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THESIS

NATIONAL GUARD ENGAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC: NO THREAT TO SECURITY

by

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**NATIONAL GUARD ENGAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC:
NO THREAT TO SECURITY**

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This thesis evaluates recent decisions to expand the National Guard (NGB) State Partnership Program into the Asia-Pacific region and examines potential effects this expansion will have on the new partners created there. It predicts likely responses from non-participants and defends the program against critics who argue that engagement activities draw personnel and resources away from primary war fighting objectives. It examines European engagement programs developed through NATO in the mid-1980s, assessing their evolution and present activities. Specifically, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) are addressed. This evaluation provides a foundation for prescribing changes to the SPP doctrine for future relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From this evidence the main body of work focuses on predictions of applying this regionally specific model. It looks particularly at evolutionary characteristics needed to make the program feasible, discussing current partnerships and those countries awaiting future consideration. Mongolia is addressed in detail, being the newest member country petitioning for partnership. Finally, and most important, the extent to which the program affects regional stability is assessed, focusing specifically on China as it ushers in its fourth generation of leadership and continues to open itself to the outside world.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
APR	Asia-Pacific Region
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, European Command (<i>no longer used</i>)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC	Central Military Command (Chinese)
CPC	Communist Peoples' Congress
GNP	Gross National Product
J5	Strategic Planning and Policy Section (U.S. Major Commands)
JCTP	Joint Contact Team Program
MAP	Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MDU	Mongolian Democratic Union
MLT	Military Liaison Team
MPRP	Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Party
NAA	North Atlantic Alliance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGB/IA	National Guard Bureau/International Affairs
OPCON	Operational Control
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLA	Peoples' Liberation Army (China)
PRC	Peoples' Republic of China
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPP	State Partnership Program
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act (U.S. Congress)
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis evaluates recent decisions to expand the National Guard (NGB) State Partnership Program into the Asia-Pacific region and examines potential effects this expansion will have on the new partners created there. It predicts likely responses from non-participants and defends against engagement program detractors. Even though these programs have matured through the 1990s and deliver tangible benefits to both partner countries and their mated states, there are critics who object to Department of Defense activities that pull personnel and resources away from traditional war fighting objectives. These include academics like Chalmers Johnson, who argues that U.S. foreign policy constitutes meddling and invites “blowback” in the form of terrorism, and military officers who underestimate the educational, operational and diplomatic value intrinsic to these programs.¹ Furthermore, recent military call-ups of traditional guard and reserve forces to fight the war on terrorism have increased operational tempos to the point where state adjutant generals are reconsidering participation in programs they view as non-essential. The small footprint of NGB engagement programs and their inherent flexibility contradict these accusations and offer essential capabilities for prosecuting a defense in the face of the current global security dilemma.

The thesis argues that the SPP is a sound, proven operation with a credible history currently resting on the edge of greater opportunities. It offers new challenges as the United States and its allies prosecute the war on international terrorism and provides a unique system that benefits national security objectives. By examining European engagement programs initiated through NATO in the mid-1980s, assessing their evolution and present activities, both achievements and shortfalls are presented to answer the disapproving and promote further expansion of these programs. Specifically, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) are addressed. This evaluation provides a foundation for prescribing changes to the SPP doctrine for future relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

¹ See Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt, 2001) for an opposing opinion on American intervention and engagement.

The main body of research focuses on predicting the prospects for applying this new universal SPP model in the region. It looks specifically at evolutionary characteristics that must be taken to make the program feasible, discussing current partnerships and those countries waiting in the wings, analyzing program limitations and problems associated with creating and sustaining Pacific engagement operations. Mongolia is discussed in detail, being the newest member country petitioning for partnership. Finally, and most important, the extent to which the program affects regional stability, paying particular attention to China, will be assessed with recommendations for further program refinements for inclusion of pivotal countries that are positioned to support U.S. national interests.

This research draws on scholarly source materials for guidance and support. Books and documents on the Asia-Pacific region's security have laid the foundation upon which analysis of engagement can be studied. Case studies of past and present partnerships provide the tools and experiences for recommending changes in building the Pacific blueprint and Interviews with administrators of the PfP and SPP from the state, national and international levels provide the "person-on-the-ground" insight into how these programs are functioning. Foreign and domestic press reports, commentaries, and official written statements have also been consulted to broaden the body of evidence supporting the recommendations offered. By drawing on this extensive range of information, a comprehensive picture of domestic and international reactions to the introduction of Pacific engagement programs, in particular the SPP, emerges from which the degree of acceptance for it may be determined and suggestions for further expansion may be scrutinized.

Chapter II establishes the groundwork for the recommendations that follow by tracing the origins of U.S. engagement programs, illustrating their historic development with nations of the former Soviet bloc and the evolution of these programs through to their present incarnations. From a broad range of perspectives, both positive and negative, a picture has been painted concerning how early engagement efforts were defined in the Bush and Clinton administrations and how these evolved in Europe and the Balkans. In the words of Lt Col Michael Dubie in an article for *National Guard*, "the SPP is a bilateral program that links U.S. states directly with developing democracies

around the world in support of U.S. national security.”² The National Guard’s leadership in expanding the SPP is a testament to its commitment to the program in furthering these security and military objectives. At the 2001 SPP conference in Gulfport, Mississippi, Major General Raymond F. Rees described SPP expansion in his opening remarks:

Beginning in 1993 at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the State Partnership Program has grown from one partnership to seventeen partnerships in Europe, eleven in the Americas, four in Central Asia and our first in the Far East. And the program continues to expand.”³

Addressing specific examples of both successful and unsuccessful partnership interactions, the thesis draws conclusions regarding promising techniques that were established and assessments flaws in those relationships. Analyzing engagement in this fashion aids recognition and avoidance of similar mistakes while at the same time gleaning wisdom and experience toward a successful strategy in future Asia-Pacific region partnerships.

Employing the techniques outlined in Chapter II, a blueprint for strengthening and expanding the Asian-Pacific State Partnership Program is discussed in Chapter III. This blueprint takes into account the fact that an original intention of the European Partnership for Peace (PfP) model - namely, bringing former Soviet Bloc countries closer to NATO membership - is not applicable in the Pacific (extending NATO’s reach to the Philippines, for example, makes little sense). The underlying principles that made the European program viable, however, are compatible with the new model for the Pacific. The research emphasizes appropriate regional issues, elaborating on benefits afforded through partnership. These include building democratic institutions, projecting American values, fostering free market economies, and promoting military-to-military and civilian-to-military relationships.⁴ Chapter III defines how these issues serve Asian-Pacific partner countries and prescribes adaptations for civilian-military relations, economic aspects, and security concerns where necessary. The chapter also addresses regionally

² Michael Dubie, “The National Guard: Promoting United States national security,” *National Guard*, Sep 1998, 81.

³ Raymond F. Rees, Major General, USA, “Opening remarks for CNGB 2001 SPP Conference in Gulfport MS, 13 March 2001”, available online at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/chief/vchief/speeches/20010313.shtml

⁴ Dubie, 81.

specific concerns that administrators face currently or expect to face in the near future as the program matures and expands.

Chapter III concludes by focusing on current security and stability questions in the Pacific related to U.S. engagement practices there. Identifying various hot spots in the region, the chapter scrutinizes contemporary tensions and conflicts regarding their likely effects on new partnerships and the consequences any increases of U.S. military presence will have on Asian interests and concerns. Reflecting upon the structure and objectives of the Pacific SPP/SOP defined earlier, the chapter offers judgments regarding Asian countries that are knocking at the SPP door and those that are not yet asking but may be considered worthy of courtship by the National Guard. The chapter concludes by analyzing how building an extensive structure of relationships affects strategic shaping in the Asian-Pacific geopolitics and what potential impact it will have on overall stability throughout the region.

The newest country petitioning for a state partnership is Mongolia. Wedged between the regions' two major powers, China and Russia, Mongolia serves as a strategic buffer in regional security. Throughout much of its twentieth century history, the country has lived under the Soviet Union's shadow, emerging in 1990-92 to declare itself independent and democratic. Having already been accepted into the SPP by U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and National Guard administrators, Mongolia awaits an American partner state. Chapter IV reveals engagement objectives Mongolia wishes to pursue with its future state partner. Using interviews with national-level program directors and research into Mongolia's history since the beginning of the 20th century, Chapter IV uses Mongolia as a case study.

China is increasingly becoming the most important regional player in the Asian-Pacific and as such, it requires special consideration as the SPP establishes a foothold within the region. Chapter V assesses China's attitude toward this growing U.S. presence and its application of the concepts presented in previous chapters. It provides a discussion on measures by regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to guarantee regional stability and support, describing how these actions parallel or constrain U.S.

engagement efforts. It is reasonable to assume that China would be suspicious of American hegemony and tactical encirclement through engagement activities in the region - especially of operations like the SPP and its list of prospective state partners. The current candidate partner, Mongolia, as well as existing mature relationships in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in particular present the most perceptible implications to Chinese ambitions in the region. Mongolia, which shares a 2500-mile border with China, presents potentially destabilizing challenges as it cultivates membership in engagement programs such as the SPP. The SPP relationships in Central Asia testify to the value of engagement for America's strategic interests and foreign policy, made all the more clear in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. military activity has recently increased within these countries as staging bases for the war in Afghanistan, and the partnerships cultivated with these countries helped pave the road for their participation. Indicative of Beijing's concerns, Chinese analysts have been suspicious of alliances in the region as potentially targeted against them and are increasingly voicing these concerns openly. As Chapter V shows, the extension of the Partnership for Peace program into the Asia-Pacific has been cited as a primary focus of these allegations, and the chapter assesses how the United States and the National Guard have in the past and should, in the future, handle them.⁵

Domestic American critics have raised some of these same issues. Among them is Dr. Larry M. Wortzel of the Heritage Foundation, who warns against rushing blindly into new partnerships with the People's Liberation Army (PLA).⁶ Since one perspective in the China debate calls for military-to-military reengagement with the PLA, the chapter also evaluates the anxieties and the opportunities of this course of action and calculates possible Chinese responses to the extension of the SPP in the Asia-Pacific.

The Asian-Pacific region that USPACOM shoulders U.S. military responsibility for comprises approximately two-thirds of the Earth's surface. Establishing a successful SPP presence in this area of the world is beneficial to U.S. strategic interests. However,

⁵ See David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security", *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), 119.

⁶ Larry M. Wortzel, PhD., "Why Caution is Needed In Military Contacts with China", December 2, 1999, available online: <http://www.heritage.org/library/background/bg1340.html>

extending SPP and other Western engagement activities to this region also carries the risk of upsetting Beijing and raising concerns among current and potential allies, partners, and competitors, even though the program maintains a small operational footprint and its objectives lend benign support for emerging democratic institutions. Throughout history, balance of power politics has continuously teetered on issues such as this. The final review presented in Chapter VI concludes by offering recommendations with respect to these regional concerns and suggesting avenues for future research.

II. ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE SPP

If the American goal is to re-create Ohio in Kosovo or Haiti, then the occupiers are doomed to be disappointed. But if the goals are more modest, then American rule can serve the interests of the occupiers and the occupied alike. Put another way, “nation-building” is generally too ambitious a task, but ‘state-building’ is a more realistic objective. The apparatus of a functioning state can be developed much more quickly than a national consciousness.⁷

No longer should The National Guard be considered the “weekend warrior command” or be the butt of Hollywood jokes. The National Guard, in addition to its essential contributions to national defense, has since the early 1990s served a unique mission to U.S. stability operations worldwide. Two engagement programs, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), were designed in the waning days of the Bush administration and implemented during the Clinton administration. These have brought traditional guardsmen in direct contact with counterparts in emerging democracies and former Warsaw Pact nations in military-to-military, “environment shaping” relationships. An examination of the processes these two programs have undergone reveals the potential impact on regional stability and security they present.

A. THE BIRTH OF “LEGITIMATE PART TIME DIPLOMACY”

As the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR gasped its last breath, the former Soviet satellite nations that found themselves without the support of a protective patron. Secretary of Defense William Perry called this era a “point between a cold war that is

⁷ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 346.

over and a peace that is not yet secure.”⁸ This period saw a surge in interest for the methods of government constructed and employed by the United States and the European Union. As these ex-Warsaw Pact countries investigated Western-style democracy and pondered the potential for assuring their security through NATO membership, Washington realized that its own national security policy could be advanced “through constructive military relationships with [these] developing countries under non-confrontational conditions.”⁹ Thus was born the State Partnership Program and its subordinate element, the Military Liaison Team (MLT). The purpose, as John Groves and others pointed out, was to introduce a forum “in the spirit of a Partnership for Peace” where regional and international ideas on defense, politics and economics could be shared, filling the strategic vacuum left in Central Europe by the Soviets’ withdrawal. A primary goal was to minimize the costs of these exchanges while maximizing the benefits for all involved.¹⁰ Latvia became the first participant in this new program, and its entry also shaped how the SPP would be organized and managed when it expressed to NATO its interest in the U.S. National Guard’s “citizen soldiers” organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Guard Bureau decided that pairing applicant countries with willing U.S. states and using the National Guard as educators and diplomats were the best way to achieve a key SPP objective, namely, restructuring former communist militaries to accept subordination to civilian control and depoliticization. By utilizing the talents of these state organizations, the NGB was able to showcase the unique nature of the Guard’s dual role: supporting civil authorities in peacetime and becoming warrior capable in times of war.

From NATO’s and NGB’s websites, a thorough understanding of how the concept of a “Partnership” among nations came into being can be deduced. Of special significance is the “Framework Document for the Partnership for Peace,” penned at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, on January 10-11, 1994.¹¹

⁸ From, “Remarks As Prepared for Delivery by William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense to the John F. Kennedy School of Government,” Harvard University, May 13, 1996.

⁹ John R Groves, Jr., “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress,” *Parameters*. (Sep 1998), 44.

¹⁰ Ibid, 44.

¹¹ This document can be found online at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm

This defined what would be required of member countries in the North Atlantic Alliance (NAA), specifying peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. The National Guard had previously sought to further justify and expand the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and instituted the SPP as the key security cooperation tool for accomplishing the goals that became central to the NAA contract, allowing interaction in social and economic, as well as military spheres.¹² In what has been portrayed in program literature as somewhat of a “chicken and egg” argument about which came first – PfP or SPP, the dates of these documents show that prior to the Brussels meeting, The National Guard was already taking positive steps toward what the PfP Framework Document called for:

The SPP was established following the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) proposal in the spring of 1993 to pair National Guard States with the Baltic Countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The NGB proposal was prompted by CINCEUR's Jan 93 decision to staff the Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) in the Baltic with Reserve Component personnel, to avoid sending a provocative signal to the Russian Federation that might have been caused by assigning active duty soldiers. The SPP thus began as a bilateral military-to-military contact program with which to engage the countries of central and Eastern Europe.¹³

As more countries began to embrace the spirit and intent of the PfP, NGB involvement expanded at a rate not anticipated by the program's initiators. It soon became apparent that the original mandate of these two programs would have to evolve to meet the growing demand and that the arbitrary restraints initially placed on the NGB doctrine would have to be revisited.

B. THE EARLY DAYS

Many authors have reflected on how quickly and successfully the SPP and the PfP took hold in Eastern Europe. Their works showcased pairings of compatible states and

¹² Information cited here is available online at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/spp_info_paper.shtml

¹³ Available at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/spp_info_paper.shtml

countries blossoming into relationships that reaped a bountiful harvest of benefits and served U.S. security interests abroad. The National Guard put forth the “citizen soldier” as the ideal ambassador, presenting hometown U.S.A. role models exemplifying the ideals of democracy, professionalism and deference to civilian authority.¹⁴ After the first two years of its existence and as word spread concerning the success and popularity of these programs, NATO made engagement a permanent cornerstone of its security architecture.

Vernon Penner, in particular, portrayed the early days as a period of rapid acceptance and expansion of the PfP marked by overwhelming successes. His recommendations for change were presented in the hope that the program would continue to evolve based on the quality relationships that were defining it. He referred only obliquely to limitations that future changes would have to address, and he cited no mistakes stemming from inadequate diplomacy or shortcomings caused by program limitations as the reason for the evolutionary changes he proposed. He gave four recommendations, set forth at a conference in 1996, for restructuring future PfP relationships, based on suggestions from existing partners. These propositions were: strengthen the political component; redraft implementation documents; deepen integration and refocus training objectives; and require more from partners. His recommendations called for expansion, not correction or revision, based on partners’ desires to increase and reinforce overall participation.¹⁵

C. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

On closer inspection of early reviews of these programs, one may be erroneously impressed that everything related to PfP/SPP had been done flawlessly. The available literature from that period tended to be tautological, as writers cited each other, offered

¹⁴ National Guard Bureau/ZI. “Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations.” (Arlington, VA: April 1998), 9. [Photocopied]

¹⁵ Vernon Penner, “Partnership for Peace,” *Strategic Forum*. Number 97, (Dec 1996). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum97.html

little criticism of the programs, and instead regurgitated praise. Serious evaluation emerged only in 1999, in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, when Jeffery Simon assessed the negative effects the PfP engagement program had for Balkan and Eastern European participants, and especially those effected by the war. Specifically, he focused on how differently the first three PfP members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) were treated by NATO compared to later partners of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a program developed out of the Washington Summit in 1999 to make the PfP more operational. Simon's accounting of program obstacles provided an alternative perspective on the program that contravened the rosy portrayals of its past, especially with respect to the often heard misconception that PfP relationships *guarantee or signal imminent NATO membership*.¹⁶ In order to evaluate these early days and assess the programs in general, one must seek outside resources.

Stepping past the early evaluations, Harkavy and Neuman provided a useful discussion on security assistance that may be applied in evaluating the PfP/SPP programs going beyond what the authors intended for their chapter, "Security Assistance and Warfare."¹⁷ Local, state and national program managers will be well advised to study this definition as they shape individual programs, in order to guard against what Harkavy and Neuman refer to as "acts by foreign actors that directly or indirectly influence the capacity of one or more combatants to fight a war." One of the most worrisome effects inherent in engagement programs such as these is the potential for a country that had been receiving military-to-military cooperation through partnership to backslide away from democratic reform and use its new knowledge in malicious ways. A less pronounced, but potentially more insidious characteristic would be the unintended consequences of misinterpretation by neighboring countries of these partnership efforts related to the level of impartiality exerted in promoting democratic reforms. As will be shown later, China represents the best and most unsettling example of this complication.

Alexander George offered another analytical perspective worth considering that relates to the concerns expressed by Harkavy and Neuman. His chapter, "Appeasement

¹⁶ Jeffery Simon, "Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo," *Strategic Forum*. Number 167, (August 1999). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html

¹⁷ Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare in the Third World* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 256.

as a Strategy for Conflict Avoidance” in *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, outlined the differences between appeasement, entente, rapprochement and détente. It also raised issues pertinent primarily to adversarial relationships, but equally as well to burgeoning SPP contacts.¹⁸ He argued that a fine line exists between appeasement and constructive engagement and that one would do well to consider the recipient of support before lending either.

Related in a fashion are the different types of engagement that the U.S. promotes - alliances, partnerships, executive decisions, and “partner-like” activities. Alliances are binding legal associations that carry the burden of reciprocity between signatories for defense related promises. Partnerships, in the context of the PfP and SPP, fall short of this legal structure, offering assistance, support, education and aid, but not the binding “you watch my back while I watch yours...” promise entailed in alliances. “Partner-like activities” take an additional step away from the formal commitments of alliances in that no long-term commitment is implied in the exchange of services. Executive agreements may resemble any of these at the whim and will of the commander-in-chief. Such international accords are enforceable under international law, but do not require submission to the Senate for advice and consent (although in contemporary times most are submitted pursuant to legislative action. Copies of all executive agreements must now to be transmitted to Congress within sixty days of enactment, according to the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972).¹⁹

NGB maintains presentations on its website that describe program shortfalls and issues of relevance for managers seeking to safeguard their partnership activities. These include funding issues, operations tempo (OPTEMPO) concerns, and on a broader scale, problems related to overall program construction. Of these, the current limitation for each state to concurrently engage only one partner represents a dilemma that NGB/International Affairs (NGB/IA) will have to deal with if the program continues to draw interest from emerging democracies in the globalizing world. At last count, there are only 17 states and 2 territories currently eligible to accept new partnerships. The

¹⁸ Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 67.

¹⁹ Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress and its Members* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), 410-11.

program's doctrine outlined a three-stage lifecycle, consisting of initiation, sustainment and maturation phases, to ensure that milestones are met and graduation from the program by the military occurred. This process freed the state from its commitment so it could take on a new partner country. An unfortunate consequence that program architects failed to consider was the popularity of interaction that partners enjoyed. This generated hesitancy for dissolving the military-centric relationships.

Standardization of events and metrics are also highlighted as areas that need improvement and modification. As the program matures, state administrators will increasingly want to engage in dialog with other participants about successful program approaches to pursue and pitfalls to avoid. NGB will require ways to evaluate partnerships for their validity and cost-effectiveness. There are concerns that these programs are not adequately defined to achieve the objectives they purport to embrace. Metrics, if they exist at all, lack the ability to assess accomplishments. Some have gone so far as to accuse the U.S. of destabilizing regions through conflicting intervention programs. Addressing engagement in the Trans-Caspian, Stephen J. Blank wrote that, "There are good intentions, a collection of activities, but no well-defined grand strategy or deeply conceived analysis of the area's strategic potential for or against U.S. operations in the area."²⁰ Blank continued by arguing that EUCOM does not specifically spell out whether it is accomplishing the goals of the national strategy it supports. Without valid measurements for success or failures, a gauge for effectiveness does not exist.

Finally, standards of conduct by these "weekend diplomats" are becoming a significant factor in current relationships. Presently, very few participants have any formal foreign relations or civil-military relations training before setting off for their partner countries. The next phase in the program's national development should require formal training for state managers, such as participation in the Civil-Military degree program offered at the Naval Postgraduate School or other related military branch specific education programs. These programs will help guarantee expertise in the administration of individual partnerships.

²⁰ Stephen J. Blank, "U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Europe," *SSI Report*, June 2000, 32-3. At: www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2000/milengag/milengag.htm

D. PRESENT SITUATION: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Currently, SPP partnership shaping looks like this:

17 State Partnerships in the US European Command (USEUCOM) AOR:	
Alabama - Romania	California – Ukraine
Colorado – Slovenia	Georgia - Republic of Georgia
Illinois - Poland	Indiana - Slovakia
Maryland - Estonia	Michigan - Latvia
Minnesota - Croatia	North Carolina – Moldova
Ohio - Hungary	Pennsylvania - Lithuania
New Jersey – Albania	Tennessee – Bulgaria
Texas & Nebraska - Czech Republic	Utah – Belarus
Vermont – Macedonia	
4 State Partnerships in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR:	
Arizona – Kazakhstan	Louisiana – Uzbekistan
Montana – Kyrgyz Stan	Nevada – Turkmenistan
12 State Partnerships in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR:	
Connecticut – Uruguay	Massachusetts - Paraguay
Puerto Rico - Honduras	Florida - Venezuela
Mississippi – Bolivia	Washington DC - Jamaica
Kentucky - Ecuador	Louisiana – Belize
Missouri - Panama	New Hampshire - El Salvador
West Virginia - Peru	Arkansas - Guatemala
2 State Partnerships in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR:	
Hawaii & Guam – Philippines	Washington – Thailand

Figure 1. 2002 Partnership Pairings²¹

As stated earlier, Major General. Raymond F. Rees commented on the growth and popularity of the SPP to an audience at the 2001 SPP Conference. General Rees’ revelation on the expansion of the program, especially in the Asian-Pacific region, reflects the insight and flexibility expressed in the governing NGB doctrine, which states that, “[the Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations] is a living document. As more nations request formal association with the National Guard

²¹ This information was obtained online at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/partners.shtml

and as these programs evolve, the doctrine will change to meet the needs of the United States and our associate nations.”²² General Rees’ qualification reveals the dynamic and unique nature of the bilateral relationships and the objectives that have grown with the program. It further embodies the flexibility associated with expanding the program beyond the regions within NATO influence.

Most cited literature addresses the goals and objectives of the PfP/SPP, but the best source of explanation related to these issues can be found within NGB Doctrine. Among the most important elements of the doctrine, four principal objectives: promoting American values; supporting national security and military objectives; preventing and defeating threats and; supporting domestic issues, reflect a continuing value for these engagement programs that have matured over the years, but have not yet reached the stage where planners should contemplate “sunset status” for them.²³

Louis Goodman’s “Military Roles, Past and Present” gave a very comprehensive discussion on criteria for evaluating military missions, providing advice that may be applied to PfP/SPP activities over the past decade and that should continue to be applied in future engagements, stating:

Smooth cooperation among allies is essential for the pursuit of common goals. Moreover, the strongest international alliances involve cooperation in many diverse areas – diplomatic, commercial, cultural and military. If such cooperation entails huge transaction costs, economic alliances may be noncompetitive, and security, environmental, or social alliances may become unwieldy...If the armed forces of nations trying to forge alliances take on markedly different roles and missions, their ability to cooperate militarily is likely to be impeded, with the possible spillover into other arenas.²⁴

His insight into the requirements for developing strong and stable alliances may be located in the objectives and goals of both the Partnership for Peace and the State partnership Program. The advice quoted here for safeguarding future interaction

²² National Guard Bureau/ZI. “Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations.” (Arlington, VA: April 1998), 1. [Photocopied].

²³ For those unfamiliar with this term, a sunset mission is one that has grown close to outliving its useful purpose and will soon be abandoned for more worthwhile projects.

²⁴ Louis W. Goodman, “Military Roles, Past and Present,” in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1996), 32.

financially and operationally provides forewarning not just for alliances that the United States engages in, but also for the PfP/SPP structure as well. Goodman's counsel parallels and supports the recommendations of Penner in that these programs must increase the participatory roles of their economic and political elements to keep pace with military exchanges now underway. Absent that, the programs will wither and die due to fiscal neglect, apathy, or a divergence of partner expectations. Simon also gave numerous recommendations for enhancement and expansion of the PfP, warning that NATO credibility is on the line because a crossroad has recently been reached with the nine MAP countries awaiting invitations to join the alliance. He concluded that managers must further clarify PfP issues, lest these MAP countries misinterpret participation and begin to expect rewards beyond what the programs have the capacity to deliver.²⁵ This too is universally applicable to the expansion of engagement activities beyond the European continent. The next chapter begins the discussion of the Asia-Pacific expansion and how U.S. led engagement must evolve to meet the specific concerns present there.

²⁵ Simon, Jeffery. "Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo," *Strategic Forum*. Number 167, (August 1999). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html

III. BUILDING NEW PARTNERSHIPS: THE ASIAN MODEL

In recent years, the challenge for U.S. policy in Asia has been convincing Asian nations that we would remain engaged as we drew down our armed forces and brought troops home from other parts of the world.²⁶

The underlying principles that made European engagement programs like the PfP and SPP viable are compatible in application to new endeavors within the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). After a brief synopsis of how the war on terrorism has affected the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the Far East, this chapter's focus shifts to citing appropriate regional concerns and elaborates on the benefits partnership offers. These include fundamentals identified by Lt. Col. Dubie: building democratic institutions; projecting American values; fostering free market economies, and; promoting military-to-military and civilian-to-military relationships.²⁷ The discussion continues by defining how these issues serve the needs of Pacific partner countries. The original SPP model requires some adaptation for regionally specific civil-military relations, economic aspects, and security concerns that are not germane to the European model. Suggestions for change are presented here. Finally, analysis of the growing U.S. presence as a Pacific nation introduces evidence that may support accusations of American hegemony.

A. ON THE WESTERN FRONT

The war on terrorism has changed the perspective of U.S. engagement activities. This is certainly the case in U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) where four SPP partnerships have matured since the mid 1990s.

²⁶ Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," *The Washington Quarterly*, Number 24, Volume 1 (Winter2001). Obtained online from: muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v024/24.1blair.html

²⁷ Dubie, 81.

These relationships developed with support and influence generated by bilateral interactions and became critical to U.S. strategic planning when the Bush administration set its sights on Afghanistan. Building on foundations of good partner relationships, war planners were able to move Western aircraft and equipment into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Pakistan, while not an SPP participant, also allowed access to its bases. It is foreseeable that when the fighting ends in Afghanistan, a continuing U.S. presence will remain in the region as a vigilant warning that terrorists are unwelcome there. If the new Afghan government leads its country down a democratic path, it certainly would become a viable candidate for SPP consideration.

Admiral Blair, the flag officer who headed U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) from February 20, 1999 to May 2, 2002, stated recently that as USCENTCOM pursues al Qaida within its AOR, many of these terrorists would seek shelter in the Asia-Pacific. Speaking with Margaret Warner for the show *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, in response to her question on where the real problem areas are, he stated, “it's sort of an arc that stretches from the southern Philippines, northern Malaysia around through across [*sic*] some parts of Indonesia, which is a huge country, 17,000 islands, and as wide as the United States, up into say Burma...it's this seam of lawlessness where not only can terrorists find a place to work from but also pirates and drug runners and gun runners and people who are a threat to the region and to the United States.”²⁸ Admiral Blair is often quoted naming these threats as the largest challenges to security and peaceful development in Asia. These dangers have direct bearing, not only on American armed forces stationed in the region, but also on the residents of the APR. Dealing with these issues is what the mission of Western peacetime engagement has come to be defined by. Tailoring the SPP to help partner countries confront these threats will be the challenge of program administrators at the state, national and international level.

²⁸ Admiral Dennis Blair, Transcript of Interview, *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, 19 Dec 2001. Online at: www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec01/blair_12-19.html

B. ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL EMPHASIS

The United States maintains friendly relations with numerous countries throughout the APR. Many of these have been formalized into alliances, as is the case with America's five treaty partners; Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. This chapter does not dwell on these relationships as they have been thoroughly explored in other forums concerning their effects to regional stability. They are mentioned only in that they represent a foundation for America as a Pacific nation. In a later chapter these alliances are mentioned as further evidence used in Chinese criticism to support the ideas of containment and hegemony that Beijing has long accused Washington of waging against China and the region. Other relationships that only receive short mention here include U.S. ties to Taiwan and Singapore - associations that merit entire studies individually - so that the crux of the argument can be investigated.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century attempted in 1999 to predict how the world might be shaped in the first 25 years after the turn of the century. In *Phase One Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment* the commission defined East Asia as "containing not only upwards of a third of the world's population, but also what is widely taken to be the most likely future politico-military near-peer competitor for the United States (China), two of its most critical allies (Japan and Korea), and one of its most intractable problems (North Korea)." The report also predicted that Northeast Asia might be the most likely region to witness a major war.²⁹ Further, Admiral Blair, addressing the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum in January 2002, defined the region and the specific concerns demanding immediate attention by stating:

Over the past several months, countering international terrorism has been our first priority in the U.S. But the events of 11 September also accelerated security cooperation among Asia-Pacific nations and their armed forces on many fronts...What missions such as combating terrorism, illegal immigration, countering narcotics, and stopping hostage-takers have in common is that their solution is beyond the resources and authority of any single country and its armed forces. These enemies draw on worldwide networks of support, and use international borders to their

²⁹ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, "The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century," in *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1999), 75.

advantage. These foes can only be defeated by international cooperation. The Asia-Pacific region does not have well-developed arrangements for regional military cooperation. Yet, regional cooperation is the key to success against these threats to the security of all of our citizens.³⁰

These definitions of the APR and its concerns are important to SPP architects as they tailor the program for regional application. However, the most important reason for a U.S. military presence in the Pacific may arguably be the region's reliance on a naval power capable of maintaining and protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Each year, over half of the world's shipping passes through these waterways. John H. Noer writes that, "The three 'southern entrances' into the region: the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok are particularly important chokepoints in the world trade system." He also included the sea-lanes adjacent to the Spratly Islands in this collection of internationally strategic interests.³¹ Since the Cold War, the U.S. navy has maintained a presence in the region to insure freedom of navigation, protect against piracy and promote stability, primarily because it was the only force capable of these tasks. Future peer competition between China and the U.S. for naval supremacy in and around the SLOCs is predictable because China also relies on these chokepoints for the majority of its shipping, especially oil from the Middle East. Conservative estimates show that if China continues its economic modernization, its demand for oil will increase exponentially. Having the U.S. monitoring the route of delivery for this critical import understandably would worry a PRC government that has traditionally regarded Washington's intentions with suspicion.

³⁰ Admiral Dennis C. Blair, "Regional Security Cooperation," transcript of speech to Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii (January 8, 2002). Online at: www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/others/2002/010801.htm

³¹ John H. Noer, "Southeast Asian Chokepoints: Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open," *Strategic Forum*. Number 98. (December 1996). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum98.html

C. MODIFY THE OLD OR BUILD A NEW BLUEPRINT

The cooperation Admiral Blair speaks of will include engagement activities such as the newly introduced Asian-Pacific SPP. Currently only two relationships have been formalized into true partnerships and Mongolia, having been approved for the program, awaits a state to claim the opportunities of this third association. According to Major Jon McIntosh, the Pacific Desk Chief for SPP at NGB, “a multitude of engagement opportunities have developed for the National Guard in the new security cooperation environment.”³² Converting the SPP from its NATO past into a viable program for the APR is the current task for program managers.

These administrators, both in Washington D.C. and at USPACOM in Hawaii, agree that the basic structure of the SPP as outlined in the *Doctrine for National Guard Cooperation with Other Nations* and *NGB State Partnership Program Standard Operating Procedures* provide adequate guidance for implementation in the APR, however, since neither has been thoroughly reviewed since 1998, they require a new evaluation. Any bias still remaining toward the “former Soviet state, Soviet controlled country model” must be removed. Colonel Newton, NGB program manager to USPACOM, commented that, “both documents should now reflect the new thrust of the SPP toward all countries and not just former *un-friendlies*.”³³

Another concern for program managers customizing the SPP should be to empathize with the independence of some Asian nations and their concept of an Asian culture. There are APR countries that are in no hurry to give up their current forms of government, embracing instead, a form of culturalism that prejudices or outright rejects Western ideals. Originating in Singapore in the 1970s and 80s, government ministers fretting over the loss of cultural identity, concluded that liberal democratic values and Asian culture were fundamentally incompatible. Surain Subramaniam traced this history and evaluated the various schools of thought influencing the dialog over what has become the *Asian Values debate*. He identified three main schools of thought -

³² From NGB-IA memorandum titled, “After Action Report-Pacific Command (PACOM) Interagency and Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group (IAACT/TSCWG),” Honolulu, HI, 22-25 Jan 2002.

³³ Colonel Ken Newton, interview by author, 17 Oct 2002, conducted via e-mail.

Formative, Reactive and Pragmatic - concluding that all three streams, although disagreeing fundamentally, believe that Asians should reject liberal democratic values.³⁴ The SPP must embrace the fact that these forces are currently present in Asia and construct the APR model, sympathetic to these concerns. Applying Subramaniam's discussion of the *Universalist School of Thought*, which defends the compatibility of Asian values and democratic liberalization stating that, "the liberal democratic path has universal applicability," individually sculpted programs can be developed in each new partnership.³⁵

There are a number of other issues that program administrators must contend with. A major premise of the SPP implies that the National Guard will not intrude upon any nation that does not first invite such activity. This places the SPP into a passive position with respect to the 43 potential partner candidates in the APR, a reasonable circumstance regardless of how program managers feel about whom in the region might benefit from partnership interaction. Colonel Newton adds that the State Department restricts engagement potential on Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, China and Indonesia for various reasons. The sheer size of the APR makes engagement challenging and more costly than its European counterpart.³⁶ Also, with the U.S. focus having been traditionally Euro-centric, regional education of the APR has lagged behind experiences gained on the European continent. APR interaction for has been limited and currently on two states - Alaska and Hawaii - and Guam maintain National Guard contingents. Once the program begins to mature, it will have to draw on non-Pacific volunteers, such as it did by matching Washington and Thailand, to meet the anticipated demand for partners.

All SPP activities must be coordinated through the respective theater component and are operationally controlled (OPCON) by that component commander while in conducting activities in the region. Therefore, it is imperative that the working relationship between NGB program managers, individual state planners and the staff of

³⁴ Surain Subramaniam, "The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy," *Asian Affairs, an American Review*. 27 (Spring 2000): 19-35.

³⁵ Ibid, 30.

³⁶ Newton, interview.

PACOM J5 (Strategic Planning and Policy) remain strong and transcend personal affiliations and routine transfers of participants. Having strong support from the J5 for SPP opportunities will help generate and guide future activities. Because one source of funding available to the SPP comes from the component's exercise program, a mature understanding by the overseers of these purse strings can ensure active inclusion for SPP participation. Colonel Newton currently fulfills this liaison role between NGB and USPACOM; it is vital for the program's continued visibility and acceptance that NGB maintain the J5 relationship he has cultivated.

SPP provides the USPACOM another *Theater Security Cooperation Tool (TSC)*. TSC objectives are designed to maintain coalition war fighting skills for deterrence and build regional coalition capabilities to carry out missions, from peacekeeping through combating terrorism. "NG engagement activities that meet TSC priorities can be conducted with any and all PACOM AOR countries."³⁷ These mil-to-mil events, referred to by NGB as "SPP-Like" activities, can be executed without formal SPP agreement and presumably could include engagement activities with non-democratic countries, given the correct assemblage of conditions and with respect to State Department restrictions. Presently, program managers feel the likelihood of any engagement with countries such as China or North Korea would tightly controlled, extremely limited and would not be a part of any planned expansion of the SPP.

As the SPP evolves within the region, the list of appropriate engagement activities must keep pace. The National Guard's vast array of knowledge and expertise represents the essence of the citizen soldier as warrior and statesman, technician and businesswoman. Tapping into this wealth of experiences and adapting them to current and future situations will contribute to the long-term viability of the program. This has become more clear in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, where terrorism has threatened peace and forced the world to look at itself through a different perspective; one that will nevermore neglect security as it strives for stability and prosperity. The Guard is uniquely equipped to support this evolution as another "tool in its bag" of available services.

³⁷ From PACOM Information paper, "National Guard State Partnership Program in PACOM." [Photocopied].

As regional security has entered the lexicon of post 9/11, peacetime engagement priorities must focus not just on how to secure American military force protection during SPP events, but also provide a valuable product the program could offer its partners. Again, Admiral Blair chose prophetic words that express this idea eloquently:

Much of this process of developing shared expectations of peaceful change is the business of policy and diplomacy, but it has a significant military component. The armed forces of the region tend to harbor unwarranted fears of neighbors and regional powers. Regional security would be improved if the armed forces of the region tailored military capabilities and plans and conducted unilateral exercises in ways that increased transparency and warning times, raised thresholds for military action, and supported peaceful solutions over time.³⁸

His words fittingly describe a goal that SPP relationships must strive to achieve in this new dangerous world. As National Guard experts share their knowledge of security and counter-terror tactics, they will make their partners active participants in the process of securing the region and providing international legitimacy to the American presence in the APR. This in turn will diminish the perception of the United States as “lone superpower, unilaterally forcing its will upon the region.” This idea parallels the course expanding engagement programs took in Europe in the 1990s and anticipates rapid acceptance in the APR, but for a different reason. The SPP grew rapidly in Europe due to the promise of Western principles filling the void left by the fall of Soviet communism. The SPP in the Asia-Pacific region is expected to expand due to the loss of security from the growing threat of international terrorism. Smaller states that currently suffer from a lack of internal safeguards will increasingly look to the U.S. for help in securing their borders against the infiltration of these shadowy organizations. The SPP will serve itself well in the region by emphasizing its expertise in countering terrorism and border security.

The SPP has only begun to establish its foothold in the APR with the first partnership pairing of Hawaii and the Philippines in February 2000. Initial exchange activities began shortly thereafter, including subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs), tabletop exercises and leadership seminars. On March 11, 2002, Admiral Blair, the U.S.

³⁸ Blair and Hanley.

Pacific Commander, approved the second SPP pairing between Washington State and Thailand. Here also, exchange activities have begun. It is the hope and goal of the program that through these relationships and others to follow, concerns over territorial rights can be peacefully addressed, regional stability maintained and democratic ideals advanced. When asked what he felt the greatest prize the U.S. could hope to achieve through an SPP relationship, Colonel Newton gave an admirable citizen-soldier response. He said, "It would be for one of the SPP countries in the Asia-Pacific AOR to legislate or direct the formation of a viable reserve component in their military. Many nations in the AOR have some loose semblance of a reserve force, but are impotent without a legal basis and a programmatic method of training and equipping [these forces]."³⁹ As will be shown in the next chapter, Mongolia represents the best candidate for realizing this jewel in the SPP crown.

D. BENEFACTORS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Highly important to the expansion of the SPP, the APR has recently opened up and nations with nascent democratic rumblings are taking notice of the benefits afforded through partnership. Foremost among these are Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia and India. Each has either asked for consideration, been approached with information by NGB program managers and/or begun "SPP-Like" activities, including SMEEs, high level military and civilian exchanges and conferences.⁴⁰

Indonesia also presents a likely candidate, however, its leaders have much to accomplish in stabilizing the government before it will be considered a viable SPP participant. In an article on Indonesian democratic transition, Ronald Montaperto, James Przystup, Gerald Faber and Adam Schwarz gave numerous recommendations for gaining stability in this SE Asian center of gravity. Many of the suggestions echo SPP objectives, including: establishing civilian control of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia's national military), high level officer exchanges and democratic reform leading to military

³⁹ Newton, interview.

⁴⁰ Taken from an unpublished NGB/IA-SPP Information Paper dated August 25, 2002. [Photocopied].

subordination and trust.⁴¹ Exploring this potential relationship would have far reaching benefits, not just due to the SLOC issue raised earlier, but also because a healthy Indonesia is essential for stability in Southeast Asia and to the vital interests of U.S. allies and friends.

The primary obstacle now standing in the way of Indonesia's full participation is the Leahy amendment, which prohibits the U.S. military from assisting foreign militaries that violate human rights with impunity. It restricted resumption of mil-to-mil contact and IMET participation for Indonesia, stemming from 1997 events in East Timor. Indonesia longs for a lifting of the Leahy amendment to allow some military assistance such that it can re-equip and rebuild its military for the tasks of keeping the archipelago together, combating terrorism and helping the U.S. safeguard the SLOCs under its shadow. New evidence that supports this lifting has occurred as the war on international terrorism progresses.

E. CONCLUSION: THE NEXT STEPS

One look at the geography in this area reveals why pursuit of engagement type relations as an element for maintaining security should be an obvious and foregone conclusion. Indonesia borders all three straits. Japan, Australia and the nations of Southeast Asia send over 40 percent of their trade through these waterways and approximately 70 percent of Japan's and South Korea's oil resources flow through the Palawan Strait next to the Spratly archipelago.⁴² Territorial claim disputes over the Spratlys by The Philippines, China, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei continue to be a source of tension in the region. China increased the stakes in the mid 1990s by building permanent structures on Mischief Reef, territory The Philippines claims, but in early November 2002 signed a non-binding agreement designed to prevent open conflict over disputes in the area. This action may signal a potential warming of relations

⁴¹ Ronald N. Montaperto and others, "Indonesian Democratic Transition: Implications for United States Policy," *Strategic Forum*. Number 171. (April 2000). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum171.html

⁴² Ibid.

between Beijing and its Southeast Asian neighbors as China ushers in its fourth generation leadership.

The spread of Islamic terrorism constitutes another important reason for establishing and maintaining good U.S.-APR relationships. Malaysia and Indonesia have large Muslim populations and pockets of poverty that have proven fruitful ground for terrorism's recruiters. Admiral Blair, speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee stated:

We cannot provide adequate protection to our citizens and our forces while only playing defense. Since 11 September, combating terrorism on U.S. territory throughout the Asia-Pacific region has been USPACOM's top priority. We are succeeding, largely as a result of cooperation among many nations. Countering terrorism has accelerated security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, but has not fundamentally altered the region's security challenges. A secure, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region remains very much in the interests of America and the world.⁴³

These statements, as well as Admiral Blair's defense of bilateral cooperation arrangements as having paid large dividends with regard to the war on terrorism, support the argument for expanding the role of engagement throughout the APR.

Future participants will determine how well Asian-Pacific engagement programs are developed and executed. Whether they present a threat or an opportunity to non-democratic regimes lies in how partners choose to manage their individual programs, which countries ask for and are accepted into the programs and if accessibility of SPP-Like activities can be offered to those non-democratic governments. With regard to China, Admiral Blair reflected his opinion on how America should approach this relationship by stating, "It is in the interests of the United States to interact with the PLA to address common interests, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, counterdrug, counterpiracy, and humanitarian assistance. These interactions should be reciprocal and transparent and serve to reduce misunderstandings and the risk of miscalculations on both sides."⁴⁴ In Chapter V, China will be discussed in detail for its reactions to the presence of America within its sphere of influence, how

⁴³ From Adm Blair's SASC testimony on 5 Mar 2002. Online at: 131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2002/020305sas.pdf

⁴⁴ Ibid.

engagement programs like the SPP are perceived by Beijing and what, if anything the U.S. and the National Guard can, or should, do to respond to Chinese criticisms.

IV. MONGOLIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEXT PACIFIC PARTNER

To protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver the other basic services that citizens demand, a democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory.⁴⁵

Appearances can be deceiving. Such is the case when studying the modernization of Mongolia and trying to pinpoint the start of its path toward liberal democracy. Much current research begins with the pullout of Russian forces in 1990 and Mongolia's new constitution in 1992. But ask a Mongolian and he'll likely say that his country's quest for modernization has been like attempting a trek across the Gobi Desert; it's been long and sometimes painful and scary, not knowing what lay just beyond that dune (or border). It also required no small amount of help from friends and acquaintances.⁴⁶ In fact, this analogy closely follows the new direction that scholars of Mongolian history are now taking. Nakami Tatsuo, writing in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan* stated that, "since the beginning of Mongolia's era of 'democratization' in the early 1990s, Mongolian scholars have begun to reevaluate [their early twentieth century history] and have initiated new studies on the 1911 declaration of independence and the formation of the Bogda Khagan regime."⁴⁷

The goal in this chapter is to set out the important events that mark this long journey, introduce the actors who have both helped and hindered Mongolia's progress along the way and continue to influence the shape of modernity in the country, and to

⁴⁵ Juan J. Linz, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 11.

⁴⁶ In a recent conversation with colleague and fellow NPS student, Munkh-Ochir Dorjijugder, I asked him when he thought the modernization of Mongolia began. As a citizen of the country, he was very helpful in writing this chapter and in guiding me to look beyond the superficial texts I had been using for sources. It was he that suggested I look back to 1911 for the start date I was seeking.

⁴⁷ Tatsuo footnotes this passage in the chapter, crediting L.Jamsran, "Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen [The Beginning of the Restoration of the Mongols], (Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo khewleiyin gazar, 1992). From: Nakami Tatsuo, "Russian Diplomats and Mongol Independence, 1911-1915." *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*. Eds. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 69.

identify challenges not yet met. Armed with this information, a review of Mongolia's 2001 "Defense White Paper" will pinpoint issues Mongolian planners hope to achieve through their engagement efforts with the United States and how an SPP relationship may help fulfill some of these concerns. For the purposes of this thesis, Mongolia was chosen because it was selected for partnership in March 2001 and awaits a Guard Bureau decision on a partner state. Its selection and extensive consideration in this chapter reflects its importance to the underlying supposition that U.S. engagement in Asia will have a profound effect on Chinese attitudes and potentially Beijing's actions in response. Mongolia represents the archetypal partner candidate in that it needs what the United States has to offer and American strategic interests will gain significant tangible benefits in return.

A. THE ROPE IN THE SINO-RUSSIAN TUG-OF-WAR

Robert Rupen described Mongolia's fate prior to the revolution of 1911 as being decided by three masters: Russian, Manchu-Chinese, and Japanese. The Outer Mongols frequently and quickly had to adjust in response to the outcomes of relations between them.⁴⁸ Mongolia's history before the beginning of the twentieth century reflected close ties economically with China, however deep seeded animosity on the part of both peoples left Mongolia wishing for a better alternative. In 1911, it received its first opportunity. Following the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, secret negotiations between Russia and Japan placed Outer Mongolia into the Russian sphere of influence and as the Manchu dynasty collapsed, Mongolia declared its independence.⁴⁹ The loss of the Outer Mongolia was protested, but to no avail by the Chinese, who were forced by Russian agreements in 1913 and 1915 to accept Mongolian autonomy. After a short period of

⁴⁸ Robert A. Rupen, *The Mongolian People's Republic* (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), 23.

⁴⁹ Marko Milivojevic, *The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991), 11. Elleman. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 69. Tatsuo confirmed this claim through his research, 69.

⁴⁹ Rupen, 23.

relative independence, aided by Russian support, Mongolia was again occupied by Chinese warlords from 1919 until 1921 when, as Rupen puts it, “China’s inability to control White Russian anti-Bolshevik activity in Outer Mongolia served as justification for the Red Army to move in, and that move resulted in the establishment of a Communist-oriented government in Mongolia.”⁵⁰ This Russian act temporarily ended the tug-of-war over control of Mongolia until 1924, when the U.S.S.R. and China signed an agreement giving control over Mongolia to the Beijing government and the Soviets promising to respect its sovereignty. Marko Milivojevic wrote that information concerning the revolution of 1911 was all but erased by the communists in an attempt to validate their claims to what Milivojevic labeled as a “false revolution.” This bit of historical revision attempted to mark the beginning of Mongolia’s Communist history in 1921.⁵¹

Although Soviet communist influences dominated Mongolia throughout the rest of the twentieth century up to 1990, the years were marked by fear of invasion and occupation by China and ambiguity over Mongolian autonomy by the Soviets. The aftermath of the Second World War transformed Mongolia into a role as pawn in the “double Cold Wars” between the United States and the Soviet Union on one hand and, more distressing, between the USSR and China on the other, in which the Mongolian People’s Republic watched helplessly as Soviet missiles deployed in its territory.

B. A SOVIET SATELLITE

Owen Lattimore described the differences between a colony and a satellite by defining the latter as a country under the influence or control of a protectorate that requires and often forcefully coerces restructuring of the satellite country in the protectorate’s image, while the former is not obligated to these assimilating duties.⁵²

⁴⁹ Milivojevic, 11.

⁵⁰ Rupen, 24.

⁵¹ Milivojevic, 11.

⁵² Owen Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1955), 44.

Mongolia's fit within his definition of a satellite, however, may be slightly inaccurate. Most authors agree that whichever period of control - Russian or Chinese - Mongolian territory was little more than an extension of the protector's border, but Mongolia's autonomy was preserved and it was not forced into assimilating the protectorate's characteristics. An even more important aspect of these relationships - especially the Soviet - was how little aid the USSR offered to its satellite. As reflected in Mongolia's poverty and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lattimore's definition might not be applicable in this case.

Lattimore also coined the "doctrine of the irreversible minimum" to describe how protector countries like the Soviet Union could establish and maintain control of border countries while not actually annexing them. In regards to creating a Mongolian satellite, Lattimore refers to the Soviet desire to protect its Siberian frontier from invasion by the Chinese. In offering the Mongolian government an opportunity for autonomy coupled with economic support and a promise of protection against the Chinese and Japanese, the Soviets gained an irreversible advantage that required minimum expenditure of resources, secure in the knowledge that the Mongolians would not reverse the agreement because they recognized that their country was better off under Soviet protection.⁵³ The Mongolians profited from this arrangement, not just in the receipt of protection but also, albeit insufficient to overcome its poverty, through an increase in trade opportunities with its patron.

Over the years, Mongolia became so dependent on the U.S.S.R. economically that when it collapsed and pulled its troops from the territory, Mongolia was faced with economic, political and military deficiencies. No longer was the patron there to insure against invasion by Mongolia's stronger neighbor. The economic trauma was two-fold. Mongolia had been importing nearly all of its oil, machinery and consumer goods from the north, so it had to now look elsewhere for these items. Complicating this search was the introduction of fifteen new regional competitors for these goods, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid, 44.

⁵⁴ Sanjaagiin Bayar, "Mongolia's National Security Challenges." *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2 (1995), 4.

Much has been written concerning breakdown in communist governance, and conditions in Mongolia after the fall of the Soviet empire tend to support these criticisms. As an example, it is now widely believed that the communist system of collective farming and agricultural associations, adopted in 1955-1960, was incapable of raising livestock numbers significantly over the past 30 years.⁵⁵ History about the present, written many years from now, will undoubtedly point to the collapse of communism as a key event, second to the 1911 revolution, in allowing Mongolia to cast off the burden of dependence on its stronger neighbors and modernize. Further, it will reflect the strength of the Mongol people in fighting pressures undermining their cultural identity and point to the importance Mongolia played for the Soviets and the Chinese. It will reveal with more clarity the security interests of these two powerful countries that were served by the small buffer country between them. Guudian Tumurchuluun, chancellor at the Policy Planning Department in Mongolia's Ministry of External Relations, wrote in 1995 that in the end, "neither Russia nor China succeeded in annexing Mongolia because our country served equally well as a buffer for both neighbors."⁵⁶

C. THE 1990 REVOLUTION: THE FAILURE OF COMMUNISM

By December 1989, the rumblings of revolution could be felt in the cities of Mongolia. Following a split in relations between the two powers in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union attempted to warm relations with China by withdrawing forces and planes from Mongolia's border and Beijing began to breathe easier, knowing that Soviet troops were retreating from close proximity to the Chinese capital. By the time the U.S.S.R. pulled back, it was in decline. As the Berlin wall and the Soviet government fell, the Mongolian People's Republic marked the beginning of the next and possibly most significant stage in its modernization. In this chapter of their history, the Mongolians would emerge from the shadow of the protectorate and write the words themselves.

⁵⁵ Milivojevic, 6.

⁵⁶ Guudian Tumurchuluun, "Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited: Its Relations With Russia and China in the 1990s," *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2 (1995): 44-45.

One theory behind the turnover in power from the ruling communist party to the new democratic forces in Mongolia argues that the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) fell out of favor due to the abandonment of Moscow following its collapse in 1991.⁵⁷ Milivojevic cited the creation of the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), founded in Ulaanbaatar by 27-year-old Sanjaasuregiyn Dzoring, an event reported favorably by both the Mongolian and Soviet media,⁵⁸ as a stark departure from the "cronyism" normally associated with communist regimes. His rise, at such a young age, and that of many in Mongolia's new democracy, speaks to the confidence Mongolians have in mortgaging their future to these promising young leaders and implies that the government is willing to take risks to develop the country's independence and security.

D. GOING IT ALONE

Not new among Mongolia's border concerns is the fear that Beijing still considers Mongolia part of its territory. Displacement, colonization and cultural absorption were still at the forefront of Mongolian concerns in the 1990s. One need only look at China's geography to make a fairly accurate guess as to which direction it would focus attention if it were to become expansionist. The path of least resistance and the road to greatest opportunity is toward Mongolia. With a small population and many, as yet untapped natural resources, the opportunity may one day be too good for China to pass up. Mongolia's fears are therefore not without merit. Even a small invasion of immigrants from neighboring China could quickly make a minority of the Mongolian people in their own country. Ravden Bold, writing for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, stated that, "changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship and in the two countries' thinking on strategic issues mean that Mongolia faces a far more complex security situation than in the comparatively recent past."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Milivojevic, 2.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁹ Ravden Bold, "Adrift Without the Soviets." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. (October 3, 1991), 30.

These fears can certainly be justified for a country not wanting to give up the gains that Mongolia now hopes to secure. Indeed, since its move toward a free market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia's modernization could easily be described as accelerating. Although poverty currently remains an overwhelming concern, even here Mongolia is making visible and significant progress. The deep depression and economic crisis caused by the Soviet Union's collapse began to turn around by 1995, and the economy has grown steadily since. Unemployment and inflation are dropping, while industrial output is on the rise.⁶⁰ Tom Ginsburg identified the severe social sacrifices that have been made in the wake of the basic reforms, but these have not led to retaliation by any of the country's political parties. He stated that "political and economic liberalization have proceeded faster and more coherently [in Mongolia] than in other countries in the region."⁶¹

E. A LITTLE HELP FROM FRIENDS, OLD AND NEW

Ginsburg also wrote, "The overarching goals of the Mongolian leadership are two: continued independence and the modernization of society."⁶² Because Mongolia is surrounded on all sides by China and Russia, it believes the best alternative for maintaining a status quo regional environment conducive to its continued modernization is to play balance of power relations, using a technique it may have learned watching China manage relations during the bipolar Cold War years. By increasing its ties internationally, Mongolia hopes to set up a balance between Russia and China by diversifying relations with other powers, such as the United States or Japan, or a coalition of countries. It is currently too weak politically and militarily to take on the role itself. In the event of a threat coming from either Russia or China, Ulaanbaatar would seek support from among the others. The theory holds that balance will be maintained so long

⁶⁰ Mongolia's economic information can be located in numerous places, however these statistics were found online at: www.un.int/mongolia/economy.htm

⁶¹ Tom Ginsburg, "Nationalism, Elites, and Mongolia's Rapid Transformation." *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*. Eds. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 247.

⁶² Ibid, 249.

as its coalition remains united and stronger than the threatening country. Mongolia is currently cultivating these international relationships with a diverse group of potential partners; the United States, Japan, Korea, and the European Union, to name a few. In addition, in 1994, Mongolia and China signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.” This document reciprocally acknowledged territorial integrity and each country’s mutual respect for the other, and it was quickly followed by a similar agreement with Moscow.⁶³

The United States recognized Mongolia in 1987 and established its first embassy in Ulaanbaatar in 1988. By granting most favored nation trading status to Mongolia, the United States has pursued an economic and cultural relationship and has supported market reforms and Ulaanbaatar’s emerging democracy. Specifically regarding the SPP, Mongolia was approved as a partner country by USPACOM in March 2001 and NGB/IA is currently courting states to find one willing to establish a long-term bilateral relationship. One of Mongolia’s primary goals through partnership is to achieve the benefit of Western principles regarding civilian control of its military. From Mongolia’s Ministry of 2001 *Defense White Paper*:

Strengthening and developing the civilian control over not only the Armed Forces exclusively, but as well as over the entire defense sector, remains the most critical and important issue of the defense policy. Civilian control is an action by the public to exercise their authority, through government institutions, over the implementation of defense-related laws, over the professional military leaderships of the Armed Forces and other troops and, finally, over the defense budgeting and spending.⁶⁴

The SPP provides a platform for accomplishing many of the new government’s stated goals. Ulaanbaatar believes the U.S. to be a benevolent superpower with no hegemonic designs on either Mongolia or the APR and will act as a counter to any attempt at regional domination by China or a resurgent Russia. The United States has stepped up backing, providing financial aid of more than \$100 million dollars over the past seven years, and is quick to respond to disasters. In return, Mongolia was one of the

⁶³ One of the better consolidated cites found for general information is available at: www.state.gov/www/background_notes/mongolia_0011_bgn.html

⁶⁴ Mongolian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, 2001, 67.

first to call on the president and offer support and assistance in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy.⁶⁵

In pursuit of a balance of power, Ulaanbaatar has further cultivated a relationship with Japan that was established in 1972. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, high-level visits have occurred frequently between the two countries, highlighted recently by a visit in 1997 by the Mongolian prime minister to celebrate twenty-five years of diplomatic relations and in 1998 by the president to confirm a comprehensive partnership agreement between the two countries.⁶⁶ A lasting relationship begun in 1992 with the European Union also provides Mongolia with international ties and aid.⁶⁷ From these relationships and others not named, Mongolia seeks to nurture support for its modernization while not becoming overly reliant on any of its new friends and upsetting the strategic triangle it seeks to build. This multilateral approach to securing regional security, continuing democratization and advancing free market economic gains will work only if Mongolian leaders recognize that the state of relations with Russia and China will continue to remain the major factors affecting Mongolia's fate.⁶⁸

F. CURRENT STATISTICS

In order to place Mongolia's modernization in perspective, it is useful to describe its composition. This section contains information drawn from various texts and atlases, many now available online. Mongolia now supports a population of approximately 2.4 million people. This makes Mongolia a small country by population standards, but one that encompasses a large land mass, about one fifth the size of the United States. Six million Mongolians live outside of the country. Mongolia shares a border of approximately 2500 miles with China and an 1850-mile border with the Russian Far East.

⁶⁵ Located at: www.state.gov/www/background_notes/mongolia_0011_bgn.html

⁶⁶ Information concerning Japan's relationship with Mongolia can be found online at: www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mongolia/

⁶⁷ Information concerning the Mongolian-EU relationship is available online at: europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mongolia/intro/

⁶⁸ Bayar, 12.

It is landlocked, and therefore transportation agreements must be negotiated with its neighbors. Almost 90 percent of Mongolia is pasture, desert (the Gobi), or mountains. Most of the people living in Mongolia live in one of the three major cities: Ulaanbaatar, the capital (650,000); Darhan (90,000); and Erdenet (65,000). The primary industries are livestock and mining. In an effort to expand its industrial base and generate interest in the country and revenue for its continued modernization, the Mongolian government hopes to capitalize on a tourism industry. It has declared 2003, “the year of tourism in Mongolia.”⁶⁹



Figure 2. The Country of Mongolia⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The geographic information cited comes from a number of sources. One of the best found for general information can be found at: www.state.gov/www/background_notes/mongolia_0011_bgn.html.

⁷⁰ This map is available online at www.mongolianews.net/map.html

G. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The Prime Minister of Mongolia Nambaryn Enkhbayar recently stated on Mongolia's "Open Government" Website, "In the past 10 years of transition from central planning to a market economy and from an autocratic regime to a democratic one we have experienced significant problems, but also accomplished a great deal. However, much remains to be done, especially in the area to improve business climate in the country and facilitate an effective dialogue between policy makers and the people."⁷¹

In converting the economy from one of a centrally planned nature to a market economy the, "70 years of communist misrule by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which has left Mongolia economically backward and stagnant,"⁷² will have to be overcome. With China, Russia and the independent states of the former Soviet Union emerging as regional competitors, Mongolia will have serious challenges ahead. Its market size, limited resources, and lack of scientific knowledge and professional skills will make its modernization more difficult than its better-equipped neighbors. Furthermore, the situation in the former Soviet Republics is similar to the economic and political restructuring faced by Mongolia. As stated earlier, competition between these fifteen countries and Mongolia represents potential flashpoints for regional conflict. Most importantly, Mongolia may not, as yet be capable politically or militarily to handle a crisis alone, if one arose.⁷³

Change in Mongolia is necessary if it is to continue on its modernization journey. The Mongolian government has become a test case of the revolutionary measures it is now undertaking. Included among these is a complete transformation of the economy to a free market system and to a government that reflects this fresh start with new ideas. Voters have determined that their representatives, most born after 1960, will preside over a more open and democratic government.⁷⁴

⁷¹ The Prime Minister's comments and other information can be found at: opengovernment.mn/english/index.html

⁷² Milivojevic, 1.

⁷³ Background Notes, 11.

⁷⁴ Milivojevic, 22-23.

H. CONCLUSION: CREATING A NEW PARTNERSHIP

It has been said that Mongolia possesses one of the most strategic locations on Earth. In addressing this claim, the government has set as one of its primary foreign policy objectives the goal of keeping a good balance between its two neighbors. By setting up a strategic balance between Russia and China with either a strong partner like the United States or a coalition made up of some combination of the 140 countries that have opened diplomatic relations with it, Mongolia hopes to play balance of power deterrence in the region.⁷⁵ In this endeavor, U.S. engagement programs like the SPP are well suited. Using the citizen-soldier concept, modernizing and subordinating the military to civilian control can occur without unduly disturbing Chinese and Russian attitudes. Fears of a predominating U.S. effort will likewise be dispelled because the small footprint of SPP interaction. However, a potential misinterpretation of partnership actions could occur, depending upon how Russia or China perceived the relationship. In this regard, Mongolia's foreign policy concept states that:

Mongolia will not interfere in the disputes between its two neighboring countries unless the disputes affect Mongolia's national interests. It shall pursue a policy of refraining from joining any military alliance or grouping, allowing the use of its territory or airspace against any other country, and the stationing of foreign troops or weapons, including nuclear or any other type of mass destruction weapons in its territory.⁷⁶

Mongolia increasingly is participating as an active member of the international community, making its presence felt in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Ulaanbaatar has weighed in on nuclear proliferation by declaring itself a nuclear-Weapon-free-zone in 1998. Further, by virtue of its unique history as a Soviet satellite and an emerging democracy, Ulaanbaatar considers itself a stabilizing force on the Korean Peninsula, as it shares good diplomatic relations with both the North and the South.

Where it may seem that small states are being marginalized by the globalization of the world economy, Mongolia refuses to give in. Here again, an SPP relationship, as it matures, will foster economic ties that strengthen the Mongolian free market and reduce

⁷⁵ Found at: europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mongolia/intro/

⁷⁶ From "Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy," Online at: www.un.int/mongolia/fpguide.htm

its poverty in ways that could prove beneficial to the NEA region overall. Mongolia appears to be doing all the right things, both economically and diplomatically, for all the right reasons. The people are making their voices heard. The prediction here is optimistic for the continued success of its modernization and liberalization as the people of Mongolia embrace and pursue their destiny.

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V. CHINA'S ENCIRCLEMENT: ISSUES ON SECURITY AND STABILITY

This chapter could easily have been titled “the effects chapter” since the bulk of its content deals with Chinese reactions to various influences within its sphere of interest. The chapter explores the outcome of the 16th Party Congress and analyzes expectations of China’s continuing economic prosperity. PRC perceptions of Western engagement and most importantly, how the war on terrorism is shaping Sino-U.S. relations throughout the APR are assessed. American foreign policy with regard to China throughout the past decade has been one of ambiguity, not just in the U.S. position concerning Taiwan, but also in how past administrations have approached Sino-U.S. relations in general. This chapter addresses how Washington’s approach to China took on an appearance of engagement while still holding Beijing at arm’s length. These actions have prompted PRC accusations stating that U.S. policy seeks to contain China. Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross argue, “In the United States, China policy is a chronic political problem in a government divided both between president and Congress and along party lines, and Americans are debating over whether to ‘engage’ or ‘contain’ China.”⁷⁷ Recent activities in the Department of Defense, undertaken within the framework of combating terrorism, also have fueled China’s encirclement fears. The significance of these claims will be analyzed.

A. AWAKENING THE SLEEPING DRAGON

China is currently engaged in a period of transformation that promises to usher in major changes for the way the Communist Party governs. The 16th Party Congress has ended and the members of China’s fourth generation of leadership have been announced. The question to be assessed now concerns what effects to the country’s stability will result from these changes? Using the past two decades as a benchmark for predicting

⁷⁷ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 57.

how internal politics will evolve, this section addresses how Beijing will likely react to U.S. operations on its periphery and throughout the APR.

This chapter's judgments rest on the premise that China is continuing in a slow evolution of incremental political change, marked by sinicized democratic concepts and away from hard line socialism. Chairman Mao probably would have considered blasphemous terms used in Western literature to describe the political revolution that has been underway in China since the Deng years by adopted capitalist reforms that were redefined by *Deng Xiaoping Theory* into "socialism with Chinese characteristics." According to Joseph Kahn, who writes for the New York Times, "China's leaders are blurring the class distinctions they once considered sacred, perhaps jettisoning ideology altogether, in a race for relevance."⁷⁸

Politically, the CPC doesn't favor complete democratic transformation because open elections carry inherent risks to the party's retention of power. However, adopting individual democratic principles and playing "socialist reform" semantics, may pass Deng's proverbial "black cat, white cat" and "on time trains" tests. Democratic-styled elections for village-level posts were quietly implemented and eventually expanded throughout the countryside in 1988. This reform will not be embraced at the national level in the near future. Taiwan's example of how quickly democracy blossomed in the 1990s through agitation by a growing middle class has left a fearfully indelible mark on the CPC. As China cultivates its own nascent civil society and faces the great intangible question of how this group really views current socialist reforms, another revolution may be incubating. Jiang's *Three Represents* concept, having been enshrined along side *Mao Zedong Thought* and *Deng Xiaoping Theory* in the constitution, seeks to bring this entrepreneurial voice into the Party's fold.

Authors like James Webb who tend to take a hard-line view towards China believe that the theory of liberalization through engagement and free trade will not work with the PRC government. He believes that this optimistic view of transforming Chinese socialism into a new democracy is untested and may have the ultimate result of making American investors and business ventures the hostages of the PRC's true revolution in

⁷⁸ Joseph Kahn, "China's Communist Party, 'to Survive,' Opens Its Doors to Capitalists," *New York Times*, 4 Nov 2002, Sec. A, 10.

military affairs (RMA), an economic weapon. He warns that U.S. business interests should “see the danger of having exposed themselves to the unpredictable nature of an un-elected, authoritarian government.”⁷⁹

Within Jiang’s reorganized Politburo, only two members have significant military backgrounds, suggesting that unless Jiang could somehow retain control over the Central Military Commission (CMC), civil-military relations would have to evolve as well. Evidently believing it to be either the most prudent course to follow or, more likely, an attempt for Jiang to retain ultimate political control, an announcement was also made at the 16th Party Congress stating that Jiang would remain CMC head for the foreseeable future.⁸⁰ There is logic in this action, even if the appointment is only temporary. Jiang maintains the trust of the military. Retaining his authority will prove a calming force through the transfer of power to the fourth generation. The war on terrorism adds further justification for Jiang to reduce the number of moving parts within the transition process. It may also prevent Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian from interpreting CPC reorganization as a weakening in China’s resolve and consequently as an opportunity to declare independence. Jiang’s retention of his CMC post imparts a deterrent to Taiwanese action - Taipei knows his policies - and provides a voice of reason if the situation across the Straits sours. Presumably, it would also diminish any thoughts of military coup by a PLA that perceives weakness in the next generation’s leadership qualities. Jiang represents a base of stability, while Hu Jintao - presumed to eventually replace Jiang – could potentially bring democratic change to the military in the form of establishing true civilian supremacy over it. If Hu’s administration is greeted with respect by the military, and alters the PLA focus from party-centric to state-centric, a key door may eventually open for the United States to establish more meaningful military-to-military contact with Beijing. This opportunity would further expand if democratic reforms bloom.

⁷⁹ James Webb, “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 13, 2001. Accessed online at: www.jameswebb.com/Articles/wallstreetjrn/masteryinasia.htm

⁸⁰ Jiang’s supporters had continued to propose he stay on as CMC Chairman leading into the 16th Party Congress, ostensibly on grounds of ensuring continuity in foreign policy. However, speculation has it that if he persists as military chief beyond March, it will hamper Hu’s ability to shape foreign policy and could create dangerous uncertainty about who holds ultimate authority in a crisis.

B. REACTIONS

Determining how domestic politics will change as the 16th Party Congress adjourns is merely one step in predicting Chinese reaction to U.S. activities throughout Asia. Historical experience from past Western influence in the region and the levels of engagement now being considered by Washington both have relevance in how the PRC reacts to Western operations. A quick reflection from China's past brings back memories of British colonialism, Japanese imperialism, and perceived American hegemony, all marked by either attempts to carve up the "Middle Kingdom" or occupy it. Prior to September 11, 2001, China bristled about U.S. containment and Western hegemony throughout Asia, but at the same time it relied on this presence for regional stability. Nathan and Ross wrote that, "Barring an intensification of the U.S.-China conflict, Chinese leaders perceive the American presence in Asia as contributing to regional stability and Chinese security."⁸¹ Beijing, in response to continuing U.S. engagement and enlargement practices developed under the Clinton Administration, sought multilateral relations with ASEAN and Russia.

According to Ronald Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk in 1997, PLA analysts argued that the alliances the United States has in northeast Asia are products of the Cold War, represent outmoded thinking, and should be replaced with new models for regional security based on Sino-Russian security architecture, developed by the PLA. This new format stresses common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security. The bilateral alliances the United States cultivated in Asia are in the words of PLA analysts, "rapidly outliving their usefulness."⁸² PRC interpretations of the U.S. Defense Department concept of "shape, respond, and prepare now" were, in the words of Evan A. Feigenbaum, misconstrued to mean an aggressive military effort was being undertaken to extend U.S. strategic interests and preserve American hegemony.⁸³

⁸¹ Nathan, 79.

⁸² Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, "PLA Views on Asian Pacific Security in the 21st Century," *Strategic Forum*. Number 114. (June 1997). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum114.html

⁸³ Evan A. Feigenbaum, "China's Challenge to Pax Americana," *Washington Quarterly* 24:3 (Summer, 2001) 35.

China continues to harbor a paranoid fear of a resurgent Japanese military and accuses Washington of allowing Japan to rearm within the context of expanding the treaty to cover regional security. Feigenbaum pointed to a Chinese analytical contention that if alliances require targets, current formal treaties involving the United States and APR partners must be targeted at China with respect to its predicament over Taiwan.⁸⁴ Theater Missile Defense (TMD), if deployed in Japan or South Korea, would allow “Tokyo to shed its traditional role of shield to the U.S. sword and develop a sword of its own.”⁸⁵ Analyzing PRC criticisms of TMD and using predictions for the region’s future by John J. Mearsheimer, it is easy to extrapolate why Beijing fears this new defense system. He believes that if the U.S. were to withdraw from the APR, Japan would be the most likely candidate to fill the void left in regional security.⁸⁶ Not possessing nuclear weapons and banishing their presence on Japanese soil in the peace constitution leaves Tokyo without a viable offensive deterrent to match China’s growing ballistic missile arsenal. A proven TMD deployed in Japan would allow it a defensive deterrent that neutralizes China’s edge, while also keeping within the stipulations of the constitution.

From its own regional security assessments, China clearly spells out its suspicions and justifications for claims of American encroachment:

There are new negative developments in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States is further strengthening its military presence and bilateral military alliances in this region, advocating the development of the TMD system and planning to deploy it in East Asia. Japan has passed a bill relating to measures in the event of a situation in the areas surrounding Japan. All this goes against the tide of the times. Joint military exercises have increased in the region, to the detriment of trust between countries. The uncertain factors affecting security on the Korean Peninsula continue to exist, and the situation in South Asia remains unstable. Encroachments on China's sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea are not infrequent, and some extra-regional countries are attempting to interfere in this issue.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Ibid, 37.

⁸⁵ Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, 3. Quote credited to PLA analyst with a “rhetorical flourish.”

⁸⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 399.

⁸⁷ China’s “National Defense in 2000” *White Paper*. Online at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/32221.html#2

C. ASSESSMENTS AND PREDICTIONS

Given the ambiguous nature of U.S. relations with China, careful consideration of relationship building in this region is paramount to U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific. By applying color to a map of the APR (see Figure 3), shading the countries that are presently interacting in engagement activities with the United States (green) or are being courted (blue), Beijing's concerns gain validity. Add the presence of the U.S. Navy along the eastern China seaboard, through the straits of Southeast Asia and stretching across the entirety of the Pacific Ocean and it becomes readily apparent that China may have some justification in its accusations of American containment and encirclement.



Figure 3. An Encircled China?⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Map source from: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/asia_pol00.jpg. Modified and colored by author.

Increasingly, as the U.S. and its Western allies pursue the war on terrorism, more is being written that stresses these concerns. For example, *The Economist* stated:

Many Chinese strategists openly worry about what they regard as the encirclement of China by American power in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. American troops have been deployed in Central Asia, an area where China has been trying to expand its influence. America has also strengthened its defence relationships with Japan, the Philippines and China's close ally, Pakistan. "It is possible that the stationing of American troops in Central Asia will be prolonged. This could remould the strategic configuration of the area, presenting a challenge to China's security and strategic interests," says a Chinese researcher, Deng Ho, in *International Studies*, published by a government-sponsored think-tank.⁸⁹

This situation is also referred to by Barthelemy Courmont, a U.S. foreign policy expert at the French Institute of International and Strategic Relations, who accused Washington of "establishing an outright network of allied or friendly states in the region, which could have the result not only of encircling China, but also, and above all, of depriving it of its hegemony in Asia."⁹⁰ These accusations represent a pattern of thought that must be addressed if U.S. security and stability interests will continue to be served in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the conclusion of *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, John Mearsheimer discussed prospects for Chinese hegemony and how the U.S. will be affected should Beijing achieve its stated goal of quadrupling the current GNP by 2020.⁹¹ Claiming that China as regional hegemon represents "the most dangerous scenario,"⁹² Mearsheimer stated that developing this exercise to its logical conclusion has a great power China using its wealth and dominance to control Japan and South Korea while hanging out the "Yankee Go Home" sign to American influence in the APR.⁹³ Interpreting remarks made

⁸⁹ Unattributed, "Asia: China feels Encircled," *The Economist*. 363, (8 Jun 2002), 40.

⁹⁰ Barthelemy Courmont, "French Analyst: US Pursuing Containment Policy Toward China," (FBIS translation: EUP20020603000152, 3 June 2002, version 01).

⁹¹ See Jiang Zemin, "On the basis of optimizing structure and raising efficiency, we will strive to make our GDP in 2020 four times that in 2000 and make our integrated national strength and international competitiveness significantly stronger." From: "Full Text' of Report Delivered at Opening of 16th Party Congress," (FBIS translation: CPP20021110000049, 9 November 2002, version 01).

⁹² Mearsheimer, 401.

⁹³ Ibid, 401-2.

during an April 2002 trip to Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Jiang Zemin appeared to support China's growing desire to replace the U.S. as overseer of regional security stating that, "One of the primary issues for China is to protect developing countries from the pretensions of the United States."⁹⁴

What appears a slight irony in China's accusations of the United States is that Beijing continues a military buildup that it one day hopes will rival and push U.S. forces out of the region, assuming for itself the role of regional hegemonic protector. China claims it desires multilateral stability for Asia, while it predominately engages only in bilateral associations in the region. Two notable exceptions to this are Beijing's development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its involvement with various branch agencies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). PRC rhetoric, which speaks of regional cooperation and breaking down territorial tensions, conspicuously leaves out Taiwan, Tibet and Chinese claims in the Spratlys and Parasols. Mearsheimer stated, "It is certainly in China's best interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen."⁹⁵

While continuing to voice its concern over NATO expansion in the west and Japanese rearmament in the east, China, between April 1996 and June 2000, created the Shanghai Five, an organization of central Asian nations - China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - with regional and border security as well as military confidence-building as the organization's focus. Now termed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it appears that Beijing may have adopted a page from the NATO and SPP playbooks, transforming the SCO into a forum for mutual exchange of security, political, economic and trade issues. Citing China's *National Defense White Paper* released in 2000, the SCO is committed to:

Deepen cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic and trade, military, military technology and other fields to consolidate regional security and stability, and to effectively implement all the clauses of the agreements they have signed concerning confidence-building in the military field and the mutual reduction of military forces along the border areas. They have made it clear that they will never allow any country to

⁹⁴ Kerry Dumbaugh, "China-U.S. Relations," *Issue Brief for Congress*, July 17, 2002. Online at: www.fas.org/man/crs/IB98018.pdf.

⁹⁵ Mearsheimer, 402.

use their territory to conduct any activities detrimental to the sovereignty, security and public order of any of the five countries, and that they will support each other's efforts in safeguarding their national independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability.⁹⁶

The last part of this passage points to conflicts of interest among Central Asian states that currently participate in the SCO and also engage in Partnership activities with the U.S. supporting the war on international terrorism. Should the U.S. pursue long term basing, as has been suggested,⁹⁷ interpreting these charters may lead to increased tension should Beijing believe that U.S. intentions are other than its declared war on al Qaida. Echoes of these allegations have already surfaced as American forces continue to mass in Central Asia. Consider:

If the US is able to have its wish fulfilled of stationing troops in Central Asia, or controlling Central Asian nations, impelling them to join NATO, then China will truly be tested. If it is said that the incident of the embassy bombing and the aircraft collision incident were both probings between China and the US before a future conflict, then the US, after completing the strategic east-west encirclement of China, and with regard to carrying out the already determined policy of splitting China, will go from the strategic stage of promotion to entering the strategic stage of implementation.⁹⁸

A more optimistic perspective on how Beijing's regional security efforts and U.S. engagement programs like the PfP/SPP might interact in future engagements was suggested in a report on the SCO by Xu Tao, a deputy director and associate research fellow in the Eurasian Studies office of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations:

Various countries have actively taken part in transnational security activities with different composition characteristics and work focus, such as the "partnership for peace plan," the CIS collective security pact organization, and the central Asian alliance, in a bid to establish a multifulcra and multistructural international cooperation guarantee for

⁹⁶ China's "National Defense in 2000" *White Paper*.

⁹⁷ See statements by Thomas Barrett of the Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation in Nathan Hodge, "Pentagon Strategist: Central Asia Bases are Long-Term," *Defense Week*, (August 19, 2002), page 3. Online at: www.ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020819strategist.htm

⁹⁸ Yi Yangsheng, "US Military Presence in Central Asia Aimed at China, Not bin Laden," (FBIS translation: CCP 20011016000087, 16 October 2001, version 01).

guarding against aggression and harassment by terrorist, extremist and separatist forces.⁹⁹

In his 1994 Air War College thesis, Michael Dubie, argued that peacetime engagement programs represent a force multiplier that will pay national security dividends into the 21st century.¹⁰⁰ He may not have known at that time how prophetic these words would become in less than ten years after he had penned them. Following the September 11 attacks and in advance of the initiation of U.S. - Afghanistan hostilities, men and equipment deployed into central Asian countries, and previous strategic competitors began to cooperate with the drive to root out international terrorists, generated by President Bush's "you're either with us or against us" speech.

Another issue is whether the political approaches that the new CPC leadership inherited will continue to succeed. Juan Linz does not think so. In *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, he argues against the "one country-two systems" concept China initiated for Hong Kong in 1982, stating that within the overall framework of a totalitarian or post-totalitarian state, citizens of the larger unit see one region enjoying freedoms to which they do not have access.¹⁰¹ If the CPC can continue China's economic prosperity, larger sections of the country must begin to enjoy similar success to that of Hong Kong and Macao. A downturn in its economy or the failure to provide a comprehensive plan for supporting workers displaced by inefficient state owned enterprises (SOE) would ultimately lead to unrest or violence. Fear of spill-out from refugees fleeing an unstable China into SPP partner countries could quickly overwhelm their native populations. Jiang believes that the "three represents" theory will account for and accommodate this situation while still "holding high the banner" of Chinese socialism. How history will interpret future changes toward Chinese democratization is left to be determined.

⁹⁹ Xu Tao, "On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Under the New Situation." (FBIS translation: CCP20020709000142, 20 June 2002, version 01).

¹⁰⁰ Dubie, vi.

¹⁰¹ Juan Linz, 19.

D. CONCLUSION: IS THE THREAT REAL?

There is no apparent danger in maintaining an ambiguous foreign policy with Beijing. In the past, when isolated tensions have occurred, an atmosphere of status quo was preserved within the APR. Engagement practices were credited with allowing both the United States and China to prosper. So long as engagement program managers proceed with caution, this equilibrium, at least in the short term, is expected to remain. The greater question is how the war on terrorism will continue to broaden the scope of U.S. engagement along China's borders and what the fourth generation PRC leadership will do in response. Advantage within a framework of status quo has traditionally favored the defender of it.

A primary objective for regional organizers of U.S. engagement programs like the PfP/SPP should be to diffuse suspicion by clearly defining intentions of their programs and allaying fears that a Western encirclement is afoot. In explaining the program to the skeptical, it must be pointed out that the SPP is a small footprint operation designed not to escalate a U.S. presence but to encourage internal stability and interoperability. Out of these partnerships, participating governments can confidently further their own relationships with neighboring countries from a position of predictable constancy. Governments like China that engage PfP/SPP countries will be able to do so comfortable in the knowledge that interaction is with predictable neighbors and not Western trained loose cannons. As the SCO matures, this should become evident to Beijing, since four of the original members also maintain SPP relationships and Russia has recently been negotiating with NATO for limited engagement activities.

With regard to U.S. engagement with China, the rules become much stricter. Public law and State Department policy forbid or restrict many of the military-to-military benefits that present SPP partners expect and receive from their state relationships. Transparency and reciprocity are key issues that must be modified by the PRC if it were to desire a greater level of inclusion in U.S. engagement efforts than are currently prescribed by law. Chinese policymakers apparently are cognizant of these benefits as evident in China's *National Defense in 2000 White Paper*:

In May 1999, China postponed its high-level military exchange programs with the United States in response to the serious incident of bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the US-led NATO. Following the gradual improvement of the relations between the two countries, normal military contacts between China and the US have resumed. The defense ministries of the two countries held defense consultations at the vice-ministerial level in January 2000. The US defense secretary visited China in July of the same year. China has always attached importance to the development of military relations with European countries, and has exchanged or maintained high-level visits and conducted military exchanges with them at various levels.¹⁰²

Much of how Beijing views engagement actions on its borders and the continuing war on terrorism will shape Sino-U.S. relations for years to come. How the fourth generation leadership handles its inheritance of power and the associated list of national concerns will ultimately determine if China will continue its economic success and related to that prosperity, continued democratic reform.

It appears, if one accepts the situation presented by Nathan and Ross that Beijing needs Washington in the APR more than Washington needs Beijing, the U.S. position as a Pacific nation is stronger at present, politically, economically and militarily than China's capabilities to replace it as regional hegemon. Given Western interpretation of Beijing's current attitudes, it has been shown that this is not presently a desired course for the APR. This may change in the near future and U.S. policies, ambiguous or not, keep pace with China's new "Long March" toward rising from regional to world power.

¹⁰² China's "National Defense in 2000" *White Paper*.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main point of this research on the origins of Western engagement and the expansion into the APR was to demonstrate that actions taken by the United States in the name of engagement don't threaten China and increase regional security, stability and mutual prosperity. The key factors in gaining acceptance by the PRC of U.S. intentions include emphasizing the benefits to stability and economic activity through partnership, downplaying the military nature (specifically pointing to the fact that partnership underscores civilian control of the military), and pointing out that there is not a concerted effort to "gang up" or contain China through the SPP. The partnerships being created in the APR are truly bilateral in nature between the partner country and its paired state. These programs, while not individually threatening, when viewed collectively could conceivably represent containment in Chinese interpretation. How many such affiliations Beijing will tolerate along its borders before it reacts, and more importantly, *how it reacts*, remain unknowable at present. Therefore preemptive actions on the part of engagement program managers to reassure Chinese leaders of the benign nature of these relationships is critically important to their long term survival.

Change in China is underway. How much, how soon and by whom was the subject of speculation and guesswork prior to the 16th Party Congress. Answers have now been partially revealed in the personage of Hu Jintao and presumably under the watchful and still powerful Jiang Zemin. Three predictions appear plausible. If Beijing's stated goal of continued economic prosperity is to be realized, it must implement social and political reforms to keep pace with the economy or the entrepreneurs and the middle class will unleash what the Party fears most, urban unrest. Second, Jiang's successful bid to remain as CMC Chairman at least temporarily to insure a smooth handoff of the PLA to his successor will guarantee he continues to wield extensive power over China's near term political reforms. Third, the incremental changes that have already occurred foreshadow the next few years as the fourth generation fully takes the reigns of power and, barring the unpredictable, reform the Middle Kingdom in a gradual democratization pattern that will be fully realized by the time the fifth generation is ready to rule.

As change occurs within China, so also will the engagement programs introduced in the APR. The objectives of the SPP as discussed here can find value and importance in this region, Beijing could almost certainly benefit from them as well. Many authors have suggested that engagement with China would be prudent and beneficial to regional stability. Unquestionably, China's interests are currently not served by antagonizing Western power in Asia. It relies too heavily on American exports and the security the U.S. military brings to the region for its continued economic prosperity. It suspects that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the only reason Tokyo has not rebuilt its military machine. The PLA knows that it currently cannot replace the United States as a benevolent regional hegemon, if that truly has been a desired goal. The world has shifted from a dangerous place in the face of great powers squaring off with each other to a dangerous place in the shadowy depths of international terrorism. The first steps in any competition are to choose up sides and the world's players are now in the process of picking which team to join. As China's fourth generation leadership will soon be burdened with the difficult task of redefining its foreign policy with Washington, strategic partners in the war against terrorism has a much better ring than strategic peer competitors pitted against one another.

Mongolia was introduced as the next SPP partner through its historic rise from the ashes of the Soviet implosion. Currently, Mongolia enjoys healthy relationships with both stronger neighbors, but this calm may only be superficial. Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, a Naval Postgraduate School student from the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, believes that Mongolia is now more vulnerable than during the period when it fell under the Soviet's protective umbrella.¹⁰³ He believes that a shift in focus has occurred with the cooperation agreements Moscow and Beijing have been crafting since 1995, away from Mongolia as their lone regional buffer in favor of concentrating their efforts with or against Central Asian states that harbor Islamic terrorist interests. In light of the events following September 11, 2001, his concerns are not without merit and lend support to claims Ravden Bold made back in 1991, as Mongolia continued to shift its attention and cooperation beyond its two immediate neighbors.¹⁰⁴ In many ways,

¹⁰³ From his presentation and class discussion, NS4630, Naval Postgraduate School, September 17, 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Bold, 30.

Mongolia could still benefit from the support it lost when the U.S.S.R. collapsed. Some domestic factions may still long for the return of a benevolent authoritarian to again present their nation with a security blanket. Neither China nor Russia currently has this capacity, and neither has voiced a desire, to implement such power. The SPP relationship that Ulaanbaatar seeks can help provide the ingredients that support Mongolia's continuing democratic transformation and increase its confidence working as an actor on the international stage. The Mongolian SPP represents a perfect platform for properly implementing the lifecycle model and it holds the best promise for achieving Colonel Newton's greatest outcome, a civilian controlled military with a professional reserve component.

Finally, the SPP has begun to establish its foothold in the APR. As new nations are introduced and become partners, the program's goals expect it to evolve and grow to meet the special challenges of the region. Anticipation has it that the new Pacific model, once it becomes recognized within the APR, will catch on like it did in Europe in the 1990s. This will occur, not because a retreating superpower (the USSR) created a void in regional stability, but because terrorism has created a demand for greater assistance in meeting the new perceived void in regional security. Should engagement programs gain broad acceptance in the region, the critical shortcoming will be the "One State-One Partner" limitation. Managers may soon find themselves readdressing this constraint. The war on international terrorism will continue to shape the strategic environment and U.S. national interests will remain threatened by those who seek to limit or destroy Western democratic principles. Using the recommendations outlined in this research, program managers will inevitably find that this is not the end of the discussion, but merely a convenient pause. Engagement practices that promote peaceful coexistence, economic prosperity and civilian control over the monopoly of violence are essential to U.S. furtherance of its strategic goals.

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