As to UNOSOM, the council decided that the operation and further deployment of 3,500 personnel authorized by UNSCR 775 should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground. Meanwhile the UNITAF, spearheaded by the US, started deploying in Somalia on 9 December 1992, aimed at ensuring uninterrupted flow of humanitarian assistance and establishing a secure environment in the country, after which the UN could take over the military command.⁶² This was codenamed Operation Restore Hope. UNOSOM, however, remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Meanwhile the Secretary-General looked toward a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation upon fulfillment of preconditions, such as establishment of a cease-fire, control of heavy weapons, disarming of lawless gangs, and creation of a new police force.

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, the Secretary-General convened a preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January, which was attended by, amongst others, the fourteen Somali political movements, secretaries-general of LAS, OAU, and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of Horn, as well as the representatives of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Important agreements from this meeting were on implementation of a cease-fire, modalities of disarmament, and establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation. The national reconciliation conference was to be held on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, as agreed upon.⁶³

UNITAF, with its 38,000 troops (from 21 coalition nations of which 28,000 were US), was remarkably successful in securing major population centers and in ensuring uninterrupted humanitarian assistance.^{64 65} The level of malnutrition and death from starvation fell dramatically in many areas.⁶⁶ However, UNITAF covered only 40 per cent of the total territory and remained concentrated in the south and center of the country. Despite the positive impact on overall security situation, violence was still prevalent, but at a lesser scale; there was still no functioning government and no organized civilian police force.

Transition to UNOSOM II

Despite seeking added security assurance, the Secretary General in his report of 3 March 1993, having addressed the existing situation, he put forward recommendations to effect the transition to UNOSOM II.⁶⁷ He concluded that the transition, if approved by the UNSC, should empower UNOSOM II with a chapter VII mandate to continue disarmament and reconciliation. His recommendation also included empowerment of UNOSOM II with the nation-building measures. This, when approved later, would eventually become one of the milestone decisions that would determine the criteria for success and failure.

Concerning disarmament, the Secretary-General stated that, on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, the team of senior officers from the UNITAF and UNOSOM would work out the “Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept.” Broadly, it would entail the establishment of cantonments for storage of heavy weapons and transition sites away from cantonments, where factions could hand over their small arms and register for reintegration into civil life.

The Secretary-General envisioned the following military tasks:

1. Monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented.
2. Preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action against any faction that violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities.
3. Maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions that would have been brought under international control, pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army.
4. Seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assisting in the registration and security of such arms.
5. Securing or maintaining security of all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
6. Protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the UN and its agencies, the ICRC, and NGOs, and taking such forceful action as might be required to neutralize armed elements that attacked, or threatened to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which could assume this responsibility.
7. Continuing the program for mine clearing in the most afflicted areas.
8. Assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia.
9. Carrying out such other functions as might be authorized by the UNSC.

A four-phased military operation for UNOSOM II was recommended. Phase I would be transition of operational control from UNITAF, phase II--consolidation of UN operational control to operate effectively throughout, phase III--efforts to reduce

UNOSOM II's military activity and assist civil authorities to exercise greater responsibility, to include Somali national police being operational, and phase IV-- redeployment or reduction of UN forces.

As far as strength is concerned, the Secretary-General recommended a military component of 20,000 besides the US Quick Reaction Force (1,150 from 10th Mountain Division), logistic component of 8,000, to include 3000 US, and 2,800 civilian staffs. The transition would take place on 4 May 1993. Meanwhile on 5 March, the Secretary-General appointed US Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Retired as his new SRSG). Earlier, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir of Turkey was appointed the force commander.

As for the humanitarian assistance, the Secretary-General in the same 3 March 1993 report indicated three major challenges for the UNOSOM II in 1993: facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs and work for the many millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias, and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure. Efforts for the humanitarian assistance continued.

In the Addis Ababa conference, 11 to 13 March 1993, a program was worked out covering ten focused priority areas. UN agencies, the ICRC, NGOs, representatives from donor governments, and 190 Somali representatives attended the conference. Focused areas included local administration, local police, support service to women, return of refugee and displaced population, food security, basic health care, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, employment and work opportunities, and primary education,

including vocational training. Of the estimated \$166.5 million cost for the program, \$130 million was pledged.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the National Reconciliation Conference was held on 15 March 1993 as scheduled, mostly with similar representation as that of the January 1993 preparatory conference. Following two weeks of negotiations, the agreement was endorsed, comprising four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and a transitional mechanism. Somalis agreed to end the armed conflict and continue the peace process, and reaffirmed commitment on compliance with the earlier cease-fire agreement. A two-year period was set for the transition, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanism was to consist of four basic organs of authority: overall political, central administrative, regional, and district councils.⁶⁹ The trend that ensued immediately prior to and into the second day of instating UNOSOM was positive and promised success. Theoretically, the UN had gotten off to a good start at last. To this end, despite existing security threats of significant magnitude, UNITAF can be said to have played its part for a worthwhile transition. It remained to be seen, though, whether the ties would break loose after the UNITAF forces left.

UNOSOM II

On 26 March 1993 the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted UNSCR 814, by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM in accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations. The resolution, like UNSCR 794, was written in the Pentagon, and was held by some high-ranking UN officials as the "mother of all resolutions."⁷⁰ Besides demanding compliance with

previous agreements by the Somalis, the resolution sought for assistance from neighboring countries and “requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance from all relevant UN entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.”⁷¹ Assistance was sought in areas like relief and rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the reestablishment of Somali police, mine clearance, and public information activities.⁷² UNOSOM II took over responsibility on 4 May 1993. As for the grandiose agendas under UNSCR 814, analysts suggest UNOSOM was unprepared, in both organization and force levels.⁷³

The 5 June Incident and Road to 3 October: UNOSOM II met with challenges from the very beginning. Disarmament was at the top of its agenda. UNOSOM II, under Admiral Howe and Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, embarked upon a path that would lead it into direct conflict with Aideed; a confrontation that the UNITAF leaders, Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, had felt wise to avoid, even with their larger force and unified command.^{74 75} Besides, the approach generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power.⁷⁶ They resorted to violence and, in effect, challenged the authority of UNOSOM. Amidst this tenuous environment, on 5 June 1993, twenty-five Pakistani soldiers were killed, ten were missing and fifty-four wounded during a series of ambushes in south Mogadishu, apparently laid by the militiamen belonging to General Aideed’s United Somali Congress/Somali National

Alliance (USC/SNA). On the following day, in an emergency meeting, the UNSC, adopted UNSCR 837, strongly condemning the unprovoked attack. Beside other things, the UNSC reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under UNSCR 814 to take necessary measures against those responsible, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment. It is important to note that the US Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, in consultation with Ambassador Howe and some of her staff members, drew up UNSCR 837 without consulting General Colin Powell, then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resolution basically amounted to a declaration of war on Aideed in all but name.⁷⁷ UNOSOM II had, thus, transitioned from its neutral role in peace enforcement to taking sides and fighting a counterinsurgency campaign.⁷⁸ On 8 June, eleven Somali parties condemned the attacks.

Following the 5 June incident, Ambassador Howe began lobbying his old boss, Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, for the Delta Force to be sent to capture Aideed. He originally envisioned a small force that would deploy secretly and capture Aideed while he was still out in the open.⁷⁹ The Pentagon declined. Now Howe and Bir attempted to destroy Aideed's capabilities through five days of AC-130H and AH-1 helicopter attacks, and QRF raids commencing on 12 June 1993. On 17 June, UNOSOM II forces nearly captured Aideed in a cordon and search operation, but failed, due to a SNA counterattack. Unfortunately, the UN action drew international criticism, for it was near a hospital and there were many civilian casualties. However, to the UN's knowledge the hospital was being used as a weapon storage site by the SNA. Earlier the Secretary-General and the UNSC had strongly backed the UN actions that began on 12

June as an international commitment to disarmament, based on Addis Ababa agreement of 27-28 March.^{80 81}

Road to the 3 and 4 October Incident, the Incident, and the Aftermath: UNOSOM II pursued coercive disarmament in south Mogadishu through active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC-SNA militia depots. Meanwhile, after the 17 June incident, the Commander of the US Forces Somalia, Major General Thomas Montgomery, posted a \$25,000 reward for information leading to the capture of Aideed. The ploy was counterproductive and support for Aideed furthered unified.⁸² USC-SNA was seeking UN targets wherever it could and stepped up its operation, particularly from the beginning of July 1993.

Following no real response for the reward, UNOSOM launched a surprise missile attack on the Abdi House on 17 July 1993 where Aideed's Habir Gidir Clan regularly met. The aim of the attack was to eliminate radicals from Aideed's clan. According to an ICRC estimate, between 20 and 215 persons were killed in the attack, including a number of moderates and innocent civilians. During the attack four Western journalists who were covering the incident were beaten to death by the angry mob. The escalation had a number of unintended consequences: the Italians threatened to pull out of UNOSOM, Aideed was further strengthened, UNOSOM lost many clan-based supporters of the negotiated settlement, and, most importantly, UNOSOM forces, particularly Americans, were being increasingly targeted. Amidst such an atmosphere, UNOSOM faced problems of unity of command within, and Italian forces made separate deals with Aideed.⁸³

A tense situation prevailed through the next couple of months. On 8 August 1993, four Americans were killed in a mine blast, and another four were injured on a similar

blast on 19 August. Two days later a decision was made to send Task Force Ranger (TFR).⁸⁴ The apparent failure on 17 July and the introduction of TFR signaled a big showdown, because UNOSOM became so focused on capturing Aideed that it was not able to focus on its political reconciliation tasks. The UN Secretary-General too had supported the hunt for Aideed.⁸⁵ The Introduction of TFR had some visible impact. Fearing tough consequences, Aideed sent numerous messages for negotiation, but there was no response to them.⁸⁶

It is interesting to note the developments at the UNSC around this time. The Secretary-General, in his 17 August report, reiterated that the disarmament of all the factions was a precondition for implementing other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. Meanwhile, on 22 September 1993 the UNSC adopted UNSCR 865, appreciating all those efforts and recognizing that the "highest priority for UNOSOM II is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administrations in the entire country." The 5 June attack was once again condemned and emphasis was attached for punishing the criminals individually.⁸⁷ Key to the resolution was a repetitive emphasis on concerted strategy for humanitarian, political, and security activities: "re-double effort to continue the national reconciliation" and reestablishment of Somali police, judicial and panel systems.⁸⁸ The resolution did not attach equal emphasis to the manhunt and "coercive disarmament" that was actually being pursued by the Secretary-General and the UNOSOM II headquarters.

On 3 October 1993 that the TFR launched a raid in south Mogadishu, aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aideed who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attacks. The operation succeeded in apprehending twenty-four suspects, including two aides of Aideed. During the course of the operation the Somali militiamen, using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, shot down two US helicopters. While evacuating the USC/SNA detainees and the crews at the crash sites, a bloody fight broke out in which eighteen US soldiers lost their lives and seventy-eight were wounded. The casualty figures on the part of Somalis remained vague, but an estimated 300 to 1,000 died while 1,000 more were wounded.⁸⁹

The TFR action was no doubt a debacle at the operational and strategic levels, but was a tactical victory and promised greater success. A shaken Aideed immediately called for a cease-fire, and during his later meet with LTG Anthony Zinni he wanted to give up fighting.⁹⁰ However, President Clinton declared an immediate pullout of all US forces, to be completed by 1 March 1994--later extended to 31 March--a decision which stemmed from lack of policy objective, and which will be analyzed later.

The US pullout was a major turning point in UNOSOM II. The UN seemed to run out of ideas as to how to deal with the current crisis. An uneasy calm prevailed in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General visited the region in the same month in pursuance of UNSCR 865. Based on his recommendation the UNSC adopted UNSCR 878 on 29 October, approving interim extension of the mission by eighteen days, that is, until 18 November 1993, and called for an in-depth consideration of humanitarian, political and security activities.⁹¹ Earlier, Belgium (950 all ranks), France (1,100 all ranks), and Sweden (150 all ranks in the field hospital) had

announced their decision to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by December 1994.⁹²

Final Months of UNOSOM II: In his report of 12 November, the Secretary-General very categorically portrayed the positive aspects of UNOSOM, seemingly in an effort to keep the mission alive. His report suggested remarkable improvements in humanitarian efforts, to include education, health, agriculture, commerce, reconstruction and recovery, resettlement, and in the political sphere, national reconciliation and reestablishment of the Somali police.⁹³ No doubt some definite progress was made in each of these areas in the preceding months, but nothing concrete and durable was achieved. The report admitted that the situation was continuously evolving and there was still no effective functional government, disciplined armed force, or organized police or judiciary. It was highlighted that the incidents of 5 June and 3 and 4 October challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation. Disarmament alone, however, still remained a precondition to lasting peace.

The secretary-general, however, proposed three probable options and sought a renewed mandate to continue with the mission. The first option suggested essentially an unchanged approach with increase in strength by another brigade; the second called for voluntary disarmament of the Somalis and self-defense capability for UNOSOM (with 16,000 troops); the third option was oriented on humanitarian aid only, with UNOSOM retaining control of the important ports of entry with some 5,000 troops. Meanwhile, on 16 November, an inquiry commission was formed through UNSCR 885 to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel. Following the investigation, all but eight of the

detainees from Aideed's faction were released; these eight would eventually be released later in January 1994.⁹⁴

On 18 November 1993, acting under chapter VII, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 886 emphasizing establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary systems, and welcomed the diplomatic efforts by member states and regional organizations. By this time, Aideed's USC/SNA seemingly revitalized and was again unwilling to negotiate. Visibly the attitude was reflected in the fourth national reconciliation meeting in Addis Ababa from 2 to 11 December 1993, where Aideed's representatives, in contrast with Ali Mahdi's "group of twelve," no longer accepted UNOSOM's mediation in reconciliation. UNOSOM II, on its part, insisted on reconciliation and continued working to that end, rather unilaterally. As reported by the Secretary-General on 6 January 1994, efforts were in place to reinstate fifty-three out of eighty-one district councils, eight out of thirteen regional councils, and the transitional national council. Work was also on for revitalizing the judicial system and instating 107 police stations. Nothing was done, however, in the northwest.

Meanwhile, in the humanitarian field, despite absence of some of the key political representatives from Somalia, the fourth humanitarian coordinating meeting was held from 29 November to 1 December, prior to the reconciliation conference. A wide range of assistance was pledged by various agencies, with gradually increased participation of Somalis. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, the security situation was becoming aggravated yet again, with renewed interclan fighting, banditry, and attacks upon UN members and other international staffs.

In the wake of clans holding on to their arms in fear of renewed fighting, disarmament was still on the top of Secretary-General's agenda. He recommended an extension of the UN mandate and reiterated his 12 November options. He opined that to continue with the existing mandate, an additional brigade was necessary, which would make UNOSOM II force 32,000 total. It is interesting to note that, contrary to reinforcement; in the preceding months a number of countries intimated their intention of pulling out. Meanwhile, no one responded to the Secretary-General's call for further troop contribution, and the US was scheduled to vacate by 31 March. This would leave the UNOSOM II with 19,700 total. Having ascertained the obvious resource constraints and the need for Somali parties to cooperate, the Secretary-General inclined towards the second of his 12 November options, which entailed voluntary disarmament by the Somalis and self-defense capability for UN.⁹⁵

On 4 February 1994, the UNSC, by UNSCR 897, approved the Secretary-General's recommendation with a revised mandate on the following: assisting the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and cease-fire effort; protecting major ports, airports and infrastructure; providing humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country; assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system; helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced person; assisting in the political process in Somalia; and providing protection for the personnel, installations, and equipment of the UN and its agencies, as well as those of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The UNSC authorized a gradual reduction to a force level of up to 22,000.⁹⁶ Any success from now on, therefore, depended more on the Somali goodwill than on the

UNOSOM II's muscle. Meanwhile, efforts were on for coordinating aid and normalizing relations between UNOSOM II and SNA. The Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was formed in response to the declaration of Fourth Humanitarian Conference. It met in Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. Besides assuring aid to peaceful areas, the meeting agreed to transfer development programs to UNDP from UNOSOM for the long-term.

In a major positive development, for the first time since December 1992 the acting SRSG, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, managed to hold a meeting between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, which took place from 17 to 24 March. After a series of intense negotiations, the Nairobi declaration was signed with positive pledges, importantly "cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia." Agreement was reached on a national reconciliation conference to be held on 15 May 1994 to elect a president and vice president, and to appoint a prime minister. It was to be preceded by a preparatory meeting on 15 April in Mogadishu by the Somali signatories of the March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement. Despite some positive response to a cease-fire in the south, the ongoing factional disputes and disagreement concerning modalities led to repeated postponement of the preparatory meeting. However, in the Lower Juba region (south) General Mohammad Siad Harsi (nick named General Morgan) (SPM) and Mr. Osman Atto (SNA)--the leaders of the two dominant factions--pledged their support to a cease-fire agreement for the area that was concluded on 19 June 1994.⁹⁷

In his report of 24 May 1994, although frustrated by the non-pursuance of the Nairobi accord, rising security concerns, including increased threat to international personnel, and renewed humanitarian emergencies in parts of the country, the Secretary-General opined that "the Somali People deserved a last chance"⁹⁸ and sought for an

extension of the mission by six more months. The council obliged by adopting UNSCR 923 on 31 May, but gave an indirect ultimatum for the Somalis and requested the Secretary-General to prepare options. On 18 July 1994, the Secretary-General informed the UNSC that, despite some progresses in the humanitarian and administrative areas, no breakthrough was achieved towards reconciliation; rather, the security situation had deteriorated further in the course of the next two months. He accepted for the first time that any success of UNOSOM II in improving the security condition had been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means, and was weighing the feasibility of force reduction.

The council consented on 28 July 1994 to the move. Following a visit by a special mission and discussion with authorities concerned, a recommendation was made to reduce the force level to 17,200 by September 1994; this could be further reduced to 15,000 at the most by October or November 1994. Meanwhile, the new SRSG, Mr. James Victor Gbeho, in consultation with the Secretary-General tried to hold reconciliation for the Hawiye clan, to which both Ali Mahdi and Aideed belong. Gbheo believed that there had to be a consensus in Mogadishu first, because Hawiye clan, which had begun the fighting in 1991 and in June 1993, controlled that city.

The reconciliation effort was underway amidst a growing security concern. UN forces were being increasingly targeted. A strong militia overran a small contingent in Belet Weyne on 29 July, which was condemned by a presidential statement of the UNSC. The force commander started to concentrate his forces in designated areas to avoid such occurrences. Meanwhile, given the nature of the ongoing reconciliation effort and the end of UNOSOM II in view (March 1995), the Secretary-General emphasized that the end of

September would be a crucial decision time. According to his recommendations, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 946 on 30 September 1994, extending the mandate until 31 October.⁹⁹

Following the visit by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General submitted his report on 14 October 1994. He highlighted that national reconciliation was still elusive and it was becoming increasingly difficult for the member states to justify the cost associated with the high troop levels in Somalia. Also highlighted in the report were the progressively deteriorating security environment and the vacuum of civilian authority that UNOSOM II could work for or with. He finally sought extension of the mission until 31 March 1995 for orderly closure. Later a mission from the UNSC visited Somalia from 24 to 29 October 1994 and concluded that UNOSOM II should end by 31 March 1995. None of the Somali factions had requested a longer extension nor did the humanitarian agencies or NGOs. On 31 October the mission was extended for an interim period of four days, and on 4 November the UNSC by UNSCR 954 extended the mandate for a final period until 31 March 1995.

UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia as scheduled. UNOSOM II ended in failure, the first ever UN venture of enforcing peace in a war-ravaged country with a fragmented society and strong clan recognition controlled crucially by warlords. Nearly \$1,700 million were spent for UNOSOM alone (I and II), and there were 155 fatalities (8 during UNOSOM I and 147 during UNOSOM II). The cost was too high for no apparent success.¹⁰⁰

¹Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Somalia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army 1992), xxi.

²Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Ft. McNair: National Defense University Press, 1995), 13.

³Metz, 57-62.

⁴*Ibid.*, xxi.

⁵*Ibid.*, 57-72.

⁶*Ibid.*, 76.

⁷*Ibid.*, 70-74.

⁸*Ibid.*, 75-83.

⁹*Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁰Scott Petterson, *Me Against My Brother* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 9-10.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 11.

¹²Metz, 12.

¹³Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998), 12.

¹⁴Metz, 28 - 31.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 36-38.

¹⁷Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution Somalia Undone* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 48-52.

¹⁸Metz, 45-51.

¹⁹“Media on the Somalia Intervention: Tragedy Made Simple,” *Extra!*, March 1993 edition, available from <http://www.fair.org/extra/9303/somalia.html>; Internet; accessed on 28 September 2001, 2.

²⁰Metz, 84-92.

²¹Extra!, 2.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., citing ABC reporter Peter Jennings dated 12/7/92, 2.

²⁴Peter Schraeder, *The Horn of Africa: U.S. Foreign Policy in Altered Cold War Environment*, in Mohammad Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 82.

²⁵Lyons and Samatar, 26.

²⁶*The New York Times*, 6 December 1992, cited in *Extra*, 2.

²⁷Lyons and Samatar, 26.

²⁸Shahnoun, 6.

²⁹Ibid, 7, citing Press Report on Somalia.

³⁰UNOSOM II, the resume available at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/peac/unosom_ii.html visited on February 7, 2002, 1.

³¹Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, cited in Major Roger N. Sangvic, Military Intelligence, "Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure" (Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1998-99), 6.

³²Abdul Mohammad, "In Power Games in Africa's Horn," in Shahnoun, 7-8.

³³Sahnoun 5-7.

³⁴Ibid., 5-10.

³⁵Ibid., 10.

³⁶Ibid., 10-11.

³⁷UNOSOMII, 1.

³⁸Ibid., 2.

³⁹Ibid, 1.

⁴⁰Ibid, 2.

⁴¹UNSC Resolution 733, 23 January 1992; available from <http://www.un.org>; Internet; accessed on 10 October 2001.

⁴²UNOSOM 1, Resume; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>; Internet; accessed on 24 September 2001, 2.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴UNSC Resolution 751, 24 April 1992 cited at Sahnoun 64-67.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Sahnoun, 15.

⁴⁸Ibid., 16.

⁴⁹Ibid., 16-17.

⁵⁰*The New York Times*, 16 August 1992, cited in Sahnoun, 18.

⁵¹Sahnoun, 34-35.

⁵²UNOSOM II, 3-4.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Allard, 13-15.

⁵⁵UNOSOM II, 5.

⁵⁶Sahnoun, 38-40.

⁵⁷Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 7-8.

⁵⁸UNOSOM II, 5-6.

⁵⁹Sahnoun, 53-54.

⁶⁰UNOSOM II, 6.

- ⁶¹Clarke and Herbst, 9.
- ⁶²Allard, 16.
- ⁶³UNOSOM II, 7-8.
- ⁶⁴Allard, 15.
- ⁶⁵Secretary General's Report of 26 January 1993, cited in UNOSOM II, 7.
- ⁶⁶UNOSOM II, 10.
- ⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 8.
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 10.
- ⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 8-12.
- ⁷⁰Walter and Jeffery, 9 and 18.
- ⁷¹UNOSOM II, 10.
- ⁷²*Ibid.*
- ⁷³Major Roger N. Sangvic, Military Intelligence, "Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1998-99), 6.
- ⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 6.
- ⁷⁵John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 111-114.
- ⁷⁶UNOSOM II, 12.
- ⁷⁷Sangvic, 7-8.
- ⁷⁸General Anthony Zinni cited in Sangvic, 7.
- ⁷⁹Michael Sheehan, Formerly Ambassador Howe's Chief of Staff, cited in Sangvic, 8.
- ⁸⁰UNOSOM II, 12-13.
- ⁸¹Sangvic, 8.

⁸²Ibid., 9.

⁸³Ibid., 10.

⁸⁴Ibid., 9-11.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., 22.

⁸⁷UNSCR 865; available from <http://www.un.org>; Internet; accessed on 10 October 2001.

⁸⁸UNOSOM II, 13-14.

⁸⁹Sangvic, 13-20.

⁹⁰LTG Anthony Zinni cited in Sangvic, 21.

⁹¹UNOSOM II, 14-15.

⁹²UNOSOM II, 34.

⁹³Ibid., 15-17.

⁹⁴Ibid., 17-20.

⁹⁵Ibid., 20-25.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid., 26.

⁹⁸The UN Secretary General Mr. Butros Butros Ghali cited in UNOSOM II, 28-31.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 1.

CHAPTER 4

CAUSES OF FAILURE AND POSSIBILITIES OF SUCCESS IN SOMALIA: AN ANALYSIS

There are a host of reasons at every level for the failure of the multilateral armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The causes outlined here are at the strategic level and governed by three broad considerations. First, there were two sides: Somalis and UN and other international agencies. Both sides contributed to the ultimate failure. Equal or more share of the blame can be attached to the Somalis themselves. However, since the activities, attitudes, and influences on the part of Somalis were themselves the catalysts for the problem in the country, those are not considered as direct causes of failure. Some of them can be held as part of “existing issues that counteracted with the positive outcome,” and are dealt with exclusively. The main focus remains with the causes of the failure on the part of international players in general, and UN in particular. Secondly, the UN mandate in Somalia called for total and comprehensive measures to deal with the multitude of problems facing the country. Programs and activities in any one field undertaken by any one of the international players involved had a wider range of implications. For example, a military development impacted ongoing humanitarian or political processes, and so on. Therefore, a holistic view is taken here of the causes that caused the mission to fail, especially while analyzing the application of instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). Finally, there are some causes outside the instruments of power that are diverse in nature but deserve equal treatment. Those will be appended as general causes.

Exercising the Instruments of Power

Flaws in Strategic Options

UN's Policy Objective: The UN did not have a coherent strategic policy objective for Somalia. It went in the country in April 1992 under UNSCR 751, a mandate that was adopted not with the insistence, but rather on the backdrop of earlier unwillingness on the part of some member states.¹ The mandate was vague and general in nature and did not, as may be expected, recommend policy objectives to any specificity. However, it was expected that the appropriate apparatus would develop the set of strategic goals soon after the involvement. This did not happen, much due to the previous lack of assessment versus the need for a crystallized picture of the situation; tentativeness in understanding of the reality of state collapse (failed state); delayed entry and consequent difficulty in getting along with other on-the-ground international players; lack of direction, particularly from the UN; and uncertainty of the degree of future commitment by the major players, to include resources, timing, and involvement. While most of these factors will be elaborated later, revelation here is that the nonexistence of a coherent strategic objective led to frequent changes and modifications that, impacted by changing circumstances, eventually continued until the end of the mission. The UN was seen, therefore, as trying to create circumstances to fit plans instead of planning to fit circumstances, a phenomenon that emanated from the lack of strategic vision. The absence of clear policy objectives also led to a dilemma, insofar as the strategic options are concerned.

Dilemma in Strategy: Somalia was a classic case of state collapse. However, it was far more complex than that of collapse in its entirety. The northeastern and

northwestern parts of the country had some form of administrative semblance, while the center and south were at the mercy of factions and warlords. The UN could not come up with a coherent strategy to deal with this reality. Starting from late 1992 until the end of mission, the UN had two broad strategic options as follows:




Figure 2. UN Strategic Options. Source: Lyons and Samtar, 70-72.

A combination of these options should have served as a broad approach for attaining the set of coherent policy objectives, which, by the way, was nonexistent. The “accommodating existing forces” model is based on a judgment (explicit or implicit) that the force should be the core of the new and sustainable order, and international interveners, therefore, may seek to encourage cease-fire and power-sharing arrangements with such viable existing forces. The force could be of singular identity or a group identity. An international force in this case, if deployed, would rely on consent of the local authorities observing peacekeeping doctrine and would perhaps be less time and money intensive.² The other option is designed to tap for legitimate leadership and provide a security umbrella to deter intimidation. A more authoritative mandate is required in this case.³ A careful analysis of the situation was necessary in devising the

adopted option, or a combination of them, for Somalia. Based on the underlining conditions prevalent in the country, the UN seemed to have gotten the combination wrong. Leadership in Mogadishu in particular, and in the south of the country in general, might have had the ability of being the “existing force” in the early stage of the crisis, but with the emergence of innumerable factions the possibility eroded.⁴ Even the strongest of the faction leaders did not exercise good control over factional militias.⁵ Some faction leaders condoned banditry and looting just to retain their authority. Even Aideed had trouble controlling his fighters and ensuring public safety in areas he controlled. He occasionally condoned looting undertaken by his allies.⁶ Thus, it would have been wise to adopt the “new institution” model for Mogadishu from about late 1992. Instead, UNOSOM considered Mogadishu-based existing faction leaders as key to overall solution. Meanwhile the UN was almost absent in the northern part, where the “existing force” model could have worked faster and with less need for deploying troops. This was expected to work faster and set precedence for other parts of the country. Greater unification would be a matter of time if different parts could come to terms with instituting local governance. After the departure of the first SRSG, the UN seemed to have been working the other way around, which proved difficult. It sought for overall consensus first and then regional stability later. Such a top down approach could have worked if the entire country could be brought under one “existing force” model solution.

Strategic Phases and General Flaws Therein

A host of chronological flaws had a cumulative impact on the ultimate outcome of the mission. Preceding the discussion, the chain of key flaws at different stages of the mission is shown in figure 2. Beside the issues that make up the chain, there existed other

causes that had relatively lesser influence at the concerned timeframe but would, also be discussed with the key causes.




Figure 2. Chain of Key Flaws. Notes: (1) The figure reads clockwise beginning in 1988 till the end of the mission. Surrounding this chain, eccentric rings of ‘absence of objective’, ‘strategic dilemma’ and all other reasons can be drawn. (2) The figure is developed from the essence gleaned from various studies.

Ignorance--1988 to January 1991: Delayed international response to Somalia can be attributed, amongst other things, to ignorance of the situation there. It was caused, to a great extent, by the absence of media coverage. Also, there was deliberate silence on the part of the UN, Britain, Italy, the US and some other countries whose offices and agencies were very much present in the country while the catastrophe was in the making. Most of the world was not aware of what was going on in the country. Some of the countries and governments seemingly took a reluctant view at the existing situation

because of respective interests and ties with the regime. Despite their involvement in Somali affairs in the late 1970s and 1980s, most governments watched the violent endgame and the unraveling of Siad Barre's regime without forming even the beginnings of a coordinated strategy to promote a peaceful transition.⁷ The UN barely anticipated the consequences. As a result, there was no real pressure exerted on Mogadishu, and the reports of human right violations were mostly unheeded. "Unmistakable alarms" as analysts put it, were ignored as early as April-June 1988, when the U.S. Department of State was clearly informed by its hired expert of the tragic cleansing of clans in the northwest.⁸

Although the crisis can be said to have developed for decades to the level at which it was in 1992, it eventually deteriorated disproportionately since mid-1988, leaving most of the world communities fairly uncertain of the consequences. More importantly, the immediate tyranny that preceded the UN's involvement was, to a great extent, unnoticed by the world because of ignorance and other contemporary concerns that were of higher relative significance. This was further influenced by the relative lack of importance of Somalia since the demise of the cold war. Due to the world's ignorance of the magnitude of the problem, major international powers were unprepared. The UN took more than a year to act after Siad Barre was deposed. In fact this was the year when most damage was done. Following Siad Barre's overthrow, in the absence of statehood and with no sense of state sovereignty, the nation plunged into devastation, seemingly forgotten by the world. The US, which would ironically become inextricably involved at a later stage, was found watering down the early UN efforts, fearing obligations for growing peacekeeping budgets.⁹ Neither the UN nor any of the nation states were ready

in a true sense for the forthcoming challenge, at least for brokering or imposing a comprehensive peace. As a result, genuine opportunities for peace were not exploited.

In theory there should have been no shortage of actors who could have intervened to mediate the conflicts that engulfed Somalia. Somalia is a member of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Islamic Conference. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, Somalia was also a close ally of the United States, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in American economic and military assistance. Somalia also maintained good relations with former colonial powers Great Britain and Italy, two important members of the UN. Any one of these actors could have offered its services as a mediator or supported the mediation efforts timidly undertaken at various times. Sadly, none of these nations or institutions, all supposedly friends of Somalia and its people, moved seriously to help the country in its hour of need in a timely and efficient way. When the international community finally did begin to intervene in early 1992, hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost.¹⁰

Avoidance--January 1991 to January 1992: During the one-year period from January 1991 to January 1992, the situation in Somalia deteriorated most. Fighting engulfed the whole country, the northwest broke up, refugees and displaced persons increased many fold, most factions surfaced, and most people died. The UN had avoided intervening, and, as a result, did not maintain any notable presence in the country.¹¹

Among other things, such avoidance was caused, due to reluctance on the part of the nation states, absence of a political mechanism at the UN to deal with such situation, absence of media, and lack of foresight. On the part of regional players, they could not or did not engage decisively, but they did condemn the situation and sought for UN help. The UN was not even interested in coming up with a resolution under Chapter VIII to let regional players have a try. Such avoidance during the year was most uncalled for. It not only led to a disproportionate catastrophe, but also made the future tasks more challenging.

Absence--January 1992 to April 1992: The UN squandered priceless opportunities many times by being absent after the first resolution on Somalia--UNSCR 733--was adopted. Even at the time of the resolution. January 1992, the situation was almost hopeless.¹² No wonder further delay in actual engagement (April 1992), caused, partly due to cool response from member states, was catastrophic. As analysts perceive it, the UN was “6 months too late” to intervene.¹³ “The March 1992 cease fire provided a breathing space for political negotiation but international players,” for the lack of commitment and genuine presence, “failed to exploit the opportunity, senior diplomats foundered in the field, the Security Council dithered, and U.N. relief agencies squandered valuable time.”¹⁴

Incompetence (Inadequacy)--April 1992 to 9 December 1992 (UNOSOM I): A genuine lack of competence on the part of the UN was most vividly exposed at the onset when UNOSOM I was operating. This incompetence was multifaceted. Even after the decision on UNOSOM was taken, the deployment was sluggish. Observers took more than two months arrive in the country, while the security battalion took more than four months. As far as the delayed deployment of the security battalion was concerned, there was yet another flaw that could be discerned. The UN forged two deals with the major warring factions of Ali Mahdi and Aideed as early as mid February and early March 1992, based on which UNSCR 751 was adopted, establishing UNOSOM. Yet the UN still had to mediate with the factions through August 1992 to earn deployment right for the Security Battalion, a ploy that only questions the viability of the earlier dialogues. The UN proved its incompetence and started losing neutrality right at the dawn of its involvement. Aideed’s agreement to the deployment of uniformed UN observers

dissolved when the UN was reportedly found to have accepted a side contract with Ali Mahdi to transport, by UN chartered aircraft, new Somali shilling notes for distribution in his area of influence. Aideed seized this incident as a pretext to “suspend” the arrival of the main body of the observers.¹⁵

UNOSOM I’s mandate sought for humanitarian assistance and political stability, basically using economic and diplomatic instruments of power. The failure on the political side was caused, amongst other things, by the inability on the part of agencies concerned to discern the dimensions of the problem and come up with a comprehensive solution. As Mr. Walter Clarke holds it, “Inability or unwillingness to discern the essential political dynamics of the country and to effect remedial measures to foster civil society out of expedience, disinterest, or naive ‘neutrality’ – lie at the root of the world’s failure in Somalia.”¹⁶

Incompetence in humanitarian operations were also apparent and complicated the political process, and vice versa. The most significant shortcoming was in the volume and distribution of food. The amount of food reaching the country through most of 1992 was far less than the assessed need, not to mention the incompetence in delivery. Such a shortcoming, as reflected during the Geneva Meeting on 12 October 1992, was considered to be one of the major problems at that time.¹⁷ Somalis, on their part, despite willing to assist towards a political resolution, with the hope of eradication of starvation, approached this reluctantly, for they thought this was an empty promise. Fighting broke out for the control of a limited and faulty food supply.¹⁸

During mid-1992, the UN’s concern for security and consequent lack of presence in the interior earned criticism of the NGOs.¹⁹ “The central problem was that, between

January and July 1992 the UN agencies made little headway in creating distribution networks for food and in providing sufficient food deliveries.”²⁰ There had been a requirement of some three hundred thousand metric tons of food for the first six months of 1992. In effect the WFP had delivered, by its own admission 18,857 metric tons of the 68,388 metric tons it pledged in January. Other UN agencies fared no better during the time. In fact, most of them did not even maintain offices in Somalia; their representatives preferred to remain in Nairobi or Djibouti. By comparison, the ICRC brought in 53,900 mt of food into Somalia through twenty different sea, aerial, and overland entry points, and operated 400 kitchens, feeding more than 600,000 people in seven towns including Mogadishu.²¹ Because of such incompetence, the UN did no good to its reputation down the road, and no wonder; it had earned little response as the apex body for coordinating, directing, and managing relief efforts.

Incoherence--9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993 (UNITAF Period): UNITAF was a humanitarian success, but, because of a unilateral and incoherent approach, it can be considered a strategic failure. A number of reasons can be attributed for such a call. UNITAF was meant to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”²² It did use all the means all right, but only for its own safety. It did not recognize the need for capitalizing on success for achieving the UN’s end state. Immediately after the adoption of UNSCR 794, President Bush wrote to the UN Secretary-General, emphasizing that the mission was “limited and specific: to create security condition which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force.”²³ He further reiterated, in his Oval Office speech on 4 December

1992, that the US “does not plan to dictate political outcomes.”²⁴ Although signaling a tougher course for the UN ahead, the administration’s position would have been fine if the on-ground realities would have been equally simplistic.

To make the impressive operation possible, Ambassador Oakley conducted a string of ad hoc meeting and reached a *modus vivendi* with various militia leaders. Eventually, in anticipation of being counterproductive, Aideed and Ali Mahdi signed a seven-point cease-fire agreement under the auspices of Oakley on 11 December 1992. Some objected that Oakley’s accommodation of militia leaders (who failed to live up to their previous promises) gave them inappropriate legitimacy. In fact one news account stated that US officials “missed no opportunity to treat Aideed and Ali Mahdi with public respect” and as a result that the militia leaders “were cloaked by their American interlocutors in the mantle of legitimate power.”²⁵ Oakley expanded his negotiations into the countryside in advance of the US forces only to secure safe entry.

These activities had profound political implications, yet the official claims stressed that UNITAF was unengaged in the process of political rehabilitation. Following the December meeting with Aideed and Ali Mahdi, in his statement Oakley said: “This is not a political meeting at all. It’s a get-acquainted meeting to discuss some of these security-related issues. I promise you the U.S. government is not going to get into drawing the possible political architecture for the future of Somalis.”²⁶ To avoid the supposed political involvement, Oakley, despite having evidence of Colonel Jess (one of the faction leaders in Kismayu) massacring more than hundred elders on 9 December, declined to take any action. He instead, met Jess on 19 December only to secure safe entry for US Forces there, traumatizing the defenseless civilians with the fear of Jess

being accepted as a legitimate leader by the world.²⁷ Further, despite repeated requests from the UN Secretary-General, UNITAF forces initially declined to enforce disarmament or confiscate caches even after finding them. Later searches were not successful because the policy led the militias to move their heavy weapons out of the urban areas and hide until UNITAF's departure.

Although the forces conducted disarmament of some sort, without a broad strategy to create a secure environment the effort did not succeed because Somalis naturally hedged their bets and hid their guns, until it was clear that they could be secure without them. The security assurance could only be given by a durable political environment, which UNITAF struck off its agenda. Interestingly, however, UNITAF was deeply involved in assisting reestablishing police, prisons and judiciary, only to avoid involvement in administration. The lack of US policy objectives was quite vividly exposed through the incoherent approach of UNITAF. Although deeply interacting with the politics of the area, leadership on ground distanced itself in compliance with the directive from the administration; it did not even send an official to the Addis Ababa conference in January 1993.²⁸ In order to present long-term benefits, UNITAF should have had pursued a more coherent approach.

Haste--4 May 1993 to 5 June 1993 (UNOSOM II): UNOSOM II's decision makers were seeking an immediate result upon deployment. Admiral Howe seemed to have been obsessed with his familiar military instrument of power from the beginning: do it, and do it now. An apparent haste for settling the crisis soon enough had led to such inclination. Arguably, a more diplomatic Howe, or the like, would perhaps have been more methodical in leveraging all the instruments at disposal. No doubt, an early and

decisive approach can yield success, and is advocated too; but it was not an early stage, for the UN had already been in the country for more than a year, and was expected to avert all possibilities that could derail it from the desired course, which had been so tentatively, yet painfully, restored. Finally, as the most authoritative power (military at the time) was applied and failed to yield the desired effect, the UN was left with very little options; instead, militia leaders felt complacent and were less negotiable. Howe's hasty approach and reliance on the military instrument made him inconsistent too. While he was surely on the lookout for defeating Aideed, his statement: "We're not going to hunt for [Aidid], or look down every rathole for him" made things unclear.²⁹

Arrogance--5 June 1993 to 9 October 1993: As UNOSOM II took a firm stance on coercive disarmament and the opposition was apparent, one would question the lack of assessment on the part of the UN of the possible threat. Rearming of militias and fighting in the south should have been accounted for. While there is no denying the fact that the 5 June ambush was one of the most barbaric ones, the force-protection measures to evade such happening could have been implemented on the spot. People who were killed in the feeding center were not the direct target of the ambush; rather the kind of unilateral inspection of the UN-sanctioned SNA arms depot escalated the event.³⁰ UNOSOM II seemed to have adopted a rugged approach too boldly too soon. It was only within the first month of the two years of the designated transition period that an impatient UNOSOM II started manhunt and coercive disarmament, while the ongoing diplomatic process should have been given some more time to come up with possible alternatives.

No doubt as a result of arrogant approach, the incident of 5 June had taken place, taking the UNOSOM II, in turn, to a confrontation course, and laying seed for the

strategic debacle of 3 and 4 October 1992 through adoption of UNSCR 837. The declaration of a reward for Aideed's head following the 5 June incident led to further direct confrontations and lack of support for UNOSOM II. The weak, incomplete, and inconsistent US-UN political strategy of political reconciliation became irrelevant. Lashing out Aideed and his aides without a political framework to guide and limit the use of force disconnected UNOSOM from any strategy of political reconciliation.³¹

Deployment of TFR was the last in a series of steps taken by the Clinton administration to salvage the ambitious UN-led mission in Somalia. The administration had to do it because of its support to UNSCR 837, which all but called for Aideed's arrest. As UNOSOM II proved unequal to the task, the administration decided to give TFR a try. The major policy problem was that TFR's military actions were uncoordinated with diplomatic efforts. The military force alone, therefore, was too little, too late and diplomatic options were by then sealed.

Pursuit of a Failed Cause--9 October 1993 to November 1994: Lack of Synergy: The UN had not been able to bring in the required synergy to its operations throughout its involvement in Somalia. Prior to the deployment of UNOSOM II in February 1993, the US and UN gave mixed signals, encouraging nonmilitia groups and using force against gunmen, while continuing to engage the militias in talks.³² The lack of synergy has been most apparent during the UNOSOM II's operations and particularly after the US decision to withdraw. The hunt for Aideed was not officially closed, and the tactical success of TFR was not followed up. On the contrary, Aideed, who boycotted the early sessions of the November–December 1993 Addis Ababa talks, was interestingly transported by US military aircraft to the meeting on 2 December 1993, a ploy that only suggests beginning

all over again.³³ Unfortunately, Aideed's presence in the meeting at the time did no good in coming to a solution. In fact, the inconclusive meeting left the UN to pursue the reconciliation effort unilaterally.

Another dimension to the lack of synergy was the commitment of the countries and their relation with the UN. Along with the US, almost all of the European countries withdrew from Somalia, leaving the African and Asian contingents there. However, the monetary commitment still had to come from those who withdrew and not from the ones who were deployed. Understandably the commitment was not durable. Eventually, by mid 1994, UNOSOM had largely abandoned any pretense of political or security objectives. Somali anarchy was as menacing as in January 1991.³⁴

UNITAFs Humanitarian Success: A Prelude to Failure: UNITAF was one of the few successes in Somalia in short-term humanitarian achievements. However, arguably the success of UNITAF laid the seed for the failure of UNOSOM II. Whereas UNITAF used all possible tools, including political ones (not officially recognized though) and later disarmament, the method was set to throw a challenge of unforeseeable proportion, if not followed up with the same vigor and authority. Despite being a larger force in theory, when UNOSOM II took over it lacked UNITAF's equivalent capability and reach. Factions that hid their weapons to evade confrontation with the more resolute and short-term UNITAF were now trying to resurface. UNOSOM was not still completely in control; no wonder the challenge was forthcoming.

Lack of Policy: US Objectives: The US was, by far, the most involved of the nation-states, and overall success largely hinged on US policy. Unfortunately, there was no clear policy objective laid down by the administration. It had tried out expedient ways

of dealing with the situation. Besides the incoherent approach by UNITAF, which was led by the US, TFR operations and their aftermaths expose the lack of policy objectives rather vividly. Even when the TFR was being deployed, in September the Clinton administration opened a secret initiative to negotiate with Aideed. Former President Jimmy Carter volunteered to act as the intermediary, without the knowledge of commanders at Mogadishu.³⁵

Deployment of TFR was the last in a series of steps taken by the Clinton administration to salvage the ambitious UN-led mission in Somalia. The major policy problem was that the TFR's military actions were uncoordinated with diplomatic efforts. The military force alone, therefore, was too little, too late. The TFR debacle and subsequent withdrawal from Somalia were a strategic failure on the part of the Clinton administration, due to a lack of coherent policy. The policy flaws were threefold: domestic, international, and military, that is, about the troops on ground.

At home the administration failed to gain congressional support for its strategy to go for Aideed, and it failed to explain to the people at home why a policy that marginalized the warlords in general, and Aideed in particular, was being pursued. The lack of coherent policy was apparent during the congressional briefing, when the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin basically solicited congressional members for ideas of where to go next.³⁶ Congress was unimpressed over the command of the policy skeptical of the ability of the administration to formulate a coherent policy on Somalia.³⁷

Given the previous lack of long term planning, public opinion and contemporary commitments, particularly Bosnia, the administration realized that further expenses on Somalia were not worth the degree of national interest.³⁸ The administration on its part

realized that it was apparent that the UN had gotten involved in Somalia much due to US insistence. TFR should have, besides reinstating US and UN authority over the situation, been integrated toward yielding an overall objective. It was unclear as to what was expected from TFR's success, other than exerting pressure on Aideed.

To the UN, the US administration owed more than deserting it, even in the aftermath of 3 and 4 October. Lack of direction was apparent and the administration did not know how to heal the losses. Finally, the administration was unclear regarding its troops on ground. The US was still in favor of a diplomatic solution. Major General Garrison, the TFR commander, was not informed of this strategy, and the troops did not know that they were a supporting effort.³⁹

Media (Information) Flaws

The media played an important role in rallying world opinion from mid-1992 and were eventually hailed for that.⁴⁰ Until then, their absence had been evident by the lack of public information, particularly in the US. Somalia captured attention only after the situation elsewhere in the world had lost its novelty or was not dramatic enough to make headline news. In all of 1991, Somalia got three minutes of attention on the three evening network news shows. From January to June 1992, Somalia got eleven minutes.⁴¹

According to Medicine Sans Frontiers, by July 1992, when the news media began to pay attention, 25 percent of Somalia's children under five may already have died.⁴² While some people have cited the intervention in Somalia as an example of the power of television pictures to compel governments to act, the fact is that the networks were hardly interested in Somalia until after the US government started using military planes to airlift supplies there.⁴³

Some of the media coverage did not give the right message. The *Times*, in its 14 December 1992 edition, viewed Somalia's problems as indigenous and eternal by saying: "Limited natural resources and internal disputes have historically kept stability at a distance. And the clans of Somalia have regularly battled one another into a state of anarchy."⁴⁴ Much coverage of Somalia has reflected a colonial mind-set, arrogant about US power and disparaging of Somalia. CBS analysts on 9 December 1992 compared the US intervention to the Marine presence in Lebanon: "As Beirut, it's just a few good men trying to help another nation in need, another treacherous country where all the members of all the murderous faction look alike." The *New York Times* went a step further to suggest colonization of Somalia. The 6 December 1992 edition noted: "One state could govern Somalia in a formal 'trusteeship' until it is ready to govern itself, in the same way that Italy administered much of what is now Somalia until it became independent in 1960s," a benign view of Italy's role that probably would be shared by few Somalis.⁴⁵ While the troops and authority on ground lent credence to leaders like Aideed and Mahdi as local authorities, and when many Somalis themselves carried out considerable relief effort, the media treated them otherwise. *Time* lamented the political factions as "Mad Max characters" and the dealing with warlords and Somalis as "taking on thugs" (14 December 1992 edition), while *Newsweek* called the parties "thugs, warlords and micro-messiahs"⁴⁶

Analysts, like Jim Naureckas, say: "A tragic situation in Somalia, with complex political economic and historical roots, comes across in the bulk of media coverage as a simple situation--helpless victims menaced by thugs--with an obvious solution: Send in the Marines. This melodramatic depiction of events, while meshing with the need for

commercial media to tell exciting, easily grasped stories, did not do justice to the reality of the Somali situation, and did nothing to help the U.S. public understand either the causes or the realistic responses to the famine that threatens millions across Africa.”⁴⁷

General Causes

Insurmountable Existing Issues

Lack of Host Nation Support: Apparently, the UN’s involvement in Somalia was destined to proceed independently, without any significant host nation support or expertise. On the other hand, native participation by consensus was significant for legitimacy. Despite being a fiercely independent nation, Somalia lacked the required experience for governance. The democratic institution that was instated by Italy was ruined during Siad Barre’s regime, which tried to introduce so-called “scientific socialism,” a concept that remained unclear to most. The regime’s eventual expulsion left a huge vacuum which none of the victorious clans was set to fill.⁴⁸ Somalis repeated tradition; everyone wanted power, but no one knew how to run the country. This very urge for power versus inability of governance was the first of the insurmountable issues with which the UN was confronted. Seemingly, the matter deserved to be weighed before any decisive commitment was made, because the entire spectrum of governance and supervision to an inexperienced power monger group is more complex than could be imagined. The initial mandate did not address the matter in any depth.

Somali Skepticism: Somalis had experienced centuries of subjugation from within and outside the country. This sore experience taught them to oppose any such attempt, while themselves continuing to subjugate opposing clans or communities. It was, therefore, almost imperative for the UN to ascertain this phenomenon and outline its own

courses. Any assessment would indicate the possibility of Somalis opposing the UN in the event of any kind of imposition, real or perceived. Depending upon the degree of enforcement that the UN would undertake, Somalis could rally in the opposition camp as a nation, clan-family, clan, lineage group, or even a faction. This was evident in later developments.

This left the UN in a rather precarious position. A moderate approach needed everyone's approval and assistance from within Somalia, so difficult a task to master in a depleted nation. On the other hand enforcement of any sort would, in all probability, meet opposition. Such a condition in itself could be held as one of the existing negative catalysts even before the UN's involvement, which could have foredoomed any positive outcome to the mission.

Fluidity: The situation in Somalia was volatile and presented no definite pattern. This was yet another factor that hindered success. Other than the human suffering and loss of lives that prevailed unabated and predictable, the military dimension to the problem was not quite predictable the same way. While the latter could easily be underlined as the threat to mission accomplishment and deserved attention in advance, the former (human sufferings) alone pulled the UN into Somalia. Human suffering needed immediate attention, but at the other end of the spectrum, the possibility of intermittent failure remained, and, the fact that such failure occurred is not surprising. The UN was, more often than not, reinforcing failure instead of creating conditions for success or exploiting the limited success it had, particularly in the humanitarian sector.

Delay: Delay was yet another factor to challenge success. Intervention in Somalia was too late to be effective per-se, at least to the desired level, because of the cascading

effect of the fighting. Wounds at individual, group, national, and philosophical levels were too deep to be healed easily. The UN, for its part, missed the opportunities presented in due time. Much can be attributed to the other complexities described before.

Operational Art

Campaign Plan: At the strategic level, there existed no comprehensive campaign plan to begin with. The Somali crisis was not one that began overnight, and it is least acceptable that a casual morning decision could involve UN. There should have been enough information and assessment over the three years of heightened catastrophe that preceded UN's deployment. It would not have been too much to expect the UN to have prepared options for deployment. That would, in fact, have allowed the decision makers to take a measure of the preconditions necessary to be successful and think through the end state. In turn, the deals could have been accordingly forged, or deployment further delayed or even cancelled. Whatever the reasons for such inaction may be--end of cold war interests or priorities focus elsewhere in the world--due to lack of intelligence preparation, the UN seemed to have set itself up for the failure.

Centers of Gravity (COG): The UN failed to attack the target centers of gravity, while not being able to defend its own, due mostly to the lack of assessment and understanding. Analysts suggest that the tactical and operational COG for the UNOSOM II was "unity of effort" and the strategic one was "cohesion."⁴⁹ One could argue with different COGs at different time. However, given the direct share for the ultimate failure, unity of effort vis-à-vis cohesion can be treated as an operational COG, but the strategic COG seemed to have revolved around neutrality. People grew skeptical because of the absence of UN neutrality, perceived and real. The UN earned enmity from dominant

factions because of trying to marginalize some and siding with others. Above all, it lost support within (cohesion) for the same reason.

As for attacking the target COG, the UN got it partly right and partly wrong. Mogadishu was perhaps the COG for all of Somalia, on which the UN focused its attention. While UNOSOM got the identification right, the approach was wrong. An indirect approach, at least until total control was achieved, was necessary. Decisive points (DP) in reaching the strategic COG could have been the outside clans, uninterrupted distribution of food in the exterior, promotion of reconciliation in outlying peaceful areas, organization of society based on the respected elders (much with the line of new force strategy discussed earlier), and so on.

As far as the operational COG is concerned, the UN's identification of it was mostly wrong. For example, Aideed's source of power was not in his SNA militia, but in his clan, because he drew their support and hung on to it with a lucrative offer. He effectively made his clan realize that the collapse of the state provided him and his numerous subclan members with the license to extend their influence from their barren, arid central region (Galcayo) into Mogadishu and the rich Shabelle and Jubba valley.⁵⁰ So long as this support was assured, there could be no dearth of numbers in the ranks and ability of being defiant. The UN had to attack this by attacking not him or his militia, but rather his clan. Instead of fighting them, yet again, an indirect approach would have been prudent.

Timing: The UN's timing was wrong for a number of reasons. Almost all the observers agree that the UN response to Somalia was late by a minimum of six months. As Mr Sahnoun says, "It is in my belief that if the international community had

intervened earlier and more effectively in Somalia, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided.”⁵¹ The UN had successively delayed developing its military strength, only to remain in the defensive.

From the beginning of UNOSOM I, there was a discernable level of immediacy in moving the process along, although disjointedly. From the humanitarian perspective this was a welcome approach, but the strategic success was uncertain, for it ideally called for a detailed assessment and comprehensive preliminary planning. The resultant inconsistency and a trend of being reactive rather than proactive have been pretty vivid. The point is reinforced by the fact that, until being energized on 27 December 1992, the UN process was rather sluggish. Scarce aid reached its destination, the aid was untimely, coordination was flawed, and capability was limited (particularly military, humanitarian and diplomatic). Had these things been kept straight around April, there would have been no need for deploying UNITAF. Finally, UNITAF's withdrawal was untimely. Although, President Clinton justified the March 1993 (later May) timeline for smooth transitions, in reality many challenges remained not addressed. UNOSOM II was facing extreme difficulty to get along with a very limited staff, who were, by the way, not fully familiarized with the area and the nature of existing Somali problem. More importantly, there was no mechanism for revitalizing possible drawbacks in the process that UNITAF had begun. QRF was a military legacy, and a good one too for giving required flexibility, but there was, indeed, no political handover, notwithstanding the fact the UNITAF avoided political involvement--another flaw discussed earlier.

Mandate Versus Reality

The initial mandates had to include both humanitarian assistance and reconciliation, because the former outlined an immediate solution while the latter was the precondition for an ultimate success. One of the key UN resolutions was UNSCR 814. Given the measure of final failure, this was by far the least achieved mandate. A host of questions arise. Firstly, since in his own report the Secretary-General noted that the environment was not yet secured and the greater part of the country still remained at the mercy of the warlords, nation building should have been low on the priority list.⁵² Secondly, such a venture is intense and involved, and there could not have been any immediate solution. The UN usually worked on short-term mandates. UNSCR 814, which authorized nation building, was to be reviewed in six months time (by 31 October 1993). Without a long-term mandate or confirmed commitment from donor countries and international players, the desired end state could not be achieved.

As discussed earlier, there had to be a clear policy objective on the part of the UN and the key players. Given the contemporary setting and arduous tasks at hand, UNOSOM II was not set for smooth sailing, and there had to be success and failures. In the aftermath of the 3 and 4 October incident and subsequent decision by the US to pull out, seemingly there was no alternative available to UN. Although lack of policy objectives was more apparent in US decision-making, it was the UN that was then controlling the mission and was expected to come up with follow-up options. As Mr Kofi Annan puts it: UNSCR 814 “included enforcement powers for disarmament as well as the delivery of humanitarian relief. UNOSOM II also had a mandate to help rebuild the nation, although no one expected this could be done coercively. That it failed to fulfill

completely this ambitious mandate highlights the dangers of trying to mix peacekeeping and peace enforcement, especially in the absence of a coherent or solidly supported international policy”.⁵³

The UN never did try to take advantage of regional players, which could have been done under the chapter VIII mandate. Given the constant involvement of the regional countries and organizations, an early yet less cost-intensive approach could have helped in many ways. Even if it failed, it would have helped to take a measure of the gravity of the situation and prepare accordingly.

Doctrine

There are some doctrinal principles laid down in Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure for Peace Operations*, as guidelines for military units in operations other than war. They are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and, legitimacy. Flaws can be easily discerned in the application of many of these principles.

Much has already been covered about the objective. It is imperative that the “commanders should understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination as well as those that yield failure.”⁵⁴ There was little effort towards formulating, understanding, and pursuing long-term objectives. Unity of effort was often undermined because of internal differences among the contingents and lack of coordination with non-UN agencies. As for restraint, theoretically, restoration of peace is supposed to be held over military victory, and sensitivity to political concerns needs clear understanding.⁵⁵ Unfortunately both the political and military players often faltered in both areas.

“Peace operations may require years to achieve the desired effects because the underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution.”⁵⁶ This basic reality of “perseverance” was not understood on ground. The kind of haste during the first months of UNOSOM II definitely lacked perseverance. As for legitimacy, doctrine states: “During operations where a government does not exist, peacekeepers must avoid actions that would effectively confer legitimacy on one individual or organization at the expense of another. Because every military move will inevitably affect the local political situation, peacekeepers must learn how to conduct operations without appearing to take sides in internal disputes between competing factions.”⁵⁷ Earlier explanations reveal the lack of perception on ground. As regards to the quality of peacekeepers, authorities on the ground let their impartiality--one of the key qualities--be compromised. This had strategic consequences. When in operations like this the three levels are so delicately interwoven, fielding troops against a side (Aideed) that has not been clearly taken out of the political process clearly questions neutrality. Later consequences are known.

Coordination and Control

It is apparent that, “If there is a common tough unstated thread running through joint doctrinal principles, it is that diplomatic, military, and humanitarian actions must be closely integrated in any peace operation.”⁵⁸ The UN had shown distinct inability to get these actions together. The small and militarily weak UNOSOM I had a diplomatic strategy but lacked the capacity to pressure militia leaders. The large and powerful US-led UNITAF had the resources but insisted that its mandate was limited and nonpolitical. The still larger but militarily and organizationally weaker UNOSOM II had more

ambitious goals, but lacked a viable, coherent political strategy.⁵⁹ Such complexity, together with differences in opinion between nation-states and UN headquarters, complicated the issue on the ground even further, let alone the problems of coordination on the ground.

The UN had been inconsistent and shortsighted in its control of the mission, much due to the inconsistency and frequent changes in policy. As a result, none of the processes were followed up with genuine success. There were six SRSGs (including one acting) during the three years of the operation, which somewhat coincided with the changes of the policy or inclination. Ambassador Sahnoun was an intense diplomat, Kittani was fairly inactive, Oakley was not responsive to the UN, Howe was fiercely military, Kouyate was shuttling temporarily, and Victor Gbeho was trying to restore the already broken process and concentrated more on staging the organized withdrawal. Bureaucratic complexities multiplied the problem. UN headquarters was often slow to react and even picked up opposing stance when the SRSG on the ground was in for a promising development.⁶⁰ Sahnoun's removal was totally uncalled for at a time when he was trying to get a grip on the situation. Instead, he needed to be supported. At a time when factions were less demanding, less military action would perhaps done the job, and success could well have been in the cards.⁶¹

Attitude

International players had treated Somalis with inconsistency, and this contributed to the failure, at least indirectly. The press, as ever, was instrumental to public awareness. Some publications had characterized all Somalis bandits and thugs. Such a generalized statement vis-à-vis treatment of the issue was far from reality. Most Somalis in fact “did

not want firearms; the reason for them to hold the arm was essentially to secure basic foodstuffs for one's family against the armed bandits. Many Somali leaders had requested UN assistance in disarming the population, and Somalis would voluntarily exchange weapon for food."⁶²

Calling the faction leaders "warlords" while continuing to maintain the political attachment with them had a few unwanted consequences. Faction leaders enjoyed being called warlords and they often believed that the degree of political legitimacy that was being attached to them was not because of political say they had in the society, but rather because of the strength of arms that they possessed. Eventually, this was one of the key factors: they did not want to give up their arms, lest they fall apart politically.

Mogadishu Centric Approach and Associated Issues

There is no doubt that Mogadishu was the Somali COG and the menace of the fighting was greater in the south, which eventually came to be known as the 'triangle of death' to denote the populous triangle of Modadishu, Baidoa, and Bardera. Most people concentrated here from the interiors and agricultural areas.⁶³ However, the northwest and northeast were no better, except that the level of fighting was relatively low and less covered by the media. For a number of reasons, the direct approach to Mogadishu was counterproductive.

For success, UNOSOM had to rely, to a great extent, on consensus and popular support. By all accounts, obtaining consensus and popular support was very difficult. However, there were a few things that the UN could have capitalized on to get the badly needed consensus.

First of all was food. As the ICRC pointed out, Somalis could be found concentrated in desert if there was food. There were two flaws associated with the delivery of food: first, most of the aids reached Mogadishu and faced a repeated threat of being looted, and second, very little was done to exploit the opportunities in exchange of food. In the case of the former, it was desirable that agencies get out of Mogadishu and infuse food to less disturbed areas through less affected entry points. Given the lift assets promised and present, particularly air, this should not have been a problem. Predictably, common people would have voluntarily vacated Mogadishu and sought food where it was available. Instead, they concentrated in Mogadishu for food, joined in the looting for food, died for food, and finally, fought those who delivered food for the want of food. As for exploiting opportunities presented by food, it has been agreed by most that Somalis were ready to give up firearms only in exchange for food or a job. Morale value means nothing to a people who were dying of starvation, and clan and warlords who promised some kind of relative assurance for living were a matter of superficial bondage during periods of starvation. Thus, if food had been prudently used, people, irrespective of their clan identity, could have been found living in the same shelter and pledging support to the donor. In order get the desired effect a coherent, sincere, and analytical approach was needed. Unfortunately agencies on ground lacked coordination, proved unequal to the task, showed a lack of willingness to reach far-flung areas, and were seeking self-recognition instead of common goal.

The next instrument for obtaining consensus was jobs. In this respect, UNOSOM II should have focused on key areas only, the most important being the police. Besides disciplining and forging cohesion amongst the inductees themselves from different clans,

the force, if provided, trained, equipped, and maintained well, could have brought remarkable changes in the overall security scenario. Moreover, there was no dearth of crimes and criminals to allow them to exercise their authority. Once again, it would have been better if such forces had been raised away from Mogadishu to avoid being overpowered at the onset. Best would have been to integrate the police with the food distribution centers.

By applying these ploys, the expected level of violence in the capital and other places could have been reduced. Support was, however, necessary for extensive media coverage of these activities and areas. As a result, people elsewhere were expected to put due pressure on the local leaders and clans to submit to UN's terms. The discussion on food could be taken little further. Aideed had his power base in the Galcayo region. From early 1992, he moved in large numbers from his Habir Gidir clan to Mogadishu and occupied all the key terrain in the southern part of the city, including the air and seaports, evicting the owners. Ironically, feeding centers that were located in Mogadishu were mostly feeding these de facto members of Aideed's militia. If the food had been delivered elsewhere and focus shifted from Mogadishu, considerable numbers of this fleeting contingent would have deserted Aideed.

¹Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998), 30.

²Ibid., 70.

³Ibid., 73-76.

⁴Ibid., 36-38.

⁵Mohammad Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 17.

⁶*Africa Confidential* 8 (17 April 1992): 33, cited in Sahnoun, 17.

⁷Lyons and Samatar, 26.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰Sahnoun, xiii.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 5-10.

¹²*Ibid.*, 15.

¹³Lyons and Samatar, 29-31.

¹⁴Jeffrey Clark, *Debate in Somalia*, cited in Lyons and Samatar, 30.

¹⁵Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 7.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁷Sahnoun, 17-36.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁹Sahnoun, 18

²⁰*Ibid.*, 20.

²¹*Ibid.*, 19-21.

²²UNSCR 794 dated 3 December 1992, cited in Sahnoun, 75-80.

²³Lyons and Samatar, 34.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Keith B. Richburg cited in Lyons and Samatar, 40.

²⁶Don Oberdorfer, *The Washington Post*, cited in Lyons and Samatar, 40-41.

- ²⁷Jane Perlez, *New York Times*, cited in Lyons and Samatar, 41.
- ²⁸Lyons and Samatar, 41-43.
- ²⁹Scott Petterson, *Me Against My Brothe.: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 166-167.
- ³⁰Lyons and Samatar, 57-58.
- ³¹*Ibid.*
- ³²*Ibid.*, 61.
- ³³*Ibid.*, 59.
- ³⁴Robert M. Press cited in Lyons and Samatar, 60.
- ³⁵*Frontline: Ambush in Somalia*; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/cron.html>; Internet; accessed on 7 February 2002, 5.
- ³⁶Major Roger N. Sangvic, Military Intelligence. "Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1998-99), 23.
- ³⁷Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, cited in Sangvic, 23.
- ³⁸Sangvic, 24.
- ³⁹*Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁴⁰Sahnoun, 29-30.
- ⁴¹Extra! March 1993, *Media on the Somalia Intervention: Tragedy Made Simple*, available from <http://www.fair.org/extra/9303/somalia.html>; Internet; accessed on 28 September 2001, 1.
- ⁴²*Ibid.*
- ⁴³*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 3.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Somalia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992, 84-92.

⁴⁹Ibid., 132-141.

⁵⁰Clarke and Herbst, 5.

⁵¹Sahnoun, xiii.

⁵²UNOSOM II, the resume available at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/peac/unosom_ii.html; Internet; accessed on 7 February 2002, 7-8.

⁵³Jonathan Moore, *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 60.

⁵⁴Joint Pub 3-07.3, cited in Allard, 7.

⁵⁵Ibid., 8.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., 9.

⁵⁹Lyons and Samatar, 36.

⁶⁰Sahnoun, 38-41.

⁶¹Ibid., 25-41.

⁶²Somalia: UNITAF, *Why the Bush Administrations Decided to Intervene in Somalia?* available from <http://www.empereur.com/solaliaus.html>; Internet; accessed on 7 February 2002, 2.

⁶³Clarke and Herbst, 5.

CHAPTER 5

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR SUCCESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

The possible different approaches for success in Somalia are based on both facts and assumptions. These include a wide range of attributes, to include players, conditions, activities, incidents, areas, and concerns. Given the obvious nature of these attributes in subsequent paragraphs, it would be clear that some of them need to be deconflicted, some capitalized on, some taken as imperatives, and some viewed as possibilities, for both adherence and nonadherence.

The challenge of installing some kind of representative government was very important. Understandably, the UN could not have bargained with a clan or community. It needed a legitimate counterpart to do that. Thus, a mechanism of establishing a representative government, as discussed earlier, should have been the first and foremost criterion before setting out for Somalia. No doubt it would have been a tough call, but the initial acknowledgement of the fact and domestic pressure could have substantiated the idea. Although from the humanitarian standpoint an early strike to the catastrophe was essential, a delay for greater long-term success would have been worth taking. A delay, which was so costly in the earlier stage, would not have had similar impact with this arrangement. It was pretty clear that the clans wanted foreign aid and would have ceased hostility, at least temporarily. So, there remained the possibility to bargain with this tool--an economic one--for a diplomatic resolution. It would have been playing with the Somalis by their own rules and would have done no harm at all. Greater

acknowledgement could have been achieved, for it would have been native representatives running the show, at least in the perception of the people.

The military instrument of power was not considered an option in the beginning. As the military situation could not be clearly comprehended, the UN could not afford to be totally unprepared. In fact, absence of this tool left a huge challenge to UNOSOM I. Uncertainty had to be ascertained in the need for military response to deal with the situation. In an event of the UN being locked in stalemate and challenged, the instinctive and skeptical reaction would have been that the UN is failing. In turn, it had, amongst other options, called for military reinforcement. Due to urgent deployment, the military lacked familiarization. With such developments, authoritarian warlords felt appeased. Therefore, it would have been prudent to include the military with all other instruments of power from the very beginning. Perhaps the level of military involvement could have been kept reasonably low.

In the kind of failed state like that of Somalia, it may have been prudent to exercise Chapter VII of UN mandate (enforcement) with jurisdiction from the time UNOSOM I went in. Prior to that, given the intricacy of sovereignty versus intervention and absence of earlier precedence of the kind, the UN could not have gotten involved in Somalia with a chapter VII mandate until the fall of Siad Barre. It is also assumed that UN could not have directly involved itself in the overthrow of the regime, but could have induced more pressure beginning in 1988. However, after the fall of the regime the nonexistence of the state, through civil war and other manmade disasters, changed the relationship between the intervening force and the community it was empowered to assist. It is quite rational to agree with the observers who think that, there being no legally

sanctioned authorities or state structures to provide legitimate consent, the actions of the international forces in a failed state were to be governed exclusively by the UN, normally authorized by a resolution under chapter VII.¹ While this would perhaps have yielded better result, the reality was in fact more challenging. Chapter VII jurisdiction, its exercise being unprecedented, could not have been expected to be implemented immediately. So this was a critical judgment call, which could only be made if a discreet assessment were made.

In order to let the UN try out all possible options, a systematic and less intense approach should have been followed. The UN should have deplored the human rights situation in Somalia no later than December 1989, when the north had already been devastated. It should have been preceded and followed by UN-sponsored fact-finding missions. If nothing worked and deterioration continued unabated as of January 1991 (the ousting of the Barre government), the UN should have had stepped in immediately and hailed the will of the people against the autocratic regime to foster the democratic process there. Given the contemporary involvement of European countries and the US around the time elsewhere in the world, most ideal would have been to request regional players to lead a peace mission under Chapter VIII. If this had not been done, and the UN had gotten involved, as it did, there could have still been chances of success with a different approach. This will be discussed later.

Of all the instruments of power, diplomacy had to be the strategic main effort. The secretary-general recalled, “Any success in improving security condition has been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means.”² Any one of the other powers could have been the main effort for a particular phase. To that end, there could be four possible

phases of the operation: diplomatic disarmament and humanitarian aid (for a general calm), diplomatic resettlement (political reinstatement and humanitarian resettlement), reconciliation and institutionalization (whatever had been reinstated in the earlier phase), and termination and withdrawal.

There had to be very careful treatment of the faction leaders at arms. There was a need for clear strategy, either in parts or in entire Somalia depending on situation at hand. This was of particular importance at the demise of UNOSOM I after which the pattern of inconsistent behavior of the factions and leaders could be used as clear indicator for decision making. Most of the southern Somalia did not deserve the treatment of “existing force” strategy after the failure of UNOSOM I because of swinging nature of clans and lack of genuine control by the faction leaders. In absence of such a strategy or strategies, the UN continued mediation with almost the same set of factions and leaders whose track record included unclear commitment, compliance or control. Thus the approach yielded little benefit while continuing to attach legitimacy to men at arms--the warlords. In turn, more and more leaders at grassroots’ level felt encouraged to gain more military strength to obtain the ability to be a “legitimate” counter part to UN and have a share of the pie in the dialogue. It was clear that a political legitimacy was crucial and there had to be a mechanism to allow the individuals with command over the people to distance themselves from factional identity (at least avoid identification with armed factions). This would have helped in the adoption of the “existing force” strategy (discussed in the preceding chapter). An equally parallel but complementary effort was needed to integrate, in the genuine sense, the respected elements of the society and the women.

They would have either facilitated pursuance of an “existing force” strategy, or, in the case of its failure, served as the base for a “new institution” strategy.

Given the historical involvement of the nation states in Somali affairs and the expertise and knowledge they possessed, it is almost essential to think that, in finding a resolution to the crisis, all or some of those countries had to be decisively involved. Thus, besides the regional players and the international organizations that Somalia was member of, the role of Britain, Italy, Russia, and the US was critical. Although Russia was not expected to play major part because of the crucial transition it was going through at the time, no role at all would have been a great role that they could have played. Their lack of neutrality and violation of the UN resolution added to damage the UN’s image on the ground. Neutrality was also critical on the part of Italy, which supposedly assisted Aideed, and the US and UN, which were inconsistently opposing him for most of the time.

There could have been three broad timeframes for which different approaches or applications could have yielded success. This is based on the assessment of the situation on ground. After January 1990, Siad Barre had no real chance of remaining in power. It was a matter of time before he was deposed. He had alienated and executed people from all segments of society, except his own clans (MOD). His fall was a matter of time, whether or not the UN deplored his actions.

The first of the alternatives for success for the UN, as far as the time frame is concerned, was an involvement not later than March 1991, on the heels of the demise of the regime, when the last bit of state mechanism was collapsing, key factions were still emerging, and the displacement and refugee problem was rising fast. This could have

been done under chapter VI or VIII of the UN charter, depending on whether the UN or regional players were to be involved.

The second and third options differ not with respect to timing, but rather with respect to approach. The second option could have been from January to April 1992, in line with actual deployment that took place. It could have been done under Chapters VI and VII. The third option would have been around January to March 1993, when the humanitarian situation had improved significantly and UNITAF was still in place. This could have been done under the existing Chapter VII mandate. There was no real chance of success during the UNOSOM II time frame, even with any conceivable change of approach or application. The possible matrixes that are provided later in this chapter will show the different dimension at each of these timeframes and required response therein.

An indirect approach would have been more likely to yield success, rather than trying to beat Mogadishu into submission with all the efforts at the UN's disposal. The approach had to be area, activity, community, and effect oriented. For a synergistic effect, a comprehensive campaign plan and coordination were preconditions.

Certain preconditions had to be met. These are not individually analyzed here. The mandate had to be a fairly long-term one. Based on the alternatives available, it could have been as short as one year if the UN had gotten involved in early 1991, or it could well have been for three to four years if the involvement began as late as it did. There had to be confirmed pledges for support and commitment. Absolute neutrality had to prevail. In the case of taking legal action against an individual or group, the agreement had to set the conditions that could allow it.

Broad Campaign Model

The plan here is based on the previous discussions and would remain effective for any of the options followed. Preponderance of power may vary depending on conditions on the ground. The model in figure 3 fits in any of the time frame with involvement under any chapter of the UN Charter.




Figure 3. Campaign Model. Notes: (1) Here Mogadishu as a COG means the ultimate hub of power for the revitalized governance. (2) Informational power is linked to all other power and is therefore not given any lines of operation. However, it would, beside the complimentary lines for other instruments, have its own line of operations attacking each of the DPs. (3) Diplomacy being the ultimate instrument for durable peace is linked to all

other powers. (4) HN elements could be part of any other powers. It is considered separately here for their directness to civic society, dominant population and particular areas. (5). The three phases could be superimposed on the model given here at the operational level and further segmented for tactical usage. (6) The model is based on an indirect approach. The southern area is not included as a DP, but forms part of all of the DPs except the specific area. (7) Economic instrument assumes a coordinated approach by all players (UN and others). (8) Directness of the military instrument to militia (disarmament) does not imply a coercive disarmament; rather it means the security umbrella for the whole process, serving, both as deterrent and facilitator.

Alternatives for Success

Option 1: Early Deployment

By about March 1991, the UN should have gotten directly involved. As part of groundwork leading to the involvement, the UNSC needed to adopt a resolution early enough (not later than December 1989) to deplore human right abuses. It would have given the UN legitimacy in the mind of suppressed ones and, perhaps, hastened the fall of the regime. The fact-finding mission should have followed next (not later than December 1990). It could have validated or refuted the Amnesty International report or that of the OAU. In all probability, it would have stood by the reports.

Meanwhile, there should have been mandates, preferably under chapter VII, imposing an arms embargo and calling for political reconciliation. Finally, assuming Siad Barre's collapse taking place in the same way as it did, leading UN teams (in the form of technical team) should have been sent to the country in February to forge a deal with the local parties (who were still mostly political) for UN supervision throughout the transition. It would be mostly a diplomatic option, closely supported by informational and economic instruments. The option takes into account the assumption that the early UN

efforts would have served to keep the violence at a significantly manageable level and entry into the country would be safe for official visits. There would have been no such escalation that would force the kind of immediate withdrawal, or withdrawal of any sort, of foreign citizens and staffs, as was riskily done by the US on 5 and 6 January 1991.³ The model is based on the principle of early and decisive engagement. Here decisive is not in military terms but the option is kept open subject to the response on the ground. The matrix is shown in table 2.

Table 2. Matrix for Option 1

Timing/ Mandate	Success/ Failure Paradigm			Application of Power				Remarks (Desired Course)
	Humanitarian Condition	Militancy vis-à-vis Need for, and Possibility of Disarmament	Political State vis-à-vis Instating a Government	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic	
Deployment: Between January to March 1991 Operation n: Initially short-term mandate and increased after the situation is crystallized Mandate: Chapter VI/ VIII	Dead: 50,000 Refugee: Minimum in and out of Mogadishu, Most in the north and in the central region, Manageable in the south Famine and Starvation: Rising	Factions: Just emerging Weapons: 40,000 government weapons are either taken away or being captured by contesting parties Militancy: Still local and no mass participation	Process: Manifesto group still active Major Parties: USC, SDA, SDM, SNM Control of Mogadishu USC Leadership Starting to fracture	UN: (Main Effort) Shuttle diplomacy, Technical team, Dialogue Regional (Supporting Effort) Dialogue, assist UN efforts U.S, Britain Italy and Donor countries : (Supporting Efforts) Help negotiations Judiciary: Find modality for restoration	Media: Objective coverage for world opinion Domestic: Leaflets, radio broadcast etc to inform people	Unarmed observers, option of deploying the force is open	In succession Food, Relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced ones, assist local experts in Restoration of facilities	The model serves as a means for immediate arrest of the situation. As the general calm and shy of relief is restored in the society, the political process begins.

Note: In this option, voluntary participation by the Somalis is encouraged. The UN- sponsored effort would have instated the port, police and judicial authorities with priority basis. Most of the looting and hooliganism took place at the ports of entry where the aid goods arrived. Therefore to discourage such activities such ports had to be secured, beside UN, by the Somali police. This would have helped restore authority of the police while restoring order in key hotspots. Police would start to enforce laws and restore order. The judiciary would start disposing cases of human right abuses and trying criminals, which would have discouraged further deterioration.

Option 2: Decisive Engagement

This option assumes that the preceding development leading to the UN's involvement remains unaltered from reality. However, in the first of the alternative preconditions, the UN had to carry out a detailed assessment and effect deployment only thereafter. Two things are key here. Irrespective of the type of mission (peacekeeping or enforcement), the UN had to work out a deal with local factions for effective control of the essential entry points, including those at Mogadishu. Adequate military strength was necessary to secure Mogadishu ports (other ports being still less threatened), escort aid convoys, and project strength as necessary. Many hold this time as the right time when the UN should have introduced the strong military presence. As observers maintain, "If political doctrine on international humanitarian intervention had been available at the time, it would probably have indicated that mid-1992 was the proper time, to introduce a substantial military force."⁴ Simultaneously with the earliest possible entry, there had to be an extensive infusion of humanitarian aid (decisive engagement). Since this option is based on an indirect approach, entry in Mogadishu would have remained flexible. In the case of the SNA's unwillingness to give up control of the ports, the operation would have begun in the outlying areas. Initial dialogue had to integrate the breakaway northwesterners and political leadership from elsewhere in the country, including the civic society, as shown in the campaign model. The mandate in this case should have been a durable one, because it was based on the earlier agreement of the parties concerned.

Table 3. Matrix for Option 2

Timing/ Mandate	Success/ Failure Paradigm			Application of Power				Remarks
	Humanitarian Condition	Militancy vis-à-vis Need for, and Possibility of Disarmament	Political State vis-à-vis Instating a Government	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic	
Chapter VI/ VII mandate (Deploy between March to April 1992)	Dead: 300,000 to 350,000 Refugee Influx in Mogadishu, Kismayu and Kenya (south), Djibouti and Ethiopia (north and west) Displacement: Mostly in the northwest and central Somalia Famine/ Disease: 3,000 ding everyday	Factions: All over, mostly around Mogadishu and Kismayu Weapons: All under factional control Militancy: Inter clan fighting, significant banditry, arms with people from all ages Crucial Controls: SNA at sea and air ports, Mogadishu divided along factional lines	Process: Ali Mahdi unilateral president, No major initiative Major Parties in Mogadishu: USC factions, rests are asserting authority locally Regional Developments Northwest broke away Leadership Faction based	UN: (Main Effort) Shuttle diplomacy; Technical team; Dialogue; Agreement on cease-fire, disarmament and relief operations Regional (Supporting Effort) Dialogue, assist UN efforts U.S, Britain , Italy and Donor Countries: (Supporting Efforts) Help negotiations Somali Parties: Political representatives from entire country and civil elites	Media: Objective coverage for world opinion, Support all other operations Domestic: Leaflets, radio broadcast etc to inform people	Observers to monitor cease-fire, Sizable force to control sea and air ports and to escort aid convoys, also QRF as a deterrent/ self contingency	Infusion of the total need of humanitarian aid based on a thorough assessment that would precede the deployment. Mogadishu is not the main whether or not the ports are secured. Emphasis is on central and northern areas that caused most refugees. The initial focus is on food, followed closely by health, resettlement and agriculture.	It remains as a flexible option. Subject to cooperation form the local people and willingness to political settlement, the main effort could vary. The Headquarters could still be maintained at Mogadishu for the ease in ultimate resolution. The reconciliation is a bottom up approach here: regions first, center thereafter.

Option 3: Capitalizing on UNITAF

This option picks up the UNITAF timeframe as the last of the possibilities of being successful. The situation remains as it was: factions are opposing humanitarian activities, the UN is literally challenged by the presence of arms, de facto leaders are not able to keep promises and lose a significant degree of credibility, and UNITAF has forces at its disposal.

This option is based on a very few simple alternatives and needs no matrix for amplification. UNOSOM had to keep a sizable military and staff presence with UNITAF to continue functions that were deemed important for the subsequent operations, including disarmament. UNITAF had to get decisively involved in disarmament and the

political process and capitalize on the willing submission of the faction leaders. UNITAF should have continued for at least two more months, overlapping the UNOSOM. The resolution should have covered it accordingly. During this time, most of the political dialogues should have been held, processes introduced, police organization sufficiently strengthened, and judiciary made functional. Humanitarian operations had to reach far-flung areas including northern Somalia.

The disarmament had to be mostly a volunteer one, as applying coercive methods only proved to be futile. An elaborate human intelligence network had to be set up for positive information, while at the same time not alienating anyone. Regional and national dialogues had to be held at regular intervals (maybe every month) to apprise the participants of the progress of the commitment, while getting their view on the matter to put things on the right track. The dialogue and agreements should have included a mechanism to assist the Somali political leadership in complying with the deals in the face of opposition from within factions, clans or parties. It should also have provided options to deal with noncompliance. An extensive information campaign, led by the civic elements, was to be persuaded to forge greater unity and positive civic perceptions. All of these activities would have made the process pro-Somali yet UN-friendly.

Once the stage was set for a real transition and there existed no real threat to politico-humanitarian operations, UNITAF should have left. UNOSOM II should have maintained an effective and alert presence to deter any last attempt at foiling the process.

Recommendations

Most Viable Alternative

It has been revealed in this study that the United Nations Mission in Somalia could have succeeded with three different approach and application. The three probabilities outlined earlier in this chapter are time, event and impact driven. The first of the three alternatives (early involvement) relies mostly on the timing. Two issues that, as these analyses reflected, were crucial contributor for failure, and, drives this option. Firstly, the magnitude of the Somali catastrophe intensified to an unmanageable proportion in the year between February 1991 to March 1992; and secondly, most of the state apparatus collapsed during this time and political machineries for representing a viable “existing force” at the aftermath of state collapse also faded, primarily because of the militarization of the political identities. The option of early involvement, although most desirable, was not most practicable in the context of overall set up. Reason for that are: post-Cold-War imperatives, lack of UN’s experience, lack of assessment of needs on Somalia, and ongoing global concerns.

The second option of “decisive engagement” has been driven by the event and trend. As could be seen, the initial Somali response to the UN was fairly encouraging. What was needed to exploit such response was a comprehensive engagement the engagement that would cover the whole country and have ability to address the humanitarian-political needs. However, this option stands second in the probability of adoption and accomplishment. Reasons for such rationale are: the absence of elaborate planning and assessment before engagement, lack of coordination, and inconsistent policy objectives on the part of the UN.

Recommended Option: The third option (capitalizing on UNITAF) is considered the most viable one and is recommended here as the most viable alternative for success. The proposition is driven by some practical imperatives. Firstly, the decisive nature of involvement considered so crucial in Somalia was achieved during UNITAF, not to mention the decisive nature of the mandate (UNSCR 794) that authorized “the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia.”⁵ Basically there were two possible impediments that had to be negotiated. These were: clear policy objective vis-à-vis integrated approach to the problem (involving all instruments of power by all players) and an extended timeframe for the mandate followed by sound transition. Of all the impediments in all the probabilities, the ones against the third probabilities could be most easily surmounted. However, it needed fulfillment of some conditions that are also considered possible in the given scenario.

Recommended Conditions

Continuous US Involvement: The U.S, was the most important player in Somalia and its involvement was most needed for a positive outcome. All the key resolutions marking major twists and turns in the course of the mission (deployment of UNITAF, nation-building by UNOSOM II, hunt for Aideed and consequent withdrawal following its failure) were adopted either at the insistence or support of US. More so, US’s participation in the humanitarian aid was crucial for addressing the magnitude of the problem. Also important was the fact of US media that helped to in rallying support for the UN operation in Somalia. Last but not the least, the size, reach, and sustenance of the force needed for the purpose could be best yielded from the US. US’s pledge therefore

should have been of a continuous and long-term involvement in Somalia that could avoid the kind of haste and incompetence experienced on ground.

UN's Authority and Synergy: The lack of coordination between the UN and non-UN agencies has been quite apparent. Also apparent was the other end of the spectrum--the need for a coordinated and synergic approach. It was therefore necessary to bring in a kind of coordinated and effective mechanism for operations. In the given scenario, UN had to be the apex body that could do the job, for it was UN that was running the show. To that end, had to take into account the willingness and effectiveness of all the agencies concerned.

¹Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 10.

²UN Secretary-General's report of 18 July 1994, cited in UNOSOM II, the resume available from http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/peac/unosom_ii.html; Internet; accessed on 7 February 2002, 29.

³Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998), 28.

⁴Clarke and Herbst, 8.

⁵UNSC Resolution 814, 23 January 1992; available from <http://www.un.org>; Internet; accessed on 10 October 2001.

APPENDIX A

MAJOR SOMALI MOVEMENTS

The following factions participated in one or more of the January, March, and November 1993 meetings in Addis Ababa. Several organizations are listed twice, with different leadership; these are factions that were split internally (usually along subclan lines) but chose not to rename their movements. The frequency of shifts in factional and clan alliances means that portions of this list may not have been maintained as denoted here.

In the Addis Ababa meetings, two loose coalitions were created: the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), led by Ali Mahdi, and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), led by Aideed.

The Somali Africn Muki Organization (SAMO) represented a minority population of Bantu origin in the southern riverine regions, the most vulnerable victims of the war and famine. One faction was allied with the SSA and another was allied with the SNA.

The Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) wasa Gudaburshi (Dir Clan) organization from the northern “Somaliland” region around Boroma. Originally formed in 1989, it opposed the Somali National Movement’s (SNM) policy of independence and participated in the Addis Ababa talks. It is allied with the SSA.

The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) was an organization based among the Rahanwein people (the agriculturalists or Somalia, who suffered some of the worse consequences of the famine) and active around the town of Baidoa. It split and reformed a number of times in 1992-94. At different times various factions were associated with both the SSA and SNA.

The Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) was A Darod faction allied with the SSA.

The Somali National Front (SNF) was led by General Orar Haji Mohamed Siad Hersi “Morgan.” The SNF was composed of Marehan (part of the Darod and Siad Barre’s clan) and was allied to the SSA.

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was an Isaq-based movement that led the opposition to Siad Barre in the late 1980s. The SNM was formed in 1981 and was supported by Ethiopia during much of the late 1980s. In 1988 the SNM occupied much of northern Somalia and suffered brutal attacks from Siad Barre. The SNM won control over the north (former British Somaliland) in 1991 and declared the territory the independent (but as yet unrecognized) Republic of Somaliland.

The Somali National Union (SNU), a Reer-Hamar group, was supported by many coastal, urban Somalis. Historically these urbanized groups have had weak clan links to the rest of Somalia but strong trading links to the Indian Ocean. As a relatively wealthy minority, they suffered greatly during the civil war and banditry. Different factions of SNU have been allied with the SSA and SNA.

The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), a grouping of Ogadeni subclans (of the Darod clan), attempted to lay claim to the region around the southern part of Kismayu, thereby triggering conflict with other Ogadeni subclans. One faction was led by Omar Jess and was allied with Aideed’s SNA. Another faction, led by Adan Abdullahi Nur “Gabiyo,” was allied with Mahdi’s SSA and with General Morgan.

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was led by General Mohammad Abshir Musse and supported by many Mijerteen (of the Darod clan); its regional

stronghold was northeastern Somalia. It was formed in 1979 by Colonel Yusuf Abdullahi following Siad Barre's attacks on Mijerteen, and supported by Ethiopia in the 1980s. Tensions with Aideed led the SSDF generally to side with the Ali Mahdi's SSA. A smaller SSDF group was based in Kismayu among the Herti subclan and fought with the SPM faction under Colonel Jess. The movement underwent a complicated leadership struggle in late 1994.

The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), a Dir clan movement, was based among the Bimaal subclan in southern coastal Somalia. It split between factions, one allied with Aideed's SNA, another with Ali Mahdi's SSA.

The United Somali Congress (USC), a group with support among the Hawiye, seized control of Mogadishu in 1991. The USC split into two subclan-based factions. The faction allied with the SNA was led by General Mohammad Aideed and many of the Habir Gedir subclan. It maintained control over southern Mogadishu and some regions in central Somalia. The factions allied with SSA was led by "interim president" Ali Mahdi Mohammad and many of the Abgal subclan, maintaining control of northern Mogadishu.

The United Somali Front (USF) was an Issa group (Dir clan) based in the far northwest (Somaliland). The Issa broke with SNM in 1991 and has had close relations with the government of Djibouti. Loosely allied with the SSA.

The United Somali Party (USP) was a Dolbahante-Warsangali subclan (of the Darod clan) movement. This subclan straddled the border between northern Somaliland and southern Somalia, and has been in conflict with the SNM. It was allied with the SSA.

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF UN CHARTER CHAPTER VI, VII, AND VIII

Chapter VI--Pacific Settlement of Disputes: This chapter provides that international disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security can be brought to the attention of the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is expressly mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to propose actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

Chapter VII--Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression: If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Security Council may employ the broad powers given it in Chapter VII of the Charter. In order to prevent an aggravation to the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measure, as it deems necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide under Article 42, such action by air, sea, and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. For this purpose, all members of the UN agree to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the use of

armed forces are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a military staff committee.

Chapter VIII--Regional Arrangements: Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for the creation of “regional organizations” or agencies to deal with such matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions (Article 52). Regional organizations are required to encourage peaceful settlement of international disputes, and must prohibit the aggressive use of threat of force in international relations. Additionally, Article 53 of the UN Charter requires that enforcement action may be carried out by a regional organization only if sanctioned by the UN Security Council and that such enforcement actions must always be consistent with principle of the Charter. Finally, the Security Council may use regional organizations for enforcement actions under its own authority.

Source: *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations*, Appendix B.

APPENDIX C


MAP OF SOMALIA



Source: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia.jpg>

APPENDIX D

SOMALI CLAN AND CLAN FAMILIES



APPENDIX E

DIVISION OF SOMALIA AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY



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