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BETWEEN IRAQ AND A HARD PLACE
Fighting Guerrilla Warfare in the Air

By

Gary C. Webb, Lt. Col., USAF

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Advisor: Dr. Grant Hammond
Director, Center for Strategy and Technology
Professor of International Relations
Air War College, Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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Abstract

The US enforces its will on other nations through air dominance. Since a would-be adversary cannot challenge the US in the air by traditional means, that adversary will adopt a non-traditional "guerrilla" style air campaign. The guerrilla believes that "to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself".¹

The US imposes dominance directly, indirectly, and through the threat of dominance. The guerrilla phases of gathering strength, challenging indirectly, and resorting to direct combat will use any means of electronic, ground and air order of battles. Its purpose is to achieve small victories that will force a reevaluation of political objectives.

The threat of guerrilla warfare in the air is real and exists today. The US should prepare and shape the National Military Strategy accordingly. History suggests the kinds of wars the US will face will be conditioned by the very superiority possesses.² An indirect strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is a very real alternative to those with limited means and the will to resist.

¹ Clavell, James. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Dell Publishing, NY, NY; 1983, 19

² Alexander, Bevin; The Future of Warfare, WW Norton & Co., NY, NY; 1995, 104

Introduction

As we stepped to our fighters at 0600 hours, the smell of coffee was strong from the shack between the two temporary squadrons, a small consolation of being deployed. The coalition fighters were in pristine condition. My jet, the F-15E Strike Eagle is strikingly American, cutting edge technology, extraordinarily lethal and beautiful. My job was to ensure that sanctions were enforced to the best of our ability while exposing our people to as little risk as possible. Every morning, coalition aircrew received an intelligence update, reviewed and tested on "Rules of Engagement" (ROE), and received direction from the coalition commander.

Airmen stood by smartly in anticipation of any changes. They were sharp and motivated. If they made any mistakes they would be putting the aircraft and aircrew at risk. They had been busy for hours. Fighter jocks had it the easiest. Although US rules said we could only work for 12 hours no such rules existed for support personnel. They were at work before we arrived and stayed for hours after our missions were complete. They routinely worked 16-hour days, sometimes more.

The political environment supporting the coalition was fragile. We were enforcing coalition sanctions through the use of direct dominance. The rogue nation state was embarrassed, yet still powerful, aggressive, and lethal. I didn't have the time to think deep strategic thoughts... it was time to execute.

I was comfortable once airborne. The F-15C Eagles monitored coalition forces and other air traffic over the "No Fly" Zone. Another airliner was entering restricted airspace and the Joint Force Air Component Commander directed coalition forces to shepherd the airliner. Earlier that week, we allowed an airliner to land in violation of coalition sanctions. It would be pretty stupid

to shoot down an aircraft full of humanitarian aid. Life is tough enough; but it's a lot tougher if you're stupid. We let the airliner through.

Suddenly, an electronic threat illuminated my aircraft and I reacted defensively. We were illuminated frequently. The threat of the electronic order of battle was as lethal as launching a surface to air missile (SAM) and the SAM team learned from battle. If they didn't move, they would die. We weren't sure what strategy they were executing.

The Jaguars were also illuminated. Their flight paths exploded. Number Four continued towards the flight path of the airliner. The Eagles also saw a "slow mover" in the path of the airliner. The Eagles committed to identify the threat and protect the airliner. "Slow movers" were usually helicopters. The Eagles could have easily destroyed the "slow mover" but they had to conform to ROE. A helicopter was shot down once before ... and it was one of our own.

The Eagles cautiously approached within missile range. The "slow mover" was a helicopter hovering in the flight path of the Jaguar and the airliner. Without warning, a smoke trail left the helicopter. An Eagle "splashed" the helicopter as the Jaguar defeated the heat-seeking missile. Three helicopters rose from below and fired on Jaguar who was slow on airspeed and ideas.

The Jaguar pumped out flares. He decoyed one heat-seeking missile and another flew into the dirt. The fourth missile blew his tail off. The pilot ejected and a helicopter followed the chute to the desert below. The airliner continued his approach ignorant of the battle below.

As the US engages in more diversified missions, it will have to defeat asymmetric strategies. What follows is the analysis of a potential strategy to defeat dominance from the air, that of "Guerrilla Warfare in the Air".

The Definition

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in the constant combat to dominate that area of political mentality that is inherent to all human beings and which collectively constitutes the "environment" in which guerrilla warfare moves...³

– *CIA on Guerrilla Warfare*

Guerrilla warfare in the air is a strategy to use unconventional and indirect means to combat direct, indirect, and implied dominance of the air. The word guerrilla means little war.⁴ Guerrilla warfare is asymmetric warfare. Given the conventional force superiority of the US, an opponent almost has to employ guerrilla warfare, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or both.

Emerging Strategy

This paper articulates an emerging strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air in response to US led dominance over Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War in Northern and Southern Watch. This theoretical assessment uses the specific circumstances in Iraq as an example. The US exercises dominance over Iraq through air superiority. However, air superiority is fragile. The US has three options to enforce sanctions through force. The first is through direct dominance, exerting direct and immediate presence. The second way is to exert dominance indirectly. Here the US maintains dominance through a detached presence, either forecasting guerrilla activity or monitoring guerrilla activity through intelligence. The third way the US exerts dominance is through the threat of dominance. The US exerts implied dominance over another nation through the knowledge that the US has the will and the means to enforce dominance.

³ CIA Textbook on Psychological Operations In Guerrilla Warfare; on-line, Internet, 19 August 2000, available from http://www.tscm.com/CIA_PsyOps_Handbook.html

⁴ Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows – The Guerrilla in History*; Vol I, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1975, xii

Bevin Alexander in The Future of Warfare recognized the threat of superiority to other countries and the need for alternative strategies. "Other countries can challenge us effectively by fighting indirectly, moving away from our military strength and avoiding large concentrations of weapons and men that we can locate and destroy."⁵ Bard O'Neill explains, "The situation, problems, and challenges of the environment, popular support, organization, unity, and external support must be set forth as cogently, comprehensively, and clearly as possible. Once this done, an overall counter strategy tailored to relevant problems can be devised."⁶ The relative roles of military, social, economic, and political measures will vary according to the guerrilla strategy.

Iraq is employing a long-term strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air in Northern and Southern Watch. The US must understand the threat of guerrilla warfare in the air. Ignoring or downplaying problems will lead to faulty, misguided, incomplete, and sometimes irrelevant policy responses.⁷

In order to confront a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air the US must *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now*. The US must recognize the threat and analyze how a "non-traditional" air campaign could be successfully waged.⁸ America must then execute the strategic concepts articulated in its National Military Strategy to prevent, defend, or defeat guerrilla war in the air. The National Military Strategy has the flexibility to allow the US to respond to a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

⁵ Alexander, 105

⁶ O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Brassey's Inc. VA, 1990, 152

⁷ O'Neill, 153

⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, writes: "Our best judgment is that this strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, and the forces for which it calls, will protect the Nation and its interests, and promote a peace that benefits America and all like-minded nations."

Taken from: National Military Strategy; on-line, Internet, 19 August 2000, available from:

<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html>. The 1997 National Military Strategy provides strategic direction of the

Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare in the Air

Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfighting strategy; the decision to fight a guerrilla war is an answer to, “How shall we fight against overwhelming odds?” Many Americans associate guerrilla warfare with communist revolutionary movements.⁹ Vietnam engaged US air forces indirectly, using selective defense in mass, low altitude wheels to defeat missiles, and ground control intercept to attack US strike packages from the rear.¹⁰ Guerrilla warfare is the option of those who confront an enemy greatly superior in numbers, equipment, and training. US enemies will not challenge its weapons superiority, but will come in “under” American technology, refusing to confront it directly, but nevertheless presenting a great challenge to American arms.¹¹ Guerrilla warfare defines the capabilities and political will of the adversary, determines a style of engagement, and becomes an overarching strategy to affect the political will of a dominant force.

Since a would-be adversary cannot challenge dominance by traditional means, that adversary will adopt a non-traditional "guerrilla" style air campaign. Nations will use “sabotage, unpredictable hit-and-run attacks, and ambush rather than mass confrontation”.¹² Modern urban guerrilla activities such as hijacking and kidnapping are frequently inspired by ideology rather than patriotism and are often tinged with elements of terrorism. Will is the determining factor.¹³

Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President's 1997 *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* and the Secretary's *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR).

⁹ Joes, Anthony James. *Modern Guerrilla Insurgency*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT; 1992, 5

¹⁰ Hammond, Grant T., *The Mind of War – John Boyd and American Security*, Smithsonian Institution Press, US; 2001; 70

¹¹ Alexander, 38

¹² Encyclopedia.com. Definition of Guerrilla Warfare; on-line, Internet, 17 August 2000

¹³ Alexander, 46

Guerrilla war fought in the air transcends the line between defensive and aggressive. The US must be aggressive enough to maintain dominance in order to achieve political objectives. The guerrilla must cross the defensive line and find a way to be effective against dominance from the air. The guerrilla will use any means of electronic, ground, and air order of battles to achieve small victories. In such wars, superior weapons are to a large degree neutralized.

Conclusion

Guerrilla warfare in the air is a plausible, viable, and an indirect strategy of an adversary fighting dominance from the air. The US has achieved such military dominance today that other nations are hard pressed to compete and challenge the US directly. If airpower is the preferred means of force application for the US, the guerrilla war in the air is a reasonable, adversarial response. By recognizing indirect attacks against US air forces as guerrilla warfare, the US can build a logical counter-strategy to defeat guerrilla warfare in the air.

Waging Guerrilla Warfare in the Air

“All warfare is based on deception. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

– Sun Tzu, 473 BC.¹⁴

A guerrilla warfare in the air strategy parallels the three revolutionary phases of guerrilla warfare as defined by Mao Tse-Tung.¹⁵ Phase I is devoted to organizing, establishing, and persevering, as in Iraq’s situation. Phase II challenges dominance and the political will of the US indirectly, covertly, and persistently. Phase III is the decisive stage where direct force challenges dominance and political will power until dominance is no longer.

During the initial phase of guerrilla warfare in the air, the guerrilla will organize doctrine and tactics to fight the US; create or acquire the weapons and technology to challenge the political will of the US; and establish political support for its cause through diplomacy, politics, and propaganda in order to establish and preserve its existence while being dominated. The objective may be to force the US to either remove a part of its dominant force structure package from theater or to force the US to stay in theater. The continuous chipping away of the dominant force structure will ultimately result in a loss of dominance. Conversely, the escalating costs of maintaining a dominant force structure may chip away at political will and ultimately result in a loss of dominance.

For example, Iraqi forces train at night because the US exerts direct dominance during the day and indirect dominance at night. The US did not dissuade Iraq from training at night.

¹⁴ Clavell, 11

Allowing night training is a small concession and constitutes chipping away at coalition resolve. The ability to fight at night is a new concept and capability for Iraq.

Conversely, the guerrilla may attempt to induce the US to remain in theater. For a guerrilla, "military strategy springs from a combination of political and social circumstances."¹⁶ The guerrilla will use just enough force to constitute a threat but not enough to require retribution. The US will bleed from a thousand small cuts that are not lethal individually. Prolonged low-grade disruption exacts a toll. If the US political will is weak, the coalition will die, and dominance no longer exists. The guerrilla will use any means of electronic, ground and air order of battle to bleed the US of its resolve.

Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)

An indirect electronic means of fighting a guerrilla war in the air employs highlighting aircraft, uncoordinated missile launches, and the threat of conventional air-to-air tactics. The guerrilla uses electronic intelligence to hide a real attack or deny electronic intelligence through alternative tactics and employment doctrines.

The most effective use of the electronic spectrum is for US forces to never know they were attacked. An EOB attack may be to gather intelligence and not necessarily to inflict physical harm. The assets of the guerrilla limit their jamming capability. Jamming assets are used as a force multiplier to conceal and camouflage their real purpose and existence.

Two actions result at the threat of attack. First, US forces react defensively to the threat and the guerrilla documents the reaction to develop a future plan of action and the mere threat to air forces reinforces US commitment to remain. The reaction to the threat confirms the success

¹⁵ Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 20

of guerrilla strategy. Secondly, the guerrilla may lull the US into complacency. Guerrilla activity may be evaluated as not threatening. As US force structure does not react, they will be at risk. This is Sun Tzu's logic at its best. Then direct fire may be successful against US dominance. The use of electronic attack is more effective when used in concert with the ground order and air order of battles.

Ground Order of Battle (GOB)

Enemies who adopt the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air will be difficult to defeat, whereas technologically inferior powers are likely to be destroyed if they attempt to confront American forces on even terms. Nations will use “sabotage, unpredictable hit-and-run attacks, and ambush rather than mass confrontation”.¹⁷ The guerrilla cannot risk mass confrontation because the US has dominance. The GOB is a critical component of a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

Tactical operating doctrine will be modified to protect the resources on the ground and to hurt the US. Even a small cut to the US is a victory against dominance. The guerrilla will strike from the ground to the air quickly and then disappear. The guerrilla must move, conceal, or deceive the US to protect his resources or lose them. Traditional full-up systems put the operators and equipment at risk. There will be cat and mouse games to move force structure visible to the US while the true motive is to put other weapons in positions of tactical advantage to lure US aircraft into the weapons engagement zone of another, a "SAM bush".

The US must be careful of how to enforce sanctions at these times. The guerrilla's attempt to apply direct force may be a ruse to lure the US to hurt somebody unintentionally.

¹⁶ Debray, Regis, *Revolution in the Revolution – Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*, Monthly Review Press, NY, NY 1967, 60

Collateral damage, CNN coverage, and artful propaganda are powerful weapons. Because of the publics' confidence in high technology weapons, any *miss* will be interpreted as intentional.

One of the disadvantages of direct dominance is that the guerrilla is forced to adapt, grow, and think "out of the box". In doing so, the guerrilla can attain an advantage. "All intelligence is based on pattern recognition. As strategic and operational doctrines develop patterns, they become predictable. If a force is predictable, it can be defeated."¹⁸ US doctrine and coalition force packages are very predictable over Iraq because command & control is made simple for multi-nation packages. Not all nations have the training opportunities, resources available, or technology to be at the same level. Therefore, direct dominance become vulnerable to the ground order of battle because of its predictability.

The US must carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of direct versus indirect dominance. As the US reevaluates the effectiveness of dominance the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air grows in the niches. The guerrilla is forced into a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air because the total commitment of US political, economic, and military will creates *an environment* of dominance. Innovation, technology, and joint and combined operations act as force multipliers. The most effective use of the GOB is to work in concert with all order of battles.

Air Order of Battle (AOB)

Guerrilla warfare in the air will use any means to achieve small victories that will force the US to reevaluate its political objective. Dominance of the air is the most fragile of

¹⁷ Encyclopedia.com *Definition of Guerrilla Warfare*; on-line, Internet, 17 August 2000

¹⁸ Dr. Grant T. Hammond, Director, Center for Strategy and Technology and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College at Air University, Interview with the author, 25 October 2000

environments and only requires the loss of political will to break it. The guerrilla's objective is to break US dominance, not to commit the US to a more total spectrum of dominance.

The guerrilla will attempt to distract the US to commit air forces into an unexpected air threat. Forces may be conned into maneuvering away from protecting high value air assets and place them at risk. Another effective means of manipulating an aggressive force in direct dominance is to entice an attack against an innocent target from the air. The presence of air forces in direct dominance allows the guerrilla to use them as propaganda pawns. Political will is weakened because US forces lost discipline in a direct dominance role.

Guerrillas maintain their own battle lines and make no distinction between their own and enemy territory in the air. The US is constrained by rules that they dictate. Cheating is the guerrilla prerogative and sanctuary. So while the US is fighting within the rules, the guerrilla has every opportunity and intention of committing force on force in the air indirectly anyway it can.

The guerrilla does not necessarily hold itself to the constraints of morality. The guerrilla can shoot down one of its own aircraft or cause destruction on the ground and then blame the US. The propaganda tool of the guerrilla then challenges US political will. Terrorism is an instrument of war. It violates the normative values regarding the employment of lethal force.¹⁹ Ultimately, the end sought is to undermine and destroy cohesion, to reduce it to its smallest part: the isolated, individual human being.²⁰ If the terrorist is seen with the capability to strike randomly with impunity, political and military power can be neutralized.

¹⁹ Hanle, 105

²⁰ Hanle, 108

Conclusion

The guerrilla will use every possible order of battle; electronic, ground, and air; together or independently to shatter the fragile dominance in the air. Every order of battle will attempt to conceal, camouflage, and deceive its existence and employment to stay alive. The goal of guerrilla warfare in the air may be to chip away at force structure to force them to leave or to be too expensive to support. The guerrilla will take the path that is easiest and most efficient to use. If the guerrilla is not effective breaking the political will using the electronic, ground, and air order of battles the guerrilla will resort to terrorism and highjacking. Strangely enough, US public resolve seems to strengthen when challenged directly through terrorist acts.

The more likely and potentially effective strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is to engage US direct and indirect dominance. If the US can predict how the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air will be used against dominance then it can develop a counter-strategy.

Direct Dominance

The Truman administration's response had been to improvise the concept of limited war – conventional military operations tightly controlled both in geographical scope and in levels of violence.

But it had given little thought, by the time it left office, to how such operations could be sustained over protracted periods of time, given their costs, given growing public impatience, and given the need to simultaneously to protect other more critical areas.

– John Lewis Gaddis

The objective of the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air against direct dominance is to either force the US to abandon direct dominance or to make the US commit and make the cost of direct dominance prohibitive, either militarily or politically. Direct dominance exists with the immediate presence of the US in the air. The US needs a total force of all elements of its airpower – command & control, intelligence, battlespace management, defenders and enforcers.

Direct dominance in the air is fragile without extraordinary effort and resources. Air power can only "occupy"²¹ or enforce a "No Fly Zone" at a high cost. Direct dominance requires continuous intelligence and credible force. Following is an exploration of possible objectives of guerrilla warfare in the air strategy against direct dominance.

Objective: Force The US To Abandon Direct Dominance

One objective of the guerrilla warfare in the air strategy is to force the US to remove portions of dominance force structure from theater. The continuous chipping away of the dominance force structure will ultimately result in a loss of dominance.

²¹ Explanatory note: "air occupation" was a Col. John Warden concept which became translated as "No Fly Zone" after the Gulf War

Diverse political agendas can affect political will. A coalition member may have a political agenda sympathetic to the existence of the rogue nation state but also sympathetic to the cause of the coalition. A sympathetic member can create a neutral environment for the guerrilla and still demonstrate coalition support. Coalition members have diverse agendas and envision varied end states. Establishing and communicating a clearly defined purpose is not an easy task for a US led coalition.

Commanders must anticipate threats, tactics, and goals of the guerrilla as they attempt to deny, delay, degrade, and disrupt air operations. Estimating the “right amount of force” and ensuring everybody with a bomb or a missile gets the message is a herculean task. It is possible that there will be no reaction to threats that do not conform to what the US expects to see. If history suggests that we most often deter the conflicts that we plan for and actually fight the ones we do not anticipate, the same principle applies to expectations. Either we do not recognize the threat because we do not expect to see it, or when we do recognize the threat, we are paralyzed into inaction because we do not have a plan to defeat it.

The guerrilla will campaign to drive a wedge in the coalition. The guerrilla can indirectly challenge the US by violating the conditions of dominance imposed by the coalition. A variety of seeming logical excuses will be offered to induce a positive public opinion. The guerrilla will continue to push and pull on the edges of dominance until they have the room to engage dominance forces. If the guerrilla can create the illusion that they are a credible threat, the US will be forced to commit additional forces to prevent an attack or another violation. The increase in operations tempo may cause a coalition member to question the cost effectiveness of its participation in the coalition.

The guerrilla will cultivate coalition infighting by creating the appearance of a credible threat to weak coalition members. The guerrilla will threaten the weakest coalition forces to make the US forces appear impotent or the guerrilla will threaten US forces to react to expose the weak forces. Either way the guerrilla is successful because they are forcing the US to react on their terms. The guerrilla will target the weak, the unsure, and the high value assets. Thus the guerrilla has successfully challenged dominance and will next attempt to challenge the predictability of the US through the use of force.

In an indirect fight, the guerrilla must achieve a lot of return for the sacrifice. The results must be graphic and suited for propaganda. Targets may not be military. Targets exist everywhere in the world. Therefore, the targets of guerrilla warfare will not be limited to US force structure in theater. Guerrilla warfare works slowly but time is the ally of the guerrilla.

Objective: Make The US Commit, Exhaust Resources, And Break Political Will

What if doing just enough to induce the US to stay costs the US so much that doing nothing becomes a sound strategy; turtle tactics. Doing nothing is a viable tactic, costs the guerrilla little, and costs the US a lot as the guerrilla gains strength. The presence of direct dominance for extended periods of time allows the guerrilla to grow without expending the costs of research and development and to develop strategic, doctrinal, and tactical thought. The airspace above the rogue nation becomes a testing ground for new technology and doctrine. The constant reassessment, defining and expanding tactical doctrine will eventually enable the guerrilla to expand a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

Committing resources over an extended period of time may be a severe test of US commitment and ability to generate resources. Additional time allows the guerrilla to build strength and support. The guerrilla only needs to convince the US that the threat still exists, to

pose a credible risk in order to force the US to commit forces. Maintaining a force structure is expensive, drives operations (ops) tempo, and affects morale. Resources are defined in terms of time, tempo, money, and force structure. Ops tempo is the frequency of putting force structure in place to support direct dominance. Limited numbers of a specific force structure drive a higher ops tempo when their presence is required in theater. The US must commit thought and planning to *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now*.

The impact of being in theater for a long time is a huge cost the US may decide not to pay. For example, maintaining direct dominance for an extended period of time mirrors the policy of containment prevalent of the 1950s; an unfavorable policy which most Americans reviled and on which an American presidency was won because of his campaign promise to stop containment. “The Republican platform of 1952 went even further, condemning the “the negative, futile and immoral policy of ‘containment’ which abandons countless human beings to... despotism and Godless terrorism...”²² The high cost may degrade political resolve.

Media coverage will decline because of the lack of action or sensationalism. The guerrilla will not challenge dominance until it can degrade dominance. It is a certainty that the guerrilla has encyclopedias of documented US response to tactical stimuli.

Conclusion

Direct dominance is expensive. Costs are resources, manpower, and will. Costs are driven by force structure, spare parts, operations tempo, and by host nation agreements. Opportunity costs of coalitions are constrained by political and military ideology, language, weapons systems,

²² Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History; McGraw-Hill, US; 1978, 216

technology, interoperability, and by time. Guerrillas know no such constraints. They have no rules to abide by, no partners to placate, and time is on their side to fight direct dominance.

The guerrilla will chip away at force structure to make direct dominance either leave or be too expensive to stay. The guerrilla only needs to pose a credible risk in order to force the US to commit forces in support of direct dominance. The guerrilla's goal is to make the cost of dominance excessive to where political resolve is lost and dominance ceases to exist. The US needs to examine alternatives to direct dominance such as indirect dominance to build a counter-strategy to defeat the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

Indirect Dominance

Once the type of insurgency and forms of warfare have been identified, the next step is to address the various strategic approaches that insurgents adopt to maximize the effectiveness of political techniques and forms of warfare in the quest for victory. The strategies... ascribe to six general principles: environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and government response.

– Bard E O'Neill

Indirect dominance exists with a detached presence of dominant force structure.

Response to a violation of dictums is not immediate but the response is planned, calculated, and credible. The US has the option to take action at a time of its choosing. Force employment is designed to enforce sanctions vice focus on self-protection.

As a result, action taken by the US is deliberate but effective and sends a specific message to the guerrilla. The US does not have to act immediately has options. Because the guerrilla does not know where or when the US will choose to enforce its will, the guerrilla has a problem defending itself. The guerrilla will place assets in civilian areas, relocate high value assets and use information operations to discredit the US. The guerrilla can wage an offensive war against direct dominance but has to wage a defensive war against indirect dominance.

Using the three stages of guerrilla warfare as a model, several conclusions emerge. In the first stage the guerrilla gathers strength and will power but cannot challenge the US. The guerrilla does nothing; the US watches. The guerrilla attempts to gather strength and support, but at the same time, the US waits for the sanctions to take effect. The US needs time for the sanctions to work.

In Phase II, the guerrilla tests US willpower and resolve. But there is no force structure for the guerrilla to indirectly attack. So the guerrilla must test the resolve of the US by violating sanctions. The guerrilla cannot take the moral high ground and has limited indirect options. The guerrilla knows there will be a reaction, but they don't know where or how. There is no longer an immediate cause and effect. The US now fights indirect strategy with indirect strategy. The blows of the guerrilla echo in the void and haunt them at the time of US choosing.

Indirect dominance requires significantly less force structure. The guerrilla has less opportunity to push and expand the edge of the envelope of contemptuous and aggressive disdain. The guerrilla's attempt to define and expand its tactical doctrine against dominance becomes an academic exercise.

Phase III of the guerrilla warfare strategy, the guerrilla directly confronts the US. But guerrilla force structure is vulnerable as they gather strength. The building of force structure becomes an overt act and the US can engage at a time and place of its choosing. The rogue nation must rely on a political agenda or attempt to induce US force structure into theater.

The US must maintain intelligence to monitor guerrilla activities. There are fewer platforms to gather intelligence in indirect dominance. Therefore, interpreting and assessing data, intentions, and capabilities is critical. The guerrilla uses the analysis of information to its advantage. The guerrilla only needs to make the US believe in the "threat of an attack". Decoys, deception, and camouflage become the weapons of the guerrilla. If the guerrilla can induce the US to engage, the guerrilla can make the US predictable and therefore vulnerable.

Interpreting intelligence is a herculean feat. After briefing intelligence activity to the political constituency, there is the threat of paralysis through analysis. This is the danger of indirect dominance and the domain of the modern guerrilla. There is only action after appeasing

all political agendas. The success of indirect dominance is absolutely dependent on a focused political agenda. The goal of the guerrilla is to blur the political agenda and to splinter the coalition. Conversely, in direct dominance, maintaining dominance is easily pushed back on the political agenda because political will is not continuously challenged. If the coalition is strong, indirect dominance is effective. If the coalition is weak, direct dominance is more effective to combat the individual agendas of the coalition.

The Threat of Dominance

Other nations recognize US potential to enforce its will. The threat of dominance is a deterrent. The significance of the threat of dominance to other nations is important for several reasons. Other nations will *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now*. Their only alternative may be to invest in a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

It is also critical for the US to realize the threat they impose to other nations even when that isn't their intent. To be naive and innocent while in possession of so much power and dominance is irresponsible. The political and national military strategy of the US needs to be in union to insure the political messages sent are intended. As a result, the US needs to *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now* to defend against a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air. Once sanctions are effective and the coalition dominance is lifted, a rogue nation must believe that the US has the will and ability to dominate again.

To fight the threat of dominance, the guerrilla will knowingly agitate the US into a position of dominance and will prepare to fight direct or indirect dominance. To create circumstances to agitate the US to re-engage puts the rogue nation at political risk and they face the possibility of losing any support they may have gained. If the US responds, it must follow through with its sanctions using direct or indirect dominance. The threat of dominance is a

temporary condition and is only credible through the will of the US to dominate when challenged.

Conclusion

Indirect dominance exists with a detached presence of dominant force structure. Response to guerrilla aggression is not immediate but the response is planned, calculated, and credible. The US fights indirect strategy with indirect strategy. The advantage of time is taken away from the guerrilla. Indirect dominance requires significantly less force structure but still requires significant intelligence resources and a focused political agenda. The danger of indirect dominance is the splintering of political resolve.

A major disadvantage to fight indirect dominance is that the guerrilla has to wage a defensive war. There is no longer an immediate cause and effect of offensive action. The guerrilla is not able to affect a series of independent strikes, chip away at force structure, or make the cost of keeping force structure in theater prohibitive. The guerrilla may resort to terrorism or highjacking to challenge political will.

The threat of dominance from the US may discourage the guerrilla from acts of terrorism and highjacking. But the threat of dominance is only credible if the US dominates when challenged. The strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is most effective against the US strategy of direct dominance. As a result, the guerrilla will most likely agitate the US into a position of dominance. To agitate the US to re-engage into a direct dominance posture puts the guerrilla at political risk and they may lose any support they may have gained. For the US, the most optimum strategy against the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is a phased strategy of direct, indirect, and threat of dominance.

Conclusion

The strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is a counter strategy to the strategy of US dominance. The US should Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now for an environment that breeds a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air. The US cannot afford to stumble through time. It must remain the symbol of hope and freedom to the world by being humble yet positive, strong yet slow to engage, forceful yet magnanimous, and most of all, intelligent without conceit. It needs to develop strategies that work to achieve its political objectives and that conform to US values, ideals, and norms yet remain sensitive to others cultures, values, ideals, and norms.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air is an alternative strategy to a situation where a nation cannot confront the US directly because of an overwhelming US military advantage. The nature of guerrilla warfare, dominance and ties to political will define strategic options. Forces can only defeat those strategies they are aware of and capable of engaging. The US can only counter those strategies for which it is prepared to fight. Guerrilla warfare can be and is fought in the air.

The US must have a system to assess its strategies and counter strategies. Iraq is engaged in a strategy of guerilla warfare in the air and the US does not know it, nor has a strategy to counter it. The US must recognize how rogue nation states will fight US dominance given their limited options.

Phased Strategy to Defeat Guerrilla Warfare in the Air

⊕ Develop a counter strategy or dominant strategy to render the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air ineffective
⊕ Build a process to recognize guerrilla air strategies
⊕ Develop a flexible, phased approach to dominance
⊕ Continuously reassess the effectiveness of sanctions and dominance <ul style="list-style-type: none">- A self correcting process
⊕ The first phase is to project the threat of dominance <ul style="list-style-type: none">- To project from the land, sea, and air
⊕ The second phase is overwhelming and immediate direct dominance <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Overwhelming and immediate direct dominance- Dominance is complete, unwavering, and sustained
⊕ The third phase is to transition to a position of indirect dominance <ul style="list-style-type: none">- The ability to respond with appropriate levels of force in a timely manner allows the US time to determine credible follow-on actions
⊕ The last phase is to re-establish the threat of dominance or to promote peace through strength

The US must develop a flexible, phased approach to the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air. The first phase is prevention or posturing by the US, to project the threat of dominance from the land, sea, and air to achieve political objectives. The threat of dominance must be credible and real. If the rogue nation challenges the threat of dominance, the US must transition into a posture of direct dominance without hesitation.

The second phase against the rogue nation is overwhelming and immediate direct dominance. The guerrilla must realize that the dominance is complete, unwavering, and sustained. Time must be an advantage for the US, not for the guerrilla. If dominance is allowed to build slowly, the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air will be initiated and time is an advantage to the guerrilla. The ability to use time or to deny the guerrilla the ability to use time

as a factor is very fragile. Whether or not the dominance is affected abruptly or incrementally, there must be a constant reassessment of the value of the dominance and sanctions.

The third phase of the dominance strategy is to position to indirect dominance. The US limits the options of the guerrilla to take indirect action against US force structure and avoids many of the costs of direct dominance. A phased counter-strategy employing a transition from direct to indirect dominance is effective because it keeps the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air out of phase. The guerrilla's use of EOB, GOB, and AOB is ineffective against a force structure removed from the immediate threat of guerrilla warfare. The ability to respond with appropriate levels of force in a timely manner allows the US time to determine credible follow-on actions. Once again, the US uses time to its advantage and takes that advantage away from the guerrilla. The last phase of counter-guerrilla warfare in the air strategy is to re-establish the threat of dominance or to promote peace through strength. The last phase of the counter-guerrilla warfare in the air strategy is to re-establish the threat of dominance or to promote peace through strength.

One way the Air Force seeks to solve the expeditionary operations tempo and personnel demands is with the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). The Air Force has to solve the increased operations tempo problem while experiencing a significant downsizing in force structure. The EAF construct is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's vision to more effectively schedule our forces, instill a warrior mindset, and exploit technology to become even more light, lean, and lethal.²³ In short, the shifting of National Strategy from one of containment to global engagement resulted in the formation of the EAF construct. Employing a phased strategy of

²³ Air Expeditionary Force, Commander's Handbook, Introduction, 2000. The Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) is the tool that we use to implement the EAF vision. The AEF allow the Air Force to better manage resources. The AEF allows the Air Force to track how, where, and how much, air forces are used. This allows the Air Force not only to be more responsive to theater CINC needs but also to take better care of people.

dominance supports with the AEF concept. Perhaps the flexibility and force projection the EAF provides could be complemented by an analysis of the indirect strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air. A transition of US forces in support of indirect dominance strategy removes most of the advantages of a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air and supports coalition members sympathetic to both causes. Instead of a change in doctrine, a change of strategy is as successful, costs less, and yet ensures our National Military Strategy remains in concert with our National Security Strategy in support of our national interests. The US should *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now* to wage war against a strategy of guerrilla warfare in the air.

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