Two-Sided Matching for the US Navy's Enlisted Detailing Process: A Comparison of Deferred Acceptance and Linear Programming Via Simulation

Abstract

Recent studies of 2-sided matching mechanisms have suggested potential benefits for implementation into the Navy enlisted assignment process. The proposed matching process improves the chance of commands and sailors being assigned to a party of choice. The same studies focused on a particular two-sided Deferred Acceptance (DA) matching algorithm which ensures stable matches, prevents "off-the-site" trades between the matching parties and upholds integrity of the matching system. Although stable matches are important in a voluntary labor market, the DA algorithm may still favor one party depending on whether the command or sailor biased form of the algorithm is used.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2002
Accession Number
ADA411324

Entities

People

  • Eng H. Low
  • Joshua H. Ho

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • California
  • Commerce
  • Computer Programming
  • Employment
  • Enlisted Personnel
  • Health Care
  • Hospitals
  • Labor
  • Labor Markets
  • Linear Programming
  • Naval Personnel
  • Probability Distributions
  • Simulations
  • Simulators
  • Spreadsheet Software
  • Students
  • Surveys

Readers

  • Applied Combinatorial Optimization and Logic Circuit Design.
  • Military Leadership and Professional Education.
  • Systems Analysis and Design