Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals
Abstract
Three years ago, the series of nuclear explosions in South Asia removed any hope that nuclear weapons would remain "in the closet." Since then both countries have gradually developed their nuclear systems and plans1 and little real progress has been made to reduce the dangers. Instead, the United States continues its principled stand to stop and reverse nuclear proliferation in South Asia or at least under a new Administration appears to be ignoring the problems attendant with new nuclear arsenals,2 In much the same way the Bush Administration seeks to "square the circle" in the anti-ballistic missile arena, so too must we find a new proliferation policy that makes the most of a bad situation. In order to reduce the chances for an inadvertent nuclear exchange in South Asia, American policymakers should adopt a novel solution to help "manage" proliferation: we should transfer selected nuclear weapon command and control (C2) systems to India and Pakistan. The objective is to transform inherently destabilizing nuclear arsenals into forces less likely to be fired in anger or in error.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA406946
Entities
People
- Robert E. Rehbein
Organizations
- Air War College