War in the Shadows: Deterrence and the Struggle Against Terrorism
Abstract
This thesis analyzes the potential utility of deterrence measures in minimizing the number and impact of terrorist operations. This study is composed of two parts, the first focusing on the theoretical aspects of deterrence theory, and the second concerned with the application of deterrence theory to anti-terrorism efforts. In the theoretical segment, the foundations and assumptions of deterrence theory are reviewed, and are subjected to a number of prominent criticisms focusing on the structure and utility of deterrence. This analysis reveals that while deterrence theory in its original conception is flawed, it is not without value. Indeed, by taking to heart its criticisms, deterrence theory can be reformulated to account for the psychological biases of an opponent, and expanded to include measures designed to reassure, as well as those meant to threaten. The thesis goes on to apply this "new" vision of deterrence to terrorism. By demonstrating the failure of current, hard-line deterrent policies such as military retaliation and economic sanctions, as well as the fallacy of adopting popular yet inaccurate assumptions vis-a'-vis terrorists and their sponsors, the study seeks to reveal both the value and necessity of implementing a "carrot and stick" approach to anti-terrorism. Though some groups are beyond the scope of conciliation and must be held in check through forceful means, many others have demands and objectives which reflect genuine inadequacies in the status quo. As such, states should seek to deter terrorism not only through forceful measures, but also by doing their best to alleviate the underlying causes of hatred and dissatisfaction which lead to violence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA406551
Entities
People
- Mark H. Lunardi
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology