Prejudicial Counsel: A Multidimensional Study of Tactical Airpower Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars
Abstract
This study analyzes the Air Force's decisions made concerning the advancement of tactical conventional airpower from 1953 to 1961, This thesis evaluates the decision- making process at three distinct levels using Graham T, Allison's three decision-making models First, this study examines Air Force decision-making based upon grand- strategic, systemic issues to conclude that tactical conventional airpower was given second priority to the dominant policy of strategic nuclear missions as a consequence of President Eisenhower's desire to balance the federal budget while deterring the Soviet Union, Second, an evaluation of organizational decision-making within the various units that contributed to the advancement of tactical airpower reveals that despite the lower level of emphasis, tactical airpower was not entirely neglected, Third, this paper highlights how senior Air Force individuals in key positions provided prejudiced counsel, which steered national command authorities toward the continuation of the strategy of Massive Retaliation and the subsequent repression of tactical conventional airpower, The final section of this study ties all three levels of examination together to create a comprehensive understanding of how Air Force decision-making, based predominantly on key individual's biases, impeded the advancement of tactical airpower between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, This impediment resulted in a greater loss of lives and resources during the opening months of the Vietnam War,
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA407800
Entities
People
- Ronald L. Banks
Organizations
- Air University