The Weinberger "Doctrine": Useful Compass or Flawed Checklist?
Abstract
In 1986, Caspar Weinberger gave a speech to the National Press Corps in which he proposed six tests for American leaders to consider before making the decision to use military force. His intent was to urge caution and restraint before committing troops. This paper evaluates the strategic utility of the "Weinberger Doctrine" by examining classical theorists and historical evidence. The author lists the six tests along with contemporary criticism to show that the criteria debuted to mixed reviews. The writer then examines the tests through the lens of three diverse theorists: Thucydides - a fifth-century B.C. historian; Carl Von Clausewitz - a nineteenth-century military theorist; and Graham Allison - a contemporary political scientist. The central conclusion is that one should not ask, as Weinberger does, whether force should be employed before one evaluates possible strategies. Next, the writer examines three varied cases: the American decisions to use force in Vietnam and Allied Force, and the German decision preceding the First World War. The cases confirm the finding of the theorists that one should evaluate strategy before deciding to use military force. They also show that Weinberger should have included a test causing leaders to consider the long-term implications of military action.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA407811
Entities
People
- John S. Sellers
Organizations
- Air University