Managing the Second Front: MACV's Response to Drug Abuse, 1965-1973
Abstract
Involvement in Vietnam challenged American military leaders in many difficult ways, and not all of them involved the first front, which included a determined adversary and dealing with an inept, corrupt ally. Composing the second front, internal disciplinary problems, of which drug abuse was most problematic, at times came close to shattering the Army's ability to be an effective combat force on the first front. The following study of Military Assistance Command Vietnam's (MACV) drug abuse policy in Southeast Asia from 1965-1973 not only unveils the magnitude of the drug abuse problem, but also provides insights into MACV's command effectiveness in attacking the problem. The most important lesson that MACV did not understand until too late was that drugs were a danger to the Army from a combat effectiveness perspective. During the first period (1965-1967), the front beyond the battlefield allowed young soldiers to develop an acceptance for drug abuse. Then during the transition years (1968-1969), obvious drug abuse signals were recognized, but MACV's commanders did not think the reported drug abuse was yet a significant problem and, worse, they did now know how to deal with it. Finally, during MACV's withdrawal (1970-1973) the Army began managing drug abuse by the numbers and MACV was, therefore, not pro actively leading with flexible drug abuse policies or programs, but merely creating the impression that it is was effectively handling this second front.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA406624
Entities
People
- Matthew J. Swanson
Organizations
- University of Nebraska–Lincoln