

PEACEKEEPING EXIT STRATEGY
A RENAISSANCE FOR THE DEADLINE?

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PEACEKEEPING EXIT STRATEGY: A RENAISSANCE FOR THE DEADLINE?

If there is anything the foreign policy strategists should have learned in the 1990s from peacekeeping operations in places like Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Balkans it's this: easy to get involved; terribly, *terribly* difficult to get out. It's not even really fair to say that we should have *learned* that lesson—we should have already *known* that lesson. Regardless, the experiences of the past decade should have burned this point into every foreign policy strategist's brain.

Perhaps it should be heartening then that, of the mere handful of foreign policy issues played out in the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign, one of them addressed this specific issue of exit strategies. Namely, how to craft a successful conclusion to the ongoing Balkan peacekeeping morass? Condoleezza Rice's proposal for the U.S. to depart and leave it to the Europeans to finish the job met with a predictable response—a very cold European shoulder.

One exit strategy for peacekeeping missions is to set a time limit for the peacekeeping mission. Put (too) simply, set a deadline for the mission and then stick to it. In fact, this deadline strategy was the official Clinton Administration exit strategy for Bosnia from 1995 to 1997. The Administration also used the deadline strategy in Haiti. In a March 1996 speech, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake articulated the use of “tightly tailored military missions” with “sharp withdrawal timelines” as the optimum way to deal with conflicts that don't engage vital U.S. security interests.¹ This idea of

¹ Anthony Lake, Remarks at George Washington University, Washington D.C., 6 March 1996, para 33, 34

using deadlines as an exit strategy drew sharp criticism. The critics no doubt took heart when the Administration later unceremoniously dumped its deadline strategy for Bosnia. Clearly the implementation of the Bosnian deadline strategy was gravely flawed. This emphatically does not mean, though, that a deadline strategy is flawed in principle. The idea of using a deadline deserves a serious second look, to include whether a proper use of the deadline strategy offers new opportunities in the Balkans.

Let us be clear that the real issue here is not merely about “cut and run” exits but rather successful peacekeeping interventions. This paper will explore the idea that setting a firm deadline up front improves the overall chance of success for a peacekeeping mission. Moreover, the international community can (and usually does) continue to assist the social, political, and economic recovery efforts after the peacekeepers depart.

The charted course for this exploration will include theory, historical practice, and the Balkan application. First, we will briefly look at the UN’s ideas for improving peacekeeping, and they have some excellent ones. We will add to the mix the theory of the deadline strategy, fleshing out both the pro and con arguments. Next, we will look at how the UN exited from the seven peacekeeping operations involving a minimum of 1,000 troops that it opened and closed in the 1990s. There is a surprisingly large amount of experience with deadlines in these operations, much of it successful. Finally, we will look at how the deadline theory was used and abused in the Balkans and see whether its reuse might lead to success.

IMPROVING PEACEKEEPING

The post-Cold War era ushered in an activity level for peacekeeping never before seen in the UN. There were some successes—they got little attention. The failures got plenty of attention, and deservedly so. Among the UN's biggest black eyes:

Somalia: The U.S. pulled out of the mission after waiting a reasonable period following the tragic death of eighteen soldiers. The remaining UN peacekeepers likewise departed quietly, and without significant achievement, one year after the U.S. left.

Balkans: Prior to the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord and the deployment of a massive NATO force, UN peacekeeping forces were repeatedly bullied, humiliated, and ignored in the most difficult of circumstances.

Rwanda: Genocidal killings, which left up to 500,000 dead, occurred while an overmatched UN peacekeeping force was deployed inside Rwanda.

Because of these and other failures, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-level panel to draft a new blueprint for future UN peace operations. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister and veteran of the UN Haiti effort, led the panel. In a word, the August 2000 report generated by this panel is excellent. Henceforth called the Brahimi report, it is frank in its assessment of shortcomings and insightful in its proposals for the future. Many of its recommendations should be implemented. But the Brahimi report perhaps best sums up the peacekeeping track record as follows: “Over the last decade the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today.”² The shortcomings are widespread. If the concern is how to make the peacekeeping operations more successful—and that should be the concern—then the focus must be on the mission's beginning. A successful end is

almost impossible without a successful beginning. Unfortunately, the UN has had some trouble with beginnings.

In UN terms, the first step in a peacekeeping mission is the mandate, which is the peacekeeping force's charter. It defines its purpose, tasks, and tools. In theory, the UN assesses the situation, confers with the involved parties, and establishes a detailed plan to meet the UN's goal for an operation. Regrettably, theory has not often matched practice.

The Brahimi report notes several problems with past practices. To seek political unanimity, the Security Council often approved ambiguous mandates. This secured near-term Security Council approval but created long-term problems.³ The UN deepened the problem by making requests for troop levels and other resources based on what was politically palatable rather than operationally required. The operations were thus under-resourced from the very beginning.⁴ The necessary detailed planning was then further flawed because the mission leadership, the team that implemented the plan on the ground, was usually not a part of the early planning.⁵ This was a recipe for disaster and, wisely, the Brahimi report proposes fixes to these problems. However, the plan omits one key component for a successful entry into a peacekeeping operation.

ENTER THE DEADLINE

In my opinion, the final step in the mandate process should be the establishment of a fixed deadline for the operation. While not advocating their universal use, the Brahimi

² United Nations, *Report Of The Panel On United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), para 1

³ Ibid, para 56

⁴ Ibid, para 59

⁵ Ibid, para 96

report noted the UN enjoyed some success with deadlines in the 1990s.⁶ So there is practical support for setting deadlines as part of the mandate; therefore, these will be studied more carefully later.

Before delving into the deadline strategy, two important aspects of peacekeeping—one definitional, one philosophical—must be addressed. The definition of peacekeeping expanded in the post-Cold War era and now encompasses a great range of operations.⁷ On the low end of the peacekeeping scale are small operations where the peacekeeping force observes an election, ceasefire, or some other event where independent verification is seen as helpful. Moving up the scale is “traditional” peacekeeping, whereby a military force deploys among former belligerents and helps to enforce or implement an agreed-upon peace treaty. But after the Cold War ended, peacekeeping operations became more complex when forces deployed into areas where the peace treaty was widely disrespected by the former belligerents or where there wasn’t even a peace treaty at all. Furthermore, some peacekeeping operations could possibly even be labeled foreign occupation forces, such as in Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo. All of these operations are still considered peacekeeping. Quite logically, the problems with peacekeeping typically occur during the more complex, “high end” side of the peacekeeping spectrum.

The philosophical aspect of peacekeeping operations is their relative importance to the international community, particularly the nations that contribute forces and the “subject” nation for the peacekeeping force. Wrapped up in this debate are the

⁶ Ibid, para 17, 20

⁷ Part of the confusion is due to the evolving nature of the definitions. Peacemaking and peace building, two terms that were formerly associated with military actions to impose a peace, both now refer to non-military activities. A minor point is that if a non-UN entity, such as NATO in the Balkans, conducts peacekeeping operations with the authorization but not direct control of the Security Council, the UN technically refers to that as a peace enforcement operation. The issue is the chain of command, not necessarily the military activities conducted.

obligations of the international community and the standards used to measure the success of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations usually do not engage the contributing nations' vital national interests. That is to say that while the peacekeeping mission may be beneficial to a contributing nation's self-interest, it is not essential. The opposite is true for the receiving nation; its vital national interests are most definitely at stake.

The fact that peacekeeping seldom engages the contributors' vital national interests while directly engaging the subject's vital interests should undergird the philosophy behind peacekeeping. The deadline strategy relies on this asymmetry. Put most bluntly, the entity with the highest stakes involved during a peacekeeping operation is the subject nation. The donor nations may advance their own interests through the peacekeeping operation, but they do not have as much at stake. However, the international community sometimes fails to use this asymmetry and displays more commitment to the peacekeeping mission's success than does the subject nation. This can then lead to all parties forgetting that the ultimate responsibility for success (or failure) lies with the subject nation. Granted, the peacekeeping operation likely is absolutely essential to getting a subject nation on the path to recovery. But it is still up to that subject nation to make the most of the opportunities provided. Success for the international community is whether it judiciously and effectively provided the subject nation a chance to succeed. Success remains, however, ultimately that nation's responsibility. This was driven home very early in the "interventionist decade" of the 1990s.

A frustrated Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Gali wrote the following on the eve of Cambodian national elections in 1993.

In the last analysis, it is on the shoulders of the Cambodian people and the Cambodian parties, which are members of the Supreme National Council and signatories of the Paris agreements, as well as the political parties taking part in the election, that responsibility for Cambodia's future rests.⁸

The context of his comment was a faltering peacekeeping mission that had failed to execute key parts of its mandate, largely due to non-cooperation by Cambodian parties. The UN's mission had devolved to an almost exclusive focus on the national elections. The run-up to those elections had been less than pure, and the vote would not be "free and fair" by the strictest standards. The Secretary-General and Security Council struggled with the decision of whether to press ahead with the elections as scheduled or delay in hope of a more suitable environment later. The UN ultimately opted to continue with the elections, largely because they recognized it was Cambodia—not the UN—that was responsible for the both poor run-up and also the consequences of the election. The Cambodians were merely reaping what they had sown.

Failing to capitalize on this asymmetry of interests cedes control of the peacekeeping operation from the international community to the subject nation. The deadline clearly demonstrates that the international community can (and will) walk away from a subject nation that squanders the window of opportunity afforded by the peacekeeping operation. That is powerful leverage.

To sum up, peacekeeping operations should begin with a thorough analysis and then a clear, well-crafted mandate. This should come from the "board of directors" for the peacekeeping operation, whether that's the UN Security Council, NATO's North Atlantic

⁸ United Nations Secretary-General, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (S/25719)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 141

Council, or some other political body. The final component of this mandate should be to set a challenging yet realistic deadline or time limit for the operation.

It is critical to separate the principle of setting a deadline from the mechanics of determining that deadline. The actual length of the mission is not the focus here. Critics may allege that implicit in the deadline strategy is a desire to set a “one size fits all” standard duration for all peacekeeping operations. That’s just not so. Each deadline should vary, based on the specifics of the mission. Chief among the many factors to be considered are the situation on the ground and the depth of commitment among the contributing nations.

That said, deadlines work only if they are credible. Too short a time limit (arguably the case for the initial U.S. deadline in Bosnia) leads to either a total hopelessness toward mission success or a widespread assumption that the deadline will be extended. And any time there is a widespread assumption that a deadline will be moved, you really don’t have a deadline. As will be seen later, if the deadline is set too far out, it is ineffective because it does not create urgency.

Another question critics soon raise is whether these deadlines should be completely immovable. The deadline strategy does not mean that the mission is totally on autopilot. Indeed, a mission could be terminated early if suitable progress were not being made. Likewise, extensions could also be an option. However, the hurdle for mission extensions must be set extremely high and be the exception rather than the rule. To do otherwise undercuts the whole idea of a deadline. It smacks of the “this time I really mean it” time limit that is never really a deadline. If, for example, anyone is advocating a deadline extension before about the three-year point of a four-year mission, this is a

problem: people are focused on extending the deadline rather than working to meet the deadline.

What is magic about a deadline? It affects peoples' behavior. As will be demonstrated below, more is accomplished with a deadline than without. It injects accountability into an otherwise muddy process. It also lets both the subject nation and contributing nations that there is an upper limit of international community commitment. Finally, a deadline also makes easier one of the hardest decisions an international body has to make—knowing when to stop trying. What follows is a point-by-point analysis of the benefits of a deadline strategy.

DEADLINES CREATE FOCUS AND ENERGY

One of the most positive aspects of a deadline is that a peacekeeping operation with a deadline is likely to accomplish more than one without. The deadline crystallizes effort. We experientially tend to know that more gets done when a deadline is set than when an unlimited amount of time is allocated. We even have an idiom that expresses this idea beautifully, “Work expands to fill the allotted time.” As it turns out, science strongly supports this common-sense notion.

The technical way to express this is to say that time becomes elastic: the pace and scope of work are directly related to the time allowed. Studies indicate that time pressures affect the way groups work together and how quickly they get the job done.⁹ Moreover, other research shows that increasing time pressure (i.e. a deadline) raises the likelihood that a group will tackle the task at hand rather than avoiding it.¹⁰

⁹ Stephen Lim and J. Keith Murnighan, “Phases, Deadlines, and the Bargaining Process,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* (May 1994), p. 157

¹⁰ James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (Cambridge: Blackwell Press, 1993), p. 206

The research of noted organizational expert Dr. Connie G. J. Gersick in the late 1980s is particularly applicable to the deadline principle. She studied groups that worked together for as little as an hour and for as long as several months. Gersick noted that every group's behavior changed almost exactly at the midpoint of the job's life span. At this halfway mark, the groups ceased muddling and achieved the focus needed to finish the task by the deadline. It was almost as if the midpoint was an unconscious epiphany—a signpost to focus and progress.¹¹ The obvious implication of this is that the absence of a deadline means there is no definable midpoint. This means that groups without a deadline are more likely to wallow in nonproductive disputes and activities that will not lead to job completion.

Negotiations are another area where the positive impact of deadlines is obvious. The annals of negotiations are full of examples where sides have negotiated for months with no progress only to reach an agreement minutes before the deadline. One reason why it works that way is that approaching deadlines allow each side to soften demands and offer compromises without being perceived as weak.¹² An upcoming deadline, then, can offer antagonists a graceful exit from corners they have painted themselves into. This could be a particularly important relief valve in strained political situations where neither side wants to appear weak and yet compromises must be made to move the effort forward. The U.S. mediator in the Northern Ireland negotiations, former Senator George Mitchell, set an arbitrary deadline for his participation in the talks. That deadline, though totally

¹¹ Connie G. J. Gersick, "Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm," *Academy of Management Review* 16 (January 1991), p. 24

¹² Roy J. Lewicki and Joseph A. Litterer, *Negotiation*, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc, 1985), p. 152

arbitrary, gave both sides the political cover needed to make the hard concessions required to close the deal.¹³

Theorists call deadlines like the one set by Senator Mitchell “action-forcing events.” As such, they can be critical in difficult situations because they are sometimes the only way to move participants toward the hard tradeoffs.¹⁴ Absent these events, hard choices are avoided at all costs.

There appears to be compelling evidence that setting a deadline for a peacekeeping operation’s duration can be a strongly positive force for progress. Groups get more done with a deadline. Conversely, the lack of a deadline may allow tough jobs to stagnate or groups to amble toward the goal. Gersick’s work shows that interim deadlines are needed lest the groups squander too much time if the deadline is years away. As will be discussed shortly, peacekeeping failed where one or multiple parties were unwilling to make the hard choices. Action-forcing events, like a credible deadline, can be vital to push the sides to make these hard choices for peace.

It is perhaps a fair question to ask whether studies from collaborative group work and the negotiation arena are directly applicable to the peacekeeping environment. Certainly the circumstances are different, especially in the more complex situations. As we will see in the upcoming review of the UN’s post-Cold War peacekeeping experience, deadlines do seem to work even in the complicated peacekeeping environment.

¹³ Michael Watkins, “In Theory, Building Momentum in Negotiations: Time-Related Costs and Action Forcing Events,” *Negotiation Journal* (July 1998), p. 254

¹⁴ Michael Watkins, “In Theory, Building Momentum in Negotiations: Time-Related Costs and Action Forcing Events,” *Negotiation Journal* (July 1998), p. 242

DEADLINES CREATE ACCOUNTABILITY

As shown earlier, the deadline should be set using a more detailed timeline that lays out the critical events for mission accomplishment. Having a timeline injects an ability to measure progress throughout the mission. This aspect is critical. If a mission falls behind schedule, its superiors (e.g., contributing nations, UN, NATO) will legitimately begin to ask why. This questioning is very positive. It begins the process of uncovering the true reasons for the slippage.

As we will see in the case studies, the UN Security Council's periodic mandate renewal frequently drove the Secretary-General to provide detailed assessments of a mission. These reports were often quite forthright about the mission's progress and who was hindering progress. The UN Security Council was then armed with a true picture of the mission's prognosis, particularly when facing a deadline. A firm timeline is a key element because it codifies expectations: suddenly there is a standard to meet, the recalcitrant parties cannot hide, and they can be publicly made accountable for their noncompliance. The UN Security Council sometimes did just that—it publicly upbraided the parties that were hindering the peace process—and it seemed to help in some of the missions.

This accountability doesn't stop with the warring parties; it must apply to the peacekeeping force as well. But there are some key requirements before someone is held accountable, namely authority and resources, which have been problems in past missions. Sometimes a mission is woefully under-resourced, and it simply doesn't have the needed

tools to accomplish the mission.¹⁵ Absent the proper resources, it's both easy and credible for the peacekeepers to say "not my fault" when a mission founders. At other times there is no central authority—no one calling the shots. The UN has even had a problem with the leader calling the shots but the followers ignoring the calls.¹⁶ Either case is a recipe for failure. In some cases, this failure to achieve unity of effort is systematic—it is built into the design of the mission. In the Balkans, the NATO, UN, EU, and OSCE all own parts of the total effort. While there are informal links, there is no single hierarchy that ties all of these aspects together.

The last link in the accountability chain is the "board of directors." This "board" can be the Security Council, the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council (PIC) for Bosnia, NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC), or any other body that is exercising ultimate authority. Incredibly, there is no central "board" for either of the Balkan operations, though all three of the above mentioned "boards" have a role in the missions. Membership of the various "boards" overlap in terms of the nations represented, but there is no one central body overseeing the overall strategy for the efforts. Needless to say, this is a serious shortcoming. Were there a requirement to set an accepted deadline, this wouldn't have happened. Why not? Because it would have been necessary to establish that one, central "board" to set the deadline in the first place. Using the exit strategy of a set deadline injects accountability even at the highest levels.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), para 265

¹⁶ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael Brown, ed, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 507

DEADLINES KEEP THE PEACEKEEPERS AN EXCEPTION TO THE NORM

The above discussion about accountability for the leadership of peacekeeping operations is correct, but it treads perilously close to a dangerous trap the international community must avoid. That trap, simply stated, is that the international intervention assumes responsibility for the future of the subject nation. This point was made earlier but it is worth reiterating that the nation's people and government, to whatever extent it is still functioning, are ultimately responsible for their own future. The international intervention is merely an assistant—albeit perhaps an essential one—in this process. However, because an international intervention inevitably erodes this feeling of responsibility, the intervention must be as short as possible.

Anthony Lake, in a speech at George Washington University, said the goal of an intervention should be only to create “breathing room” for nations to “tackle their own problems.”¹⁷ He enumerated three reasons why setting deadlines is important: operations with indefinite durations create unrealistic expectations, undermine the sovereign government, and ultimately build resentment among the populace toward the peacekeeping forces.¹⁸ These reasons all point to the need to keep the international presence an exception rather than the norm. Failure to heed Lake's call for deadlines has, unfortunately, proved him prescient.

In Kosovo, for example, the West is walking a fine line of acknowledging the horrible treatment of Albanian Kosovars by the Milosevic regime while at the same time supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The failure to set a clear end-state

¹⁷ Anthony Lake, Remarks at George Washington University, Washington D.C., 6 March 1996, para 42

¹⁸ Lake, para 38-41

vision and deadline for the NATO peacekeeping forces has allowed the Albanian Kosovar leadership to adopt unrealistic goals. Ibrahim Rugova, the “moderate” Albanian Kosovar leader, has called for both independence from Yugoslavia and a permanent NATO presence in an independent Kosovo. Note that this remains his position even though Milosevic has been dumped by the Serbian people.¹⁹ The ambiguity of the West’s strategy has allowed Rugova to champion these two outcomes (independence and a permanent NATO presence) that are contrary to NATO’s goals.

The Haitian experience, which Lake was lauding in his speech, would also later bear out the truth of missions that do too much and last too long. Jocelyn McCalla, executive director of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights and a strong advocate for Haiti, commented in 1997 that “To a great extent, the presence of the UN military force gave the Haitian government and opposition the luxury of paralyzing the country in senseless jockeying for political power while blaming the international community for Haiti’s problems.”²⁰ The international forces in Haiti armed the squabbling Haitian leadership with a convenient and credible scapegoat, freeing them to act irresponsibly. Moreover, the Canadians, who had more than pulled their weight in the Haiti operation, withdrew their troops and cut its profile in other areas in 1997. Why? The Haitians were beginning to resent the UN military forces.²¹ This resentment must be absolutely galling to the nations that gave so much to Haiti, but it happens. Stay too long and the international peacekeepers become the goats instead of the heroes they arguably are. Deadlines, with a

¹⁹ David Sands/Washington Times, “Kostunica Faces Tough Challenges,” updated 6 October 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Oct2000/e20001006kostunica.htm> (cited 10 October 2000), p. 1 and Gregory Piatt/European Stars and Stripes, “KFORR Soldiers’ Roles Changing in Kosovo,” updated 27 November 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Nov2000/e20001128kfor.htm> (cited 28 November 2000), p. 3

²⁰ David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 147

²¹ David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 153

focus on doing the mission quickly and efficiently, help to keep the subject nation from becoming too dependent and keep the UN from overstaying its welcome.

DEADLINES LINK MANDATE, STRATEGY, AND RESOURCES

As mentioned earlier, the Brahimi report noted the absence of a clear mandate has handicapped many peacekeeping missions and that some missions were under-resourced from the beginning. For a mission to succeed, the mandate, strategy, and resources must be closely linked.

The mandate delineates what the strategy is to achieve—the objectives of a peacekeeping operation. Too often the strategy has been poorly defined because the mandate has been poorly defined. Setting a deadline introduces a rigor into the process that can fix that problem. A deadline does this by requiring a systematic analysis of the tasks and then demanding a timeline be associated with those tasks. All of this requires a thoughtful, detailed analysis. Contingencies would undoubtedly arise, but the planning must take these into account when establishing a realistic yet challenging deadline.

This deadline then becomes an instant feedback mechanism for the mandate and the resources. Are the costs of the operation in line with what donor nations are willing to contribute? Over-reaching—setting too ambitious mission objectives—opens the door to beginning a mission no one may be willing to see to a successful conclusion. Bosnia may be an example of this problem.

Setting a deadline—one that will stick—closes the planning loop. It may prove necessary to take more than one trip around the loop, however. If the political authorities agree the deadline is too long—the resource cost of the operation is too high—another trip around the loop is needed. Paring the mandate (objectives) is the first step on the

second lap. This iteration should ensure a more coherent entry for the peacekeeping force, and a deadline can bring discipline to the process.

DEADLINES INCREASE WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE

Closely related with the problem of resources is the open-ended commitment typical of some previous peacekeeping operations. Deadlines give contributing nations something both new and welcome—a certainty of when they will get their troops back. The importance of this becomes clear only when you face the realities of successful peacekeeping.

Fact one is that peacekeeping forces are more effective when they go in big and heavily armed. The civilian panel that formed the Brahimi panel understood that highly trained and well-equipped forces are central to the success of the mission. Furthermore, the panel said deployments must be sized on worst-case assumptions about the opposition the peacekeeping force is likely to face.²² A vivid demonstration of this fact is Bosnia. After harassing UNPROFOR troops for three years (many of whom were NATO troops) the Bosnian belligerents did not mount significant resistance to the NATO force that replaced UNPROFOR. The difference? NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) was much larger than UNPROFOR and came armed with heavy weapons and the permission to use them. Even in peacekeeping, the size of your force and your arms matter. Successful missions, therefore, are likely to require a wealth of resources, especially in the early days of an operation.

²² United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), para 51

Fact two is that the presence of troops from one or more of the Security Council's five permanent (P-5) members is critical to success for most operations. Dr Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, a noted researcher and expert on UN peacekeeping, found in a 1995 study that the engagement of one of the P-5's (China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S.) national interests was one of two key determinants of peacekeeping mission success. When the P-5 became involved, it brought the diplomatic focus and the resources (troops and money) needed to do the job.²³ In reality, though, it's not the P-5 so much as the P-3. It has been France, the United Kingdom, and the United States that have led the complex peacekeeping missions. Russia and China are neither the keys to success nor are their militaries equipped to provide the critical leadership and command.²⁴

All these facts add up to this. If a complex peacekeeping mission is to succeed France, the U.K., or the U.S., either singly or in combination, must be willing to commit a large number of well-equipped troops to the operation. For several reasons, setting and sticking to a deadline can increase the possibility that these nations will participate, particularly for the U.S.

First, contrary to conventional wisdom, the American public is supportive of peacekeeping operations under certain conditions. Polling data shows one of these conditions is that the mission be of limited duration.²⁵

Second, setting a definite exit date is likely to mollify the Pentagon, one of the strongest opponents of recent peacekeeping operations. The Pentagon is not blind to the benefits of these operations. Beyond the national interests advanced by these missions,

²³ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael Brown, ed, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) , p. 522

²⁴ Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives With Force*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), p. 12

²⁵ Ibid, p. 4

the military leadership knows troops often gain invaluable experience during these missions. Rather, it's that the Pentagon has experienced, in spades, the resource drain that peacekeeping operations usually represent. Once forces are committed, they are very difficult to withdraw. The operation then becomes a resource black hole, siphoning the men, money, and equipment of the military with no end in sight. By being given a firm intervention duration, one of the Pentagon's chief fears is removed.

Likewise, the U.S. Congress would like a firm deadline. Indeed, in a 1995 hearing, Senators pressed Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili about the duration of the proposed Bosnian peacekeeping effort. Perry and Shalikashvili said it was a twelve-month job and the troops would then be withdrawn.²⁶ While this statement now seems absurd, as the troops have been there for over five years, the Administration thought the assurance of a limited duration was central to achieving congressional support.

Finally, the reality is that France, the U.K., and the U.S. only have so many forces. When these countries are tied down, as they currently are in the Balkans, they have little capability to engage in other peacekeeping missions. Advocates for international interventions should favor short and effective missions because it could free up the P-3 to turn their resources to other needy locations.

DEADLINES OVERCOME THE INTERTIA TO STAY

While it might seem only logical that all parties would want to successfully conclude a peacekeeping effort as soon as possible, there are often significant pressures pushing in exactly the other direction. "Never-ending" peacekeeping operations have a surprisingly

broad constituency. This constituency includes the subject nation, the UN, other contributing nations, and even U.S politics.

While a peacekeeping mission necessarily represents an erosion in a subject nation's sovereignty, peacekeepers have an emotional and psychological tether to their capitals that make them extremely valuable to subject nations. To use a military term, the presence of peacekeepers is a "force multiplier"—that is they bring a lot more to the reconstruction effort than their actual on-the-ground contributions. Nowhere is this more apparent than with U.S. peacekeepers. Where a contingent of U.S. troops goes, the president (in high-profile operations) the cabinet secretaries, congressmen, and the media are sure to follow. Typically, high-ranking visitors do not come empty handed; they like to conclude agreements and announce specific measures that the U.S. is commencing. The net effect of these high-level visits is that the U.S. government will focus on that country far more than would normally be the case. With that focus comes U.S. money. Thus, the presence of U.S. peacekeepers is an effective entry into the hearts and pocketbooks of America. And leaders of troubled nations are aware that if the American forces leave, the high-ranking visitors will come much less often, if ever, and the dollars will dwindle.

It is easy to understand why some nations want an indefinite (or even permanent) presence of U.S. troops in their country; they have strong financial and policy incentives to want them to stay.

The UN contingent itself may share these mixed motivations. As noted in the Brahimi report, the UN often has to recruit contract workers to fill its in-country management positions. When the peacekeeping ends, these contract workers are out of a

²⁶ Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 211

job. The conflict of interest in this situation is obvious. To a lesser extent, the peacekeeping staff in New York shares this same conflict of interest—more and bigger ongoing peacekeeping operations translate into bigger peacekeeping budgets and more staff jobs. Clearly, not all oars in UN bureaucracy are necessarily rowing toward a clean conclusion of peacekeeping efforts.

Many contributing nations also have a very different picture of peacekeeping than does the U.S, where the perspective is that peacekeeping missions are not the optimal use of a military and are best concluded quickly. Some of our western allies, Canada and Finland among them, view peacekeeping as laudatory international work and embrace peacekeeping efforts. Other nations—India and Pakistan to name two—effectively use their participation to enhance their international reputation (incidentally, both of these nations have strong peacekeeping reputations and work well with each other).²⁷ A handful of poor nations even contribute their forces to peacekeeping missions as a way to pay and equip their forces. By Third World standards, the UN reimbursement (about \$100 per day per soldier) is quite handsome and impoverished militaries often leverage their willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions as a means to get free military equipment. The point is that, unlike the U.S., some nations have no problem with seemingly eternal peacekeeping operations.

In spite of this well-known U.S. desire to minimize the duration of peacekeeping missions, domestic political pressures often work to extend them. Looking beyond the opinion polls that seem to indicate the U.S. public doesn't favor long peacekeeping commitments, the fact is that so long as the U.S. doesn't incur casualties, the issue simply isn't on the American public's radarscope. After five years in Bosnia (or a five-fold

increase in the mission duration first promised to the American public), there is no groundswell calling for a pullout. And although the matter did arise in the 2000 presidential campaign, it didn't seem to gain much traction with the public. On the whole, however, the politically safe option becomes the status quo. Political risk arises when you threaten to change the status quo. Witness the response to the Rice proposal. Should the Bush Administration carry through on that proposal (or any other proposal that it is perceived to have crafted), it will assume both the substantial domestic and international political risk for any negative consequences. Small wonder then that these "safe" missions take on a life of their own.

The net effect of all these pressures is that, contrary to common sense, there is significant inertia to stay rather than to conclude a mission. Just as a deadline can be an action-forcing event for the competing factions inside a nation, the deadline is needed to ensure the international community moves forward.

DEADLINES MAKE HARD DECISIONS EASIER

Like the preceding discussion of inertia, this final aspect of decision-making is a matter of saving contributing nations and the UN from their own best/worst impulses. Having studied the exits for the seven major peacekeeping operations opened and closed in the 1990s, I can attest that the decision of closing all but the most successful peacekeeping operations were gut-wrenching experiences for the UN. The reasons for this difficulty can be lumped into two main emotions: uncertainty and hope.

Knowing when a country is ready to go it alone is tough. The UN usually evidenced uncertainty about what will happen in a country after it withdrew. Having invested so

²⁷ Colum Lynch, "Providing U.N.'s Peacekeepers," *Washington Post*, 15 November 2000, A36, p 2

much emotionally and financially, the normal tendency is to be risk averse, stay a little longer, and try to improve the circumstances before finally withdrawing. The trouble is, there is no clear end to this process. Were it not for pure fatigue, the UN would have stayed with some missions even longer than it did, with Haiti as a case in point. Incidentally, the UN's worst fears seldom materialized after the pullout from even the failures. In fact, Rwanda has done far better than anyone could have expected and there are hopeful signs in Angola and Somalia.

The second problem is hope—hope that if the UN stays just a little longer it can turn around a failing mission and redeem its investment. Rationally-based decision-making theory maintains that sunk costs—what you've already invested in a mission—don't matter when deciding what to do in the future. But they do matter—a lot! Reviewing the Secretary-General reports in some of the UN's biggest failures—Angola and Somalia, for example—you see a search even to the bitter end for a glimmer of hope. The Secretary-General was ready to recommend additional extensions if only he could've found a little more cooperation. Having invested so much in a country, he just did not want to turn his back on the operation. This, coupled with the genuine concern about the fate of the population when the UN withdrew, made it exceptionally difficult to terminate a mission.

A deadline gave the UN the push it needed to end its futile efforts in Somalia. Deadlines can also help future peacekeeping operations by establishing before the fact just how great an investment the UN and contributing nations are willing to make.

CRITICISMS

There is no shortage of critics toward the idea using a deadline as an exit strategy for peacekeeping operations. The criticisms run along basically four lines: timelines put the

plan too much into the open and play into the hands of those opposed to the peace process; timelines are too simplistic; a deadline runs counter to the way diplomacy is conducted; and exit strategies are just plain wrong in principle. There are strands of truth in each of these arguments; the question is whether these strands prevail over the merits of a deadline.

The first argument goes along these lines. In sports, teams don't openly publish their game plans or strategies before the game. If they did, the opponents would then map a strategy to specifically counter that plan. It's the same in war: hide your plan and try to get his. Thus, the thinking goes that having a detailed exit strategy with a timeline plays exactly into the hands of those opposed to the peace. President Clinton's Balkan point man, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, felt the Administration's initial deadlines crippled the Dayton implementation effort because the Serbs initially thought they would just be able to outlast the NATO intervention.²⁸ This argument seems compelling, but its foundation merits scrutiny.

First, the discussion of "those opposed to the peace process" and hardliners uncovers an attitude that drives to a central issue. The UN and international community learned a very hard lesson in the 1990s. Interventions you do *to* a nation are much less effective than operations you do *for* a nation. What is the purpose of the peacekeeping force—is it really implementing an agreed upon negotiated settlement or is it imposing an external solution? If the former, why are we afraid to insist that the protagonists for peace (the people that signed the agreement in the first place) deal with their hardliners? What's more, if a peacekeeping force is there to do something *for* a nation, why isn't it in everyone's best interest to put the cards on the table in full view? You can then deal with

the obstructionists from a position of power and transparency. This is a far stronger theoretical point than the argument that you need to hide the plan lest hardliners derail your effort. But it's fair to say that hardliners may still exert a lot of influence. There's some sobering real world data for that situation.

The Balkans and many other peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War were the result of a negotiated end to a civil war. In 1995 Dr. Roy Licklider, then a professor of political science at Rutgers University, published an exhaustive study of how civil wars ended in the period 1945-1993. The data showed that 50 percent of all negotiated settlements collapsed back into war within five years of the original settlement. Only 15 percent of civil wars that ended with one side militarily winning and imposing its will flared back up within five years.²⁹ The point is obvious. Leaving two entrenched and competing leaderships with irreconcilable visions of the future usually does not result in peace. Consequently, if there are genuine hardliners present who don't subscribe to the peace, there must be a positive strategy to curtail their influence; waiting them out is very risky.

So, is it foolish to hold to a time schedule even in the presence of hardliners? Not if it's handled properly. First, does the peace agreement accommodate at least some of the hard line attitudes? In Bosnia, there was some room in the Dayton Accord for accommodation, but interpretation and bias dramatically shrunk the maneuvering room. If that's the case, then there has to be a positive strategy to de-legitimize the hardliners. In the early days of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia there was a real fear that the situation would unravel if IFOR attempted to capture the Bosnian Serb

²⁸ Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p 364

leaders indicted as war criminals. If that fear was justified, then there should have been more accommodation room granted the Serbs. If that was impossible, then NATO had to be tasked with collecting the persons indicted for war crimes. Just hoping the hardliners will go away is what hasn't worked.

The second criticism that deadlines are too rigid is closely related to the first. The critics would say "You can't schedule reconciliation." But are patience and time the proper antidotes for lingering animosities? Turning again to the Bosnian experience, the West was dismayed when the first (and all subsequent) Bosnian elections found hardliners from each of the three warring factions winning. Only in the most recent elections have the hardliners even begun to slip. So, is unlimited time a virtue or would the accountability of a deadline have helped? The Bosnian people at large have not had to face the hard choices of electing leaders that could lead them to the future because there was no urgency; the healing period could take as many years as the Western world had patience.

Deadlines make clear that the responsibility for the future lies in the people's hands—not the international community. Carl Bildt, who served as the international community's High Representative in Bosnia immediately following the Dayton accords, noted that five years after Dayton's signing the people and leaders of Bosnia had yet to take responsibility for their future. They are still wrapped in internecine arguments, jockeying for better position.³⁰

²⁹ Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *American Political Science Review*, Vol 89, No 3, September 1995, p 685

³⁰ Carl Bildt, "In Bosnia Five Years Later, Help the Leaders Get Responsible," updated 18 December 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Dec2000/e20001218responsible.htm> (cited 19 December 2000), p 1

Furthermore, over five years into the Dayton implementation effort there is no consensus that success in Bosnia is imminent. Following the Second World War, the Western Allies occupied West Germany for only seven years. Are we to be more patient in reconstructing Bosnia than we were with West Germany? Or is the problem that we were less decisive in tackling reconciliation and the future head on? Patience is almost always a virtue in personal relations; it is also often a virtue in international relations. But patience without the accountability a deadline brings has not been an asset in Bosnia, and is likely to fail elsewhere.

The third argument is that deadlines, with their clarity, run counter to the way diplomacy is conducted in that they remove any semblance of nuance or ambiguity, which purportedly allows the policy to adapt quickly to opportunities that arise. A classic example of this would be the Milosevic's ouster in the fall of 2000. Critics of a timeline would say that had all the West's cards been on the table, that opportunity might not have presented itself. Frankly, that would be a hard case to make. Even if we generously grant that the presence of a deadline in the Balkans might have undercut the Serbian pressures that voted Milosevic out, a key question remains.

Is relying on opportunities that *may* emerge an appropriate strategy? As little as two months before the elections that led to Milosevic's fall, the West was denouncing the elections as a sham and predicting a Milosevic victory by hook or crook.³¹ In fact, he did lose and the West gained an opportunity. But if this opportunity was widely unexpected, what was the plan had Milosevic retained power?

³¹ R. Jeffrey Smith/Washington Post, "West's Interest Surges in Yugoslavia's Election," updated 26 September 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Sep2000/e20000922wests.htm> (cited 26 September 2000), p. 1

Being frank, ambiguity is quite often a fig leaf covering the fact that there is no plan. To illustrate: following the recent U.S. presidential election, a national publication carried the following “insider assessment” from one of the Clinton Administration’s Balkan experts: “Our objective in Kosovo? I don’t know what it is.”³² And if you don’t know your objective, you couldn’t have a plan to get there.

The final general objection about exit strategies is that they are flawed in principle. In truth, the critics say, there is no requirement to know the way out before entering. These critics would say that exit strategies are an attempt to conduct foreign policy “on the cheap” or that insisting on an up-front exit strategy is really a tool to ensure that operations are never begun because one cannot satisfactorily define an end-state in advance in the real world. In a thoughtful dissection of the exit strategy concept, Gideon Rose showed that this focus on exit strategies is a historical aberration. It’s unusual to *have* an exit strategy—entering without a clear idea of how one would exit is the historical norm for most military operations.³³

Although definable exit strategies may not have a strong historical legacy, the critics are wrong to say that knowing the way out should not be a requirement for entry in peacekeeping situations. The reason is that, contrary to the idealistic view that the West should be willing to sustain peacekeeping operations indefinitely, peacekeeping operations do end, and they sometimes end even when the mission isn’t complete. As will be seen later, the UN ended operations in Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, and Rwanda not because the mandates were fulfilled, but rather because all parties were tired of trying. Even in the “vitally important” Balkans the West’s endurance may not be

³² Richard J. Newman, “Balkan Punt,” 8 January 2001, <<http://usnews.com/usnews/issue/010108/8whisplead.htm>> (cited 19 February 2001), p 2

indefinite. Wolfgang Petritsch, the PIC's new High Representative in Bosnia, said "Five years after Dayton, taxpayers in our countries are running out of patience." Frustrated by Bosnian fraud, corruption, and infighting, the West fears it has wasted over four billion dollars in aid and effort.³⁴ In the U.S., it will be interesting to see whether a Republican-led Congress will continue to threaten a cutoff of funds for the Balkan missions now that the president is also a Republican. In reality, the choice is not between having a well-conceived exit strategy and having indefinite endurance. The true choice is between having well conceived exit strategy or allowing fatigue and politics to define your exit. The preferable choice is obvious.

As noted earlier, the end of a peacekeeping mission does not mean the end of the international community's assistance. Departing peacekeepers signal that the security situation is sufficiently stable for the recovery to continue without a military presence. Critics of setting a deadline for military peacekeepers should also consider the financial opportunities. Peacekeepers are expensive; for the year 2000 the U.S. spent 87 percent of its total expenditures in Bosnia and Croatia supporting its peacekeepers.³⁵ Were the peacekeepers withdrawn, the U.S. could apply to the civil effort just 20 percent of the resultant savings and still double its civil support budget.

Summing up, there is both a strong case in support of the deadline strategy and there are also some credible criticisms. These criticisms, however, largely originate from a philosophy that the West should be willing to pay any price for indefinite missions. If you do not accept this philosophy, the deadline strategy is highly attractive. And even if

³³ Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1998) , p 57

³⁴ R. Jeffrey Smith/Washington Post, "West Tires of Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia," updated 25 November 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Nov20001127west.html> (cited 27 November 2000), p 1

you do accept this philosophy, the UN's experiences in the post-Cold War world may convince you that deadlines may truly make a peacekeeping operation more effective.

UN POST-COLD WAR EXPERIENCE

In the process of researching this paper, I examined seven UN peacekeeping operations to understand how the UN had exited from peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. The seven UN peacekeeping operations, in order of inception, are: Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique, Haiti, Rwanda, and the Central African Republic. I used three criteria to select the cases: a mission inception date of 1990 or after, a mission completion date of December 2000 or prior, and a minimum mission size of 1,000 troops. The 1990 and onward look was to capture the post-Cold War experience. I included Angola even though it began in 1988 because the mission significantly changed in the mid-1990s, and it is that later period that I examined. In a study of exit strategies, the need for the mission to have ended is obvious; the December 2000 cut-off was simply based on the fact that I completed the research in January 2001. Of note, I did not include any UN operation from the Balkans because they never truly ended—they were merely subsumed by NATO peacekeeping missions.³⁶ The 1,000-troop requirement restricted the look to the more complex UN missions; these are the missions that make the front pages of newspapers. Moreover, the number 1,000 was a clear breakpoint; no missions fell just below the mark. When the UN chose to deploy at

³⁵ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2000), p 86

³⁶ This is technically not correct for the small UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). China, in response to FYROM's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, refused to renew UNPREDEP's mandate in spring, 1999. The air war in Kosovo and NATO preliminary deployments to FYROM followed shortly after UNPREDEP's demise.

least a battalion of troops, UN monitors, and support staff, the number of troops typically topped 1,000.

Proving a clear cause and effect relationship is always tricky but especially so in situations as dynamic and multi-partied as peacekeeping operations. A researcher could spend months examining a single operation and the role that a deadline played. Indeed, my examination of deadlines indicates that such research would be profitable. Even then, however, there would likely remain some controversy about the deadline's exact role. That said, the UN has far more experience using deadlines than many realize, and that experience seems to strongly support the usefulness of deadlines. What follows are the highlights of the seven UN operations and some insights into the UN experiences; refer to appendices one through seven to read the more detailed examination of the operations.

The first insight is that the UN used a deadline more often than not. In fact, in six of the seven cases the Security Council established some sort of deadline. In four cases, the Council adopted a deadline after the mission was underway and the Council became frustrated at the lack of progress. In three of the cases the Council tied the conduct of national elections to the deadline. The Security Council also seemed to learn from the debacles of the early 1990s and twice set deadlines in the initial authorizing resolution. Given that the deadlines were widely used, the question becomes "to what effect?"

The UN experience shows two primary effects. The first and most satisfying effect is where the deadline seemed to push progress along faster than would have otherwise been the case. That occurred in four of the six operations (Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, and the Central African Republic). The second effect—enabling the UN to terminate a failing mission—is less satisfying but is also both beneficial and necessary.

That was the case in Somalia, where further UN peacekeeping efforts were not justifiable, and to a much lesser extent in Cambodia.

The first major trial for the UN in the post-Cold War era came in Cambodia. The UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to facilitate the implementation of the Paris peace agreement. The Security Council did not set a clear deadline, but the effort later coalesced around the conduct of national elections, which were initially scheduled for April 1993.

UNTAC got off to a slow start and soon ran into trouble. Largely due to non-compliance by the Khmer Rouge, the demobilization effort—a key part of the transition process—collapsed. This, combined with rising violence and other problems, caused the UN to dramatically scale back its mandate and focus almost solely on creating the conditions for a safe election. The UN ultimately succeeded, with the May 1993 national elections being both safe and drawing an impressive 90 percent voter turnout.

The deadline played a major part in this success. Although the election date did slide two months due to the slow start, UNTAC's personnel used the election timing as a clear and credible deadline. Despite UNTAC's many difficulties, the focus for the UN remained on meeting the election schedule. The firmness of the election date also made hard decisions easier. Significant problems with political violence and intimidation led some observers to call for delaying the elections. The Security Council resisted these pressures and stuck with the plan, and the election's success validated this decision. Getting through the elections also gave the UN a marker to withdraw, even though key aspects of its mandate remained undone (and probably undoable).

Learning from its experiences in Cambodia and Somalia, the Security Council used a deadline with great success in Mozambique. When implementation of the Rome peace agreements lagged in 1993, the Council proactively began to drive the pace of progress. It virtually mandated that the warring parties agree to national elections in October 1994, which would then lead to a termination of the peacekeeping mission. Having gained that agreement, the Council then imposed a strict timetable for preliminary events and insisted on frequent Secretary-General progress reports. The clear but unspoken threat was that failure to meet the schedule would lead the Council to terminate the UN peacekeeping mission. The UN even overcame a last minute threat by one warring faction to boycott the elections. The elections were successfully held in October 1994, coincidentally again with 90 percent turnout. True to its word, the Council ended the peacekeeping mission shortly after the election. The Security Council's insistence clearly pushed the warring parties to progress faster than would've otherwise been the case.

Unlike the two previous operations where the Security Council set a clear or implied deadline after the operation was underway, the Council set the deadline in Haiti before the troops moved in. The Haiti operation was notable for the remarkable strategic clarity and vision in the initial authorizing resolution. The U.S. drove the establishment of a February 1996 deadline, which was based on the scheduled presidential elections and subsequent inauguration of a new Haitian president. This firm deadline was key to gaining the acquiescence of a U.S. Congress hostile to the Haiti mission. The post-mortems on the Haiti mission are almost as controversial as the decision to enter. That makes the entire discussion of the success or failure of the UN mission in Haiti equally

controversial. But again, the deadline seemed to play a positive role in moving things forward.

It is fair to say that the Haiti mission accomplished a lot in a short period. The Haitian armed forces were dissolved and a new police force deployed before the deadline. Despite efforts by Haitian President Aristide and others to delay the scheduled presidential elections, those elections did occur on schedule and the handover of power came a month before the deadline. The deadline also allowed the U.S. to resist pressures to extend its combat troops past February 1996. Though the UN did not totally close shop until March 2000, the peacekeeping force that remained after the deadline was only roughly 10 percent of its initial size. It is difficult to believe that all of this would have occurred absent a deadline.

With a decade of difficult experience to learn from, the Security Council closed the 1990s with a tight rein on the mission in the Central African Republic (CAR). A skeptical Council put stringent reporting requirements and a cap of 1,350 troops on the CAR mission. The political climate within the CAR was probably the most cooperative seen in any of the seven cases, and that obviously played the leading role in the mission's success. However, the Security Council made clear through stringent reporting criteria and strict standards that it would not accept any backsliding from set schedules. After having successfully assisted both a legislative and presidential election, the Council rejected regional requests to further extend the mission and terminated it on 15 February 2000. This was the clearest example of the Security Council as an efficient "board of directors"—it scrupulously balanced the cost, schedule, and objectives. Furthermore, it made the brave call that the CAR was ready to go it largely alone. The successful period

since the withdrawal validate the Council's judgment. Setting a deadline was one of the Council's principal tools in exercising its oversight.

On a far less pleasing note, a deadline proved to be the UN Security Council's best way to extract itself from the fiasco in Somalia. The three unhappy years in Somalia typified the problems with an incremental entry and exit. Having made significant progress in the humanitarian effort, the Secretary-General launched efforts to foster national reconciliation in the spring of 1993. While this move was essential to brighten Somalia's future, it brought the UN into conflict with the warring parties. This conflict led to the death of 25 Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993 and eighteen U.S. peacekeepers in October 1993. This precipitated a U.S. withdrawal in March 1994, with other key European contingents leaving as well. The UN found itself in a difficult situation; the force was too small and the contributing nations too traumatized to play an aggressive role, but the belligerents were anything but cooperative. Previously, in March 1993, the warring Somali clans had agreed upon a political reconciliation plan that included a two-year timetable. The Council seized this timetable and set a deadline for UN participation that coincided with the end of the timetable. This deadline gave the UN a clear end date for what was obviously a failed mission. Although one could argue that the UN should have left even sooner since there was never any real cooperation among the Somali warlords, it's interesting to note that the Secretary-General was looking until the very end for any semblance of progress that could justify continuing the mission. At a minimum, the deadline prevented the UN from wasting more time in Somalia.

The two remaining cases are useful for the painful lessons they offer. The Security Council never set a deadline in Angola, and it probably wished it had. Confronting a

frustrating and deteriorating situation, the Council equivocated time after time. It incrementally extended the mission's mandate eight times in a period of only fourteen months before finally ending the mission in February 1999. The Council's great reluctance to terminate a virtually hopeless peacekeeping mission shows just how hard it is to stop trying. A deadline might have made that difficult decision easier. Rwanda, on the other hand, did begin with a firm deadline. The horrific genocidal war that occurred after the UN peacekeepers entered Rwanda overwhelmed the deadline and every other aspect the UN's plans. The fact that the Security Council set a deadline in the beginning became irrelevant. What emerged as relevant was that one warring faction "won" the genocidal war and gained control over Rwanda's government. Just as Licklider's data suggested, this military "victory" in Rwanda has yielded a more durable peace than most of the negotiated agreements of the 1990s. It's sobering (and very uncomfortable in Rwanda's case) to recognize that battlefield solutions seem to bring more lasting peaces.

A final important lesson gleaned by examining the UN's post-Cold War experience is the issue of defining success. At its heart, this issue is about clearly determining what a mission is meant to accomplish. Failing to define success up front leaves the contributing nations vulnerable to the problem of "moving goalposts." This turn of phrase simply means that the bar for determining success goes up and down based on personal interpretations and events. Frankly, this has been useful in some situations because it allowed the UN to abandon certain aspects of its mandate while still declaring some level of success and leaving. Cambodia is the prime example here. On the other hand, the lack of definition allows others to elevate the bar, which leads to perception that the mission is never quite done and the UN needs to stay longer. Although what

constitutes success in any given situation is somewhat ambiguous (there's that tool of diplomacy again), it is critical that the UN and contributing nations seize the definition of success for themselves and not let others dictate those terms. Variable definitions of success can lead to grave problems, as has been the case in the Balkans.³⁷

Table 1 summarizes the UN's use of deadlines in the post-Cold War era.

³⁷ Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy* 104 (Fall 1996), p 62

Table 1. UN Experiences With Using a Deadline in Post-Cold War Era

Country	Deadline in initial UNSCR	Deadline later adopted	Deadline Aided Progress	Deadline Limited Investment	Comments
Cambodia	No	Implied from Elections date	Yes	Yes	Elections became action forcing event and key to UN exit. Secretary-General and Security Council went ahead with elections despite less-than-desired conditions
Somalia	No	Yes	No	Yes	Deadline emerged after nation-building efforts faltered. Became an excuse to exit
Mozambique	No	Yes	Yes	NA	Deadlines seemed to play a highly positive role
Rwanda	Yes	NA	No	No	UN plan (and deadline strategy) completely overwhelmed by genocidal war
Haiti	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes	Deadline was very successful from U.S. perspective
Angola	No	No	No	No	Classic example of incremental steps failing
Central African Republic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Demonstrates use of deadline to limit resource use

FAILED DEADLINES IN BOSNIA

Though the UN experience has much evidence to commend deadlines, the U.S. attempt to employ a deadline in Bosnia was largely a failure from the perspective of accomplishing the mission and getting the troops out. Not surprisingly, though, there is more to the story.

The chronology of the Bosnian deadlines is a bit confusing; the basic facts are as follows. As discussed earlier, the Clinton Administration set a twelve-month deadline for U.S. troops in Bosnia as it was selling the mission to Congress and the American people. President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, National Security Advisor Lake, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili all assured Congress and the public that it was a twelve-month job. There were very early rumblings that this deadline wouldn't stick, but the one-year limit remained the Administration's official policy for eleven months. Days after winning re-election and with only one month to go before the deadline, President Clinton announced on 15 November 1996 that the U.S. would stay in Bosnia past the established deadline. He indicated U.S. willingness to participate in a stabilization force that would enable the ongoing reconstruction efforts. However, he again limited the U.S. commitment—this time it was an additional eighteen months.³⁸

This new time limit for participation in NATO's stabilization force (SFOR) again played a key role in securing congressional acquiescence. In the summer of 1997 the House expressed its frustration with the lingering Bosnia mission and voted to cut off funds for U.S. peacekeepers at the new deadline—30 June 1998. The Senate didn't

³⁸ Alison Mitchell, "U.S. Ready to Keep a Force in Bosnia 18 Months Longer," updated 16 November 1996, <<http://nytimes/qpass.com/archives>>, cited 26 February 2001, p 2

mandate a cutoff of funds, but did adopt a nonbinding resolution, expressing their expectation that the president honor this second deadline. In the end, the Senate view prevailed; funds would not be cut off but they expected a June 1998 end to the Bosnia mission.³⁹

But the Senate's expectation was not met—the president announced in mid-December 1997 that the troops would stay past the 30 June 1998 deadline. Senator John McCain said, "I certainly hope they don't insult our intelligence again with another date certain [sic—meaning another deadline]." They didn't; the president offered no new time limits on U.S. participation.⁴⁰ The deadline strategy was both dead in practice and gravely wounded in principle.

The deadline strategy did succeed from one perspective, however. Were it not for the initial twelve-month limit—had anyone imagined that U.S. soldiers would still be in Bosnia in the 21st Century—the U.S. probably wouldn't have put troops there in the first place. In December 1995, the House narrowly voted down a bill to prohibit funds for a Bosnia mission. Public enthusiasm was similarly tepid. Even after President Clinton pitched the Bosnia mission to the nation, the polls showed less than a majority of American's supported the intervention.⁴¹ However, this "Trojan Horse" contribution of the deadline—persuading the American people the operation would be far less costly than has proven the case—is hardly one to tout.

³⁹ Lizette Alvarez, "Senate is Cool to G.I. Mission in Bosnia but Doesn't Cut Off Funds," updated 12 July 1997, <<http://nytimes/qpass.com/archives>>, cited 26 February 2001, p 1

⁴⁰ James Bennet, "Clinton to Extend G.I. Role in Bosnia," updated 18 December 1997, <<http://nytimes/qpass.com/archives>>, cited 26 February 2001, p 1-2

⁴¹ Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), p 112-113. Major polls measured these levels of support for the President's action: CBS-33%, ABC-39%, Gallup-46%

Why did the deadline idea fail so badly? The reasons, fortunately, are both clear and avoidable in future uses of the deadline. The story of the how the initial twelve-month deadline came about and the internal Administration divisions is vital to understanding its failings.

The initial twelve-month deadline was derived through military planning and based on a clear-cut exit strategy. The idea was that it would take a year to separate the forces, conduct the transfer of lands, and bolster the Muslim-Croat Federation Army with training and heavy weapons. At that point, the peacekeepers would exit and the Bosnians could then choose peace or a return to fighting, albeit with a more level playing field. This was known as the “minimalist” approach. Others within the Administration—Secretary of State Albright and Ambassador Holbrooke chief among them—favored the “maximalist” approach of basically rebuilding a multiethnic, integrated Bosnia and wanted the peacekeepers to take on a broad span of duties. Either approach was consistent with the Dayton Accord. At the outset, however, the minimalist approach was the Administration’s chosen strategy. When IFOR entered Bosnia, a wonderful thing happened—implementation went smoother than could’ve probably ever been imagined: organized opposition never materialized, armies withdrew, land traded hands, and people moved peacefully. The success seduced the U.S. into gradually shifting to the maximalist strategy, and the Administration jettisoned the strategy that enabled a relatively short deadline in favor of a strategy that was sure to take an extended period.⁴² The first lesson here is that deadlines don’t work if you fundamentally change the strategy.

⁴² Ivo Daalder, “Frontline: Give War a Chance,” <http://pbs.org/wgbh/pagcs/frontline/shows/military/ctc/daalder.html> (cited 14 March 2001), pp 6, 7, 9, 19

A key reason the deadline failed is that it never received the needed support. As can be seen from the above discussion, there wasn't agreement at the highest levels of the Administration about the minimalist strategy. Richard Holbrooke, the Administration's Bosnia point man, thought the deadline both wrong in principle and unrealistically short.⁴³ After he resigned in early 1996, the State Department increasingly championed his maximalist approach.⁴⁴

It wasn't just Albright and Holbrooke who didn't support the twelve-month limit. Key NATO allies certainly did not agree to this twelve-month deadline nor did they agree with giving heavy weapons to the Federation—a central part of the U.S. strategy.⁴⁵ Since the NATO allies didn't accept the strategy, what would happen at the twelve-month point? Would the U.S. just go home alone, or would it try to coerce the entire Alliance into withdrawing? That was a train wreck no one wanted.

Akin to this lack of support, the deadlines suffered from a serious lack of credibility. It was very easy to believe that the Administration was never committed to these deadlines. For example, Senator Hutchison railed against the administration in May 1996 (only five months into the initial deadline) for indicating its intention to bust the twelve-month commitment. Her cause for concern—U.S. and foreign press accounts that high-ranking U.S. officials, including the commander of NATO troops, had given private assurances to our allies that the U.S. would stay well past a year.⁴⁶ The Administration quietly recognized in the summer of 1996 that the U.S. needed to stay past twelve months.

⁴³ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p 211

⁴⁴ Ivo Daalder, "Frontline: Give War a Chance," <<http://pbs.org/wgbh/pagcs/frontline/shows/military/ctc/daalder.html>> (cited 14 March 2001), p 16

⁴⁵ Mark Heinrich/Reuter, "Federation Signs Uneasy Deal for US Military Training," updated 16 July 1996, <www.linder.com/berserk/army_716.html> (cited 26 February 2001), p 3

⁴⁶ U.S. Government Printing Office, *Congressional Record, May 7 1996 (Senate)*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p S4764

The pattern continued for the second deadline as well. Only seven months into the eighteen-month deadline, the president publicly put his own commitment to the June 1998 pullout in serious doubt.⁴⁷ Leaks continued, especially in November when Secretary of State Albright stood beside the German Foreign Minister at a press conference and declared that there was a building U.S. “consensus” that the troops needed to stay past the deadline. Her comments followed a White House meeting for key administration and congressional leaders.⁴⁸ The president formally killed the eighteen-month deadline only twelve months into its life.

To be fair, even critics of the deadline strategy must admit that the NATO peacekeepers accomplished a tremendous amount in a short period. The demobilization and separation of forces happened much faster and more smoothly than in any other UN operation. Bosnia returned to an essentially peaceful environment in a dramatically short time span. Despite these remarkable accomplishments, the maximalist strategy of Dayton required much more.

Two aspects of the maximalist implementation of Dayton—one general and one specific—ensured that the peacekeepers would not be able to leave any time soon. The maximalist approach wanted to preserve a multiethnic Bosnia, with the ethnic groups learning to cohabitate and cooperate. Thus, this view required a good measure of political and social reconciliation. Not surprisingly, this social healing lagged. And the peacekeepers are captive to this healing process. The particular aspect of the maximalist view that guaranteed a long stay was the return of refugees to their prewar homes.

⁴⁷ Alison Mitchell, “Clinton Keeps Door Open to Extended U.S. Role in Bosnia,” updated 13 July 1997, <<http://nytimes/qpass.com/archives>>, cited 26 February 2001, p 1

⁴⁸ Steven Erlanger, “Albright Says Consensus Is Emerging on the Future of U.S. Troops in Bosnia,” updated 6 November 1997, <<http://nytimes/qpass.com/archives>>, cited 27 February 2001, p 1

Returns to areas where the refugees were an ethnic minority could only take place in a secure environment, and only the presence of NATO peacekeepers could allay the refugees' fears. Moreover, this encouragement to return to prewar homes would essentially reset the volatile ethnic patchwork of Bosnia and rebuild the tinderbox that made Bosnia such an ugly war in the first place. Thus, a long-term NATO presence would be necessary to ensure the tinderbox didn't re-ignite. As we will see later, the refugee resettlement issue still looms large.

The lessons from the Bosnian deadline debacle are obvious. The deadline must be an alliance strategy, not just a U.S. strategy. The deadline must be both realistic and credible for the task at hand. And finally, the leaders must support the deadline both in public and private. The good news is that all of these problems are avoidable in the future. Before we can see whether the deadline strategy is viable for the future, we must examine the present situation.

CURRENT BALKAN SITUATION

Bosnia and Kosovo share many similarities, yet are different in important ways. NATO provides the peacekeepers for both efforts. Both places are dynamic, with the political situation shifting often. And both situations seem intractable. At the same time, the political challenges and ethnic "facts on the ground" are different in form and structure. Consequently, it's important to examine each situation separately.

It's been over five years since NATO peacekeepers began implementation of the Dayton accord. Tracing the official progress of the Bosnia mission is now relatively easy, as both the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and U.S. president issue periodic reports. Congress imposed the latter requirement following the last deadline

“extension.” This, in turn, led to the PIC establishing these ten benchmarks to measure progress in Bosnia.

- Military Stability: Maintain Dayton Ceasefire
- Public Security and Law Enforcement: A restructured and democratic police force in the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS)
- Judicial Reform: An effective judicial reform program
- Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions
- Media Reform: A regulated, independent, and democratic media
- Elections and Democratic Governance: National democratic institutions and practices
- Economic Development: Free-market reform
- Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns: A functioning and orderly minority return process⁴⁹
- Brcko: Implementation of the Brcko Final Award
- Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs): Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to the Hague for trial

So, how is the mission faring against these benchmarks? Reading the five presidential reports issued to date, the record is decidedly mixed. On one hand, there is some progress and there is hope that one benchmark (Brcko) is nearing achievement. On the other hand, one is struck by how little progress is found in some areas across the reporting periods. Indeed, some parts of the report have been repeated verbatim from one reporting period to the next.

There are, however, some readily apparent trends. First is that the NATO peacekeepers are the glue that hold the situation together. Their presence is deemed vital to deterring conflict and permitting the return of refugees into areas where they are a minority. The second trend is that all sides continue to obstruct progress toward the maximalist Dayton vision, not just the Bosnian Serbs. For example, the Serbs accepted

⁴⁹ In UN terms a person isn't a technically a refugee until they have crossed an international border. Thus, people that fled the fighting but remained inside Bosnia are considered “displaced persons.” However, for matters of simplicity, the paper will use the term refugee for both categories

judicial reforms advocated by the West; it was the Federation that resisted until the High Representative simply imposed the provisions. Leaders of all factions make decisions from narrow interests, and even occasionally put their personal interests first. Corruption is still a massive problem. Finally, the ethnic separatists retain tremendous political sway. This is true even three years after the PIC gave the High Representative tremendous latitude to remove hardliners and unilaterally impose decisions, and the High Representative has not been shy about wielding this clout. In fact, the High Representative overrules local Bosnian leaders an average of about once every eleven days.⁵⁰ To quote the most recent presidential report, “The High Representative has removed some of the most egregious opponents of peace and democracy, but their organizations and influence remains entrenched.”⁵¹ Indeed, the High Representative just removed the Bosnian Croat president and other ranking Croats in March 2001 for veering from the maximalist vision of multiethnicity.⁵²

The picture from the PIC reports is very similar to that painted by the U.S. presidential reports. The communiqué from the latest full PIC meeting in May 2000 lauded the progress in Bosnia, specifically the stable security situation, completed reconstruction effort, accelerating refugee returns, and growing political pluralism (though the record on this point is quite mixed). Conversely, the PIC scolded the “obstructionist political parties and their allies, both within and outside of BiH” for the

⁵⁰ Carla Anne Robbins/Wall Street Journal, “Task of Rebuilding Looms As Challenge for the Next President,” updated 3 November 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Nov2000/e20001103task.htm> (cited 3 November 2000),, p 1

⁵¹ Presidential reports published pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174 were issued in Feb 99, Jul 99, Apr 00, Jul 00, and Jan 01. The quote comes from the president’s closing conclusions in the latest report.

⁵² Associated Press, “Angry Croat Leadership Ousted in Bosnia,” updated 8 March 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Mar2001/e20010308angry.htm> (cited 8 March 2001), p 1

glacial pace of domestic peace implementation.⁵³ And the pace hasn't increased of late. The February 2001 PIC Steering Board meeting noted the "painfully slow" political process.⁵⁴

While the picture from inside Bosnia is one of slow and unsteady progress, there has been dramatic improvement in the external situation. Kostunica's ascendancy to the Yugoslav presidency in the fall of 2000 removed a significant barrier to progress, if only because the West now has someone in Belgrade they are willing to work with. Croatia's new president, Stipe Mesic, has cut off support for Bosnian Croat hardliners. Given that both leaders desperately want and need to integrate their countries into Europe, the West has significant clout with these leaders. Since both wield some influence over the ethnic nationalities, this is a tremendously hopeful step. Some optimists see the recent rhetorical "self-immolation" by the Bosnian Croat hardliners and their subsequent removal as proof positive that the hardliners' days are numbered now that Belgrade and Zagreb are focusing westward.⁵⁵ Only time will tell.

Compared to Bosnia, the situation is less mature and static in Kosovo. The United Nations has a very different political role in Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, where the High Representative is theoretically assisting its (marginally) functioning government, the UN *is* the government in Kosovo. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) exercises both legislative and executive power over Kosovo and administers the judiciary, as well. Based on dissatisfaction with the Bosnian experience,

⁵³ "Communiqué by the Peace Implementation Council," updated 24 May 2000, <<http://www.ohr.int/docu/p20000524a.htm>> (cited 3 February 2001), p 1

⁵⁴ "Communiqué by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council," updated 1 February 2001, <<http://www.ohr.int/docu/d20010202a.htm>> (cited 3 February 2001), p 2

⁵⁵ Reuters, "Croat Threat Masks Bosnia Peace Progress," updated 6 March 2001, <www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/inte...a-.html> (cited 7 March 2001), p 1-2

the peace mission structure in Kosovo is also very different. There is no PIC and no High Representative—the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative is the senior official, but three major aspects of the operation (peacekeeping under NATO, democratization under the OSCE, reconstruction under the EU) do not report to the Special Representative. Nor are there any well-defined benchmarks as there are in Bosnia. One final and very important difference between Bosnia and Kosovo is that the final political status of the latter is not certain. While it is stated U.S. and implied UN policy to maintain Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, there are currents within the UN that could ultimately lead to independence for Kosovo. This essential point is therefore up for debate.

Kosovo has taken big strides toward self-government. Chief among these strides were the successful municipal elections in October 2000, in which the “moderate” Democratic League of Kosovo was the big winner, capturing about 58% of the vote.⁵⁶ UNMIK is now trying to build functioning municipal governments. The next electoral step will be provincial (national) elections, but when to hold the elections has been hotly debated. The UN fears the Albanians could use a provincial assembly to push their case for independence.⁵⁷ Consensus is building, however, for Fall 2001 elections. Other good news is that over 20,000 houses have been rebuilt, and over 2,500 cadets have graduated from the Kosovo Police Service School. But the news is far from all good.

The problems of Kosovo can largely be summed up in two words—Albanian radicalism. In a stunning reversal of perspectives from the 1999 NATO war against

⁵⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2000/1196)*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), p 1

Serbia, KFOR peacekeepers often view the Albanians as the enemy and the Serbs as the victims. KFOR increasingly finds itself protecting Serbs in Kosovo and attempting to restrain Albanian extremist forays into neighboring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia. These forays clearly have the potential to quickly unravel all the good UNMIK has done. Albanian attacks on Serbs have increased in seriousness, if not in frequency.⁵⁸ Serb returns to Kosovo into areas where they would be an ethnic minority (a goal of the UN) are few, and concern for their safety has compelled the UN to take a decidedly “go slow” approach. In his annual report to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan sent up red flags over the Albanian extremism, believing that it put the entire democratic self-government program for Kosovo at grave risk. Ironically, Annan fears the rise of the more moderate Kostunica government may actually stoke the flames of Albanian extremism.⁵⁹

So far I have carefully avoided the question that cuts to the heart of any Balkan assessment—How much longer are the peacekeepers going to be needed in the Balkans under the current approach? Having read many assessments and many opinions, I conclude that nobody really knows: one can make equally credible cases that it’s going to take another five, ten, or fifteen years (or just about any other number). For example, when asked how long the UN would need to stay in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, then UNMIK’s top official, gave the wonderfully (and wisely) ambiguous answer, “It will be

⁵⁷ Steven Erlanger/New York Times, “Self-Determination in Kosovo Will Take Much Determination,” updated 1 Feb 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Feb2001/e20010201self.htm> (cited 1 February 2001), p 1

⁵⁸ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2000/1196)*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), para 35

⁵⁹ Ibid, para 13

some years. It is impossible to say, but I think less than 10 years.”⁶⁰ In my opinion, there are only two unbelievable answers to the question of how much longer: first would be “not much,” and second would be any answer that predicted a specific number of years. Indeed, having backed away three times from deadlines, President Clinton scrupulously avoided making any predictions on how much longer the peacekeepers would stay. The presidential reports to Congress always noted a positive trend in Bosnia but tersely answered “no time limit has been established for total withdrawal of U.S. forces” to the mandated question concerning the expected duration of the peacekeeping mission.

Whether the international community (or the U.S.) currently has a viable strategy for bringing the international domination and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo to a successful close is open to debate. One could easily maintain that the international community has a strategy in Bosnia: it is moving to implement the maximalist vision for a multiethnic Bosnia established in the Dayton peace accords. The PIC has benchmarks and has laid out timetables for some of them (though there is a conspicuous lack of an effective “or else” to not meeting the timetable). Likewise in Kosovo: the UN, OSCE, and EU have general plans for the future (minus a decision on Kosovo’s final political status). But there is one serious shortcoming that brings this strategy’s viability into question.

The entire international community—NATO, the UN, the EU, the OSCE—are all hostage to the whims and wills of the warring factions in the Bosnia and the Albanians in Kosovo. At this point, they possess the strategic initiative, and they dictate the pace of

⁶⁰ David Sands/Washington Times, “Kosovo Mission Not In Sight,” updated 30 September 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Oct2000/e20001002kosovo.htm> (cited 2 October 2000), p 1

progress. Let me illustrate the problem. In 1998 Senator Joe Biden stood on the floor of the Senate and made this statement defending a continuing U.S. presence in Bosnia:

But our commitment to assisting the Bosnians, of course, is not open-ended. Rather than tying [sic] our exit to an artificial date, we should—and will—link it to the completion of clearly defined criteria, such as the establishment of a functioning national government and other national institutions, seated elected local governments, free media and a free-market economy. I have every confidence that the Administration will spell out these criteria in its request for U.S. participation in the international force after this June.⁶¹

Senator Biden was absolutely correct that the Administration would specify clear benchmarks; the “PIC benchmarks” fulfilled his prophecy. But note that every defined criterion is ultimately under the Bosnian leadership’s control. Thus, Biden was absolutely wrong when he said that the U.S. commitment is not open-ended. Though not a reality the Administration would gladly acknowledge, the U.S. commitment to Bosnia and Kosovo is unlimited in both theory and practice. Even as the new Bush Administration tries to reduce the U.S. presence, the commitment will still be effectively unlimited; it will simply cost less each year. The same is true for the rest of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.

The simple truth is that the people that will eventually decide when the peacekeepers can go home under the current strategy live in and around Sarajevo and Pristina (and, to a much lesser extent, in Zagreb and Belgrade)—not in Washington, New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, or anywhere else in the world. I see this as a serious shortcoming.

The West’s support for Bosnia and Kosovo and the asymmetry of interests should lead to the West dictating the pace. To be sure, the West is not entirely passive. The High Representative in Bosnia is very aggressive in his actions. However, as long as the

peacekeepers stay and the support continues to roll in, there is insufficient cost or danger to the warring factions to preclude their dragging of feet. The prime leverage the West has is cutting off the lifeline to Bosnia and Kosovo. That won't happen so long as the West remains convinced that the peace in Kosovo and Bosnia is worth any price. This leads to the question of what is at stake in the Balkans.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS

It would be too broad and difficult to address the interests of all international actors at work in the Balkans. I will limit the discussion almost exclusively to U.S. interests, though there is surely significant overlap between U.S. interests and those of key Western allies like Germany, France, and Great Britain. The Bush Administration has yet to issue a new National Security Strategy (NSS), but the final Clinton NSS said European stability was a vital national interest—the highest possible level of interest in security lingo.⁶² The Clinton NSS also said that the on-going Balkan peacekeeping operations support European stability and, by implication, Balkan stability could arguably be a vital national interest. The term “vital” is critical, because it implies a “pay any price” level of commitment. The U.S. has indeed paid a big price; the GAO estimates that from 1992 through 2000 the U.S. spent over \$21 billion attempting to bring peace to the Balkans.⁶³ The Clinton NSS also says that the U.S. has important and humanitarian interests (the other two levels of national interest) in the Balkans.⁶⁴

⁶¹ U.S. Government Printing Office, *Congressional Record, February 12, 1998 (Senate)*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p S722

⁶² *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Dec 1999, p 29.

⁶³ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2000), p 5

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p 88

Both the minimalist and maximalist approaches toward Dayton support the vital interest of stability. The tension between the two approaches becomes more pronounced when one introduces other goals or interests. The maximalist approach embraces other interests: not accepting the results of ethnic cleansing, not rewarding aggression, and preserving multiethnicity. Ambassador Holbrooke said it was the insistence of the Bosnian Muslims to preserve a singular, multi-ethnic Bosnia that drove the U.S. policy going into Dayton (Bosnian Croats and Serbs would have been quite satisfied with some sort of soft partition). But Ambassador Holbrooke himself reiterated to President Clinton even after the Dayton Accord that dividing Bosnia into separate countries along ethnic lines was not inconsistent with U.S. vital interests.⁶⁵ The point is that some elements of the maximalist strategy are not essential to U.S. vital interests.

As we look toward future strategies, the idea of interests will be critical. What interests should the U.S. pursue—should the U.S. focus on a strategy that yields stability or should it continue to embrace the loftier goals envisaged under the current maximalist strategy?

A brief aside on the interests of the Balkan players. Rationally one might think that the Bosnian and Albanian leaders would value the return of peace, stability, and economic improvements—in essence, that they would share the Western goals for them. They may, but not at the expense of losing their ethnic identity and security. The leaders largely retain their wartime goals of ethnic independence.⁶⁶ Sadly, they are more

⁶⁵ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp 96, 364-365

⁶⁶ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2000), p 24

interested in preserving ethnic status and power, and will act corruptly to achieve these goals.⁶⁷

A DEADLINE RENAISSANCE?

Therefore, since stability is the true U.S. (and I think European) interest in the Balkans, we should consider strategies that might meet that interest. One option would be to dramatically escalate the NATO/EU commitment to the Balkans, radically purging the corrupt leadership, and start all over again. I think we can immediately dismiss this option as both politically untenable and having absolutely no guarantee that it would work any better than the existing strategy. That leaves two general strategies. The first is to continue with the same basic approach, looking for opportunities to downsize the level of troops in the Balkans. The second is to seize the initiative by establishing a clear upper-limit for NATO contributions to the Balkans. In other words, go back to a deadline strategy.

Staying the current course is by far the most comfortable thing to do. The entire bureaucracy has adjusted to the status quo; staying the course doesn't upset any apple carts. The U.S. cannot be accused of driving any precipitous changes in the Balkans. Moreover, one could argue that, despite the rhetoric, the current course isn't even all that expensive. The U.S. spent \$3.6 billion on peacekeepers in 2000, with almost another billion supporting civilian projects in the Balkans.⁶⁸ From a personnel perspective, the costs are down considerably. The U.S. presence in Bosnia was initially 27,000 soldiers; NATO has taken measured reductions and the U.S. force is now down to 4,400 soldiers

⁶⁷ R. Jeffrey Smith/Washington Post, "West Tires of Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia," updated 25 November 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Nov20001127west.html> (cited 27 November 2000), p 1

and is about to drop another 750 troops. In Kosovo the U.S. force now stands at 5,700. And other nations are indeed pulling the vast majority of the load; U.S. troops comprise only 23% of the total force in SFOR and 15% in KFOR.⁶⁹ NATO had envisaged the possibility of reducing KFOR this spring, but that looks far less likely with the current unrest in Kosovo and FYROM.

Although staying the course is comfortable, that does not mean that it is either risk-free, or even cost effective. While the scenario is not probable, a number of American deaths could spike the American public's awareness of the lingering U.S. Balkan presence and trigger a sudden withdrawal (another Somalia). Another nightmarish scenario would be an eruption of ethnic fighting under NATO's nose that would prove both tragic and highly embarrassing (another Rwanda).

We do not need to restrict ourselves to hypothetical scenarios—we see situations unfolding today that challenge the current strategy. Bosnian Croat leadership is chafing at its position in the Federation, which led to the High Representative removing several high-ranking officials. Thus far, the Croatian government has acted to support Western interests rather than the hardliners, but these matters clearly present a great challenge.⁷⁰ The situation in Kosovo is worse. The Albanian Kosovar extremists are conducting armed raids into FYROM and Serbia. This creates two dangers—one potential and one present. The former is the fear of another ethnic war that could potentially ignite the entire southern Balkans. While this may never materialize, NATO is being called upon

⁶⁸ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2000), p 87

⁶⁹ Colonel James W. Church, <james.church@js.pentagon.mil>, "Numbers for KFOR/SFOR," personal e-mail, 14 March 2001, p 1

⁷⁰ Reuters, "Croat Threat Masks Bosnia Peace Progress," updated 6 March 2001, <www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/inte...a-.html> (cited 7 March 2001), p 2

to take a more confrontational stance with the extremists. This dilemma tasks NATO's ability to adapt both strategically and politically, as well as raising the specter that NATO soldiers could die attempting to subdue the extremists. These all create fissures within NATO, with many fingers being pointed at the U.S. due to its reluctance to risk casualties. If the Bush Administration pushes to salami-slice U.S. contributions to KFOR and SFOR which are not tied to overall force reductions, the U.S. appears even weaker. This combination undercuts U.S. leadership in Europe as well. So, while sticking to the current strategy may be comfortable, it is by no means "safe"—not for U.S. leadership and not for U.S. soldiers.

The cost effectiveness of the current approach is a matter of simple math. Four billion dollars a year (and change) times an unknown number of years equals a big (though unknown) amount of money. And that money comes with no guarantee of success.

The ambiguity and indefinite nature of the current approach have not served us well. As noted earlier, the "moderate" Albanian Kosovar leadership calls for independence, even though neither stated U.S. nor current UN policy support this. A senior western diplomat said this: "The serious problems now are a result of eighteen months of indecisiveness, and a lot of soft decisions dancing around the real issues, without dealing with them."⁷¹ Not only does this ambiguity foster extremism, it limits the Western responses to the extremism. During the current crisis the U.S. and UN cannot call on the elected Kosovar leaders to formally rein in the extremists because UN conservatism has not permitted national elections. The moderates can pawn off the responsibility for

⁷¹ Steven Erlanger/New York Times, "NATO Adrift in the Balkans," updated 12 March 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Mar20010312adrift.htm> (cited 27 November 2000), p 2

reining in the extremists on NATO. This lack of Kosovar accountability is a major flaw in the present arrangement. We are not without options, however; there is an alternative to this current open-ended strategy.

If the U.S. (and NATO) want to both regain control of the Balkan missions and maintain stability, its prime leverage and opportunity is to set an upper-limit to its resource contributions—in other words, set a deadline for withdrawal of the peacekeepers. Proposing a renaissance for the deadline strategy may shock some; after all, the deadline experience of 1995 to 1997 could hardly be called a success. However, what we have seen is not that deadlines don't work—I think they can—but that the deadlines in Bosnia were horribly implemented.

The confluence of political changes and five years of perspective offer a unique opportunity to revive the deadline. New administrations in Washington, Belgrade, and Zagreb create the political opportunity for a change. In an odd way, the current flash in Albanian and Bosnian Croat extremism highlight the risks of the current maximalist approach. Setting a deadline will require a shift back toward the minimalist approach, and that seems more acceptable and reasonable than ever given the West's experiences in the Balkans over the past five years. Some of the maximalist urges were natural responses at that time to the undeniable suffering of the Bosnian Muslims and Albanian Kosovars at the hands of Slobodan Milosevic. The postwar conduct of these two groups, however, has evaporated the aura of innocence initially granted them in the West. Likewise, it should now be clear that all of the ethnic groups really are not ready to live in a highly integrated, multiethnic society. One must ask how long the West will

persevere in insisting on a maximalist vision for Bosnia and Kosovo that the inhabitants do not share?

What good would setting a deadline do? It would create a focus and impetus now lacking. It would be the unconscious epiphany discussed in Gersick's research—the time for muddling has passed; it's time to make progress. It would drive the leadership and their people to contemplate the hard choices, since NATO wouldn't be there forever to restrain ethnic rivalries. The responsibility for their future would fall squarely—and now visibly and undeniably—to them. This step forward would move the strategy beyond the nether world where it currently resides, where matters neither deteriorate so much as to demand a different approach nor improve enough to permit the peacekeepers to go home. The point isn't merely that a deadline would allow NATO to go home, it's that a deadline could push the Balkans to its end-state much faster than the current strategy.

Being blunt, this is certainly not a no-risk option. Critics will immediately argue that withdrawing the peacekeepers anytime soon is sure to trigger that much-feared wider Balkan war. I think it is far less than certain fighting would resume if the deadline is implemented properly, but we will return to this issue shortly. Before we do move on, there remains that major philosophical question. Having spent five years in Bosnia and nineteen months in Kosovo, is it not both reasonable and realistic to demand in the near future that they somehow coexist without NATO holding them apart?

If we are going to avoid another deadline debacle, certain issues must be understood up front. First, we should be neither deterred nor surprised when the various belligerents say that they will resume the fight after we leave. That is their leverage, and they've used it extremely well in the past to keep NATO peacekeepers on the ground. Realize, though,

that saying you are going to fight and then actually fighting are two entirely different matters. Our resolve may well be tested as the deadline nears, and we should be prepared. Second, a deadline for the withdrawal of peacekeepers must be embraced as the NATO strategy, not a unilateral U.S. strategy. Beyond the fact that NATO does provide the Balkan peacekeepers, the key players in NATO are also the key players in the other agencies engaged in the Balkans. So, NATO is the key political arena. Equally important, a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkan peacekeeping missions would be a disaster for NATO in general and for U.S. leadership in NATO in particular. Fortunately, Secretary of State Colin Powell recently allayed our NATO partners' fears, saying of the Balkans "we went in together, we will come out together."⁷² NATO unity is key to successfully implementing a deadline strategy. Finally, unlike the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration must speak and act in universal support of the deadline. If all the above is not done, the Balkan players will not judge the deadline (and subsequent withdrawal) credible and there will be no change for the better.

What about the mechanics for setting a deadline? It seems wisest to stagger the withdrawals from Bosnia and Kosovo by about a year. That gives NATO some hedge capability in the region over the withdrawal period. NATO should leave Bosnia first; NATO's been there longer and the situation is a bit more stable. Advocating a deadline one to three years from now for Bosnia seems like a decent starting point to negotiate with our NATO allies. As will be seen below, certain things need to take place before that actual withdrawal and the countries need time to adapt to the fact that the troops are

⁷² Alan Sipress/Washington Post, "U.S. Will Consult on Key Issues, NATO Told," updated 28 February 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Feb2001/e20010228told.htm> (cited 28 February 2001), p 1

leaving. Also, some of those long-deferred political decisions need to be made, and again, there needs to be some time for the realities to set in for the belligerents.

One important thing a deadline would not do is end the international community's support for the economic and social reconstruction in Bosnia and Kosovo. The deadline is targeted only at the peacekeeping forces. Reconstruction efforts could and should continue, just without the security umbrella of NATO peacekeepers. As alluded to earlier, the peacekeeper's removal represents a potential financial boon to the reconstruction effort. The U.S. alone spent over twice as much on peacekeepers in 2000 as the entire international community pledged to spend in a year under the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.⁷³ Capturing even a small amount of the savings generated by the end of the peacekeepers could significantly magnify the economic stabilization efforts.

To understand the implications for withdrawing the peacekeepers, we should understand their primary contributions in the current mission. In very general terms, the peacekeepers accomplish two related tasks. On a macro level they deter the resumption of widespread hostilities; on a micro level they provide security to pockets of ethnic minorities. Successfully disengaging NATO peacekeepers means finding a way of shifting these responsibilities to the inhabitants or eliminating the need altogether.

Closely associated with this shifting of responsibilities is a shift toward the minimalist strategy, leaving the degree of multiethnicity up to the Bosnians and Kosovars. The overarching interest in the Balkans is stability—either the maximalist or minimalist view can support that interest. The current maximalist strategy is inconsistent

⁷³ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2000), p 85

with setting a deadline; it relies on an open-ended commitment to succeed. The minimalist view accepts that a more likely and realistic expectation for the near future is that the ethnic groups will voluntarily congregate in ethnically homogenous areas and avoid isolated ethnic pockets.

A worst-case scenario would be a resumption of ethnic fighting. Though the NATO peacekeepers are an effective way to deter ethnic war, they are by no means the only tool available to the West. Economic assistance and the possibility of eventual EU membership gives the West some leverage over Balkan leaders. Within the realm of diplomacy, there are solid ties between the West and the ethnic Croat and Bosnian Muslim leaders, and better ties with Belgrade are being built even now. On a slightly draconian note, Western European governments could make their social policies less generous toward refugees, thereby reducing the attractiveness of their countries to the refugees.

Let us take a brief glimpse over the cliff and ponder the implications of renewed fighting. While certainly not desirable, a resumption of the civil war in Bosnia or Kosovo need not be destabilizing to Europe as a whole. The events in Bosnia in the 1992-1995 time frame did destabilize southern Europe and transfix the West for two reasons: the *perceived* inequity of the war and the massive refugee flows. It was the well-armed Serbian “aggressors” against the out-gunned Muslims/Albanians “victims.” Making some strategic adjustments that are wholly consistent with the minimalist view of Dayton could significantly undercut the reasons why Balkan fighting led to European instability. In the time before the deadline NATO should work toward a balance of power between the factions to deter fighting, thus eliminating claims that it’s an unfair

fight if fighting does reoccur. NATO should also adopt policies that would minimize refugee flows if fighting resumes.

While pushing for the best (a peaceful Balkans after NATO leaves), eliminating the requirement for NATO peacekeepers by shifting responsibilities to the inhabitants under the minimalist approach better prepares the Balkans for even the very worst outcome—a resumption of fighting.

MILITARY BALANCE

The U.S. has done a good job—perhaps too good of a job—of altering the military balance in Bosnia. In June 1996, Croatia, Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Federation (Muslims and Croats), and Bosnian Serbs signed an arms control treaty in Florence, Italy, which gave the Federation a basically two-to-one advantage over the Bosnian Serbs in tanks, heavy weapons, and combat aircraft.⁷⁴ Unlike the war of 1992-1995 when the Bosnian Serb army offset its smaller size with vastly superior firepower, the Federation would have both a manpower and firepower advantage in any future wars. Not only did the Federation then have authorization to outgun the Serbs, the U.S. (and other Muslims countries) embarked on a program to give them the guns. The U.S. alone gave 45 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, 15 helicopters, and 116 artillery pieces. Muslim nations gave a like amount of heavy weapons. The U.S. also contracted with MPRI, a company led and staffed by retired U.S. military personnel, to provide training to Federation soldiers.⁷⁵ These investments have paid off handsomely in one sense; the almost universal view is that Federation army is clearly superior to the Bosnian Serb army.

⁷⁴ Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), p 124

That's a good situation so long as you are sure that the Federation wouldn't attack the Bosnian Serbs ... but personally I'm not so sure.

A brief side trip into defense theory is fruitful on this issue of stability. In theoretical terms, weapons that can only be used for defensive actions and not offensive actions can build the defensive posture of one entity without threatening its neighbors. Such weapons eliminate the "security dilemma" entities face.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, weapons with defensive but no offensive capabilities are rare. An arrangement could be made, though, that would work toward that end. As a condition of continued economic assistance, the West could require the Federation to place under NATO's (or the OSCE's) control the majority of their heavy weapons. To the extent that NATO would be seen as an honest broker, the Federation's weapons then become purely defensive weapons. NATO wouldn't allow the Federation to use them to attack the Serbs but would allow them to be used if the Serbs attacked. Thus, the security dilemma is solved, at least in theory. This does open the door to mischief and deception from all sides, leaving NATO with a task much like that of a policeman sorting out which ruffian started the fight. The garrison sites would certainly need to be equipped so that the NATO overseers could quickly and easily destroy the entire garrison (and all of the heavy weapons) to ensure the Federation never decided to attack the NATO troops as a means to get the to weapons.

The situation is more problematic in Kosovo due to the recent flash of extremism. In theory, it would be easy to train and equip an Albanian Kosovar "National Guard" to deter a Serbian attack. Again, the weapons could be garrisoned under absolute Western control. Trusting the Kosovars not to pick fights with FYROM and Serbia is difficult

⁷⁵ "Train and Equip Program Status, February 7, 2001" (Position Paper provided by Mr Steve Geis, U.S. State Department, 2001), p 1-6

right now. Plus, it's hard to see that Serbia poses a threat to Kosovo at the moment. However, the idea of creating and equipping a National Guard could be an attractive carrot to moderate Albanian leaders and could give the West a key insight into their genuine willingness to live in peace.

REFUGEES

While deterring conflict is a major contribution, KFOR and SFOR make the biggest difference in peoples' daily lives by effectively protecting the pockets of ethnic minorities. And this is also, by far, the task most likely to make NATO's presence impossible to remove. I say this because people are making decisions under the assurance of NATO protection. In Kosovo, the daily routine is full of KFOR peacekeepers guarding Serb weddings, Serb schools, and Serb convoys. If KFOR wasn't there, it's likely the Serbs wouldn't be either. As discussed earlier, the inability of KFOR to protect more Serb refugees has put the UN's plans to return more of them to Kosovo on the back burner. The same dependence on NATO is true in Bosnia. One Muslim returnee said: "The only reason I came back is because Americans are here to protect us." Likewise, a U.S. peacekeeper, speaking of Muslim returnees to eastern Bosnia, said "The only reason they feel safe at all is because we're here."⁷⁷ NATO peacekeepers often visit the returnees on a daily basis, just to ensure all is well.⁷⁸

This dependence on NATO for refugee returns is the tar baby that could hold NATO peacekeepers in place for a very, very long time. Encouraging and assisting the return of

⁷⁶ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Jan 1978, p 199

⁷⁷ Joshua Hammer/Newsweek, "The View From the Front," updated 30 January 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Jan20010130view.htm> (cited 30 January 2001), p 1-2

refugees to areas where they are an ethnic minority only increases the reliance on NATO peacekeepers. For example, the U.S. recently constructed a new SFOR base camp in eastern Bosnia expressly to increase the presence of U.S. soldiers, thereby facilitating the return of more Muslim refugees.⁷⁹ Implicit in this action is that NATO will protect the returnees. While this U.S. action is admirable on a humanitarian basis, it takes the NATO mission in exactly the wrong direction if one isn't willing to accept an open-ended, long-term commitment.

Another theoretical diversion is useful here. Noted political scientist Stephen Van Evera studied modern nationalistic and ethnic conflicts (civil wars) to determine their causes. One aspect is structural—where do people live? Van Evera noted that the more densely nationalities are intermingled, the greater the danger of war. Moreover, local intermingling and the presence of “pockets” that could be “rescued” by the “homeland” in time of war further heightens the risk of war.⁸⁰ This exactly describes Bosnia in 1992 and partly explains why the civil war was so savage. However, the maximalist view of Dayton is attempting to rebuild this very same population distribution in 2001. In other words, the maximalist view encourages the reconstruction of the most unstable population structure theoretically imaginable. Clearly this is inconsistent with the Western goal of stability.

What NATO must do is stop providing this implicit security guarantee for minority returns. Does this mean that the refugee returns to areas where they would be a minority

⁷⁸ Carla Anne Robbins/Wall Street Journal, “Task of Rebuilding Looms As Challenge for the Next President,” updated 3 November 2000, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Nov2000/e20001103task.htm> (cited 3 November 2000), p 3

⁷⁹ Scott Schonauer/European Stars and Stripes, “New U.S. SFOR Camp to Protect Returning Muslims,” updated 5 February 2001, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Feb2001/e20010205newus.htm> (cited 5 February 2001), p 1

may slow to a trickle? Probably. Does it even mean that the whole flow of minority returns could reverse, with people leaving their ancestral homes for areas where their ethnic groups are in control? Again, probably. But this is totally consistent with the minimalist approach for Dayton. It is not NATO's responsibility to enable the refugees' return. If you don't accept the notion that NATO should be protecting Bosnians from other Bosnians for an unknown additional number of years beyond the five already spent, then these are the logical consequences of a people who still do not trust other ethnic groups. The same is true in Kosovo. We should expect that the Serb minority would move north into regions where Serbs are a majority.

Being pessimistic, this voluntary consolidation back into homogenous regions (or a soft partition as some call it) is also useful should fighting resume after NATO leaves. The highly intermingled nature of Bosnia in 1991 made the atrocities far easier to commit and ethnic cleansing almost inevitable. Should the sides begin to fight again, there would be clearer battle lines and the civilians could be brought back into safer areas removed from the front lines. This would reduce the humanitarian pressure on the West to intercede if fighting resumes.

CONCLUSION

I stated in the opening of the paper that the deadline strategy deserved a second look to see whether it offers a viable exit for the peacekeepers from the Balkans. In theory, setting a deadline can have many positive effects: it creates focus and a push to progress; enhances accountability; links strategy and resources; keeps an international presence to a

⁸⁰ Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, Vol 18, No. 4, Spring 1994, p 8

minimum; and increases the chances the major powers will contribute. On a less satisfying note, a deadline also makes it easier to end failing missions. There are critics of setting a deadline. Underlying this criticism, however, is a philosophy that the West should be willing to fund indefinite missions.

Beyond the theory, the UN's experience with deadlines has been quite positive. Missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, and the Central African Republic all were more effective due to a deadline. Even in the tragic case of Somalia the deadline saved the UN from wasting yet more time and resources than it did.

Despite the strong theory and positive experience supporting a deadline, the Clinton Administration's attempt to use a deadline for Bosnia in 1995-1997 failed miserably. The deadline was neither credible nor supported. We can overcome those problems in 2001 should we so choose. Setting a deadline requires a shift toward the minimalist view of the Dayton Accord. It further requires that NATO work toward a military balance between the former combatants and a more stable refugee settlement pattern.

In the end, the matter really boils down to a choice between setting a deadline or continuing with the current strategy, which entails an unlimited commitment of Western funds and time for Bosnia and Kosovo to heal. Of the two strategies, the former is the more risky. It will require dedicated U.S. leadership. In the worst case, it could result in fighting. On the other hand, the former strategy also offers a potentially huge payoff, with an obvious benefit being the acceleration of the dreadfully slow process of stabilizing the Balkans. Removing the troops saves a great deal of money and wear and tear on the NATO militaries. And those monetary savings could be flowed into the stabilization efforts. Moreover, establishing a deadline sets an important precedent. The

West is willing to assist in troubled areas but will not throw unlimited resources down a black hole. Accountability and making the most of an opportunity enter the picture for warring factions. Some have likened the deadline strategy to the “tough love” approach. I think the analogy is apt; genuinely helping other nations means taking effective measures to assist their betterment. It does not mean enabling counterproductive behavior.

The West now has almost a decade (and it has been an unhappy one) of experience dealing with this latest crisis in the Balkans. I recognize taking a gamble by setting a deadline is not an easy choice. The current strategy seemingly offers fewer risks, even if success in the near or even long term is not assured. The urge to stick with this approach is undoubtedly strong. However, given their Balkan experience, decision-makers might want to consider this old saw: “Why do you keep doing the same thing over and over again, each time hoping for a better result than you got last time?” If decision-makers want a better result, they may very well need a different strategy—perhaps even a deadline strategy.

APPENDIX 1: CAMBODIA

The UN's involvement in Cambodia followed the October 1991 comprehensive peace agreement for Cambodia signed in Paris. Ultimately called the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the mission was to facilitate the implementation of the peace treaty agreed upon by all the Cambodian warring factions. UNTAC would eventually grow to over 22,000 military and civilian personnel and cost over \$1.6 billion. It would also cost 78 UN lives.

As the job of implementing the Paris accords was a broad one, UNTAC's mandate was similarly broad. The military aspects called for ceasefire monitoring, demobilization and disarmament of the warring troops, de-mining operations, and repatriation and resettlement of refugees. UNTAC was also to lead an economic rehabilitation effort and maintain law and order during the transitional period.⁸¹ Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative had substantial authority to direct the political actions during the transition. Organizing and conducting free and fair national elections was, however, the UN's fundamental task.⁸² Based on the Paris accords, the elections were initially set for April 1993. As we will see, the timing of these elections became a deadline of sorts.

Armed with this ambitious mandate, the UN slowly began to work; I say "slowly" because it took five months from the peace treaty signing until UNTAC would begin to

⁸¹ "United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia," http://www.un.org/dpko/dpko/co_missions/untac.htm

⁸² MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p 94

deploy in significant numbers.⁸³ While this slow start would prove to be a problem, it was not the UN's greatest problem. Set to begin in June 1992, the warring factions quickly hamstrung the demobilization effort. The peace accord called for demobilizing and disarming 70 percent of the factions' soldiers and cantoning the remained 30 percent.⁸⁴ While none of the warring factions cooperated entirely, the Khmer Rouge or Party of Democratic Kampuchea (DPK) became the primary obstructionist. Essentially, the Khmer Rouge never allowed UNTAC to demobilize or disarm any of its soldiers. After having disarmed some 55,000 troops from the other warring factions but being completely stymied by the DPK, UNTAC quietly abandoned the demobilization effort and shifted its military focus to providing security for the voter registration effort.⁸⁵ But increasing political violence, especially by the DPK, would plague the preparations for the national elections.

Faced with the collapse of the demobilization effort, increasing noncompliance by the warring factions with the peace treaty, and rising political violence, the UN faced a difficult strategic decision. The approaching elections would fall short of the West's definition of free and fair. The UN chose to concentrate almost entirely on creating conditions for a safe election, even though it had initially sought to do much better.⁸⁶ The UN's ambitious mandate was shrinking dramatically.

Just getting to the elections proved to be a monumental challenge. In the spring of 1993, many sources called on the UN to suspend the elections, given the increasingly negative environment of violence and intimidation. In a major strategic decision, the

⁸³ Ibid, p 279

⁸⁴ Ibid, p 135

⁸⁵ United Nations Secretary-General, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (S/25719)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 6

Security Council eventually decided—based on the strong recommendation of the Secretary-General and his special representative—to proceed with the elections in May 1993.⁸⁷ Just prior to the election the Secretary-General called the conditions “imperfect,” but one has the sense that he knew the UN had done its best.⁸⁸

The elections did proceed and did so remarkably safely. Voter turnout was almost 90 percent of registered voters.⁸⁹ Although the losers derided the elections, Cambodia ratified a new constitution and installed a new government. Four months after the election, UNTAC declared its mission complete and closed out its mandate.⁹⁰

As we will see over and over, whether one calls UNTAC a success depends on the benchmark used. Measuring UNTAC against its original mandate shows that it came up far short of the mark: the warring factions never demobilized, the election was far short of the “fair and free” standard initially envisaged by the UN, and the political situation was incredibly muddled. In short, some would say that the UN left with Cambodia in little better shape than when it had arrived.⁹¹ Time, indeed, has proven that Cambodia did not flourish after the UN left, but that is not the standard that should be used to measure UNTAC.

If one uses the “Tony Lake” standard (giving a country breathing space to tackle their problems), then UNTAC was a success. Noncompliance by the warring parties with the Paris Accords was the fundamental cause of UNTAC’s shortfalls. And this goes back

⁸⁶ Pierre Lizée, *Peace, Power, and Resistance in Cambodia* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p 115

⁸⁷ MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p 149

⁸⁸ United Nations Secretary-General, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (S/25719)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 139

⁸⁹ MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p 155

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p 189

⁹¹ Pierre Lizée, *Peace, Power, and Resistance in Cambodia*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p 127

to the fundamental question—who is ultimately responsible for a nation’s future? The international community successfully gave the Cambodian political factions a genuine chance for lasting peace. It was these political leaders that failed to fully capitalize on the opportunity.

The UNTAC experience also gives strong credence to the idea of timelines. UNTAC knew that it was behind schedule as early as June 1992. How did it know? It had a detailed plan that culminated in April 1993 elections, and it knew that it had fallen behind in some areas. Even as officials acknowledged their situation, they expressed confidence that the elections would still proceed as scheduled. Why the urgency? Because the rainy season precluded much slippage in the election date.⁹² The election date became a de facto deadline or action-forcing event and UNTAC’s personnel viewed the deadline as both realistic and credible, a view that drove UNTAC throughout its mission. Furthermore, the deadline (in this case, elections) gave the UN a fixed point to withdraw. The UN could arguably have stayed well past September 1993, because key aspects of its mandate remained undone, but the Security Council wisely stuck with the original deadline.

⁹² MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p 93

APPENDIX 2: SOMALIA

The three unhappy years of the UN missions in Somalia typify the problems of incremental entries and exits. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNISOM I) began in April 1992 in response to deteriorating conditions there. The initial effort was small—only fifty military observers. The Security Council subsequently increased the troop authorization to 3,500 in August 1992 and then again to almost 4,300 troops a month later. The troops were to monitor a ceasefire and support the movement of humanitarian aid. Somali factions put the UN forces squarely in the middle, with the end result being that the UN was shot at by both sides. Not surprisingly, the conditions further deteriorated in the country.⁹³

Faced with the building humanitarian problem, the U.S. (and others) entered Somalia in December 1992. Two aspects of this intervention were unique. First, although it had Security Council authorization, the force was not initially under UN command. Second, this new force was massive compared to its UN predecessor. The U.S., along with twenty other nations, sent almost 40,000 troops to Somalia. This massive force succeeded in overwhelming the factions and ensuring the humanitarian aid got through. Success at this basic task, however, led to new dangers for the international force.

In early 1993, the Secretary-General launched efforts toward national reconciliation. While this move was essential to brighten Somalia's future, it put the UN mission on a more hazardous course. Having gained agreement from all contributing nations, the UN

⁹³ "United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNISOM I)," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unisomi.htm (cited 8 December 2000), pp 1-3

brought all troops under the UN umbrella of UNISOM II in March 1993. The Security Council then gave UNISOM II an aggressive mandate: it tasked the Force Commander with creating and maintaining a secure environment in Somalia.⁹⁴ The warring factions had agreed to a disarmament plan, but General Mohammed Farah Aidid's faction vigorously resisted its implementation, which put Aidid and the UN on a collision course.

The attempt to forcefully disarm Aidid was the turning point for the UN operation. A June 1993 clash resulted in the death of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers. The struggle continued throughout the summer. On 3 October 1993 a U.S. force attempted to capture some of Aidid's key lieutenants—while the raid did net some big fish it came at a terrible price. Eighteen U.S. servicemen died and one was captured.⁹⁵ Four days after the operation, U.S. President Clinton declared that he would withdraw virtually all U.S. forces by the end of March 1994. Although the Security Council didn't formally drop the peace enforcement aspect of the mission's mandate until February 1994, after the U.S. deaths the UN force never again asserted itself.⁹⁶ The UN would remain in Somalia for another eighteen months after the October tragedy, but it was never the same force.

The U.S. force's departure in March 1994 seriously damaged UNISOM II's military capability. Not only did U.S. forces leave, but many highly capable European contingents left as well. Although the Security Council authorized 22,000 troops in February 1994, the Secretary-General couldn't field that many troops due to a lack of donors.⁹⁷ The Secretary-General knew this new force was not up to the tasks before it.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 814 (1993)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 14

⁹⁵ "United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II)," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unisom2.htm> (cited 8 December 2000), p 4

⁹⁶ United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 66

⁹⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 897 (1994)*, (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 3

Like so many peacekeeping operations, broken promises littered Somalia. But one promise was key to the timing of the UN's exit. In March 1993 the warring factions agreed to a reconciliation plan. Although the plan was ultimately widely ignored, the Somali leaders had agreed to a two-year timetable for implementing the plan. The Security Council seized this commitment and in September 1993 declared that the UNISOM II would complete its mission by March 1995.⁹⁹ Note that the Security Council set this time limit at the end of a troubled and dangerous summer but before the tragic death of U.S. troops of October 3rd. In every subsequent mandate extension, the Security Council referenced this March 1995 end date.

Did this specific end date crystallize Somali cooperation? Not really. There didn't seem to be any significant political cooperation. Aidid and the other competing clan leaders fought each other until (and well after) the UN exited. But the key question is whether the deadline ever had a chance to generate progress. Again the answer is no.

The UN's deadline was arguably not credible when established in September 1993 and was most certainly not credible after October 1993. The international will and consensus had evaporated. The Secretary-General himself undercut the deadline's credibility: as late as fall 1994, he was still angling to stay past March 1995, should he see sufficient political progress.¹⁰⁰

What the deadline did do was give the Security Council a good reason to terminate the mission "on schedule." The Security Council did just that, directing in November

⁹⁸ United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p 62

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 865 (1993)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 4

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia (S/1994/977)* (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 20 and United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Somalia (S/1994/1166)* (New York: United Nations, 1994) para 23

1994 that the mission was to be terminated in March 1995.¹⁰¹ The UN spent its last six months in Somalia simply preparing to withdraw. In the end, the only thing all parties could agree on was that it was time for the UN to go. None of the warring factions or international aid agencies requested the UN to stay past March 1995.

¹⁰¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 954 (1994)*, (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 1

APPENDIX 3: MOZAMBIQUE

The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is perhaps the UN's shining moment in turbulent peacekeeping annals of the 1990s. After a long civil war, Mozambique's warring factions signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992. It was the job of ONUMOZ's 7,000 troops to assist in implementing the peace agreement.

Fitting a very predictable pattern, the implementation of the peace agreement soon fell behind schedule due to continued political skirmishes between the warring factions. This time, however, the bad start did not portend the ultimate failure of the mission. The Secretary-General and Security Council were able to keep the process moving forward. Only four months into the operation, the Security Council expressed strong dismay with the delays and called on all sides to set a firm timetable for the remaining aspects of the peace agreement's implementation.¹⁰² In June of 1993 the Secretary-General began pushing for national elections in October 1994, which was a one-year slip from the timetable originally set forth in the peace agreement.¹⁰³ Despite this setback, the UN tenaciously clung to this date and the elections eventually became the event that led to a UN withdrawal.

The latter half of 1993 would follow the pattern of hope, promise, and setback. In August the warring parties ambivalently accepted the October 1994 date for the elections,

¹⁰² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 818 (1993)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993) , para 3, 10

¹⁰³ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/onumoz.htm> (cited 15 February 2001), p 7

and the Security Council kept up the heat throughout the fall with resolutions condemning further delays. In November the Security Council clearly put the warring parties on notice that its patience was running thin in UN Security Council Resolution 882. Not only did the Resolution label “unacceptable” further maneuvering that would lead to more slippages, it laid out a strict timetable for political and military milestones that culminated in the October 1994 elections. It then required the Secretary-General to report quarterly on the progress, with the clear but unspoken threat being that more delays would lead to the Security Council terminating the mission.¹⁰⁴

The Secretary-General’s first report pursuant to Security Council Resolution 882, in January 1994, set the tone for what was to be a most successful year. The Secretary-General noted some problems but overall said there had been significant progress. He described the timeline as “increasingly tight” but also expressed confidence that Mozambicans and their leaders understood that the international community would not accept further delays.¹⁰⁵ The Security Council then maintained pressure by accepting the Secretary-General’s report and directing him to develop firm plans to withdraw all UN personnel by November 1994, immediately following the elections.¹⁰⁶ The Council went so far as to send a mission to Mozambique in August 1994 to ensure that events were on schedule. A week before the elections, the Secretary-General declared that the essential conditions for free and fair elections were present.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 882 (1993)* (New York: United Nations, 1993) , para 3, 10

¹⁰⁵ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (S/1994/89)* (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 11, 31, 36

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 898 (1994)*, (New York: United Nations, 1994) , para 4

¹⁰⁷ “United Nations Operation in Mozambique,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/onumoz.htm> (cited 15 February 2001), p 16

The election, originally planned for 27 and 28 October, proceeded fairly well after jumping one last hurdle. One warring faction decided to boycott the elections as the polls opened on the 27th. Predictably, the UN and other international players quickly and forcefully lobbied the faction's leader to reverse his decision. They succeeded, and the polling was extended one more day. In the end some 90 percent of registered voters cast ballots in the election.¹⁰⁸

True to its word, the Security Council quickly terminated ONUMOZ after the successful elections, and the mission closed shop in early 1995. Unlike some other UN peacekeeping operations, this mission truly accomplished its job. And it seems undeniable that the deadline strategy adopted by the Security Council played a role in its success. The Council's persistent insistence on the October 1994 elections pushed the warring parties to move forward with the peace process. To be sure, the ultimate success depended on the willingness of the warring factions to honor their agreements. Truly, however, the UN played a highly constructive role, in part due to its impatience with delays and disruptions.

¹⁰⁸ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/onumoz.htm> (cited 15 February 2001), p 17

APPENDIX 4: RWANDA

While Mozambique is the high point for UN peacekeeping efforts, Rwanda is arguably the low point. The mission began like so many others. Following a peace agreement signed by the warring parties in August 1993, they invited the UN to help implement the peace accords. The UN accordingly formed the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993. Seeming to apply the lessons learned in Mozambique, the Security Council set in the initial authorizing resolution an end date for the mission of December 1995, following national elections projected for October 1995.¹⁰⁹ The mission began with the usual fits and starts, but soon went badly wrong.

Rwanda exploded in April 1994 following the suspicious crash of an aircraft carrying the Rwandan president. This triggered a genocidal civil war that led to the horrific deaths of between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandans. Not only was UNAMIR an eyewitness to some of the violence, the violence engulfed UNAMIR and ten Belgian peacekeepers were tragically killed.¹¹⁰ This triggered a pullout of all Belgian forces. The combination of the UNAMIR's reduced capability and the fighting emasculated UNAMIR's ability to implement its mandate. Amidst a rapidly deteriorating situation, the Secretary-General proposed a range of options to the Security Council, from a massive reinforcement of UNAMIR—essentially making it a peace-imposing force—to a

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 872 (1993)*, (New York: United Nations, 1993), para 6

¹¹⁰ “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/unamir_b> (cited 15 February 2001), p 8

complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.¹¹¹ In the end the Security Council left a small military contingent in Rwanda, hoping that it could help broker a ceasefire.

UNAMIR would rise again, but it would never play a central role in Rwanda's peace process. In May 1994, the Security Council approved the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops, hoping to stabilize Rwanda and assist in meeting the humanitarian needs of the displaced persons.¹¹² Given the recent events, it should come as no surprise that volunteers to man this expanded force were slow to come. Although UNAMIR would eventually fill its ranks, throughout the summer of violence no nation deployed additional troops under UNAMIR's auspices. The UN had only 500 troops and some military observers on the ground in Rwanda.¹¹³

France did send troops under their national command authority, albeit with Security Council permission, into Rwanda in June 1994. Codenamed Operation Turquoise, the French established "humanitarian protected zones" in southern Rwanda. The French remained until August and then passed responsibility for the zones to UNAMIR.¹¹⁴

Having gained control over most of Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) declared a unilateral ceasefire in July 1994.¹¹⁵ The next day a government of national unity was named. Although there would be minor flashes, the war in Rwanda was basically over. The UN and others were still coping with the humanitarian crises triggered by the fighting.

¹¹¹ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report on the Situation in Rwanda (S1994/470)*, (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 12-20

¹¹² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 918 (1994)*, (New York: United Nations, 1994), para 3, 5

¹¹³ "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/unamir_b> (cited 15 February 2001), p 19

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p 16, 23

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p 17

Estimates showed that as many as 70 percent of all Rwandans fled their homes. The most intractable problem would be the refugee camps spawned in neighboring countries, where upwards of two million people lived at their peak. Over time, former government leaders and soldiers opposed to the RPF-led unity government attempted to manipulate and form these refugees into an invasion force in waiting. The Secretary-General proposed detailed plans for a decisive move into these camps, in essence “freeing” the refugees from the radical leadership. Although the Security Council condemned those manipulating the refugees, it never took any action along the lines envisaged by the Secretary-General.¹¹⁶

After almost a year of relative peace in Rwanda, the unity government grew frustrated with the UN’s inability to weed out those fomenting unrest in the refugee camps. Perhaps fearing an invasion from the camps while being hamstrung by the existing UN arms embargo, the government called for a reduction of UNAMIR from 5,500 to 1,800 troops. Moreover, it wanted UNAMIR completely out by December 1995.¹¹⁷ The UN did not meet this request. After the government reaffirmed its desire for UNAMIR to leave as soon as possible in December 1995, the mission essentially went into a termination mode. The pullout was complete in March of 1996.¹¹⁸

While the UN mission was a failure, it’s interesting to note that the Rwandan government has remained stable since the 1994 ceasefire. Perhaps it has been too stable because Rwanda has joined other African nations in intervening in Zaire/Congo’s internal

¹¹⁶ “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/unamir_b> (cited 15 February 2001), p 28

¹¹⁷ United Nations Secretary-General, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance for Rwanda (S1995/107)*, (New York: United Nations, 1995), para 57

¹¹⁸ “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/unamir.htm> (cited 15 February 2001), p 2

affairs. Rwanda is an example that when a civil war ends with one side in control, as happened with the RPF in 1994, the peace is typically more stable and long lasting.

APPENDIX 5: HAITI

The UN mission in Haiti, particularly from the U.S. perspective, is another case where the mission began with an established time limit. Unlike Rwanda, however, the deadline had a chance to work. But whether the mission was a success depends very much on the eye of the beholder.

The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) predated by a year the ultimate entry of the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF) onto Haitian soil. In September 1991 a military coup displaced the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide. The UN mission began in September 1993 to assist the implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement of July 1993. When junta leader Raoul Cedras thumbed his nose at the UN by refusing to honor his obligations under the agreement, preventing the entry of UN personnel and equipment, a process of gradual escalation began. Cedras ultimately backed down only when faced with a massive U.S. invasion force.

The Security Council authorization of the MNF—Security Council Resolution 940—was remarkable for its strategic clarity and vision, and it appears that the Council was putting into practice the hard lessons learned in Somalia and Mozambique. Two aspects come to the fore. First, the Security Council Resolution specified the mechanism for the MNF to eventually be subsumed into UNMIH. The resolution directed the transition occur when a stable and secure environment had been established and UNMIH was prepared to assume the tasks. Second, UN Security Council Resolution 940 set February

1996 as the time limit for the mission.¹¹⁹ It was the U.S. that drove the insertion of this time limit, which was based on the anticipated inauguration of Haiti's new president.¹²⁰

The military operations of the MNF and UNMIH went better than probably anyone dared expect. The MNF included 22,000 troops from twenty-eight nations at its high water mark. The MNF force transitioned to UNMIH in March 1995 and the troop level fell to the 6,000 specified in UN Security Council Resolution 940.¹²¹ UNMIH suffered only six fatalities during the mission.

The question then becomes what happened as the established time limit of February 1996 approached. The Haiti operation was never popular in the U.S. Congress, and during March 1995 testimony concerning the mission's success before a skeptical Senate committee, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott twice referred to the definite time limit of February 1996 for U.S. troop involvement.¹²² Events would test that commitment. In early 1996 newly elected Haitian President Preval requested UNMIH remain past its rapidly approaching termination date. The UN Secretary-General agreed and ultimately proposed a force of 1,900 military personnel.¹²³ At that point, international politics entered the fray.

The first major issue was whether the U.S. would ignore its own time limit and participate in the continued UN force. The White House quickly answered that question

¹¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 940*, (1994), (New York: United Nations, 1994) , para 8, 11

¹²⁰ David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p 108

¹²¹ United Nations, "United Nations Mission in Haiti," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm> (cited 10 December 2000), p 2

¹²² Strobe Talbott, "Statement Of The Honorable Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary Of State, Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee," updated 9 March 1995, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/bureaus/lat/1995/950309talbotthaiti.html>> (cited 12 February 2001), p 1, 8

¹²³ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti (S/1996/112)*, (New York: United Nations, 1996), para 47, 51

with a loud NO!¹²⁴ Quietly, U.S. diplomats called for continued U.S participation. Indeed, even U.S. military officers on the ground in Haiti expected the U.S. to remain past the time limit. One senior U.S. official, speaking of the White House's decision, said "of course it's not the right decision."¹²⁵

In the face of these expert opinions, why did the administration withdraw the troops on schedule? Anthony Lake, then the president's National Security Adviser, said that he personally felt the mission was complete and the U.S. troops could leave. Furthermore, there was Bosnia. In early 1996 the U.S. was deploying troops for NATO's new mission in Bosnia. Again the mission was unpopular in Congress and again the Administration promised a strict time limit on involvement. While Lake said there was no explicit link made between Bosnia and Haiti (others disagree with this), he said the context was still there. Namely, if the Administration reneged on its Haiti promise, it would be wrecking its credibility on Bosnia.¹²⁶ A less obvious point is that the U.S. didn't technically abide by the time limit. U.S. troops remained in Haiti, albeit at fairly low levels, through December 1998.¹²⁷

The second interesting international aspect of UNMIH's continuation was China's role. China was miffed at Haiti's diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. After threatening to veto the entire mission, China allowed the UN to authorize only 1,200 troops for

¹²⁴ New York Times, "U.N. Says Peacekeepers Will Remain in Haiti", updated 11 January 1996, <<http://archives.nytimes.com:80/plweb-cgi/...tor=AND&TemplateName=doc.tpl&setCookie=1>> (cited 13 February 2001) p 1

¹²⁵ Johanna Mcgeary, "Did The American Mission Matter?," updated 19 February 1996, <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1996/dom/960219/world.haiti.html>> (cited 12 February 2001), p 2

¹²⁶ Lake interview and David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p 162

¹²⁷ David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p 147

Haiti—well below the Secretary-General’s requested level.¹²⁸ At this point, Canada and Pakistan stepped forward to offer troops to support the UN force without officially being part of the UN mission. This ad hoc arrangement lasted until the troops eventually departed. In due course, the Security Council extended UNMIH at the reduced level until June 1996.¹²⁹

Illustrating just how hard it is to end an operation, it took the UN almost another three years before it would truly wind down its peacekeeping operations in Haiti. The primary concern was the training and maturity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). The UN mission did transition to primarily a police-training function and was effectively an all-civilian mission from 1998 onwards. The UN’s final mission, the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, closed shop in March 2000.¹³⁰

The postmortems on the Haiti missions are almost as controversial as the decision to enter in the first place. The judgment of success depends very much on the benchmark used. By many measures Haiti in 2001 is clearly better off than in 1993. Still, Haiti is not all that some had hoped for when the MNF entered Haiti. Politically, the results are mixed. The junta is gone and the Haitians have twice conducted presidential elections. Ironically, Aristide—prevented by Haiti’s constitution from consecutive terms—is again the president. On the other hand, the democratic process is tainted, so much so that the U.S. threatened in the fall of 2000 to levy sanctions for electoral mischief and virtually ignored Aristide’s inauguration.¹³¹ The nascent HNP and judicial system have proven

¹²⁸ Ibid, p 134

¹²⁹ United Nations, “United Nations Mission in Haiti,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm> (cited 10 December 2000), p 1

¹³⁰ United Nations, “United Nations Civil Police Mission in Haiti,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm> (cited 14 February 2001), p 1

¹³¹ Luis Lauredo, “The Situation in Haiti,” updated 5 September 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000905_lauredo_haiti.html> (cited 8 January 2001), p 1

more durable than many expected. Haiti continues to limp along economically, though it is not bad enough to have restarted the refugee flow that arguably caused the U.S. to enter Haiti in 1994.

Using the standards of UN Security Council Resolution 940 as a yardstick, one could only call the operation an unqualified success. The resolution reaffirmed the international community's goal was to restore Haiti's democracy and its elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide—mission accomplished. The resolution specifically called for the creation of a safe and secure environment as well as the creation of a separate police force—again, mission accomplished. At a more basic level, the U.S. national interest of stemming the Haitian refugee flow was accomplished. And after all, the U.S. did intervene for its own national interests.¹³²

Those who believe the international community owed the Haitian people a good deal more than that specified in UN Security Council Resolution 940 or the “opportunity to succeed” standard will judge the mission a failure. They will argue that the only lesson of Haiti is to set low goals that one is sure to achieve.¹³³

Again, the question returns to the ideological divide of what the international community “owes” failing nations. The maximum view is that a failing state is owed a substantial rehabilitation, with a functioning market economy, viable social structure, and a democratic governmental structure being the essential requirements. But is this really what the international community owed Haiti? Is this even reasonable to consider?

¹³² Strobe Talbott, “Statement Of The Honorable Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary Of State, Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” updated 9 March 1995, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/bureaus/lat/1995/950309talbotthaiti.html>> (cited 12 February 2001), p 8

¹³³ Johanna McGeary, “Did the American Mission Matter?,” updated 19 February 1996, <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1996/dom/960219/world.haiti.html>> (cited 12 February 2001), p 1

Indeed if these are the standards of success then the price of success is sure to be extremely high and the probability of success low.

While the deadline strategy was not perfectly implemented, Haiti is an opportunity to assess its impact. It is fair to say that the operation accomplished a lot in a fairly short period. After a massive entry, the UN and MNF successfully pared the force rapidly: from 22,000 troops to 6,000 troops in roughly six months. The Haitian armed forces were dissolved and a new police force of 5,200 was recruited, trained, and deployed by February 1996.¹³⁴

The focusing impact on the Haitian leadership was mixed. President Arisitide did hand over power on schedule even though he (and others) strongly campaigned to extend his term in compensation for “time lost” to the junta. Recall that an “on schedule” and democratic handover of the presidency was a key part of the deadline timing. The political landscape, however, was far from solid and the process less democratic than some would have hoped. The Haitian leadership seemed to squander the economic opportunities presented by the international community.¹³⁵ This was not for want of focus by the international community, though. The U.S. alone invested over 235 million dollars in 1995, and, by the time U.S. troops pulled out of Haiti, the international community had pledged almost a billion dollars of assistance over the next three years.¹³⁶

The difficulty of truly assessing the focusing factor is that we don’t know what would have happened without the deadline. Even with the deadline though, the corrosive

¹³⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti (S/1996/112)*, (New York: United Nations, 1996), p 2

¹³⁵ Johanna McGeary, “Did the American Mission Matter?,” updated 19 February 1996, <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1996/dom/960219/world.haiti.html>> (cited 12 February 2001), p 3

¹³⁶ Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, “Sustaining Success in Haiti ...,” *Strategic Forum/NDU Press* #77 (June 1996);, p 3

effects of an extended international presence—even one as helpful as MNF and UNMIH—were still apparent. The Haitian government was reportedly happy to see the U.S. troops leave on schedule. Still, the U.S. had served as an excellent scapegoat for the Haitian leadership whenever something went wrong in Haiti. Some Haitian newspapers, though not necessarily representing the majority view, called the UN presence an occupying force. Canada, which essentially assumed the leading role in Haiti after the U.S. troops left, tired of Haitian ingratitude and left in 1997.¹³⁷ Ingratitude and scapegoating are regrettable yet predictable. More problematic was the abdication of responsibility by leading Haitians. Recall that even advocates for Haiti complained that the Haitian leadership acted corruptly and immaturely, behavior enabled by the UN force's presence. At face value, this observation seems to mean that the UN perhaps stayed too long, not too little. At an absolute minimum then, the deadline strategy prevented the U.S. and UN from overstaying its welcome even more than they did.

¹³⁷ David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p 153

APPENDIX 6: ANGOLA

The UN spent a decade attempting to bring peace to Angola. Its involvement began in 1989 with a relatively small operation that verified the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. After this successful and limited mission, the on-again, off-again peace process slowly seduced the UN into a growing involvement.

After the initial peace agreement for Angola faltered, all parties signed the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. The UN's mission grew to over 8,000 personnel and the mandate called for these troops to assist implementation of the protocol.¹³⁸ As has proven typical in other peacekeeping missions, the failure of the signatories to meet their obligations doomed the peace efforts and led to continued war. In the case of Angola, the UN and most observers find fault primarily with the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia de Angola (UNITA) faction. How the UN responded to UNITA's challenge is a classic example of hope far outstripping reality.

For over two years the UN kept hoping UNITA would live up to its promises and comply with the signed agreements. As early as October 1996, the Security Council fingered UNITA's noncompliance as the problem and demanded that all parties honor their commitments.¹³⁹ Initially the UN had hoped that its mission in Angola would be complete by the spring of 1997, though the Secretary-General recognized that Angola would still require a small UN presence even after then. Based on the hope that the

¹³⁸ "The United Nations Mission of Observers In Angola," updated 21 July 1999, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/monua_b.htm> cited 8 December 2000

¹³⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1075 (1996)*, (New York: United Nations, 1996), para 1-20

demobilization and other key military tasks would be complete by early 1997, the Security Council retooled the mission and mandate for Angola in June 1997. This follow-on presence was expected to last for nine months.¹⁴⁰ Although the initial plans called for only a very small military presence (around 300 troops) after February 1997, almost 5,000 troops remained in June 1997. Draw-down plans called for the removal of all but 300 troops by September, but unrest in Angola repeatedly delayed the plan's execution.¹⁴¹ In October 1997, the Secretary-General reported no significant progress in the peace process but hoped that the troop draw-down could soon resume (at that point, just under 3,000 troops remained).¹⁴²

Faced with a deteriorating prognosis for peace, the UN equivocated time after time—the

very course of action that firm deadlines would preclude. Over the next fourteen months the Security Council approved eight extensions of the UN mission. In the summer of 1998, the UN twice extended the mission for only one month. Despite repeated Security Council demands and repeated Secretary-General assurances that the troop level would be cut to the original intended level, the force did not shrink below 675 troops until the mission was terminated.¹⁴³ Numerous times during this period the Secretary-General reported the political dialogue was going nowhere and yet he called for extension after extension. What did this hesitant strategy reap? The UN forces became pawns and victims of the warring parties. Restrictions upon the movement of UN

¹⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1118 (1997)*, (New York: United Nations, 1997), para 3

¹⁴¹ United Nations Secretary-General, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) (S/1997/438)*, (New York: United Nations, 1997), para 14

¹⁴² United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (S/1997/807)*, (New York: United Nations, 1997), para 13-15

personnel and numerous threats to their safety destroyed any effectiveness in implementing their mandate. The warring parties shot down two UN aircraft, killing twenty-three personnel.¹⁴⁴ In short, the UN was almost totally ineffective in carrying out its mandate and became a force to be protected rather than a force to assist peace.

In late 1998, all parties found one thing they could agree upon—the UN should go. The Angolan government, UNITA, and the Secretary-General all rejected any further extensions for the UN mission. Amid escalating fighting and human suffering, the UN closed the book on its peacekeeping operations in Angola in February 1999.

The Security Council and Secretary-General's reluctance to terminate the UN mission throughout 1997 and 1998 almost certainly wasn't due to naiveté. Both recognized that the probability of success was quite low. So, the lesson of Angola isn't that the decision makers were fools; rather it is that even in deteriorating situations it is very difficult to shut down an operation. Another lesson, though, is that incremental strategies don't work. Would UNITA have complied with the agreements had the UN set a firm deadline for mission termination—it's doubtful. However, with a firm deadline the Security Council would have had a clear point to stop hoping and begin terminating the mission. Many UN personnel tragically lost their lives in what was fairly clearly a hopeless situation.

¹⁴³ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1164 (1998)*, (New York: United Nations, 1998), para 9 and United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (S/1999/49)*, (New York: United Nations, 1999), para 49

¹⁴⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (S/1999/49)*, (New York: United Nations, 1999), para 8

APPENDIX 7: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

The UN mission in CAR encompasses many of the perspectives seen in the other operations. In 1996, rocked by three mutinies spawned by simmering social and economic problems, CAR President Patasse asked the presidents of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali for help in mediating a truce in the CAR. Having succeeded with the agreement of all parties to the Bangui Agreements, these countries formed an inter-African peacekeeping force (codenamed MISAB) to assist in implementing the truce. Troop deployments began in early 1997. At the request of the presidents of CAR and the MISAB nations, in August 1997 the UN Security Council passed a resolution giving UN authorization for the MISAB actions. The operation proceeded well throughout 1997; however, the French decided to withdraw its troops and logistical support for MISAB by mid-April 1998. Although the MISAB countries were willing to continue their support of the CAR peace process, they were unable to do so without the French support.¹⁴⁵ They then turned to the UN.

The UN Security Council authorized the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in March 1998. It capped the peacekeeping force at 1,350 troops and authorized the force for an initial three-month period.¹⁴⁶

Owing to a political climate of cooperation and a seemingly genuine desire for a peaceful process, events in the CAR were largely positive. Legislative elections, initially

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (S/1998/61)*, (New York, United Nations, 1998), para 4-9, 28

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1159 (1998)*, (New York, United Nations, 1998), para 9, 12

slated for the early fall of 1998, slid to December due to minor problems. The Secretary-General requested the Security Council expand MINURCA's mandate to include assisting the conduct of the elections. The UN Security Council agreed but expressed its intention to terminate MINURCA soon after the elections.¹⁴⁷

The electoral process proved a success, though the results were somewhat foreboding. The competing parties, with significant MINURCA assistance, overcame the squabbles that typically precede such momentous elections. From a process perspective, the election was quite successful: the UN saw only minor technical problems and isolated voting irregularities.¹⁴⁸ However, the results left the country split along ethnic and regional lines. In the end, the ruling party maintained control of parliament by only one seat—and that only after an opposition politician threw his support to the ruling party. Both the UN Secretary-General and the CAR president strongly requested that the Security Council not terminate MINURCA in early 1999, as it planned to do.

The Secretary-General, while keeping MINURCA at its present size, proposed the mandate continue and include assisting the presidential elections to be held in fall 1999; the UN could then terminate MINURCA.¹⁴⁹ A reluctant UN Security Council went along, extending the mission until November 1999 with some serious caveats. First, the Security Council made clear that it would not favor any extensions past the presidential elections. Second, it required the Secretary-General to file a report every forty-five days on the CAR's progress.¹⁵⁰ This unusually stringent reporting requirement was a shot

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1201 (1998)*, (New York, United Nations, 1998), para 2, 11

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Secretary-General, *Third Report Of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Mission In The Central African Republic (S/1998/1203)*, (New York, United Nations, 1998), para 11-14

¹⁴⁹ United Nations Secretary-General, *Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (S/1998/1203)*, (New York, United Nations, 1998), para 51-53

¹⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1230 (1999)*, (New York, United Nations, 1999), para 2, 3

across the CAR's bow, warning them that any foot-dragging could end in a swift termination of MINURCA.

The Secretary-General was able to consistently report favorable progress and the presidential election occurred in September 1999. Having been re-elected, CAR President Patasse and other regional leaders lobbied the Security Council to yet again extend MINURCA's mandate.¹⁵¹ They did not succeed; the Council remained true to its commitment and directed the removal of all peacekeepers by 15 February 2000.¹⁵² Timing, fatigue and geopolitics played a role in the Security Council actions.

In an odd way, this combination of factors and MINURCA's success are a fitting culmination of the UN mission review. In one major sense, MINURCA was a textbook example of "Get in, do the job, and get out." The Security Council clearly wasn't going to abide warring factions delaying the timetable. In this sense, the Security Council seized the initiative and never let go. Some context is also important, though. This mission started toward the end of an expensive and frustrating decade for UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, the Council had the Kosovo effort and Sierra Leone to worry about. The net effect of all this was that the Security Council wasn't going to be dragged into a long, expensive mission in the CAR. And that was a good thing for both the UN and the CAR. The UN maintains a small political unit in the CAR, and things are still less than perfect. But the UN did its job and now the CAR people have been left to do theirs—an appropriate end for all sides.

¹⁵¹ United Nations Secretary-General, *Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (S/2000/24)*, (New York, United Nations, 2000), para 9, 33

¹⁵² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1271 (1999)*, (New York, United Nations, 1999), para 1