Trustworthy Refinement Through Intrusion-Aware Design
Abstract
High confidence in a system's survivability requires an accurate understanding of the system's threat environment and the impact of that environment on system operations. Unfortunately, existing development methods for secure and survivable information systems often have a patchwork approach in which the focus is on deciding which popular security components to integrate rather than making a rational assessment of how to address the attacks that are likely to compromise the overall mission. This report proposes an intrusion-aware design model called trustworthy refinement through intrusion-aware design (TRIAD). TRIAD enables information system engineers to use known and hypothesized attack patterns to iteratively improve and continually maintain system survivability, even as the system and threat environment evolve over time.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA407784
Entities
People
- Andrew P. Moore
- Robert J. Ellison
Organizations
- Carnegie Mellon University