Biodetection Architectures
Abstract
JASON considered the essential components and operation of an effective strategy for homeland biodefense based on technologies that are currently available or likely to become available within the next five years. It is not realistic to undertake a nationwide, blanket deployment of biosensors. This might be done for the detection of airborne anthrax, albeit at substantial cost. However, there are many possible bioterrorism agents and many possible ways in which they can be delivered. Instead, biosensors should be deployed in a focused manner as one component of a broader biodetection architecture that also includes information derived from intelligence gathering and medical surveillance. This information should be analyzed by a team of local experts who are familiar with local vulnerabilities, high-value targets, and environmental conditions. The local analysis team also should be responsible for directing an appropriate response in the event of a bioterrorism attack. They will be guided by a pre-established "playbook" that recommends particular responses for a particular set of circumstances, which will have been practiced and refined through staged exercises.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA411190
Entities
People
- Freeman Dyson
- Gerald F Joyce
- Henry Abarbanel
- Sidney Drell
- Steven Block
Organizations
- MITRE Corporation