The Air War Over Serbia: Denial, Punishment, or Balance of Interest
Abstract
Since the days of Giulio Douhet, airpower theorists and practitioners have hotly debated the best use of airpower for achieving political objectives. Academics and airmen have written and tested several theories on the use of coercive air power. Currently, three main theories of coercive airpower are in vogue within academic and airpower circles denial, punishment, and balance of interest. This study examines NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE within the construct of these three theories, The first section summarizes the conflict from both a military and diplomatic perspective. It splits the 78-day conflict into four phases and uses foreign and domestic press reports, NATO-member after action reports, and US Air Force data to determine NATO and Belgrade's objectives, strategy, and actions between March and June of 1999. It then uses the historical record to ascertain the fit between the facts of the conflict and the three theories of coercion. Using the denial theory of Robert Pape, the punishment theory of Thomas Schelling, and the balance of interest theory of Alexander George and William Simons, section two of this study determines which theory best explains the outcome of NATO's air war over Serbia.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA407809
Entities
People
- Troy R. Stone
Organizations
- Air University