

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO FACILITATE FUTURE JOINT
OPERATIONS**

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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When we apportion forces to a Combatant Commander to fight in a theater of war, we give the commander forces from each of the services. When the combatant commander organizes the joint fighting force it is not done by service, instead it is organized by function. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is given responsibility of all ground forces (Army and Marine). The Joint Force Air Component Commander is given responsibility of all air assets (Air Force, Navy, and Marine). The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is given responsibilities of all naval forces (Navy and Marine). And finally, the Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander (JSOTF) has responsibility for all special operations forces in theater.

If this is how we organize to fight, then why not organize, train, and equip under the same structure? Why not establish functional service chiefs, staffs, and forces?

This paper looks at the direction and guidance we have been given by both our legislative and administrative branches of government, it then explores the transformational efforts of the individual services to meet those established guidelines, and finally, looks at how we can reorganize the Department of Defense to facilitate joint operations.

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REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO FACILITATE FUTURE JOINT OPERATIONS

“Without a doubt, the most important legacy of Goldwater-Nichols is its ability to focus the strengths of each Service together into a potent joint team. Jointness is the heart and soul of our operating style and with each passing year becomes even more a part of our institutional fabric and culture”.¹

—General Richard D. Myers, 2001

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 caused the most sweeping legislation related to the Department of Defense since the end of World War II and enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.² With an overarching objective of enhancing jointness (i.e. unifying the direction of the armed forces under joint doctrine and establishing policies for employment of multi-service military forces), the practical purpose was to improve war-fighting capabilities. Since 1986, Goldwater-Nichols has made tremendous changes in the way the Department of Defense operates; indeed, Joint Operations are now the norm.³ However, we still do not have a joint force. We have individual services, which have developed tactics, techniques, and procedures that allow them to function together. To become a fighting force that is indeed Joint we must organize, train, and equip in the same manner we intend to fight.

This paper will look at what direction and guidance we have been given by both our legislative and administrative branches of government. We will then look at the transformational efforts of the individual services to meet those established guidelines. Finally, we will look at how we could reorganize the Department of Defense to better facilitate joint combat operations.

CURRENT SITUATION

Before looking at how to reorganize the Department of Defense to function and fight as a joint force, we need to understand where we are now: What direction have we been provided by the legislative branch of our government, what guidance have we received from the current administration, and what paths have each of the service chiefs taken.

LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE

In the early 1980's many individuals from within the military, the Department of Defense, and the then current administration realized the military was having problems. The military's poor performance in Vietnam and subsequent bungled operations in Iran, Lebanon, and Grenada revealed that interservice rivalries were adversely affecting the military's ability to accomplish the simplest missions. Despite the objections of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Congress, which has the authority to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, took action to remedy the military's problems by passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.⁴ The guidance and direction of Goldwater-Nichols was codified in law in Title 10 of the United States Code (Title 10, USC).

Title 10, USC establishes the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the single military leader (subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense) responsible for assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense with the strategic direction of the armed forces, preparing strategic plans, conducting contingency planning, and advising on requirements, programs, and budget. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Joint Staff, with representatives from each branch of service. The Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Chairman in meeting the congressional purpose set forth in the last clause of Section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947: "To provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, operating under unified command, and integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces".⁵ Clearly, the intent of the updated code was to strengthen the position and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; improving his ability to coordinate service actions and ensure that our armed forces are organized to fight as a joint team in support of a unified combatant commander.

Numerous other requirements, which drive the Department of Defense toward more efficient and effective joint operations, levied on the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be found throughout Title 10, USC. First, The Secretary of Defense is required to submit to Congress an annual report on Joint Warfighting Experimentation. Specifically, the report addresses the reduction or elimination of redundant equipment and forces, including guidance regarding the synchronization of the fielding of advanced technologies among the armed forces to enable the development and execution of joint operational concepts.⁶ Second, The Secretary of Defense is required to establish a Joint Requirements Oversight Council with the assigned mission of identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy.⁷ And finally, once

every three years the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to submit a report containing recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the armed forces as they relate to the changing nature of the threats faced by the US, unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces, and changes in technology that can be applied to warfare.⁸

So, what does all of this mean? It means that the Congress has determined that the ability of our armed forces to organize, train, and fight as a joint force is important; important enough to establish laws directing the highest military authorities to move in the direction of a completely joint force. While we have made great progress toward operating jointly, there is still much which can be done.

CURRENT POLICY DIRECTION

Section IX of the current National Security Strategy of the United States, dated September 2002, directs the transformation of America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.⁹ The National Security Strategy highlights that our military institutions were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. The military services are structured to meet the Cold War threat. However, the Cold War is over, the threat has changed, and the President's intent is clear---restructure the force. In response to the President's National Security Strategy, the Joint Staff authored the National Military Strategy, 2002. In this strategy, the roles of the military are defined as: protect the United States, its interests and its allies; prevent conflict and unwarned attacks; and prevail against adversaries in a wide range of contingencies. In order to fulfill these roles, the military must achieve four national military objectives: defend the United States homeland, promote security and deter aggression, fight and win the nation's wars, and ensure military superiority. In the Chairman's Foreword to the Pre-Decisional Draft of the National Military Strategy, he states, "The execution of this strategy requires a broad range of joint capabilities resulting from the synergy of our air, land, sea, special operations, information operations, and space forces." He then establishes three priorities to guide the military. First, focus on winning the war on terrorism. Second, enhance joint warfighting capabilities. And finally, transform the forces to ensure military superiority.¹⁰

We have now established that both the legislative and the executive branches of our government want the military to focus on equipping, organizing, training, and fighting as a joint force. A close look at the direction each of our services is taking will reveal that they are in the process of transforming their services to function in a more joint manner.

CURRENT SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS

Title 10, USC provides for a Service Secretary for each of the three services (Army, Navy, Air Force). Each service secretary is similarly subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. They also are responsible for the efficient functioning of their service, the formulation of policies and programs fully consistent with national security objectives, and interestingly, charged to “effect cooperation and coordination between their service department and the other military departments to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication.”¹¹ (Note: the Marine Corps, to this point, is not regarded as a separate service, but falls under the Department of the Navy. However, from this point on, the Marine Corps is essentially staffed and organized as the other services.) Further, each of the services has a Service Staff, functioning under the direction of their Chief of Staff, in the case of both the Army and Air Force, and under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the case of the Navy and Marine Corps, respectively. Each of the military service chiefs is given a very broad mission in Title 10, USC. Each has, through the years, expanded on the direction provided by Title 10, USC in an attempt to keep their respective service current and in line with the changing direction and demands of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

Title 10, U.S. Code provides each of the individual service chiefs with a general direction in which they must take their service. With this very broad guidance in hand, the service chiefs then develop their strategies to guide their service from present day to some point in the future. The Army Transformation Campaign Plan, Navy Transformation Road Map, Marine Corps Strategy 21, and Air Force Transformation Flight Plan are the strategies that the current service chiefs are following to guide them and their forces as they prepare for the future. While it may seem that these are plans for the future, realize that the services are already in the process of implementing these strategies. A close look at these plans, along with all the other guidance provided, will show that the services are moving toward improving joint capability.

Army – According to current law, (Title 10, USC) it is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, its territories, commonwealths, possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; supporting national policies; implementing national objectives; and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. The Army shall be organized, trained,

and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. In general, the Army “includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport as may be organic.”¹² The Army mission, as defined and assigned by the Congress, is very vague and open to interpretation, leaving much room for creativity on the part of the Army Staff when developing service roles and missions.

Currently, Army Transformation is focusing on delivering land power capabilities to meet 21st Century strategic requirements. More specifically, the Army will need to be strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations. It must provide the nation with a force that is organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from Major Theater Wars through counter terrorism to Homeland Security.¹³ It is envisioned that Army units will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances, arriving at multiple points of entry, improved and unimproved. As necessary, units will conduct forcible entry operations, overwhelm enemy anti-access capabilities, and rapidly defeat the enemy. In order to accomplish this task, units must arrive immediately capable of conducting combined arms, air-ground operations, day or night in all terrain conditions, anywhere in the world. The Army will dominate land operations, providing the decisive complement to air, sea and space operations¹⁴. In other words, the Army is looking to redesign the force to allow it to be more deployable while maintaining the same level of combat effectiveness. It will do this through redesign of weapon platforms and through an increased reliance on improvements in Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capability.

The first unit to be organized, trained, and equipped based on the Army Transformation strategy is on the ground and will meet a full operational capability by June of this year. The fielding of this unit significantly improves the Army’s joint operational capability.

Navy – Consistent with the direction given the Army, according to Title 10, USC, the Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. However, instead of directing that the Navy have its own Navy Aviation, it goes on to provide that “naval aviation shall be integrated within the naval service as part of the overall Department of the Navy”.¹⁵ Leaving one to consider the possibility of combining Navy and Marine aviation, certainly questioning if that was the intent when the law was written.

That point aside for now, the Navy’s focus is on the sea, more specifically, control of the seas. In the late 1800s, Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent naval strategist wrote that the

ultimate defeat of an enemy can be brought about by denying him the use of the seas. Therefore, he argued, control of the seas through defeat of the enemy navy was required.¹⁶ The current Chief of Naval Operations is expanding the aspect of control of the seas to a new dimension with his vision of Naval Operations in the 21st century: "Sea Power 21".

Admiral Vern Clark (Chief of Naval Operations) defines Sea Power 21 as the transformational way to fulfill the Navy's enduring missions of sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward presence. Sea Power 21 is based on three fundamental concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.¹⁷ These three fundamental concepts will be linked by a C4ISR infrastructure and implemented through a global concept of operations.

The concept for Sea Basing is to build and deploy force packages somewhat similar to what the Navy and Marines are deploying today, but different. Today the Navy maintains a forward presence in multiple strategically important areas around the globe. They form carrier battle groups composed of a variety of ships, all centered on an aircraft carrier. These carrier battle groups, normally three at a time, deploy to different areas around the globe. Their purpose while deployed is to support the National Military Strategy (assure allies and friends, dissuade future military competition, deter threats and coercion against US interests, and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails). What better way to do this then to maneuver a large armada of ships off the coast of a friendly or unfriendly country, showing the American colors? At the same time, the Marines are doing virtually the same thing, except they are normally located in a different area to provide expanded coverage. In the case of the Marines, they form Marine Expeditionary Units with all of the equipment and personnel required to wage war. These units deploy to an area of operation and remain for approximately six months, periodically entering a port to resupply. In the event there is a requirement to take some sort of action to support our National Objectives the carrier battle group and the Marine Expeditionary Unit would rendezvous and commence mutually supporting operations.

The difference between today's operations and those envisioned in Sea Basing 21 is that the Navy and Marine assets will form up together in groups called Expeditionary Strike Forces. Because of increased technological advances in information gathering, intelligence collection and dissemination, weapons effects, and platform capability, these combined groups will be smaller in size than the previous combined groups. Therefore, they will be able to deploy more of them, covering more area. While increases in efficiency can be gained through technology, the number of personnel available is still limited. To overcome this, the forward deployed forces will not be fully manned, but will be full sets of equipment that can be manned

on short notice while at sea. This allows the Navy and Marines to geographically cover more area, while maintaining the ability to respond quickly to trouble spots around the globe. Additionally, the forward positioned ships will contain all required equipment and supplies, eliminating the need to rely on foreign ports or on additional strategic sea/air lift to maintain the fight.

To provide protection to the forces associated with Sea Base, the Navy envisions Sea Shield. The Sea Shield concept addresses protection of forward based assets, protection of theater deployed forces, and defense of the homeland in the same concept. Embedded within the expeditionary strike force are assets with the capability to collect information, conduct reconnaissance, and take action before the adversary can gain the initiative. This is accomplished with surface and sub-surface assets, all linked by a network that allows for the rapid formation of an intelligence picture of real time activities in an area. When indications of a potential problem exist, the capability to react is in position and the appropriate action is taken. Eliminating threats to the deployed force, before they can be brought to bear, decreases the need for defensive weapons and increases the availability of offensive weapons. For instance, defeating an adversary's attack aircraft while sitting on the runway reduces the need for aircraft to provide air defense to the expeditionary strike group, freeing those aircraft to conduct offensive strikes.

The outcome of the combined effects of Sea Base and Sea Shield is a well-protected, forward-based, combat-capable force. The concept of Sea Strike is to maximize the effectiveness of this force. Sea strike envisions linking precise, time sensitive intelligence with rapid planning processes, to tailor strike packages that deliver calibrated effects at precise times and places.¹⁸ No longer will the Navy sit off shore while the Marines take the beach, build up a logistic stockpile on the beach, and then begin the move in land to the objective. With advances in weapons and delivery systems, the Navy will now be able to take the fight directly to the objective through the use of both manned and unmanned delivery systems.

The Navy's concept for pulling Sea Base, Sea Shield, and Sea Strike together is ForceNet. ForceNet will integrate existing networks, sensors, and command and control systems to improve situational awareness, accelerate speed of decision, and effectively distribute combat power. Portions of the Navy's Sea Power 21 strategy have already been put into operation; other pieces are dependent on development of new technology. As this new technology is developed, it will be integrated into existing systems, but clearly the Navy is moving toward its goal of improving its joint operational capability.

Marine Corps – Like the Army and Navy, the Congress has established a function for the Marine Corps. However, unlike the other forces, Congress was very specific in the composition of the Marine Corps. Title 10, USC states, “the Marine Corps shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as required.” Title 10 further states, “the Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”¹⁹ Additionally, the Marine Corps is directed to provide an officer in the grade of Major General to supervise the staff responsibilities regarding all aspects of expeditionary warfare, including development of tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces during amphibious operations.²⁰

As a separate service within the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps' future strategy is closely tied to the Navy's. “Marine Corps Strategy 21” is constructed around the Marine Corps core competencies and ties directly to the Navy's Sea Power 21 strategy. Their core competencies demonstrate how the Marines Corps' strategy prepares them to deal with the future. The primary competencies are Ready to Fight and Win, Expeditionary Culture, Combined-Arms Operations, Task Organized, and Forcible Entry from the Sea.²¹

It is the intent of the Marine Corps to maintain its expeditionary culture; to remain forward deployed around the world, allowing them to be the first on the scene with the right equipment, ready to take action as required. These expeditionary units will be task organized as combined arms forces; integrated organizations consisting of air and ground units, each organized, trained, equipped, and deployed to fight as a team. When required, multiple units can be brought together to fight as a larger, more capable force, thus allowing the commander to tailor the force to meet the threat. Most of this is not new to the Marine Corps, but what is new is the method in which they envision this capability being utilized. In the past, marine and naval forces would arrive off the coast of a hostile country. They would begin forced entry operations to establish a base ashore. Once the base ashore was secured, they would begin the task of bringing ashore the equipment and supplies necessary to carry the fight to the enemy. Under the Corps' new strategy, all of the build up of supplies and equipment ashore would not be necessary. The necessary equipment to take the fight directly to the enemy would be configured aboard the naval vessels in such a manner to allow it to deploy directly to the fight. The Marine forces would deploy directly from the ships to the objective, what is referred to as Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM).²² With advances in technology, it is envisioned that

this type of maneuver could be carried out up to 300 miles inland, a significant increase in the Marine Corps force projection capability.

The Marine Corps does not have in place all of the required equipment to fully take advantage of their new operational concept, but they are well on the way to refining the tactics, techniques, and procedures required. The first demonstration of their capability to project force well inland was witnessed in Afghanistan in the early stages of the war on terrorism.

Air Force – Consistent with the manner in which the Army and Navy are structured Title 10, USC, directs the Air Force to organize, train, and equip primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.²³ Again, given fairly open latitude to interpret Title 10, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has developed a Service Vision that he believes will guide the Air Force from today to the future. Air Force Vision 2020 broadly outlines the goals for transformation of the Air Force. This vision highlights the core competencies that the Air Force must develop and field in order to maintain its position as the most dominate Air Force in the world. These core competencies include: Air and Space Superiority - the ability to control what moves through air and space to ensure freedom from attack and freedom to attack; Information Superiority - the ability to control and exploit information to our Nation's advantage to ensure decision dominance; Global Attack - the ability to engage adversary targets anywhere, anytime to hold any adversary at risk; Precision Engagement - the ability to deliver desired effects with minimal risk and collateral damage to deny sanctuary to the enemy; Rapid Global Mobility - the ability to rapidly position forces anywhere in the world to ensure unprecedented responsiveness; and Agile Combat Support - the ability to sustain flexible and efficient combat operations.²⁴

The key concepts of operation supported by these core competencies highlight that the Air Force intends to become expeditionary in nature, allowing for global coverage while maintaining the majority of its assets home stationed in the United States. This meets the requirement to provide Joint Force Commanders with ready and complete force packages that can be tailored to meet the full spectrum of contingencies. The first of these force packages is the Global Strike Task Forces that combines stealth, standoff, and precision to create the conditions for access and can rapidly respond to areas where an enemy could attempt to deny access. Once access is gained and airfields are secured the Air Force will establish an in theater presence from which it can better support the joint force. The second type of force package is the Global Mobility Task Force; organized with the capabilities necessary to provide rapid and effective air mobility support to theater combatant commanders during contingencies. The final type Task Force is the Nuclear Response Task Force that provides safe, reliable, and proficient nuclear forces. These forces provide the deterrent umbrella under which conventional

forces operate and, if deterrence fails, will be prepared to execute a variety of nuclear attack options.²⁵

Leaning forward where they can, the Air Force has already taken steps to implement its transformation plan. They have restructured their air wings into Air Expeditionary Forces and working with the new technology as fast as it can be developed. The airframes that are the backbone of the transformed Air Force are already beyond the design stage and into the flight-testing process.

THE PROBLEM

While each of the service strategies is sound and moving toward working in a Joint environment, we are still organized by service. There has been no attempt to move from separate services, capable of working together, to services organized by function. As we are organized now, our military currently consists of the largest surface and sub-surface naval fleet in the world, the most technologically advanced army in the world, the largest and most technologically advanced air force in the world, and the most proficient and powerful marine amphibious force in the world. The capabilities existing within this current force include two forced entry capable forces, two mechanized ground combat forces, two air superiority capable forces, three close air support capable forces, three special operations forces, and four different C4I systems. There is great capability embedded in each of the services, however, we have done little to reduce the redundancies and take advantage of the synergies.

Forced Entry Forces— Both the Marine Corps and the Army maintain a forced entry capability. The Marine Corps' divisions each consist of up to three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) that are organized to fight as individual or as a combined Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Each MEU maintains the capability to conduct forced entry operations either through amphibious attack over the beach to secure a beachhead or port or by helicopter assault to secure a foothold in land. Under their new doctrine, the Marine Corps plans to expand this capability with their Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) as explained earlier. Meanwhile, the Army has had, and continues to maintain, its forced entry capable forces, specifically the Airborne and Air Assault Divisions. The 82d Airborne Division provides for forced entry operations through parachute assault allowing the Army to deploy a Division size force from the continental United States to anywhere in the world to secure an airfield to support follow-on ground combat operations. The Army also maintains the ability to conduct helicopter assault operations with the 101st Air Airborne (Air Assault) Division. This division maintains the capability to forward base its helicopter assets at an Intermediate Staging Base and then

launching a forced entry air assault operation to secure terrain and facilitate future operations. This is a duplication of capability that is expensive to maintain and is seldom fully utilized.

Mechanized Ground Combat Forces– As a part of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force the Marines maintain a mechanized ground combat capability. Once a port or beachhead is established, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force has the capability to introduce additional ground forces with which they can continue the fight. These additional ground forces are equipped with the M1A2 main battle tank (the same main battle tank that the Army maintains in its heavy divisions) and the Light Amphibious Assault Vehicle (LAV). The LAV is a lightly armored wheeled vehicle used for providing protection and mobility to ground combat forces (similar in function and capability to the Army's M2 infantry fighting vehicle). At the same time, the Army maintains 6 heavy divisions. These divisions are equipped with the M1A2 main battle tank and the M2 infantry-fighting vehicle. Their mission is sustained ground combat operations. Again, a duplication of capability that is expensive to maintain.

Air Superiority Forces– Both the Navy and the Air Force maintain aircraft that give them the capability to conduct offensive and defensive counter air operations, or in other words, the capability to gain and maintain air superiority. In the case of the Navy, these are carrier based aviation assets primarily assigned the mission of protecting Naval assets as they transit the seas and conduct operations. In the case of the Air Force, these are assets that begin operations from air bases outside the area of operation and once an airfield is secure will continue operations from within theater. Their mission is to give both friendly air and ground forces the freedom to maneuver without the threat of attack from enemy air assets. Based on current transformation plans, it can be argued that both of these capabilities are required, but we must look at where changes can be made to gain some efficiency.

Close Air Support Forces– The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each maintains fixed wing aviation assets capable of providing aerial fires in support of ground forces. In the case of the Navy, these are air assets that can be used for dual roles. They can be used as air platforms to attack an enemy inland by use of aerial bombing or they can be used to provide fires in support of ground forces in close combat. The same is true for the Air Force. They have single role aircraft, specifically designed for support of ground forces. However, they are moving to dual role aircraft that can do both, support ground forces or drop bombs in support of the aerial interdiction mission. In addition to these forces, the Marine Corps maintains fixed wing aviation assets that are a part of their Marine Air-Ground Task Force. These assets are used to support Marine forces engaged in ground combat operations. A close examination of

the roles and missions of each of these air fleets will likely reveal potential efficiencies to be gained by eliminating at least one of these forces.

Special Operations Forces– Currently, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all have Special Operations Forces. Each of the three services train and equip their special operations forces to conduct operations specific to their services. The Army's Special Operations Forces are specifically trained and equipped to conduct special operations ground missions. The Navy's Special Operations Forces are trained to operate from the sea, the littoral, and riverine environments. The Air Force Special Operations Forces train and operate fixed and rotary wing aircraft in support of special operations ground forces. Even though each of the services has their own unique special operations force, they all currently operate at the direction of the Commander, Special Operations Command. In support of Commander, Special Operations Command all service special operations forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish assigned roles in 9 principle mission areas. Not necessarily duplicate capability, but certainly one that could be further combined to gain some efficiency and eliminate redundancy.

Service Support Efforts– All four services maintain their own supply, service, and logistics capability. While most of the commodities provided are common to all services, each service still maintains its own system. Water, food, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and medical supplies are all commodities that each of the services maintains the capability of providing to their forces. Better than 90% of these commodities are the same, regardless of the service, which is clearly, a duplication of effort.

C4I Systems– Each service, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps has developed and operates its own unique Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence system. While some of the equipment within these systems is common and can be linked together to share data, the lash-ups are work arounds. This equipment was designed around different requirements and to different specifications making the systems almost impossible to operate jointly.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION

Today, when we apportion forces to a Combatant Commander to fight in a particular theater of war, we give the commander forces from each of the services. When the combatant commander organizes the joint fighting force it is not done by service, instead it is organized by function. When we fight as a joint force we organize by function and establish functional command relationships. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is given

responsibility of all ground forces (Army and Marine). The Joint Force Air Component Commander is given responsibility of all air assets (Air Force, Navy, and Marine). The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is given responsibilities of all naval forces (Navy and Marine). And finally, the Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander (JSOTF) has responsibility for all special operations forces in theater.

If this is how we organize to fight, then why not organize, train, and equip under the same structure? Why not establish functional service chiefs, staffs, and forces? More clearly aligning each of the services with responsibility for a distinct functional area should eliminate duplicate capabilities, foster service cooperation, and enable us to function as a joint force. As an additional benefit, this reorganization could free up some portion of each of the services to take on future missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are numerous ways to reorganize the current force structure by function. I will only attempt to highlight some changes that could be made in conjunction with the current service transformation plans.

Department of Defense - Reorganize the upper echelon of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is the head of the Department of Defense and answers directly to the President of the United States, as the Commander in Chief. Under the Secretary of Defense there could be two chains of command, one for "Force Utilizers" (Combatant Commanders) and one for "Force Providers" (functionally oriented Service Chiefs).

The Department of Defense chain of command for the "Force Utilizer" would run from the Secretary of Defense directly to each of the geographical combatant commanders. There would be six geographical combatant commanders, each responsible for a portion of the globe (See Fig 1). Each combatant commander would have a planning and intelligence staff capable of maintaining situational awareness of their assigned region. In the event of potential conflict or any other requirement to introduce forces into the combatant commanders area of responsibility, forces would be apportioned from the Force Providers (just as it is currently done).

COMBATANT COMMANDERS (FORCE UTILIZER)




FIGURE 1. COMBATANT COMMANDERS (FORCE UTILIZER)

The structure for Force Providers would be made up of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs. As the force providers, the Joint Chiefs would be realigned under key functional capabilities. Each Chief of Staff subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their service, the efficient functioning of their service, and the formulation of policies and programs fully consistent with national military strategy objectives. There would be seven functional Chiefs of Staff (See Fig 2). The first four of these are the current service chiefs reorganized with a different force structure and mission. The remaining three are functional combatant commanders that would be realigned as functional chiefs in a role of force provider.

JOINT CHIEFS (FORCE PROVIDERS)




FIGURE 2. JOINT CHIEFS (FORCE PROVIDERS)

Some of the steps taken to reorganize the current services into functional services are as follows:

Early/Forced Entry Forces- Re-designate the Marine Corps as the Department of Defense Early/Forced Entry Force. Expand on "Marine Corps Strategy 21" and assign the

Marine Corps complete responsibility for forced entry operations. In accordance with their current strategy, they have and plan to maintain a forced entry capability. In conjunction with the Navy's "Sea Base 21" strategy, Marine forces and equipment will be forward positioned and capable of responding around the globe. Additionally, migrate the Airborne forced entry capability from the Army to the Marine Corps to give them the full capability to conduct forced entry operations and allow the Army to provide its full attention to ground combat. Once the Marines have established entry points (ports and airfields) into the theater of operations, the more substantial ground forces of the Army could arrive by air and sea. Once relieved, the Marine forces could re-embark and prepare for follow-on missions.

Ground Combat Forces - Designate the Army as the Department of Defense Ground Combat Force, responsible for all ground combat operations. In concert with the Army's current transformation, focus this force structure on medium to heavy maneuver ground forces. As currently envisioned, these forces and their equipment will be designed and organized to allow for deployment of personnel by strategic airlift to link up with equipment in forward based stocks and on maritime pre-positioned ships. Once personnel and equipment are joined, they can be moved into theater by ground movement, intra-theater airlift, or through the use of fast sealift ships.

Naval Superiority Forces - With little exception, the Navy would remain unchanged and would become the Department of Defense Naval Superiority Force. Expanding the Navy's "Sea Base 21" concept to allow for the maritime pre-positioning of army equipment, as well as the equipment of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will facilitate the deployment of all ground combat forces.

Air Superiority Forces - Designate the Air Force as the Department of Defense Air Superiority Force. Again, little will change in the current Air Force's missions. However, it would remain important to clearly define which service has responsibility for gaining and maintaining air superiority and control of air assets during the different phases of the fight. Naval air should have responsibility for coverage of the fleet and for Marine forces while ashore, thus relieving the Marine Corps of the requirement to maintain fixed wing aircraft. The Air Force should provide air coverage once in-theater air bases are established and Army ground forces are introduced, realizing that the Navy will always remain in control of assets required to protect the fleet.

Special Operations Forces - Combine all Special Operating Forces (SOF) under one service and do away with each of the service specific special operating forces. Move this function from the combatant command structure into the force provider chain of command. The

Chief of Special Operations Forces would be responsible for providing SOF forces to all geographic combatant commanders as needed.

C4ISR Forces - Establish a new service responsible for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). This new service would have responsibility for all Department of Defense intelligence assets, most space-based intelligence collection assets, all space and ground communications assets, and for providing standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. This structure would ensure a complete integration of all intelligence data, fully networked (compatible) communications capability, and a trained and ready command structure capable of deploying and operating immediately upon arriving in theater. Some of the assets to perform this mission would come from each of the current services and some would come from the current Commander Strategic Command.

Defense Logistics Forces - The final functional chief would be the Chief of Defense Logistics. Comparable with today's Defense Logistics Agency, the Chief of Defense Logistics would be responsible for all of the logistics requirements of all of the services. All classes of supply would be organized, maintained, and controlled by this single service; ensuring commonality when ever possible.

SUMMARY

The consolidation of all services into functional groupings - Land Component, Air Component, Naval Component, and Special Operations Component - along with the creation of a Forced Entry Component, C4ISR Component, and a Logistics Component are but a few of the potential changes that can be made to reorganize the Department of Defense along functional lines instead of the current service lines. With this type of structure, the Combatant Commander will be able to select the desired type and size of force necessary to tackle any mission, no matter what region or the level of conflict. Some of these proposed changes create other problems (i.e. what to do about Transportation Command and Joint Forces Command?) that will have to be worked out, but these are a step in the right direction.

CONCLUSION

The legislative and administrative branches of our government have made it clear that we must transform our services to meet the challenges of the future. Evidence indicates that each of the services is indeed transforming to meet those future challenges. The only remaining stumbling block to success is the overall reorganization of the Department of Defense.

The successful reorganization of the Department of Defense lies in our ability to restructure the services along functional capabilities resulting in a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance across the entire range of military operations. This joint force will have the ability to strike with precision from long distances and at the same time have the capability to introduce and sustain ground maneuver forces capable of closing with and destroying the enemy.

None of these changes will be possible with the current mindset. The reorganization of the Department of Defense will take major changes, foremost of which will be a change of service attitudes. While each service will give up some of its traditional roles and missions, these changes will allow for economies of force and should lead to a force that is better prepared for future contingencies.

WORD COUNT = 6,891

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