Other Costs of Coalition Building - How to Buy Friends and Intimidate (Former) Enemies
Abstract
The war against terror, like most wars that the United States has fought with a coalition, costs more than just the outward cost of paying for the U.S. military. In addition to the huge cost of the U.S. military machine are less obvious expenditures of economic and political capital (often with economic consequences), offered as carrots to entice other countries to support the U.S. led coalition. Although we would like to believe that other countries are fighting alongside the U.S. out of altruism there are substantial numbers of self-interest driven expectations of a quid pro quo from the U.S. as a reward for lending support to the coalition effort. Toward this end, there are multiple economic and diplomatic tools that the U.S. has in its arsenal. Some of these tools are more controversial than others, but all available tools are used and considered as a cost of doing business in fighting a war in the global environment in which we live today. This paper looks at the economic and diplomatic tools with economic consequences that the United States has utilized in building the U.S led coalition in the war against terrorism. This paper addresses the pros and cons of bringing into a coalition states that are unsavory allies that are needed in order to effectively prosecute the current war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA406501
Entities
People
- Tony F. De Alicante
Organizations
- Naval War College